



Strategic Studies Institute



THE PEACE PROCESS,
PHASE ONE:
Past Accomplishments,
Future Concerns

Edited by
Stephen C. Pelletiere

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


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
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**Stephen C. Pelletiere
Editor**

January 3, 1997



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FOREWORD

This report grew out of a conference on the Mideast Peace Process that the Strategic Studies Institute held with North Georgia College at the latter's Dahlonega, Georgia, campus in March 1996. At the time of the conference, Israel's Prime Minister Itzak Rabin had already been assassinated, and his successor, Shimon Peres, had called for new elections.

Almost all of the participants at the conference felt confident there would be a peace settlement before October 1996. This was a confidence built on the widely held conviction that, with so many powerful players calling for peace, it must come. Instead, the Israeli referendum on peace—as Peres dubbed the elections—turned out to be a victory for Israel's Likud Party, whose leader, Benyamin Netanyahu, had repudiated many of the provisions of the agreements reached to that time.

It is not known what course the peace process will take or even if it will continue. There is a danger, despite the best efforts of the United States and the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian talks, that we will see a period marked by political stalemate, likely accompanied by increasing violence.

The three essays which follow, however, take stock of several key aspects of what can now be considered the first phase of the Mideast Peace Process (i.e., that period from the 1991 Madrid Conference to the 1996 Israeli election).


In the first essay, Alfred B. Prados examines the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement, which vies with the Israeli-Palestinian accords as the most positive development of the first phase. Prados outlines the history and terms of this landmark agreement. His concluding observations about the risks King Hussein has taken are even more salient in today's context.

Next, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen H. Gotowicki assesses in detail the issue of deploying U.S. troops on the Golan Heights. Recent Israeli and Syrian statements seem to have doomed any near term Golan arrangement (and hence an Israeli-Syrian settlement). However, should the peace process with Syria suddenly resume, expectations of the United States

could be even greater, and a U.S. Army peacekeeping mission would become the topic of intense debate in Washington.

Finally, Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere's study of Operation GRAPES OF WRATH looks at possible Israeli and Syrian motives underlying the violent exchanges in April 1996 in southern Lebanon. His analysis does not augur well for what lies ahead on the peace front. U.S. policymakers must move quickly to exploit—or at least to try to control—developments in the Syria-Lebanon tangle of relations.

These three essays, then, illuminate different pieces—Jordan, the Golan, Lebanon—of the large tapestry of a peace process whose final dimensions are not clear, or, for that matter, certain of completion. What is clear are the high stakes for U.S. diplomacy and national security interests attendant on the outcome.



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JORDAN AND THE PEACE PROCESS

Alfred B. Prados

Since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, Jordan has been the linchpin in long-standing efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Among Arab states, Jordan has the longest border with Israel and hosts the largest number of displaced Palestinians. Until 1967, Jordan governed the principal portion of pre-1948 Palestine that remained in Arab hands after the 1948 war, namely the West Bank territory including eastern Jerusalem. Jordan lost the West Bank to Israel in 1967, and King Hussein formally severed Jordan's administrative ties to the West Bank in 1988; however, in practice, the future of Jordan and the fate of the Palestinian community have remained closely linked.

This linkage between Jordan and the Palestinian community has seriously circumscribed King Hussein's freedom of maneuver in negotiating with Israel. The king has always felt a special responsibility toward his Palestinian subjects and toward the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem, some of which he continued to administer even after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. With more than half of his population of Palestinian origin, the king has had to measure any concession he might offer Israel against the weight of public opinion in Jordan. To a large degree, Jordanian steps toward negotiation with Israel have had to move in tandem with the Palestinian leadership.

The problem for King Hussein has been compounded by the vulnerabilities of Jordan's geographic position sandwiched between Israel and the neighboring Arab states of Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Syria and Iraq, governed by left-leaning socialist regimes sometimes hostile to Jordan, have opposed negotiations with Israel in the past, at least on terms the latter would be likely to accept. Both Arab states have mounted direct military threats to Jordan

on previous occasions. Saudi Arabia, a source of much needed financial support to Jordan in the past, has not opposed negotiations in principle but does not countenance separate peace arrangements and is sensitive to any settlement that might forfeit Muslim interests in Jerusalem. Hussein, on his part, is well aware that he is surrounded by militarily stronger neighbors and that his economy heavily depends on foreign aid. Consequently, he has had to avoid actions that would unduly provoke Israel on the one hand, and policies that appeared to stray too far from the Arab consensus on the other.

With these constraints, it is remarkable that Jordan has emerged as the second Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Even more remarkable is King Hussein's determination to build a "warm peace" with Israel in contrast to the chilly relations that have prevailed between Israel and Egypt since the conclusion of their peace treaty in 1979. To do this, the king will have to harness a somewhat reluctant Jordanian public, withstand likely criticism (and possibly more active opposition) from Syria and several other regional states, and perhaps deal with a future Israeli government less inclined to accommodate Jordanian and other Arab concerns. King Hussein's ability to achieve this goal may be the ultimate test of his skill in governing a small but sometimes fractious kingdom and maintaining its security in an unfamiliar and changing environment.

A brief summary of Jordanian involvement in the Arab-Israeli peacemaking process may shed some light on the development of Jordanian-Israeli relations in the years ahead. The story of Jordan's role encompasses several phases, which will be covered below: the early—and largely abortive—history of peace efforts between Israel and Jordan; a 2-year negotiating process under a U.S.-Russian sponsored process that began in 1991; the rapid conclusion of bilateral agreements in 1993 and 1994; and the process of establishing normal relations between Jordan and Israel, arguably the most intricate and demanding task facing Jordan's leaders.

Early Peace Efforts.

Direct, open Jordanian negotiations with Israel are of recent vintage, beginning in 1991 with Jordan's acceptance of the negotiating framework proposed by then U.S. President George Bush. Jordanian involvement in peace moves, however, is as old as the Arab-Israeli conflict itself. Even before the initial Arab-Israeli war in 1948, Jordan's founder, King Abdullah, had contacts with Israeli emissary (later prime minister) Golda Meir in an unsuccessful effort to head off the impending conflict. According to unofficial reports, King Hussein (King Abdullah's grandson, who acceded to the throne in May 1953) had private contacts with Israeli leaders long before public negotiations began in 1991.¹ For the first 38 years of Hussein's reign, domestic and regional considerations precluded a direct negotiating forum between Jordan and Israel. Nonetheless, this period witnessed some significant indirect steps along the road to formal negotiations between the two countries.

Israel's territorial gains in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, including its occupation of the West Bank territory which Jordan had governed since 1948, created a new set of conditions that have formed the backdrop for subsequent developments in Arab-Israeli affairs. United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, which stipulated return of occupied territories in exchange for peace and mutual recognition, provided a framework for subsequent Arab-Israeli negotiations. Jordan, like Egypt, accepted the resolution in the context of a comprehensive peace but dismissed any proposals for a separate peace with Israel as "neither possible nor sensible."² Until 1993, a two-fold principle formed the cornerstone of Jordan's position on Arab-Israeli negotiations—acceptance of a peace agreement based on the return of Arab territories occupied by Israel, but only as part of a comprehensive settlement accepted by all parties including the Palestinians.

Jordan was prepared to press the envelope of these constraints in an effort to find negotiating opportunities with Israel, sometimes at the risk of domestic and regional

opposition. Between September 1970 and July 1971, the Jordan Armed Forces suppressed armed Palestinian guerrillas who for 3 years had launched cross-border raids against Israel and defied Jordanian governmental authority. In taking this step, King Hussein reestablished a quiet border with Israel, but his actions were widely decried in the Arab world and the Palestinian community. In 1972, he presented a proposal for a "Unified Arab Kingdom," which would consist of two loosely federated states, the Jordanian East Bank and the Palestinian West Bank, under the central authority of the Hashemite monarchy. This proposal, which largely would have restored the situation that existed before 1967, was not acceptable to Israel and was condemned by Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In 1982 the king praised U.S. President Ronald Reagan's plan for Arab-Israeli negotiations as "positive" and "constructive,"³ and in February 1985 he reached tentative agreement with PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat on a joint negotiating strategy with Israel. Syria and several radical Palestinian organizations condemned the Hussein-Arafat agreement as a U.S.-Israeli inspired plot, and it collapsed a year later.⁴

With rare exceptions, however, Hussein has not been prepared to abandon the Arab consensus in pursuing negotiations with Israel. In November 1994, at an Arab summit conference held in Rabat, Morocco, the king reluctantly endorsed the decision of the conferees to recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, thereby weakening Jordan's ability to negotiate Palestinian and West Bank issues.⁵ Demonstrating once again his opposition to separate peace arrangements, King Hussein joined most other Arab leaders in condemning the 1978 Camp David Accords, which led to a bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel. Camp David also envisioned a role for Jordan and Egypt in a proposal for Palestinian autonomy, which Hussein and other Arabs viewed as deficient in meeting Palestinian aspirations. In 1988, acceding to "the PLO's desire and the general Arab orientation" for Palestinian self-determination, King Hussein announced the disengagement of Jordan from the

West Bank.⁶ Finally, Jordan's growing rapprochement with Iraq in the 1980s, though mainly related to economic considerations and mutual concerns over Iran, had the effect of increasing Jordanian tensions with Israel and associating King Hussein indirectly with the strident anti-Israeli posture adopted by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on the eve of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

The Gulf and Its Aftershocks.

Jordan's refusal to join the allied coalition after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its sympathetic posture toward Iraq resulted in one of the most serious crises in the country's history. Though popular among Jordanians (especially those of Palestinian origin) and supported by public opinion in many parts of the Middle East, King Hussein's perceived tilt toward Iraq alienated important allies in the Arab world and the West. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states terminated subsidies to Jordan (running at approximately \$450 to \$500 million) and expelled over 300,000 Jordanian expatriate workers, who consequently were no longer able to send back a portion of their earnings to Jordan, creating yet another burden on the Jordanian economy. Tourism, which provided approximately \$500 million in 1989, virtually disappeared. Politically, Jordan was shunned not only by the Gulf states but by several other Arab members of the allied coalition, notably Egypt. The United States, angered by Jordan's stand, suspended a total of \$105 million in economic and military assistance to it during fiscal years 1991 and 1992 although these funds were gradually released in 1993.

With the defeat of Iraq, Jordan had two principal options in seeking to restore relationships injured by the Gulf crisis: a clear-cut reversal of its former support for Iraq or a revival of previous Arab-Israeli peacemaking endeavors. The two approaches were not necessarily mutually exclusive, and, in fact, King Hussein has pursued both of them, albeit at different paces, since 1991. An immediate Jordanian move to sever relations with Iraq, however, was economically

unfeasible at the time in view of the many commercial links that remained between the two countries; among other things, Jordan continued to depend on Iraq to meet its oil needs of 60,000-75,000 barrels per day since Saudi Arabia had cut off oil supply to Jordan. The other option, cooperation in peacemaking with Israel, offered no immediate prospects of an improvement in Jordanian relations with Gulf states, but it would be welcomed in the United States, which recognized that Jordanian participation was essential in seeking resolution of several core Arab-Israeli issues, notably the Palestinian problem.

Bilateral Talks and Agreements.

In the summer of 1991, a major Arab-Israeli peacemaking initiative designed by then U.S. President George Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker provided Jordan with an avenue of escape from its diplomatic and economic isolation. Even before President Bush and then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev issued a joint invitation to an international peace conference, King Hussein informally signalled Jordan's willingness to attend.⁷ Even more important than this early acceptance was King Hussein's offer to facilitate the negotiating process by providing an "umbrella" for a Palestinian delegation in the form of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian team (the only format acceptable to Israel at that time for inclusion of Palestinian representatives). This formula of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was maintained during two years of bilateral negotiations that followed the opening conference held in Madrid on October 30, 1991. As time went on, however, the Jordanian and Palestinian components of the delegation began to conduct their meetings with Israelis in a separate format. Meanwhile, secret contacts between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators outside the framework of the U.S.-Russian sponsored bilateral talks led to the landmark Declaration of Principles signed by then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat in Washington on September 13, 1993.

The historic Israeli-Palestinian agreement caught King Hussein by surprise and confronted him with an altered set of circumstances. At first, he expressed irritation that Jordan had not been consulted, particularly in view of Jordan's efforts to coordinate its peacemaking activities with the Palestinians. He seems to have realized quickly, however, that this unexpected development provided him with unprecedented opportunities: first, his peacemaking strategy need be encumbered no longer with the burden of supervising a joint Jordanian-Palestinian effort; and second, the unprecedented recognition of the state of Israel by Arafat gave Jordan essential political cover to pursue its own moves with Israel. In addition, the king seems to have realized that further progress in peacemaking might help unlock doors to international economic assistance. Although the United States had released previously suspended aid funds to Jordan by mid-1993, the country faced a debt of over \$7 billion (almost twice Jordan's gross domestic product) with no outlook for continued aid at a significant level. These considerations imparted fresh momentum to Jordanian-Israeli talks which subsequently resulted in three milestone agreements.

The Common Agenda. The first Jordanian-Israeli agreement was already in the making by the time Arafat and the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin met on the White House lawn. In actuality, by late 1992 Jordanian and Israeli negotiators had drafted an agenda and formed five working groups to deal with principal bilateral issues. On September 14, the day after the Israelis and Palestinians signed their declaration, the heads of the Jordanian and Israeli delegations with much less fanfare signed their so-called "common agenda," which listed issues to be addressed by both sides with the goal of achieving a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace among the Arab states, the Palestinians, and Israel as per the Madrid invitation. Shortly afterward, in the the highest level official contact between the two countries so far, Jordan's Crown Prince Hassan met with then Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres in Washington on October 1 and agreed with their

U.S. hosts on the formation of a tripartite commission to discuss economic cooperation.

The Non-Belligerency Declaration. Once again, progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track coupled with prospects of economic benefits to Jordan gave added impetus to Israeli-Jordanian negotiations. On May 4, 1994, Israeli and Palestinian representatives reached agreement on the terms of a Palestinian self-rule regime to begin in Gaza and Jericho. During the following month, U.S. President Clinton promised King Hussein that he would work to obtain debt relief for Jordan, presumably in recognition of Jordan's peacemaking role. Concurrently with these developments, there was an increase in the frequency and level of Jordanian-Israeli contacts. On July 9, King Hussein stated in a speech to the Jordanian parliament that he was ready to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin if such a meeting would advance the interests of Jordan. Six days later, President Clinton announced that the Jordanian monarch and the Israeli prime minister would meet in Washington, stating that this historic meeting is another step forward toward achievement of a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East.

On July 25, in the first public contact between the Jordanian monarch and a top Israeli official, King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin signed a declaration at the White House. The terms of the declaration expanded on those of the 1993 Common Agenda and included the following highlights: termination of the state of belligerency between Jordan and Israel; negotiations to end economic boycotts; establishment of communications, electric, and air links; establishment of border crossings; Israeli agreement to respect Jordan's historic role in administering Islamic holy places in Jerusalem; and further negotiations toward a full-fledged peace treaty. The two leaders addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress the same day. Congress responded by enacting legislation to forgive a portion of Jordan's debt to the United States (see below), but accompanying congressional statements suggested that a final peace treaty (as well as Jordan's compliance with

economic sanctions against Iraq) would be a factor in further debt forgiveness.

The Peace Treaty. This time the two countries moved more rapidly to consummate their movement toward peace. On October 17, Jordanian Prime Minister Abd al-Salam al-Majali and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin initialed a peace treaty, which the two officials subsequently signed at a ceremony held on the Jordanian-Israeli border on October 26. President Clinton and 5,000 notables from various countries witnessed the occasion. The 120-member Israeli Knesset (parliament) ratified the treaty by a vote of 105-3 with six abstentions on October 25. On November 6, the 80-member Jordanian lower house of parliament endorsed the treaty by a vote of 56-23 with one absentee. The royally appointed Senate endorsed it by a vote of 33-0 with one abstention and six absentees, and ratification became final with the king's signature on November 10.

The treaty, which consists of 30 articles and five annexes, stipulates that peace is established between the two countries "effective from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty" (Article 1). The treaty provides for recognition of each other's sovereignty, borders, and political independence (Article 2); demarcation of borders within nine months of the treaty's signature (Article 3); refraining from threats or use of force against each other (Article 4); exchange of ambassadors within one month of treaty ratification (Article 5); water sharing arrangements (Article 6); freedom of access to religious shrines and respect for Jordan's historic role regarding Muslim holy places in Jerusalem (Article 9); repeal of discriminatory legislation (Articles 11 and 26); and a number of provisions covering cooperation in economic, administrative, scientific, and cultural fields.

One interesting aspect of the treaty concerned the demarcation of borders. Aside from the West Bank, which did not figure prominently in the treaty negotiations, territorial issues between Jordan and Israel were minor, consisting of several small border areas that Jordan claimed Israel had occupied through various encroachments

between 1948 and 1967, amounting to approximately 340 square kilometers. Under Annex I of the treaty, Israel agreed to return these areas to Jordan; however, the parties agreed on an arrangement whereby Jordan will allow Israeli landowners and farmers continued use of two small enclaves within this territory for a 25-year period. This lease-back arrangement, which is renewable after 25 years, has been singled out for special criticism by opponents of the peace treaty as an unnecessary territorial concession to Israel.

Prospects for Durable Peace.

What are the prospects for a viable and durable peace between Jordan and Israel? In an effort to answer this question, it would be useful to examine four more specific ones. First, what has Jordan gained from the peace treaty with Israel? Second, how strong is internal support in Jordan for normalization with Israel and other recent shifts in official Jordanian policy? Third, what degree of support can Jordan expect from its other neighbors in the Middle East for its role in the peacemaking process? Fourth, what effect will future arrangements to resolve the Palestinian question have on Jordan's role in peacemaking with Israel?

Gains to Jordan. The fruits of peace for Jordan are difficult to assess. Some limited benefits will accrue to Jordan through recent agreement with Israel in the form of civil air access, preferential trade arrangements, and revenues from tourism. Although Israeli tourists have begun to visit Jordan on short trips, so far they have not proved to be heavy spenders. The removal of trade barriers could be a double-edged sword; Jordanians, like other Arabs, are uneasy over the possibility that their economy could be dominated by that of their stronger neighbor. Israeli willingness to accept tariff provisions weighted in Jordan's favor may reflect Israel's understanding of Jordanian concerns and its realization that Jordan is a vital link in Israeli economic access to the farther reaches of the Middle East.

Beyond the potential economic benefits of open borders, Jordanian leaders hoped that peace with Israel would lead to an influx of foreign aid, particularly from the United States. They have recognized reluctantly, however, that, in an era of budgetary constraints, there is little likelihood that Jordan will realize a peace dividend on the scale that accrued to Israel and Egypt after their peace treaty in 1979. A few comparative figures illustrate the lowered expectations to which Jordan must adjust. For the first fiscal year following their peace treaty, Israel and Egypt received \$2.4 billion and \$1.7 billion, respectively, in U.S. economic and military aid, and by 1985 their respective annual aid levels had risen to \$3.0 and \$2.1 billion, where they have remained ever since. Jordan, on the other hand, was allocated \$59.2 *million* in economic and military aid in 1996, the first fiscal year after the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty; moreover, there is no outlook for an appreciable increase in the 1996 level as Congress continues to tighten foreign aid. But Jordan has received two other significant benefits in the form of debt relief and a modest military modernization package.

In mid-1994, on the eve of Jordan's peace treaty with Israel, the country faced an external debt of approximately \$6.4 billion, 109 percent of its gross national product at the time;⁸ of this amount, an estimated \$702.3 million was owed to the United States.⁹ In their discussions with U.S. counterparts, Jordanian leaders emphasized the three-fold importance to Jordan of debt relief by the United States: to foster popular support for a peace treaty by creating a climate favorable for foreign investment with accompanying economic benefits; to help convince other international creditors to follow suit; and to demonstrate to Syria and the Palestinians the credibility of U.S. commitments in support of the peace process. On June 22, President Clinton promised King Hussein to seek forgiveness of Jordan's debt to the United States and encourage other countries to alleviate Jordan's debt burden. Congress, increasingly friendly toward Jordan after it signed the July 25 Non-Belligerency Declaration with Israel, agreed to forgive approximately \$220 million of Jordan's debt to the United

States under a supplemental appropriation; however, legislative language accompanying the appropriation cautioned that additional steps by Jordan—a final peace agreement with Israel, abrogation of the Arab boycott, and compliance with sanctions against Iraq—would be important factors in further debt forgiveness.¹⁰ After Jordan signed the peace treaty with Israel on October 26, the administration pressed Congress to forgive the remainder of the debt. Following further debate over the amount to be forgiven and the proper legislative vehicle, Congress ultimately included a provision covering full debt forgiveness for Jordan in an emergency supplemental appropriation bill.¹¹

Another high priority on Jordan's list has been modernization of the armed forces, which over the years have constituted the mainstay of the Hashemite monarchy. Though well trained and disciplined, the Jordan armed forces are outgunned and outnumbered by each of Jordan's neighbors, and military units face serious equipment shortages. Little or no equipment has been received since 1983, mainly due to financial constraints; also, the United States, once Jordan's major supplier, grew increasingly reluctant to supply Jordan with arms until it concluded a peace treaty with Israel and distanced itself from Iraq. As Jordan moved on both fronts, the United States began to review options for long-term military aid. On January 7, 1996, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry announced that the United States was offering Jordan a military equipment package consisting of 16 F-16 fighter aircraft, M60A3 tanks (50 according to press reports), night vision equipment, and (according to the press) a C-130 cargo plane and a helicopter. The package, estimated at between \$300 million and \$360 million, does not include state-of-the-art equipment and will only fill some of the more glaring gaps in Jordanian inventories. Even this relatively modest package will require special financing arrangements, including the authority granted on a one-time basis to draw down \$100 million in military equipment from U.S. stocks.¹²

Degree of Popular Support. Important as these measures are to Jordan's financial well-being and national security,

they may have only a limited effect on the perceptions of the average Jordanian citizen. In this connection, there is considerable evidence that recent dramatic shifts in King Hussein's regional policies have outstripped public opinion in Jordan. The process of normalization with Israel has been accompanied by a marked cooling in Jordan's relations with Iraq and a partial rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf states angered by Jordan's stand during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. At the same time, significant segments of the Jordanian population remain suspicious of or hostile toward Israel; supportive of Iraq on political or economic grounds, and resentful over the reprisals they suffered at the hands of the Gulf states because of Jordan's earlier support for Iraq.

Support in Jordan for the peace treaty with Israel remains lukewarm. Opposition is strongest within two groups—Islamic fundamentalists and secular left-wing nationalists. Together these groups can muster 25 to 30 deputies in the 80-member lower house of parliament and obstruct government-sponsored legislation although they have not succeeded in permanently blocking government initiatives so far. As noted above, opposition to normalization with Israel is especially strong among professional and trade organizations, which have become increasingly aggressive in seeking to block economic and cultural contacts with the Israelis. Clear support for the treaty seems concentrated in upper echelons of the government, parts of the business community, and groups such as the hotel, restaurant, and transportation sectors that stand to gain from Israeli tourism. A great many Jordanians appear to be withholding judgment pending further evidence regarding the impact of the peace treaty and seem willing to give the king the benefit of the doubt, at least in the short term. All the same, there is perceptible disappointment among many mainstream Jordanians that the treaty with Israel has not brought tangible economic benefits so far.

Though not directly related to the peace treaty, the recent dramatic shift in Jordanian policy toward Iraq has

accentuated anti-government views in some Jordanian circles and served to heighten opposition to normalization with Israel. Once Iraq's leading ally in the Middle East, Jordan began to distance itself from the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein after 1992; by 1994, U.S. officials noted a marked improvement in Jordanian enforcement of UN-imposed trade restrictions against Iraq. In August 1995, King Hussein granted asylum to two high-level defectors from Iraq, and on December 16, he called for a meeting of Iraqi factions opposed to the present government to chart a new direction for the country. On February 6, 1996, U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry indicated that the United States and Jordan are cooperating on actions which he refused to identify designed "to accelerate the demise of the present regime in Iraq."¹³ Ties with Baghdad, however, have not been completely severed. Iraq agreed on December 30, 1995, to continue supplying oil to Jordan, and in mid-January 1996, the two countries renewed a trade protocol, albeit providing for a lower level of Jordanian exports to Iraq.¹⁴

A combination of political and economic factors have contributed to a strong measure of support among Jordanians for the Iraqi regime. Some Jordanians, especially Islamists, nationalists, and those of Palestinian origin, applauded Saddam Hussein's pan-Arab utterances and his defiance of Israel and the West. Many Jordanian manufacturers and merchants had built close economic ties with Iraq in the 1980s. They argue that Jordan's economic future is tied more much closely to Iraq than to the Arabian Peninsula and are also skeptical over the likelihood of a profitable commercial relationship with Israel. Jordanians of a more ideological bent tend to see the government's peacemaking with Israel and coolness toward the Iraqi regime as twin aspects of a policy that bears the stamp of Western dictation.

Active opposition to Jordanian regional policies may be confined to a minority, but it has created a dilemma for the government. King Hussein seems sincerely committed to the growth of democratic institutions in Jordan and has said

the process of liberalization in his country is irreversible. On the other hand, some commentators have expressed concern that the government is slowing the pace of democratization in an effort to forestall attempts by the opposition to resist implementation of the peace treaty with Israel or to curb rear-guard actions by the opposition against the new policy toward Iraq. A report prepared by the Committee on Civil Liberties of the Jordanian parliament in September 1995 expressed the view that government policy since the October 1994 peace treaty with Israel "has visibly affected the ceiling of public freedoms."

Regional Support. In its efforts to establish normal relations with Israel, Jordan does not enjoy the full support of its neighbors. Predictably, the strongest opposition to the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty came from the so-called rejectionist states of Libya and Iran; the Iranian foreign minister denounced the treaty as treason against the Palestinian cause. Lebanon, which closely follows Syrian leads in regional policy, and Syria criticized Jordan for abandoning the goal of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement. President Asad of Syria called separate treaties a "mistake," but said he would not fight governments that concluded such agreements. Syria has objected especially to the arrangements under which Jordan leased back small plots of territory to Israel, and Syrian leaders warned that this does not constitute a model that Syria would be willing to follow. Syria also continues to allow radical Palestinian groups based in Damascus to inveigh against Jordan for making peace with Israel. (The mainstream PLO leadership, which had already concluded agreements with Israel, is cooperating with Jordan in implementing provisions of their respective peace pacts with Israel; however, Chairman Arafat has taken exception to the passage in the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty dealing with a special Jordanian role regarding the Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem.)¹⁵

The six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi Arabia and the five smaller Gulf states—show a certain ambivalence toward Jordan's role in Arab-Israeli

peacemaking. Though supportive in principle of the peace process, GCC states on the whole are cautious over the establishment of formal ties with Israel. For example, the GCC states have not yet taken formal steps to terminate their direct boycott of Israel although on September 30, 1994, they undertook to stop enforcing indirect boycotts, which penalize other countries and companies that deal with Israel. Qatar and Oman, which have been laying the groundwork for future economic ties with Israel, have been more inclined to support Jordanian-Israeli peace moves, but other GCC states have been more reticent. In part, this attitude may stem from residual resentment on the part of Gulf leaders over Jordan's stand during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis—a resentment that even King Hussein's growing estrangement from the Iraqi regime has not totally dispelled.

The Palestinian Dimension. The Palestinian factor will be particularly important in the success or failure of Jordan's efforts to normalize relations with Israel. The question is one of particular complexity, involving Jordan's relations with the PLO leadership, with its own indigenous Palestinian population, with other segments of the Palestinian diaspora, and with the emerging Palestinian entity on the West Bank and Gaza. Before the effects of the Palestinian question on Jordanian-Israeli normalization can be assessed, major issues will have to be addressed—the final status of the West Bank and Gaza territories, and the fate of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons.

The 1993 Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles stipulated that negotiations on the final status of the occupied territories would begin in May 1996 and should be completed 3 years later. PLO Chairman Arafat has made clear his view that the negotiations should lead to an independent Palestinian state, but not many Israeli leaders are willing to endorse that concept. Despite King Hussein's 1988 decree disengaging Jordan from the West Bank (Gaza had never been under Jordanian governance in the first place), the question of a future Jordanian association with an independent or autonomous Palestinian entity is likely

to arise. Statements by King Hussein indicate that he would accept some type of federation with a West Bank-Gaza entity, perhaps along the lines of his 1972 Unified Arab Kingdom proposal, but only after the Palestinians have achieved self-determination and can exercise a free choice in favor of independence or association with Jordan. Depending on the outcome of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, numerous ancillary decisions will have to be made regarding the relationship among Israel, Jordan, and an emerging Palestinian entity. These decisions could have a profound effect on later stages of Jordanian-Israeli normalization.

Final disposition of Palestinians dispersed throughout the Middle East will also heavily influence the course of Jordanian-Israeli relationships. The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration provided for the establishment of a quadripartite commission representing Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO to discuss the status of Palestinians displaced during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. A meeting of this commission held in Cairo in February 1996 reportedly resulted in some useful proposals to deal with the problem of Palestinians displaced in 1967. But the declaration does not deal with the more long-standing and difficult issue of Palestinians who became refugees after the original Arab-Israeli war in 1948. It is unlikely that a West Bank-Gaza ministate could absorb a large number of refugees from other parts of the Arab World, and Israel (which will either control or have a major voice in access to a Palestinian entity) would be likely to resist their return on the grounds that their presence nearby would heighten threats to Israel's security. Jordan, on its part, worries that it may become a depository for Palestinian refugees forced to leave other host countries but unable to be accommodated in the West Bank or Gaza. A disposition that placed undue burdens on Jordan could affect the country's stability in ways that might hinder normalization with Israel and revive former tensions between the two countries.

Concluding Assessment.

In moving rapidly to consummate and implement a peace treaty with Israel, King Hussein took a calculated risk. He took this step with no assurance of a major peace dividend, settling for relatively small financial gains in the near term and hoping that regional peace would spawn future economic advantages on a larger scale. The timing of his peace moves, which took place while Syrian and Lebanese negotiations with Israel remained deadlocked and even before Palestinians had fully sorted out the implementing details of their agreement with Israel, left him vulnerable to charges of premature peacemaking with Israel. Some observers, including Middle East governments and individuals associated with a harder line toward Israel, believe that Hussein abandoned his long-standing policy of pursuing a comprehensive rather than a separate peace with Israel.

Jordan's leaders can advance several counter arguments. Jordan was not the first Arab state to conclude a peace treaty with Israel; Egypt had done so 15 years earlier. Moreover, Jordan did not begin signing agreements with Israel until after the historic Israeli-PLO declaration had been concluded, thus illustrating once again Jordan's policy of moving in tandem with the Palestinian leadership. Finally, the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty did not represent a separate line of endeavor on Jordan's part; it evolved from negotiations conducted under the umbrella of the Bush-Gorbachev peace talks, which had been accepted by all Arab states concerned.

In the final analysis, the question of whether the Jordanian-Israeli treaty constituted a separate peace or a component of a comprehensive peace may be academic. Unless and until Syria and Lebanon follow suit, Jordan is likely to come under attack at home and in the region from opponents of the current peace process. The degree to which the average Jordanian citizen benefits economically could significantly heighten, or lessen, domestic opposition to normalization. While these scenarios unfold in the months

ahead, Jordanian efforts to pursue normalization with Israel will require a large measure of dexterity in dealing with domestic constituencies and neighboring states. King Hussein, who has proven himself an unusually astute and nimble figure in Middle East politics, may meet the most intricate challenges of his career as he strives to make peace a reality.

ENDNOTES

1. In January 1994, Israeli Army Radio quoted King Hussein as saying that he had met every Israeli leader except the late Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Bradley Burston, "Rabin Fuels Speculation He Met King Hussein," *Reuters Newswire*, June 6, 1994.

2. Hussein of Jordan, *My 'War' with Israel*, as told to and with additional material by Vick Vance and Pierre Lauer, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1969, p. 119.

3. "Chronology," *The Middle East Journal*, Winter 1983, p. 72.

4. On February 19, 1986, King Hussein announced the termination of this effort, charging that Arafat had "broken his word" after the king had secured major concessions from the United States. "Chronology," *The Middle East Journal*, Summer 1986, p. 481.

5. King Hussein told reporters that "We have always said we would be willing to give our support to either option—our way, or the PLO way. The collective Arab will was to choose the PLO option." Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., *The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank*, New York: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1977, p. 351.

6. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Near East*, August 1, 1988, pp. 40-42.

7. On July 21, 1991, two days before the official invitation, King Hussein announced that "Jordan will be among the first to attend" such a conference. *The Washington Post*, July 22, 1991, p. A15. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation became co-sponsor of the peace talks.

8. *Middle East Economic Digest*, April 21, 1995, pp. 8-9.

9. Information provided by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, July 1994.

10. *Congressional Record*, August 1, 1994. The appropriation was contained in Title VI, Public Law (P.L.) 103-306, signed on August 24, 1994. Because of budgetary scoring procedures, it was necessary for Congress to appropriate only \$99 million to forgive the \$220 million.

11. This was done under P.L. 104-19, signed on July 27, 1995. Again, under scoring procedures, Congress only had to appropriate \$275 million to forgive the remainder, which amounted to approximately \$480 million. Due to the complexities of fluctuating interest rates and their effect on these calculations, however, it now appears that an additional subsidy of \$25 million will need to be appropriated to complete the process of debt forgiveness for Jordan.

12. Granted under Section 572 of the *Foreign Operations Appropriation Act for 1996*, P.L. 104-107, signed by the President on February 12, 1996. See also James Bruce, "Jordan to get F-16s and Tanks in \$300 Million Package," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, January 17, 1996, p. 13; and Thomas W. Lippman, "Jordan Plane Deal Draws GOP Criticism," *The Washington Post*, February 14, 1996, p. A12.

13. Transcript, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry discusses national strategy in the Middle East in a speech to the first Les Aspin Memorial Lecture at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 6, 1996, *Reuters Newswire*, February 6, 1996.

14. Under the new protocol, Jordanian exports to Iraq will drop from about \$400 million in 1995 to a projected \$200 million in 1996. Jordanian officials advanced economic rather than political reasons for the cut, citing a high Iraqi debt owed to Jordan from previous shipments. Rana Sabbagh, "Jordan Slashes Trade with Iraq Almost in Half," *Reuters Newswire*, January 22, 1996.

15. In Article 9, the treaty states that "Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines." Arafat asserted that "sovereignty over Jerusalem and supervision of Jerusalem is for Palestinians."

**CONSIDERING A U.S. MILITARY FORCE
ON THE GOLAN:
CONFRONTING THE HYPERBOLE,
PARANOIA, HYSTERIA AND AGENDAS**

Stephen H. Gotowicki

First, if there is a peace agreement between Syria and Israel, and if the two parties request that we send troops to monitor the Golan Heights, then after consultation with Congress we would be willing to do that, or we'd be willing to consider doing it. I'm quite sure we would find a way to do that, but the decision is very much contingent on two things. One, there has to be a peace agreement; and two, both parties have to request it.

Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon,
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs),
Department of Defense News Briefing
January 16, 1996

President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, and Secretary of Defense Perry have all, at one time or another in the last several years, offered a U.S. military force to assist in the implementation of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. Indeed, the current administration has placed a high priority on achieving an Israeli-Syrian accord. At the same time, neither the Arabs nor the Israelis have requested U.S. military forces as part of an agreement, but expectations are high that the Israelis will make such a request as a condition for withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Moreover, Syria, is likely to acquiesce to a U.S. force on the Golan as well.

Since the Clinton administration is committed to the success of the peace process, it is likely that, if U.S. military forces are required, they will be made available. The question is not whether the forces will deploy to the Golan; if an accord is signed, almost certainly they will. The more important questions for the military planner have to do with

the size of the force, its mission, mission duration, and who will pay.

Administration officials have so far refused to spell out the specifics of a U.S. presence on the Golan. The standard administration position is that it is too early for this: first there must be an accord. To some extent, this is true. The accord should deal with the security and geographical modalities of the peace, and these will determine the specific force requirements in terms of size and equipment but not the force mission. A peacekeeping force has fairly standard mission requirements, i.e., compliance monitoring.

Pundits, commentators, and armchair strategists, both in Israel and the United States, have not hesitated to propose the composition and mission of a possible U.S. military force. Indeed, many such opinions have sprung from people or groups opposed to an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. These negative presentations usually adopt a "worst-case" approach and contend that the dispatch of U.S. troops to the Golan would have dire existential consequences for Israel and present dangers for American soldiers. For example, they maintain that an Israeli withdrawal will lead to a surprise Syrian attack; that a U.S. force interpositioned between Israel and Syria would restrict Israeli military options; that a U.S. force could not provide Israel the security guarantees it requires; and that U.S. soldiers would be subject to terrorist attack. Speculation on required force size has ranged from as few as a handful to as many as two combat-ready divisions. Proposed mission requirements have included compliance monitoring, early warning, deterrence, serving as a tripwire and the active defense of Israel.¹

A U.S. military deployment to the Golan Heights will most likely occur under the auspices of a multinational force because one or both parties is likely to reject a unilateral U.S. force. This would be in line with U.S. policy. In May 1994, President Clinton signed *Presidential Decision Directive-25 (PDD-25)* which was the first comprehensive U.S. policy on multilateral peacekeeping suited for the post-Cold war era.² *PDD-25* embraced multilateral

peacekeeping operations (specifically UN operations) as potentially important and useful tools in American foreign policy. The directive proposes that collective engagement is a practical strategy. Collective engagement shares the cost burdens, shares the commitment of resources, provides community legitimacy, and shares the blame if problems arise. *PDD-25* established a series of factors to consider when contemplating participation in a given peace operation:³

- Participation advances U.S. interests and both the unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable.
- Personnel, funds, and other resources are available;
- U.S. participation is necessary for the operation's success;
- The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an end point for U.S. participation can be identified;
- Domestic and congressional support exists or can be marshalled;
- Command and control arrangements are acceptable.

In the case of a possible U.S. military deployment to the Golan, it is possible to conclude that participation will advance expressed U.S. interests; that personnel, funds, and other resources will be available (within limits); and also that U.S. participation is necessary for the operation's success. The issues of unique and general risks, clear objectives and end point, and domestic and congressional support are as yet uncertain.⁴

This chapter will attempt to address all but the last of these uncertain factors and will survey the prospects for providing a U.S. military presence on the Golan. It will endeavor to look beyond the arguments of the special pleaders to focus on the standard requirements for peacekeeping, the possibilities of a Syrian surprise attack,

the military balance between Israel and Syria, early warning, deterrence, and the terrorist threat to U.S. peacekeepers. The goal of the study is to determine what U.S. military peacekeeping package for the Golan Heights would be in the best interests of the United States and would most effectively guarantee the peace between Israel and Syria.

The Golan Heights.

The Golan Heights (see Figure 1) is a mountainous plateau rising steeply from the Jordan River valley along Israel's northeast border. The Golan has a north-south length of 40 miles and an east-west width varying between 7.5 miles and 16 miles. It covers an area of approximately 780 square miles. The average altitude of the Heights is approximately 3,200 feet with Mount Hermon in the north rising to an elevation of 7,296 feet. At its most rugged, the surface geology is a hard basalt cover strewn with massive

boulders, explosion craters, ropy lava formations, and, most notably, occasional conical rises shaped like giant ant hills (known as tels).⁵ In other areas, the Golan provides broad expanses of rich arable land.

During the 1967 Six Day War, Israel captured the Golan Heights, placed it under military administration, and began to establish Jewish settlements. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Syria




Figure 1. Golan Heights Map and Cross Section.

briefly recaptured a portion of the Golan Heights, but Israel quickly regained the lost terrain and captured additional Syrian territory. In 1974, the "Israel-Syria Disengagement of Forces Agreement," brokered by the United States, resulted in Syria's regaining some of the land lost in 1967, but the majority remained in Israeli possession. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established to monitor compliance for this disengagement agreement. In December 1981, the Israeli government passed legislation to bring the Golan Heights under civil law, jurisdiction, and administration. There have been no major military conflicts on the Golan since 1973.

Prior to the 1967 war, there were reportedly 130,000 or more Syrians living on the Golan Heights. Today only about 16,500 Syrians (15,000 Druze and 1,500 Alawites) remain on the Heights in four or five villages. The Jewish population numbers about 14,500 in 32 communities.⁶

Some commentators have compared the mission requirements for the Golan with that of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, but there are major differences. The Sinai offers broad expanses of terrain with large buffer zones and a very sparse population where direct contact between the two parties is minimized. The Golan, in contrast, is compact, populated, and offers very little expanse to establish large buffer zones. Distances on the Sinai are in the hundreds of miles—on the Golan they are in tens of miles, thus the opposing military forces can be expected to remain in fairly close proximity to each other.

The Golan is important to Israel for a variety of reasons. The foremost is security. The Israelis are concerned that Syria might mount another surprise attack against northern Israel through the Golan. Many Israelis strongly insist that the Golan provides an indispensable strategic buffer zone, a favorable line of defense, and an advantageous position for launching an offense against Syria.⁷ As a consequence, the Israelis maintain an armored division and numerous intelligence facilities on the Heights. The principal intelligence setup is a large and sophisticated site on the northern slope of Mount Hermon with a commanding

view of southern Syria and Damascus. From here, the Israelis gather extensive visual and electronic intelligence on Syria which provides them detailed tactical and strategic intelligence as well as early warning data.

Some would argue that there is a certain illogic in Israeli references to the Golan as a strategic buffer since it has been occupied and settled. A buffer zone that is settled is no buffer zone. Ze'ev Maoz, Director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, says "The claim that the Golan provides strategic depth that protects the Galilee has led to an absurdity: we are simply transferring the Galilee to the Golan, and the problem of defending the Galilee today will turn into a problem of how to defend the Jewish population of the Golan in a few years hence."⁸ He continues by asking whether it would be possible to evacuate the 14,500 Israeli settlers on the Golan on a few hours notice when hostilities are anticipated. These settlers would compete for use of the same limited and narrow roads that would be needed for the deployment of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and would likely inhibit Israel's strategic response to Syrian aggression.

The Israeli settlements on the Golan are also a factor in the Golan's importance to Israel and constitute a significant political problem for the Israeli government. In any accord, Syria will insist upon their removal. A significant percentage of the settlers are not willing to leave their homes peaceably which again raises the specter of Yamit for the Israeli government.⁹

Arguably, water is second only to security in importance to Israel. Approximately 30 percent of Israel's national water supply comes from the Golan. Two of the three springs that give birth to the Jordan River flow from the Golan. Prior to the 1967 war, the Syrians attempted to divert these sources to deny Israel water, and the Israelis attempted to divert the Jordan River from Syrian use in the demilitarized zone established by the 1949 armistice agreements. The continued exclusive Israeli control over Lake Kinneret (also called the Sea of Galilee and Lake Tiberias) will also be an

important factor for Israel in determining the final Israeli withdrawal lines.

For the Syrians, the present situation is unacceptable because it allows the IDF to occupy positions only about 35 miles from Damascus. Syria is concerned with the Israeli capability to use the Golan Heights to launch an attack against it. Moreover, Syrian citizens continue to live on the Golan under Israeli occupation, and this is a source of embarrassment for the Syrian government. An Israeli occupied Golan is also a continuing reminder of Syria's resounding military defeats of 1967 and 1973.

As the opening quote of this chapter specifies, both Israel and Syria will have to agree to the deployment of U.S. forces on the Golan Heights. In meetings with senior U.S. military officials in 1993 and early 1994, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin told them he had never asked for, nor accepted, the concept of U.S. forces on the Golan. Mr. Rabin believed that asking for a U.S. military presence would violate the Israeli credo of military self-reliance. On October 3, 1994, during his annual address to the Knesset, Mr. Rabin changed his position and stated that he would accept U.S. soldiers on the Golan to provide only compliance monitoring and early warning.

Today there are 980 U.S. soldiers in the Sinai supervising the military annex of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. We will not demand anything else of the Americans when we secure a peace treaty with Syria on the Golan—the same thing, the very same thing. . . . We will have a multinational force deployed on the Golan like that which exists in the Sinai today, and it will include American troops, also similar to those we now have in the Sinai, as well as early warning stations, periodic checks, etc.¹⁰

It is likely this change of position was an attempt by Mr. Rabin to gain popular support for a peace accord with Syria. Under increasing political pressure, Mr. Rabin committed himself to holding a national referendum to approve peace with Syria. Israeli polls at the time showed an overwhelming rejection (60-80 percent) of returning the Golan Heights, in whole or part, to Syria. Since Mr. Rabin's

assassination, polls have shown an increase in those supporting a withdrawal from the Golan Heights in return for peace with Syria of 42 to 47 percent. In his references to American troops "similar to those we have in the Sinai," Rabin appeared to be asking for a U.S. combat unit as opposed to U.S. military observers. There is an implication that these U.S. soldiers would assist in providing Israel security or assist in its defense which could be intended to mollify public fears. Dore Gold states, "The Israeli popular perception of an American presence on the Golan is that it would somehow have defensive combat value."¹¹

In 1993 and early 1994, Syria's position was that they did not want an exclusive U.S. military force on the Golan Heights. Their stated preference was for an international force probably from the United Nations. In late 1994, the Syrians indicated that they would accept a U.S. military presence on the Golan that was a part of a larger international force. The Syrians have never addressed the size of such a force. There are indications that they see the presence of U.S. military on the Golan as a military plus for Syria because it would provide them with a measure of protection against an Israeli attack as well as provide a venue for improving relations with the United States.

Peacekeeping Requirements.

What should a U.S. military peacekeeping force on the Golan look like? In the parlance of the United Nations Charter, a peacekeeping mission on the Golan Heights would normally constitute a "Chapter VI" mission.¹² A Chapter VI mission calls for the pacific settlement of disputes through negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, etc., vice imposition of peace through military action (Chapter VII). In a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, both belligerents have agreed to a military disengagement (with the accompanying withdrawal, demilitarization, and military limitations) and the supervision of an impartial UN peacekeeping force. In these peacekeeping operations, the primary mission of the peacekeepers is "the prevention, containment, moderation

and termination of hostilities between states (or forces) through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain order."¹³ This is accomplished through impartial third-party compliance monitoring of withdrawal, demilitarization, and force limitation agreements. In a situation such as an Israeli-Syrian accord, where peace will be established through mutual agreement, a peacekeeping force to monitor compliance would normally be comprised of unarmed military observers and would not require regular combat units.

Such has been the case on the Golan Heights since 1974 where the peacekeeping mission established by the Israeli-Syrian Disengagement of Forces Agreement has been successfully conducted by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). UNDOF has a strength of about 1,030, representing four countries (Austria, Canada, Poland, and Japan).¹⁴ Austria and Poland each provide an infantry battalion, Canada provides a logistics battalion, and Japan provides transportation assets. Are infantry soldiers necessary? Probably not, but one must remember that UNDOF was deployed onto the Golan in 1974 immediately following major hostilities between Israel and Syria. There was no peace treaty. Tranquility was by no means assured.

Compared to recent U.S. experiences in peacekeeping, the Golan Heights should offer a relatively straightforward, simple proposition focusing primarily on compliance monitoring. Unlike Somalia or Rwanda, there is no ethnic separation required, no expected conflict with hostile belligerent forces, no requirement for peace enforcement, no nation building, and no humanitarian support. Nominally, a U.S. military contingent of between 50-200 military observers as part of a larger multilateral force could effectively accomplish the required peacekeeping responsibilities.

However, a new peacekeeping force on the Golan Heights will have to address Israeli security concerns, be acceptable

to Syria, and have costs consistent with U.S. resources, interests, and expected benefits. This may not be easy. Israel is expected to insist that early warning and, implicitly, deterrence be added as required missions for a new peacekeeping force. Israel's emphasis on the deployment of a U.S. combat unit is probably derived from three factors: its concern for the possibility of a major Syrian surprise attack; the expectation that U.S. soldiers will be asked to man the Israeli early warning sites that Israel will be required to vacate, and the symbolic requirement to appease the concerns of its citizens concerning peace with Syria. Providing early warning is doable and can be construed as a reasonable function of compliance monitoring. Moreover, it has been done by the United States in other circumstances. The question is, will the commitment of the minimum U.S. resources necessary to adequately accomplish these missions be acceptable to realize Israel's largely symbolic requirements?

The United States no longer has the resources to enter into long-term, open-ended, expensive commitments without compelling reasons to do so and without possible negative impact on U.S. global military readiness. Since 1988, the U.S. Army has shrunk from 16 active divisions to 10. Between 1990 and 1996, U.S. Defense budgets declined approximately 30 percent (from \$349 billion to \$245 billion [constant 1996 dollars]).¹⁵ The requirements for global engagement have not shrunk. In committing itself to maintain force size for a U.S. Golan peacekeeping contingent, the United States must decide whether to plan for the "worst case" with the concomitant costs or to seek the economy of planning for the "most likely." It must balance risks, costs, likelihood, and benefit. Key to this decision is an assessment of Syria's commitment to peace and its capability for negative action. The following will argue that Syria does not have the motivation or capability to attack Israel.

Asad's Strategic Choice.

Syria seeks a just and comprehensive peace with Israel as a strategic choice that secures Arab rights, ends the Israeli occupation, and enables all peoples in the region to live in peace, security and dignity. In honor we fought; in honor we negotiate; and in honor we shall make peace.

Syrian President Hafez Asad
Press Conference with President Clinton
January 16, 1994

After 48 years of conflict with Israel, the Syrian leadership has apparently made the "strategic choice" to seek peace. The complete return of the Golan is the *sine qua non*¹⁶ for peace between Syria and Israel. The changes in the Middle East over the last decade would seem to indicate that a change in Syrian attitudes toward peace with Israel is a strategic requirement. From the strategic, political, and economic points of view, Syria has found itself in a highly unfavorable situation that is likely only to deteriorate further.¹⁷

For Syria, the regional strategic situation changed drastically with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Syria depended on the generous military aid it received from Moscow. Russia is no longer a willing and generous military sponsor and armorer to Syria. With a weak economy, Syria has been unable to find other sources of military aid to replace Soviet largesse. With the collapse of Soviet influence in the Middle East, Syria also lost a large measure of perceived deterrence against an Israeli attack, believing that its close relations with the Soviet Union would have deterred Israeli aggression.¹⁸

Syria's economy is somewhat stagnant. Despite the significant reforms and ambitious development projects instituted in the early 1990s, the legacy of long-term, socialist-style state intervention still hampers Syrian economic growth. Oil production, while not large when compared to the Arab Gulf states, accounts for much of Syria's export income; however, Syrian production levels are expected to shrink in coming years. Financial aid from the

Gulf states is also expected to taper off. Through heavy military spending in years past, Syria has accumulated large external debts which it has not adequately addressed and which diminish its credit worthiness. Syria needs significant external investment; however, Western and Arab investors have not rushed to fill Syria's needs.¹⁹

Syria's support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war isolated it from the majority of its Arab neighbors during the 1980s. This isolation denied Syria significant levels of Arab investment and regional political support. Egypt's peace accord with Israel isolated Syria further, making it, along with Iraq, the only remaining significant confrontation state against Israel. Only since Syria's participation in the allied coalition against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has Syria's relations with the moderate Arab countries and the West improved. Syrian support and shelter of groups involved in regional and international terrorism continue to strain its relations with Western nations.

Focusing on this new regional milieu, many believe that Asad has made a judgment that improved relations with the United States is a strategic requirement, and this has become one of his top priorities. It is not hard to imagine that Syria would prefer to make peace and normalize relations with the United States more than with Israel—but peace with Israel is the price Asad has to pay to improve relations with the United States and to recover the Golan Heights.

Many Israelis question President Asad's dependability. Logically it would hold that if one accepts that he is committed to achieving peace with Israel (as does former Prime Minister Peres, President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, and the late Yitzhak Rabin), one must by default also accept his dependability. Frequently, senior Israeli leaders refer to Asad as the most cunning, shrewd, and intelligent leader in the Middle East. The comments of Major General Uri Sagi, until recently the Director of Military Intelligence, Israel Defense Forces, concerning Hafez Asad are enlightening:

I believe that Asad understood that Israel is stronger than Syria militarily, and he finds it difficult to reach strategic parity. . . . Asad is a very experienced person who knows the Middle East inside and out. . . . He is a man of reason, he is cautious and suspicious. . . . To a very large degree it is possible to say that he is reliable as long as his interests are served. . . . Suffice it to say that if and when he signs an agreement, he will keep his word. . . . I can detect enough stability among today's ruling group—I am referring to four or five people—to continue in Asad's direction, for a short period of time at least.²⁰

In military terms, Israel doesn't need peace with Syria; Israel maintains a pronounced military superiority over Syria, and the border has been (remarkably) quiet since 1974. In some Israeli circles, the *status quo* is acceptable. Despite frequent claims in the Western media, Syria is not a powerful state in the Middle East. It does not have significant oil resources; it has no ideological draw for the Arab masses; it does not have a superpower sponsor; it has a weak economy; and, while it does have a large military, it cannot project or sustain its military power far beyond its borders. Its long-range weapons, its SCUD-C ballistic missiles, are essentially suited only for harassment, interdiction, and getting it into trouble. For Israel, however, Syria is a key to a broader regional peace. Peace with Syria is necessary to improve the prospects for peace with the countries of the Arabian Peninsula (read Saudi Arabia²¹) and, to a lesser extent, the Maghreb states. As one of the primary confrontation states, Syria carried the burdens of the Arabs *writ large* in the struggle against Israel. As that struggle comes to an end, Saudi Arabia will not abandon Syria and is unlikely to openly embrace peace with Israel until a satisfactory peace accord (from Syria's perspective) is instituted between Israel and Syria.²²

Possibilities of a Syrian Surprise Attack.

The Israeli concern for a major Syrian attack against Israel after its withdrawal from the Golan is a somewhat legitimate concern resulting from three wars and almost 50 years of suspicion, fear, and mistrust. Popular Israeli fear

of a Syrian attack is probably an important factor in Israel's desire for a symbolic U.S. combat force. Syria's demonstrated capabilities, however, render this concern somewhat implausible. A number of facts and considerations support this conclusion.

- President Hafez Asad has long accepted Israeli military superiority.²³ In point of fact, the Syrians are afraid that Israel will attack Syria.
- While Israel's regional qualitative military edge is expected to continue to grow in the coming years, Syria's military capabilities are actually in decline.²⁴ The collapse of the former Soviet Union left the Syrians without a major military benefactor and forced President Asad to conclude that his drive to reach military parity with Israel is unachievable. The flow of modern military equipment on "bargain basement" credit terms, which Syria previously enjoyed,²⁵ stopped in the late 1980s. The Russians now demand cash payment on delivery for weapons systems—cash Syria doesn't have. Asad recognizes that Syria does not have the economic capacity to effectively compete with Israel in the military sphere.
- Syria's new situation with its former Soviet armorer has also resulted in major shortages of critical repair parts, which has precipitated a further decline in Syrian military readiness and capability. No short-term improvement in this situation is foreseen.
- An attack upon Israel on the Golan would carry significant strategic risks for Syria. It would likely precipitate an Israeli military response either through the Bekaa in Lebanon—flanking Syria's attacking force and threatening Damascus—or through Jordan. In either case, Syria would be hard pressed to effectively respond. It would also probably trigger a massive punitive Israeli air campaign against high-value Syrian targets and cities. Syria

would not be able to achieve air superiority to prevent such an Israeli air campaign.

- The Syrians take seriously, as do all of the Arab states, the threat posed by the reputed Israeli nuclear arsenal.
- The Syrians are probably under no illusions that they could win a war against Israel without significant support from other surrounding Arab states. Unlike 1973, Syria is now isolated in its opposition to Israel and would have to attack Israel without the benefit of its previous allies. The Egyptian, Jordanian, and Palestinian peace accords with Israel preclude such support, and support from the Gulf states could not be expected.
- Syrian military officers were reportedly very impressed by the U.S. technology and weapons demonstrated in DESERT STORM. They know that Israel has acquired and produces many of these weapons which they cannot match.²⁶
- DESERT STORM established a precedent that the United States would employ combat forces in the region in defense of its interests. President Asad cannot believe that an attack on Israel would not precipitate a U.S. military response, given the long and close relations between the United States and Israel. A U.S. military response could conceivably consist only of a rapidly mounted air campaign against Syria, but even such a limited response would be extremely damaging to and virtually indefensible by Syria.
- A Syrian attack on Israel would run counter to Syria's goals of improving its relations with the United States and seeking Western economic aid.
- With the return of the Golan to Syrian sovereignty, and at least a partial resolution of the Palestinian

plight, Syria's primary motivations for war against Israel will have been removed.

A countering argument to most of the preceding could be that these same concerns did not prevent Syria from attacking Israel in 1973. While true, in 1973 Syria had a superpower ally.

It is hard to imagine many compelling reasons why Syria would attack Israel if it withdrew from the Golan Heights. Unrequited hatred of Israelis or Zionists? Continued unsolicited support for Palestinian claims? Arab nationalism? One could argue that such an attack is more likely if Asad is rebuffed by Israel's refusal to return the Golan to Syria.

Israeli-Syrian Military Balance.

The current military balance would also seem to argue against a Syrian attack on Israel. To evaluate a military balance, two factors—numbers and potency—need consideration. As Figures 2 through 4 show, the aggregate differences between the Israeli and Syrian militaries are not significantly large. Figure 2 shows that, in terms of numbers, Syria possesses more tanks (18 percent) and artillery pieces (46 percent) while Israel possesses 38 percent more armored personnel carriers than Syria. In terms of potency, 46 percent of Israel's tanks can be rated




Figure 2. Israeli-Syrian Equipment Balances.

high quality (Merkava or M60A3), and the remainder are medium quality (Centurion, M60A1, M48A5). Only 31 percent of Syria's tanks can be rated high quality (T-72). Over 48 percent of Syria's tanks are aging, near-obsolete, low quality T-54/T-55s. Most of Israel's artillery pieces are self-propelled systems. Of Syria's artillery pieces, 84 percent are older, less capable towed systems. A comparison of long-range targeting and fire control capabilities would further demonstrate Israeli superiority in this category.

Figure 3 shows that Israel has a significantly larger fleet of combat capable aircraft than Syria. As was demonstrated in 1982, the Israeli air force is one of the region's most potent combat forces. In combat aircraft, Israel commands unquestioned numerical, technological, and capabilities advantages over Syria.




Figure 3. Israeli-Syrian Combat Capable Aircraft.

Figure 4 compares personnel strengths and shows a striking difference in strategic philosophies. Syria maintains a large standing army of 306,000²⁷ at all times and depends on a smaller reserve structure of 100,000²⁸ during periods of conflict. Israel, in contrast, maintains a small standing army of 136,000 and is dependent on its 363,000 reserve soldiers. This difference in active versus reserve strengths is the reason why Israel places such high importance on early warning. Israel nominally requires




Figure 4. Israeli-Syrian Military Strengths.

24-96 hours to fully mobilize, equip, and deploy its reserves to the battle zone. It should be noted that once fully mobilized, the Israeli army is larger than Syria's.

The regional proliferation of Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSMs) has complicated Israel's mobilization strategy. Syria possesses sufficient SSMs (SS-21s, SCUD-Cs) with the necessary range, firepower, and adequate accuracy to disrupt Israel's mobilization by attacking bases, assembly points, air fields, and transportation and logistics facilities. However, this threat is unrelated to an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan in that Syria has this capability in any case. This factor will serve to raise Israel's perception of threat and may lower its response threshold.

One last element of comparison is the military expenditures each country allocates. Figure 5 compares Israeli and Syrian military expenditures from 1975-1993.²⁹ Despite recent Israeli concerns for Syrian procurement with its Gulf war profits,³⁰ this figure shows that Israel's military expenditures are consistently higher than Syria's—significant when comparing country sizes, armed forces sizes, and populations.

Potency is factored into military capability evaluations because it is a force multiplier. Israel's potency is often characterized by what is referred to as its Qualitative Military Edge (QME). Israel is the unquestioned military hegemon in the region because of the quality of its military.




Figure 5. Israeli-Syrian Military Expenditures, 1975-1993.

Unlike the Arab states, Israel has embraced the Revolution in Military Affairs.³¹ In American military thought, QME is the aggregate of all those factors that enhance a military's capabilities over those of its adversaries. These include, among other things, the quality and technology of its weapons as well as the quality of leadership, personnel, intelligence, training, doctrine, battlefield automation, battle management, research and development, logistics infrastructure, morale, and alliances. The potency of QME can best be seen in the dramatic effectiveness of the U.S. military against Iraq during the Gulf War. Israel possesses and produces many of the high-technology weapons used by the United States in DESERT STORM. Like Iraq, the Arab states surrounding Israel don't.³² Militarily, Israel's is a modern army whose QME is enhanced further because, without exception, the Arab enemies it faces are at best eighthth or ninthth rate armies.³³ Israel's superior QME is not a new phenomena—it was demonstrated convincingly in 1967, 1973, and 1982. As was the case for the United States in the build-up to DESERT STORM, Israel's ultimate victory over its opponents is not really in question; the only question is at what cost in casualties?

Assuming some measure of rationality, Syria does not appear to have the capability or motivation to attack Israel

once it withdraws from the Golan Heights.³⁴ In the context of Israeli military capability, the Syrian military constitutes not an existential threat, but merely a nuisance.

Early Warning.

Many Israelis, both opponents and supporters of peace with Syria, claim that Israel's intelligence facilities on the Golan are indispensable for ensuring that Syria does not mount a large scale attack, similar to 1973, against Israel. Senior Israelis have used this argument in the United States as part of their demands that Israel be "compensated" for its possible loss of security guarantees resulting from an Israeli-Syrian accord.³⁵ Were the Israelis to convince Washington to reimburse them for making peace with Syria, the compensation would provide a major windfall in modernizing the IDF. However, these claims of an indispensable Golan are overstated, and the reader should consider the possibility that there is a political agenda behind these claims.

Since the early 1980s, the United States has provided Israel a minimum of \$3 billion each year in foreign military financing (FMF) and economic support fund (ESF) grants.³⁶ This level of aid is based upon 1981 and 1983 memoranda of understanding on strategic cooperation between the United States and Israel. These memoranda called for U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation against a Soviet threat to the region. With the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the original assumptions underpinning U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation have disappeared. Logically, so has the rationale for the high aid levels. Coupled with this, recent milestones in the peace process have led some congressional leaders to publicly question the need to continue the heavy subsidy of Israel when the Middle East is moving toward peace.

For several years, the Israelis have been seeking out regional threats, such as Iran, to replace the former Soviet threat. This would allow the Israelis to maintain their strategic value to the United States and keep the stream of

military assistance flowing. To date, they have only middling success, but by portraying a significant Syrian threat, they may hope to validate their continued need for the aid from a sympathetic America.

Israel has sufficient intelligence assets to offset the loss of its intelligence facilities on the Golan Heights and should suffer no major loss in warning capabilities by withdrawing from the Golan. Israel has sufficient ground and airborne intelligence assets available to replace critical data gathered on the Golan itself.³⁷ These assets include Israel's newly developed Phalcon Airborne Early Warning aircraft. The Phalcon employs a phased-array radar with Moving Target Indicator (MTI) mode capabilities which will allow it to simultaneously track 100 ground or air targets to a range of 250 miles³⁸—well beyond what would be needed for Golan surveillance. Israel also has MTI capable radars mounted on some of its reconnaissance fighter aircraft which can provide early warning out to 50 miles. In conjunction with these systems, Israel also has a variety of airborne-mounted, long-range, electro-optical, ELINT (electronic intelligence), SIGINT (signals/communications intelligence), thermal signature, FLIR (forward-looking infrared radar), SLAR (side-looking airborne radar), remotely piloted vehicle, and balloon aerostat intelligence systems. In addition, Israel now has its indigenous developmental satellite program, the Ofeq-3, reportedly with sufficient clarity to provide militarily significant intelligence.³⁹ Taskable, satellite imagery capability with 1-Meter resolution is now available through commercial sources and could further offset the Israel's loss of its Golan intelligence facilities. Under full normalization with Syria, Israel would probably have liaison officers working with Syrian officers on the Golan⁴⁰ and with military attaches in Syria who could provide early warning information. By withdrawing from the Golan, Israel may lose a large measure of the convenience that its facilities provide, but it will not lose the critical early warning information required.

If forced to withdraw from its intelligence facilities on the Golan, Israel is likely to ask the United States military

to man and operate these (or other) early warning facilities in its place. This could present problems for Washington's impartiality⁴¹ and credibility as a facilitator of the peace process. Syria might consider any U.S. reporting to Israel as providing Israel targeting data against it. As a peacekeeper, the United States would be required to provide early warning data equally to both sides. Intelligence provided in this fashion is usually fairly generic⁴² and is not likely to be sufficient for Israel—they would want much more.

Opponents of a U.S. military deployment to the Golan focus on this issue of intelligence supply as a strong negative.⁴³ They argue that Israel could not rely on critical intelligence information from a foreign source—even the United States. In terms of reciprocity between the two parties, Dore Gold speculates that the United States would have to construct intelligence facilities directed at Israel to provide Syria intelligence equal to that given to Israel. Such facilities would provide a quantum improvement in Syrian intelligence capabilities⁴⁴ to Israel's detriment. Gold also argues that reliability would be an issue. Intelligence collection would be divorced from intelligence analysis. Both parties would have to be satisfied with the intelligence provided and could not task collection based on individual priorities or concerns.⁴⁵ Both Gold and Gaffney make the point that Israel would be unlikely to depend on U.S.-supplied intelligence because of differing priorities, interpretations, conclusions, perspectives, or interests. To paraphrase Mr. Gaffney, the intelligence would be "filtered by foreign interests."⁴⁶ There is some merit in these arguments.

This raises the question of how important this issue is to Israel, and why it was raised. Israel must know that providing asymmetrical warning to it is out of the question since that would compromise the impartiality and credibility of the United States as a peacekeeper. Why would Israel want to risk compromising the peace accord? Israel and the United States have robust military-to-military channels for sharing critical intelligence and military

information. U.S. participation in the Golan peacekeeping force will not preclude continued military cooperation between Israel and the United States. These channels will remain open and will allow the United States to pass critical intelligence to Israel without compromising its impartiality or Israel's security.⁴⁷ Possible answers to this question again might be linked to the Israeli government's need to provide popular reassurances.

While generic early warning and deterrence are feasible, are U.S. combat soldiers required to provide this data? Experience and precedent say no. In previous peacekeeping situations, the United States has provided early warning data through civilian organizations and technical means.⁴⁸ From 1976 to 1982, the Sinai Field Mission, established by the second disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt (September 1, 1975), consisted of 200 U.S. civilians who provided electronic early warning surveillance in the critical mountain passes in the Sinai desert. Both Egypt and Israel were pleased with the performance of the Sinai Field Mission and agreed to extend its service by 2 years.⁴⁹ Since 1974, the United States has provided airborne surveillance photography for early warning to both the Israelis and Egyptians in the Sinai⁵⁰ and to Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights.

Combat units are not required to perform peacekeeping duties. U.S. military officers have served as unarmed military observers in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East since 1948. They have also served in Angola, the Western Sahara, and Cambodia among others. A Civilian Observer Unit (COU), consisting of 25-30 State Department and retired U.S. military personnel,⁵¹ currently accomplishes a majority of the observer duties in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai desert.⁵² Frank Gaffney makes the point, "There is no need for the United States to undertake an expensive, risky, and open-ended commitment of troops to carry out the relatively minor (and not inherently military) task of serving occasionally as a third-party referee on compliance issues."⁵³

Deterrence.

A multilateral peacekeeping force on the Golan Heights, by its very presence, is likely to provide a large measure of political deterrence. Both Israel and Syria, at one time or another, have demonstrated a sensitivity to international opinion. An attack by either party on the other will antagonize, at a minimum, those countries providing peacekeeping personnel and could elicit diplomatic condemnation, a possible military response, or international sanctions of one sort or another.

Peacekeeping forces in a Chapter VI-type mission provide little, if any, military deterrence—the political deterrence is more important. Deterrence is also maintained by several factors outside the context of a peacekeeping force. Israel's military might provides probably the strongest deterrent to Syria. Withdrawing from the Golan Heights will not diminish this in Arab eyes. Another important deterrent is the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Even without the involvement of U.S. soldiers, America is likely to respond vigorously to any threat to Israel.

Many pundits have considered the deployment of a U.S. combat brigade or division to provide a "trip wire" or deterrent force.⁵⁴ This force would deter violations of the agreement and directly oppose any party engaging in aggression. Such a deployment would provide a credible military deterrent, but the downside outweighs its value. A "trip wire" could not force-posture against any one party without violating its impartiality. If it did posture only against Syria, Damascus would most likely oppose its deployment. A "trip wire" force would not demonstrate confidence in the strength of the peace or the sincerity of the parties; it "would send a message that an Israel-Syria peace was more like an armed truce enforced by outside powers rather than a reconciliation between erstwhile enemies; it would thereby reduce each side's incentive to work together to enhance mutual security and build confidence."⁵⁵ A "trip wire" force would greatly increase the costs and troop

commitment of the United States⁵⁶ and would greatly increase its terrorist target value. It would run counter to Israel's credo of military self-reliance and would constrain any military action Tel Aviv might consider necessary. Some analysts also worry that such a force would create conflicts and tensions in the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

Threat to U.S. Soldiers.

Opponents of the Israeli withdrawal from the Golan (and certain members of the U.S. Congress) have postulated a series of threats to U.S. forces which, according to them, provide a rationale for not placing them there. The most common threat proposed is the possibility that U.S. forces deployed to the Golan would be subjected to terrorist attack. Mark Langfan⁵⁷ and Dore Gold⁵⁸ hold that, upon regaining control of the Golan, Syria will flood the territory with Syrian population by resettling the 100,000-130,000 citizens that evacuated during the 1967 war in order to reestablish sovereignty. Mr. Langfan proposes that these civilians would be potentially hostile and might attack U.S. forces with "mines, remote controlled [road] side-bombs, snipers, grenade launchers, or even suicide 'Beirut'-type car bombs." Mr. Gold says these citizens would provide the Syrian government the option to harass an unwanted foreign presence by means of terrorist action. This latter point is inconsistent with the fact that U.S. forces will not deploy to the Golan without Syrian acquiescence (or a Syrian interest in having them there). Neither Mr. Langfan nor Mr. Gold specify to what purpose these attacks would be conducted, but Mr. Langfan states that the Syrian government would have the luxury of denying responsibility for such attacks by possibly attributing them to radical Muslim fundamentalist elements. There is no record of terror activity on the Golan. Such attacks would be inconsistent with Syrian national interests—improving relations with the United States, shedding its reputation as a state sponsor of terror, seeking Western economic investment and having the U.S. forces on the Golan serving as a deterrent to Israeli aggression. History also shows that

President Asad has effective techniques to counter such activity.

Other commentators, such as Frank Gaffney,⁵⁹ cite the threat of terrorism originating in Lebanon from groups such as Hizbollah (under nominal Syrian influence) and other rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, or Libya. Again the purpose of such attacks is not specified. The threat, I feel, is overstated. With a couple of exceptions, the Shi'ite and Palestinian elements in Lebanon have not targeted U.S. military personnel, focusing instead on their goal of ending the Israeli occupation. The 1982 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut occurred in great part because the United States surrendered its impartiality when it engaged in combat operations against the Muslims on behalf of the Christians. Except for the case of Lieutenant Colonel Richard Higgins, USMC (the U.S. military observer killed in Lebanon), which may have involved special circumstances, none of the 5-11 U.S. military officers who served as UN military observers in Lebanon from 1948-1993 had been threatened or harmed by Hizbollah or any of the other Shi'ite Muslim groups.⁶⁰ Nor have the U.S. officers assigned to UNTSO and living in Damascus been threatened.

U.S. forces on the Golan would not be observable for targeting or in range of most indirect fire weapons, such as Katyushas, fired from Lebanon. An attack on U.S. facilities or troops on the Golan would require terrorist penetration on foot (since it is unlikely Israel, Syria, or Jordan would allow them across the border in vehicles) in generally open, unforested terrain over long distances. Assuming normal and reasonable security measures, the approach of terrorists on the Golan would be detected.⁶¹

Is there an indigenous terrorist threat that could appear on the Golan without Asad's blessing or Syrian support? Perhaps. Could Israeli settlers on the Golan try to sabotage an Israeli-Syrian peace by clandestinely attacking U.S. soldiers? Perhaps. Is the Golan absolutely devoid of a terrorist threat? Probably not. Could Asad's perspectives change? Perhaps. The threat of terrorism is a constant for

American forces operating in foreign countries. American personnel have faced terrorism in countries as diverse as West Germany, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Japan, and Pakistan, to name but a few. Terrorism is part of the territory in international engagement, but it should not preclude U.S. participation in activities which advance its national interests. Assurances from both Syria and Israel to cooperate in actions to prevent terrorist action against the deployed peacekeeping force should be included in the peacekeeping mission mandate.

Another possibility raised is that U.S. troops would be caught in the middle of a surprise Syrian attack or an Israeli military preemption against Syria. In the case of the former, previous arguments have established that such a scenario is fairly unlikely. The latter case is a possibility, considering that the loss of Israel's Golan early-warning facilities may greatly lower Israeli response thresholds. However, American casualties in such an event would not be automatic or guaranteed. U.S. military officers assigned to UNTSO served on the Sinai in 1973 and in Lebanon in 1982 without fatalities or major injury.

Alternatives.

Unilateral U.S. Peacekeeping Force. Establishment of a unilateral U.S. military force to serve as peacekeepers on the Golan should not be considered a credible alternative. It is not in American interests, i.e., embracing multilateral engagement (*PDD-25*), burdensharing, and conserving resources. It would be unnecessarily expensive for the accomplishment of mission goals and probably would not be accepted by either Israel or Syria.

Bolster UNDOF. UNDOF is widely held to be one of the United Nation's most successful peacekeeping missions. Capitalizing on this success, UNDOF could be bolstered with the addition of soldiers from the United States and other countries to provide an enhanced force for guaranteeing an Israeli-Syrian accord. Such an approach offers several benefits: minimal start-up costs, extensive

institutional mission experience, an established multilateral basis, and the established confidence of Israel and Syria. From an American perspective, the UNDOF alternative provides burdensharing, credibility, and the prospect for minimizing its personnel contributions. The cost of UNDOF in 1994 was \$32.2 million.⁶²

Syria probably would prefer a UN force on the Golan because it believes, when needed, it could muster a large bloc of support within the UN from the Arab and nonaligned states and because it has two friends on the Security Council—Russia and China. Israel would prefer that a peacekeeping force on the Golan not be under the auspices of the UN. Israel views the UN as indecisive, inefficient, and potentially unfriendly to Israel. Israeli concerns arise from the precipitous withdrawal of the first United Nations Emergency Force from the Sinai in 1967 which was prompted only by the unilateral demands of Egypt's President Nasser. Israel also has a history of unpleasant disagreements with UNTSO and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). For the United States, as described by *PDD-25*, the UN approach might be the best. If so, Israeli concerns can be addressed by explicit requirements written into the mission's mandate which would preclude unilateral termination or alternation of mission objectives and institute broader mission control responsibilities for both parties.

MFO II. This alternative would call for the formation of a new MFO-styled organization on the Golan Heights. Were the parties to declare success on the Sinai, it might be possible to migrate the existing MFO structure to the Golan. Such an approach would not offer the benefits that an enhanced UNDOF could provide. Mission start-up costs probably would be higher with the requirement to import mission equipment and support infrastructure. There would be no institutional knowledge on the mission area, its geography, or effective operational measures. Command and control arrangements, acceptable to all mission participants, would need to be established. A new force would also be required to establish a *modus vivendi* with the

parties to the accord and earn their confidence. The cost of the MFO in 1994 was \$53 million.⁶³ One proposal suggests that such a force could be established under American civilian control with civilian technicians but without U.S. troops.⁶⁴

Sunset Clause.

Both *PDD-25* and the United Nations hold that peace operations should not be open-ended, burdensome commitments. This recognizes that there should come a point where the peacekeepers are no longer needed. This principle was not considered in the formation of the MFO in the Sinai. Many observers believe that the MFO's mission succeeded (years ago) and that it has outlived its usefulness. This judgment is supported by the very low operational tempo and requirements placed upon the MFO's observers. The MFO's protocols specify that mission termination requires unanimous agreement to do so. Both the United States and Egypt have indicated interest in concluding the mission; however, Israel, emphasizing the symbolic support the MFO provides for the peace process, wants the MFO to continue to serve.

U.S. concerns over the MFO have to do with the extended commitment of U.S. soldiers. Egypt's concerns are probably the costs it pays and an issue of sovereignty—the MFO's military forces are stationed and operate only on Egyptian soil. Syria is likely to have the same concerns over sovereignty and may demand that a “sunset clause” or programmed mission termination date be included in its accord with Israel. Senior military leaders in the Pentagon would probably welcome a “sunset clause” for the Golan Heights.⁶⁵

Any “sunset clause” should be tied to the successful accomplishment of specified peace milestones and confidence-building measures (CBMs) which encourage and facilitate increasing the responsibilities of the two parties for the peace and diminishing the need for third party supervision. These CBMs should include such measures as

liaison officers, joint patrols, prenotification of military exercises and weapons tests, crisis management provisions such as a hotline and conflict resolution committees, and establishing transparency. Transparency is intended to help each country understand the defense policies and strategic intentions of the other, and thereby lower tension. The primary vehicle to institute transparency would be through military-to-military ties, which could include activities such as doctrinal exchanges, reciprocal base visits, and personnel exchanges.

Conclusion.

Considering the priority that an Arab-Israeli peace holds in American foreign policy, providing U.S. military personnel to perform peacekeeping duties on the Golan Heights is a small price to pay. A successful peacekeeping mission to guarantee an Israeli-Syrian peace accord is a doable proposition; however, the required peacekeeping responsibilities do not warrant committing a large U.S. force or combat units. As a "Chapter VI"-type operation, a Golan peacekeeping mission should be reasonably straightforward and simple. Since both parties will have agreed to establish peace, a nominal U.S. force of 50-200 military or civilian observers within a larger multilateral organization of 1,200 to 2,000 personnel could effectively provide the necessary elements for mission success—compliance monitoring and early warning.

The United States should not succumb to hyperbole, paranoia, hysteria, "worst case" pressures, or overemphasize its "special relations" with Israel in establishing the mission or size of the U.S. peacekeeping contingent. Israeli claims of the threat posed by Syria and the indispensability of the Golan must be critically analyzed. Syria does not have the capability or motivation to attack Israel. The Israelis are risk averse and prone to the *status quo*. Habitually, they analyze threats in a "worst case" mode which, as opposed to "most likely," is the most resource intensive and costly mode of planning. The United States must balance consideration

of threat, risks, costs, resources, and benefit of its peacekeeping contingent comprising the Golan Heights.

U.S. policy has long held that an Israel confident in its security would be able to make the compromises necessary to create peace. The United States can and should continue to provide security assurances to Israel through existing bilateral military-to-military and strategic channels. It should not, and need not, do so through its participation in a peacekeeping presence on the Golan. The United States should embrace the impartiality required and should not unnecessarily compromise its peacekeeping role with unbalanced bilateral considerations for one party over the other.

ENDNOTES

1. See, among others, Dore Gold, *U.S. Forces on the Golan Heights and Israeli-Syrian Security Arrangements*, Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, August 1994. Dr. Gold is the director of the U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy in the Middle East project at Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies; Frank Gaffney, Jr., et al., *U.S. Forces on the Golan Heights: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs*, Washington, DC: The Center for Security Policy, October 25, 1994. The Center for Security Policy assembled six senior retired officers and five senior civilians who served in various senior governmental positions—most as Assistant Secretary of Defense to address this issue; Mark Langfan, "U.S. Troops on Golan 'Quicksand?'," *Security Affairs*, March 1994. Mr. Langfan is a real estate attorney in New York and an avid activist in this issue; Gerald Steinberg, "Israeli Security in the Context of the Peace Process," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 1, March 1994. Mr. Steinberg is a Professor at Bar Ilan University in Israel; and Andrew Bacevich, Michael Eisenstadt, and Carl Ford, *Supporting Peace: America's Role in an Israel-Syria Peace Agreement*, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994. A well-reasoned and logical study.

2. *PDD-25* is a classified document. An extensive unclassified extract was provided to the press corps by the White House. This unclassified extract is available via the Internet from the Department of the Navy Public Affairs office (www.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/peaceops/elements.txt).

3. While *PDD-25* was oriented toward U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping operations, these factors are also meaningful when considering other, non-UN, peacekeeping operations.

4. The U.S. Congress is likely to debate the issue. As the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia demonstrated, Congress has shown little interest in deploying U.S. soldiers to peacekeeping missions around the world. Despite traditional generous support by Congress for the state of Israel, preliminary indications are that Congress may oppose a U.S. military deployment to the Golan Heights. Congress has been lobbied (with some apparent success) by Israeli Likud party supporters who oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and who claim that the risks to U.S. soldiers would be high.

5. Steven J. Rosen, *Military Geography and the Military Balance in the Arab-Israel Conflict*, Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post Press, 1977, p. 70.

6. *The World Factbook, 1995*, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995, p. 408.

7. This latter capability also provides a good measure of deterrence.

8. Ze'ev Maoz, "Strategic Depth and Other Myths," *Ha'aretz*, June 30, 1995.

9. An Israeli settlement evacuated by force by the Israeli government during Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai. The extensive press coverage of the forced evacuation resulted in significant government embarrassment.

10. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*, "Rabin Speaks at Opening of Winter Knesset Session", cited in *FBIS-NES-94-192, Daily Report: Near East & South Asia*, October 4, 1994, p. 44.

11. Gold, p. 30.

12. United Nations, "Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes," *Charter of the United Nations*, San Francisco: The United Nations, 1945.

13. International Peace Academy, *Peacekeepers Handbook*, New York: Pergamon, 1984, p. 22.

14. While not directly assigned to UNDOF, American military officers, assigned to the UNTSO in Damascus, Syria, and Tiberias, Israel, have supported UNDOF's mission since its inception. UNTSO officers routinely conduct compliance inspections and liaison duties for UNDOF; however, U.S. and Soviet officers have been precluded from

physically performing duties on the Golan itself by restrictions placed on the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

15. William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995, p. B1.

16. See Muhammad Muslih, "Dateline Damascus: Asad is Ready," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1994, pp. 145-63; and "The Golan: Israel, Syria, and Strategic Calculations," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 47, No. 4, Autumn 1993, pp. 611-632.

17. Ronald D. McLaurin, "Hidden Agendas Amidst Opposing Objectives—The Newest Incarnation of the Middle East Peace Process," *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 8, No. 2, September/October 1991, p. 17.

18. *Ibid*, p. 17. Mr. McLaurin points out that the true degree of Soviet commitment was uncertain, but "the Syrians long considered the Soviet backing a critical element of their overall strategic posture, even if it only introduced the requisite degree of uncertainty into Israeli planning."

19. See Department Of State, *Background Notes: Syria*, Washington, DC: State Department Bureau of Public Affairs, October 1995; and Patrick Clawson, *Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-Up and Economic Crisis*, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989.

20. Smadar Peri, "IDF Intelligence Chief Interviewed," *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, March 25, 1994. Cited in *FBIS-NES-94-061, Daily Report: Near East & South Asia*.

21. In the last year or so, Israel has made improvements in its relations with some of the smaller Gulf countries such as Oman and Qatar, but these are peripheral countries whose actions, in the context of Gulf Cooperation Council bickering, may have been more intended to annoy Saudi Arabia. The real key to broader Israeli regional integration lies with Saudi Arabia, the only Arab economic superpower, which is key to the economic focus of Israel's (or at least Prime Minister Peres') vision of a "new Middle East."

22. This writer was told on several occasions by official Saudi delegates to the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group of the Multilateral Peace Process talks that Saudi Arabia has a special interest in ensuring that Syria reaches a satisfactory accord with Israel. Saudi interaction with the Israeli delegation in successive ACRS meetings appeared to be conditioned by the prevailing tone of Israeli-Syrian negotiations at the time. The Saudis are also very

interested in the final status of Jerusalem and the Palestinians. Muhammad Muslih (*Dateline Damascus*, p. 159) makes this point as well when he says, "Saudi policy is almost completely in agreement with Syria's basic policy with respect to the peace talks with Israel."

23. Having suffered resounding military defeats to Israel in 1948, 1967, 1973, and 1982.

24. Former Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Ehud Barak said, "Today it is also clear that Syria, without additional Arab allies—and today it has no other Arab ally—has a far smaller military option than in 1973. If there has been any change in the Syrian military option, one must realize that it has weakened due to the developments of the past few years. It is not getting any stronger." Tzvi Timor, "IDF Chief of Staff Barak on Talks With Syria," *Al Hamishmar*, September 14, 1994, pp. 7-9. Cited in *FBIS-NES-94-182, Daily Report: Near East & South Asia*, September 14, 1994.

25. Amassing a debt estimated by some sources as high as \$16 billion to the former Soviet Union.

26. See McLaurin, p. 17.

27. Both Syrian and Israeli numbers are ground forces only.

28. Shlomo Gazit and Zeev Eytan, *The Middle East Military Balance 1993-1994*, Jerusalem: *The Jerusalem Post*, 1994, p. 439, state that Syria can mobilize another 750,000 reservists not organized in units and 400,000 members of the worker's militia. This writer is comfortable ignoring these numbers because these personnel would not be suitable for offensive operations. Syria does not have the major weapons systems to arm these personnel, and they lack the necessary training and leadership to comprise effective combat units. Their most effective use would likely be home defense. In most Arab armies, maintenance of low-capability reserves such as these reduces overall military readiness because it diverts resources which would be better spent improving the combat capabilities of the active force.

29. The value of such a comparison is only to demonstrate broad trends. The data will support little else. The data doesn't factor the different prices each country pays for equipment from different suppliers. It doesn't factor equipment received but not paid for, such as the \$700 million in drawdown Israel received from the United States between 1992-94 or equipment Israel received from the United States without cost as excess defense articles. It doesn't necessarily factor the cost of equipment produced indigenously by defense industries, such as Israel's, when infrastructure costs are accounted for under other national categories. It doesn't factor the quality of the technology

transferred. It doesn't factor time differences in delivery and payment, etc.

30. See Richard F. Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1987-1994*, CRS Report for Congress 95-862 F, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 4, 1995, pp. 50-52. Mr. Grimmett presents data on arms transfer agreements during the periods 1987-1990 and 1991-1994. In the period 1987-1990, Syria implemented agreements for \$5.3 billion to Israel's \$2.3 billion. During the period 1991-1994, Syrian agreements totalled only \$900 million compared to Israel's \$4.3 billion. Totals for the two periods were Syria \$6.5 billion and Israel \$6.6 billion. The significant Syrian decline in the 1991 to 1994 period should have a significant negative impact on future Syrian military readiness.

31. According to Steven Metz and James Kievit, *The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, p. 5, the Revolution in Military Affairs is "centered around the fusion of sophisticated remote sensing systems with extremely lethal, usually stand-off, precision strike weapons systems and automation-assisted command, control and communications (C³) [which] allow smaller militaries to attain rapid, decisive results through synchronized, near-simultaneous operations throughout the breadth and depth of a theater of war."

32. For strategic reasons, the United States has transferred high-technology weapons such as M-1 tanks, AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, Patriot air defense missiles, and F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft to states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. However the systems usually don't have the same capabilities as those provided to Israel and the Arab states have significant problems in absorbing the technologies involved and employing them in a fashion that in any way approaches their capabilities.

33. With perhaps only one exception—Jordan—the Arab armies facing Israel emphasize mass over quality; have highly centralized, inflexible command structures and poor organization for combat; depend on conscripted, poorly educated, poorly paid soldiers; lack technical sophistication; rely on outdated choreographed Soviet military doctrine; eschew effective training; and lack an emphasis on sustainability. Acquisition generally focuses on "big-ticket," high-technology equipment items without the required training and sustainment packages. These countries seem to believe that the mere possession of these high-tech, sophisticated weapon systems and not any operational proficiency with them provides deterrence.

34. Bacevich, Eisenstadt, and Ford (p. 11) state that, "Damascus currently lacks the means to retake the Golan by force," and cite Michael

Eisenstadt, *Arming for Peace? Syria's Elusive Quest for Strategic Parity*, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992.

35. In various political and military venues, Israel has been asking the United States to compensate Israel for making peace with Syria. As part of this compensation, Israel has asked for several JSTARS and AWACS aircraft, downlink terminals for U.S. satellite imagery, a variety of other high-technology (and high cost) weapons systems, and funds to cover redeployment costs. Reported estimates of Israel's compensation requests run from \$3 billion to \$12 billion. See, for example, Avino'am Bar-Yosef, "Baraq Demands Early Warning Alternatives From U.S.," *Ma'ariv*, August 19, 1994, p. 2. Cited in *FBIS-NES-94-161, Daily Report: Near East & South Asia*; Alon Pinkas, "Shahaq To Discuss Golan 'Compensation Package' in U.S.," *The Jerusalem Post*, June 11, 1995, pp. 1, 2. Cited in *FBIS-NES-94-112, Daily Report: Near East & South Asia*; and Op Ed, "The Price of Middle East Peace," *The Washington Post*, January 17, 1996, p. 16.

36. In fiscal year 1995, Israel's share of the total U.S. security assistance budget totalled approximately 55 percent. Assistance to Egypt, linked to Israel through Camp David, comprised 36 percent. This left only 9 percent for the rest of the world.

37. Major General Uri Sagi, then the Director of Military Intelligence, Israel Defense Forces, supported this assessment during a September 14, 1994, interview with the Israeli newspaper, *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, when he said, "Nobody better than me realizes the enormous importance of the Golan Heights from the intelligence point of view, particularly when we do not yet have a political arrangement. On the other hand, I also realize that if and when the political level makes its decision, the Army in general and the Intelligence Branch in particular will find ways to supply early warning. . . . If and when the political level decides that the political arrangement calls for a redeployment, I believe we will find the answers." Smadar Peri, "Intelligence Head on Arab Leaders' Health, Syria," *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, September 14, 1994, pp. 1-3. Cited from *FBIS-NES-94-182, Daily Report: Near East & South Asia*, September 14, 1994.

38. Bernard Blake, ed., *Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems*, Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group Inc., 1995, pp. 269-270. Note: Israel's Phalcon is apparently experiencing technical difficulties and is not yet fully operational. Israel sold a Phalcon to Chile who has had repeated system problems and complained to Israel of system shortcomings. With Israel's national technical prowess, these problems should be quickly overcome.

39. Christian Larder, "Israel Launches Ofeq-3 Satellite," *Air & Cosmos/Aviation International*, April 14, 1995, p. 36. Cited in *FBIS, JPRS-EST-95-014 Reports*, April 14, 1995.

40. See Ben Kaspit, "Uzi Dayan's Dilemma: How to Return the Golan Heights While Preserving Israel's Deterrent Power," *Ma'ariv*, January 19, 1996, p. 14. Cited in *FBIS-NES-96-015, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia*, January 23, 1996.

41. The requirement for the impartiality of peacekeeping forces is universally accepted. There are a plethora of sources which uphold the criticality of impartiality. The United Nations states, "It is a key principle that the operation . . . must not in any way favour one party against another. This requirement of impartiality is fundamental, not only on the grounds of principle but also to ensure the operation is effective. A United Nations operation cannot take sides without becoming a part of the conflict which it has been set up to control or resolve." United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990, p. 6.

42. In this context, generic is used to refer to early warning intelligence provided by the peacekeeping authority equally to the two parties on a "take it or leave it" basis. Such an arrangement would not allow either party to task collection of special requirements or intelligence priorities without the acquiescence of the other party.

43. See Gold and Gaffney.

44. Gold, p. 22. Gaffney, p. 18, also addresses this point.

45. Gold, p. 22.

46. Gold, p. 23; and Gaffney, pp. 8, 18-19.

47. While the United States will provide critical intelligence data in these channels, it would probably be careful to exclude data which would increase the possibilities of a preemptive Israeli strike against Syria.

48. Perhaps using these precedents, Bacevich, Eisenstadt and Ford, pp. 19, 35, 40, 47, call for 200-300 U.S. *civilian or military* technicians to perform the early warning duties for a Golan peacekeeping force.

49. See Mala Tabory, *The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai: Organization, Structure, and Function*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1986, p. 6; and Gold, pp. 20-21.

50. See Tabory, p. 7; John Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 164; and Gold, p. 21.

51. See Tabory, p. 72; Mackinlay, pp. 183-184; and Robert B. Houghton and Frank G. Trinkka, *Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East*, Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, 1984, pp. 50-51.

52. The MFO area of operations is broken into four zones, A-D. The MFO's military forces operate only in zone C inside the Egyptian border. Observation duties in the other three zones are handled exclusively by the COU. The COU operates in zone C as well.

53. Gaffney, p. 9. It should be noted that Mr. Gaffney, and the group of retired general officers and former senior leaders he collaborated with on his work, oppose a U.S. military deployment on the Golan.

54. See Gold, pp. 30-34; Gaffney, pp. 10-11; and Bacevich, Eisenstadt, and Ford, p. 36.

55. Bacevich, Eisenstadt, and Ford, p. 36.

56. In terms of personnel, the commitment of a unit to a long-term peacekeeping mission requires a force three times the size of the committed unit to sustain: (1) the unit deployed; (2) the next unit scheduled to deploy is withdrawn from normal operations to provide manning, equipment, and specialized training; and (3) the unit that has returned from serving in the mission must be blocked to re-train its soldiers in their primary combat specialties. This re-training is critical to return the unit to combat proficiency since peacekeeping duties will not sustain required combat skills.

57. Langfan.

58. Gold, p. 43.

59. Gaffney, p. 15.

60. This fact is not coincidental. In 1985, the Lebanese Shi'ite Amal military chief Daoud Daoud offered to protect the American observers assigned in southern Lebanon when their senior officer received an anonymous death threat and the Americans were temporarily withdrawn from duty in southern Lebanon. Daoud believed that the presence of the Americans inhibited the Israelis and supported Shiite goals. One U.S. Navy Commander assigned in southern Lebanon noted that a colorful emblem had been painted onto a building fairly close to his living quarters which had become a meeting hall. It was a couple of

weeks later when he discovered that the colorful emblem was the crest of Hizbollah. Despite their proximity and the American flag patch he wore on his uniform daily, the commander was never bothered or threatened by Hizbollah.

61. See Michael Eisenstadt, "U.S. Troops on the Golan?", *Middle East Insight*, Vol. XI, No. 2, January-February 1995, pp. 51.

62. National Defense University, *1995 Strategic Assessment*, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995, pp. 166-167.

63. *Ibid.*

64. Bacevich, Eisenstadt, and Ford, p. 35. The authors' intent in this proposal appears to be related to minimizing the constraint that U.S. soldiers might place on Israel's freedom of action.

65. It should be noted that a termination of U.S. participation would not necessarily lead to mission discontinuance.

HARIRI'S CRITIQUE OF OPERATION GRAPES OF WRATH: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS

Stephen C. Pelletiere

Tel Aviv justified its devastating assault on Lebanon in April 1996 by pointing to the depredations of Hizbollah guerrillas who were attacking Israel's northern settlements.¹ Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri brushed that explanation aside, claiming that, in fact, the Israelis were trying through Operation GRAPES OF WRATH to wreck Lebanon's economy.² This chapter looks at the operation to assess the competing claims. It finds that Hariri's accusation has merit, but what is more, Operation GRAPES OF WRATH shows us a new power alignment developing in the Middle East which will have far-reaching consequences for the peace of the area.

Background.

The incident that indirectly provoked Israel's Operation GRAPES OF WRATH occurred in late March 1996 when an Israeli tank fired on two Lebanese civilians in southern Lebanon, killing both.³ Although Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres claimed that this was an accident and apologized for the occurrence, the Lebanese guerrilla group, Hizbollah, retaliated by rocketing Israel's northern settlement of Kiryat Shimona. Peres angrily attacked Hizbollah's action, saying that this was an escalation. The matter subsequently died down, but then, not too long afterward, two more Lebanese civilians died after a roadside bomb detonated, which the Hizbollahis also blamed on the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).⁴ The IDF disavowed responsibility. However, Hizbollah fired another barrage at Kiryat Shimona.

This time the IDF retaliated massively. The Lebanese had been anticipating some such response; however, the scale of the retaliation and the choice of targets proved a surprise. The Israelis attacked infrastructure—roads, bridges, water reservoirs—even bombing the country's electrical grid.⁵ In addition, the IDF blockaded the coast so that the Lebanese could not get food.⁶ They interdicted the major highway through Lebanon and blockaded Beirut International Airport.⁷ Whenever the Lebanese tried to rebuild any of the damaged infrastructure, the IDF warned them off.⁸ As a consequence, for a period of time during the attacks, communications between a number of Lebanese communities were interdicted; commerce came to a standstill.

This is what provoked Hariri's ire. He claimed that because so many economic targets were hit, Israel was not sincere in claiming that the operation was in response to Hizbollah activity. In fact, said Hariri, this was a plot the Israelis had contrived to wreck Lebanon's economic recovery.⁹

To understand how Hariri could make this charge, and, also to assess its significance, one needs to know something about the recovery to which Hariri was referring.

The Lebanese Miracle.

Lebanon has been torn by civil war since 1975, and, over the course of that ordeal, the country's infrastructure has been practically wiped out. The nadir can be said to have come in 1993 when the Israelis mounted a major assault on the country (the third such carried out by the IDF since 1978).¹⁰ The 1993 hostilities, which the Israelis dubbed Operation ACCOUNTABILITY, resembled Operation GRAPES OF WRATH in a number of aspects. In both instances, no Israeli ground troops were permitted to enter Lebanon,¹¹ but enormous damage was inflicted on the country through aerial bombardments and artillery barrages.

The 1993 assault ended when Secretary of State Warren Christopher brokered a ceasefire. The terms of that truce were limited but for this very reason easy to fulfill.¹² For the first time in many years, Lebanon looked forward to peace.

At this point, Hariri announced that he would direct a monumental rebuilding effort, the so-called \$32 billion Horizon 2000 Plan, to replace Lebanon's shattered infrastructure. Through this activity, Lebanon hoped to become the services entrepot for a region reshaped by peace and, in particular, a sophisticated capital market channeling funds into the Middle East.

Before the civil war broke out in 1975, Lebanon was something of a showpiece in the region. One of the loveliest places on the Mediterranean, it was the favored vacation spot for the Gulf sheikhs. The monarchs not only came to play in Lebanon, they banked there as well. This led to the establishment of Beirut as the financial center of the area.

However, it is not merely that the Lebanese exploited the largesse of the sheikhs. The Lebanese on their own are master money managers. Their ability to turn a profit, often on seemingly little or no basis, is legendary. Middle Easterners generally regard the Lebanese among the shrewdest traders in the region.

When the civil war raged, most of this trading ceased. However, at the first opportunity, the community recovered itself. Under Hariri's direction, it began to move forward again. The prime minister's scheme was a simple one—reclaim the bomb-blasted capital by gutting the city center and rebuilding it from the ground up. Once the building got underway, the economy generally began to pick up; in the last 3 years, the rate of growth has averaged over 7 percent, and total assets held by Lebanese banks increased by 25 percent.¹³

Hariri is an exceptional individual. A billionaire contractor who made his fortune in Saudi Arabia, he was able to enlist the support of the Saudi royal family for the grand recovery scheme that he envisioned.¹⁴ With aid

flowing from the Gulf, other channels of assistance soon opened up.

One unexpected source of funds was Lebanon's Shia community. The Shias, who traditionally have made their home in southern Lebanon, were forced out of the area by the first two Israeli invasions (1978 and 1982). Many of those displaced went abroad as expatriate businessmen, and many sent money home. Despite the uncertain conditions in the south, the bulk of the money flowing into Lebanon went to purchase real estate there as the expatriates clearly meant to make the area their home. It was this continuous flow of cash that underpinned Hariri's recovery program.¹⁵

The Shias are an interesting group. For many years they were outcasts among Lebanese society. Unlike Lebanon's Christian community and the Sunni Muslims, who rank high in the social order, the Shias were the lowest of the low. They had little political consciousness, and this helped to keep them down.¹⁶

In the late 1960s, the Palestinians began to set up bases in the Shias' territory. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) wanted the area as a launching pad for raids against Israel's northern settlements.¹⁷ The Shias—partially because they were so politically unaware—allowed the Palestinians to come among them, and it was not long before they were caught up in the latter's deadly war against Israel.

In 1982, the Israelis mounted what was probably their most crushing assault on Lebanon, Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE. The aim of that operation was to drive the Palestinians not only from the border area but out of Lebanon entirely. The Shias, who were fed up with the Palestinians' encroachments, welcomed the Jewish soldiers as saviors. Had the Israelis exploited this sentiment, the subsequent history of Israeli-Lebanese relations might have turned out quite differently.

Instead, the Israelis ignored the Shias' offer of friendship to concentrate on building up their self-proclaimed

security zone along the border. This was a nine-mile-wide strip, comprising about 10 percent of Lebanese territory. To create this enclave, the Israelis took land away from the Shias, and naturally the latter resented this. The Shias discovered that they had gotten rid of one lot of oppressors, the Palestinians, only to become saddled with another, the IDF.

Gradually, the Shia community—for so long dormant politically—began to stir. A leader emerged in the person of Nabih Berri, heading an already established militia called Amal. Amal began to fight the Israelis.¹⁸

Another group appeared soon after that—Hizbollah. It, too, was made up of Shias, but Hizbollah was founded by Iran, which dispatched Revolutionary Guards to instruct the Lebanese Shia community in the ways of militant Islam.¹⁹ Ultimately, the Hizbollahis became, among the Lebanese, the fiercest opponents of Israel. But it was not only the Iranians who took an interest in the Shias; the Syrians did as well.

Syria and the Shias.

Syria was drawn into the Lebanon imbroglio in 1976. It came in response to an appeal by the Christians, who were losing out in a fight with a coalition of Muslim groups.²⁰ Ostensibly, the conflict arose over the desire of the Muslims to involve Lebanon in the Arab-Israeli War. In fact, the fight was about status. The Christians had always led the country politically and commercially; now the Muslims were challenging that suzerainty.²¹ Syria entered to restore a rough balance of forces in Lebanon. It checked the Muslims' growing strength, and this prevented the country from sliding into anarchy.

The Syrians were still in Lebanon in 1982 when Israel invaded to drive out the Palestinians. Inevitably, the two countries were fated to clash; this came about as the Israeli army drove north to Beirut.

The Syrians tried to stay the Israeli advance, and, although they suffered grievous casualties, they did manage to hold the Israelis in check.²² Thus, when the United States worked out a truce—and the Israelis withdrew to their self-proclaimed security zone in the south—the Syrians settled down in the Beka'a Valley. Neither side would leave Lebanon as long as the other was there.

In the meantime, the Syrians made common cause with the Shias, who by that time were engaged in their guerrilla war against Israel. Syria's President Hafez al Asad provided the Shias with a low level of military assistance and undertook to repair breaches within the community.

The Amal group and Hizbollah were desperate enemies.²³ Asad drew the two together and got them to suppress their animosities so they might better concentrate on fighting the Israelis.

Amal soon turned all of its energies into becoming an effective political force. The group's secular leader, Nabih Berri, rose very fast within Lebanon's political system, eventually becoming speaker of the Lebanese parliament. Exploiting the power and prestige of this office, Berri was able to, in effect, draw the Lebanese Shia community up the political ladder after him.

Hizbollah, on the other hand, became, if anything, more radical. It carried the burden of fighting the occupation, but along with that it established a primitive, but nonetheless effective, network of social services in the south.²⁴ Money for this, estimated anywhere from between \$60 and \$100 million a year, came from Iran.

During all these developments, Asad kept working with the Shia groups, maintaining excellent relations with both of them. Asad, who has the reputation of a fox (probably the shrewdest politician in the Middle East) showed his ability in this instance.²⁵ Early on, he recognized the potential of the Shias, and patiently, he brought them along.

In 1991, U.S. President George Bush convened the Madrid Conference to try to reach a permanent peace in the

Middle East. Syria went to that conference although its position at the time was extremely weak. The Soviet Union had just collapsed, meaning that Damascus had no patron.

The Israelis assumed that Asad would have to make concessions as he had no other alternative. To be sure, Asad's position was difficult, but he acquitted himself well. He gave nothing away, but rather took the stand that Israel, under the terms of the UN resolutions, was the one obliged to make concessions.²⁶

Asad and the Israelis were bargaining over the Golan Heights. Lebanon, which also attended the Madrid conference, wanted back the security zone Israel had carved out of the Shias' territory. The Israelis indicated willingness to bargain with the Lebanese over this but only if they abandoned their common front with the Syrians. The Lebanese refused.

In fact, Hariri did not have the option of deserting Asad. With 35,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon, the Syrian President practically ran the country. Any significant actions Hariri might make had to be vetted in the Syrian capital. Indeed, Hariri owed his job to Asad; the latter pressured the Lebanese parliament into confirming him in his post.

This solidarity between Beirut and Damascus somewhat offset Israel's strong position in the talks. In the meantime, to put pressure on the Israelis, Asad encouraged Hizbollah to carry on its guerrilla activities in the south. For a time these activities were not very effective; the Hizbollahis were not skilled fighters. But by 1993, things had begun to change.

The Hizbollahis had become more proficient, and they began to score some remarkable successes. For example, in the spring of 1993, they killed nine IDF soldiers in 4 weeks.²⁷ This stung Israel's then-Prime Minister Itzak Rabin into ordering Operation ACCOUNTABILITY, discussed above.

That operation was widely regarded as a debacle. The announced purpose was to force Lebanon and Syria into curbing the Hizbollahis, but after 7 days of intense

bombardment, in which 500,000 Lebanese were rendered homeless (roughly the number displaced in Operation GRAPES OF WRATH), nothing changed.²⁸ Neither Asad nor Hariri gave way, and Hizbollah still went on attacking the IDF.

Christopher's 1993 ceasefire arrangement was widely regarded as a setback for Rabin. Under it, the Hizbollahis gained recognition as resistance fighters. Moreover, as the Hizbollahis construed the agreement, they were free to go after Israel's northern settlements whenever Israel killed any Lebanese civilians.²⁹

The Israelis certainly were not happy with the way things turned out; however, for awhile they were under no compulsion to react. Starting in late 1993, the pace of the peace talks picked up, and this motivated Asad to rein in the Hizbollahis by effectively cutting off their arms supply. The guerrillas reportedly got their weapons from Iran. They were flown from Tehran to Damascus and then transported to southern Lebanon through the Beka'a Valley, which Syria controls. As long as the peace talks seemed to be making progress, Asad interdicted the weapons flow to the guerrillas—no weapons, no resistance activity.

Then, at the end of 1995, Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated, and his successor, Shimon Peres, had to decide whether to call for new elections or wait until October when he was required by law to seek a mandate. The danger in moving up the elections was that it would cut short negotiations with Syria and Lebanon (and with the Palestinians), because Peres could not bargain effectively in the midst of an election campaign.

At the time, negotiations between Syria and Israel had hit a snag (as discussed below), and apparently for that reason Peres decided to call elections immediately. Asad, however, was not at all pleased with this, and shortly after the decision was made, resistance activity in the south flared anew.³⁰

It was during this renewal of fighting that the Hizbollahis rocketed Kiryat Shimona, not once but twice.³¹

This insured Israeli retaliation, which came in April when Operation GRAPES OF WRATH was launched.³²

With an election coming, Peres probably could not have done other than he did (in ordering Operation GRAPES OF WRATH).³³ Moreover, his reaction was generally expected, and so Operation GRAPES OF WRATH, when it came, did not generate a lot of concern in Israel or the non-Muslim world.³⁴ The United States, for example, reacted in a subdued way, which seemed justified at the time. The Israelis made a great deal of the fact that, with their superior technology, they could minimize civilian casualties and that they were only going after infrastructure.³⁵

Hariri, however, almost immediately began to fulminate against the operation, claiming that it was not an ad hoc response to guerrilla depredations but a contrived plot to wreck Lebanon's recovery. What seems to have set Hariri off was the open-endedness of the assault. While it was going on, Peres laid down a number of demands that the Lebanese and Syrians would have to fulfill before the operation could be stopped. This amounted to undertaking a campaign to disarm the guerrillas with which neither Hariri nor Asad was likely to comply.³⁶

As the operation dragged on, more and more infrastructure was destroyed, and thus the costs to Lebanon escalated. Nor were these simply random strikes that the Israelis were carrying out; there appeared to be a pattern to them.

Finding the Pattern.

The obvious point at issue, in trying to make sense of Operation GRAPES OF WRATH, is the level of destruction. The Israelis maintained that, by going after infrastructure, they were sparing the Lebanese. But, the infrastructure damage was considerable, and along with that, people *were* killed. To be sure, the number of deaths increased as the operation progressed (whereas at the very beginning, casualties were low).³⁷

The most spectacular aspect of the assault was the human exodus it caused. Anywhere from 300,000 to half-a-million Lebanese fled their homes (according to one estimate, 90 percent of southern Lebanon was depopulated). The people decamped after the IDF warned that the whole of southern Lebanon would be targeted. Subsequently, the bombardment followed the fleeing victims north, as the IDF bombed Shia neighborhoods in Beirut and Shia communities in the Beka'a Valley. The United Nations estimated at one point that the Israelis were firing between 3,000 to 4,000 artillery shells a day into Lebanon and were flying 200 air sorties across the border.³⁸ Meanwhile, Hizbollah kept up its barrage of rockets into Israel.

As of April 16, it was reported that 35 Lebanese had died and 20 were wounded at the hands of the IDF.³⁹ According to the Israelis, most of these were Hizbollahis. But this does not appear to be the case; the IDF probably killed no more than four guerrillas.⁴⁰ The Hizbollahis have no formal bases; they live among the villagers they claim to defend. Hence, in going after the guerrillas, the Israelis were forced to target the villages and, in the process, innocents died.

Considering the amount of ordnance that the Israelis expended, it is extraordinary that, in the early days of the assault, Lebanese casualties were kept so low. This would appear to constitute a testimonial to the Israelis' precision bombing. The IDF's success in this department was widely publicized, and thus, it came as a shock when, on April 18, an Israeli battery firing into Lebanon hit a UN camp at Qana, into which some 800 refugees had crammed themselves. The barrage killed over 100 persons and wounded a large number more. The IDF immediately claimed that this was an accident. The United Nations, which launched its own investigation, reported otherwise.⁴¹

A number of points of interest should be mentioned in connection with this incident. First, the Israeli government never apologized for the shelling, which, if it were accidental, would have been a simple thing to do.⁴² Nor did it ever attempt to court martial any of the officers involved in the affair. And, finally, the IDF refused to answer

allegations set forth in the report, although the UN left open the possibility that, if the Israelis did so, the report could be amended. This apparent indifference would seem to lend credence to the UN finding that the attack on Qana was deliberate.

The shelling aroused a significant outcry throughout the world and is certainly what induced the United States to become involved. Secretary Christopher travelled to the Middle East and began to meet with the principals. Ultimately, this produced the truce which brought Operation GRAPES OF WRATH to a halt.

Selected Targets.

In determining what, in fact, was going on with Operation GRAPES OF WRATH, we need to pay attention to what precisely was targeted and the manner in which the raids were carried out.

For example, after the huge exodus that was triggered by the operation got underway and hundreds of thousands of Lebanese were streaming northward, the IDF then went about destroying the deserted villages; several reports refer to 60 that were "obliterated."⁴³ The IDF had to inflict a certain amount of destruction on the villages to keep the exodus moving out of the area, but the destruction that actually occurred seems excessive. Reservoirs were blown up, bridges destroyed, and roads were cratered.⁴⁴ It was as though the Israelis were trying to degrade living conditions throughout the entire southern region, not just temporarily but for some time to come.

This was what went on in the south. Equally disturbing were the attacks on the capital. Beirut had absorbed the brunt of damage from Lebanon's 18-year-long civil war, and had assumed as of 1993 that its long ordeal was over. The return of Israeli helicopter gunships, blasting neighborhoods in the city's downtown, horrified the Lebanese.⁴⁵

Along with that, the Israelis destroyed the capital's electrical facilities by blowing up the main plant at Jumhour and another auxiliary installation at B'slam.⁴⁶ These two installations had been brought on line in January at a cost of millions of dollars. With their startup, Lebanon received round-the-clock electricity for the first time in 16 years.⁴⁷

Indeed, the plants at Jambour and B'slam were the symbols of Lebanon's reconstruction.⁴⁸ With them in operation, the recovery was free to move forward on several fronts. For example, the stock market reopened;⁴⁹ the telephone system came back on line;⁵⁰ several of the great international hotels began to rebuild their damaged edifices;⁵¹ and a number of international firms, which formerly had operated out of Lebanon, reopened offices in Beirut.⁵²

When the electricity shut off again, Lebanon's miracle recovery slipped under a cloud. It became problematical whether the great reconstruction would ever be completed. Evidence of lost confidence was Hariri's decision to cancel a \$100 million bond offering to produce new housing.⁵³ There was another bond offering set to go (for another \$100 million); this, too, appears to have been cancelled.⁵⁴ The head of Lebanon's central bank commented that the Israeli operation set back the recovery at least 2 years. He put the cost of the damage at \$300 million (other estimates range as high as half-a-billion), and he claimed that the Israelis should be made to compensate Lebanon for this.⁵⁵

How serious the damage was and what it will take to recover from it are questions which will only be answered with time. We will have to see how the international lending community responds to further appeals from Hariri, and also whether the Lebanese will be willing to rebuild for yet another time. Indeed, this would appear to be the key factor—the morale question. Will the country's morale hold up after all of the destruction to which it has been subjected?

Targeting the Shias.

Looking closely at the pattern of destruction, it is apparent that one community was targeted throughout—the Shias. Their villages were flattened in the south, and when they fled to Beirut for shelter, their neighborhoods in the capital were bombed.⁵⁶ The IDF also went after Shia communities in the Beka'a Valley.

Who are the Shias; that is, who are they precisely in relation to the recovery? They are the ones who are bankrolling a large portion of it.⁵⁷ Their money—largely coming from expatriate enclaves in West Africa—is behind much of the reconstruction effort. The willingness of the Shias to buy up property in the south is a guarantee of the country's ability to rebuild.⁵⁸

Thus it would appear that the Israelis, by going after the Shias, were actually targeting the recovery because if the Shias were to become demoralized (and stop pouring money in), the recovery could never succeed.

Looked at from that angle, Hariri's charges appear to have substance. The aim of the operation *was* to wreck the recovery or at least to set it back. The tipoff to this was the targeting. Destroying Beirut's electrical grid was a disproportionate response to Hizbollah activity. Nothing the Hizbollahis did warranted shutting down this system, especially when the country depended on it for its recovery.⁵⁹ Further, the shelling of Qana was unacceptable. Indeed, most of what was done to the Shias surpassed acceptable limits.

However, if, in fact, the Israelis were trying to harm the recovery, then targeting both the system and the community makes sense. With the electricity shut off, the recovery would come practically to a full stop. Similarly, Hariri could not hope to continue rebuilding without further infusions of capital from the Shias.⁶⁰

Thus, I think that Hariri's accusation is justified. At the same time, however, I do not agree completely with Hariri.

I think his rationale as to why all this was taking place is not sufficiently convincing.

In at least one interview, Hariri implied that Israel feared Lebanon as a commercial rival.⁶¹ This does not appear likely to me. Israel's economy is doing very well at present, better perhaps than Lebanon's.⁶² Moreover, Israel has the strong support of the United States. And finally, Israel's economy is largely high-tech; Lebanon's, commercial banking. The two economies (Israel's and Lebanon's) do not have to be in competition; they can exist side by side.

As I see it, Israel was not going after Lebanon's economy because it regarded that economy as a threat to it.⁶³ Something else triggered this violent outburst and to discover what that might have been, look to Damascus.

Lesson of the Master.

In the current peace negotiations, most observers have assumed that Asad primarily is interested in getting the Golan Heights back. This, they feel, is a matter of honor for him. Asad was Syria's defense minister in 1967 when the Heights were lost, and before he dies, he wants the Heights returned to expunge the stain to his reputation.

This at least is the theory, and it appears that the Israelis based their negotiating position on it. They felt that Asad was under pressure to get a deal, and thus, all they had to do was wait him out. The man was ill; he could not last much longer (the thinking went).⁶⁴ Eventually, if the Israelis sat tight, he would be forced to come around.

However, for a man who is presumably driven to make a deal, Asad has a curious way of behaving. His negotiating style is exasperating;⁶⁵ he picks over every detail, causing sessions to go on for hours. Asad thinks nothing of cancelling sessions and did this recently when he unilaterally cut off negotiations with Secretary Christopher, who arrived for a session in Damascus only to be informed that Asad was indisposed and refused to see him, thus forcing Christopher

to fly back to Tel Aviv.⁶⁶ This is not the behavior of a man who feels he has few diplomatic options.

The substance of what the Israelis and Syrians are negotiating over is fairly straightforward. The Israelis—or at least the Labor Party—have no objection to giving back the Golan. However, they will not do it on a silver salver, as it were. They do not accept Asad's argument that under the UN resolutions, they are obliged to hand back territory without preconditions.

The Israelis want what they call full peace. They were shortchanged (as they see it) by the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, which has really not gone anywhere, at least not commercially. Militarily, the Israelis achieved a great deal with the peace as they now no longer have to fear an Egyptian threat. But other aspects of the deal which the Israelis had counted upon have not materialized. For example, very few Egyptian tourists visit Israel, and no significant business deals have been struck between the two countries. As far as the Israelis are concerned, the Egyptians have fallen down in all the areas that really count.⁶⁷

Therefore, in attempting to make peace with the Syrians, the Israelis are determined to get the best deal that they can. This means creating a situation whereby Israel would be integrated into the regional economy. Israel does not want to be the odd man out as it presently sees itself. And therefore, Asad was given to understand that, in any final peace, Israel would require an immediate exchange of ambassadors, full trade relations, and open borders.⁶⁸

To date, Asad has been unwilling to go along with this. He has claimed that the two economies—Israel's and Syria's—are so different it is impossible to link them up in this way. At least it cannot be done all at once. The Syrian economy is too fragile; it could not possibly survive the shock of being confronted with such a dynamic entity as Israel.⁶⁹

This idea, that full peace is out of the question—at least for the present—was communicated to the Israelis by the Syrians negotiating at Wye, Maryland. Evidently it

influenced Peres' thinking about the elections after Rabin's death. Peres had the option of deferring the poll until October of this year, yet he chose instead to go to the people almost immediately, perhaps because he felt that he had nothing to lose.

Negotiations with Damascus were not going well. The Syrians would not discuss the one thing Israel was interested in—full peace. That being the case, it seemed acceptable to call for elections on the assumption that if Peres emerged a victor, his position would be that much stronger. And in any event, nothing would be lost so long as the Syrians were not in a mood to make any significant concessions.⁷⁰

This was the setting for Peres' announcement that the date of the elections would be changed and the negotiations with Syria would be put on hold. Asad reacted violently, claiming that precious momentum in the peacemaking was being lost. It was all that Secretary of State Christopher could do to keep the Syrians from breaking off the talks entirely. In the meantime, to Peres' surprise, the guerrilla war on Israel's northern border flared anew.⁷¹

This has been Asad's customary *modus operandi*. Whenever he is negotiating in earnest with Israelis, he shuts down the guerrilla war; when he is not, he allows the guerrillas to have free rein.

This time, however, the Israelis did not expect Asad to follow his customary pattern. Peres was locked in a close race with Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud Party. Asad may distrust Peres and the rest of the Labor politicians; however, he loathes Netanyahu who has stated publicly that he will never, as prime minister, preside over Israel's abandonment of the Golan.

Thus, Peres expected Asad to restrain the guerrillas, if only to make things easier for the Israeli leader. By not doing so, the Syrian practically ensured that the Israelis would have to conduct some operation such as GRAPES OF WRATH; Asad left Peres no choice. In this respect, his behavior made no sense.

It is easy to see how the Israelis might have reached the conclusion they did, but I think they misinterpreted what was going on. They assumed that, before everything else, Asad wants the Golan Heights back. But does he? After all, what are the Heights to Asad? They have no great significance strategically.⁷² In fact, they are nothing but several hundred square kilometers of rocky ground. Even commercially, they do not have much value.

Supposing Asad were to get them back, what could he do with them? To be sure, the original settlers, those displaced in 1967 or their descendents would be pleased to recover lost property. But if that is all the reward that Asad gets, that is not much.

Asad wants Lebanon. That is his primary goal, with the Golan Heights coming after that. Interestingly, almost without anyone's taking notice, Asad has been pursuing this goal of co-opting his neighbor from at least 1989.⁷³

Until the United States pulled out of Lebanon in 1983, the country was in the Western camp, largely because the Christians ran the government.⁷⁴ However, after the United States decamped, the Christians effectively relinquished control. This was a situation that had been a long time developing, the Christians had been losing power since the 1960s but had managed to maintain their position by trading on their ties to the United States. When the United States abandoned them, the Christians could not withstand the shock of that occurrence.

The surrender of the Christians to the Muslims left the field open to Asad to step in and virtually to take over the country. He did this in a number of ways, one of which was to strengthen his ties to the Shias, the most dynamic community in Lebanon and the most numerous.⁷⁵ Shia leader Nabih Berri's increasing power in the parliament was, to a certain extent, a function of his being perceived as Asad's man.

But Asad was not content merely to take over Lebanon politically, he encouraged the amalgamation of the two economies. During the 1980s, Syrian officers stationed

inside Lebanon made fortunes smuggling drugs out of Lebanon. When Hariri launched his reconstruction campaign, Asad and the men around him saw to it that they benefited. For example, many highly placed Syrian officials sit on the boards of Lebanese firms from which they take a percentage of the profits.

In addition, trade between the two countries has blossomed, it is estimated that it is now around \$90 million a year. Much of this is generated by Syrian workers (300,000 to a million of them) who are employed in rebuilding Beirut and its environs. The Syrian workers shop in Lebanon, but along with that, many Lebanese travel to Damascus to purchase items at lower prices than they can find at home. Wealthy Syrians also come to Lebanon to do their shopping in Beirut's smart boutiques.⁷⁶

This growing together of the two economies began slowly, but in recent years the pace has quickened largely due to the construction boom that is at the heart of Lebanon's recovery. As the domestic economy revived, the Lebanese began to speculate in overseas ventures. In 1994, the country was the first in the Arab world to tap the Eurobond market with an oversubscribed \$400 million issue, followed last year by a \$300 million deal. A Lebanese institution, Bank Audi, became the first Arab issuer of Global Depository Receipts. It raised over \$34 million in a twice-subscribed issue sold mainly to European and United States institutional clients.⁷⁷ As a consequence of such transactions, Lebanon has achieved a higher than 7 percent growth rate for the last 3 years, the first 3 years of consecutive growth in the past 30 years.⁷⁸

To take advantage of these developments, Asad has begun to privatize Syria's economy. Areas formerly controlled by the public sector are being turned over to private enterprise, and as a result, Syria has been showing greater productivity. The Syrian economy is looking well and also more like Lebanon's. In other words, one could say that the Syrian economy is becoming Lebanized.⁷⁹

This growing together of the two countries is not a power grab by Asad, or at least not completely so. No doubt if the Lebanese had their way, they would prefer to remain independent. The problem is that they have shown that they cannot live at peace with themselves. Witness the vicious feuding between the sects that virtually destroyed the country during the civil war.

Syria has the ability to curb Lebanon's feuding. So, there is a tradeoff here; Lebanon gets the strong authority that it needs, and Syria gets the revitalized economy that it needs.

If there is any doubt that something like this is happening, we need only to turn to Hariri. Recently in an interview given while Operation GRAPES OF WRATH was going on, Hariri said that the alliance of Lebanon and Syria is a natural one, and he expects it to persist even after the Israelis withdraw from the south.⁸⁰

Playing Catch Up.

It is my belief that the Israelis belatedly came to appreciate that this, in fact, was what Asad was after. They saw that they had misjudged him or, more precisely, that they had underestimated him. He is aiming for nothing less than parity with Israel. This is ambitious; few would have thought this possible. Always it was assumed that in any post-conflict settlement, Israel would emerge as the dominant power. Evidently Asad does not see it this way.

Assuming that my interpretation is correct, how does this explain the Israelis' behavior in Operation GRAPES OF WRATH? Once the Israelis awoke to the fact that Asad was pursuing a separate agenda (i.e., one not directly related to recovering the Golan Heights), they then had to reassess their stance in the peace talks.

They had been assuming that they were in a superior position and that therefore they would not have to make concessions to Asad; he would have to come to them. In fact, Asad benefits from standing pat. The longer the peace

process drags on, the more time the federation of Lebanon and Syria has to work itself out.

It is impossible to say at what point the Israeli leadership realized the change that had come about, but it must have been a frustrating revelation. What could they do to restore their erstwhile advantage? It seems likely that they grasped the opportunity of renewed Hizbollah attacks to set matters right as they saw it.

The Israeli leadership never expected Hariri or Asad to follow through on IDF demands to disarm the guerrillas. Assuming that the two would balk at this, they counted on being able to perpetuate Operation GRAPES OF WRATH and target more and more infrastructure which they knew would hurt the Lebanese recovery and in the process drive the morale of the Lebanese farther and farther down.

One could even speculate that, had it not been for Qana, the Israelis would have devastated Lebanon to ensure that it would never rise again. But when Qana occurred, the international outcry proved effective in shutting the operation down.⁸¹

I doubt this. The Israeli barrage at Qana, according to the UN report, was deliberately orchestrated to kill a great many people; and therefore, the Israelis would have anticipated that once the Qana incident was publicized, further bombardment of Lebanon would have been impossible. Indeed, U.S. President Clinton immediately called for a ceasefire, and one was arranged soon afterward.

Therefore, I would argue that the operation was meant to end where it did. Qana was a way of driving the point home. And what was the point? The Israelis were saying to Asad, "You must not think that you can evade the full peace issue. You must negotiate with us on this, or we will see to it that your dream is destroyed. There will be no rejuvenation of Syria's and Lebanon's economy because the IDF will wreck the recovery before it has a chance to take hold."

One possible counterargument to this theory is that Israel has no need to negotiate with anyone. It controls the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon and thus, had it wished, could retain its holdings and let the peace talks collapse.

This overlooks two points. One, the United States wants the talks to succeed, and there were inducements for the Israelis, not only to keep the talks alive, but to actually make progress in them.

The Labor Party made deals with a number of Gulf states which, if they could be consummated, would enrich Israel considerably. These deals were stalled, however, because Asad had pressured the Gulf sheikhs to hold back.⁸² The Labor politicians also were aware that many foreign firms wishing to do business with the Jewish state were hesitant so long as peace had yet to be declared. So Israel had an interest in achieving full peace and was motivated to galvanize Asad into making concessions.

Summing up then, Hariri's critique of Operation GRAPES OF WRATH is sound. The aim of the operation *was* to threaten Lebanon's recovery but not, as the Israelis maintained publicly, to force the Lebanese and Syrians to rein in Hizbollah. The aim was to force movement in the peace talks, movement that would benefit the Israelis.

Will Asad do as the Israelis have indicated? Probably not; the Syrian rarely gives way under pressure. But this may be academic now with the elections in Israel and the victory of Netanyahu.

Conclusion.

The most illuminating insight to come out of this analysis is the future of Lebanese-Syrian ties. If Lebanon and Syria are moving toward an informal federation, Syria has the potential to be a formidable actor in the Middle East.⁸³ Moreover, a Syria-Lebanon federation with ties to Saudi Arabia and to Europe through France would be in an advantageous position economically.⁸⁴

Of course, all of this could be moot if Lebanon does not recover from Operation GRAPES OF WRATH. Immediately after the truce, the Shias in the south were quoted as saying that they would certainly rebuild,⁸⁵ and Hariri announced that he had pledges of support from the Europeans to rejuvenate the construction effort.⁸⁶ There was even talk that Operation GRAPES OF WRATH had forged a new consensus in Lebanon; for the first time, all of the Lebanese—of every sect—were pulling together, determined to rebuild their country.⁸⁷

This may be pure rhetoric. But if it is not, and the rebuilding effort does go forward again, then the spotlight will shift to Israel's new Prime Minister Netanyahu and to the Likud Party, the winners in the Israeli elections. If Netanyahu orders another Operation GRAPES OF WRATH and the economy of Lebanon once more is targeted, not only Lebanon but all of the Arabs will cry foul. They will claim with justification that it is not Hizbollah the Israelis are trying to eliminate, but the chance of Lebanon's ever recovering.

Effectively, this should provide a pointer to U.S. policymakers. Washington should take the position that hostilities between the guerrillas and the IDF must be restricted to the security zone. The IDF must not perpetuate violent actions north of the zone; the guerrillas must not fire on Israel's northern settlements. There is a mechanism in place that is capable of preventing this.⁸⁸ We should use it.

Washington must see that after Operation GRAPES OF WRATH, the expansion of hostilities outside the zone is a very dangerous proposition as it has the potential to touch off yet another Arab-Israeli War.

ENDNOTES

1. Israel's Operation GRAPES OF WRATH commenced on April 11, 1996, and was over on April 28, 1996.

2. Hariri made the charges repeatedly while the invasion was going on. For the thrust of his comments, see *FBIS-NES-96-088*, May 6, 1996, under the heading "Lebanon."

3. See "Israel and Militants Trade Fire in Lebanon," *The New York Times*, April 1, 1996.

4. See "Peres Ponders Response to Attacks," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 10, 1996.

5. See "Israeli Bombs are Blocking Aid to Lebanese Villagers," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 18, 1996; "After the Bombardment," *The Financial Times*, April 27, 1996; "Lebanon Accuses Israel of Ruining Reconstruction Effort," *The Financial Times*, April 18, 1996; "Israeli Shelling of Coast Road Cuts Aid to Lebanese Villages," *The New York Times*, April 21, 1996; "Israeli Gunships Close Lebanese Roads," *The Washington Post*, April 21, 1996; "After Israeli Bombing, Move to Rebuild Lebanon in Retreat," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 28, 1996; "Israel Is Targeting Lebanon's Economy," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 19, 1996; "Israel Targets Lebanon's Economy," *The Washington Post*, April 16, 1996; "Lebanese Cope With Smashed Country," *The New York Times*, April 26, 1996, and "Assault Stalls Lebanon's Postwar Recovery," *The Washington Post*, April 27, 1996.

6. See "Israeli Shelling of Coast Road Cuts Aid to Lebanese Villages."

7. See "Syria and Israel Are Still Balking Over a Cease-Fire," *The New York Times*, April 22, 1996.

8. See "Israeli Jets Step up Pressure in Lebanon," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 26, 1996.

9. The best succinct statement of Hariri's feelings on this can be found in an interview he gave on April 29, 1996, over Beirut Radio (quoted in *FBIS-NES-96-084*, April 30, 1996). He said:

[T]here is a clear Israeli plot based, not on striking at Hizbollah militarily, but on something else. Western propaganda has given Hizbollah a certain image. Relying on this image, they started to say the first day that they wanted to strike Hizbollah. They wanted nothing from the Lebanese people because the Lebanese are a peaceful people. They wanted nothing from the Lebanese state because it is a recognized state. . . . They knew that Hizbollah could not be uprooted by force. They started to strike at some places and terrorize the people. They bombarded the areas around Beirut. . . . What was their plan? It was to bombard and urge the people to leave, using the excuse of striking at Hizbollah and uprooting it by force. Evicting the people forced them to come to Beirut. . . . The idea was to destroy through the exodus. The Israeli

operation was very clear. The Israeli message was very clear. Israel sought to undermine the Lebanese government's plan for the country's revival. . . . Israel believes that if this plan is implemented, peace is established and Lebanon is reconstructed, then Lebanon will be its major economic rival in the Arab world.

For other accounts of Hariri's position, see "After the Bombardment"; "Lebanon accuses Israel of ruining reconstruction effort"; "No More Short Term Solutions, Says Lebanon's PM," *The Financial Times*, April 23, 1996; "Lebanese Trapped in the Middle," *The Financial Times*, April 20, 1996; and "Trust Is a Casualty of Israeli Attacks," *The New York Times*, April 29, 1996. Also, see "Al-Hariri Speaks to Journalists in Paris," *FBIS-NES-96-073*, April 15, 1996; "Prime Minister Views Israeli Offensive, Occupation," *FBIS-NES-96-074*, April 16, 1996; "Al Hariri 'Shocked' by Peres' Comments on Israeli attack," *FBIS-NES-96-077*, April 19, 1996; "Al Hariri Interviewed on Situation," *FBIS-NES-96-078*, April 22, 1996, and "Al Hariri-'Israeli Aggression' Targeted Construction," *FBIS-NES-96-088*, May 6, 1996.

10. In 1978, Palestinian guerrillas were raiding northern Israel from Lebanon, and the Israelis mounted an invasion to drive them away from the border. The Israelis repeated the operation in 1982, this time with more success. However, by 1993 when Israeli staged its third assault, Hizbollah had replaced the Palestinian guerrillas as the principal danger threatening Israel from Lebanon. The 1993 incursion—Operation ACCOUNTABILITY—was widely regarded as a failure since it did not end the Hizbollah attacks. The most recent assault by the IDF in April of this year was the fourth such attack.

11. In fact, Israeli troops did enter Lebanon in 1993 but only after the operation had been going on for several days; tanks went in to blow up the homes of villagers. The Israeli public is strongly adverse to the introduction of ground troops into Lebanon, especially after the 1982 invasion. As a consequence of that affair, Israel experienced an inordinately large number of casualties, and since then the Israelis have looked on Lebanon as a potential quagmire.

12. The terms worked out by Christopher appear to have been left purposely vague. Moreover, the agreement was never committed to writing. Hence the parties could interpret the agreement almost any way they wished. The Hizbollahis maintained that neither party—Hizbollah nor Israel—could target civilians. If either did, then its enemy was free to target civilians in return. It is this proviso that Hizbollah used to justify its attacks on Kiryat Shimona, claiming that, since the IDF had killed Lebanese civilians, it (Hizbollah) was free to go after Israel's northern settlements. For a discussion of

Operation ACCOUNTABILITY and Christopher's agreement, see Stephen Pelletiere, *Assad and the Peace Process: The Pivotal Role of Lebanon*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 1, 1995.

13. See "Israel Is Targeting Lebanon's Economy."

14. See "After the Bombardment."

15. Lebanon is home to a number of sects, each with its own area of residence. The Shias have always lived in the south, just over the border from Israel. There is also a large complement of Shias in the north of the Beka'a Valley and in the suburbs south of Beirut.

16. For information on the Shias generally and Hizbollah specifically, see Stephen Pelletiere, *Hamas and Hizbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 10, 1994.

17. The Palestinians for many years made their headquarters in Jordan, but clashes with the Jordanian army resulted in their being driven from the country in the early 1970s, after which they shifted operations to Lebanon.

18. Amal was started in the early 1970s by Imam Sadr, a Shia cleric and the spiritual leader of Lebanon's Shia community. When he died, his place was taken by another cleric, Hussain al Hussaini, and he in turn was replaced by a secular leader, Nabih Berri, in the mid-1980s.

19. In the Middle East, the Lebanese represent the largest community of Shias outside of Iran (which is 90 percent Shia). Hence, the Iranians have taken an interest in cultivating their co-religionists in Lebanon. However, the Iranians have not been able to develop close ties to Nabih Berri's group, probably because of its secular leadership. Hizbollah is the organization that Tehran mainly supports.

20. After the Palestinians were driven out of Jordan and took up residence in Lebanon, the fighting arm of the community, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), clashed with the Christians. At that time Lebanon's Christians were pro-West and probably pro-Israel. For a time, it appeared that the Christians would destroy the PLO, but then Muslim groups in Lebanon rallied to the PLO's cause and effectively turned the tables on the Christians, threatening to break their powerful position. It was at this point that Asad intervened to restore the balance in favor of the Christians. His reasons were various, but basically he feared that if the Christians were seriously harmed, the Israelis would use this as a *casus belli* to occupy Lebanon, which would threaten Syria's security.

21. Power arrangements in Lebanon at this time were set by the so-called Lebanese National Pact. Under it, the president of the country was always a Christian; the prime minister, a Sunni Muslim; the minister of defense, a Druze; and the speaker of the parliament, a Shia. This pact was based on an understanding that the Christians were the numerically dominant community. However, that was a fiction. In fact, the Muslims surpassed the Christians demographically during World War II; however, to maintain the old power arrangement, the Lebanese never took a census.

22. For the best account of this conflict, see Robert Fisk, *Pity the Poor Nation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

23. See Pelletiere, *Hamas and Hizbollah*, and *Assad and the Peace Process*.

24. See "Iran's Party of God Puts Deep Roots in Lebanon," *The New York Times*, April 12, 1996.

25. See Patrick Seale, *Assad*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

26. Under UN Resolutions 242, 338, and 425, Israel is enjoined to withdraw from the Golan Heights and Lebanon without conditions.

27. The Hizbollahis probably do not number more than 200 fighters, although in a crisis they can probably call on a few hundred more. For details on the 1993 attacks, see "Israel Bombards Targets in Lebanon," *The Washington Post*, July 27, 1993; "Israeli Warplanes Pound Guerrillas," *The Washington Post*, July 26, 1993; "A blow for compromise and conciliation," *The Financial Times*, July 31, 1993; and "Rabin faces his greatest challenge," *The Financial Times*, July 31, 1993.

28. Operation ACCOUNTABILITY lasted 7 days, to Operation GRAPES OF WRATH's 17 days. In the former, Beirut was not hit; it was in the latter. In neither operation did the Israelis introduce land troops although at the end of Operation ACCOUNTABILITY, Israeli tanks went into Lebanon to demolish homes. After both operations ended, the Hizbollahis went immediately back into action.

29. According to Secretary Christopher's arrangement, the Hizbollahis were also free to operate against the IDF in the security zone. In effect, this is what enhanced their status as resistance fighters.

30. See "The Damascus Dilemma," *The Financial Times*, January 23, 1996.

31. According to a story in *The Washington Post*, during the 1990s Hizbollah has launched more attacks inside the security zone each year. In 1994, the last year for which complete data is available, the Hizbollahis killed 21 Israelis and 43 Christian mercenaries fighting with the IDF, compared with 12 and 13 two years before. Another 23 Israeli soldiers died in 1995, and 7 in the first quarter of 1996. See "Rationale for Containment Died Along With the Peace Talks," *The Washington Post*, April 21, 1996. As for the Katyusha attacks, the latest round targeted Kiryat Shimona, and an estimated 36 Israelis were wounded, none seriously.

32. See "An Attack on Israel Brings Woe to Peres," *The New York Times*, April 10, 1996.

33. Prior to the election, Peres had a problem with his image. He was not perceived to be a decisive leader. One thing against him was that, unlike most Israeli politicians, he had no background in the military. Operation GRAPES OF WRATH was seen as a way to portray the prime minister as a man of action.

34. See "Raids Draw Wide Praise in Israel," *The Washington Post*, April 15, 1996.

35. See "Israel's Pinpoint Shelling Creates Barrier for Refugees," *The Financial Times*, April 23, 1996.

36. Peres wanted an understanding that Hizbollah would not launch guerrilla attacks on Israeli soldiers in Lebanon from the cover of sympathetic Shia villages near the security zone. This amounted to a demand that the guerrilla force come out and fight like an army or quit fighting. Second, Peres wanted Syria to guarantee that Hizbollah would not fire Katyusha rockets or any other weapons into northern Israel. Both Syria and Lebanon take the position that as long as Israel is in illegal occupation of Lebanese territory in the south, the local inhabitants are within their rights to fight the occupiers. Hence, Hizbollah, which is carrying on the brunt of that fight, should be considered a resistance organization, not, as Israel would have it, a terrorist group. See "Israel Loses Leverage, Support After Slaughter of Refugees," *The Washington Post*, April 20, 1996.

37. The final tally will probably never be known. But it appears that it surpassed 200 persons killed and a couple hundred wounded.

38. See "Israeli Gunships Close Lebanese Road," *The Washington Post*, April 21, 1996.

39. See "Peres Hints He'd Talk as Raids Go On," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 16, 1996.

40. See "Israeli Rocket Hits Lebanese Ambulance," *The Washington Post*, April 14, 1996.

41. The United Nations investigators found that the pattern of shelling was inconsistent with the Israelis' claim that it was an accident. The report notes that the shells fell in two distinct patterns, one outside and one inside the camp. The report also notes that proximity-fused rounds fell on the base, while impact-fused rounds (better for destroying equipment) fell outside. The Israelis also maintained they did not know the refugees were in the camp, but the United Nations was able to show that the Israelis had a reconnaissance plane over the camp and two helicopters nearby. Finally, the camp had been located in that place for 18 years, and refugees always sought it out for shelter in a crisis. See "Camp Shelled by Israel, Inquiry Finds," *The Washington Post*, May 4, 1996; "Israel Blames Faulty Map In Shelling of UN Camp," *The Washington Post*, May 6, 1996; "91 Bodies Prepared for Rites in Lebanon," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 3, 1996; "Israel Blasts 'Absurd' UN Report on Qana," *The Financial Times*, May 9, 1996; "Israeli Says UN Troops Partly to Blame at Qana," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 16, 1996; "UN: Shelling of Base Likely Wasn't Mistake," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 9, 1996; "UN Criticism of Refugee Camp Shelling Attacked by U.S., Israel," *The Washington Post*, May 8, 1996; "UN Report Suggests Israeli Attack Was Not a Mistake," *The New York Times*, May 8, 1996; "Israel Denies It Targeted the Refugees," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 6, 1996; "Israel Says Mapping Error Led to Shelling of UN Base in Lebanon," *The New York Times*, May 6, 1996; "Israel Pressed on UN Shelling," *The Financial Times*, May 7, 1996; and for Amnesty International's inquiry and findings, see "Letting Israel Off the Hook," *The Washington Post*, April 27, 1996.

42. For comment on Israel's failure to apologize, see Thomas Friedman, "Lebanon's Aftermath," *The New York Times*, May 15, 1996. An objection has been raised to the theory that Israel deliberately bombed the camp; that is, Israel would not have taken this risk, knowing that the adverse publicity would be devastating. This line of reasoning assumes, however, that Israel had to fear exposure. In fact, it was only that the UN released its report in a timely fashion that hurt Israel. After the report's release by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, both the United States and Israel rebuked the head of the world body. Washington never subsequently condemned Israel's action, so one could say by way of reply that only in one area important to it—its relations with Washington—did Israel suffer at all. See "U.N. Criticism of Refugee Camp Shelling Attacked by U.S., Israel," *The Washington Post*, May 8, 1996.

43. See "Hizbollah Portraits Peer from Rubble of Nabatiyeh," *The Financial Times*, April 25, 1996.

44. See "Lebanese Refugees Return Home," *The Washington Post*, April 28, 1996.

45. See "In Beirut Suburbs, Attack Brings Back Old Memories," *The New York Times*, April 12, 1996.

46. Specifically, the Israelis hit two power stations—one, a recently refurbished \$20 million installation at Jamhour, East Beirut; and the other, a newer \$20 million plant at B'salim, northeast of the city. See "Israel Targets Economic Sites in Lebanon," *The Washington Post*, April 16, 1996.

47. After the plants were knocked out, electricity was rationed to 6 hours a day.

48. See "Crushing Lebanon's Dream," *Time Magazine*, May 6, 1996.

49. See "Beirut Exchange Reopens Despite Trading Delay," *The Financial Times*, February 13, 1996.

50. See "Beirut Starts to Re-emerge as a Business Centre," *The Financial Times*, January 2, 1996.

51. *Ibid.*

52. *Ibid.*

53. See "After Israeli Bombing, Move to Rebuild Lebanon in Retreat," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 28, 1996.

54. *Ibid.*

55. See "Lebanon Accuses Israel of Ruining Reconstruction Effort."

56. See "In Beirut Suburbs, Attack Brings Back Old Memories," *The New York Times*, April 12, 1996.

57. "After the Bombardment" reports that last year \$6.7 billion worth of capital entered Lebanon to finance real estate purchases and construction. The bulk of the money came from Shia emigres working in west Africa. In 1994, the same group contributed \$6.5 billion.

58. See "Hizbollah Portraits Peer from Rubble of Nabatiyeh."

59. The Israelis claimed that they were justified in destroying the electrical system because a Hizbollah Katyusha had knocked out the generator that supplied electricity for Kiryat Shimona. But Kiryat Shimona is a settlement of only a few thousand people. Beirut is the

capital of Lebanon, and the two plants supplied electricity for it and its environs.

60. A feature of the operation was the destruction of many sumptuous villas built by the expatriate Shias. Several stories reporting on the return of the refugees to their homes in the south commented on the fact that many of these villas, some worth millions of dollars, had been destroyed by the Israelis. This, of course, would be a heavy blow to the expatriates that built them. See "Lebanese Determined To Rebuild," *The Washington Post*, April 28, 1996.

61. See interview with Hariri in *FBIS-NES-96-088*, May 6, 1996, under "Lebanon."

62. See "Israel's Economy has Boomed with the Spread of Peace in Middle East," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 27, 1995. Moreover, Israel has \$70 billion GNP and is the prime beneficiary of Washington's shrinking aid program. See "Business Backs Peres in Bid for Peace Dividends," *The Financial Times*, May 16, 1996.

63. Not everyone would agree with this. Michael Jansen, writing on the "Failure of Grapes of Wrath," *Middle East International*, April 26, 1996, says that "the long term aim (of Operation GRAPES OF WRATH) was to delay Lebanon's economic recovery so that it would not be in a position to challenge Israel's attempts to penetrate the Middle East on the economic level and eventually achieve economic hegemony over the region."

64. Asad has had more than one heart attack.

65. See "U.S. Show of Anger Won Asad," *The Washington Post*, April 28, 1996.

66. See "Christopher Gets Snub From Asad in Middle East Talks," *The New York Times*, April 24, 1996.

67. There has been some improvement in trade between Egypt and Israel, but this is conditioned upon progress in talks between Israel and the Palestinians. Mubarak has threatened to break off commercial contacts if Israel's new Prime Minister Netanyahu reneges on commitments his predecessor made in the negotiations.

68. See "Peres Challenges Syria Leader To Reach Inclusive Peace Pact," *The New York Times*, November 23, 1995.

69. See "Israel's Vision of Syria Pact Is Ambitious," *The Washington Post*, January 24, 1996; also, "Hussein and Christopher Make Twin Visits to Israel," *The New York Times*, January 11, 1996.

70. See "Syrians Critical After Peace Talks with the Israelis," *The Financial Times*, January 15, 1996.

71. See "Israel Finds Challenge Impossible to Ignore," *The Washington Post*, April 12, 1996; also, "Guerrilla Bombers Heat Up Israel's War in South Lebanon," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, March 20, 1996.

72. See Lieutenant Colonel Gotowicki's article, "Considering a U.S. Military Force on the Golan," in this document.

73. This is the date of the Taif Agreement, brokered by the Saudis, which essentially ended the old political system in Lebanon. In fact, one could argue the Syrians have always wanted Lebanon to come under their sway ever since the British and French carved out the separate country of Lebanon after World War I. That country was deliberately configured to give supremacy to the Christians so that they would become surrogates of the Europeans. The Syrians rejected this creation, and, interestingly, Damascus has never opened an embassy in Beirut, which would appear to show it did not recognize Lebanon as an entity separate from it.

74. Under the Reagan administration, the United States left Lebanon after the destruction of the Marine Corps barracks in which over 200 marines died.

75. There are 1.2 million Shias in Lebanon, constituting almost half the population of the country.

76. See "Israel Is Targeting Lebanon's Economy."

77. See "Beirut Starts to Emerge as a Business Centre."

78. *The Wall Street Journal* sets the figure even higher. According to it, Lebanon's economy is growing at 8 percent a year, and total assets in Lebanon's banking system have increased 25 percent in the past 3 years. See "Israel Is Targeting Lebanon's Economy."

79. For a discussion of the improving Syrian economy, see Pelletiere, *Assad and the Peace Process*.

80. See "Trust Is a Casualty of Israeli Attacks." Also, see *FBIS-NES-96-088*, May 6, 1996, in which Hariri is quoted as saying, "one of the objectives of Israel's recent war against Lebanon was to separate Lebanon from Syria. But this only resulted in strengthening relations between the two countries." For the viewpoint of a leader of the Christian community on this, see Amine Gemayel, "A Failed Policy in Lebanon," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 2, 1996.

81. There is a possibility (which this report cannot explore) that the Israeli leadership was split over how to proceed on this. This would account for a curious incident which occurred at the outset of the operation. The general in charge of Operation GRAPES OF WRATH, Giora Inbar, warned Peres publicly not to try to end the operation prematurely. This suggests that hawks in the Israeli military may have been following their own agenda. See "General Tells Peres Not to End War in Lebanon Too Soon," *The Times*, April 18, 1996. See also the general's apology in *FBIS-NES-96-075*, April 17, 1996. See also "Israel: Army Said Demanding Different Cease-fire Terms Than Government," *FBIS-NES-96-076*, April 18, 1996.

82. There were deals with Qatar and Oman, and other deals supposedly were in the works.

83. Syria has always suffered from being resource poor, unlike its chief rival, Iraq, which has enormous supplies of oil. Syria in a position to exploit a dynamic Lebanese society would be another matter. It would be a significant economic force in the Middle East.

84. Asad has been in good standing with the Saudis since he agreed to take part in Operation DESERT STORM on the side of the coalition. However, his standing is now, if anything, improved. Prince Abdullah has taken over as *de facto* head of the desert kingdom, and Abdullah is a long-standing supporter of Syria. If, as everyone feels is inevitable, King Fahd is forced to step down because of illness, then Abdullah is likely to become king. As for France, the French inserted themselves into the negotiations to end Operation GRAPES OF WRATH over the objections of the Americans and Israelis. However, in the end, the Syrians and Lebanese maintained that it was France primarily that enabled the truce to come about. Paris would like to develop strong commercial ties with both Syria and Lebanon, countries for which it formerly held mandates after World War I.

85. See "Lebanese Determined to Rebuild," *The Washington Post*, April 28, 1996.

86. See "Assault Stalls Lebanon's Postwar Recovery," *The Washington Post*, April 27, 1996.

87. See "Plight of Qana's Victims Unites Lebanon Factions," *The Times*, April 22, 1996.

88. This is the committee to monitor the ceasefire. For Hariri's description of how this mechanism will work, see "Lebanon: Al Hariri Holds News Conference," *FBIS-NES-96-084*, April 30, 1996.

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