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PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material and covers the following topics:

- modernization of the North Korean Army,
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics in the Korean War, and
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics since the Korean War.

The bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

GLOSSARY

CPLA Chinese People's Liberation Army

CFC Combined Forces Command (US and ROK)

DPRK Democratic People's Republic of

Korea (North Korea)

NKA North Korean Army

NKAF North Korean Air Force

NKN North Korean Navy

KPA Korean People's Army (Comprises NKA, NKAF,

and NKN)

KWP Korean Workers' Party

ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)

ROKA Republic of Korea Army

ROKAF Republic of Korea Air Force

ROKN Republic of Korea Navy 1. MODERNIZATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

Humphrey, Hubert H. and Glenn, John. <u>U.S. Troop Withdrawal From the Republic of Korea.</u> Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978. 81 pp. UA26.K6H85

This report to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations compares the military capabilities of North and South Korea in order to assess the effect of the withdrawal of US Forces from Korea as proposed by President Carter in 1977. A determined North Korean effort to achieve military superiority over South Korea is viewed as having upset the military balance on the peninsula. Between 1970 and 1977, the number of personnel, tanks, assault guns, and antiaircraft guns in the NKA increased by 120,000, 1,350, 630, and 3,500, respectively. The report concludes that although North Korean intentions cannot be predicted with certainty, the deployment of NKA units close to the Demilitarized Zone gives Pyongyang the option of attacking South Korea with little or no warning.

Porth, Jacquelyn S. "South Korea: Strategy for Success."

<u>Defense and Foreign Affairs</u> (Washington D.C.), vol. 12, no. 5, May 1984, pp. 11-18. UAl0.D428

The author states that a 10-year military buildup has substantially improved the offensive capabilities of the NKA, particularly in armored and artillery assets where the NKA maintains a 2 to 1 advantage over the ROKA. Porth believes that North Korea plans to increase its use of terrorism against South Korea in the future and describes South Korean counterterrorist programs.

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2.		STRATEGY				

Hoyt, Edwin P. <u>The Bloody Road to Panmunjom.</u> New York: Stein and Day, 1985. 320 pp. Maps. Bibliography. Index. DS918.H657

Hoyt focuses on the Chinese intervention in the Korean War and subsequent political and military factors which prevented either side from winning a decisive victory in the conflict. Chinese and North Korean tactics in a number of battles after October 1950 are described, the author emphasizing the capability of Chinese strategists to use the element of surprise and the rugged Korean terrain to their advantage. Hoyt attributes Chinese successes in the fall and winter of 1950 to the failure of US intelligence to provide military and political leaders with accurate information on the size of CPLA forces in Korea and accurate assessments of Chinese military capabilities.

Lanza, Conrad H. "International Military Survey." <u>Army Combat Forces Journal</u> (Washington D.C.), vol. 1, no. 2, September 1950, pp. 40-42. Ul.A93

The ROKA's inability to hold a main line of resistance north of Seoul for longer than 2 days following the North Korean invasion in June 1950 is attributed to inadequate preparation and poor training. As an example, the author describes how a battalion of the ROKA 7th Division ran out of ammunition while defending a hill. The battalion commander ordered his unit to fall back and resupply, leaving the hill undefended. Lanza is critical of the ROKA for not having prepared to move ammunition to frontline forces. The author also discusses problems faced by US infantry personnel (equipped with bazookas and 4.2-inch mortars) and US artillery personnel when coping with North Korean tanks. The author notes that without a war plan for Korea the US had to improvise a strategy to stop the well-equipped and well-trained NKA.

Leckie, Robert. <u>Conflict.</u> New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1962. 448 pp. Bibliography. Notes. Index. DS918.L36

Much of this book deals with US efforts to limit the NKA advance after the fall of Seoul on 28 June 1950. It provides useful information concerning NKA strategy and tactics and describes how South Korean and US units, often heavily outnumbered and outgunned, succeeded in slowing down the advance until reinforcements arrived via Pusan. Leckie believes that the US Army would have performed even better between July and September 1950, if the units committed to combat had been equipped with the appropriate weapons and, if young recruits in the ranks had been adequately prepared for wartime conditions. Leckie blames the poor attitude of the American public for morale problems among US soldiers in Korea.

O'Ballance, Edgar. <u>Korea: 1950-1953.</u> Hamdon, Conn.: Archon Books, 1969. 171 pp. DS918.025

In chapter 8, the author describes Communist preparations for attacks on UN Forces in April and May 1951.

O'Ballance maintains that Soviet military advisors to the CPLA and NKA devised the strategies for these battles under the leadership of Colonel General Shykov. However, the author does not explain the discrepancy between this assessment and the actual campaigns which emphasized Chinese mass wave assaults with very little armor and artillery to support the attack. When the Communists ran out of ammunition and supplies after only 5 to 7 days, they retreated. Reportedly, heavy casualties in the two campaigns, 80,000 in April and 120,000 in May, convinced Communist leaders that the war could not be won.

Odgers, George. Across the Parallel. London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1952. 239 pp. DS918.03

The author, an Australian correspondent, describes the combat action of the 77th Fighter Squadron of the Royal Australian Air force in the Korean War. Odgers believes that the NKA would have taken Pusan if it had not been for allied airpower. Odgers claims that airpower accounted for the following percentages of enemy losses in the first 3 months of the war: personnel, 47 percent; tanks, 81

percent; artillery, 72 percent; and trucks, 75 percent. NKA and CPLA air defense tactics in the Korean War are discussed throughout the book.

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3.	KOREAN	STRATEGY	AND		KOREAN	

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Gong, Gerrit W. "The Potential for Conflict in Northeast Asia in an Era of Change." The Future of Conflict in the 1980s. pp. 313-34. Edited by William J. Taylor. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982. UA10.5.F87

Gong maintains that North Korea would limit its military actions to low-level guerrilla and commando operations, if, indeed, it decides to use military tactics against South Korea in the 1980s. He contends that if North Korea launches a full-scale attack on South Korea, it would risk losing China's support and encouraging other nations to actively support the defense of South Korea. By limiting its military action to small-scale acts of terrorism, Gong believes that North Korea can create confusion and panic in the South and avoid creating a united opposition.

"North Korea Moves 65 Percent of Its Forces Near the DMZ."

<u>Korea Herald</u> (Seoul), 24 November 1985, p. 1.

South Korean Minister of National Defense Yoon Sung-min states that North Korea has stationed 65 percent of all NKA units close to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in an apparent attempt to increase its capability to launch a blitzkrieg attack against his country. Yoon also reports that the NKA is converting armored and mechanized divisions into brigades to facilitate joint operations with the NKAF and NKN.