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#### PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material and covers the following topics:

- modernization of the North Korean Army,
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics in the Korean War, and
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics since the Korean War.

The bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

### GLOSSARY

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CPLA	Chinese People's Liberation Army		
CFC	Combined Forces Command (US and ROK)		
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)		
NKA	North Korean Army		
NKAF	North Korean Air Force		
NKN	North Korean Navy		
КРА	Korean People's Army (Comprises NKA, NKAF, and NKN)		
KWP	Korean Workers' Party		
ROK	Republic of Korea (South Korea)		
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army		
ROKAF	Republic of Korea Air Force		
ROKN	Republic of Korea Navy		

## 1. MODERNIZATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

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"Brzezinski Warns of Pyongyang Venture During '88 Olympics." Korea Herald (Seoul), 20 December 1986, p. 3.

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor to US President Jimmy Carter, says that while North Korea continues to spend about 20 percent of its GNP on defense, its economic problems are beginning to have an impact on its capability to maintain military superiority over South Korea. He believes that Pyongyang may be preparing to undertake some type of military action against Seoul in the near future to disrupt the economic progress of the latter. In the longterm, he suggests that new leaders in the two Koreas, China, and Japan may be able to work together to facilitate a reduction of tension throughout Northeast Asia. For the time being, however, he views the presence of US Forces in Korea as an essential element in preserving peace on the Korean Peninsula.

"Emergency in North Korea." <u>Korea Times</u> (Seoul), 19 November 1986, p. 2. In JPRS-KAR-86-056, 8 December 1986, pp. 13-14.

North Korean loudspeaker broadcasts on 16 and 17 November that claimed North Korean President Kim Il-song had been assassinated are said to be evidence of a power struggle within the NKPA. It is argued that factions have existed in the military since the early 1970s. President Kim is said to be opposed because of his plan to have his son take over after he leaves the political scene.

"Kim Calls at the Kremlin." <u>Asiaweek</u> (Hong Kong), Vol. 12, No. 45, 9 November 1986, pp. 16-17. DS1.A715

Kim Il-song's October 1986 visit to Moscow is viewed as an indication that the North Korean President is interested in expanding military links with the Soviet Union. It is speculated, however, that Kim will not tilt so far toward Moscow so as to alarm Beijing. Although the subjects of Kim's talks with General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev have not been publicized, it is believed that the two leaders discussed ways to expand North Korean trade with the Soviet Union

and East European countries, Sino-Soviet relations, and the current situation in Cambodia. Pyongyang and Moscow are said to have common threat perceptions of US and Japanese military cooperation.

"Kim Il-song's Visit to Moscow 'Bodes Ill'." <u>Choson Ilbo</u> (Seoul), 22 October 1986, p. 2. In JPRS-KAR-86-050, 10 November 1986, pp. 3-4.

This article suggests that a major part of the evolving alliance between North Korea and the Soviet Union includes cooperation between the Soviet Navy and the NKN. It points out that North Korean President Kim Il-song's October 1986 visit to the Soviet Union came a short time after the first joint naval exercise ever arranged between the two countries. It is speculated that North Korea is interested in purchasing naval vessels, most likely submarines, from the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union is said to be interested in encouraging North Korean participation in training exercises targeting US Naval Forces in the region.

McBeth, John. "Monitoring the Moles." Far Eastern Economic <u>Review</u> (Hong Kong), Vol. 134, No. 50, 11 December 1986, pp. 29-31. HC411.F18

North Korean tunnels under the DMZ and the storage of large amounts of weapons and equipment underground in areas close to the DMZ are said to represent significant threats to the security of South Korea. Although no tunnels originating in North Korea have been found south of the DMZ since 1978, such tunnels could exist and may be used to infiltrate large numbers of infantrymen behind ROKA lines in the initial stages of combat. Additionally, the NKA and NKAF have both built a number of underground shelters in strategic locations to protect NKA supplies and NKAF aircraft. In the event of hostilities, these shelters would be difficult to locate and destroy. The only problems the North Koreans have with such facilities are preventing flooding and preserving the items being stored. The report notes that NKA and CPLA forces made

extensive use of tunnels and underground shelters during the Korean War.

"Soviet North Korea Joint Military Exercise." <u>Tonga Ilbo</u> (Seoul), 21 October 1986, p.2. In JPRS-KAR-86-050, 10 November 1986, pp. 1-2.

This editorial criticizes the Soviet Union for encouraging North Korean bellicosity aimed at South Korea. It maintains that by organizing joint naval exercises and selling Pyongyang weapons and aircraft, the Soviets are increasing the chance of war on the Korean Peninsula. Gorbachev's July 1986 speech is cited as an example of the Soviet Union's interest in expanding its own influence in Asia and the Pacific. <u>Tonga Ilbo</u> calls on the Soviet Union to restrain the bellicose nature of North Korea and to promote the participation of the latter in inter-Korean peace talks. The editorial was written on the eve of North Korean President Kim Il-song's October 1986 visit to Moscow.

"Soviets Believed to Have Committed Supply of Modern Equipment to North Korea. <u>Chungang Ilbo</u> (Seoul), 12 December 1986. In <u>Press Translations</u> (US Embassy, Seoul), 15 December 1986, p. 2. DS901.P7

The South Korean daily says North Korean President Kim Il-song may have asked Soviet leaders to supply the NKAF with MiG-29/FULCRUM fighter aircraft during his October visit to Moscow. According to a professor at the Japanese Defense Agency's Defense Institute, there is a good chance North Korea will get the MiG-29s it wants, if it is willing to provide military facilities to the Soviets in return. 2. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR

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#### Hopkins, William B. <u>One Bugle No Drums</u>. Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 1986. 274 pp. DS919.H56

This books is an evewitness account of the US First Marine Division's successful effort to prevent the CPLA 9th Army from taking Hamhung before the Division could be evacuated from the North Korean port city in December 1950. In chapter 9 the author discusses CPLA preparations for battle in November 1950. Its major strengths were strong leadership, a large number of battle-tested troops, good intelligence on the location of UN Forces in North Korea, the ability to move unhindered at night, and excellent morale. CPLA weaknesses included its poor supply network--the average Chinese infantryman had 4 days rations and 80 rounds of ammunition for his rifle--and a communications network that extended only as far down as the regiment and thereby denying CPLA commanders at the battalion level and lower little tactical flexibility. The author believes that the CPLA lost the support of many North Koreans early in the conflict because Chinese soldiers stole food and failed to treat civilians with The US Forces benefited from this situation as respect. many North Koreans provided valuable intelligence about the location of CPLA units. Hopkins believes that these friendly North Koreans later turned against the United States because of the destruction caused by aircraft bombing. He believes that a lesson to be learned from the Korean and Vietnam Wars is that indiscriminate bombing by airpower is detrimental to the overall war effort because of its effect on the civilian population.

Nath, Pram. <u>A Condensed Study of the War in Korea</u>. New Delhi: E.B.D. Publishing and Distributing Co., 1968. 103 pp. Maps. DS918.N34

The author, a major in the Indian Army, presents an objective evaluation of the performance of the enemy and allied forces which participated in the Korean War. The NKPA did well in the first month of the war because it was better-organized, equipped, and trained than the ROKA. The author criticizes the failure of the ROKA to collect and utilize intelligence on the NKPA before and during the conflict. The biggest problem faced by the CPLA was its high tooth-to-tail ratio and, as a result, the Chinese had

difficulty supplying their troops in Korea. Nath praises the leaders of the UN Forces for their skillful use of combined operations. However, he believes they could have done a better job of training and motivating ground force personnel throughout the conflict. Other subjects discussed include the effects of weather and terrain on military operations, the effectiveness of allied air and naval forces during the war, the problems associatd with integrating military units from several countries under one command, and the military training records of key allied and enemy commanders. 3. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS SINCE THE KOREAN WAR

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"Dynastic Succession Faces Opposition." <u>Korea Herald</u> (Seoul), 3 December 1986, p. 3.

This article claims that unnamed diplomats and analysts in Seoul believe that North Korea did broadcast reports on 16 and 17 November saying that President Kim Il-song had been assassinated. The article says that a large number of senior North Korean officials oppose Kim's plan to pass power to his son and would like to establish a collective leadership after his death. Longtime supporters of Kim, possibly including Minister of the People's Armed Forces O Chin-u are said to oppose heir apparent Kim Chong-il. Chinese leaders may also distrust the President's son because of his alleged involvement in the October 1983 attempt by NKA commandos to kill South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan.

Lee, Ki-tak. "Soviets' Linkage with North Korea." <u>Korea Herald</u> (Seoul), 8 January 1987, p. 2.

North Korea, the Soviet Union, and Mongolia are said to be establishing a tripartite military alliance which will encircle the northern and eastern parts of China. The three are believed to be united in opposition to China's growing relationship with Japan and the United States. The author, a professor of political science at Yonsei University in South Korea, says that Mongolia and North Korea signed a friendship treaty in November 1986 and are initiating bilateral military exchanges. Moscow is said to be promoting smooth military relations with North Korea by inviting junior military officers to visit the Soviet Union. The author believes that despite North Korea's peace and anti-nuclear proposals of recent months, Pyongyang is allowing Soviet aircraft and naval vessels with nuclear weapons into the country. He suggests there is no chance of a military coup taking place in North Korea because the NKA is firmly under the control of Kim Il-song and because security measures for the North Korean president are excellent.

Manguno, P. and Schiffman James R. "Kim Il Sung Apparently Remains Alive." <u>Asian Wall Street Journal</u> (Hong Kong), 19 November 1986, p. 3.

According to this article, it is a mystery why North Korean loadspeaker broadcasts along the DMZ falsely reported the death of President Kim Il-song on 16 and 17 November. Most foreign diplomats contacted by the authors believe that reports about these broadcasts were the result of a deliberate disinformation campaign by one of the two Korean governments, but the article does not suggest whether it is the South or North who is the most likely candidate for blame.

McBeth, John. "Damning Conclusions." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), Vol. 134, No. 47, 20 November 1986, p. 29. HC411.F18

Some Western analysts are said to disagree with South Korean analysts who say there is no good reason for the North Koreans to build a dam along the Han River just north of the DMZ. The dam, currently under construction at Kumgang, is located at the confluence of the Han and Kumgang rivers. Fifty thousand NKA soldiers have been mobilized to construct the dam. The project is expected to take about five years. The South Korean Government fears that if North Korea deliberately destroys the dam when the reservoir is full, it will flood Seoul and cut communications and transportation to ROKA units north of However, Western analysts say that the dam will Seoul. provide a needed source for energy in the region south of Pyongyang. They point out that most of North Korea's energy plants have been built much farther north. The article includes a map of North Korea, showing how the North Koreans plan to divert water from Kumgang to Anbyon located in the northeastern part of the country. Another map illustrates the danger posed to Seoul and its environs.

McBeth, John. "The 'Great Leader' Mystery." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), Vol. 134, No. 48, 27 November 1986, p. 12. HC411.F18

This is a compilation of the few facts known about the mysterious reports of 16 and 17 November which falsely claimed that North Korean President Kim Il-song had been assassinated. Japanese, Chinese, South Korean, and US journalists, diplomats, and other officials heard several versions of the report during the two-day period. Kim reappeared at an official welcoming ceremony for General Secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Jambyn Batmonh. The author says it is impossible to determine from available information whether the incident was a bizarre charade or the result of a serious challenge to President Kim's leadership.

"Report on North Korean Moves to Expand Military Cooperation." <u>Naewoe T'ongsin</u> (Seoul), 26 September 1986, pp. 1J-7J. In JPRS-KAR-86-051, 13 November 1986, pp. 3-5.

This article examines North Korea's bilateral military exchanges in the summer and fall of 1986 with five Communist countries. The "frequent" visits by Soviet naval vessels to the North Korean port of Wonsan, the use of North Korean airspace by Soviet reconnaissance aircraft, statements suggesting the Soviet Union would come to the aid of North Korea made on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, and other events during the period are said to be indications that Pyongyang is a firm supporter of Soviet military strategy in the Far East. In August, the commander of China's Beijing Military District visited Pyongyang and met with key North Korean military leaders. Although China is not known to have agreed to any new military sales, he reportedly conveyed a pledge to support North Korea if it was attacked by another country. In September, NKPA Chief of Staff O Kuk-yol visited Romania, Hungary, and East Germany. It is speculated that North Korea wants to import more weapons produced in these countries and may be willing to expand other forms of military cooperation with Soviet allies in Eastern Europe.

"Soviet Aircraft Flying Over North Korea." <u>Hanguk Ilbo</u> (Seoul), 8 November 1986, p. 2. JPRS-KAR-86-56, 8 December 1986, pp. 69-70.

The visit by three US naval vessels to Qingdao, China is viewed as an effective military reaction to various Soviet military activities in North Korea. Soviet bombers flying between the Soviet Union and Vietnam on a route that passes over North Korea have been observed practicing missile attacks on South Korea and Japan. Additionally, Soviet naval vessels are said to be using the North Korean port of Nampo. The editorial says that Chinese military cooperation with the United States will contribute to the maintenance of peace on the Korean Peninsula.

"Soviets Get New Overflight Rights." <u>Asian Aviation</u> (Singapore), Vol. 6, No. 11, November 1986, p. 56. Not in LC.

Admiral James Lyons, Commander of US Forces in the Pacific, reported in November that Soviet Tu-16/BADGER bombers are now flying regularly over North Korea in transit between the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Lyons said, "This is an entirely new profile and greatly facilitates the movement of resources." Lyons attributes the new development to agreements reached during North Korean President Kim II-song's October visit to Moscow.