19961202 059

* :

,\$

October 1986

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED &

METRIBUTICA

STATEMENT

Approved for public release, Distribution Unimited

ê

Dear Reader:

• !

This product was prepared by the staff of the *Federal Research Division* of the *Library of Congress* under an interagency agreement with the sponsoring United States Government agency.

The Federal Research Division is the Library of Congress's primary fee-for-service research unit. At the request of Executive and Judicial branch agencies of the United States Government and on a cost-recovery basis, the Division prepares studies and reports, chronologies, bibliographies, foreignlanguage abstracts, databases, and other tailored products in hard-copy and electronic media. The subjects researched include the broad spectrum of social sciences, physical sciences, and the humanities.

For additional information on obtaining the research and analytical services of the Federal Research Division, please call 202-707-9905, fax 202-707-9920), via Internet frd@mail.loc.gov, or write to Marketing Coordinator, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 20540-4840.

D

Louis R. Mortimer Chief Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, DC 20540-4840

REPOR	T DOCUMENTATIO	NPAGE	Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
gathering and maintaining the data needed, an of information, including suggestions for reduci	ormation is estimated to average 1 hour per resp of completing and reviewing the collection of info ng this burden, to Washington Headquarters Se 2-4302, and to the Office of Management and Bi	mation. Send comments regarding this burder vices, Directorate for Information Operations a	estimate or any other aspect of this collection nd Reports, 1215 Jefferson
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COV	
	OCT 1986	Final	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE		-	5. FUNDING NUMBERS
A Selective, Annotated Bibliog	graphy on the North Korean Military	/	
6. AUTHOR(S)	<u></u>		- -
Rodney Katz			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, DC 20540-4840			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
N/A			AGENOTALIONINOMBLA
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Prepared under an Interagency 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STA			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.			
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)			
monographs on the army of the author in three sections: moder	monthly installments from an onlin Democratic People's Republic of K nization of the North Korean army, ategies and tactics used by the North	orea (North Korea). Entries are an strategies and tactics used by the 1	ranged alphabetically by
14. SUBJECT TERMS	<u>,,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,</u>		15. NUMBER OF PAGES
North Korea National security			16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	SAR
NSN 7540-01-280-5500	i	1	Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std 239-18 298-102

n ng la sina tan

• :

;

-

PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material and covers the following topics:

- modernization of the North Korean Army,

•7

ž

- North Korean Army strategy and tactics in the Korean War, and
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics since the Korean War.

The bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

GLOSSARY

• :

¢

CPLA	Chinese People's Liberation Army	
CFC	Combined Forces Command (US and ROK)	
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)	
NKA	North Korean Army	
NKAF	North Korean Air Force	
NKN	North Korean Navy	
КРА	Korean People's Army (Comprises NKA, NKAF, and NKN)	
KWP	Korean Workers' Party	
ROK	Republic of Korea (South Korea)	
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army	
ROKAF	Republic of Korea Air Force	
ROKN	Republic of Korea Navy	

1. MODERNIZATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

.

• :

2

Jacobs, G. "North Korea's Armoured Forces." <u>Asian Defence</u> <u>Journal</u> (Kuala Lumpur), June 1986, pp. 56-61. UA830.A8

• :

The organization of the NKA's armored units are outlined and estimates of the numbers and types of tanks and armored fighting vehicles (AFV) currently in th NKA inventory are discussed in this article. North Korea is said to be producing and fielding large numbers of T-62 tanks to supplement the older T-54/55 and Chinese-produced Type-59 tanks which have been the main battle tanks of the NKA for more than a decade. Based on what is known about the deployment of North Korea's armor, Jacobs believes that the mechanized infantry divisions, which were recently formed and positioned close to the DMZ, have been equipped with new tanks and AFVs and will be used to exploit infantry penetrations of ROKA defenses in the early stages of a conflict. Additionally, each of the frontline NKA corps level commands has one independent armor regiment as a tactical reserve, and the NKPA's Strategic Forces Command (SFC) is reported to control one armored division and one mechanized infantry division as a strategic reserve. The NKA's Armored Command is said to have technical and training responsibilities, but no operational control over armored units. Jacobs disagrees with reports published by the Institute of International Strategic Studies which credit North Korea with five independent armor brigades. He believes that North Korean doctrine on the use of armor is based primarily on Soviet doctrine.

Morrison, Charles E., ed. <u>Threats to Security in East</u> <u>Asia-Pacific</u>. Lexington, Ma: D.C. Heath and Company, 1983. 217pp. UA830.T48

Chapter six provides information collected in the early 80s concerning South Korean threat perceptions. The author cites two opinion polls taken in 1980 and 1981, both of which indicate that a majority of South Koreans do not believe that North Korea will attempt another all-out invasion of the South. The author, Sang-woo Rhee, speculates that the general public is optimistic about ROK security for two reasons. First, most Koreans believe that US commitments to their country will prevent war. Second, many Koreans do not believe the worst case

• 2

assessments frequently publicized by the ROK Government. However, 43.5 precent of those polled in 1981 believed that North Korea would continue subversive activities designed to politically destabilize South Korea. The author concludes that North Korean revolutionary propaganda will not win many supporters among the general populace of South Korea, but he argues that South Koreans should be more concerned than they are about the North Korean military threat. Additionally, he questions whether the US will remain willing and capable to come to South Korea's defense because of its global strategic interests and growing relationship with China. He states that the latter point, in particular, poses a poltical dilemma which the South Korean Government must deal with during the next decade.

Park, Tong Whan. "Political Economy of the Arms Race in Korea." <u>Asian Survey</u> (Berkeley), Vol. 26, No. 8, August 1986, pp. 839-850. DS1.A492

The author applies mathematical equations and action-reaction models in an attempt to explain the motivations of North and South Korean leaders for perpetuating high levels of defense spending. He contends that as long as North Korea has the larger military establishment, it will primarily be concerned with the rate of change in Seoul's defense spending and its own inability to keep pace. In contrast, South Korea has disregarded decreases in Pyongyang's defense spending on at least one occasion (1971-72), and has always focused on the North's maintenance of high force levels. The author predicts that when Seoul surpasses Pyongyang in total military strength (around 1990), the threat perceptions of both countries will be reversed. Park suggests that since the Rangoon Bombing incident (October 1983), North Korea has appeared more willing to discuss reductions in force levels and he calls on the ROK Government to take advantage of Pyongyang's apparent willingness to negotiate agreements that could promote a reduction of tension on the Peninsula.

2. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR

.

•:

ï

Clark, Mark W. <u>From the Danuabe to the Yalu</u>. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1954. x. 369pp. Illustrations. DS918.C55

• :

Clark was Commander of UN Forces in Korea from May 1952 until the end of the war in 1953. This book includes useful information on how he and his staff formulated strategy for a defensive war while under instructions from Washington to focus on the political task of negotiating an acceptable armistace. In chapter 7 the author discusses the leadership and tactics of the NKA and CPLA. Clark describes them as "members of the Soviet Union's second team," and argues that the Korean War was one part of a Soviet plan to achieve world domination. He believes that the top echelons of the NKA and CPLA commands were filled with able leaders, however, he states that the Communists handicapped themselves in the middle and lower command echelons by placing more importance on political loyalty than military skill. The fact that Communist operations were almost always planned and rehearsed well in advance of an attack are said to have given UN Forces an important tactical advantage. Allied field officers could react flexibly to the battlefield situation, while their counterparts in the NKA and CPLA were usually not allowed to disregard orders from higher commands. Clark suggests that the UN Forces should have continued to undertake offensive operations in 1952 and 1953. He believes such actions would have deterred Moscow and Beijing from subsequent attempts at subversion and armed aggression directed at other Free World nations.

Foot, Rosemary. <u>The Wrong War</u>. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985. 290pp. DS918.F62

Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, at various times between 1950 and 1953 seriously considered expanding the Korean War to include air and naval operations against military targets in China. The author has analyzed declassified US Government documents, the memoirs of high level officials in the two administrations, reports published by Congress, and open source materials to try and obtain a clear understanding of why the US did not attack China. Foot believes that US policymakers were aware that the Soviet Union's unwillingness to provide more military support for

• :

China and North Korea during the Korean War would eventually lead to the development of a Sino-Soviet split that would be advantageous to US national security interests. A corollary assumption was that an attack on China would have solidifed trilateral cooperation among the Soviet Union, China and North Korea, thereby increasing the Communist threat to the Free World. Other constraining factors taken into consideration included the reluctance of our allies to support expanding the conflict, and the desire to avoid risking more loss of life. Foot argues persuasively that the Korean War increased the influence of military and civilian policymakers in the US Government who favored high levels of military spending and the establishment of US military bases abroad to deter Communist aggression. She also believes that perceptions formulated during the Korean War contributed to the extensive US involvement in Vietnam.

1

Knox, Donald. <u>The Korea War: An Oral History</u>. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985. 697pp. Illustrations. Maps. DS918.K53

This book discusses the strategy and tactics of the NKA, CPLA, and UN Forces in all of the major battles fought during the first six months of the Korean War. The author interviewed several hundred US Army officers and enlisted personnel with Korean War experience, and he selected the best eyewitness accounts for inclusion in the book. Reports by journalists who covered the war are also included. Knox provides a chronologically arranged and candid description of how the war was fought by both sides. 3. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS SINCE THE KOREAN WAR

•:

•

.

NORTH KORDAN ARMT STRATEGT AND TROTTES STREE THE KOREAN

•1** .

7 .

• . . .

"Dialogue for Detente Must Precede Arms Control Steps." <u>Korea</u> <u>Herald</u> (Seoul), 31 August 1986, p. 3.

This report presents summaries of five papers presented at the International Conference on Arms Races and Arms Control in Northeast Asia held in Seoul from 27-29 August. The article supports the view that the external powers, particularly the US, China, Soviet Union and Japan, hold the key to arms control on the Korean Peninsula. A paper delivered jointly by Professors Tong-whan Park of Northeastern University in the US and Professor Se-hyun Jeong of the Ilhae Institute in Korea, suggests that the political and economic situation in North Korea appear to augur for the opening of an inter-Korean dialogue which could bring about favorable developments such as cross recognition and joint entry into the United Nations. Professor Byung-joon Ahn of Yonsei University in South Korea believes that the only realistic way for North and South Korea to resolve obstacles standing in the way of bilateral arms control negotiations is to hold a summit meeting.

"North Korea Turning Into Soviet Base." <u>Tonga Ilbo</u> (Seoul), 27 August 1986, np. In <u>Press Translations</u> (US Embassy, Seoul), No. 86-160, 28 August 1986, pp. 2-3. DS901.P7

The influential South Korean daily says that Soviet military aid to North Korea and the expansion of Soviet military forces in Asia and the Pacific are actions which will increase the possibility of war in Northeast Asia. <u>Tonga Ilbo</u> views CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's 28 July speech in Vladivostok, in which the Soviet leader suggested that his country is ready to reduce its military presence in the region, as nothing more than a ploy to reduce US and Chinese influence. Recent Soviet actions, such as the deployment of SS-20 missiles in the Far East and increases in the size of its Pacific Fleet, are described as "dangerous." The article expresses concern that Soviet support for Pyongyang could encourage the North Koreans to initiate hostilities with South Korea in the near future.

+1

1

Olsen, Edward A. "The Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula." <u>Asian</u> <u>Survey</u> (Berkeley), Vol. 26, No. 8, August 1986, pp. 851-867. DS1.A492

The article discusses national and international factors influencing the military policies of the two Koreas and evaluates the possible causes for renewed conflict. The two major tenets of North Korean military doctrine are said to be: preparation for offensive operations is the nation's best defense, and maintaining a self-reliant defensive posture is less risky than depending on a larger power such as the Soviet Union. In contrast, while there are many in South Korea's military-industrial system who would favor a more independent defense policy, the majority favor continued reliance on and alliance with the United States. Olsen believes it was a mistake for the US to sell F-16s to South Korea for two reasons: (1) North Korea has a limited capability to modernize its own weapons, and (2) such actions strengthen Pyongyang's ability to import advanced weapons from the Soviet Union and thereby fuel the arms race. Olsen argues that the probability of Pyongyang planning an all-out invasion of South Korea is decreasing with time, but the possibility for an incident in the DMZ, or some other accident, touching off a war remains high because of the arms race and the the absence of any inter-Korean channel that could prevent such an escalation. He proposes the negotiation of an inter-Korean agreement whereby each side would place and monitor movement detectors in the other's territory as one way to insure that a small incident does not escalate into a major conflict.

"Parallel Risks." <u>Asiaweek</u> (Hong Kong), Vol. 12, No. 28, 13 July 1986, p. 8. DS1.A715

The escalation of student demonstrations in South Korea could influence North Korean leaders to consider an invasion of the South. Pyongyang is said to be waiting for two conditions before it will consider an all-out attack on South Korea: widespread civil unrest on the same level as the 1980 Kwangju uprising in which more than 100 South Koreans lost their lives, and the growth of

•7

anti-Americanism among South Koreans born after the Korean War. The possibility of conflict will probably increase when North Korean President Kim Il-song dies or surrenders power to his son and heir apparent, Kim Chong-il, for the following reasons: the younger Kim is believed to be responsible for the 1983 Rangoon Bombing which killed 17 South Korean government officials; he has been raised as a revolutionary and thinks "everything in the South belongs to him;" and the post-war generation of North Korean military commanders knows nothing about world affairs and would probably support an order to invade South Korea. The article suggests that South Korean radicals need to open their eyes to the realities of life in their country.

Polomka, Peter. "The Two Korea's: Catalyst for Conflict in East Asia?" <u>Adelphi Papers</u> (London), No. 208, Summer 1986, 60pp. Not in LC.

North Korea's commitment to expand and modernize its armed forces are viewed as a response to the political and security environment in all of East Asia and not just the one existing on the Korean Peninsula. The author challenges a number of common assumptions on the best way to prevent the occurrence of a war between North and South Korea. He believes that as the ROK increases its economic, and inevitably its military superiority over the DPRK, that Seoul may become less dependent on US military power and more interested in establishing independent policies which could include plans to forcibly reunite Korea on its own terms. Polomka argues that the US, and the other major powers, must seek to promote the peaceful reunification of the two Korea's and recognize that nationalism in both is too strong for the current political division to be accepted as a permanent solution by the majority of Koreans. He does not believe that North Korea will "sell out" to the Soviet Union in exchange for new weapons and advanced technology, and points to its xenophobic behavior over the last three decades to bolster this argument. Polomka views the eventual withdrawal of US Forces from South Korea, the establishment of a less paternalistic partnership between Seoul and Washington, and superpower support for a serious

٠č

dialogue between the two Koreas as actions which would lead to a more stable security environment in East Asia.

"Sino-DPRK Friendship Treaty Anniversary Noted." <u>Nihon Keizai</u> <u>Shimbun</u> (Tokyo), 12 July 1986, p. 6. In JPRS-KAR-86-007-L, 5 September 1986, pp. 28-29.

In July North Korea celebrated the 25th anniversaries of its friendship treaties with both the Soviet Union and China. This analysis suggests that although North Korea is clearly strengthening its military ties with the Soviet Union, its actions during July indicate that it has no plans to tilt so far toward the Soviets that it jeopardizes its relationship with China. The article notes that North Korea relies on China for oil, economic aid, and diplomatic support. The fact that Chinese Vice Premier Wan Li restated Chinese support for North Korea's proposal to hold military talks with the US and South Korea on 10 July, and Pyongyang made another call for these talks the next day, is viewed as a sign that the two countries are still on good terms.

Wolf, Charles et al. <u>The Changing Balance</u>. Santa Monica: Rand, 1985. 70pp. UA253.K6.C473

The focus of this study is on how South Korea can best deter a north Korean attack through the modernization of its armed forces. It is assumed that the ROK will continue to maintain significant economic and technological advantages over the North, and it encourages the ROK Government to increase defense spending to about 8 or 9 percent of GNP. Three alternative force postures are analyzed: (1) the present primarily defensive force structure, including projected improvements, (2) a 25 percent augmentation of existing forces to provide the ROKA with a credible counteroffensive capability, and (3) a reduction in force by 30 percent with the savings being used to build a technologically sophisticated and mobile force. The study concludes that the only constraints on South Korea seeking to strengthen its military capabilities are political. Wolf believes that South

•7

Korean leaders will not make any change in military policy which could jeopardize the US-ROK security relationship.

•