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PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material and covers the following topics:

- modernization of the North Korean Army,
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics in the Korean War, and
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics since the Korean War.

The bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

GLOSSARY

CPLA	Chinese People's Liberation Army	
CFC	Combined Forces Command (US and ROK)	
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)	
NKA	North Korean Army	
NKAF	North Korean Air Force	
NKN	North Korean Navy	
КРА	Korean People's Army (Comprises NKA, NKAF, and NKN)	
KWP	Korean Workers' Party	
ROK	Republic of Korea (South Korea)	
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army	
ROKAF	Republic of Korea Air Force	
ROKN	Republic of Korea Navy	

1. MODERNIZATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

"KPA Becomes Private Army for Two Kims." <u>Naewoe Tongsin</u> (Seoul) 24 April 1987, pp. 1A-8A. In JPRS-KAR-87-49, 26 August 1987, pp. 77-81.

The inner ring of military leaders in North Korea is considered to be loyal to President Kim Il-song and his son and heir apparent, Kim Chong-il. Reportedly, the younger Kim gained control of the military around 1973 when he arranged for the replacement of many NKA regiment and battalion commanders and some division commanders. The article uses a recent defector's commentary on conditions in the military as the basis for arguing that the average NKA soldier is unhappy with the plans for hereditary succession and with the extensive KWP surveillence network that keeps the Army under the party's control.

Milivojevic, Marko. "The Korean People's Army." <u>Armed Forces</u> (London), Vol. 6, No. 6, June 1987, pp. 259-63.

Article provides a comprehensive evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the NKA, NKAF, and NKN. The massive firepower in the NKA inventory represents its main advantage over the ROKA. However, the author notes that Pyongyang needs more modern tanks and is unlikely to receive those from Moscow soon. Similarly, the NKAF has 50 MiG-23s, but it is unlikely to obtain more sophisticated Soviet fighter aircraft. Most of its remaining inventory of aircraft is obsolescent. The NKN is said to be the weakest part of the NKPA. The author believes the ROKN would have little trouble coping with North Korea's 21 submarines. North Korean fast attack craft, while definitely a threat, are also obsolescent. Milivojevic makes two points which, if true, have important political and military implications: the Soviet Union is reported to have complete control over the North Korean port of Najin; and North Korean Defense Minister O Jin-u, who has not been seen in public since September 1986, is said to oppose Kim Il-song's plan to pass power to his son, Kim Chong-il.

"North Korea Has 320,000 Troops More Than It Admits." <u>Korea</u> <u>Herald</u> (Seoul), 1 October 1987, p. 1.

Report summarizes US Defense Department figures on the numbers of personnel and selected weapons in the NKPA. The NKA, NKAF, and NKN, are said to have 750,000, 55,000 and 35,000 personnel, respectively, for a total of 840,000 in the three military services. Pyongyang claims the size of its armed forces is half that figure, or 420,000. The NKA is reported to have 3,275 tanks, 4,750 pieces of field artillery, 15 SCUD surface-to-surface missiles and 54 FROG-5 missiles. The NKAF has approximately 560 Soviet-produced MiG fighter aircraft or Chinese models of the same. Naval vessels include 25 submarines and 2 frigates.

Pollack, Maxine. "The Selling of Terrorism: Profit From a Lucrative Export." <u>Insight</u> (Washington DC), 20 July 1987, pp. 30-31.

North Korea is reportedly using the money it receives from training military and security forces in other countries to help reduce its \$3 billion foreign debt. Presumably, some of the money earned from its military assistance programs is also being used for military modernization. Pyongyang is currently providing various types of military aid to Angola, Zambia, Iran, and Nicaragua.

"Seoul to Achieve Military Parity with Pyongyang by Early 1990s." <u>Korea Herald</u> (Seoul), 28 October 1987, p. 2.

Pyongyang is said to be losing a battle with time in its effort to forcibly reunite North and South Korea. The article suggests that North Korea's military power is decreasing relative to South Korea's because many of its weapons are now obsolete. For example, the author points out that NKAF fighter aircraft produced in the 1950s would be no match for ROKAF F-4 and F-16 fighter aircraft. Analysis is based primarily on information published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London. The size of the NKPA and ROKA is placed at 750,000 and 520,000, respectively. 2. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR

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Dixon, Joe, C., ed. <u>The American Military and the Far East.</u> Washington DC: United States Air Force, Office of Air Force History, 1980. 318 pp. DS518.8.M58

This book is a collection of papers presented at the ninth military history symposium sponsored by the US Air Force. The symposium focused on four subject areas: American strategies in Asia; analyses of the American military involvement in the Philippines, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam; the impact of American military actions on Asian societies; and the implications of the American role for the future of Asia. The following papers provide some interesting notes on the Korean War. Norman Graebner, in a paper entitled "The United States and East Asia: 1945-1960," documents how and why the containment policy of President Truman and the subsequent commitment of American troops in the Korean War made important contributions to stopping the spread of communism in Asia during the 1950s. Richard Stillwell, a former commander of US Forces in Korea, points out that North Korea had weakened South Korea's constabulary before the 25 June 1950 invasion. John Schlight, in a paper dealing with the use of airpower in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, argues that limiting the US Air Force to a tactical role reduced this service's capability to support the ground forces directly engaged in combat operations.. Finally, C. I. Eugene Kim suggests that the American involvement in the Korean War, and the subsequent permanent deployment of US Forces in South Korea, has been one of the factors which have facilitated the military's control of the country's political system over the past two decades.

Oliver, Robert Tarbell. <u>Syngman Rhee and American Involvement</u> <u>in Korea, 1942-60</u>. Seoul: Panmun Book Company, Ltd., 1978. 508 pp. DS916.5.R5 038

This book is based primarily on the author's personal correspondence with the late South Korean President. Chapters 13 and 14 include passages from Rhee's letters to the author detailing the differences between ROK and US assessments of the military/political situation just before the NKA's invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 and the CPLA's entrance into the war in November 1950. In chapter 13, the author discusses Rhee's assessment of why

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the NKA failed to make it to Pusan. The two main points of this assessment are: logistics support to the NKA was inadequate; and North Korean leaders wasted time having the NKA wipe up small pockets of resistance instead of moving quickly south. In the preface Oliver says that while the objectivity of Rhee's correspondence must be left to historians to evaluate, it is his goal to accurately reflect the Korean perspective of events in the critical periods before, during, and following the Korean War.

Paschall, Rod. "Special Operations in Korea." <u>Conflict</u> (New York), Vol. 7, No. 2, 1987, pp. 155-78. JAL.C65

This article is a well written and apparently comprehensive account of American efforts during the Korean War to recruit and organize North Koreans for guerrilla operations. Various NKA installations, particularly along the west coast close to the front, were frequently attacked by groups based on islands in the West Sea which were under allied control. The groups carrying out guerrilla operations were under the command of North Koreans and received training and other assistance from the allies. In 1953, the ROKA assumed responsibility for the program. Paschall believes that American assistance to these groups would have been more effective if the US Navy and US Air Force had been including in the planning and training of combat missions. 3. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS SINCE THE KOREAN WAR

"Chun's Armed Forces Day Message." <u>Korea Herald</u> (Seoul), 2 October 1987, p. 2.

In a 1 October speech delivered to commemorate South Korea's Armed Forces Day, President Chun Doo Hwan says that North Korea has never changed its strategy to reunite the Korean Peninsula by force. It is implied that the Soviet Union is progressive in that it has admitted that many tenets of communist ideology are impractical. According to Chun, however, Pyongyang is more intransigent than ever and remains a serious threat to Seoul's security. The South Korean president also expresses concern that many young people in his country apparently believe North Korean propaganda and seek to promote a violent revolution to overthrow the democratic system. He calls on his fellow countrymen to remain alert to the North Korean threat and praises the South Korean Armed Forces for recent improvements in equipment and tactics introduced to enhance the nation's security.

Howe, Russell Warren. "Nuclear Disarmament: the East Asian Element." <u>Far Eastern Economic Review</u> (Hong Kong), Vol. 137, No. Vol. 137, No. 32, 6 August 1987, pp. 28-9. HC411.F18

The article discusses probable scenarios for a North Korean invasion of South Korea. NKA missile units in the Kaesong area would probably target Seoul and reduce the city to rubble as a prelude to an attack by armored and other forces. The author suggests one reason Moscow hoped to exclude its intermediate nuclear forces in the Far East from a nuclear disarmament pact now under negotiation with Washington is that it wanted to have these weapons as part of its deterrent in the event Kim Il-song started another war. It is predicted that if Pyongyang does attack Seoul, American quick reaction forces will immediately attack Pyongyang and other military targets in North Korea.

"North Korea Gunboat Sinks ROK Trawler Leaving 11 Fishermen Missing." Korea Herald (Seoul), 9 October 1987, p. 1.

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Report says a North Korean attack on a South Korean fishing vessel may have been part of Pyongyang's strategy to disrupt the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The sole South Korean survivor reported that no warning was given by the single NKN patrol boat that fired on and then rammed his ship. The incident occurred 64 kilometers northwest of Paengnyong Island which is controlled by South Korea. North Korea claims the 100-ton South Korean trawler was sunk because it entered its territorial waters to spy on North Korea.

"Operational Control and Nationalism." <u>Choson Ilbo</u> (Seoul) 25 October 1987. In <u>Press Translations</u> (Seoul), 26 October 1987, pp. 2-3.

The influential South Korean daily argues that the national security of the ROK will suffer if the new wave of nationalism in the country forces the government to alter existing bilateral security agreements which give the US control over the ROKA during wartime. The article reminds readers that North Korea is still capable of attacking South Korea and says the US-ROK alliance remains the country's best deterrent.

"Real Intention of the North's Arms Reduction Proposal." <u>Hanguk</u> <u>Ilbo</u> (Seoul), 25 July 1987, p. 2. In JPRS-KAR-87-Ø49, 26 August 1987, pp. 1-2.

North Korea's large military establishment and its continual effort to modernize the NKA are given as reasons to question its July 1987 proposal for mutual force reductions by the DPRK and ROK. The South Korean daily criticizes Pyongyang for proposing talks begin in Geneva in March 1988. It is anticipated that Seoul will not be ready to participate because the inauguration of its next president is scheduled for February 1988. The editorial says it is ridiculous for North Korea to propose sensitive political talks start before the new South Korean president has sufficient time to deal with domestic issues and establish his administration's foreign policy.

"Superpowers Want Status Quo in Korea: Harold Brown." Korea <u>Herald</u> (Seoul), 23 October 1987, p. 8.

This article summarizes selected points made by former US Defense Secretary Harold Brown in a speech at the Ilhae Institute in Seoul on 22 October. Brown believes that the Soviet Union is more interested in strengthening its economy and promoting trade, particularly in Asia and the Pacific, than in supporting a war in Korea or some other hotspot. Apparently, Brown did not discuss Afghanistan or mention how it fits into the picture. Brown's general assessment is that Soviet leaders would "pick up the pieces" if the North Korea started a war on the Korean Peninsula, but the Soviets reportedly share the view of the United States, China, and Japan that a war in Korea would be costly to all. Brown praises South Korea's democratization program and says that although the establishment of a democracy is not without risks, he believes that in the longterm a strong political system and economic prosperity will improve the security situation in Northeast Asia.