


**A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CURRENT  
INDOCHINESE ISSUES**

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


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## PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material on three current Indochina-related issues:

- \* Thailand's political strategy for solving the Cambodian question
- \* tactics and organization of Khmer/Laotian resistance groups
- \* the war in Cambodia

This bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

## GLOSSARY

ANS	Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste (Sihanoukist National Army)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
DK	Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge)
FUNCINPEC	National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia
KCP	Khmer Communist Party
KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front (Son Sann)
KPRAF	Khmer People's Revolutionary Armed Forces
KR	Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot)
KUFNCD	Khmer United Front for National Construction and Defense (PRK)
<u>Naeo Na</u>	<u>Progressive</u> [lit: moving in new directions]
PAVN	People's Army of Vietnam
PCCS	Provisional Central Committee for Salvation (KPNLF)
PERMICO	Permanent Military Committee for Coordination (KPNLF and ANS)
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
PRPK	People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, aka KPRP (Khmer People's Revolutionary Party)
RTG	Royal Thai Government

Siam Rat

SPK

SRV

Su Anakhot

Thai Nation

News Agency of the PRK

Socialist Republic of Vietnam

Forward [lit: going toward the  
future]

1. THAILAND'S POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR SOLVING THE CAMBODIAN QUESTION

"Diplomatic Victory." Su Anakhot (Bangkok), 18-24 July 1985, p. 7 in JPRS-SEA-85-136, 4 September 1985, pp. 73-74.

Editorial states that not enough is being done by the ASEAN countries to apply pressure on Vietnam to disengage from Cambodia. "The ASEAN countries should show solidarity and launch a diplomatic offensive to get the entire world to condemn the invaders." At the same time, the suggestion is made that discussions should be held with the Soviet Union.



2. TACTICS AND ORGANIZATION OF KHMER/LAOTIAN RESISTANCE GROUPS

Crossette, Barbara. "Cambodia Rebel Says Time is Growing Short." New York Times, 1 September 1985, p. A5.

KPNLF leader Son Sann says that he has given his guerrilla army a 2-year deadline to provoke and to support a popular uprising in Cambodia. He fears that after that point the Vietnamese will have succeeded sufficiently in changing the ethnic composition of Cambodia to block a nationalist political movement. He also states that the two non-Communist resistance groups urgently needed to expand their political and military activities to limit the influence of the Khmer Rouge inside Cambodia.

Crossette, Barbara. "The Puzzle of Pol Pot's 'Retirement.'" New York Times, 8 September 1985, p. E4.

The retirement of Pol Pot invites speculation about the Khmer Rouge's motives. Some view China, the most important backer of the Khmer Rouge, as responsible, reasoning that the moving aside of old leaders has become the order of the day in Beijing. China is also very much aware that Pol Pot's harsh reputation limits international support for the Cambodian resistance coalition.

Cumming-Bruce, Nicholas. "Pol Pot to be Replaced as Khmer Rouge Chief." Guardian (Manchester), 3 September 1985, p. 6.

In this version of Pol Pot's retirement, the reporter states that it remains to be seen whether he has, in fact, retired, or whether the announcement reflects a purely cosmetic change intended to deflect Vietnam's argument that his presence in the resistance coalition constitutes a main obstacle to any negotiated settlement of the Kampuchean conflict. The move may also reflect a power struggle among Khmer Rouge factions, in which case his successor, Son Sen, also a Khmer Rouge veteran, is unlikely to prove any more acceptable as a negotiating partner to the Vietnamese than Pol Pot.

"Khmer Rebels' Plea: 'Sponsor a Guerrilla'." New York Times, 27 September 1985, p. A6.

Encouraged by the response to its first campaign to raise money for its forces, the KPNLF has opened a second "Sponsor a Guerrilla" drive, complete with a glossy brochure. The fund-raising effort is aimed primarily at Cambodians living in the West and has already raised more than \$15,000.

Quinn-Judge, Paul. "Diplomacy in Depths of the Jungle." Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 5 September 1985, p. 9.

Article describes a meeting between Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge in a remote clearing on the Thai-Cambodian border and the bizarre conditions surrounding a situation where diplomacy ordains that two parties who loath each other carry on a charade of civility because of their mutual need.

Quinn-Judge, Paul. "Norodom Sihanouk's Popularity is His Coalition's Key Weapon Against Vietnamese." Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 5 September 1985, p. 13.

Prince Sihanouk is still the key to the effort to push Vietnam out of Cambodia. His popularity among Cambodians far exceeds that of any other leader despite the fact that he has been in exile for most of the last 16 years. His brutal frankness, however, sometimes embarrasses his allies. The reporter recalls that on a recent visit to Thailand he said that the Khmer Rouge had told him in the early 1970s that when they came to power "they would kill just seven people." Instead, he said, "they killed a million in order to build socialism. Now they want to restore capitalism. I wonder how many people they will have to kill to do that."

Quinn-Judge, Paul. "Pol Pot Resignation Seen as a Cosmetic Change for Khmer Rouge." Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 4 September 1985, p. 9.

A variety of explanations, based on conjecture rather than on fact, have been put forward as the purpose for Pol Pot's alleged retirement. The most plausible explanation is that it is purely cosmetic. Instead of retiring, Pol Pot--a secretive leader to begin with--simply may have slipped further into the background where he can concentrate on the war against the Vietnamese. The evidence that he may have been the victim of a power struggle is said to be too scanty and too confused to evaluate.

Quinn-Judge, Paul. "The Sound and Fury: The Khmer Rouge Need Drama to Restore Their Battered Image." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 22 August 1985, pp. 38-39. HC411.F18

The Khmer Rouge have told their allies that they plan to launch attacks in the area of Phnom Penh in the near future. In the past, predictions by the Khmer Rouge have not always been followed by action. This year, however, all three members of the Democratic Kampuchea coalition government are under pressure from ASEAN to accomplish a spectacular military act as a means of restoring faith in the coalition government. The proposed attacks will take the form of sabotage and small-team operations directed against military targets and communications facilities in the capital.