


**A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CURRENT  
INDOCHINESE ISSUES**

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
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## PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material on three current Indochina-related issues:

- \* Thailand's political strategy for solving the Cambodian question
- \* tactics and organization of Khmer/Laotian resistance groups
- \* the war in Cambodia

This bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

## GLOSSARY

ANS	Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste (Sihanoukist National Army)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
DK	Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge)
FUNCINPEC	National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia
KCP	Khmer Communist Party
KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front (Son Sann)
KPRAF	Khmer People's Revolutionary Armed Forces
KR	Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot)
KUFNCD	Khmer United Front for National Construction and Defense (PRK)
<u>Nao Na</u>	<u>Progressive</u> [lit: moving in new directions]
PAVN	People's Army of Vietnam
PCCS	Provisional Central Committee for Salvation (KPNLF)
PERMICO	Permanent Military Committee for Coordination (KPNLF and ANS)
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
PRPK	People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, aka KPRP (Khmer People's Revolutionary Party)
RTG	Royal Thai Government

Siam Rat

SPK

· SRV

Su Anakhot

Thai Nation

News Agency of the PRK

Socialist Republic of Vietnam

Forward [lit: going toward the  
future]

1. THAILAND'S POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR SOLVING THE CAMBODIAN QUESTION

Boriphat, M.R. Sukhumphan. "Farewell to Sacred Cows." The Nation (Bangkok), 1 July 1985, p. 4 in JPRS-SEA-85-119, 5 August 1985, pp. 28-32.

A Thai academic writes that an effective policy must be based on a realistic appraisal of facts and not on assumptions the factual bases for which are highly dubious. The writer claims that ASEAN's policy towards Cambodia is rooted in the following false assumptions: (1) Vietnam can be "bled;" (2) the Soviet Union has a great deal of influence on Vietnam's behavior; (3) China is a credible deterrent against Vietnam in all scenarios; (4) the costs of the present policy are minimal and hence bearable from Thailand's point of view; (5) while the Cambodian conflict has acted as a centripetal force for regional cooperation, the costs of the present policy are minimal and hence bearable from ASEAN's point of view; (6) it is possible to bring about a neutral non-aligned, stable, free and democratic Cambodia; and (7) in the post-Vietnam War era, an increase in American interest and activity in Southeast Asia is ipso facto a good thing.

"Marines Deny PRC Resupply of CGDK via Trat, Strength Noted." Dao Siam (Bangkok), 26 June 1985, pp. 6, 12 in JPRS-SEA-85-12, 8 August 1985, p. 167.

A 1200-word feature on Royal Thai Marines stationed in Trat Province on the Cambodian border mentions that the SRV and the PRK believe that aid from China reaches the Khmer Rouge from Thailand. Specifically, such military supplies are brought in by boat and offloaded at Hat Lek or in other places in Chanthaburi or Trat provinces. An unnamed marine denies that Thailand is used for Khmer Rouge resupply.



2. TACTICS AND ORGANIZATION OF KHMER/LAOTIAN RESISTANCE GROUPS

Cumming-Bruce, Nicholas. "Guerrillas Display Their Talents, Almost, in a Foray Down the Sihanouk Trail." Guardian (Manchester), 10 August 1985, p. 5.

In a plan to give Western journalists a first glimpse of their guerrillas in action, the ANS fails to move them in time to link up with a demolition team blowing up a bridge near the village of Katum in northwestern Cambodia. Instead, the journalists are taken to a village some 32 kilometers inside the Cambodian border and greeted by Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Sihanouk's son, his representative and ANS commander, along with Prince Chakrapong, his brother and ANS deputy commander. In what the reporter terms "a carefully staged piece of propaganda," several hundred ANS guerrillas are deployed round the village and some 500 more moved in to secure routes back to the border. To the reporter, the exercise proves little except the relative ease with which the guerrillas can infiltrate Cambodia via the Sihanouk trail as Prince Ranariddh dubs it.

Deron, Francis. "At Least One Heng Samrin Agent in Each Village." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 25 July 1985, p. 9.

According to a profiled non-Communist resistance fighter, the Cambodian resistance commands hardly any logistical support in Southwest Cambodia, and the civilian population's feelings range from indifference to hostility. The soldier says he doesn't trust anyone in Cambodia and that most villages are inclined toward the Heng Samrin regime with at least one PRK agent-in-residence. Thai military leaders admit that the resistance hardly gets any support in the neighboring area of Cambodia but that further north towards Siem Reap the insurgents have made considerable progress in obtaining support.

Deron, Francis. "Khmer Rouge Seeking a New Image in an Old Struggle." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 10 August 1985, p. 4.

The Khmer Rouge is seeking to present an image radically different from the bloodstained regime that ruled Cambodia from 1975-78. Although armed by China, its members claim to have abandoned their Communist ideology and have offered to step out of government, if Vietnam withdraws its troops in a political solution to the Cambodian conflict. The brutality of the years in power is blamed by a Khmer Rouge official on the "Khmer Vietminh," or pro-Hanoi Cambodians allegedly infiltrated into Pol Pot's Cambodian Communist Party.

"Hu Tells Khmers to Mount Attacks." Bangkok Post, 20 May 1985, p. 5.

Chinese Communist Party Chief Hu Yaobang urges Kampuchean resistance forces to mount fresh attacks against Vietnamese troops inside Kampuchea during the current rainy season. He renews China's support for the resistance at a meeting with Khieu Samphan and praises the insurgents for withstanding Vietnam's seventh dry season offensive.

Nations, Richard. "Khmer Double Talk." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 1 August 1985, pp. 12-13. HC411.F18

The Khmer Rouge declaration that it will accept the "Heng Samrin group" as a legitimate partner in a future Cambodian government clears away a major obstacle to an eventual political settlement, by bringing the most powerful force in the anti-Vietnamese resistance into line with the ASEAN appeal for "proximity talks" with Hanoi. The Khmer Rouge appeal, however, is unlikely to have any immediate effect on the Cambodian deadlock since Hanoi has already heaped ridicule on ASEAN's proximity-talks proposal while pressing its "non-negotiable" demand for the exile of the Khmer Rouge leadership. The Khmer Rouge statement may be timed to influence the UN vote on Cambodia this autumn and may signal a Chinese attempt to show flexibility over Cambodia without, however, announcing any concessions on its demand for a total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops.

"Pol Pot Retires." Washington Post, 3 September 1985, pp. A17, A19.

A Khmer Rouge radio broadcast is reported to have announced the retirement of Pol Pot as military commander. The reason given is that he had reached the mandatory retirement age set by Khieu Samphan. He is thought to have turned 60 in May. Although no other explanation was given, Pol Pot's long-rumored poor health and signs of an internal power struggle are thought to be possible reasons. In announcing the retirement, the Khmer Rouge radio said the Supreme Military Council that Pol Pot formerly headed had been abolished as of the 24 August date of the communique. It said Pol Pot would now become "director of the Higher Institute for National Defense" and that Son Sen, the number three man in the former Supreme Military Council had been named "supreme commander of the Democratic Kampuchean National Army," in effect replacing Pol Pot. Non-Communist Cambodian sources reported that there were signs of a rivalry between Pol Pot and Son Sen and that the latter was about to be purged by Pol Pot when the Vietnamese invaded in late 1978.

"Sihanouk's Son Makes a Daring Trip." Bangkok Post, 1 August 1985, p. 5.

Prince Norodom Ranariddh, commander-in-chief of the ANS and Prince Sihanouk's son, recently visited Khmer villages deep inside Cambodia. Traveling with a fairly light escort of about 40 men, the prince inspected an ANS base and visited three villages in 4 days time.

"Son of Sihanouk Threatens to Quit." Bangkok Post, 31 July 1985, pp. 1, 3.

Prince Norodom Ranariddh threatens to quit his father's coalition unless foreign backers can forge unity among its three factions. He states that it is understandable that there is no willingness to cooperate with the Khmer Rouge but he cannot explain the lack of cooperation with the non-Communist KPNLF. He adds that he will meet with representatives of Thailand, China and other coalition sponsors soon to ask them to "force" cooperation within the coalition and to tell them he will quit if things do not change.

Taylor, Stephen. "Tardy Warriors Banking on Diplomacy." Times (London),  
8 August 1985, p. 10.

Prince Norodom Ranariddh, son of Prince Sihanouk, admits that the resistance has lost credibility as a result of the Vietnamese dry season successes. He states that resistance forces need, and are planning, the propaganda coup of a major strike behind Vietnamese lines. In theory, conditions on the border favor a new guerrilla initiative since the Vietnamese are having to maintain a large force strung out along the border to seal off guerrilla penetration which leaves Hanoi's forces highly vulnerable to disruption of supply lines. Of the three factions, the KPNLF appears to have suffered most from the dry-season humiliation and has failed to rebuild morale and discipline. The leadership acknowledges that its guerrillas, accustomed to operating from fixed border sanctuaries, have difficulty overcoming the psychological barrier of having to penetrate deeply inside enemy territory.