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#### PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of opensource material on three current Indochina-related issues:

- \* Thailand's political strategy for solving the Cambodian question
- \* tactics and organization of Khmer/Laotian resistance groups
- \* the war in Cambodia

This bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

# GLOSSARY

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ANS	Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste (Sihanoukist National Army)	
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea	
DK	Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge)	
FUNCINPEC	National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia	
KCP	Khmer Communist Party	
KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front (Son Sann)	
KPRAF	Khmer People's Revolutionary Armed Forces	
KR	Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot)	
KUFNCD	Khmer United Front for National Construction and Defense (PRK)	
<u>Naeo Na</u>	<u>Progressive</u> [lit: moving in new directions]	
PAVN	People's Army of Vietnam	
PCCS	Provisional Central Committee for Salvation (KPNLF)	
PERMICO	Permanent Military Committee for Coordination (KPNLF and ANS)	
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea	
PRPK	People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, aka KPRP (Khmer People's Revolutionary Party)	
RTG	Royal Thai Government	

iii

<u>Siam Rat</u>

SPK

· SRV

<u>Su Anakhot</u>

<u>Thai Nation</u>

News Agency of the PRK

Socialist Republic of Vietnam

<u>Forward</u> [lit: going toward the future]

1. THE WAR IN CAMBODIA

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"A Dancing Bear." <u>Asiaweek</u> (Hong Kong), Vol. 12, No. 35, 31 August 1986. DS1.A715

The article focuses on events following Soviet Secretary Gorbachev's Asian initiative speech in Vladivostok on 28 July. The speech, which the article implies signaled Soviet interest in mending relations with China, was responsible for placing into motion a number of events with possible consequences for Cambodia. The article suggests that Vietnamese leader Truong Chinh knew nothing of Soviet plans for improving relations with China when he flew to Moscow two days before the speech at Gorbachev's invitation and that when Gorbachev met with Chinh after Vladivostok, the Soviet leader acted outwardly as though nothing had changed. However, continued Soviet support for Vietnamese efforts in Cambodia was suddenly at stake and the article reports that, although the Indochinese states, at their foreign ministers conference in August, rejected the 8 point peace plan offered by the CGDK, behind the scenes they were casting far and wide to gauge the value of the plan as a direct consequence of a pending change in Sino-Soviet relations.

Bekaert, Jacques "The War In Cambodia, 1979-1986." <u>Asian</u> <u>Defence Journal</u> (Kuala Lumpur), August 1986, pp. 13-19.

The author summarizes the Cambodian conflict from the time of the Vietnamese invasion in December 1978 to the present. The five armies involved in the war are described. He concludes that what in 1979 looked like an "easy blitzkrieg" for the Vietnamese has turned into an endless conflict with no clear victory in sight. The resistance coalition forces did better than expected in 1986, leading to the questions: "how long can the resistance sustain its present level of activity, and what price is Hanoi prepared to pay for its control over Cambodia."

"Cambodia Initiative." <u>Far Eastern Economic Review</u> (Hong Kong), Vol. 133, No. 36, 4 September 1986, p. 11. HC 411 F18

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Newly appointed Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev is reported to have embarked on a diplomatic mission aimed at Cambodia. Shortly before being named as the new Soviet negotiator with China, he traveled to Phnom Penh, Hanoi and Vientiane. As a result, when he meets his Chinese counterparts he will be well versed on Cambodia, whose continued occupation by Vietnamese troops is one of three obstacles preventing normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.

"Comrades in Crisis." <u>Asiaweek</u> (Hong Kong), Vol. 12, No. 38, 21 September, 1986, pp. 17-25. DS1.A715

Moscow and Hanoi in the weeks following Secretary Gorbachev's speech seemed anxious to avoid a public rupture in their relations but could no longer hide their deepening disagreement over Vietnam's "Indochina" policy. At the same time, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping told U.S. reporter Mike Wallace of CBS that if the Soviets "encouraged" the Vietnamese regime to quit Cambodia, a Sino-Soviet summit would follow. Such a summit is highly desired by the Soviets and may make the act of straining relations with Vietnam a bit easier. In any case, the mood in Beijing was unusually buoyant over Cambodia with Prince Sihanouk and other CGDK leaders meeting with a host of Chinese leaders.

"End of a Vision." <u>Asiaweek</u> (Hong Kong), Vol. 12, No. 36, 7 September 1986, pp. 12-16. DS1.A715

Article suggests that the trial of Ngo Van Truong, accused of setting up "an extremely dangerous counterrevolutionary organization," may provide one of the earliest signs that Hanoi, with Soviet encouragement, is now moving rapidly to end the fighting in Cambodia and withdraw its troops as quickly as possible. The argument presented infers that in the past Truong's accusers would have first named him to be a Chinese spy, and that such an ommission may be indicative of Moscow's determination to mend fences with Beijing and Hanoi's own sense of having to mend its own fences as quickly as possible. Most important of all the

article argues that Communique 13, issued at the end of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers Conference (18 August 1986) indicates that Hanoi is finally conceding the futility of trying to gain Chinese recognition of Indochina as Vietnam's own sphere of influence. The communique states that the "normalization of relations between Vietnam and China as well as between Laos and Cambodia respectively and China would constitute a very important factor for the safeguarding of peace and stability in Southeast Asia." The document also applauds what is characterized as Laos' own desire for a direct relationship with China.

"Hanoi Headlock." <u>Asiaweek</u> (Hong Kong), Vol. 12, No. 37, 14 September 1986, pp. 15-16. DS1.A715

Hanoi and its allies, the Kaysone government in Laos and the Samrin government in Cambodia, have already showed signs of feeling the heat from Soviet Secretary Gorbachev's initiative in mending relations with China. Three weeks after the speech, they suddenly acknowledged "large public opinion" favoring withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. They also stopped insisting that China could improve relations with Laos only through Hanoi and that China's support for Pol Pot was to blame for the Cambodian conflict. However, remarks by Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping during the first week of September seemed intended to spur Secretary Gorbachev to place more pressure on the Vietnamese to disengage from Cambodia. In talking about the three obstacles preventing better relations with the Soviets: Soviet belligerency along the Sino-Soviet border, Soviet support for Vietnam, and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, he seemed to say that the border and Afghanistan were secondary to Vietnam. Thus in some ways, Deng's remarks placed Gorbachev under increasing pressure to show evidence of action following his words in Vladivostok, and this pressure was being transferred to the Vietnamese.

Jones, Clayton. "Peking Gives a Little on Cambodia Issue." <u>Christian Science Monitor</u> (Boston), 7 August 1986, p. 9.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's peace initiative toward Asia sparked a positive response from Beijing on Cambodia. Indirectly, through Prince Sihanouk, Beijing has recognized the right of the Soviet-backed regime in Cambodia to be part of a proposed national reconciliation government, and offered to reduce the Khmer Rouge resistance force that China supports. Both proposals, however, hinge on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. Western diplomats in Bangkok are reported to have stated that if both Moscow and Beijing are serious about improving relations by tackling the Cambodia problem, it would require both to give up important interests in the current Cambodian stalemate.

"Khmer People's National Liberation Front Bulletin." No. 46, May 1986.

Originating from KPNLF Headquarters in Bangkok, this bulletin includes an editorial on the origins of the KPNLF, statements about Cambodia by 12 European countries, an article on Son Sann's visit to Australia and New Zealand, and a number of Photographs of the KPNLF.

"Stepping Aside." <u>Far Eastern Economic Review</u> (Hong Kong), Vol. 133, No. 35, 28 August 1986, p. 9. HC 411 F18

KPNLF leader Son Sann has told ASEAN officials that he will take no further part in the political work of the CGDK until problems dividing factions in the resistance group are resolved. Sann is reported to be concerned about the KPNLF's loss of control of its own armed operations inside Cambodia.