

**A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CURRENT  
INDOCHINESE ISSUES**

*August 1986*

19961202 106

DNIC QUALITY INSPECTED

*Author: Ronald Cima*


DISSEMINATION STATEMENT A  
Approved for public release  
Distribution Unlimited

Dear Reader:

This product was prepared by the staff of the *Federal Research Division* of the *Library of Congress* under an interagency agreement with the sponsoring United States Government agency.

The Federal Research Division is the Library of Congress's primary fee-for-service research unit. At the request of Executive and Judicial branch agencies of the United States Government and on a cost-recovery basis, the Division prepares studies and reports, chronologies, bibliographies, foreign-language abstracts, databases, and other tailored products in hard-copy and electronic media. The subjects researched include the broad spectrum of social sciences, physical sciences, and the humanities.

*For additional information* on obtaining the research and analytical services of the Federal Research Division, please call 202-707-9905, fax 202-707-9920, via Internet [frd@mail.loc.gov](mailto:frd@mail.loc.gov), or write to *Marketing Coordinator, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 20540-4840.*



Louis R. Mortimer  
Chief  
Federal Research Division  
Library of Congress  
Washington, DC 20540-4840

| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  |  |   | Form Approved<br>OMB No. 0704-0188             |  |
|--|--|---|--|--|
| Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503. |  |   |  |  |
| 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank)   | 2. REPORT DATE<br><i>August 1986</i>                     | 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED<br>Final               |  |  |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE<br>A Selective, Annotated Bibliography on Current Indochinese Issues   |  |   | 5. FUNDING NUMBERS                             |  |
| 6. AUTHOR(S)<br>Ronald Cima      Russell Ross<br>Tuyet Cosslett  |  |   |  |  |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)<br>Federal Research Division<br>Library of Congress<br>Washington, DC 20540-4840  |  |   | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER       |  |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)<br>N/A   |  |   | 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER |  |
| 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES<br>Prepared under an Interagency Agreement   |  |   |  |  |
| 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT<br>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.   |  |   | 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE                         |  |
| 13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)<br>This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material on two current Indochina-related issues: Thailand's political strategy of solving the Cambodian question, and the tactics and organization of Khmer/Laotian resistance groups. The bibliography was prepared monthly and incorporates serials and monographs arranged alphabetically by author and title within each section.   |  |   |  |  |
| 14. SUBJECT TERMS<br>Indochina<br>Cambodia<br>Thailand<br>Insurgencies   |  |   | 15. NUMBER OF PAGES<br><i>6</i>                |  |
|  |  |   | 16. PRICE CODE                                 |  |
| 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT<br>UNCLASSIFIED  | 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE<br>UNCLASSIFIED | 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT<br>UNCLASSIFIED | 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT<br>SAR              |  |

## PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material on three current Indochina-related issues:

- \* Thailand's political strategy for solving the Cambodian question
- \* tactics and organization of Khmer/Laotian resistance groups
- \* the war in Cambodia

This bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

## GLOSSARY

|                |  |
|----------------|--|
| ANS            | Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste<br>(Sihanoukist National Army)                                    |
| ASEAN          | Association of Southeast Asian<br>Nations  |
| CGDK           | Coalition Government of Democratic<br>Kampuchea  |
| DK             | Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge)   |
| FUNCINPEC      | National United Front for an<br>Independent, Neutral, Peaceful,<br>and Cooperative Cambodia    |
| KCP            | Khmer Communist Party  |
| KPNLF          | Khmer People's National Liberation<br>Front (Son Sann)   |
| KPRAF          | Khmer People's Revolutionary Armed<br>Forces   |
| KR             | Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot)  |
| KUFNCD         | Khmer United Front for National<br>Construction and Defense (PRK)                              |
| <u>Naeo Na</u> | <u>Progressive</u> [lit: moving in new<br>directions]  |
| PAVN           | People's Army of Vietnam   |
| PCCS           | Provisional Central Committee for<br>Salvation (KPNLF)   |
| PERMICO        | Permanent Military Committee for<br>Coordination (KPNLF and ANS)                               |
| PRK            | People's Republic of Kampuchea   |
| PRPK           | People's Revolutionary Party of<br>Kampuchea, aka KPRP (Khmer<br>People's Revolutionary Party) |
| RTG            | Royal Thai Government  |

Siam Rat

SPK

SRV

Su Anakhot

Thai Nation

News Agency of the PRK

Socialist Republic of Vietnam

Forward [lit: going toward the  
future]

1. THAILAND'S POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR SOLVING  
THE CAMBODIAN QUESTION

A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY  
ON CURRENT INDOCHINESE ISSUES  
August 1986

"Prasong Discusses Current Cambodian Situation." The Nation (Bangkok), 2 July 1986, p. 3. In FBIS (Asia & Pacific), 3 July 1986, pp. J3, J4.

Thai National Security Council Secretary General Prasong Sunsiri states that the Soviet Union is stepping up the delivery of weaponry to Vietnamese forces in Cambodia in an effort to defeat the Khmer resistance and seal the Thai-Cambodian border. He also states that the Vietnamese have failed to achieve their objective of sealing the border and strangling the resistance. These goals were set out in a plan code-named K-5 which also envisaged transferring security responsibilities to the Heng Samrin forces by 1985 but which, because of Vietnamese failures, had to be postponed until 1990.

"The War Reserve Stockpile, a Double-Edged Sword From the United States." Ban Muang (Bangkok), 10 April 1986, p. 5. In JPRS-SEA-86-099, 12 June 1986, p. 47.

Article criticizes the proposed war reserve stockpile, arguing that it will lead to an arms race in the region if the Soviet Union equips Vietnam with more sophisticated weaponry in response. It would also give the United States greater influence over Thailand.

"The War Reserve Stockpile." Ban Muang (Bangkok) 12 April 1986, p. 4. In JPRS-SEA, 12 Jun 1986, p. 46.

Editorial supports the war reserve stockpile, stating that Thailand's sovereignty is threatened by Vietnam and the Soviet Union and that the country needs the stockpile as a first line of defense, in order to resist the enemy long enough for the U.S. and ASEAN countries to arrive with additional military support.



2. TACTICS AND ORGANIZATION OF KHMER/LAOTIAN RESISTANCE GROUPS

A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY  
ON CURRENT INDOCHINESE ISSUES  
August 1986

Deron, Francis "Sihanouk on PRC Diplomatic Flexibility" AFP (Hong Kong), 10 August 1986. In FBIS (Asia & Pacific), 11 August 1986, p. H1.

Prince Sihanouk states that China is trying to strengthen its diplomatic position by showing new flexibility towards the Cambodian crisis. Beijing has promised a cut in the forces of the Khmer Rouge if the Vietnamese leave Cambodia. According to the Prince, the "suggestion," which was put forward by Chinese Communist Party chief Hu Yaobang, was aimed at enhancing the CGDK's position at the next session of the UN General Assembly.

"Help For Sihanouk." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), Vol. 133, No. 28, 10 July 1986, p. 9. HC 411 F18

Malaysia has trained 60 Khmer military instructors from Prince Sihanouk's forces to operate as training cadre inside Cambodia and intends to train 40 more. Meanwhile, the Sihanoukists have received 77 field radios from the United States as part of its "humanitarian aid" program to the non-Communist resistance factions. The Sihanoukists have also received field medical equipment from the United States and currently have 23 medics undergoing training in China.

"Khieu Samphan Noncommittal on Force Reduction." Bernama (Kuala Lumpur), 10 August 1986. In FBIS (Asia & Pacific), 11 August 1986, p. H3.

Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan is noncommittal when asked about China's suggestion that Khmer Rouge forces be reduced to the level of their non-Communist partners in the Cambodian resistance coalition. The Chinese suggestion would cut the Khmer Rouge force now numbering about 30,000 to the level of the two non-Communist groups -- the ANS, who number 11,000 and the KPNLF, which has 15,000.

A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY  
ON CURRENT INDOCHINESE ISSUES  
August 1986

McDonald, R.J. "Vietnam's Silent Guns Spark Speculation."  
Pacific Defence Reporter (Victoria, Australia), Vol. 13,  
No. 1, July 1986, pp. 29, 30.

To the surprise and relief of resistance forces on the Thai-Cambodian border, the annual Vietnamese dry season offensive did not occur this year, leading to renewed speculation that Hanoi is moving towards a rapprochement with the United States and that the Vietnamese may believe that factionalism within the KPRLF will be self-destructive. Last year's dry season campaign removed any hope held by the Thai military that the Cambodian resistance groups would be able to keep the fighting from spilling over into Thai territory. The offensive had the desired effect of driving the resistance from its strongholds inside Cambodia and destroying resistance base camps such as Ampil and Tatum, which had become symbolic of resistance strength. This dry season, however, the situation is quite different. The KPRLF leadership is rife with conflict while the ANS remains directionless. In effect, the Vietnamese have not needed to attack, as the resistance seems to be devouring itself.

"Says No New Peace Plan." The Straits Times (Singapore), 6 August 1986, p. 9. In FBIS (Asia & Pacific), 11 August 1986, p. H2.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk announces that he will not propose new initiatives on the Cambodian resistance's eight-point peace plan because he does not wish to upset China. While agreeing with Singapore Foreign Minister S. Dhanabalan that the peace proposal could be improved upon, he expresses his concern that the time is not right to amend it, and that China and the Khmer Rouge are not ready to listen to him. He states that he would like to see the fighting forces disarmed and international peace-keeping forces implaced but that China and the Khmer Rouge were against such proposals and the possibility of their changing their position was remote.

A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY  
ON CURRENT INDOCHINESE ISSUES  
August 1986

"The Vietnamese Enemy Aggressors Are Losing Initiatives and Are Following Our National Army and Guerrillas." Voice of Democratic Kampuchea (clandestine), 4 June 1986. In JPRS-SEA-86-115, 9 July 1986, pp. J2, J3.

VODK commentary states that the Vietnamese have failed in their 8th dry season campaign and that Democratic Kampuchean forces had turned the Cambodian interior into a fierce battleground to include the areas around the Tonle Sap and around Phnom Penh itself. Previously the Vietnamese were compelled to concentrate their forces along the border, but the current disposition of DK troops has forced them to withdraw these forces to the interior where the chances for victory are less.