
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This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material on two current Indochina-related issues: Thailand's political strategy of solving the Cambodian question, and the tactics and organization of Khmer/Laotian resistance groups. The bibliography was prepared monthly and incorporates serials and monographs arranged alphabetically by author and title within each section.							
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PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of opensource material on three current Indochina-related issues:

- * Thailand's political strategy for solving the Cambodian question
- * tactics and organization of Khmer/Laotian resistance groups
- * the war in Cambodia

This bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title.

Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

GLOSSARY

Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste ANS (Sihanoukist National Army) Association of Southeast Asian **ASEAN** Nations Coalition Government of Democratic **CGDK** Kampuchea Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) DK National United Front for an FUNCINPEC Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia Khmer Communist Party KCP Khmer People's National Liberation KPNLF Front (Son Sann) Khmer People's Revolutionary Armed KPRAF Forces Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot) KR Khmer United Front for National KUFNCD Construction and Defense (PRK) Progressive [lit: moving in new Naeo Na directionsl People's Army of Vietnam PAVN Provisional Central Committee for PCCS Salvation (KPNLF) Permanent Military Committee for PERMICO Coordination (KPNLF and ANS) People's Republic of Kampuchea PRK People's Revolutionary Party of PRPK Kampuchea, aka KPRP (Khmer

People's Revolutionary Party)

RTG

Siam Rat

Thai Nation

SPK

News Agency of the PRK

· SRV

Socialist Republic of Vietnam

<u>Su Anakhot</u>

Forward [lit: going toward the
future]

1. THAILAND'S POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR SOLVING THE CAMBODIAN QUESTION

McBeth, John. "Arms For Peace." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong', Vol. 131, No. 12, 20 March 1986, p. 50. HC 411 F18

A formal agreement between Washington and Bangkok on setting up a war-reserve stockpile is expected to be reached before mid-year. Although Thailand is viewed by Washington as a "trontline state" with legitimate fears of intensified Vietnamese pressure along its eastern and northeastern borders, officials say the stockpile is designed for a "nation-threatening emergency" rather than simply as a means to replenish units during limited border fighting.

2.	TACTICS	AND	ORGANIZATION	OF	KHMER/LAOTIAN	RESISTANCE	GROUPS
					•		

"A Fresh Breeze Over Cambodia." Asiaweek (Hong Kong). Vol. 12. No. 13, 30 March 1986. p. 17. DS1.A715

The CGDK announces an eight-point peace plan following a meeting in Beijing of alliance partners Prince Sihanouk Son Sann and Khieu Samphan. The plan calls for a two-stage withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. the installation of a four-party government that would include Heng Samrin. and U.N.-supervised elections. The proposal marks the first time the three partners agree on a means to for negotiated settlement to the Cambodian conflict.

Bekaert, Jacques. "Support From The Heng Samrin Army." Bangkok Post, 3 January 1986. p. 4.

The Sihanoukist resistance once barely taken seriously: is now a force to reckon with. The credit, the author submits, is due to Prince Morodom Ranariddh a specialist in the Law of the Sea and a teacher of political science, who answered the call of his father. Prince Sihanouk and left his teaching position in France to command a guerrilla army. According to Ranariddh, the AMS soldiers want to avoid being a border army and plan to spend more time in the interior. He also disclosed that, when in the interior, the AMS has often been supplied with ammunition by PRK soldiers and Vietnamese soldiers of southern origin.

Bekaert, Jacques. "AMS General Cites Support In Interior. DK Harassment." Bangkok Post. 21 February 1986. p. 4.

AMS general Duong Khiem- having just returned from the Cambodian interior, discloses that his troops have received assistance from villagers as well as troops from the Heng Samrin army. The PRK soldiers explained to AMS troops that they did not want anything to do with the Khmer Rouge or the Vietnamese but wanted to support Prince Sihanouk. Khiem is critical of the Khmer Rouge who he says created many more problems for him than the Vietnamese and were a constant source of harassment.

Bekaert, Jacques. "Columnist Reviews Resistance Prospects, PRK Positions." Bangkok Post, 7 February 1986, p. 4.

In a lengthy article, Jacques Bekaert examines the prospects of the Cambodian resistance stating that China is not amused at the dissidence in the KPMLF and although the Chinese may have tew illusions as to the military capabilities of the KPMLF and the AMS, they seriously support the political roles of Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann and want no changes at the top. The AMS have problems of a different sort because no one would think of forming a dissident faction or asking Prince Sihanouk to retire. Their problems center around waging political warfare and controlling funds. The Khmer Rouge, on the other hand, he concludes, seem to be doing well. He believes that many of the victories reported over the Voice of Democratic Kampuchea are not entirely propaganda.

Bekaert, Jacques. "Khmer Rouge Strength." Bangkok Post. 31 January 1986. p. 4.

The author writes that in the Cambodian situation the politicians cannot be separated from the military, particularly in the Khmer Rouge, which is very much a political army. Most independent observers are convinced that the Khmer Rouge are doing quite well in Cambodia and the reassuring propaganda they spread among villagers is backed by their presence and their apparent capacity to build parallel forms of political control.

"CGDK's Khieu Samphan Cancels Bangkok Address." Bangkok Post. 27 March 1986- p. 3.

The non-Communist partners in the Khmer coalition mysteriously asked Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan not to speak on their latest peace initiative at a Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand function because "the timing was not appropriate."

"Khieu Samphan: Troops to Keep Arms in Ceasefire." <u>Bangkok</u>
<u>Post</u>: 6 April 1986. pp. 1. 3.

Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan, citing "Vietnam's violation of the Paris peace agreement," states that his troops will retain their arms in any political solution to the Cambodian conflict because the Vietnamese cannot be trusted.

"Khmer Rouge: Province Capital Captured." <u>Bangkok Post.</u> 3 January 1986, p. 5.

The Khmer Rouge claim to have taken control of the provincial capital. Takeo, 37 miles south of Phnom Penh, in a Christmas Day battle that left 15 Vietnamese troops dead and 25 wounded.

"KPMLF Sides Locked in Talks." Bangkok Post. 25 December 1985 p. 1.

"Proximity talks" between the conflicting factions of the KPMLF continue without agreement. Sources do not disclose how the talks are progressing or what has been discussed. The General Secretary of the KPMLF, however, does disclose that the internal conflict is in the process of being resolved.

"KPMLF Split in Leadership Widens." Bangkok Post. 21 February 1986, p. 3.

A power struggle within the KPMLF intensifies following Son Sann's announcement that Gen. Sak Sutsakhan commander-in-chief, and Dien Del chief of staff. Left their posts. Son states that he accepted Sak's resignation and fired Dien Del in a move to heal a two-month rift in the organization, but Thai sources state that actual command of the KPMLF fell by default to a committee of 10 commanders controlling individual units along the border

and that the split in the organization is far from resolved.

Lao, M.H. "Background to KPMLF Leadership Struggle." Bangkok Post: 5 February 1986. p. 4.

The author writes that the crisis within the leadership of the KPNLF following the expulsion of two of its leading cadres, Dr. Garfar Peng-Meth and Hing Kunthorn, and the subsequent formation of the Provisional Central Committee of Salvation to topple Son Sann is a sad event because it sets a bad precedent, damaging the democratization of Cambodian politics.

"Pol Pot To Quit If Viets Leave." Bangkok Post. 3 January 1986.
p. 5.

A statement dated 30 December and broadcast in the name of Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan states that "Pol Pot promises to the nation and the international community that he will stop all activities, whether military or political, forever." effective "from the first day after Democratic Kampuchea and Vietnam sign an agreement on the withdrawal of the Hanoi aggressor forces from Kampuchea."

"Retugees May Be Hostages to CGDK Policy." The Mation (Bangkok). 9 February 1986, p. 3. In JPRS-SEA-86-04. 11 March 1986, pp. 88, 89.

The 230,000 Cambodians living along the Thai-Cambodian border are trapped in a bureaucratic and political limbo. Many want to return to Cambodia but either the war makes doing so too dangerous or political forces controlling the camps won't permit it. The Khmer Rouge are particularly guilty of forceably detaining their civilian followers and lately have tightened their grip on the camps they control.

"Sak Sutsakhan Leadership Faction Discussed." <u>The Mation</u> (Bangkok), 28 February 1986, p. 5. In JPRS-SEA-86-054, 25 March 1986, p. 46.

KPMLF military leader Gen. Sak Sutsakhan visits some of the commanders of the KPMLF forces on the Thai-Cambodian border in a move to reassert his command following President Son Sann's move to deprive him of his military and political posts. Out of the eight base commanders, five are present to receive him and he tells them to continue their fighting against the Vietnamese under his command but does not discuss the leadership crisis which pits him against Son Sann.

"Sihanouk Reshuffles Top AMS Commanders." The Nation (Bangkok).
9 February 1986. p. 3. In JPRS-SEA-86-043. 11 March 1986.
pp. 90, 91.

Prince Sihanouk recently appointed Prince Rannariddh to top military positions in the ANS in an effort to enable his son to exercise full control over the resistance force. Rannariddh was made commander in chief and chief of staff in an order sent from Beijing at the end of January. Gen. Teap Ben, who lost the two positions to Ranariddh was named deputy commander in chief and retained his post as deputy commander of the inactive Joint Military Command which was originally formed to direct the activities of the KPNLF and the ANS.

"Sihanouk To Inject 'Punch' Into Flagging Resistance." Bangkok Post, 3 January 1986, p. 5.

Prince Morodom Sihanouk has moved to inject "punch" into the AMS by positioning a handpicked force of 600 guerrillas near Phnom Penh. Sihanouk's son. Prince Ranariddh states that the force is tree from normal command channels and that such tactics are necessary because many Sihanoukist generals are becoming too old and set in their ways.

The Ame Falls." Asiaweek (Hong Kong), Vol 12. No. 9, 2 March 1986, p. 24. DS1.A715

Following KPNLF president Son Sann's announcement that he had sacked commander in chief Gen. Sak Sutsakhan, and chief of staff Gen. Dien Del, he discloses the establishment of a military command committee to replace them. Head of the new committee is Prum Vith, deputy chief of general staff in charge of military operations, commander of Sok Sann base, and a neutral in Son Sann's dispute with his two deposed generals. There are now three committees with either potential or actual command.

Van Der Kroer, Justus M. "Kampuchea: The Road to Finlandization 1983." <u>Asian Protile</u> (Hong Kong), Vol. 13, No. 3, June 1985, pp. 221-241. DS1.A4746

The author argues that ultimately ASEAM might hope only for a "Finland solution" to the Cambodian conflict in which Cambodia is given a "flawed" neutrality (i.e. one that is pro-Communist Vietnamese) and a puppet regime heavily garrisoned by Vietnamese and Soviet forces.