A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON
THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

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**A Selective, Annotated Bibliography on the North Korean Military**

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This bibliography, produced in monthly installments from an online database, provides selective annotations of serials and monographs on the army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Entries are arranged alphabetically by author in three sections: modernization of the North Korean army, strategies and tactics used by the North Korean army during the Korean War (1950-53), and strategies and tactics used by the North Korean army since the war.
PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material and covers the following topics:

- modernization of the North Korean Army,
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics in the Korean War, and
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics since the Korean War.

The bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.
GLOSSARY

CPLA
Chinese People's Liberation Army

CPC
Combined Forces Command (US and ROK)

DPRK
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)

NKA
North Korean Army

NKAF
North Korean Air Force

NKN
North Korean Navy

KPA
Korean People's Army (Comprises NKA, NKAF, and NKN)

KWP
Korean Workers' Party

ROK
Republic of Korea (South Korea)

ROKA
Republic of Korea Army

ROKAF
Republic of Korea Air Force

ROKN
Republic of Korea Navy
1. MODERNIZATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

The article says that North Korea's ongoing military modernization and Moscow's recent expressions of support for Pyongyang have made the peninsula's security situation "extremely serious." Hughes helicopters surreptitiously imported from the United States could be used by the North Koreans to infiltrate commandos into South Korea. The military balance could shift more in favor of North Korea if it allows Soviet naval vessels to use the west coast port of Nampo. In August 1985, Soviet naval vessels visited the east coast port of Wonsan during a Soviet-North Korean celebration marking the 40th anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II. China is said to be disturbed by the revitalization of Soviet-Korean military ties and particularly by the possibility of the Soviets being granted airfields and naval bases in North Korea. The article includes order of battle information for the NKA and NKAF.


A recent article in the monthly Japan Military Review (date of publication not reported) discusses the organization and capabilities of the KPA. The KPA is said to have an organization similar to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the NKN and NKAF reportedly have little control over the missions of their services because of the predominance of the NKA in operational matters. The NKA is credited with eight corps and independent mechanized missile and special forces. Each of the eight corps is said to have eight divisions. The NKA is assessed as having the weapons and manpower it would need to launch a full-scale attack on South Korea; however, the author believes North Korea may have inadequate supplies of fuel to sustain offensive operations for long.
"Lee, Weinberger Share View on Rising Pyongyang Menance." Korea Herald (Seoul), 5 April 1986, p. 3.

In a joint communique issued on 3 April at the conclusion of the 18th US-South Korean Security Consultative Meeting, the two nations agree that recent developments in North Korea's ongoing military modernization effort have added to its capability to carry out a surprise attack on South Korea and to sustain offensive operations. The expansion of new mechanized corps in the NKA and the forward deployment of ground-force units are cited as reasons for concern.


The Korean daily reports on a press conference given by US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in Washington on 25 March. At one point Weinberger discusses Soviet military aid to North Korea. He estimates that Moscow has delivered 26 MiG-23/FLOGGERs plus a limited number of SA3 surface-to-air missiles to Pyongyang. In return for military equipment, North Korea allows Soviet TU-16/BADGER and TU-95/BEAR aircraft to fly reconnaissance, intelligence collection, and training missions over its territory. Weinberger believes that the Soviets are transferring arms to North Korea because they have determined Pyongyang is serious about improving bilateral relations. Military contacts between the two countries were limited until 1985. The press conference was held to publicize key findings in the 1986 edition of the US Department of Defense publication entitled Soviet Military Power.

"Pyongyang Deploys 65 Percent of Military Strength Along the DMZ." Korea Herald (Seoul), 22 March 1986, p. 1.

South Korean Minister of National Defense Yi Ki-baek holds a press conference on 20 March to report on North Korea's military capabilities. Yi places the number of tanks and
artillery weapons possessed by the North Koreans at 3,500 and 7,400, which are 2.7 and 2 times more than what South Korea has, respectively. The North Koreans have built new air bases close to the DMZ. If fighter aircraft left these bases, they could be over Seoul in only 8 minutes. MiG-23 fighter aircraft stationed at Pukchang Air Base could fly to Seoul in only 17 minutes. The North Koreans have stockpiled about 250 tons of chemical weapons, consisting of mustard and nerve gases, for use in a future war. The Korea Herald publishes a map, used by Yi in his briefing, which shows that North Korea has increased the number of troops deployed close to the DMZ from 45 to 65 percent of its total ground forces in recent years. Yi believes that South Korea will catch up with North Korea and have equivalent military strength by the early 1990s. Until that time, Yi says the US role in deterring North Korean aggression is essential. The apparent purpose of Yi's press conference was to remind the South Korean people that North Korea still poses a significant military threat to the nation's security.
2. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR

This book discusses the perceptions and decisions of US and Communist policymakers in power at the time of the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950. The author believes North Korean President Kim Il-song started the war at a time of his choosing and for his own reasons. Soviet leaders expected hostilities to begin in August. The author reasons that if the invasion had been planned in Moscow, the Soviets would have prepared a much more effective propaganda effort than they did in June and July 1950. Foot also believes that if US policymakers had favored the establishment of a demilitarized zone along Korea's borders with China and the Soviet Union, China probably would not have sent the CPLA into Korea.


The Chosin Reservoir campaign of November and December 1950, during which units of the 1st Marine Division were encircled by 11 CPLA divisions along a 78-mile stretch of road in Northeast Korea, ended with the successful evacuation of the division from Hungnam, following some of the most intense fighting of the war. Chapter 3 discusses CPLA organization and tactics in October 1950 and the failure of US intelligence to ascertain the facts about China's preparations for entering the war. Chapters 8 through 15 discuss the tactics used by Marine units to stop mass wave assaults and enemy efforts to cut the main supply route. In chapter 15, captured Chinese documents are evaluated. During the Chosin Reservoir campaign Chinese losses are estimated to have been 5-times greater than American losses. Additionally, the Chinese were surprised by the effectiveness of US command and control of forces, and concomitantly, concerned about their own C3 and supply problems.

Three CPLA full-scale attacks occurred in the first five months of 1951. Chapter 2 discusses the January offensive in which the CPLA captured Seoul. The authors speculate that the successes of the Chinese at that time could be attributed more to a lack of preparedness on the part of the allies than to good planning by enemy commanders. CPLA offensives in April and May, although successful in breaking through UN defenses, were extremely costly in lives and materiel and forced the Chinese to abandon efforts to move farther south. In chapter 7, it is suggested that relations between the CPLA and NKA were not good in 1951. Chapter 9 describes fighting between NKA and allied units in the central part of Korea in September 1951. Chapter 12 discusses the intricate network of tunnels and trenches constructed by the Chinese and North Koreans in the latter part of 1951.


The author argues that Kim Il-song was primarily responsible for starting the Korean War on 25 June 1950 without Soviet approval. Simmons suggests that Stalin favored a date in August, but speculates that Kim ordered the June attack because he believed Syngman Rhee was politically unpopular. He was told by advisors that as many as 500,000 South Koreans would support the invasion by the NKA. Simmons also believes that at no time did the Soviet Union consider entering the war, not even when US Forces approached the Soviet and Chinese borders in October 1950. Soviet radio broadcasts to China and Korea during the period are cited as indications that Moscow made clear its intention to avoid a conflict with the United States, while it encouraged China to become actively involved.
Tillman, Barrett and Nichols, John B. "Fighting Unwinnable Wars." Proceedings (Annapolis), vol. 112, no. 4, April 1986, supplement on naval aviation, pp. 78-86. Vl.U8

The contributions of naval aviation to the Korean and Vietnam Wars, although substantial, are said to have never been used to their full potential for political reasons. The correct military procedure in both wars would have been to choke off the entry of munitions being supplied to the enemy by other Communist nations, including China and the Soviet Union. Although naval aviation could successfully disrupt Communist logistics in Korea and Vietnam, it could not interdict deliveries. The authors point out that in future conflicts with Communist countries, the United States will have to contend with more sophisticated air defense weapons and tactics, and possibly, with a much improved Soviet Navy.
3. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS SINCE THE KOREAN WAR

South Korean and US military leaders meet in Seoul on 1 April to discuss North Korea's military capabilities and measures to counter the North Korean threat. The two sides agree that North Korea is continuing its military buildup with the assistance of the Soviet Union and conclude that this military buildup threatens South Korea's security. To counter North Korea's "5-to-7 day strategy," the two nations agree to study ways to improve defense cooperation, including ways to counter North Korea's chemical warfare threat. Both sides express satisfaction with South Korea's enhanced capability to thwart low-altitude infiltrations by North Korean aircraft using US-provided Red Eye and Stinger missiles.


An article published in Sankei on 10 January reports that North Korea has recently organized a new artillery corps and has deployed the unit within 50 kilometers of the DMZ. The artillery corps is said to have three-to-four brigades equipped with weapons such as 122-mm self-propelled howitzers, 152-mm self-propelled guns, and multiple rocket launchers. This artillery corps will augment four North Korean "armored corps" and contribute to North Korea's capability to break through South Korea's frontline defenses at the outset of renewed hostilities. The Japanese daily also reports that the NKA has recently been provided with new types of river crossing equipment, including amphibious vehicles and floating bridges for tanks.

An editorial in the Korean daily supports remarks by US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and CFC Commanding General William J. Livsey warning the DPRK may decide to take military action against the ROK to disrupt either the 1986 Asian Games or the 1988 Summer Olympics. The editorial views North Korean leaders as being irritated because the holding of these two events in Seoul will enhance South Korea's international prestige. The South Korean people are encouraged to support efforts by the ROK Government to maintain a strong defense to counter the North Korean threat.


This editorial in the independent daily argues that while the military threat from North Korea is real, the ROK Government should not use the issue for political purposes. Tonga Ilbo says that it regards as credible reports by the US and ROK Governments which have concluded that KPA offensive capabilities have been enhanced in recent months by the forward deployment of additional troops and aircraft and by Soviet deliveries to North Korea of weapons such as MiG-23/FLOGGER fighter aircraft and SCUD surface-to-surface missiles. The editorial goes on to say that despite these developments, the South Korean people are capable of understanding the realities of the current situation without efforts by the ROK Government to use the security issue for its own political purposes. The editorial was written in response to public remarks by South Korean Defense Minister Yi Ki-pae on 20 March in which Yi called on political opponents of the regime to end their struggle for constitutional reforms because of the precariousness of the security situation.

The Soviet Union may have allowed the export of SA3 surface-to-air missiles to North Korea as a tactical measure to offset South Korea's acquisition of F-16 fighter aircraft, according to a 26 December 1985 article in *Sankei*. Two reasons are given in support of this assessment. First, the Soviet Union has previously refused to export the SA3 to North Korea. Second, the SA3 is designed to provide air defense against low-flying aircraft. North Korea reportedly has deployed 30 SA3 sites around Pyongyang.


US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, in Seoul for the 18th annual US-South Korean Security Consultative Meeting, says that North Korea poses an increased threat to South Korea because it has moved additional NKA units close to the DMZ and is now importing new and more sophisticated weapons from the Soviet Union. Noting that Seoul will host the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Summer Olympics, Weinberger pledges that the US will do what it can to ensure that both events are held without incident.