U.S. ARMY CADET COMMAND
THE 10 YEAR HISTORY

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This volume is an examination of the role played by the U.S. Army Cadet Command (est. 15 April 1986) in the reform and reorientation of the Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps. It was undertaken to provide the Cadet Command Commander and other interested senior Army leaders with an assessment of the command's part in the revolution in precommissioning military training that began in the mid-1980's. Extensive documentary files and numerous oral history interviews support the study. Endnotes document the sources used in this volume and an index facilitates the location of specific topics.
FOREWORD

Foreword

Much has been written about the remarkable regeneration of the Army in the two decades after Vietnam. The “training revolution,” which fundamentally changed the way the Army prepared for its war-fighting mission, was an important part of that regeneration. It permitted the Army to field a force of the type that performed so competently and confidently in Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm. Strangely, the precommissioning part of that training revolution went largely unnoticed by the public and by senior Army leaders despite the fact that the changes and improvements made in this arena were every bit as revolutionary as those effected elsewhere in the Army. It is hoped that the present volume will help correct this oversight as it relates to the Army’s largest commissioning source—the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC)—and complete the picture of the training revolution the other aspects of which have received so much attention and acclaim.

JAMES M. LYLE
Major General, United States Army
Commanding
Preface

This volume is an examination of the role played by the U.S. Army Cadet Command in the reform and reorientation of the Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps. It was undertaken to provide the Cadet Command Commander and other interested senior Army leaders with an assessment of the command's part in the revolution in precommissioning military training that began in the mid-1980s. Extensive documentary files and numerous oral history interviews support the study. Endnotes document the sources used in this volume and an index facilitates the location of specific topics.

I am greatly indebted to Major General Robert Wagner, Major General Wallace Arnold, and Major General James Lyle for the invaluable perspectives they provided on the establishment and subsequent development of the command and Major General Daniel French for the insights he gave into events preceding the founding of the command. My thanks also to the many members of the Cadet Command Headquarters staff, past and present, for their part, which was considerable, in preparing this study.

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ARTHUR T. COUMBE
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Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
INTRODUCTION

It was not until the decade of the 1980s that the ROTC began to move in a different direction. A program whose effectiveness had long been limited by its organizational diffusion and lack of standardization was transformed in a relatively short period of time into an efficient producer of commissioned officers.

No one today would question the motivation and competency of newly commissioned Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) graduates. Their performance in recent conflicts such as Operation Just Cause (Panama) and Operation Desert Storm (Persian Gulf) testifies to their professional skill and leadership ability. The ROTC is finally doing what its proponents in the past have claimed it could—namely, it is producing a broadly educated junior officer, thoroughly imbued with the customs, traditions, and ethos of the military profession yet with one foot firmly planted in the civilian community. Moreover, it does this at relatively little cost to the taxpayer. Indeed, many senior Army officers feel that of the three commissioning sources currently available to the United States Army, the ROTC program is the one that produces the second lieutenant best prepared to meet the complex array of technological, social, intellectual, and leadership challenges that are an inseparable part of the modern military profession.

ROTC graduates, however, have not always been held in high esteem. Until relatively recently, they were often compared unfavorably with their Officer Candidate School (OCS) and West Point counterparts. A reputation for being “second string” stuck with the ROTC program
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from its inception in 1916 until well into the 1980s.

This reputation, it must be admitted, was not entirely undeserved. Considered as a group, the performance of ROTC graduates as junior officers had been uneven over the years. In the two decades before World War II, tight federal budgets and an inhospitable collegiate environment—created in part by the pacifist sentiment that became prevalent in the American collegiate community after World War I—limited the effectiveness of the program. During this era, enthusiasm for military service was low, training resources were scarce, and the number of officers who could be assigned to ROTC instructor duty were few, at least relative to enrollment. Moreover, only a small number of graduates were permitted to serve on extended active duty. Most were shunted into the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC). Once in the ORC, only a handful were given the opportunity to attend any additional training. As a result, the professional skills and knowledge they did acquire soon eroded and within a short time these officers became of marginal value to the Army.

Much has been made of the contribution of ROTC graduates to victory in World War II. It is true that they, along with other officers that formed the ORC, constituted a leadership nucleus around which General George Marshall mobilized the U.S. Army. However, the contribution that these individuals made to the war effort was due more to their innate abilities and on-the-job experience than to any training they received in the ROTC. In fact, the program was suspended during the war in part because, in the opinion of the Army Ground Forces Staff, college educated OCS graduates made more capable lieutenants than recent products of ROTC.

After World War II, the need for a better educated officer corps, a desire to cut costs, and the fear of service academy elitism combined to propel the ROTC program to a new prominence. The ROTC was now expected to provide the bulk of officers for both the active and reserve forces. Despite its new importance, the program experienced difficulties producing second lieutenants in the quantity and of the quality desired by Army leaders. Even some of the ROTC’s most ardent proponents admitted these shortfalls. Lack of career motivation and an inadequate understanding of the roles, methods, and ethos of the military service and the military profession were frequently voiced complaints about ROTC graduates. Their lack of the most fundamental military skills
and knowledge also aroused comment. These reports, along with the substandard performance of ROTC graduates at branch basic courses, suggested to some that the Army had erred in making the ROTC the primary source of Army officers.

A number of chronic problems plagued the program in the four decades after World War II that greatly detracted from its value as an institution of precommissioning education and training. A major problem was a lack of standardization—a deficiency that was evident in every functional area from administration to training. As Professors Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland noted in the preface of their seminal work on the ROTC program, *Education and Military Leadership: A Study of the R.O.T.C.:

ROTC is a familiar brand name. It is not, however, one of those brand names which guarantee uniform ingredients in all packages bearing the brand...it varies from campus to campus.²

Although written in 1959, this remark was as true in the early 1980s as it was at the time it was written.

This lack of standardization had many negative consequences. Training especially suffered. While some ROTC units instituted rigorous military training regimens and produced well-oriented lieutenants fully ready to benefit from instruction at branch basic courses, other units had no training program worthy of the name. The same unevenness of training prevailed at ROTC summer camps. Here, too, the quality and content of training varied widely. This condition largely explains why as recently as the early 1980s, a battalion commander who welcomed a newly commissioned ROTC graduate into the unit could not be certain of just what he was getting.

Advertising and marketing were other areas hurt by the lack of standardization. The ROTC advertising effort was uncoordinated and, in many respects, haphazard. Each level in the ROTC hierarchy followed its own agenda; there was no central message or theme to give coherence or a distinct image to the program.

Nonstandardization also afflicted the methodologies used for selecting cadets for commissioning. Governing command structures
essentially set their own standards and policies for deciding which cadets were to be awarded commissions. In some regions, cadets were denied commissions for almost frivolous reasons; in others, cadets were commissioned who were clearly unfit to be junior officers. When enlistment criteria were tightened in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the ROTC selection process led to the anomalous situation in which enlistees sometimes possessed more intellectual and leadership potential than the junior officers who led them.

The quality of officer assigned to the ROTC was another problem. Typically, officers (normally colonels or lieutenant colonels) at the end of their military careers were appointed as Professors of Military Science (PMS). Unfortunately, many of them regarded their assignment as a transitional one—one in which they could prepare to take their place in the civilian community after retirement from the Army. They did not always inject energy and intensity into the programs which they directed. Neither were the junior officers assigned to ROTC of a uniformly high quality. ROTC positions, it was understood, did little to ensure future promotion, and Army personnel managers did not as a rule assign the most competitive officers to instructor duty.

The size and structure of the ROTC program further inhibited the precommissioning process. The existence of small and uneconomical units wasted resources and personnel and, like the lack of standardization, degraded training and leader development. In periods of demobilization, people and resources were withdrawn before and more quickly than unproductive units were closed. This resulted in the proliferation of small and ineffective units and partially explained past qualitative production problems.

An inefficient use of ROTC scholarship monies also damaged ROTC production capabilities. A disproportionately large portion of the scholarship budget was channeled into high-priced, exclusive schools with little consideration given to the long-term benefits thus gained. Moreover, a defective management system rendered the scholarship program unresponsive to budgetary controls. University officials who set tuition rates determined how far the Army's scholarship dollars would stretch.

One might ask how, if the program was so inefficient, could ROTC produce such prominent officers as General Gordon Sullivan and General Colin Powell? The answer to this question is quite simple. If one casts
one's net wide enough, especially in and among such an able group as the collegiate population of the United States, one is bound to catch a number of big fish—even though they might represent a very small fraction of the whole catch. In any case, the success of the ROTC program in producing prominent civilian and military leaders tells us little about its ability to produce competent, well-motivated junior officers. Historically, leadership at the tactical level has not been a forte of the U.S. Army. Leavenworth graduates have been world-class; our junior officers have not.

It was not until the decade of the 1980s that the ROTC began to move in a different direction. A program whose effectiveness had long been limited by its organizational diffusion and lack of standardization was transformed in a relatively short period of time into an efficient producer of commissioned officers—a producer that was capable of turning out in sufficient quantity junior officers of the type that performed so creditably in the Persian Gulf War. To be sure, from the program's inception there were officers who both recognized and worked to correct the many problems that plagued the ROTC. Indeed, many of the reforms and improvements instituted over the last decade had been prefigured in
the proposals and actions of these officers. Unfortunately, the disjointed and decentralized structure of the program prevented these designs from being implemented on any more than a local or, at best, a regional level.

The present work represents an attempt to describe and analyze the revolution in precommissioning education and training effected by the U.S. Army Cadet Command. Before beginning discussion of the various forces and personalities that played a role in forming and shaping the command, it is first necessary to review the history of collegiate military training and the ROTC program to provide a framework for what follows.
CHAPTER I

THE CADET COMMAND HERITAGE

Captain Alden Partridge, former superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, founded Norwich University in 1819 at Norwich, Vermont. It is to this institution that the modern ROTC program traces its heritage.

The idea of conducting the precommissioning military education and training of Army officers in America’s colleges and universities is as old as the nation itself. In 1783, George Clinton, prominent statesman and six-term Governor of New York, came forward with a plan that called for the introduction of military instruction at one civilian college in each state of the Union. Under this plan, students, after completing their degree and the prescribed course of military instruction, would be commissioned and serve a short stint on active duty. Upon returning to civilian life, they would form a trained officer reserve that would be available in time of emergency. A system of inspections and reports was to give coherence and uniformity to his officer education program. Nothing came from Clinton’s proposal.

The University of Georgia claims to have hosted on-campus military instruction as early as 1807. Georgia state law in the early nineteenth century required all male citizens (except clergy) between 18 and 45 to assemble five times a year for a military muster. Because many university students fell into the designated age group, they attended campus drills. The purpose of this training was not to prepare its recipients to receive commissions but to allow them to fulfill their military obligation.

The first civilian institution of higher learning in the United States to actually incorporate military education into its curriculum was the American
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Literary, Scientific and Military Academy—now Norwich University. Captain Alden Partridge, former superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, founded the school in 1819 at Norwich, Vermont. It is to this institution that the modern ROTC traces its heritage.

The citizen-soldier ideal was the driving force behind Partridge’s educational experiment. Partridge wanted officers who would be “identified in views, in feelings, and in interests, with the great body of the community” and a college that would reconcile the efficiency and discipline demanded by a regular army with the republican values and popular sentiments inherent in the militia system. While most of the school’s graduates went into the militia, some entered the regular army and thereby broadened the educational base and expanded the political outlook of the professional officer corps.

The college’s curriculum was advanced for its time and much more diverse than West Point’s. It included courses in agriculture and modern languages in addition to the sciences, liberal arts, and various military subjects. Field exercises, for which Partridge borrowed cannon and muskets from the federal and state governments, supplemented classroom instruction and added an element of realism to the college’s program of military training.3

Between 1819 and the Civil War, a number of other essentially military schools were established. Lafayette College, Oak Ridge Academy, and Kemper and Marion Institutes were private institutions while the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and The Citadel were state-supported ventures. At these latter two colleges, attachment to the citizen-soldier ideal was not as strong as at Norwich. Their founding was bound up with the Southern military tradition and the practical need to provide a management education for the sons of the planter aristocracy.4

A number of civilian institutions hosted military instruction during the antebellum period. St. John’s College (Annapolis, Maryland) began offering it in 1826. The University of Tennessee and Indiana University purportedly had it as early as 1840 while William Tecumseh Sherman introduced it at Louisiana State in 1859. Collegiate military training enjoyed a brief and checkered run at the University of Virginia in the 1820s and 1830s. Upon founding the university in 1825, Thomas Jefferson made tactical drill and training mandatory. Such training, he hoped, would produce qualified officers for a national militia. He even foresaw military education developing into a recognized academic field of study. Jefferson’s dreams were soon dashed, however. Within a decade of its activation, the university’s cadet company was disbanded after a spirited confrontation with the university’s faculty.5
The Civil War and After

At the start of the Civil War, the Union found that it did not have nearly enough trained officers to lead the Army. The 20,000 officers initially required overwhelmed the supply of 1,500 West Point and Norwich graduates available for service. By necessity, the leadership in most regiments devolved upon military novices. The officer crisis impelled the United States Congress to make some provision for the education of citizen-soldier military leaders.

Representative Justin S. Morrill of Vermont, a friend and neighbor of Alden Partridge, introduced a piece of legislation which came to be known as the Land-Grant College Bill in December 1861. The proposed act gave every state 30,000 acres of public land for each of its members in Congress. Funds generated from the sale of the land were to be used in establishing and sustaining at least one agricultural and industrial college in each state. The bill stipulated that military tactics had to be included in the curriculum of these institutions. President Abraham Lincoln signed the Morrill Act on 2 July 1862, the day after General George McClellan’s disheartening defeat in the Seven Days Battles (June 25 to July 1).

Soon after the passage of the Morrill Act, land-grant colleges began to be endowed and military instruction became part of many college curricula. Professors with Civil War military experience headed up most collegiate military programs. They did this, however, as a sideline as they still had to perform their full-time duties in other fields. The training offered in those early years often left much to be desired. In most cases, it consisted exclusively of drill—and that of the most rudimentary kind. Perhaps this was all that could be expected from a program that had no defined objective, no authorized provision for uniforms or equipment, no syllabus, and no prescribed outline of courses. Even had the training been better, the Union’s officer procurement woes would not have been allayed since Morrill’s bill came much too late to have exercised a significant impact on the course of the war.

In the post-Civil War era, the Congress enacted a number of measures designed to improve collegiate military training and encourage its growth. In 1866, it authorized the President to detail 20 officers to teach military science at land-grant institutions; in 1870, small arms and equipment were authorized to be issued; in 1880, retired officers were granted permission to teach; in 1888, War Department assistance was made available to schools outside the land-grant community, to include high schools; and in 1893, legislation raised officer authorizations for detached college duty to 100. By the turn of the century, some 42 institutions, including both state and private colleges, had
established departments of military instruction. It was among the land-grant institutions, however, that the tradition of military training took firmest root and the concept of citizen-soldier officer education became the most firmly embedded. At most land-grant schools, one year of military training had been made compulsory by 1900.9

Despite the various steps taken to improve instruction, the contributions of collegiate military training programs to the national defense were limited. No uniform training standards guided instruction nor was the federal government given supervisory authority to regulate the various collegiate programs. Officers were allowed to conduct training according to their personal views and desires. The result was that no two institutions were alike in their courses of military instruction.

According to a board of officers assembled in 1911 to consider collegiate military programs, the majority of officers assigned to campus duty lost sight of their principal purpose—which was to produce volunteer
officers—and concentrated on developing “fine drill corps.” The board lamented the fact that both institution and instructor were “judged by parade ground results.” The latitude accorded to officer-instructors in developing their own courses of instruction, board members concluded, was largely responsible for this unfortunate state of affairs.\textsuperscript{10}

The officer assignment policies of the War Department also limited the effectiveness of on-campus military training programs. The department’s stinginess in personnel matters presented a particular problem. In some of the larger land-grant schools, the Army detailed one Regular Army officer to manage a corps of several thousand cadets. University administrators complained about the quality as well as the quantity of the officers assigned to their institutions. Many received inexperienced second lieutenants when they expected seasoned colonels. Others got officers who were physically not up to the task at hand. In 1911, a War Department inspector deemed the retired major serving at North Dakota Agricultural College in Fargo as unfit for his position because of old age—he was to turn 80 on his next birthday. Cadre motivation was another issue. The Army simply did not attach much importance to instructor duty and officers knew it. One university president urged that time spent as a collegiate military instructor “should count as time spent with the troops in considering his service and promotion.” Otherwise, he warned, the “discrimination” against such work would continue to discourage officers from accepting such assignments.\textsuperscript{11}

The Army’s lukewarm support of collegiate military training was due in part to personnel and budgetary constraints. Both people and money were in short supply during most of the period in question. Senior army leaders were reluctant to detail officers to colleges and universities because, in the words of one Department Commander, such detached duty “depletes the line and deprives the troops of the services of these excellent officers when they are most needed.” The pre-World War I Army, like the post-Cold War Army, devoted more words than resources to leader development.\textsuperscript{12}

The “indifferent” attitude of university authorities toward military training also dampened the War Department’s enthusiasm for the program. This indifference, one general staff study noted, was displayed by the “wholesale excusing” of students from military instruction. Farm chores, athletic commitments, conflicting civilian job schedules, and a host of other activities too numerous to recount got students excused from drill. The failure of college administrators to “allot proper time and opportunity for the work of the military department” was another sign of this indifference, or so it seemed.
A student at the Army War College complained that “college authorities usually designated the last hour of the school day for military work; a time when the ordinary student had no enthusiasm for work or play.” The reluctance or refusal of most college administrations to provide adequate facilities and resources for their military departments only confirmed their apathy toward military training in the minds of many military officers.

Student motivation for military training suffered because there were few opportunities available for commissioned service either in the Regular Army or in state militias. It is true that around the turn of the century, the War Department started granting Regular Army commissions annually to one outstanding student from each of the ten most highly rated land-grant and military colleges—called “Distinguished Institutions.” George C. Marshall received his commission in 1902 upon graduation from VMI as a result of this policy. Yet only a relative handful of students could get commissions in this way.

It seemed odd to some regular officers that state militias (with two exceptions) did not take advantage of land-grant institutions to fill their officer ranks. The fact was, however, that most state organizations wanted no part of these colleges or their alumni. One state Adjutant General openly declared that the graduate of a collegiate military training program was not “the material desired for the militia of his state.” One college president explained the situation as follows:

...The ordinary college graduate usually has difficulty in securing the approval of his untrained and uneducated compeers (in the militia). They naturally look upon him as a college fellow who is trying to show off what he has learned in college.

To be sure, there were units that achieved a relatively high state of morale and effectiveness. The unit at the University of Nebraska was one of these. During the Spanish-American War, its cadet corps organized itself into the First Nebraska Infantry, which fought with distinction in the Philippines. Yet, despite occasional bright spots, collegiate military training in the half century after the Civil War was, on the whole, an underfunded, fragmented, and above all, non-uniform enterprise. The training it provided to students was, in the words of one authority, “spotty and varied in time and intensity from one institution to another.” It was primarily this lack of uniformity that made the Army question the value of the program and the wisdom of dedicating money and resources to its operation.
The Creation of the ROTC

The years immediately preceding America’s entry into World War I witnessed increased Army interest in collegiate military training. The General Staff devoted considerable attention to it. That body believed that America’s institutions of higher learning were the source from which the United States should draw the bulk of its reserve officer corps. But to obtain the desired qualitative results, the General Staff felt, the system of collegiate military training had to be standardized, which in turn necessitated centralized direction. “Central control,” it wrote in one report, “is needed...to insure efficiency and standardization.” Imposing such a uniform program of military instruction on the nation’s highly diversified system of higher education, it also realized, would be difficult in the extreme.

The Army Chief of Staff at the time, General Leonard Wood, put forward some definite ideas about how to improve the existing system of military training at colleges and universities. In addition to upgrading on-campus instruction, Wood wanted to introduce a system of summer camps to provide cadets with practical training and to require every lieutenant to perform a short tour of active duty upon commissioning.

In 1913, General Wood tested his summer camp prototype when he sponsored two experimental Student Military Instruction Camps for high school and college students at Pacific Grove, California, and Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Except for tents, rifles and personal equipment, which were provided by the Army, students paid the entire bill. The training lasted five weeks and included drill, marksmanship, squad patrolling, and other tactical subjects. Two years later, with the 1915 sinking of the Lusitania as a backdrop, Wood opened an additional summer camp at Plattsburg, New York, for some 1,200 attendees, ages 20 to 40, with contributions from business and professional men. Within weeks, national interest in Wood’s camps escalated into the Plattsburg Movement. Utilizing the Plattsburg model, Wood hosted two more camps that same summer; one attracting 3,000 participants and the other 16,000. These camps prepared 90,000 officers for service in World War I and served as models for the ROTC summer training program that followed after the war.

While Wood was busy pushing his program, representatives from The Ohio State University—led by President William O. Thompson and Dean Edward Orton, Jr.—advanced one of their own. At the 1913 annual convention of land-grant colleges, Orton recommended legislation instituting minimum national standards for collegiate military training and education. At the very least, he wanted each military science program to include: two years of
military drill; three periods per week of military instruction; strict discipline during drill periods; a week of field training each year; and instruction in small unit tactical operations. Students completing this course of study would be commissioned into a reserve officer corps. To ensure compliance with prescribed standards, the federal government should, in Orton’s opinion, reserve the right to discontinue payments of land-grant funds to those schools failing to meet these criteria.\textsuperscript{20}

Representatives from various civilian and Army educational organizations met in Washington, D.C., in November 1915 and, using Orton’s proposals as a guide, drafted a bill to create a Reserve Officers’ Training Corps. The full support of the academic associations made possible the eventual incorporation of the ROTC Bill into the National Defense Act of 1916, which was passed on 3 June of that year. In addition to creating the ROTC, the act established an Organized Reserve Corps, an organization into which ROTC graduates and other reserve officers could be pooled during peacetime.\textsuperscript{21}

The first ROTC units appeared in the autumn of 1916 at 46 schools. They registered a combined enrollment of about 40,000. These units came along too late, however, to permit them to exercise a significant impact on American involvement in World War I. ROTC training, in fact, was suspended in 1918 in favor of the Student Army Training Corps, a body formed to train enlisted men for special assignments, not to provide on-campus precommissioning training.

The Inter-War Years

Shortly after the armistice, the ROTC was reestablished at most of the institutions that had maintained pre-war units. Congress attempted to reinvigorate the program when it passed the National Defense Act of 1920, which provided for more federal support to ROTC units in the form of uniforms, equipment, and instructors. In the period between the wars, the ROTC grew steadily although not as much or as quickly as some government and Army officials would have liked due to limited appropriations. Starting with units at 135 institutions in 1919, the program encompassed 220 colleges and universities by 1940. Production also increased. By the time the United States entered World War II, the ROTC had produced over 100,000 officers and its graduates constituted about 80 percent of the Organized Reserve Corps.\textsuperscript{22}

To get an ROTC unit established on their campus during this period, college and university presidents had to petition the Army Adjutant General's
Office. In their petition, they had to pledge to offer a four-year course of instruction in military science, which included a Basic Course of three hours per week during a student’s first two years and an Advanced Course of five hours per week during his final two undergraduate years. If the petition was approved (which was by no means certain since fiscal constraints resulted in many institutions being denied units), the school was given the authority to require compulsory enrollment in the Basic Course and to determine the number of credit hours awarded for each military science course. The Army assigned active duty officers and enlisted men as instructors and paid their salaries. Upon acceptance by school officials, the senior officer assumed the title Professor of Military Science and Tactics (PMS&T) and the other officers the title of Assistant PMS&T. Permission to enroll in the Advanced Course was granted only to those cadets who desired to pursue a commission. The Army provided uniforms, equipment, and textbooks and paid Advanced Course cadets a small subsistence allowance to defray the costs of haircuts and uniform care. Cadets also received a small stipend during their six-week summer camp between the junior and senior year.23

The branch affiliation of each ROTC unit determined its curriculum and summer camp regimen. Some institutions supported units of several types (infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineer, etc.). Certain subjects—for example, map reading, military history, military law, basic tactics, camp sanitation, drill, and marksmanship—were part of every curriculum. All military science instruction, both Basic and Advanced, was categorized as either theoretical or practical.
The Infantry ROTC Basic Course curriculum, for instance, offered military history, current military policy, infantry tactics, and military organization as theoretical subjects, and marksmanship, drill and ceremony, and orienteering as practical ones. The Advanced Course of instruction followed a similar pattern. The infantry had the largest enrollment and greatest number of ROTC units. Approximately 40 percent of the ROTC officers produced between the wars were commissioned through infantry units.24

**Impediments to Program Effectiveness**

The ROTC may have turned out an adequate supply of reserve junior officers during the inter-war years, but it did not always produce lieutenants ready to take their place in the Army. A host of troubles beset the program. Federal budgets were tight, training resources were scarce, facilities were often inadequate and, because of the pacifist sentiment prevalent in many university communities, the environment on the college campus was not always supportive of an officer training program. Moreover, because ROTC in this era was geared almost exclusively to the production of reserve officers, a sense of urgency and immediacy was often absent. In many units, close order drill was the heart of the program. Any tactical instruction that did take place tended to be overly theoretical. Summer camp, where cadets received their most concentrated practical training, was more often than not conducted at a leisurely pace with cadets given nights and weekends off and their schedule punctuated by frequent social activities. The result of all this was that the newly commissioned ROTC lieutenant often lacked basic military skills and knowledge and was unfamiliar with the ethos of the military profession.25

Part of ROTC’s problem (which had been anticipated by the General Staff when the program was still in the planning phase) lay in its decentralized and diffuse organizational structure. At the national level, the G-1 of the War Department was responsible for assigning Regular Army personnel to ROTC duty, the Adjutant General of the Army for the financial management of the program, and a section of the G-3 for policy formulation. The G-3 assigned such a low priority to ROTC that the officer appointed to this duty usually rotated to another assignment before he became familiar with his area of responsibility. College officials who visited Washington, D.C., with the hope of discussing the ROTC program with War Department authorities, often came away disappointed because they could not identify an officer who was responsible for their particular area of concern.
The War Department held the commanders of the nine separate corps areas responsible for supervising the ROTC at the intermediate level. Each year, corps commanders were expected to conduct summer camps and inspect every detachment within their area of responsibility. Unfortunately, the staff element at corps headquarters that watched over the ROTC program was usually very small. In some corps, a single officer performed this duty. Not surprisingly, many detachments received only a superficial annual inspection while other detachments got none at all.

The chiefs of the 15 principal branches also played a part in overseeing the ROTC program at the intermediate level. While the corps staff concerned itself with all aspects of the program, the branches focused on curriculum development and summer camp instruction. The organizational dividing lines between the branches and the corps were not always clearly delineated. Overlap and "underlap" were both problems.26

At the lowest level, the PMS&T ran day-to-day operations. He answered to both the president of the institution to which he was assigned as well as the corps commander. The PMS&T conducted his business with an officer-to-cadet ratio that would have horrified his counterparts of a later era (roughly 1:100 in 1923 versus about 1:20 in 1990).27

The organizational arrangement outlined above did not have a mechanism for upholding minimum training and commissioning standards nor did it have at its head an individual positioned to protect the program's interest in high Army councils. What was needed, some felt, was a centralized command structure dedicated to the administration of the ROTC and capable of enforcing uniform standards. But creating such a command structure and imposing uniform standards on such a disparate set of institutions as those represented in the ranks of America's colleges and universities would be, it was recognized, difficult in the extreme. Colonel Ralph C. Holliday, PMS&T at The Citadel in the late 1930s, thought it would be next to impossible. At the 1937 regional ROTC conference held at Fort McPherson, Georgia, he noted,

...It must be remembered that Senior units are not alike. What is done at The Citadel, others can not do. The War Department cannot afford to undertake the straightening out of all these things. It is not a good policy to undertake to do that which you cannot do.28

In 1941, the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, tried to
improve the situation through the creation of an Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs. The general officer who filled this position acted as an advisor and representative for the ROTC in dealings between the Army leadership and college presidents. An ROTC Division, headed by a colonel and consisting of six officers and two civilian clerks, monitored day-to-day operations and advised the Reserve Affairs Executive and the General Staff G-3 on all ROTC matters. The creation of this office reflected a praiseworthy intent but resulted in few concrete improvements. The Executive's lack of real command authority saw to that.

The lot of the ROTC product did not get better after entering the Organized Reserve Corps. Beyond correspondence courses and the rare opportunity for a 15-day active duty tour, little post-commissioning training or education of any type was available. Nor could most reserve officers hope to hone their skills by finding positions in units outside the organized reserve. The National Guard normally commissioned officers from its own enlisted ranks after passing them through state-run Officer Candidate Schools. In 1935, the situation improved slightly with the passage of the Thomason Act. This piece of legislation authorized a year of active duty for 1,000 ROTC graduates annually—50 of whom could be awarded Regular Army commissions upon tour's end. In the main, however, professional development beyond the precommissioning phase became a reality for only a handful of ROTC graduates.

World War II

The mobilization of the U.S. Army for World War II gave the ROTC its first real test. From August 1940 to December 1941, 80,000 Organized Reserve Corps officers, the vast majority of whom were ROTC graduates, answered the call to active duty. This group of officers formed the nucleus around which General Marshall built the war-time Army. In the midst of the war, Marshall paid tribute to these officers:

The procurement of suitable officer personnel was fortunately solved by the fact that during lean, post war years over 100,000 reserve officers had been continuously trained... These reserve officers constituted the principal available asset which we possessed at this time... Without these officers the successful rapid expansion of our Army...would have been impossible...
In quantitative terms, the contribution of these reserve officers was indeed significant. A 1944 Army study of five combat divisions revealed that reservists constituted 34 percent of the total officer strength: 70 percent of all captains; 82 percent of all majors; 69 percent of all company commanders; and 50 percent of all battalion commanders.\(^3\)

But, as Lyons and Masland pointed out, the “mere availability” of 100,000 and some odd officers at the beginning of mobilization did not make the pre-World War II ROTC program a success. Most ROTC graduates who did rise to positions of authority owed their accomplishments to the hard school of battlefield experience, not ROTC training. Junior officers commissioned through the ROTC, in fact, did not prove as immediately useful to the war effort as did OCS graduates.\(^3\)

At the beginning of hostilities, the Army Ground Forces (AGF) Staff found two principal weak points in the ROTC system. First, it did not produce officers fast enough to meet demands. Second, its product was qualitatively inferior to the OCS product. “The three months of intensive training undergone in an officer candidate school under war conditions,” an AGF memo stated, “is far superior to the full ROTC course.” Another AGF document asserted that the ROTC graduate was neither a “first class leader” nor “tactically and technically proficient.” One of the reasons for this qualitative inferiority, the authors of the document maintained, was that in the inter-war ROTC program, “theoretical training was stressed at the expense of the practical, largely because of the lack of the necessary facilities for carrying on practical instruction.” An AGF study of officer production problems at the Infantry OCS found that “leadership deficiencies were far more common” among ROTC candidates than among candidates from other sources. The study attributed ROTC leadership defects to, among other things, the fact that ROTC candidates “had on the whole received less practical military training than enlisted candidates” and to the fact that “ROTC men had not been screened for leadership to the same extent or on the same basis” as candidates from the enlisted ranks.\(^4\) AGF misgivings led to the suspension of the ROTC Advanced Course from 1942 through 1945. It was superseded by OCS programs. Only the Basic Course remained in place to facilitate the post-war reactivation of the ROTC.
The Post-World War II
ROTC Program, 1945-1960

After the conclusion of World War II, the Army moved quickly to reestablish ROTC in its pre-war image. Units were active on 129 campuses by September 1945. Despite the Army's dispatch in reestablishing ROTC, the program languished in the immediate post-war era. It did not approach the ambitious production goals set for it by the Department of the Army and retained, in stark contrast to the Naval ROTC program, a distinctly reserve orientation. Congress dealt a blow to the Army ROTC in 1946 when it rejected the Universal Military Training Bill, a measure that Army policy makers had counted upon to spur enrollment.35

The period between World War II and the Korean Conflict was one of demobilization, "downsizing," and shrinking military budgets. The competition for resources and personnel was fierce. The Army ROTC, with its ties to the reserves and amorphous command structure, understandably did not fare well in this environment.

ROTC administrators faced many obstacles in the post-war period—obstacles which, to a greater or lesser extent, had been with the program since it first appeared on college campuses in the autumn of 1916. One of these was instructor quality. Army personnel managers were reluctant to assign the ablest officers to a professional backwater like ROTC duty. The best leaders, it was felt, were needed for more critical positions (in troop units, high level staff positions, etc.). ROTC got the leftovers.

In addition, the most fundamental management devices were often absent or inadequate. Standard operating procedures for administration and training were practically nonexistent. Screening and selection procedures for admission into the Advanced Course and for attendance at Advanced Camp were primitive. Many cadets were sent to summer camp without physical examinations and found at their reception that they were medically unqualified to continue in ROTC. The evaluation tools used to measure cadet leadership ability and officer potential were just as crude. One officer, himself a graduate of ROTC, labeled them "inadequate and unscientific" and likened them to "guesswork." A common complaint voiced by ROTC cadre members was that they were inundated by paperwork. One observer alleged that the administrative burden at unit level was so great that the cadre had little time left to take care of what was supposedly their major function—instruction.36
Once again, many linked ROTC’s ills to its fragmented and decentralized organizational structure. At the Department of the Army level, the Organization and Training Division and the Personnel and Administration Division of the Army General Staff controlled those aspects of the program which fell into their respective areas of responsibility. The Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs (until 1954 when it was abolished) had various advisory, supervisory and liaison functions. Most of the other General and Special Staff agencies at the Department of the Army, including the Administrative and Technical Services, had an “ROTC desk” which handled matters relating to their particular field of concern. The size of this desk varied from one person, performing ROTC-related duties on a part-time basis, to several persons. No one staff division had responsibility for the overall conduct of the program.

The story was pretty much the same at the intermediate level. In army headquarters, duties and responsibilities were likewise parceled out among a number of staff sections. Although each army headquarters was organized along the same lines, the number of people devoted to ROTC related duties in each staff section varied widely among the armies. And again, there was no one staff section charged with overseeing the ROTC.37

New Direction

The year 1948 marked a watershed in the history of collegiate military education for in it, several developments took place that foreshadowed ROTC’s transformation from an institution whose primary purpose was to turn out reserve officers to one charged with producing the majority of active duty and career officers as well. The build-up of Cold War tensions moved Congress in 1948 to pass the Selective Service Act, which encouraged tens of thousands of students to enroll in ROTC to enable them to fulfill their military obligation by serving as officers. The year 1948 also witnessed Congressional approval of the Distinguished Military Graduate Program, which awarded a limited number of Regular Army commissions each year to the most highly qualified ROTC graduates. In that same year, a committee, headed by the Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, concluded a study which explored the future role of the Army Reserve in the nation’s defense. In its findings, the Gray Committee recommended that the ROTC be renamed the “Army Officer Training Corps” and become the primary source of officers for the Army.38

These developments reflected the growing feeling that the ROTC was,
given prevailing conditions, the best available means of producing enough officers of the right type to lead America's Cold War Army. The need for a college-educated leader capable of understanding and employing increasingly sophisticated military technology, the predilection for an officer corps reared in the citizen-soldier tradition and the pressure to keep the costs of officer production as low as possible all played a part in creating this sentiment.

Over the next decade, the movement to enlarge and restructure the ROTC gathered momentum. A 1949 meeting of the Service Academy Board echoed the Gray Committee's call to make the ROTC the Army's prime officer procurement source. To help turn this recommendation into reality, the board proposed that, as in the Naval ROTC, scholarships be awarded to cadets who met certain selection criteria. At the same time, the board called for a fundamental overhaul of the military science curriculum. Believing the existing curriculum to be too narrow in scope, it advocated replacing branch-oriented instruction with "general military education." Newly commissioned lieutenants, it said, should receive the necessary branch specific training at a branch-affiliated Officer Basic Course (OBC) after they got their degree. The curriculum adopted by the Army in the early 1950s reflected many of the board's suggestions. It is also noteworthy that the Service Academy Board urged that the control of the Army ROTC be centralized so as to remove the major organizational and administrative anomalies that obstructed its development.39

Korea

ROTC enrollment was given a boost by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Due to the U.S. Government's decision to declare partial rather than full mobilization, the Army decided to rely on the ROTC, not OCS, to meet the needs of the emergency. The program immediately became more popular among college students because of the deferment it offered from the draft. University officials, fearing that enrollment at their institutions would be decimated by conscription, flooded the Army with applications for new units and thus gave additional impetus to ROTC expansion.40

The creation of the Army Advisory Panel on ROTC Affairs in 1952 was another important milestone in the evolution of collegiate military education. Consisting of 12 civilian and six military educators, the panel provided a forum for the exchange of views between the Department of the Army and
the academic community. Upon its formation, the panel took up the task of articulating the program of “general military education” called for by the Service Academy Board in 1949. With the aid of education specialists, it drafted an outline of a curriculum, which it labeled the General Military Science Program, for the purpose of establishing a common body of military knowledge that all prospective officers, regardless of future specialty, had to master before being commissioned. This so-called branch immaterial instruction emphasized (at the suggestion of the Chief of Army Field Forces, General Mark W. Clark) small unit operations and consisted of 480 hours of on-campus instruction: 180 for the Basic Course and 300 for the Advanced Course. In the Basic Course, cadets received a basic introduction to the Army and learned the fundamentals of drill and staff procedures, while in the Advanced Course, they learned how to apply more advanced tactical techniques. During summer camp, cadets practiced individual military skills and received tactical training.41

In the last year of the Korean War (1950-1953), the General Military Science Program was introduced on an experimental basis. The following year, it was offered as an alternative throughout the entire ROTC community. By 1960, over 80 percent of ROTC host institutions had adopted it. The adoption of the new curriculum allowed the Army to begin the gradual phasing out of branch specific summer training.42

The revised curriculum, however, soon aroused complaints from civilian educators. ROTC, these critics charged, now took up too much of the student’s time. During the inter-war years, ROTC had not been such a time-consuming proposition. Military courses carried no academic credit at many colleges and, because cadets were only getting reserve commissions, military instruction often had little immediacy or urgency about it. The new time demands were closely bound up with the post-war transition of ROTC from an institution intended only to fill the ranks of the Organized Reserve Corps to one charged with producing the bulk of active duty officers. The new instructional and training regimen also had the effect of attracting more scrutiny to ROTC instruction, which many academic officials felt fell below college standards. Some suggested that a large portion of ROTC course work should be accomplished during summer training. Such a shift in venue, they argued, would allow the cadet more time to study and at the same time receive more concentrated and effective military training.43

Two members of the Army Advisory Panel in particular, Professors Lyons and Masland, emphasized the need for further curriculum reform. Part of the
answer, they insisted, was to substitute courses offered by regular academic departments for military science courses whenever possible. Courses in management and communications, they pointed out, could be more effectively and conveniently taught by civilian academicians than by military officers who often did not have an appropriate academic background and who would be on campus for at most three years. Moreover, the policy of "academic substitution" would allow the civilian faculty to participate in the education of prospective officers—something that the two panel members believed would act to liberalize cadets. Like many others, Lyons and Masland urged that the bulk of ROTC military training be conducted at summer camp. They held up the Marine Corps' Platoon Leader's Course, where all training was accomplished in the summer, as an example for the Army to emulate.44

Army leaders agreed that academic substitution could strengthen the ROTC curriculum but insisted that most on-campus instruction could not be replaced without damaging the program. Regular and frequent cadet contact with appropriate role models over an extended period of time, they asserted, not the actual content of ROTC courses, lay at the heart of the officer development process. Expedients like the Platoon Leader's Course and "college-option" OCS could produce college-educated officers but their short duration prevented their graduates from receiving the extended professional nurturing so important to the development of an officer.

In the end, the Army responded to the Advisory Panel's academic substitution recommendation by developing a third curriculum option, the Modified General Military Science Program. This option, introduced in 1960, reduced the required number of Advanced Course contact hours from 300 to 210 and bestowed the title of Professor of Military Science (PMS) on military department heads in an effort to raise their status on campus. It also allowed cadets to substitute academic courses in the fields of science comprehension, psychology, communications, and political science for certain parts of the military science curriculum.45

The adoption of the Modified General Military Science Program only partially mollified ROTC's critics on campus. The old complaints about the program's narrowness and supposed incompatibility with the pursuit of a baccalaureate degree continued unabated. In fact, it was while the new curriculum was being introduced that the movement to abolish compulsory ROTC at land-grant institutions gathered steam.

With the inevitable drawdown at the end of the Korean War, the Army
found itself with a surplus of ROTC officers awaiting active duty. The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 represented an attempt to address this problem. It stipulated that Army ROTC graduates could be given a six-month active duty tour before being placed in one of the reserve components. Using this piece of legislation, the Army was able to gradually pare its glut of junior officers and at the same time give most ROTC graduates a taste of active duty.46

The Turbulent Sixties

By the early 1960s, signs pointing to the new importance of ROTC were clearly discernible although not generally recognized by the American public or its Army. The Distinguished Military Graduate Program, approved by Congress in 1948, was now producing twice as many Regular Army officers annually as West Point (and had been since the mid-fifties). Moreover, fully 75 percent of the yearly contingent of active duty lieutenants came from the ROTC. It was also during this period that the first four-star ROTC generals appeared: Generals George H. Decker (Army Chief of Staff), Herbert B. Powell (Commander, Continental Army Command), and Issac D. White (Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Pacific Command).47

Nevertheless, the ROTC was still not living up to expectations. The Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes declared that the Army ROTC program was on a “downhill slide.” Many questioned the quality of the product it was turning out, but its most serious shortcoming was seen as its inability to produce enough officers to meet demands. Army leaders wanted 14,000-15,000 new ROTC lieutenants annually, but ROTC could produce only 11,000-12,000.48

ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964

To resolve the ROTC production shortfall, Army leaders came forward with an incentives package designed to attract more high quality cadets into the program. Its major features were: a scholarship program; a larger subsistence allowance for cadets enrolled in the Advanced Course; and an abbreviated curriculum option intended to accommodate those students who did not enroll in ROTC as freshmen but who subsequently developed a desire to do so. This last feature, it was believed, would allow the Army to tap a heretofore unexploited segment of the student market—namely, the junior and community college population of the United States.
Congress acceded to the Army’s requests and passed the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps Vitalization Act of 1964. This legislation authorized 5,500 two- and four-year scholarships, raised the cadet monthly subsistence allowance from approximately $27 to $50, and introduced a two-year program to supplement the traditional four-year one. The new abbreviated program permitted a student who did not complete the Basic Course to enter the Advanced Course by attending a six-week Basic Camp during the summer before his junior or MS III year. It also mandated that all Advanced Course cadets enlist in the Army Reserve and serve either six months or two years on active duty upon commissioning.49

The Comptroller’s Organization for Management Study

While the Vitalization Act was still being debated, the Army’s senior leaders resolved to upgrade the “organization for management” of the ROTC program. Otherwise, the belief was, the reforms introduced by the Vitalization Act would have little effect. Senior officers were particularly concerned about the decentralized nature of the ROTC management hierarchy and the localism that this engendered. One officer gave voice to these concerns in an article which appeared in the Army Magazine in 1963. Each ROTC unit, he complained, “is inclined to remain an island unto itself.” It would be necessary, he felt, to reverse “this rather wasteful system of detachmental individualism” if things were ever going to get better. Others called attention to the adverse effects of unit parochialism on ROTC operations. One commentator, in an article which ran in a national magazine in 1963, wrote:

There seems to be no definite overall policy about important aspects of the program. The basis for selecting students for the ROTC and for keeping them in the program are different in each school. The same is true of the method of awarding the Distinguished Military Student classification.50

Initially, the Army Chief of Staff tasked the ROTC Division within the Office of the Chief of Reserve Components, Department of the Army to study the problem. When that body returned a report with recommendations not to his liking, the Chief of Staff rejected it. He then turned to the Comptroller General of the Army and directed that officer to conduct “a comprehensive study of the management of the ROTC/NDCC (National Defense Cadet Corps) program.”51
As might have been anticipated, the Comptroller study found that ROTC management was fragmented at all organizational levels. Under the existing organization, the problem was at its most acute at army headquarters, where the number of personnel devoted to ROTC matters was too few and the span of control over instructor groups was too wide. Campus operations were being managed, it appeared, by “remote control.” Indeed, one general officer involved in the administration of the ROTC at the time contended that supervision by the armies was so “insufficient” that “cases of embarrassing divergences from policies and objectives” had become almost commonplace.
The same source deplored the lack of support provided to the PMS by the armies. "In looking to the large army headquarters," he maintained

...the PMS is referred to several offices before getting the response he requires. A single home base—or focal point—where the PMS can get an immediate understanding and useful response does not exist at most armies.\(^{52}\)

The group of officers that conducted the study noted that a nonstandard organization rendered nonstandard results:

Each of the six ZI (Zone of the Interior) Army Commanders and the Corps Commanders in five of the six ZI Armies give the ROTC/NDCC program varying degrees of priority within their respective commands. As a result there is wide variance in program execution, in quality and quantity of administrative and logistical support provided, and in the quality of the program product.\(^{53}\)

Things were almost as bad at the Department of the Army level, according to the report's authors. There, general staff responsibility for officer production programs was split among the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), and the Chief of Reserve Components. The ROTC's close association with this last agency—it had a seven-person ROTC Division within it—was not, it was felt, altogether a desirable state of affairs. The study group asserted that:

Association and identification of the Army ROTC with the Army Reserve has caused the ROTC to receive a lower priority and less emphasis than it deserves as the primary source of officers for the active army, regular and non-regular.\(^{54}\)

At the Continental Army Command (CONARC) Headquarters, an eight-person ROTC Branch within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training was responsible for coordinating ROTC affairs. (The branch had been transferred there from the Reserve Components Division effective 15 May 1962 in an interim reorganization of CONARC Headquarters.) With such meager personnel assets, the branch could not provide the kind of
"detailed uniform supervision" that the Comptroller’s study group felt was necessary to put the ROTC program on a sound footing.55

The Comptroller’s report enumerated five alternatives to the existing ROTC management structure. They were: (1) a special staff agency at the Department of the Army; (2) a major command reporting directly to the Department; (3) a separate command under Headquarters, CONARC; (4) an integrated staff/command at Headquarters, CONARC; and (5) the organizational status quo modified by augmenting the staffs at both CONARC and the Zone of the Interior Army Headquarters.

Of the five alternatives, only two seem to have been seriously considered—namely, alternatives three and four. Alternative three was patterned after the Air Force ROTC organization. It called for a separate command reporting directly to the Commanding General, CONARC. Alternative four entailed the creation of a dual Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC (DCSROTC)/ROTC Command in CONARC Headquarters exercising operational control over the program. Under both alternatives, all ROTC units were to be withdrawn from the control of the Zone of the Interior Armies and subordinated to the ROTC Commander or the DCSROTC/ROTC Command. Control over ROTC units was to be exercised through “area supervisors” or “area commandants,” who were to be permanently stationed at CONARC Headquarters.

The Comptroller’s report recommended alternative three, a separate command under CONARC, as the “best” solution to ROTC’s organizational problem. This solution, the authors of the report maintained,

...features uniform, authoritative control over all ROTC/NDCC operations. It is in sharp contrast to the present, diverse, decentralized, loosely governed system. It provides a direct channel between the PMS and the directing authority. Policy, guidance, and support are thus made immediately available to the PMS, in a radical departure from the present multi-layered channel through which the PMS must find his way to get response to requests for information or to urgent needs for administrative and logistical support. The separate command under USCONARC establishes a clean, clear-cut command with a clearly defined mission to accomplish.56

The results of adopting this solution, it was predicted, would be the long-sought after standardization of the program and the bestowal upon the ROTC
of the prestige which it had up to that point lacked.\textsuperscript{57}

The report rejected the dual DCSROTC/ROTC Command alternative. The principal objection to this alternative involved the “unconventional dual role of the commander.” Such an arrangement, it was posited, “is prone to conflicts of interest and is inconsistent with accepted Army patterns of organization.”\textsuperscript{58}

When the Comptroller’s study was sent to the field for staffing, CONARC Headquarters strenuously objected to the recommendation that a separate ROTC Command be created.\textsuperscript{59} It took this position because it believed that a separate command would, in the words of one CONARC spokesman,

...tend to divorce the ROTC program from the main-stream of Army life as found in the ZI Armies and Class I installations and thus degrade ROTC further in the eyes of the active Army. Moreover, under this concept, logistical and administrative support would be part of the commander’s mission. We see this as an added disadvantage to the proposal; that such support can be furnished better through the Class I CONARC system.\textsuperscript{60}

A concern about the personnel requirements that the establishment of a separate command would inevitably entail also seems to have shaped the CONARC decision.

In the end, the CONARC Commanding General won the argument. The reorganization scheme that finally emerged from all this study and discussion resembled neither of the Comptroller’s two preferred alternatives. It did, however, make two major changes in the way that ROTC was managed. At the Department of the Army level, the ROTC function was transferred from the Chief of Reserve Components to the DCSPER (effective 1 July 1966). An ROTC Branch, consisting of 18 persons, was inserted into the Office of the DCSPER’s RUO Division. This division then assumed responsibility for policy and program matters pertaining to all three commissioning sources—ROTC, the Military Academy, and OCS.

The second and more significant change was the shift of operational responsibility for the program from the Department of the Army to CONARC (effective 1 January 1967). The latter headquarters thus became the focal point for ROTC—or, at least, as close to a focal point as existed during this period. To exercise its newly acquired authority, CONARC elevated the ROTC Division
within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training to Directorate status, placed a brigadier general at its head, and raised its strength from eight to 60 persons. See Figure 1-1. Publicity, recruiting, curriculum development, personnel and cadet administration, logistics, and resource management all fell within the purview of the new directorate. While the increased personnel authorization seemed generous, it was substantially less than the augmentation that would have been necessary to create an independent ROTC Command or an Office of the DCSROTC (60 vs 142 and 89 respectively). See Figure 1-2.

CONARC attempted to standardize ROTC operations at army headquarters by providing them with a model staff organization as a guide. Unfortunately for CONARC, the armies largely ignored this model. According to Colonel Edward Chalgren, Deputy Director of the ROTC/NDCC
Directorate, each army headquarters engaged its own local “experts” to engineer an organization to its own liking. Thus, one army created an Office of the DCSROTC. Another directed the ROTC through an ROTC Division within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. A third placed its ROTC Division within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces and a fourth within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training.

With such an organization, standardization was impossible.

The impact of the reorganization initiative on the program was not great, at least in the near term. It is true that as a result of this initiative, the ROTC was identified more closely with the Active Army at the Department of the Army level than previously and that the CONARC staff section responsible
for coordinating ROTC affairs received substantial augmentation. However, the basic organizational structure remained pretty much the same and things continued to operate pretty much as before.

ROTC Under Assault

The undeclared war in Vietnam entangled the ROTC in a controversy of an intensity unparalleled in the program's history. Concerns about the draft as well as about the cost and morality of the war turned many college students and faculty members into virulent opponents of the American involvement in Vietnam. As the only visible sign of the Army on campus, the ROTC became the "lightning rod" for anti-war sentiment. Anti-ROTC demonstrations became commonplace and, on some university campuses, acts of violence, vandalism, and arson were directed against ROTC instructors and facilities.

During this time of turmoil, many universities re-evaluated the desirability and appropriateness of retaining ROTC. Some of this institutional introspection can be attributed to the unpopularity of the Vietnam War, but some reflected a genuine concern about the quality and substance of ROTC instruction. Nine universities, including some of the most prestigious, decided to discontinue their connection with the program, while some others reduced or eliminated academic credit for military science courses. The abolition of ROTC units at elite institutions along the eastern seaboard was more than offset, quantitatively at least, by the creation of additional detachments at state institutions in the South and West. The trend away from elite schools, however, worried some Department of Defense officials. They feared that the average quality of ROTC students would drop and that the social balance of the Army officer corps would be upset. There were other officials and officers who were glad to see the Army sever its relations with schools which, in their opinion, had never been avid supporters of the military in any case.

Faced with such widespread and diverse opposition to ROTC, the Defense Department buckled and agreed to reexamine the design and administration of the program with the intent of making collegiate military training more palatable to academic authorities and, at the same time, making the curriculum more relevant to the needs of the student. Taking his cue from a recommendation submitted to him by the Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird set up a committee to review the ROTC curriculum and suggest ways to make the program fit less obtrusively into the academic community. In June 1969, he appointed Dr. George C. S. Benson, former President of the Claremont Colleges and long
Even before the report of the Benson Committee was published, the Army introduced a fourth curriculum option—called the Military Science Core Curriculum or Option C. Many of the old ideas about collegiate military training advanced by Lyons and Masland in the 1950s were reflected in the new option. Two widely voiced criticisms of the ROTC curricula were that they were too vocationally oriented and that they were not challenging enough academically. ROTC texts, one student commented, were written "by and for cretins." Option C, it was hoped, would eliminate these problems by integrating military instruction more closely with that of regular academic departments and relegating to summer camp those subjects undeserving of academic credit.

Option C went further toward diluting the military content of the ROTC than any previous initiative. It reduced the required number of military contact hours in the Advanced Course to 120—down 43 percent from the 210 hours mandated in the Modified General Military Science curriculum introduced in 1960—and specified that 180 out of the total 390 hours of the program could be filled with regular academic subjects believed to be of value to the future officer. As might be expected, the new liberal approach to precommissioning training quickly caught on among institutions that hosted ROTC units. General William C. Westmoreland, the Army Chief of Staff, gave expression to the direction that the ROTC was taking in a letter he wrote to the CONARC Commanding General in May 1969:

Many—to include some senior officers as well as junior—will find it difficult to accept the fact that we no longer expect ROTC to provide trained platoon leaders. Instead, we expect the program to produce well-educated men with high moral standards who are motivated toward the military service and who have only a minimum of military training (but) who have the potential to become junior officers of high quality.

The deemphasis of the "purely military" aspects of ROTC instruction may have made the program more acceptable to some of its critics on campus, but it did nothing to improve the ROTC cadet's orientation to the military profession. In fact, the demilitarization of the curriculum placed ROTC cadets in a more disadvantageous position vis-à-vis their more thoroughly indoctrinated OCS and West Point counterparts. Even before the advent of Option C, CONARC historical records tell us, the ROTC did not
do a uniformly good job of preparing cadets for their future roles. One junior officer of that era complained that when he and some of his ROTC associates entered the Army, they found themselves woefully unprepared for their jobs. “We were just a bunch of civilians with uniforms,” he lamented. Option C only made the situation worse. It was no surprise to many officers who were familiar with the ROTC that an Army review board in the early 1970s found that of the three major commissioning sources, ROTC did the poorest job in preparing its charges for their first assignment.68

Support within the Army for this demilitarization of the program was by no means universal. An ad hoc committee of officers, convened on the occasion of the Sixth Annual CONARC ROTC Conference (1968), expressed concern about the direction the program was taking. It warned that things had gone far enough and should be allowed to proceed no farther:

...there may be some pressure to further water down the military requirements of current ROTC program options to make the program more attractive. The committee, however, considers that these pressures should be resisted strongly. No further watering-down of ROTC options is acceptable. Therefore, serious shortfalls in officer production should be made up from procurement programs other than ROTC.69

Senior officers became defensive about charges that the military component of ROTC was being emasculated. Brigadier General Melvin A. Goers, Chief of the ROTC Directorate at CONARC Headquarters, felt compelled to assure ROTC cadre members in 1970 that CONARC was “certainly not going to prostitute any of the principles that we hold dear in the military” in promoting Option C and other liberal policies.70 To many officers, such assurances had a hollow ring.

ROTC After Vietnam

The period of transition from a conscript to an all-volunteer military establishment in the early 1970s was a trying time for the three services. All officer production sources faced new and imposing challenges but those that confronted the Army ROTC were especially daunting. To be sure, ROTC production problems surfaced well before the Vietnam drawdown. As early as the spring of 1967, Army leaders found themselves faced with a choice between
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"adequate procurement" and "adequate military training"—a dilemma they resolved by opting for adequate procurement. One Undersecretary of the Army summed the matter up quite succinctly:

Adequate procurement and adequate military training prior to graduation are not both obtainable under current conditions. Since we cannot train unless we first procure, procurement takes precedence where there is conflict. And, given the trends in American education, we cannot expect in the foreseeable future to meet our ROTC requirements without deferring some of the military training and motivational aspects of an ROTC officer’s education to the post-commissioning period.71

In the years that followed, the dilemma became more acute.

Despite the emphasis placed on recruiting and building an adequate production base, ROTC enrollment plummeted by 75 percent (from 165,430 to 41,294) between School Year 1967-1968 and School Year 1972-1973. The end of conscription certainly played a part in this. So too, according to Brigadier General Milton E. Key, the Chief of CONARC’s ROTC Directorate in 1972, did the virtual elimination of compulsory ROTC and the “apathetic enrollment policies...of many PMS.” The legacy of Vietnam, it appears, weighed heavily on many cadre members. They were reluctant be become too visible on campus.72

Steadfast

To boost sagging officer production (especially reserve officer production because the reserve components had a particularly difficult time filling their officer ranks after Vietnam) and to improve program management, Army leaders introduced a new command structure for the ROTC in 1973. The new arrangements came about as part of the post-Vietnam “Steadfast” reorganization, which replaced CONARC and the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). The new structure, the Department of the Army promised, would eliminate the “layering and span of control deficiencies” that had plagued the old system.73

In the intra-Army discussion that preceded the Steadfast reorganization, calls for the creation of a separate ROTC Command were heard and rejected. Once again, it seems that the personnel costs associated with such an
organizational solution were considered excessive. Instead, a weakened version of one of the alternatives advanced by the Comptroller’s Study Group in 1965 was adopted—namely, the creation of an Office of the DCSROTC at the TRADOC level. See Figure 1-3. Only in its 1973 form, the ROTC chief was to be merely the TRADOC DCSROTC, not, as the Study Group had recommended, the DCSROTC/ROTC Commander. A major general headed the new office, which was essentially the old CONARC ROTC Directorate with a different name. It was approximately the same size (about 60 personnel) and, except
for the addition of budgeting and automatic data processing responsibilities, performed the same functions. See Figure 1-4.

Below TRADOC, army area commands were replaced by four ROTC region commands. A brigadier general, assisted by a headquarters element of 85 people, commanded each region. This officer supervised on-campus ROTC activities within his assigned geographical sector and conducted an annual summer camp. Regions were further divided into geographical divisions or areas, each of which was commanded by a colonel operating from the region headquarters. The authors of the final Steadfast plan were convinced that region commands would provide the ROTC program with a dedicated mid-level supervisory organ capable of effecting “a standardization of control and management” of ROTC instructor groups and an organization that could furnish “close year-round coordination” with installation commanders for summer camp planning. See Figure 1-5.

Close year-round coordination with installation commanders for summer camp planning seemed to have been considered of particular importance. The nature of coordination that program administrators had in mind had two aspects. First, it was thought necessary that the person in charge of each Advanced Camp be a general officer. The old system, in which the senior colonel/PMS in the army area served as camp commander, did not work, or at least in the opinion of many senior officers, did not work well. It would take the presence of a general officer to give the camp the prestige and emphasis it needed and deserved. General Westmoreland, during his tenure as Army Chief of Staff, told the CONARC Commander that “ROTC Summer Camps are of such major importance that we should consider selecting other than professors of military science to be in charge of each camp....” Westmoreland believed that “specially selected general officers” should be appointed to oversee operations at each Advanced Camp site.

The second aspect of the close year-round coordination had to do with the issue of camp continuity, of which there was very little before the 1973 reorganization of the ROTC command structure in some army areas. A CONARC-convened Ad Hoc Committee for Basic and Advanced Camps reported in October 1969 that the “lack of continuity” in the prevailing camp system “requires that special measures be taken to preserve the experience of each year's camp for the benefit of the next.” The maintenance of a “full-time, permanent party Advanced Camp Planning Staff at the camp site,” a measure that a few armies had already implemented on their own initiative by 1969, was one means held up by the Ad Hoc Committee to ensure the
THE CADET COMMAND HERITAGE

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR
RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS (DCSROTC)

DCSROTC
ADCSROTC

ADMIN OFC

MANAGEMENT SERVICES DIVISION
OPERATIONS DIVISION
EDUCATION DIVISION
RECRUITING PUBLICITY DIVISION

Figure 1-4. Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Officers' Training Corps (DCSROTC)

STANDARD ORGANIZATION FOR HEADQUARTERS ROTC REGIONS (1973)

COMMANDING GENERAL

AREA COMMANDERS
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OFFICE
PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION DIVISION
OPERATIONS DIVISION
ADVERTISING & INFORMATION DIVISION

Figure 1-5. Standard Organization for Headquarters, ROTC Regions (1973)
necessary continuity. The call for the appointment of a general officer as the commander of each camp and the recommendation for the establishment of a full-time, year-round planning staff at each camp site were both incorporated into the final Steadfast plan.76

While the new organization represented progress of a sort, it was not the organizational panacea many had hoped it would be. The new head of the program—the DCSROTC—was, after all, just another staff officer within TRADOC Headquarters. He possessed neither the status nor prerogatives of a commander. Instead of commanding the ROTC regions, he exercised “operational control” over them.77 The DCSROTC, like all staff officers, possessed only the authority he derived from his commander—a situation that made the health of the program to a high degree dependent on the personal rapport that existed between the two men.

The new organizational setup meant that summer camps, like virtually every other aspect of the ROTC program, would continue to operate in a fragmented and highly diversified manner. True, the presence of a permanent staff at each camp site provided for better coordination and greater continuity but the goal of bringing an across the board uniformity to the Advanced Camp system remained a distant goal.

**Efforts to Boost Production**

Certain steps were taken during this era to spur recruiting and attract a student of a high caliber in the ROTC. In 1971, Congress raised the cadet subsistence allowance from $50 to $100 per month and increased scholarship authorizations from 5,500 to 6,500. Nine years later (1980), with the ROTC still falling short of its assigned production objectives, Congress boosted the number of scholarships again—to 12,000.78

Not all new incentives were monetary. Some took the form of special training programs designed to make the program more exciting. Cadets attended Airborne School for the first time in 1970. A two-day Reconnaissance and Commando Doughboy (RECONDO) Course was incorporated into Advanced Camp in 1971. In the same year, selected cadets were permitted to attend Ranger School in lieu of Advanced Camp. The Army Orientation Training Program (renamed Cadet Troop Leader Training in 1979) was introduced the following year. Based on the Military Academy model, it allowed cadets to serve as apprentice junior officers in Active Army units. Later, the Air Assault and Northern Warfare Courses (1979), Flight Orientation/Training (1982), and the Russian Language Course (1983) were added as training options.
A number of other special programs in the post-Vietnam era focused on recruiting for the reserve components. The Early Commissioning Program, initiated in 1966 for Military Junior Colleges, was broadened in 1979 to accommodate cadets who had completed all ROTC requirements but still had not received their undergraduate degree. It gave them a reserve commission and allowed them to serve in reserve units. The Simultaneous Membership Program permitted Advanced Course cadets to serve as officer trainees in reserve component units and receive the drill pay of a sergeant (E-5). Beginning in School Year 1983-1984, 5,000 Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty contracts were reserved annually for cadets whose interest in the military extended only to the reserves. 79

The admission of women into the ROTC was another boon to enrollment. After a successful test at ten schools during School Year 1972-1973, the entire program was opened to female participation in the fall of 1973. Within two years, women accounted for over 29 percent of ROTC enrollment. 80

Perhaps the most ambitious and fateful program undertaken to increase officer production was the “Expand the Base” (ETB) initiative introduced at the end of the 1970s. Its goal was to boost annual output to 10,500 by 1985 (“ten-five by eight-five” was the slogan coined to popularize the goal throughout the ROTC community). This was to be accomplished by creating more units. Over 100 extension centers along with 36 host institutions were to be established by the end of FY 1983. Although the ETB did not reach its stated objective, it did result in a substantial expansion of the program. Between FY 1978 and FY 1983, the number of ROTC units shot up by 40 percent (from 297 to 416). 81

The DCSROTC had attempted to raise production in the mid-1970s by creating extension centers. He enjoyed only limited success because the Army refused to give him more than the 1,500 officers he already had assigned. In the ETB, the TRADOC Commander and his DCSROTC got around this roadblock by tapping the reserve component for the additional officers needed to staff the new units. Originally, one Active Guard/Reserve officer was authorized for each host unit. Later, this number was doubled. By the mid-1980s, almost 630 reserve officers were authorized to serve in ROTC detachments on a full-time basis. Not everyone in the reserves appreciated this arrangement, but the TRADOC Commander and his DCSROTC thought it was appropriate given the fact that most of the additional production would go into one of the reserve components. 82
"Quality" Problems

This massive infusion of money, time, and personnel into the program did obtain results. Enrollment along with the number of cadets commissioned annually rose steadily in the decade after Vietnam. Unfortunately, production did not increase enough to meet Army requirements and much of the increase that did occur was achieved at the expense of quality.

William Snyder, associate professor of political science at Texas A&M University and former PMS at Princeton, gave an overview of the major problems that beset the ROTC in an article he wrote in the mid-1970s. In the main, his comments tell the same story as the DCSROTC historical summaries, although his comments are less constrained. The picture he painted was not a complimentary one.

ROTC graduates, he asserted, were less well prepared than the products of other commissioning sources for their first assignment, being “particularly deficient in the degree of familiarity with the overall scope of service activities.” He attributed some of the program’s shortcomings to its emphasis on the acquisition of basic military skills and its focus on turning out large numbers of short service officers.

Also detrimental to the quality of ROTC training, Snyder believed, was the small size of many ROTC units. To be sure, the existence of small and uneconomical units had been a problem since the very inception of the program. But the end of the draft coupled with the virtual abolition of compulsory programs in the early 1970s made the problem much more acute than ever before. Indeed, by 1975, over half of all units recorded an enrollment of less than 100. This state of affairs reduced the effectiveness of much on-campus training and made it all but impossible for the cadet in a small program to get “a meaningful leadership experience.”

It was a situation that was to grow worse over the next decade as the number of small, inefficient, and uneconomical units proliferated under Expand the Base.

Various Active Army observers gave pessimistic appraisals of the ROTC product. Major General Charles C. Rogers, DCSROTC from September 1975 to November 1978, was not enthusiastic about the quality of student that was being admitted into the program. In a letter dated 20 April 1977, he upbraided the four region commanders for enrolling “personnel” who “clearly do not have what it takes to be an officer.” The practice of enrolling students with a criminal record particularly disturbed him. In 1978, a Department of the Army sponsored study group concluded that “intelligence standards” in the Army ROTC were “inadequate.” In 1980, TRADOC’s Deputy Commanding
General, Lieutenant General William R. Richardson, complained to the DCSROTC, Brigadier General Daniel W. French, about low ROTC commissioning standards and expressed the hope that with recent gains in enrollment, TRADOC could be "more careful" in its "selection for commission." 85

Attempts at Reform

After the Vietnam War, there was a general consensus among senior Army leaders that something had to be done to improve training. To further this end, the Army introduced the systems approach to training in the 1970s. Essentially, the new approach consisted of "performance based instruction" in which subjects were broken down in a number of specific tasks, each of which had to be performed to a prescribed standard. The old lecture-demonstration-practice training format was thus replaced by one which was performance oriented and required hands-on involvement on the part of the student.

Other initiatives that concentrated strictly on officer development were also undertaken in the post-Vietnam era. In 1978, the Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) Board convened to develop a uniform system for educating and training Army officers. The RETO group discovered that the four commissioning sources (Military Academy, ROTC, OCS, and National Guard OCS) followed very different agendas and shared few common standards. To remedy this condition, the group recommended the adoption of the Military Qualification Standards system by all four sources. This system specified the basic knowledge and skills each officer was to possess at each stage of his professional development. By the early 1980s, the Military Qualification Standards I, which essentially was a revised version of the 1970 Option C Program, became the single common curriculum for the entire precommissioning education and training community. 86

The RETO Board also determined that the ROTC desperately needed an assessment instrument that could objectively measure cadet leadership ability. TRADOC introduced the Army Precommissioning Assessment System (PAS) in the early 1980s to address this need. The PAS consisted of nine interrelated parts and formed the basis of a screening and selection process that began prior to enrollment and extended through commissioning. An important component of the PAS was the Leadership Assessment Program (LAP). Introduced in 1980, the LAP measured 12 leadership dimensions (which Cadet Command later expanded to 16) by having cadets participate in a variety of behavioral simulations that replicated situations they might encounter as Army
officers. In its original form, LAP behavioral situations featured garrison rather than field settings. The ROTC cadre were trained to look for and evaluate the critical performance indicators of each dimension.  

The programs set in motion by the RETO Board undoubtedly represented a step forward in precommissioning education and training, at least on the theoretical plane. Their practical value was, however, strictly limited. Like previous efforts to reform collegiate military training, these programs were essentially task-oriented. That is, they focused on the mastery of basic military skills and the acquisition of certain bits of knowledge and neglected the far more important area of leadership development.

ROTC's unconventional organization prevented even uniformity in task-oriented training from being realized. As in most endeavors, the key lays in the execution, and in this critical respect, the program continued to come up short. The overhaul of the ROTC would have to wait until an organizational architecture was in place to tap the potential of initiatives like Military Qualification Standard I. In the next chapter, we will see how just such a structure was built.
CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF A CADET COMMAND

...I consider ROTC to be first and foremost a crucible for leadership development. I see a direct link between what the officer is to learn before commissioning and the follow-on training provided in the TRADOC school system, and our goals for future officer professional development....

By 1980, the ROTC was facing a crisis. Despite the many incentives introduced in the 1970s to stimulate student interest in ROTC, production problems persisted. Although it had recorded substantial gains in the last several years, the Office of the DCSROTC had no chance of meeting the ambitious production goals set by the Army Staff. The legacy of Vietnam and the elimination of conscription still weighed on the program. A declining national birth rate and a downward trend in college enrollment threatened to complicate the task of ROTC program managers even further.

Yet by the turn of the decade, forces were in motion that promised some relief. The defense build-up that occurred during this era, started under the Carter but accelerated under the Reagan Administration, had spawned both an expansion and a major restructuring of the Army. Two initiatives in particular—the Division 86 “heavy division” project and the force modernization of the reserve components—had important implications for the ROTC, principally because they heralded the need for a greater annual influx of lieutenants into the Army.1

But at TRADOC headquarters, attention in the early 1980s was focused on the near-term prospects of the ROTC program, which did not appear very good. Even with the Expand the Base initiative and the other measures adopted to raise production, few believed that “ten-five by eighty-five”
was an attainable goal. The TRADOC Commander, General Glenn K. Otis, felt the mission was too high and, in addition, that the costs bound up with the on-going expansion of the ROTC were excessive. In January 1983, General Otis convoked the first of several conferences to consider ROTC's production problems. Attending the meetings were the TRADOC Chief of Staff, Major General John B. Blount, the DCSROTC, Major General John P. Prillaman, and the four ROTC region commanders.

At the urging of Prillaman and the region commanders, the group took up a number of long-standing organizational issues that, it was agreed, bore directly on ROTC's production problems. What particularly concerned the group was ROTC's irregular command structure. Under existing arrangements, region commanders were essentially adjuncts of the TRADOC staff. They were rated by the DCSROTC and senior rated by the TRADOC Chief of Staff. The DCSROTC did not command the regions but exercised "operational control" over them. It was a system that limited the DCSROTC's ability to influence events and his access to the highest Army councils.²

A variety of alternatives were considered, to include the one of making the ROTC a major subordinate command under TRADOC. In the end, General Otis decided to "dual hat" Major General Prillaman. This meant that Prillaman, while remaining the DCSROTC, would also become the Commander, U.S. Army ROTC Command, with the new appointment becoming effective on 14 March 1983.³ Otis thus chose the organizational alternative that the 1965 Comptroller's report had rejected because it was "prone to conflicts of interest" and was "inconsistent with accepted Army patterns of organization."

While the "dual hat" alternative might not have been the optimal structural solution, it did have one big advantage from the TRADOC perspective—it required no additional personnel. When Major General Prillaman assumed his new title, he assumed little else in the way of tangible assets. He did not even get an aide or a command sergeant major assigned to his new "command." Moreover, the TRADOC Chief of Staff, another major general, remained his rater. This meant that the focus of the ROTC chief continued to be on staff management and that his elevation to commander had more symbolic than real value.⁴

Nevertheless, Prillaman tried to exploit the worth of the new title as best he could. He had two sets of letterhead drawn up, one for DCSROTC and the other for the ROTC Command. Depending on the nature of the correspondence, he selected the letterhead most appropriate for the person
or organization he was addressing. In this way, he was able to gain at least a little more respect for his office from outside agencies.⁵

Only three days before Major General Prillaman became ROTC’s nominal commander, General William R. Richardson assumed command of
Richardson's appointment would prove to be significant because of the part he was destined to play in the transformation of the ROTC program. He brought to his new post an in-depth knowledge of the ROTC acquired during his tenure as TRADOC's Deputy Commanding General and as Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School. When he assumed command, Richardson brought with him two principal concerns about the program. First, he, like General Otis, felt that the officer production quota of 10,500 by 1985 was far too high. Second, he believed that too many ROTC graduates (124 in 1982) were failing their Officer Basic Course. These facts reinforced a conclusion he had drawn months earlier—namely, that quantity was being bought at the expense of quality in the ROTC. His conclusion was correct, for recruiting pressures in the 1970s and early 1980s induced many ROTC cadre to commission individuals who, to paraphrase one DCSROTC, clearly did not have what it takes to become officers. Richardson decided to attack the problem at both ends—i.e., to lower production quotas and raise commissioning standards. He took up the quota issue with the DCSPER, Lieutenant General Robert M. Elton, and explained to him that the 10,500 figure simply could not be allowed to stand—at least not if Army leaders wanted a capable annual cohort of new lieutenants entering the Army. Lieutenant General Elton worried that a substantial lowering of the goal would leave the Army with too few junior leaders. But Richardson pressed the point and the DCSPER eventually relented and agreed to drop the quota to, from the TRADOC perspective, more realistic levels. By 1986, the production mission had been reduced to about 8,700.

One of the steps Richardson took to raise the quality of ROTC production was to redefine unit success. A detachment's relative standing now rested not only on how many officers it turned out but on how well those that it did produce fared at their Officer Basic Course. The DCSROTC was instructed to track Officer Basic Course failures by individual program. When an officer failed the basic course, the DCSROTC informed the PMS of his alma mater and detailed the reasons for failure. The PMS in question was then expected to review the performance records of that officer to determine whether or not he should have been commissioned in the first place and report back on the findings. This procedure encouraged PMSs to do everything they could to avoid such unwanted attention.

Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) had an especially high proportion of their graduates fail at Officer Basic Courses. This led General Richardson to solicit the support of HBCU presidents in resolving the
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problem. As a result, an ROTC-HBCU cooperative arrangement was estab-
lished. It was called the Enhanced Skills Training Program and was designed to improve the reading, writing, and mathematical skills of cadets found want-
ing in these areas.9

Richardson also pushed to have more competitive officers assigned to ROTC duty. Army personnel managers in the past had tended to shunt top performers away from ROTC units. General Richardson attempted to reverse this tendency by insisting that only successful line unit commanders be placed in ROTC detachments. He enlisted the support of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Lieutenant General Carl E. Vuono, in this ef-
fort. Vuono, like Richardson, understood that the presence of a suitable role model counted for far more than curriculum content in the development of aspiring officers.

Many university officials were clearly not happy with what Richardson was trying to do. Their idea of “quality” apropos ROTC cadre, it seems, diff-
ered markedly from that of the TRADOC Commander. Whereas academics tended to view this elusive concept in terms of grade point average and aca-
demic attainment, General Richardson looked at it in terms of military perfor-
mance. The best officers, he believed, did not always possess a graduate de-
gree or have a sterling undergraduate record.10

The call for more academically qualified ROTC instructors had become louder in the academic community during the final stages of the Vietnam War. The Army responded to this call. Thanks to the Advanced Degree Program for ROTC Instructor Duty and similar initiatives, the Army boosted the per-
centage of instructors with advanced degrees from eight to 64 between 1968 and 1974. This pleased college and university officials but not all ROTC program administrators.11

The emphasis on graduate studies, many believed, damaged the program in two ways. First, it strengthened the tendency of personnel managers to assign “non-competitive” officers to ROTC. A graduate degree, which at some universities became a prerequisite for assignment to its ROTC unit, was no guarantee of military competence. Second, it tended to distract cadre mem-
ers from their military responsibilities. Senior ROTC administrators com-
plained loudly and often in the mid-1970s that widespread cadre participation in graduate programs was hurting ROTC units and cadets. Annoyed by this criticism, the TRADOC DCSROTC, Brigadier General Wilfrid Smith, reminded these critics that the Army had encouraged these officers to pursue advanced studies and added: “we cannot be too high-handed or critical when
we find our PMS and APMS engaged in obtaining degrees."

Richardson's intent was clearly to redirect the focus of the ROTC along more military lines. He implored the Army's personnel managers to "stop pushing graduate studies on prospective...Assistant Professors of Military Science". ROTC cadre, he told them, work hard and "do not have time for graduate work."  

Another reason for the opposition to Richardson's drive to raise cadre quality was that it often involved the replacement of colonels with lieutenant colonels in PMS positions. Quality throughout much of the university community was gauged largely in terms of rank. A colonel, the prevailing belief was, brought more prestige to the job and to the university than a mere lieutenant colonel.  

The "downgrading" of PMS positions had begun in earnest in the late 1970s when General Donn Starry was TRADOC Commander and Major General French was his DCSROTC. It was a matter of both necessity and preference. Starry and French saw a cut in the TRADOC Officer Distribution Plan for colonels as an opportunity to fill PMS positions with lieutenant colonels, who, they were convinced, would bring more enthusiasm and energy to the job than would many colonels. Their experience told them that many of the colonels assigned to ROTC were on the verge of retirement and were consequently more focused on follow-on employment opportunities than on the task at hand. Richardson took up where Starry and French left off and hastened along the "downgrading" process.  

**Organizational Changes**

Unfortunately, ROTC's irregular command apparatus prevented the reforms and initiatives sponsored by Richardson from taking full hold. Localism and regionalism continued to pose formidable barriers to progress. Yet, it was during this period that certain organizational adjustments were made that resulted in the ROTC headquarters taking on at least some of the characteristics of a real command. It assumed certain additional functions and widened its involvement in others. Its liaison and coordination roles in particular were expanded. Officers from the Office of the DCSROTC now attended periodic meetings hosted by the Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Maxwell R. Thurman. At these gatherings, Thurman was briefed on the status of the ROTC and he in turn gave guidance on various issues affecting the program.  

Sometimes, ROTC representatives brought back from these meetings ideas
and proposals that did not go down well at TRADOC. One such proposal advanced by Generals Thurman and Elton called for removing ROTC from TRADOC and making it either a field operation agency (FOA) of the DCSPER or a major subordinate command (MSC) of the proposed “Army Personnel Command.” The advantage of this arrangement was that it would facilitate ROTC recruiting since it would place ROTC in an organization whose prime function was filling the ranks of the Army. It would also, however, detract from the educational and training aspects of the ROTC program by divorcing it from TRADOC, the command responsible for, among other things, the education and training of Army leaders.

To establish the ROTC as an independent command in the manner proposed by Thurman and Elton would have required a significant increase in manpower. Approval for such an increase, it was realized, would be difficult to secure because the Army at this time was attempting, through a program called “Army Management Headquarters Activities,” to enlarge its teeth at the expense of its tail. All major headquarters and administrative agencies were expected to make significant personnel cuts. This had serious implications for the Office of the DCSROTC, which had the manpower assets of all four region headquarters and every ROTC detachment charged to its account.15

General Richardson adamantly opposed the proposed move, arguing that the professional education of officers had no place in the accessions business. Such an organizational realignment, he insisted, would make the ROTC even more of a recruiting agency than it already was and would do nothing to eliminate the operational disadvantages under which it presently functioned. Moreover, by severing ROTC’s organizational link to TRADOC, training support from that command would be more difficult to obtain. Richardson’s March 1984 letter to General Thurman detailed the strongest reasons for leaving the ROTC under TRADOC control:

...I consider ROTC to be first and foremost a crucible for leadership development. I see a direct link between what the officer is to learn before commissioning and the follow-on training provided in the TRADOC school system, and our goals for future officer professional development.... The preponderance of officer precommissioning training is through ROTC. Both this and subsequent training through our school system are under TRADOC’s command. Fragmenting initial entry training for officers deprives the Army of the necessary coherence and continuity
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inherent within a single command. Indeed, dividing officer training between a DA FOA and TRADOC would add a burdensome management layer to the training and education process. ROTC derives its credibility as an adjunct of the college academic curriculum.... We would jeopardize this image by making ROTC a DCSPER FOA. I believe it would be an error to imply (even remotely) that ROTC is firstly a recruiting tool for officer accessions and, secondly, an educational experience.

In October 1984, the Army Chief of Staff, General John A. Wickham, became involved in the discussion about proposed changes to the ROTC management structure. He chartered an “ROTC Study Group” to conduct a “systematic, comprehensive” review of the program to assess its viability and to consider alternatives to its present organizational make-up. The group published its report in May 1986, although its findings were well known at TRADOC and the department well before its publication date.

The study group found that “structural problems in the management organization” of the ROTC inhibited TRADOC’s ability to fulfill its precommissioning training responsibilities. While it conceded that the 1973 Steadfast reorganization of the program and the subsequent addition of the title ROTC Commander to the DCSROTC had been steps in the right direction, it recognized that many old structural dilemmas remained unresolved. Existing command arrangements, the group wrote, suffered from “excessive span of control, inappropriate division of labor, failure to provide for the accomplishment of all functions, and the absence of a centralized personnel management capability.” Decentralized logistics and administrative functions, it was posited, posed particular problems at the regional level because they detracted from the mid-level manager’s ability to concentrate on the operational mission, which included recruiting, training, retaining, and commissioning lieutenants.

Eight organizational alternatives were considered. They were: (1) a field operating agency of TRADOC; (2) a field operating agency of the DCSPER; (3) a major subordinate command of TRADOC; (4) the organizational status quo; (5) a major subordinate command of the proposed Personnel Command; (7) the ROTC Study Group alternative; and (8) a functional realignment under which each function in the officer production process would be isolated and placed in the most appropriate organizational environment available. Alternative three (TRADOC major subordinate command) and seven (study group
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proposal) differed only slightly. In the end, group members reached essentially the same conclusion as had the authors of the 1965 Comptroller’s Report—the establishment of the ROTC as a major subordinate command of TRADOC (or its organizational forefather CONARC) was the best solution to the program’s managerial ills. This solution promised to maintain the informal training support channels so essential to the precommissioning training system, while still allowing the ROTC to influence policy making in such areas as cadre assignments, lieutenant accessions, and advertising.\(^\text{18}\)

TRADOC prepared its plan for ROTC restructuring while the Chief of Staff’s Study Group was conducting its investigation. The TRADOC team and the Study Group shared information and worked closely together on issues of mutual interest. TRADOC’s plan, encapsulated in a document entitled “Feasibility Study: ROTC as a Major Subordinate Command (MSC) of HQ TRADOC” was completed in September 1985, eight months before the Study Group’s final report appeared.

The TRADOC Feasibility Study located the proposed ROTC Command at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The new headquarters was to be created from the assets of the Headquarters, Second ROTC Region, which was to be eliminated. The three remaining region headquarters were to be reduced in size by consolidating much of their administrative and logistics workload in the new national headquarters. Centralizing ROTC planning and management at the national headquarters, it was asserted, would enable regions and ROTC detachments to concentrate on operations and training and thus raise the quality of their product. The realization of substantial manpower and financial savings was cited as a secondary justification for the proposed reorganization. The plan’s timetable set 1 October 1986 as the date of the new command’s activation.\(^\text{19}\)

According to several witnesses, the location of the national ROTC headquarters at Fort Knox was not dictated solely by operational considerations. Before the Feasibility Study was completed, the promotion of the Fourth Region Commander, Brigadier General Robert E. Wagner, to major general had been announced and his selection as the next ROTC commander was widely rumored. This was not good news to the TRADOC staff. Not only did they find some of his personality traits objectionable, but his habit of circumventing the chain-of-command and taking his case directly to the DCSPER, TRADOC Commander, the Army Chief of Staff, and any other influential decision-maker who would listen enraged them. By banishing him to Knox, the thought was, his access to prominent personages in Washington, D.C., and at Fort Monroe would be restricted.\(^\text{20}\)
TRADOC submitted the Feasibility Study to General Wickham on 26 September 1985. Responding to a request from the Army DCSOPS, it also provided an accompanying implementation plan on 6 January 1986. TRADOC’s proposal, however, was not well received in Washington. In addition to misgivings about placing the ROTC command under TRADOC, Army leaders worried about the political fallout that would result from moving the ROTC headquarters away from Fort Monroe. The local populace, already jittery because Congress was considering the possibility of closing down the fort entirely, would regard such a step as the prelude to a total Army withdrawal from the area. Moreover, neither U.S. Senator John Warner nor the Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh wanted the headquarters moved out of state. Both men were Virginia natives and graduates of Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Virginia. Marsh suggested that the new command be located on the campus of a prestigious Virginia university.

With the Army Staff vacillating about what it was going to do with the ROTC and with his own retirement fast approaching, General Richardson became impatient and took matters into his own hands. He invoked Army Regulation 220-5, which allowed Army field commanders to designate provisional units without approval from the Pentagon. Accordingly, on 22 February 1986, he directed Major General Prillaman to organize the ROTC as a provisional command of TRADOC at Fort Monroe, which Prillaman promptly proceeded to do. After more than twenty years, the recommendations of the Comptroller’s Report had been finally accepted. The U.S. Army ROTC Cadet Command, the name that the new organization would assume, was thus born in an atmosphere of uncertainty and controversy. Its survival was problematic, for its existence rested not upon a broad consensus among the Army’s senior leaders, but upon the unilateral action of a frustrated TRADOC Commander.

Advent of Wagner

To place the events leading up to Cadet Command’s founding in their proper perspective and to set the stage for what follows, it is necessary to consider developments in the Fourth ROTC Region during Richardson’s tenure as TRADOC Commander. Brigadier General Wagner, who took over Fourth Region at approximately the same time that Richardson took over TRADOC, arrived at Fort Lewis with some definite opinions about the ROTC program and about precommissioning training in general. As a commander of an armored cavalry regiment and as an assistant division commander for maneuver
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for the 3d Infantry Division in Europe, he had had the chance to observe at first hand a cross-section of the Army's junior officers. He came away unimpressed with what he saw. Fully 30 percent of the Army's lieutenants were, in his estimation, incompetent as leaders. They possessed neither the moral nor intellectual attributes required of an Army officer. The ROTC, in his opinion, was largely to blame because it did not impose uniform standards of training, evaluation, and selection on ROTC regions or detachments. Its products were, consequently, an extremely dissimilar lot; battalion commanders simply did not know what they were getting when an ROTC graduate reported into the unit.23

Shortly before learning of his posting to Fort Lewis as Fourth ROTC Region Commander, Wagner returned to the United States to visit his son who was enrolled at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia. The visit dismayed him, at least from a professional point of view. The student leaders and fraternity members with whom he talked manifested little interest in and slight regard for the ROTC. Indeed, several were offended when he suggested that they enroll in the ROTC. The program, it appeared to him, was the province of students on the margins of the college, not of student opinion makers—a perception that, as we will see, was largely correct. He left William and Mary more concerned than before about the overall health of the ROTC.24

As the Fourth Region Commander, Wagner introduced or had introduced numerous measures, programs, and initiatives that, when applied nationally, were eventually to lift the ROTC out of its post Vietnam rut. Nothing he did in this period, however, proved more important than his establishment of a close professional partnership with an officer three levels above him in the chain of command—General Richardson. Through the media of phone calls, office visits, conferences, and a host of other channels, he got his ideas across directly to the TRADOC Commander. Together these two men laid the foundation for the revolution in collegiate military training that occurred in the late-1980s.

This relationship, though, was forged at a cost—namely, the willing cooperation of TRADOC staff officers, many of whom were jealous of and unnerved by Wagner’s rapport with Richardson. The Fourth Region Commander approached General Richardson without consulting the DCSROTC or anyone else in TRADOC Headquarters and did this with a frequency and with a nonchalance that annoyed even the good-natured and mild-mannered Prillaman.25
Richardson and Wagner made an odd pair. It is true that the two had served together in Vietnam and shared, in all essentials, a common training philosophy; but it is difficult to imagine two men whose personalities were so dissimilar. The staid Richardson, the son of missionary parents and the very epitome of social correctness, was never heard to utter a profane word; Wagner, on the other hand, often appeared as the archetypical cavalryman, laced his conversations with earthy expressions and did not feel himself bound by social convention. While Richardson created the command climate that made reform possible, it was Wagner who provided the blueprint for reform. Under his command, the Fourth Region acted as a proving ground for new training and leadership evaluation techniques—many of which were pioneered by Wagner himself.

Brigadier General Wagner brought with him to his new command a determination to rid the ROTC of what he considered to be one of its main flaws—its reserve orientation. ROTC had become the primary source of career officers in the fifties, but had retained its reserve flavor and many of its original reserve attributes—intense localism, operational diversity, informality, an emphasis on individual skills, etc. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, he attempted to do this by standardizing and centralizing ROTC operations, replacing individual skills with leadership development as the core of the program, and making ROTC training more rigorous and demanding in an attempt to replicate the atmosphere of a Regular Army unit.

He made several adjustments to the ROTC vocabulary to emphasize the new direction that the Fourth Region was taking. For example, the ROTC detachment received the more martial designation of cadet battalion. Area commanders became brigade commanders. Critics complained that Wagner was trying to take the "R" out of ROTC. He retorted that he wanted only to bring the program on line with what had been its principal purpose for the last three and a half decades—producing the bulk of junior officers for the Active Army.26

The Performance Gap

When Wagner arrived at Fourth Region Headquarters, the staff was preparing for the 1983 regional summer camp. For his edification, the staff presented a series of briefings on training, the cadet leadership evaluation process, the methods for selecting cadre, and various other aspects of camp operations. As the planning process progressed, Brigadier General Wagner
became increasingly uneasy about the methodology for the conduct of camp, especially for the evaluation of cadet performance.

Once summer camp got underway, he was appalled at what he saw. Instruction and camp organization both left much to be desired. The cadets reported to camp in two increments of about 1,400 each. All cadets did not undergo the same developmental progression. Some started with basic individual skills, while others jumped right into collective training (squad or platoon tactics). According to CONARC ROTC Conference reports, this “improper sequencing” of summer camp training had plagued the ROTC since the early sixties. But because of certain flaws in the command structure and the low priority attached to the program, the problem never entirely went away. The standardization of instruction and evaluation procedures and the adoption of a more logical training sequence, Wagner recognized, were essential for pulling the ROTC summer training program out of the rut into which it had fallen.27

During his first summer in the region, the new Fourth Region Commander also wanted to get a measure of the general level of intellectual attainment of cadets participating in Advanced Camp. Perhaps his interest in this matter was sparked by a letter he received in May 1983 from Major General Prillaman informing him that 60 ROTC cadets in the Fourth Region, all of whom were contracted and a majority of whom were either MS IV or “completion” cadets, had grade point averages below 1.5 (nationally, 600 contracted cadets fit into this category). Through a discussion with Major General Robert M. Elton, the Commander of the 9th Infantry Division at the time, he got the idea of using the Test of Adult Basic Education—a test employed throughout the Army to gauge the math and reading skills of soldiers—as the assessment mechanism.

The results of the test disturbed him. The test was given to 2,400 cadets. Fully 30 percent of them scored below the 12th grade level (10 percent at the 11th grade level and 20 percent at or below the 10th grade level) in the evaluated areas. The Ordnance School had conducted similar tests the previous year on newly commissioned lieutenants and got almost identical results. These unsettling statistics only confirmed his belief that serious problems existed in the ROTC and that ROTC cadets were not being properly trained or screened prior to enrollment in the Advanced Course.28

His experience at the Fourth Region’s camp prompted Wagner to take a look at how summer training was being conducted in the other three regions. He did not like what he discovered. There was a multiple Advanced Camp
system in effect in which no two camps offered the same training experience. One camp stressed individual training skills, another accentuated small unit tactical training. The systems for evaluating leadership ability were just as diverse. Brigadier General Wagner viewed the absence of a standard evaluation mechanism as the most serious deficiency:

The obvious result of these differing Advanced Camp systems is the absence of a defined, understood, and uniformly applied yardstick against which we judge the officership qualities of cadets. At the bottom end of the quality spectrum, a cadet “makes it” based upon the luck of the draw. Where one goes to camp “does” matter. In the summer of 1983, a camp with one-half the population of another camp boarded twice as many cadets.29

Wagner was by no means the only one worried about the state of ROTC. Ever since the 1978 RETO Study had focused attention on the program’s problems, successive TRADOC Commanders, their DCSROTCs, and service school commandants had evidenced considerable concern about low commissioning standards and unevenness of training, especially summer camp training. The Commandants of the Ordnance, Field Artillery, Signal and Quartermaster Schools were especially vocal in expressing their misgivings.30

At the close of camp, Wagner began visiting host and extension centers in order to discuss his concerns with instructors in the field. He impressed upon the cadre the critical importance of their mission while at the same time soliciting their views for improving ROTC training and operations. Before long, he gained an understanding of the quality of instruction, the type of cadet recruited into the program, and the character of the cadre.

Upon his return to region headquarters, he had Colonel James Neale, his Chief of Staff, draw up a position paper outlining the impressions garnered by Wagner from his experience thus far as region commander. The paper was entitled ROTC: Everybody’s Business and was published in October 1983. It made two major points: first, the ROTC program produced 70 percent of the Army officer corps; second, the program was not alive and well as everybody believed it to be.31

To drive home the second point, Neale made certain generalizations about the state of the ROTC. These generalizations, he was to find out, were not ones that everyone wanted to hear. For example, he denounced the program’s permissive enrollment policies that allowed students with civil convictions
for felonies and moral turpitude offenses to enroll in the Advanced Course. He also deplored the lack of initiative, leadership ability, and cognitive and communicative skills that he found in all too many recently commissioned ROTC graduates.\textsuperscript{32}

The practice of commissioning people who did not possess the requisite strength and flexibility of intellect to lead on the modern battlefield particularly disturbed him. This practice, it was asserted, had created a performance gap; the complexity of modern weapons systems was overmatching the intellectual abilities of the junior officers responsible for employing them. See Figure 2-1. In Wagner’s words,

Too many of our young officers cannot meet operational standards in the field....It is tragic to observe an Army in its greatest modernization surge in history lacking the junior leadership required to exploit the potential of our new systems. Technical competency, disciplined and decisive decision-making, and flexibility in adapting to rapidly changing situations are missing talents in many of our younger officers.\textsuperscript{33}

The Fourth Region Commander thought it strange that the Army had put so much effort into raising the quality of the enlisted force and in producing first-rate soldiers while neglecting the equally important task of turning out competent second lieutenants. Yet this neglect of collegiate military training should not have been so surprising for it was something of a tradition in the

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American Army. Indeed, the Army’s record of apathy stretched back to the passage of the Morrill Act of 1862.

It was difficult to explain this tradition. Perhaps it was bound up with the anti-elitist proclivities of the American public and the American Army. Perhaps it was a result of the localism that had for so long characterized ROTC operations. This localism had inhibited the growth of an ROTC corporate identity which in turn inhibited the development of an ROTC constituency within the ranks of the Army’s senior leaders. Whatever the reason, the fact was that the professional nurturing of ROTC officer aspirants was given scant attention before 1986.34

No major improvements could be made in the officer accessions process, Neale’s paper went on to say, until the ROTC received its fair share of resources. In 1983, the Army spent $159,000 to commission one West Point cadet and only $36,000 to train one four-year ROTC scholarship cadet. Moreover, the vast majority of academy graduates attended Cadet Troop Leader Training, Air Assault, Airborne, Flight Orientation, or Northern Warfare Training compared to only 27 percent of their ROTC counterparts. A significant difference in cadre quality also existed: at the Military Academy, the cadre promotion rate from lieutenant colonel to colonel was 64 percent, in ROTC only 20 percent. The obvious point was that a more equitable distribution of resources and training opportunities among the commissioning sources was in order.

ROTC: Everybody’s Business also alleged that ROTC was being short-changed in the recruiting arena. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command’s recruiting budget amounted to $75 million per year, but ROTC received only $6.4 million of this total. To compensate for inadequate recruiting funds, ROTC targeted markets where the quality of the average prospect was relatively low and recruiting easier. Scholarships were of little help in remedying this “quality deflection syndrome” because of the Army’s academic mix requirements, which focused on bringing more engineering and other so-called “high tech” majors into the program. Students enrolled in these disciplines were given preferential treatment in the scholarship selection process even though in many instances they did not exhibit the same intellectual and leadership potential as applicants who were pursuing or planned to pursue liberal arts degrees. This was unfortunate, Fourth Region Headquarters felt, because the Army had never definitively established a positive correlation between a technical or engineering background and adeptness in operating and employing modern weapons systems.35
Reform Initiatives

After he had the opportunity to take stock of the situation and reflect on the magnitude of the challenge that confronted him, the new Fourth Region Commander, with the help of his staff, started to formulate a plan of attack designed to correct the many problem areas he had identified. In developing his agenda, he was determined to inject a new vigor into the program and reshape it, insofar as it lay within his power, into an Active Army organization. At the same time, he was intent on endowing ROTC with a status commensurate to its function. His constant reminders to his cadre, to the rest of the Army and to the American public that the ROTC produced 70 percent of the U.S. Army officer corps was one small aspect of this broader campaign.

To address both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the Fourth Region’s production problems, he introduced a new production management system, which he named Operation Goldstrike. Unlike the former system which had established commissioning goals for individual ROTC detachments on the basis of past performance, Operation Goldstrike took into account both the market potential and the average prospect quality within a given area. Recruiting resources and advertising funds were redistributed if it was found that the potential of a particular market was not being fully exploited.

Accompanying the new production management system was the region commander’s imperative for ROTC cadre members to “enter the heart of the university.” By stressing this imperative, he hoped to reverse a tendency that had long been with the ROTC, but had become especially pronounced since the late sixties when the program had run into stiff and sometimes violent opposition on campus. ROTC instructors tended to remain on the margins of the university, either afraid or unwilling to take a central place in the life of the institution to which they were assigned. As a result, they often forfeited close ties with the administration and faculty and, even more unfortunately, attracted into the program students who themselves occupied positions on the fringes of the university. This last fact had been bemoaned by ROTC program managers for some time. According to a 1969 Quartermaster School report, “square” and “jerk” were appellations commonly attached to ROTC cadets. “Nerd” became a popular designation in the eighties. Wagner’s goal was to transform the program from an appendage to a vital part of the college and, in this way, entice students in the mainstream of college life into the Army.

The Fourth Region Commander suggested to the DCSROTC that the Goldstrike recruiting methodology should be adopted by the other ROTC
regions. With the assistance of the Recruiting Command, TRADOC and N.W. Ayer, the Army’s advertising agency, the region staff developed a nationwide marketing and advertising scheme to support the proposed regional variants of Operation Goldstrike. The scheme promoted the use of a “soldier-leader” theme to complement the ads already employed by the Recruiting Command. It had the advantage of obviating the need for expensive advertising devoted exclusively to attracting officers.

The Fourth Region’s first real test of the Goldstrike methodology took place in the Los Angeles Basin. The test was named Operation Goldminer and was based on a market analysis by the region staff. The analysis revealed that California contained 51 percent of the region’s potential market and the Los Angeles Basin 45 percent of California’s market. In this latter market, over 30,000 students entered institutions of higher learning each year. A prototype ROTC Enrollment (Goldminer) Team, consisting of three officers and one non-commissioned officer, canvassed the high school and college campuses looking for prospects. A special media plan complemented TRADOC’s national advertising scheme and provided basic program and scholarship information. The campaign used regional print media and campus newspaper advertisement. It was supplemented by 630 radio spots during college registration periods. This allowed the ROTC detachment personnel to concentrate their enrollment efforts on their own campuses. The success of Operation Goldminer caused the Fourth Region to establish four additional Goldminer teams, one each in Seattle, Minneapolis, Denver, and San Francisco. Major General Prillaman was so impressed with the program that he established ten additional Goldminer teams in other ROTC regions.39

To raise ROTC product quality, Wagner purposed to strictly enforce enrollment standards. He was especially eager to eliminate eligibility waivers for students with a criminal past. Prior to his arrival in Fourth Region, granting waivers for felonies, moral turpitude offenses, and other crimes had been common practice. It was a practice that had been denounced in the late 1970s by Major General Charles C. Rogers, the DCSROT during General William E. DePuy’s tenure as TRADOC Commander. Rogers told region commanders to stop commissioning students with criminal records but recruiting pressures rendered his efforts in this area ineffectual. Wagner, because of his aggressive follow-up and the support he received from the TRADOC Commander, got better results.40

Intellectual standards were also vigorously enforced. All cadets, it was decided, would have to pass the Officer Selection Battery, a standardized
diagnostic aptitude test, before being enrolled in the Advanced Course. Only if a cadet had a grade point average of at least 2.85 could this requirement be waived.41

An overhaul of the training and evaluation methods used at Advanced Camp was another of the new commander’s priorities. He was intent on replacing the teaching of individual military skills with leadership development as the centerpiece of the cadet summer experience. To realize this goal, he eliminated the teaching of many perishable mechanical skills at camp and substituted in their stead tactical training, which lent itself to the evaluation of cadet leadership potential.42

In the summer of 1984, Fourth Region Headquarters introduced at Advanced Camp a new method for conducting summer camp. It was called the “tiered approach” to training. Under this approach, cadets reported to camp in ten increments. The reporting times of these increments were staggered by two or three days. This permitted the scheduling of identical, sequential, and progressive training for each cadet and corrected a problem that had plagued the ROTC Advanced Camp system for decades. See Figure 2-2. Each increment consisted of approximately 260 cadets organized into a regiment of two companies, both with four platoons. The distribution of cadets among the 10 cycles was random, with no more than two cadets from the same school assigned to a particular platoon. The system standardized operations and encouraged competition. A five-day capstone exercise, Adventure Challenge, punctuated summer training and forced cadets to use the full range of skills and knowledge they had acquired over the previous six weeks. Impressed by what he saw at Camp Adventure, Major General Prillaman directed the other regions to adopt the tiered approach.43

The Fourth Region Commander did not rest content with reordering cadet summer training in his own region. As was his wont, he strayed into other domains where he possessed no formal authority and where, in many cases, his involvement was not welcome. His proposal for the creation of an Army Officer Cadet Center (AOCC), for example, clearly exceeded the scope of an ROTC region commander. The AOCC, as envisaged by Wagner, involved the establishment of a single national summer camp through which all cadets—ROTC, OCS, and the Military Academy—would have to pass before being commissioned. The AOCC was to be modeled after the Fourth ROTC Region’s Advanced Camp and would, it was anticipated, become the vehicle for the standardization of the entire U.S. Army precommissioning training system.44
There were, in Wagner's estimation, simply too many flaws in the existing multi-camp system. Camps were too short to evaluate leadership potential and standards between camps varied greatly. Moreover, the multiplicity of camps inhibited the development of a sense of corporateness among ROTC cadets and among cadets from the three commissioning sources.

The implementation of the single camp concept would eliminate or alleviate many of the problems inherent in the old system. By pooling ROTC, OCS, and Academy cadre, better cadre-to-cadet ratios could be achieved, which in turn would enhance the quality of both training and evaluation. The Army would also enjoy a much greater degree of quality control over the officer selection process. All aspiring officers would be placed under the same magnifying glass and evaluated under the same conditions. In addition, the AOCC would foster a corporate spirit within the officer corps. Brigadier General Wagner summed up the benefits of the proposed camp as follows:

Upon commissioning all officers should be of a uniform high quality, share the same training experience, and believe they are joining a cohesive integrated Army. ROTC cadets would meet West Point cadets and West Point cadets would
experience the diversity they will encounter in the Army after their commissioning.\textsuperscript{46}

The proposed camp organization included a brigadier general as camp commander supported by a full-time staff and liaison elements from the active and reserve forces. During summer training periods, the staff would be augmented by Military Academy, ROTC, and OCS cadre. FORSCOM and reserve component units would be brought in for added support. The Fourth Region staff identified Forts Benning, Chaffee, and McCoy as the most suitable locations for the AOCC, because they offered facilities for light infantry training and because they did not house Active Army maneuver units, whose normal operations might be disrupted by the presence of thousands of cadets. The proposed center would operate in three, eight-week cycles of 4,500 cadets each and all training would revolve around the cadet platoon. Each platoon would consist of 30 to 40 cadets and two cadre, who would monitor training and evaluate cadet leadership potential.\textsuperscript{47} See Figure 2-3.

\textbf{Figure 2-3. Proposed Command Structure for AOCC}
There was little support at West Point or in the Army in general for the AOCC. Authorities at West Point were particularly averse to the proposal. Their attitude led some to conclude that they feared the prospect of having their cadets compete with those in the ROTC program on an equal footing. In the end, the proposal was rejected. It did, however, clearly indicate the direction in which Wagner was trying to steer precommissioning training in the U.S. Army.

**A New Identity**

Imparting a distinct identity to the ROTC was another facet of his reform agenda. In the past, localism had pervaded the program. Detachments operated as independent fiefdoms with their cadets feeling little kinship with or affinity for cadets enrolled at other institutions. Many cadets thus did not get a sense that they were part of a larger scheme that transcended the local campus. They might be of vital importance to the Army and to the nation, but they saw nothing in their routine which would indicate this. Many of them entered the Army without that sense of identity possessed by graduates of Senior Military Colleges, West Point, and OCS.

Brigadier General Wagner tried to cure this identity crisis by introducing measures designed to build an ROTC esprit de corps, imbue cadets with a sense of their own history (or manufacture this history if it was missing), and give a Regular Army aura to the ROTC experience. These measures, it is true, had practical value as well, but their overriding purpose was to lend to the program those moral dimensions listed above.

The Regimental Affiliation Program was one such initiative. Introduced in 1985, it associated each cadet regiment at summer camp with a distinguished active duty regiment. Cadets wore a version of the affiliated unit patch, displayed its flag during ceremonial functions, and in a sense, became a part of that regiment’s tradition.

The renaming of ROTC detachments as cadet battalions and of ROTC areas as cadet brigades was another part of the Wagner plan. The area and detachment designations clearly did not evoke martial images or a Regular Army aura. Moreover, the terms were too closely associated with the program as it had existed in the past—a past that did not live up to the billing, Wagner believed, that its supporters had given it. To combine the sense of belonging to a centralized cadet corps with individual unit elan, he ordered cadet battalions and brigades to adopt operational names and mottoes, such as
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day's “Cougar Battalion” and the “California Brigade.” For the Fourth Region itself, the nickname “Goldstrike” was selected.51

A new standard organizational setup accompanied these name changes. In each battalion, there were to be two staffs: a cadre administrative staff and a cadet staff. The structure of the cadet staff was to mirror that of a regular military battalion and consist of a commander, an executive officer, S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, and S-5. Cadet companies were headed by a commander and executive officer and cadet platoons by platoon leaders. The size of the unit was to determine the number of platoons in a company and the number of companies in a battalion. Heretofore, most battalions organized themselves as they had seen fit.

The new organizational scheme established a definite chain-of-command—something that in the past had not always been discernible. A Fourth Region directive, dated 20 December 1983, emphasized the importance of the new organization:

The effective organizational structure of a unit directly influences mission accomplishment and morale. The members of any organization must recognize their individual responsibilities and their place on an integrated team geared toward common objectives. Our goal is to standardize the cadet corps organization for the benefit of our cadets and cadre.52

The Ranger Challenge program represented yet another way in which the Fourth Region Commander attempted to instill an esprit de corps and an Active Army intensity into cadets in the region. The program was very rigorous and consisted of individual and team competition in such military skills as orienteering, marksmanship, combat patrolling, and rope bridge construction, as well as a test of physical endurance in the form of a 10-mile road march. It was envisaged that this competition would one day evolve into a true varsity sport in which cadet battalions would be pitted against one another at the inter-collegiate level. It never progressed quite that far but it did become an important tool for recruiting students and retaining them in the program.53

The push to imprint an identity on ROTC in the Fourth Region did not go down well with all cadre members. Some thought it frivolous, others considered it downright silly. Relatively few fully grasped what Wagner was trying to do and why he was trying to do it. The utility of improving Advanced
Camp instruction they could understand, but the importance of imbuing cadets with a sense of their own history and tradition escaped them. Brigadier General Wagner realized that many of the devices he employed to achieve the desired moral effect ("instant tradition" as he called it) were artificial; he also believed, however, that this mattered little. His concern centered on the minds of cadets, not on scholarly accuracy.
CHAPTER III

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CADET COMMAND

The ROTC was no longer the agency that produced reserve officers to be called up in case of mobilization; it was now responsible for turning out leaders for America's first line of defense.

The restructuring of the ROTC program in the Fourth Region caught the attention of the Army Chief of Staff, General John A. Wickham, Jr. When in the autumn of 1985 consideration was being given to the question of who was to succeed Major General Prillaman as head of the ROTC, Wagner was an obvious but controversial choice. He had by this time (i.e., the fall of 1985) been selected for promotion to major general and was thoroughly familiar with the ROTC program. Wagner himself would have preferred to command the Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, but Wickham considered him too abrasive and outspoken for that sensitive post. A fear that Wagner would use the Armor School as a bully pulpit to impose his warfighting ideas on the Army apparently militated against his appointment. Besides, Wickham was anxious to see some of the initiatives introduced by Wagner in the Fourth Region implemented on a wider scale. General Richardson shared the Chief's assessment of Wagner's suitability for the new command.¹

The decision to make the ROTC an independent command under TRADOC was not a universally popular one; neither for that matter was the decision to appoint Wagner the commander of the new organization. Resistance to the two decisions was particularly intense within the Office of the DCSPER. This resistance was in part a response to the manner in which Wagner had opposed past attempts to place ROTC under the DCSPER.² As Fourth Region
Commander, he had used every tool and channel available to him to underline the inappropriateness of turning precommissioning military training over to the Army's personnel managers. After the command had been established and his emotions had cooled, Wagner summarized his thoughts about this issue in an interview:

I did not want the ROTC to be aligned under the DA DCSPER because I feared it would become another recruiting agency and forget the major essence of its function, which is leadership development... Producing officers of substance and intellectual capacity would be lost as a part of the DCSPER community.  

Forging A New Image

Major General Wagner took over the reins of the new ROTC command on 10 March 1986. One of his first tasks was to come up with a name for the new organization—a task that on the surface might seem simple enough but whose accomplishment was to incite lively controversy. He disliked the title ROTC Command—the name that the Army Staff proposed to attach to the organization. At the Pentagon, Wagner had heard officials referring to the ROTC Command as "ROTCOM," the "Rots," and the "Rotters," appellations that he found insulting. Moreover, he considered ROTC to be an inaccurate and, indeed, a derogatory term since it conjured up images of the program's less than venerable past. New verbal images had to be introduced to represent the current thrust of the program. He advanced Cadet Command as a fitting designation.

There was stiff resistance at the Department of the Army and elsewhere to the title "Cadet Command." Neither West Point nor OCS cadets, it was pointed out, fell under the jurisdiction of the commander of the ROTC program. West Point authorities demonstrated a particular sensitivity about the proposed name; they objected to the appropriation of the word cadet—a word historically associated with the students at their institution—by the institutional upstart at Fort Monroe.

In truth, there was more than simple parochial sensibilities involved in the squabble over the name. Wagner saw his command one day becoming an organization that would control all precommissioning military training in the U.S. Army, as his earlier proposal for the establishment of the Army
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Officer Cadet Center suggested. Standardizing training and operations in the ROTC was just the first step; OCS and West Point would also eventually be brought under the new command's organizational purview. Officials at West Point and Fort Benning discerned the significance of Wagner's proposed name for his new command and vigorously objected to it. In the end, General Richardson intervened and engineered a compromise which resulted in the name U.S. Army ROTC Cadet Command being bestowed upon the new organization—a compromise that did not fully please Major General Wagner.6

Fostering an esprit de corps within the ROTC community was another of the new commander’s prime concerns—a concern to which he had devoted so much attention while serving in the Fourth Region. To promote this end, he assiduously went about acquiring flags, guidons, unit crests and other heraldic devices for his new command. Even before he had arrived at Fort Monroe, in fact, Wagner had sought approval for a new command patch and crest for the ROTC. Since 1973, the cadre had worn a TRADOC patch and cadets one of two versions of an ROTC patch. See Figure 3-1. In July 1985, while still Fourth Region Commander, Wagner had pressed Richardson and Prillaman to adopt a single patch for ROTC when it became a separate command. The new patch and crest should, he believed, better express the program's purpose than the ones then in use.

Figure 3-1. Pre-1986 Shoulder Sleeve Insignias for ROTC Cadets
The Fourth Region staff submitted a design of what it thought the new emblem should look like to the DCSROTC. Major General Prillaman selected it from among a number of other design proposals. On 16 August 1985, he, after making one significant alteration, forwarded up the Fourth Region’s insignia to the U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry, the Army agency charged with reviewing and approving all such items.7

The insignia had a background consisting of a shield divided into four quadrants; the shield symbolizing the Army's mission of national defense and the four quadrants the traditional four-year course of study. In the new design, the red, white, and blue on the old ROTC patch were replaced by the colors of the Army—black and gold. The interior symbols consisted of an upraised sword, "representative of the courage, gallantry, and self-sacrifice intrinsic to the Profession of Arms;" a lamp, symbolizing "the pursuit of knowledge, higher learning, and the study of military science;" and the helmet of Pallas Athena, Greek Goddess of both War and Wisdom, representative of the "warrior scholar." In the Fourth Region proposal, the inscription "Leadership Excellence" was emblazoned across the top of the shield. See figure 3-2. Prillaman substituted "Duty-Honor-Country" for "Leadership Excellence" before sending it on.8

PROPOSED ROTC COMMAND PATCH

Figure 3-2. Proposed ROTC Command Patch
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CADET COMMAND

The shield, lamp, and sword generated no controversy but the helmet of Pallas Athena and the Duty-Honor-Country inscription unleashed a firestorm. The DCSPER, Lieutenant General Elton—himself a West Point graduate—and the Superintendent of the Military Academy, Lieutenant General Willard Scott, hotly protested the incorporation of these latter two elements into the ROTC crest. In words that only partially veiled his deep-seated hostility to the proposed ROTC insignia, Scott pointed out that:

The strong association of this motto and these colors with West Point makes them most inappropriate for inclusion in/on the shoulder sleeve insignia of another commissioning source. I object...to the use of the helmet of Pallas Athena...I strongly urge Department of the Army disapproval of the proposed insignia.9

Elton, who was just as repulsed as the Superintendent by the ROTC request, wholeheartedly agreed and ordered the Institute of Heraldry to come up with some alternative design for the ROTC crest.10

On 19 December 1985, the Institute presented the DCSROTC with two choices. Design A substituted the motto “Leadership Excellence” for “Duty-Honor-Country” (Wagner’s original recommendation), while Design B suggested “Knowledge Leadership” (a recommendation of the Institute). Both alternatives replaced the helmet of Pallas Athena with a Greek helmet and both retained black and gold as the colors. Prillaman chose Design A and forwarded it up the chain-of-command to obtain the Department of the Army’s approval. Initially, the Department demurred on the grounds that the ROTC had not been officially activated as a command. Again, General Richardson intervened on behalf of Cadet Command and persuaded the Army Chief of Staff to authorize the modified patch for wear by ROTC cadre and cadets. Formal approval was finally granted on 22 August 1986.11 See Figure 3-3.

Cadet Command was activated, or granted official recognition of its new command status, on 15 April 1986. The second of May was set as the date for the command’s activation ceremony, which was to be held at Fort Monroe’s Continental Park. Like his campaign for a new shoulder patch, Major General Wagner saw the activation ceremony as a means to stimulate esprit de corps within his command and to instill in cadets and cadre a sense of the history and tradition of the ROTC.12 The Spring Review became an annual event commemorating the anniversary of Cadet Command’s
founding and served a function somewhat analogous to that of the graduation parade at the service academies.

Over the next four years, the Cadet Command staff adopted a series of other measures intended to infuse the command with clan and tradition. In September 1986, Cadet Command adopted a musical piece entitled “A Bar of Gold on Army Green” as its official song. At the 1987 Spring Review, Wagner dedicated the Cadet Park, which was established on the grounds of the Cadet Command Headquarters (Bldg #56 on Fort Monroe), to celebrate the American citizen-soldier tradition. To add to the “historicity” of the occasion, Lieutenant General Robert H. Forman, the TRADOC Deputy Commanding General, and Major General Wagner planted two white dogwoods—the Virginia state tree—with soil from the Yorktown Battlefield. (Wagner’s hidden motive in opening the park on the grounds of the headquarters was to make it difficult for acquisitive TRADOC staff officers, not all of whom were supporters of the new command, from appropriating the headquarters building for their own use. Its official designation as a national park, Wagner believed, would help prevent this from happening.)
The 1988 Spring Review witnessed the firing of the first Cadet Cannonade. The three-volley cannonade, which symbolically saluted the concepts of Duty-Honor-Country, thereafter became an integral part of the Cadet Command ceremonial repertoire. Wagner formed his own salute battery, the Golden Cannoneers, for the 1989 Spring Review, and equipped them with three 75-mm pack howitzers which he named Duty, Honor, and Country. Howitzers of this type had been used by glider, airborne, and mountain field artillery units during key campaigns in World War II, and Wagner wanted to borrow their tradition for the command. Earlier, in September 1986, two Model 1857, 12-pound gun-howitzers, popularly called Napoleons, were installed at the entrance to the Cadet Command Headquarters for the same purpose. Wagner directed all of his subordinate units to establish cadet parks, form salute batteries, and manufacture an “instant tradition” of their own.14

In addition to witnessing the firing of the first Cadet Cannonade, the 1988 Spring Review saw the introduction of the Cadet Creed. Dr. Larry Brown of the Training Directorate was the principal author of this creed, which explained what the Army expected of its cadets. It was subsequently read to all
cadets prior to contracting and prominently displayed in all region and cadet battalion headquarters.\textsuperscript{15}

The customs and traditions of the U.S. Army regimental mess were also appropriated by Cadet Command. All units were required to hold an annual Dining-In and Military Ball, the instrumentality through which the customs and traditions of the regimental mess were transmitted. This tradition originated in the British Army during the eighteenth century when officers were quartered in taverns or private homes. The close association of British and American officers during the world wars resulted in the adoption of this tradition by the U.S. Army.\textsuperscript{16}

Flags were a command fetish during the Wagner era. Historically, the most prized possession of any unit was its colors. The organizational colors identified a unit's physical presence on the battlefield and provided a rallying point for its members during combat. In light of this tradition, Major General Wagner believed that Cadet Command had to have one of its own.

He enlisted the aid of the Institute of Heraldry and by June 1987, had manufacturing drawings of new flags and guidons for the command and its subordinate units in his possession. These drawings were patterned on the design of the Foster Flag—a flag designed by Sergeant Major Calvin Foster, Wagner's long-time associate, and his wife. Until the arrival of the official flag in December 1987, the Foster Flag flew at all Cadet Command ceremonies. Afterwards, it was retired and placed on display in the foyer of Cadet Command Headquarters at Fort Monroe, Virginia. It became something of an institutional icon, its somewhat roughhewn appearance symbolizing the many obstacles that the command had to overcome in order to assert its identity in its early days.\textsuperscript{17} See Figure 3-4.

Noncommissioned officers also figured prominently in the campaign to imprint a distinctive stamp on the command. Through a program known as Operation Striper, noncommissioned officers were made the guardians of tradition. In this capacity, they taught the customs and traditions of the service to cadets, ensured that cadets maintained high standards of personal appearance, gave instruction in drill and ceremony, and, in general, guided the military socialization process of the students entrusted to their care.\textsuperscript{18}

The new role given to the noncommissioned officer through Operation Striper made him a much more valued and, from the cadet perspective, respected member of the cadre. Before the establishment of Cadet Command, college and university faculty members frequently complained that the ROTC staff was filled with noncommissioned officers who lacked college
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educations and who were unprepared for the instructional duties they were called upon to perform.

An ROTC cadet enrolled at the University of Illinois in the 1960s told of an incident on his campus that illustrated this miscasting of the noncommissioned officer. It seems that one cadet, an astronomy major, answered a question on a celestial navigation exam with the term "Constellation Cassiopeia." His answer was correct but the noncommissioned officer teaching the class marked it wrong. When confronted by the student, the instructor responded that the Army manual called the constellation in question "The Big M" and that no other response was acceptable. The cadet then went to his astronomy instructor who became incensed at the slight that had been inflicted on his field of study. Obviously, the astronomy instructor concluded, the noncommissioned officer's action was reflective of the basic inflexibility and oversimplicity of the Army ROTC program.19

Figure 3-4. The Foster Flag (note the misspelling of Headquarters and the reversal of the helmet of Pallas Athena)
Under Operation Striper, noncommissioned officers were not placed in such difficult and embarrassing circumstances. They limited their teaching to subjects about which they knew a great deal. Instead of coming across as incompetents, they appeared as consummate professionals.\textsuperscript{20}

To Wagner, forging a new image for the ROTC meant not only imparting to it a sense of history and tradition, it also entailed giving it an Regular Army flavor. One way he attempted to do this was by extending the Fourth Region’s system for ROTC unit designation and cadet battalion organization through the entire command. He directed that all elements in the Cadet Command chain-of-command (i.e., battalions, brigades, and regions) adopt the prescribed unit designations and organization along with operational names by the end of 1989. There was a precedent for this move. General Maxwell Thurman had introduced a similar unit identification scheme into the Recruiting Command when he headed that organization.

Despite this precedent, the redesignation of ROTC units stirred up all sorts of opposition, especially in the Pentagon and at TRADOC. There were two primary reasons for this opposition. First, many felt that the new designations were inaccurate and, in a sense, insulting to the Army. Battalion and brigade were terms that should be reserved for “regular” military units and should not be used in connection with the ROTC. Second, the commanders of the new units were designated battalion and brigade commanders. In the Army promotion system, service as a battalion and brigade commander is a virtual prerequisite for advancement to high command. Critics of the name change wanted to make it clear that a lieutenant colonel serving as a PMS was in no way the professional equal of a “real” battalion commander. Strangely enough, many of these same critics seemed to accept the proposition that recruiting battalion commanders approximated their counterparts in tactical units, at least in terms of hours worked and pressures associated with the job.\textsuperscript{21}

Of course, changing the ROTC vocabulary to reflect more martial images was just one small part of a larger campaign to infuse a Regular Army spirit and intensity into the program. Yet, the importance of such semantical adjustments should not be underestimated. Names and titles convey powerful images and messages and often shape the ideas that individuals and groups of individuals have about themselves and others. The adoption of battalion and brigade as designations for ROTC units impressed upon members of the command and the Army as a whole that the ROTC was no longer the agency that produced reserve officers to be called up in case of mobilization; it was now responsible for turning out leaders for America’s first line of defense.
The New Command

When it was established on 15 April 1986, Cadet Command had a new name and a new relationship with TRADOC, but it inherited only the personnel and material assets and the narrow mission of the old DCSROTC staff. On 9 May 1986, Cadet Command representatives met with General Richardson for the dual purpose of charting a new course for the command and of determining precisely what was needed for the command to pursue this course. At this meeting, they pressed home several points. First, they lobbied to get more people assigned to the headquarters. At least 44 additional positions, they told the TRADOC Commander, were needed for the command to function as a truly independent entity and become something more than the old DCSROTC with a new name. Richardson agreed and gave Cadet Command 38 of the 44 positions requested.22

They also pressed to have the command's mission broadened. In addition to directing ROTC training, they insisted that Cadet Command should assume the responsibility for monitoring the training of the other commissioning sources (the Military Academy, Army OCS, and National Guard OCS) as well. Only in this way, they argued, could the many inefficiencies and redundancies inherent in the extant system of precommissioning training, with its diversity of standards and objectives, be eliminated.

Surprisingly, in light of the jurisdictional squabbles such an arrangement was bound to produce, General Richardson agreed. Richardson's support was due primarily to his desire to bring the various state National Guard OCS programs under closer TRADOC scrutiny. He doubted that these state-administered programs were meeting the requirements of the Military Qualification Standards (MQS) I and believed that Cadet Command would provide a valuable service in overseeing their operation. In December 1986, General Richardson formally designated Cadet Command as his “functional proponent” in overwatching the implementation of the MQS I by West Point, Federal OCS, and National Guard OCS programs and the “instrumentality through which TRADOC (fulfilled) its precommissioning training responsibility.”23

The decision to entrust Cadet Command with this responsibility had a number of fateful consequences, not all of which materialized in the short term. In 1993, seven years after being appointed as TRADOC’s overwatch instrumentality for precommissioning training, Cadet Command, now under the command of Major General James M. Lyle, incorporated a two-week National Guard OCS “module” into ROTC Advanced Camp at Fort Lewis, Washington. The
National Guard organizations of nine western states sent OCS candidates to Lewis that first summer. The next year, the program was expanded to the Advanced Camp at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Nine eastern states sent their OCS candidates to that camp. By 1996, it was projected, all states would participate in this program. The bringing together of two commissioning sources with such different traditions into an intimate training relationship was certainly a milestone in the history of Army training.

Cadet Command’s assumption of TRADOC’s precommissioning mandate, however, also caused some problems. When certain senior National Guard officers heard about it, they were furious. They made it plain that they did not want Cadet Command interfering with state-run commissioning programs.

Major General Wagner aggravated matters by taking the oversight mission seriously—too seriously according to some observers. During his last two years in command, he had representatives from his headquarters make a series of National Guard OCS site visits. The reports his agents brought back to him were not always highly commendatory of the programs visited. He, in turn, did not try to sugarcoat the assessments he gave to the TRADOC Command and staff. He did not win friends at the National Guard Bureau or elsewhere in the Guard by proceeding in this manner. One state OCS Commandant reportedly became so exasperated with Wagner that he refused to allow the Cadet Command Commander or his minions to visit his facility.

Headquarters Organization

The entire command and control architecture of the ROTC program changed when Cadet Command became a major subordinate command of TRADOC. A single national headquarters devoted exclusively to the administration of the ROTC now directed the efforts of the four region headquarters. The change did not please everyone, of course. Staff officers assigned to the region headquarters chafed at the sudden erosion of their operational autonomy that the new organization brought with it.

With the 38 additional positions approved by General Richardson, Cadet Command Headquarters was 40 percent larger than the staff agency it had replaced. The headquarters itself was organized according to function; it consisted of a command group, a coordinating staff of five divisions (later to become six directorates) and six special staff offices. The four ROTC region headquarters were similarly structured and nearly as large; they had 115 authorized positions as opposed to 132 such slots in the national headquarters.
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In the new headquarters, the former divisions of the old DCSROTC were retained but substantially expanded. The new Personnel and Administration Division formulated policies and procedures for the management of personnel—military, civilian, and cadet. It also ran the Army ROTC Scholarship program and controlled the Precommissioning Assessment System. A Resource Management Division managed the command’s logistics, finances, and manpower allocation processes. The Training Division dealt with matters relating to precommissioning training, education, and leader development. The operation of and the evaluation methods used at both Basic and Advanced Camp fell within the purview of this division. Training also had a high school desk which oversaw the operation of the Junior ROTC. A Marketing Division supervised the national advertising program, conducted market research, and through its Public Affairs Office, acted as the official spokesman for the command. See Figure 3-5

A new Operations Division along with several special staff offices were added on to the frame of the old DCSROTC structure. Operations headed up the Goldstrike Mission Management System and measured how well
the command was doing its job. It also directed the recruiting program, to
include the operation of the Goldminer Teams, and managed the School of
Cadet Command (SOCC), which was created after the command’s inception
to instruct incoming ROTC cadre about the command’s mission philosophy
and operational methods.

The special staff consisted of individuals who held their position on the
basis of their specialized knowledge. The Inspector General inquired into the
state of the command’s efficiency, economy, discipline, and morale. The Com-
mand Surgeon dealt with health-related policies, superintended the command’s
preventive medicine and occupational health programs, and ruled on cadet
medical eligibility questions. The management of all automation systems was
a responsibility of the Information Management Office. The Army Reserve
Component Advisors gave advice on matters pertaining to Army Reserve and
Army National Guard activities. An independent internal audit capability
within the command was provided by the Office of Internal Review and Audit
Compliance. Its auditors evaluated all major activities and projects for regu-
latory compliance, economy, and efficiency. The Command Nurse headed the
nurse recruiting effort, coordinated nurse summer training, and, in general,
oversaw the complex process by which ROTC-trained nurses were brought
into the Army.27

For the most part, Wagner hand-picked the officers who filled key
positions in the headquarters. He had served with many of them in the
past, was familiar with their capabilities and limitations, and knew that
they shared his philosophy about training in general and about
precommissioning training in particular. Through his personnel selections,
Major General Wagner imprinted his signet on the command and gave it
what he considered to be an appropriate focus.

Because he fitted jobs to the capabilities and peculiarities of the people
at hand, there was a distinct “task-force” orientation to the command in
those early days. This method of doing business usually resulted in the
most suitable people being selected for specific jobs but it also created orga-
nizational anomalies. The case of the School of Cadet Command illustrates
the point. This school was placed under the Operations Division solely be-
cause of the particular qualifications of the chief of that division, Lieutenant
Colonel Michael Hodson. Functionally, of course, it belonged under the
Training Division—the staff component responsible for the training and
professional development of both cadre and cadets. As the command ma-
tured, these anomalies gradually disappeared (the school was made part of
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the Training Directorate in 1992). Yet, the expediency displayed in this case was representative of the unconventional measures that were taken to get the headquarters on its feet.\textsuperscript{28}

Subordinate Commands

The organization of region headquarters bore a close resemblance to that of Cadet Command Headquarters. The major differences were the absence of the internal review, surgeon, and information management functions on the regional special staffs, the presence of a Junior ROTC division at region, and the combination of the marketing and operations functions in one division at the regional level. As the command matured, the national headquarters was gradually reconfigured to match the organization of its subordinate regions. A Junior ROTC Division was established at Cadet Command Headquarters in October 1987 and the marketing and operations functions were consolidated in March 1992 into a Marketing, Operations, and Public Affairs Directorate.

The regional commands were subdivided into cadet brigades. Originally, there was a total of 18 brigades (that number subsequently shrank as the Army downsized). On average, a brigade commander supervised 18 cadet battalions and five extension centers and controlled all ROTC activities—to include those of JROTC units and Goldminer recruiting teams—within an area that extended over two middle-sized states. See Figure 3-6. To bring them into closer contact with their charges, most brigade commanders were “forward deployed”—i.e., stationed in the area for which they were responsible instead of at region headquarters as had been the practice in the past. To assist them in carrying out their various responsibilities, which included recruiting, training, and institutional liaison chores, they were given a small staff, which normally consisted of an executive officer and an administrative noncommissioned officer.\textsuperscript{29}

Goldminers played an especially important role within the brigade. See Figure 3-7. One of their principal tasks was to help high school students who had indicated an interest in becoming Army officers get in contact with the nearest college or university hosting an Army ROTC unit. These recruiting teams worked hard to entice into the program the “All-American Freshman”—a well-rounded high school student who not only had a respectable grade point average but also participated in extracurricular activities, played sports, and belonged to service and special interest clubs. By charging the Goldminer Teams to seek out this type of student, Wagner, as he had done as Fourth Region Commander, attempted to draw cadets from the mainstream of univer-
sity life. When Wagner took charge," Colonel William Hausman, a brigade commander in the Fourth Region, explained to a reporter from the Chicago Tribune in a July 1989 interview, "he took as his mission to de-nerdify the ROTC. To get rid of the image of pimply-faced kids with slide rules hanging from their belts."30

The basic building block of the Cadet Command organizational structure was the cadet battalion. A PMS/battalion commander stood at the head of each battalion—the PMS title signifying his responsibilities as an academic department chairman, the battalion commander title his military role. Since the end of the Korean War, the PMS was usually an Active Army colonel or lieutenant colonel assigned to a campus for a three-year period. The Army and the university both had a say in selecting the PMS; the Army nominated him and the university either accepted or rejected him. A staff of five to ten officers and noncommissioned officers assisted the PMS. In addition to

Figure 3-6. State Locations of Brigade Commanders (1986)
“selling” the ROTC program on campus and representing the Army in the local community, the PMS and staff taught and trained cadets and performed the myriad of administrative and logistical chores associated with all military units.31

Wagner realized that an overhaul of the ROTC structure on campus could not by itself revitalize the program. Only by raising the quality of officers assigned to ROTC instructor duty could this happen. The battle to upgrade cadre quality promised to be a difficult one if for no other reason than the precedent for the ROTC being a professional dumping ground for officers had been so firmly established. In the four decades between the end of World War II and the establishment of Cadet Command, military periodical literature abounded with references, both direct and indirect, to this destructive assignment policy.

In an article published in the May 1986 issue of Military Review, Colonel Robert F. Collins, at the time the PMS of Colorado State University in
Pueblo, Colorado, laid the blame for ROTC’s personnel misfortunes on the Army’s senior leaders who had given the ROTC such a low priority. He had spent the last 23 years in the Army, he told his readers, “listening to disparaging remarks about ROTC.” The crux of the problem, as he saw it, was that the “senior Army leadership” did not provide “the necessary emphasis to attract qualified officers to seek ROTC assignments.” The prevailing sentiment in the Army, he claimed, was that an ROTC assignment was “a necessary evil that is to be avoided if one wants to advance one’s career.” ROTC duty, he continued, was not “highly regarded by promotion boards” and “the Army’s best officers” were not “encouraged to seek ROTC jobs.”

In light of the low importance attached to such duty by the Army, it is not surprising that officers banished to ROTC units were often unenthusiastic about their duties. Many, in fact, became transparently apathetic; who could blame them? Even if they did a good job, their chances for advancement would not be significantly improved. An ROTC tour came to be regarded as something of a vacation. One student at the Army War College, writing of ROTC assignments before the advent of Cadet Command, described them as opportunities to get to know your family better, obtain an advanced degree, improve your golf score, and recover from the rigors of the Regular Army.

Something, it was evident, had to be done to raise the overall quality of officers assigned to ROTC duty. A qualitative upgrade of the most critical position in the program—that of the PMS/battalion commander—was the first order of business. Before the advent of Cadet Command, the PMS selection process was, at best, unrefined. The U.S. Army Military Personnel Center in Washington, D.C., nominated officers for PMS positions according to the normal officer assignment procedure. After being identified by the Military Personnel Center as a candidate, the name of the officer, along with the appropriate personnel records, were sent to the institution in need of a PMS. Typically, a review of a nominated officer’s records would then be conducted by a college or university appointment committee. The rejection of a PMS nominee by such a committee, however, was extremely rare.

There were two major flaws in this assignment procedure, at least from the Cadet Command perspective. First, there was no one to represent the interests of the command in the selection process on the military side. Assignment officers, some of whom knew little about the ROTC, often seemed more concerned about filling a vacancy than with ensuring the presence of an
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appropriate role model on campus. Low lieutenant colonel to colonel promotion rates for PMSs bore this out. Second, relatively few of the faculty members or officials who sat on the university-appointed selection committee had a military background or were familiar with officer career paths. In many instances, this left a candidate’s undergraduate and graduate transcripts as the only records that the committee could understand and evaluate.

Cadet Command moved to address the problem by establishing a formal PMS Selection Board. It was to meet biannually and review the files of all officers put forward by their branches to fill these positions. Their performance as Army officers was the primary basis on which nominees were evaluated. Cadet Command could, and regularly did, reject those officers who, although they may have possessed solid academic credentials, had not proven by their service in the Army that they would be suitable role models for cadets.35

An effort was also made to raise the quality of the subordinate officers in each battalion—the Assistant PMS. In this area, too, the ROTC had experienced difficulties in the past. All too frequently, officers arrived on campus with one of two aims. Either they reported with the intention of cutting short their ROTC tour and returning post-haste to the “real” Army where the jobs were more exciting and the promotion opportunities were better, or they came determined to complete a graduate degree. In either case, their focus was not on the task at hand.

The Cadet Command Commander tried to change this by initiating an intense lobbying effort with the Office of the DCSPER and by flatly rejecting substandard performers and inexperienced officers who were nominated for ROTC duty by that office. The ROTC needed, he believed, seasoned officers who had already commanded a company and whose chances for advancement were good. Anything else was unacceptable.36

The results achieved by these efforts were dramatic. Within two years of the command’s establishment, the promotion rate for captains in Cadet Command actually came to exceed the Army average. The promotion rate of field grade officers shot up sharply as well, albeit not as sharply. The key to the success attained by the command rested with its ability to control who was selected for an ROTC assignment.37
At the time of Cadet Command’s establishment, Army ROTC was available to approximately 85 percent of the nation’s collegiate population through its presence on over 400 college and university campuses across the United States. Three different types of legal arrangements governed the relationship between the Army and ROTC-affiliated institutions. A host institution was a four-year college having a contractual agreement with the Secretary of the Army to provide military science instruction through an ROTC battalion stationed on campus. The host was obligated to furnish facilities and administrative support. Extension centers existed at colleges where the officer production potential was high but which, for one reason or another, could not or did not want to enter into a formal contract with the Army. A center functioned as a satellite of a host ROTC battalion. It relied upon its host to provide it with a staff (six to 12 cadre members normally comprised the staff of a host; two to four cadre members the staff of an extension center) and was under the command of the PMS at the host. Cross-enrolled schools agreed to allow their students to register for ROTC courses offered at hosts or extension centers, but entered into no agreement with the Army and undertook no obligations in relation to the ROTC program. Normally, no ROTC instructors or staff members operated on the campuses of cross-enrolled institutions.

According to the doctrinal literature produced by its headquarters, Cadet Command was created to meet three basic needs: first, producing career officers for the Regular Army; second, producing short-service lieutenants for the active forces; and third, providing a pool of trained officers to lead reserve units. From 1986 through 1990, it appears that Cadet Command was generally successful in meeting the officer production quotas set by the Army Staff. In fact, by 1990, there was a glut of second lieutenants in the Individual Ready Reserve, a pool of reserve officers which was managed and administered by the Army Reserve Personnel Center in St. Louis, Missouri. However, the many revisions to the quota during this period not only complicated Cadet Command’s mission, but made a precise assessment of just how well the command did in meeting production requirements very difficult if not impossible.

In order to ensure that no part of a cadet’s precommissioning training experience was neglected, Cadet Command enlarged the word commission to denote a multiplicity of functions and tasks. Six major developmental functions were identified: recruit; select; motivate; train; retain; and commission.

Although the recruiting function had been with the ROTC program from
its inception, Cadet command gave it a very different face. In the past, indifference or antagonism had all too often characterized military-university relations. A siege mentality prevailed at many ROTC units, with the faculty and university administration being viewed as the enemy. Under Wagner, the command tried to make the collegiate environment if not exactly friendly, at least benignly neutral by, as Wagner was so fond of putting it, "entering the heart of the university." ROTC instructors were enjoined to stop hiding in their offices, volunteer for assignments on faculty committees and, in general, become active and contributing members of the university community. Entering the heart of the university also had, as we have already seen, another meaning. It reflected the command’s resolve to target students in the mainstream rather than on the periphery of college life.

Selection was another discrete function identified by Cadet Command staff officers as a vital part of the commissioning process. For decades, critics of the Army ROTC had complained of both the dearth and unevenness of eligibility and retention criteria used to determine who would be allowed to enroll in the program and, once enrolled, who would be allowed to stay. Army ROTC’s failure to address this “selection” problem was a major cause of the traditional unevenness of the ROTC product.

Over the years, various observers had pointed out the need for a single national ROTC headquarters empowered to enforce uniform selection standards throughout the country. The creation of Cadet Command made such a nationwide imposition of selection criteria possible. The new command, however, went beyond instituting uniform standards in the academic, moral, physical, and medical areas—the traditional areas of concern. It took the Leadership Assessment Program (LAP), which evaluated the 16 leadership “dimensions” that the Cadet Command Training Division had identified as essential for success as an Army officer, and incorporated its evaluation of leadership ability into the selection process. To be sure, a weak form of this assessment mechanism had been selectively used since the late 1970s by ROTC detachments to weed out marginal performers; but its uniform, across-the-board application to the officer selection process was a Cadet Command innovation.

The third function singled out as key to the Cadet Command mission was motivation. Sustaining a student’s commitment to the Army and to the ROTC throughout his collegiate career had always been a difficult task. The command addressed the motivation function in two principal ways. First, it got better role models for cadets to emulate. Gone were the days when a


"tired major" could "plug in his life-support system and coast to retirement on a college campus." Second, training, which was itself the fourth discrete function in the commissioning process, was made more rigorous and interesting. Training methods were brought on line with those of the Active Army and cadet training assumed a purposefulness and an intensity it had heretofore lacked.

Retention, the fifth developmental function, was closely bound up with both training and motivation. Cadet Command, it is important to understand, gave retention a very different look relative to the one it wore in the 1970s and early 1980s. In that era, many ROTC detachments (with the Army's sanction) sought to keep students in the ROTC program by demilitarizing it and relaxing requirements. The curriculum was made "flexible," uniform requirements were loosened, haircut policies were liberalized, and the time devoted to military training was kept limited. Unfortunately for the Army, this slackening of standards did not have the desired effect. In fact, some observers suggested that the loosening of training standards and discipline which accompanied demilitarization resulted in many cadets becoming bored and disillusioned with ROTC and leaving the program.

Cadet Command took an opposite tack. Instead of lowering standards, it raised and enforced them; instead of reducing demands on student time, it increased them; and instead of working to demilitarize the program, it deliberately set out to give it an active duty air. Not all students, of course, responded to this approach, but Cadet Command observers believed that it helped retain in the ROTC program the type of individual the Army wanted for its officer corps.

The final function, commissioning, was viewed as an extended educational, training, and nurturing process that subsumed the five other functions. In subsequent years, Cadet Command refined and expanded its functional overview to accommodate a changing environment, but that is a story for later chapters. The next chapter will treat the function most affected by the establishment of Cadet Command—training. The way the command trained and evaluated its cadet charges will be its focus, but cadre orientation and preparation will also be covered in considerable detail. It is important not to minimize this latter facet of the training function since the entire system depended upon its leaders and executors becoming committed apostles and expert practitioners of the command's distinctive training methodology.
CHAPTER IV

CADET TRAINING

One of the most important byproducts of the standardized camp system was a more rational and effective training sequence. The tiered training system with its staggered reporting format was introduced at all Advanced Camps. Consequently, all ROTC cadets now experienced sequential, progressive and identical training.

The seeds of the revolution that Cadet Command was to effect in precommissioning education and training in the mid-1980s were planted in the late 1970s by a committee of officers known as the Officer Training and Education Review Group. In the summer of 1977, the Army Chief of Staff, within whose office the group operated, had entrusted this ad hoc committee with the rather broad task of determining “officer education and training requirements based on Army missions and individual career development needs.” A complete revamping of the extant officer development system was necessary, senior Army leaders agreed, because the Army was not “producing officers with the desired level of military competency.” This was particularly disturbing, they felt, in an age when sophisticated weaponry put leader competency at a premium.1

The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War had initiated a period of introspection within the Army. The conflict had illustrated not only the lethality of new weapons technology but also the effects of technological advances on command and control. The accelerated operational tempo and battlefield dispersion that accompanied the new military calculus demanded more of leaders, especially junior leaders, than ever before. Technical competence was important but not in and of itself sufficient. Even lieutenants now had to possess leadership qualities of the first order and be capable of making
independent decisions and taking independent action in the absence of detailed orders from above.²

When the Chief of Staff convened the study group, the U.S. Army did not have a system capable of producing enough leaders of the desired quality and competency to fulfill the Army’s needs. The Review Group’s mandate encompassed assessing officer professional development at all levels, from precommissioning to senior service college. In the precommissioning education and training arena, the group focused its attention on the most prolific and heterogeneous commissioning source—the ROTC. It clearly did not like what it found. ROTC detachments, the committee felt, spent too much time and energy on recruiting and not enough on training. Moreover, the Army had gone “too far,” in its estimation, in demilitarizing the program, or in the words of the study group, “in making ROTC programs more popular and palatable than proper and professional.”³ The Review Group’s analysis of officer professional development needs along with its conclusions about what should be done to bring officer education and training on line with Army requirements were summarized in a document entitled “Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO).” Two derivatives of the RETO Study were especially significant—the Military Qualification Standards I (precommissioning requirements) and the Leadership Assessment Program. These two initiatives provided the theoretical foundation on which Cadet Command constructed its precommissioning training edifice.

**Military Qualification Standards**

With the RETO Study as its guide, TRADOC at the beginning of FY 1980 started the construction of what would become the Army’s Military Qualification Standards (MQS). The purpose was to establish a baseline of skills and knowledge for all Army officers. Through the MQS system, TRADOC planners hoped to establish an integrated and comprehensive framework for professional development that combined self-study, resident schooling, and on-the-job experience. In its final form, the system had three phases identified as MQS I, II, and III, which laid out the tasks and subjects officers needed to master at each stage of their career.

By 1984, the first phase—MQS I or the precommissioning phase—of the MQS system had been fully articulated. It had three components—military skills, professional knowledge subjects, and professional military education requirements. Military skills were the basic soldiering tasks that every
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lieutenant, regardless of specialty, was supposed to master before attending an Officer Basic Course. When the MQS system was introduced, there were 73 such tasks organized under 11 subject headings, which were: drill and ceremonies; written and oral communications; inspections; operations and tactics; land navigation; first aid; physical fitness; weapons; nuclear, chemical, and biological defense training; army training, and radio and wire communications.4

Professional knowledge subjects were intended to introduce the aspiring officer to the customs and traditions of the military profession and to provide him with a general understanding of the organization, administration, and doctrine of the U.S. Army. This component of MQS I was also divided into 11 subject areas—Airland Battle Doctrine; Combat Service Support; intelligence; command and control; leadership; low intensity conflict; military history; mobility and survivability; soldier support systems; the Total Army Concept; and training.5

The professional military education requirements were introduced to supplement the cadet’s regular academic workload with subjects that would provide the “broader insights” necessary for a cadet’s subsequent development as an officer. Unlike the other two components of the MQS I, professional military education subjects were not intended to prepare cadets to function as second lieutenants; rather, their purpose was to give cadets an educational and theoretical base from which they could grow. Cadets were required to complete a course in each of three categories—written communication skills, human behavior, and military history. They were also encouraged to enroll in courses relating to management and national security studies. If possible, regular academic departments were to teach professional military education requirements. Uniformed instructors could teach them if the university did not offer the appropriate courses. It was left to the discretion of the local PMS to determine which college courses satisfied the various requirements.6

The MQS I contained elements of all three ROTC programs of instruction then in use—the General Military Science (GMS), the Modified GMS, and the Military Science Core (Option C) curricula. It retained the practice of academic substitution, a practice which Lyons and Masland had championed so passionately in the late fifties and early sixties. The new program of instruction was meant to be flexible enough to be adapted to the academic environments of most institutions of higher learning and still meet the military standards set by the Department of the Army. Under MQS I, the PMS could excuse the cadet from completing certain ROTC academic requirements
provided that the cadet in question was otherwise performing satisfactorily.\(^7\)

In general terms, the goals of the Army ROTC were to provide each cadet with a broad educational base; a general appreciation of the history of the U.S. Army; a familiarity with the organizational structure of the Army and the operations of its various components; a strong sense of personal integrity, honor, and individual responsibility; a knowledge of the human dimensions of military organizations and an understanding of basic leadership principles; the ability to communicate effectively, both orally and in writing; and a sufficient knowledge of Army life to ensure a smooth transition from the civilian to the military environment.\(^8\)

At its core, the Army ROTC was a four-year program designed to be pursued concurrently with a baccalaureate degree. Each year of the normal undergraduate experience was supplemented by a corresponding military science (MS) course of instruction, i.e., Freshman = MS I; Sophomore = MS II; Junior = MS III; and Senior = MS IV. A number of options were offered for flexibility, including recognition and credit for previous military related experience and “accelerated” or “compressed” instruction to allow late entry into the ROTC program. Placement credit for the Basic Course (MS I and MS II) could be granted to prior service members who completed enlisted basic entry training and to those students who had completed at least three years of Junior ROTC. Battalions also had the option of offering an on-campus summer compression program, allowing students to complete MS I and MS II as a part of the summer school schedule. In addition, the PMS could permit a student to compress the Basic Course by simultaneous enrollment in MS I and MS II or the Advanced Course by simultaneous enrollment in MS III and MS IV. For those students unable to complete the normal four-year ROTC curriculum, receive placement credit, or take the compression course, there was the two-year curriculum. Successful completion of a six-week Basic Camp at Fort Knox, Kentucky, earned students credit for MS I and MS II, and permitted their enrollment in the Advanced Course (MS III and MS IV).\(^9\)

In the MQS system, performance objectives guided military skills training while terminal learning objectives regulated the teaching of professional knowledge and professional military education subjects. Performance objectives set specified conditions and established performance standards for military tasks. Cadets proved their mastery of the terminal learning objectives through both objective and subjective testing. The minimum classroom contact hours for military skills and professional knowledge subjects were set at 90 hours for the Basic Course and 120 hours for the Advanced Course.
Although great leeway was allowed in scheduling military science subjects, no subjects could be transferred between the Basic Course and the Advanced Course. To assist ROTC instructors, TRADOC's U.S. Army Training Support Center, working closely with branch schools and other TRADOC agencies, prepared and distributed lesson plans called training support packages for each military skill and professional knowledge subject listed in MQS I.\textsuperscript{10}

**The Leadership Assessment Program**

The evolution of the Leadership Assessment Program (LAP), the second derivative of the RETO report, began in November 1979 when the TRADOC DCSROTC, assisted by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences and Development Dimensions International, took up the task of devising a performance-based assessment process for all three Army commissioning sources. The idea of screening cadets for leadership potential through the use of behavioral simulation exercises was new to the ROTC program. If it was new to the ROTC, there was some precedent for it in other government agencies, however. During World War II, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) used an assessment methodology involving rigorous physical and mental testing to choose the best candidates for intelligence agents. In the 1960s, various government agencies and private companies followed the lead of the OSS by developing assessment instruments of their own to assist in selection and promotion decisions. The Army experimented with personnel assessment in a pilot project conducted at Fort Benning near the end of the Vietnam War. It had been the favorable reports of the Infantry School instructors participating in this project that persuaded the RETO Study Group to recommend such an assessment system for precommissioning education and training programs.\textsuperscript{11}

The DCSROTC/Army Research Institute Study of 1979-1980 produced the LAP. As originally designed, the LAP was a process for evaluating the leadership behavior of prospective MS III cadets through the use of 12 “dimensions of leadership.” Seven draft revisions and three field tests were necessary before the LAP Assessor Training Guide and the LAP Assessor Workbook, the materials that instructed ROTC cadre members how to conduct the LAP, were ready for distribution.

This leadership assessment process underwent a final field testing in the fall of 1980 at nine universities hosting ROTC—Fordham University, New York; The Citadel, South Carolina; Central State University, Ohio; Texas A&M
University, Texas; University of Notre Dame, Indiana; Westminster College, Missouri; Kansas State University, Kansas; University of Washington, Washington; and Creighton University, Nebraska. Headquarters TRADOC arranged for the training of the ROTC cadre in the LAP methodology and evaluation techniques at the TRADOC Orientation and Enrollment Program (TROEP) located at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.

It was not long, however, before officials and instructors at TROEP began to question the feasibility of administering the LAP to all prospective MS III cadets. The LAP and the various tasks it entailed were simply too expensive in terms of both personnel and money, they felt, to be applied so widely. As a result, the DCSROTC in 1983 limited LAP testing to summer compression program graduates, certain advanced placement candidates, and substandard performers at Basic or Advanced Camp. Cadets with prior military service, Junior ROTC advanced placement candidates, and certain four-year “progression” cadets were exempted.

The Leadership Assessment Program was administered in a series of four behavioral simulations—In-Basket; Scheduling; Counseling; and Assign-Role Leaderless Group Discussion. Normally, a team of two or three cadre members assessed six cadets. The cadre collected, recorded, and evaluated each participant’s behavior observed in the simulations. After all four LAP exercises were completed and the assessors compared behavior evaluations, a feedback session lasting 30 to 60 minutes was conducted for each cadet by one of the assessors.

A cadet’s leadership potential was gauged according to the 12 dimensions of leadership mentioned earlier. A leadership dimension was one of many skills or abilities identified by a survey of active duty Army captains conducted by the U.S. Army Center for Army Leadership as important for effective performance as a second lieutenant. They included: oral communication; oral presentation; written communication; initiative; sensitivity; influence; planning and organizing; delegation; administrative control; problem analysis; judgment; and decisiveness. The cadre used these performance indicators to produce a leadership profile for each cadet evaluated. This profile was intended to help ROTC cadre members determine the participant’s potential for commissioned service. Although the LAP could serve as a basis for developing the leadership potential of cadets, it was primarily used in the years before the establishment of Cadet Command as a screening tool for admission into the Advanced Course.13

At the time of Cadet Command’s activation in the spring of 1986, both
the MQS I and the LAP were available—at least as theoretical constructs. The problem was, as the preceding paragraphs have perhaps intimated, that the application of these programs was uneven and, in many cases, faulty; this was especially true with the LAP. Much of this was due to the decentralized structure of the Army ROTC. No two regions and no two detachments administered these programs or used their results in the same way. The uniformity and standardization that the MQS and the LAP were supposed to introduce remained unrealized goals.

**The Cadet Training Arch**

Upon assuming command of Cadet Command, Major General Wagner began the task of standardizing and streamlining cadet training using the MQS and the LAP as methodological plumblines. A restructuring of the ROTC Advanced Camp system took top billing on his training reform agenda. He gave the mission of effecting this restructuring to Colonel Robert S. Cox, an officer with an extensive training background who Wagner had sought out to be his training director. Cox arrived at Fort Monroe in June 1986 and, almost before he had a chance to unpack, was sent on a whirlwind fact-finding tour which included visits to all four summer camps. The purpose of this trip was to determine precisely where the command’s system of summer training stood and what was necessary to bring all camps in line with the Fourth Region model.

After his return to Fort Monroe in August, Colonel Cox started a process designed to bring about the uniformity in camp conduct demanded by Wagner. Through a series of conferences and other coordination mechanisms, the regions were included in this process. The metaphor that Cox liked to apply to this standardization and reorientation effort was that of constructing a “training arch” through which all cadets had to pass on the way to commissioning. Heretofore, the heterogeneous ROTC training system had allowed for multiple and often diverging paths toward a commission in the Army. The implementation of the training arch idea would mean that there would be a convergence of these paths at Advanced Camp and, therefore, an evenness of product quality.

In April 1987, Major General Wagner made the first of a series of visits to see how or if regions were making the requisite adjustments to their summer programs. During these visits, he observed many classes, walked virtually every committee station, and spent many hours talking with cadets and
cadre members. Expecting to see replications of Camp Adventure, he was patently disappointed by what he found. Each camp had adopted the "tiered approach" and the regimental affiliation program, and used the same terminology, but the spirit of the new training guidance was absent. Intensity, rigor, and a uniformity of execution were missing.

In an attempt to turn things around, he formed an evaluation team composed of field grade officers from each region under Colonel Kenneth "Barky" Norman, a brigade commander in the Fourth Region and one of the original Camp Adventure architects. The team traveled between camps during the summer giving advice and assistance to camp administrators. When the camps closed at the beginning of August, however, the process of remaking them was still not as far along as Wagner would have liked.

Cadet Command held its first post-camp conference in September 1987. All regions were represented at this gathering. A comprehensive review of the entire summer training program uncovered the reasons why things had not gone as planned. The opinions and proposals of Colonel Norman’s evaluation team provided the catalyst for discussion. Through the exchange of ideas and views that followed, a plan was developed for effecting the necessary adjustments in camp operations the following summer.16

Out of this conference emerged a standardized planning cycle—a planning methodology that has been used by Cadet Command ever since. The cycle began in September, the month after the close of camps, with a Camps After Action Review Conference. At this conference, participants reviewed the problems of the previous camp and developed plans for remedying them. The results were summarized in an executive summary. Cadet Command then took this executive summary, combined it with other information, and published a Camps After Action Review Report, which contained guidance to the regions for the next year’s camp. The regions, in turn, held their own pre-camp conferences during the fall or winter to coordinate summer training preparation at their level. In the spring, Wagner conducted a program review and inspection at each camp to ensure his intent had been realized.

The Camps Evaluation Team served as the "directed telescope" of the Cadet Command Commander. For the camps of 1988 and 1989, Colonel Cox and Lieutenant Colonel Jimmie Hataway headed the team. They were assisted by one experienced lieutenant colonel from each region. The team assembled before the opening of summer camp at Cadet Command Headquarters, where the members were briefed on the commander’s vision for camp operations. Evaluation visits lasted up to a week at each camp, allowing
team members ample time to observe training and uncover things missed at the program review. Camp operations could be staged for a short visit by a general officer; they could not be staged for the extended visit of the team.

As the deputy team chief, Lieutenant Colonel Hataway played a principal role in codifying the summer training process. Using the Fourth Region model and the experiences of the Evaluation Team, he produced an *Advanced Camp How-To-Fight Manual*. The manual outlined in great detail how regions should conduct summer training and specified the training order. Successive editions of the manual helped institutionalize the command’s training methodology and capped the efforts toward standardization—efforts which were rewarded in the camps of 1988.17

One of the most important byproducts of the standardized camp system was a more rational and effective training sequence. The tiered training system with its staggered reporting format was introduced at all Advanced Camps. Consequently, all ROTC cadets now experienced sequential, progressive and identical training. The staggered format resulted in a 20-day extension of camp operations (although Advanced Camp for the individual cadet still lasted for only six weeks). The added time largely explained why such a logical and obvious step had not been taken before. ROTC cadre and program managers had for decades complained about a summer camp program that taught platoon operations before weapons employment but were prevented from doing anything about it because of a lack of time and money.

The five-phase, six-week, summer training program started with the most fundamental instruction and progressed through successively more complex training. Each phase (called an operation) was given a distinctive title, i.e., Trailblazer (general military subjects), Gunsmoke (weapons training), Audie Murphy (small unit tactics), Green Thunder (weapons demonstration), Kit Carson (small unit patrolling), and Challenge (capstone exercise). During Operation Trailblazer, the prospective lieutenant was expected to master the basic skills of soldiering. Upon completing this phase, the cadet was supposed to be able to analyze terrain and navigate using a map and compass, to identify types of obstacles and the methods for their proper employment on the battlefield, to respond properly to a chemical attack, to operate company-level radio and wire communications equipment, and to complete a 25-meter swim in battle dress uniform with boots. A leader’s reaction course was incorporated into this training phase to test cadet leadership abilities under stressful situations.

Weapons training was conducted during the next segment designated
Operation Gunsmoke. This second phase of training focused on the correct battlefield employment of hand grenades, fire support systems, the M-60 machine gun, anti-armor weapons, the M-16 rifle, and armor. The fire support portion of the training, in which cadets practiced the fundamentals of indirect artillery fire planning, and the anti-armor portion, in which they assembled, fired, and disarmed the LAW, Dragon, and TOW anti-tank weapons, were, perhaps, the most challenging parts of this phase.

The RECONDO training exercise followed the completion of Gunsmoke. This event included a 60-foot rappel, a one- and three-rope bridge crossing, a 30-foot rope drop into water, and a 200-foot “slide-for-life” into water. Cadets who successfully completed this exercise (approximately 50 percent) received the RECONDO Tab to wear on their uniforms. RECONDO training tested a cadet’s composure under stress and gave the cadre a unique assessment opportunity.

The 108 hours of tactical exercises included in Operations Audie Murphy and Kit Carson provided an ideal forum for teaching and evaluating leadership. Under conditions similar to those encountered in combat, the cadre could gauge the leadership potential of each cadet as he served in leadership positions. The Squad Tactical Reaction and Assessment Course, included in Operation Kit Carson, reinforced all previous tactical training.

Operation Green Thunder build on Audie Murphy and Kit Carson by exposing the cadet to the complex operations and the firepower of a combined arms (company) team. Through observation of a simulated mechanized battle and separate live-fire demonstrations, cadets obtained a first-hand look at the lethality and precision of weapons on the modern battlefield. They also gained an appreciation of the different elements assigned to the combined arms team and how these elements interacted when conducting an assault on an enemy position. The assault normally included a parachute inserted reconnaissance team, a landing zone reconnaissance team inserted by helicopter rappel, a platoon helicopter air assault, a sling load insertion of tactical vehicles, and a tank heavy company team attack supported by helicopter gunships. Green Thunder had the additional aim of encouraging cadets to pursue one of the combat arms as their branch of commission.

Operation Challenge was the capstone exercise of Advanced Camp. The designation of this segment was preceded by the region nickname to add a sense of local color to the event (First Region — “All American Challenge;” Third Region—”Warrior Challenge”; and Fourth Region - “Adventure Challenge”). The operation itself consisted of a platoon field training exercise
lasting four days and three nights and unfolded in four overlapping phases—
preparation; offense/defense; patrolling (raid); and company fighting march.
After each phase of the exercise, controllers critiqued the cadets. As the exer-
cise progressed, the cadets were subjected to increasing levels of physical and
mental stress, caused by a depleted water supply, long movements on foot,
lack of sleep, bugs, rain, and other field nuisances. See Figure 4-1.

The graduation ceremony at the end of Advanced Camp was meant to
symbolize the passing of the officer candidate through the “cadet training arch”
and the completion of what was considered to be the single most important
event on the road to commissioning. It was especially important to such
“an incredibly far-flung organization” like Cadet Command to have such
an instrument available, Wagner believed; for not only would it help en-
sure product quality, it would also develop esprit and instill a sense of
solidarity in and among the cadets who made up the ROTC program—
qualities that the widely scattered and organizationally diffuse ROTC pro-
gram had never previously possessed.

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Figure 4-1. Training Advanced Camp (1987)
U.S. ARMY CADET COMMAND: THE 10 YEAR HISTORY

To help prospective officers pass through the "cadet training arch," Cadet Command produced the Cadet Leaders How-To-Fight Manual in 1988. It was issued to each cadet prior to the start of Advanced Camp. The manual provided the procedural steps for accomplishing each task that the cadet was expected to master. Critical task outlines allowed the cadet to conduct a self-evaluation before each day's instruction. By careful self-testing, a cadet could identify weak areas and seek assistance before the official evaluation process began.

Basic Camp

Basic Camp, the other part of the ROTC summer training program, was also subjected to drastic revision and rearrangement by Cadet Command. Major James Sutherland, a member of the command's Training Directorate, headed this effort to remake Camp Challenge (the operational name given to Basic Camp) in the image of Camp Adventure. After soliciting and collecting input from the regional headquarters, Sutherland put together a proposal to accomplish the restructuring. It was ready in final form by February 1987.

The restructuring of Basic Camp involved two fundamental alterations to the traditional program. One was an expansion of the mission. In addition to teaching basic military skills and qualifying students for enrollment in the ROTC Advanced Course (missions that Basic Camp had had since its inception in 1964), Basic Camp was now charged with the responsibility of evaluating their leadership potential. The second alteration was the adoption of a progressive and sequential approach to training, similar to the approach used at the three Advanced Camps. The phases (also called operations) of Camp Challenge were designated Pathfinder (general military subjects), Gunfighter (weapons training), True Grit (adventure training), Future Challenge (branch orientation), and Bold Challenge (squad tactics). Since about one-fifth of the cadets commissioned each year were graduates of Camp Challenge, the revisions to the program and training regimen introduced by Major Sutherland and his associates were destined to have far-reaching consequences.

Operation Pathfinder familiarized the cadet with all the first-level general military subjects required for successful participation in the squad tactical training. It included communications; first aid; individual tactical training; an infiltration course (conducted first in daylight and then at night to the sounds of exploding munitions and machine gun fire); land navigation; nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare; and troop leading procedures.
The next phase of training, Operation Gunfighter, taught basic weapons skills. During Gunfighter, cadets learned to fire the M-16 rifle, the M-60 machine gun, the M-203 grenade launcher, and sight and detonate the M-18A1 claymore mine. They also acquired a basic knowledge of how these weapons were to be employed on the battlefield. The adventure training phase, Operation True Grit, was normally conducted during the first two weeks of camp. It included swimming, rappelling, stream crossings with one-rope, two-rope, and three-rope bridges, the negotiation of obstacle and confidence courses, and short classes in the principles of military leadership. Operation Future Challenge was held just prior to squad tactical training and taught cadets about the operation and composition of the combined arms team.

Operation Bold Challenge, Basic Camp’s capstone exercise, served as the vehicle for evaluating both cadet leadership ability and competency in military skills. It consisted of four phases: squad offensive tactics; squad defense tactics; a field leader’s reaction course (which tested the leadership abilities of cadets by requiring them to solve various problems in a field environment); and patrolling.

Camp Challenge also attempted to instill an esprit de corps in cadets and acquaint them with the customs and traditions of the Army. To promote these ends, it hosted its own guidon presentations and graduation ceremonies to activate and deactivate the cadet regiments and issue awards to those cadets who excelled at camp. Like Advanced Camp regiments, Camp Challenge cadet battalions were affiliated with an Active Army regiment (46th Armored Infantry Regiment) and became part of that regiment.

**Administrative Reform of Camps**

When Major General Wagner took over Cadet Command, he found major problems not only in the conduct of camps but in their administration as well. Glaring disparities in the amount of resources and the number of personnel that it was taking to run the various summer programs raised questions about the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of camp operations and undermined the process of standardization that the command was so vigorously promoting. Concerns about cost-effectiveness weighed heavily on the command because introduction of the tiered training concept had extended the period of camp operations and increased camp costs.

In an effort to level camp expenses and promote administrative and fiscal efficiency, Cadet Command Headquarters initiated a detailed review and
reconsideration of how it and its subordinate region headquarters went about allocating personnel and resources to the camps. During School Year 1986-1987, a series of meetings were held at which region representatives met with their Cadet Command counterparts to resolve resource and personnel allocation issues. Between meetings, Cadet Command staff officers kept in close contact with the four region headquarters to avert potential problems. In addition, the Evaluation Team visited the camp sites and gave its assessment of and perspective on what should be done to obviate inter-camp resource and personnel disparities.

These efforts culminated in the publication of a Camps Staffing Model during School Year 1987-1988. In this model, standard requisitions for ammunition, equipment, manpower, and other materials necessary to conduct summer training were prescribed. By the summer of 1988, the desired leveling effect had been achieved.

The new model helped resolve a personnel utilization and distribution issue that had plagued Advanced Camp operations for some time. The issue had to do with the fact that, due to the heavy emphasis at summer camp on tactical training and the employment of various weapons, combat arms officers and noncommissioned officers were always in great demand. Unfortunately, there had been a perennial shortage of this type of leader assigned to ROTC duty. Every summer, camp commanders battled each other to get their fair share of these people. Because there was no mechanism to ensure an equitable distribution of these personnel among the camps, some Advanced Camps suffered. The staffing model helped change this by providing a device by which the distribution of combat arms officers could be regulated. Even with the model, the balancing of combat arms personnel among the camps was still a source of inter-regional tensions. Although the bickering continued, the gross personnel allocation discrepancies of the past were largely eliminated.

A New Intensity

The standardization of training and the administrative reform of the camp system were not the only significant steps taken to improve ROTC summer training. Cadet Command's injection of rigor and an Active Army intensity into Advanced Camp also had a profound impact. In order to understand why this was so, it might be useful to comment briefly on the nature and conduct of ROTC summer training prior to the establishment of Cadet Command.
Since its inception, ROTC had been generally regarded as the easy way to get a commission. Its charges faced no rites of passage similar to those encountered by officer aspirants at West Point or in the OCS system. Reports of ROTC summer encampments in the 1920s told of cadets being received by coeds from local colleges and of the many social activities available during the evenings and on weekends. Things tightened up over the ensuing decades, but even in the first half of the 1980s, ROTC Advanced Camp was little more than a kind of watered down basic training. Cadets basically had a 40-hour training week with weekends off. The mood at the camp among the cadets and cadre was relaxed. Success at Advanced Camp involved becoming adept at certain basic military skills (like map reading, first aid, marksmanship, etc.). The lecture-demonstration form of instruction prevailed over hands-on participation. Leadership ability and the capacity to function under pressure were not qualities systematically evaluated in summer training.

Wagner began his effort to transform the ROTC into an organization with an Active Army ethos and outlook at Advanced Camp. Free weekends were among the first features of the old system to go. The informal and relaxed instructional style followed soon thereafter. In Wagner’s system of summer training, cadets were allowed to make mistakes, cadre were not. He insisted that all training and instruction be thoroughly rehearsed, presented with precision and crispness, and conducted to standard. The example set by the instructor, in this system, was considered every bit as important as the content of instruction. Stories of cadre members being “Duelerized” (a term used by cadre members to describe a dressing down by Wagner) for failing to measure up to the new instructional standards spread throughout the four regions. Undoubtedly, the degree of Wagner’s ferocity was exaggerated in the telling. Nevertheless, these stories did convey a sense of the new spirit that was animating the ROTC program.

Cadets also felt the pressure. The taking away of their discretionary time certainly added to their strain. It was the shift in the focus of Advanced Camp from the teaching of military skills to leadership evaluation, however, that really ratcheted up cadet stress levels. Under the new system, the Leadership Assessment Program occupied a preeminent position. Cadets were evaluated on the basis of the LAP’s 16 leadership dimensions (Cadet Command had expanded the original 12 dimensions to 16) in every leadership role to which they were assigned, the average cadet receiving between five and seven leadership positions over the course of the summer. This had the effect of putting cadets under a kind of leadership microscope through which their actions and
behavior were thoroughly and systematically assessed. The new way of gauging officer potential was an abrupt departure from the old with its narrow focus on technical competence and mission accomplishment and its extremely subjective evaluation instruments.

At the end of camp, performance appraisals were reviewed and a platoon order of merit list developed. A cadet’s rank in this list depended upon demonstrated leadership ability, not adeptness at basic military skills. The top 10 percent of this list received the highest score of 5; the next 20 percent were given 4s; most of the remaining 70 percent got 3s—unless they failed camp, in which case they received either a 2 or a 1.

Moreover, under Cadet Command, the Advanced Camp score became a critical factor in determining who would be assigned to active duty and who would not. As a rule, cadets who got a 4 or 5 at camp could be assured of active duty; the prospects for a cadet who got a 3, on the other hand, were problematic. Cadets with aspirations for a career in the military often became teary-eyed when their platoon tactical officer informed them at the end of camp that they had received a 3 rating.

The resultant pressure to excel placed great stress and demands on cadets. This pressure, however, was not of the artificial or concocted variety that one associates with basic training, Marine Corps boot camp, or freshman year at a military college. Hazing and other forms of abuse were not permitted because they were not necessary. The stress at Advanced Camp was inherent in the training and evaluation process, not externally induced.

The Cadet On-Campus Training Program

The standardization of summer training led inevitably to the standardization of on-campus instruction. Before the advent of Cadet Command, as Colonel Cox had discovered to his dismay on his initial fact-finding tour in the summer of 1986, PMSs conducted training and gave instruction pretty much as they pleased. No two battalions prepared their cadets for commissioning or for summer training in exactly the same manner. Newcomers to the ROTC expressed astonishment at the “wide variety of programs which vary so greatly in scope, content and activity.” PMSs had MQS I but no guide for its uniform application.

Disturbed by this lack of standardization, Wagner directed Cox to restructure the on-campus program along the same lines as he had remade the ROTC system of summer training. Taking the procedural manuals developed
CADET TRAINING

for the Basic and Advanced Camps as his models, Cox produced a "campaign plan" for on-campus use. Through the campaign plan, the training director hoped to bring a high degree of uniformity to on-campus MQS I training and instruction. But uniformity was not his sole concern. He also wanted the plan to be acceptable to the many types of institutions that hosted ROTC units and to be so framed so as not to restrict the freedom of action of the battalion commander. Reconciling these in many respects conflicting goals, he realized, would not be an easy task.

Cox began by circulating a prototype of his campaign plan in the form of a command letter. The letter, which was sent out just before the beginning of camp, called for the field-testing of the new program during School Year 1986-1987. In reality, the decision to institute the program had already been made; the real purpose of the so-called field-test was to correct flaws in the plan's implementation. As anticipated, the feedback that soon began to trickle in from the field was not overwhelmingly positive. Many battalion commanders recoiled from the limitations that the plan imposed on their traditional freedom of action.

Cadet Command staff officers, however, brushed aside all such objections. In fact, they even devised new mechanisms to guarantee strict compliance with the campaign plan's provisions. A structured review process, a more intensive command visitation program, and a revised command briefing format were all designed to keep close tabs on how the plan was being implemented at battalion level. To recognize its centrality to the on-campus training program, the campaign plan was made a command regulation in July 1987.

Linking the camp performance of its cadets to the evaluation of the quality of a battalion's on-campus training program was another way that Cadet Command promoted standardization and at the same time increased the tempo and intensity of training during the academic year. The system of Training Management Indicators (TMI) was introduced in the fall of 1986 to establish this linkage. With the TMI, Cadet Command Headquarters could gauge the comparative performance of battalions at Advanced Camp and, hence, the relative quality of their on-campus training program by assigning each a composite score, which equated to the average rating of its cadets at Advanced Camp. Categories of green, amber, and red served as general indictors of a battalion's training condition. The PMS whose battalion was green could rest easy; the PMS with a red rating definitely had cause for concern. Through the introduction of the TMI system, intense pressure was brought to bear on the PMS
to bring his battalion on-line with the provisions of the training regulation, and another step taken to eliminate the localism that had pervaded the ROTC throughout the first seven decades of its existence.  

Field training exercises also became a much more important part of the ROTC training regimen with Wagner and Cox at the helm. In the 1960s and 1970s, field exercises in many detachments resembled mini-Boy Scout Jamborees more than they did Active Army training exercises. The pace of the exercises was slow, the mood was lethargic, and the emphasis was on the acquisition of basic military skills. Few detachments went to the field more than one weekend a semester. Even with the limited demands the ROTC program placed on the cadet during this era, there were critics, it is interesting to note, both within ROTC and without, who complained that ROTC took up too much of the cadet's time and detracted too much from the cadet's academic pursuits.

Cadet Command introduced a field training regimen of an intensity and rigor unprecedented in the history of ROTC. Although the PMS was required by regulation to conduct only one field exercise a semester, pressures to prepare cadets for Advanced Camp (especially since the advent of TMI) virtually mandated that supplemental field training sessions be held. Soon, ROTC cadre added “mini-camps” lasting from three to six days (and sometimes longer) to the schedule in an attempt to ensure that their cadets reported to camp with every possible advantage. At these mini-camps, which were usually conducted near the end of the spring semester, the atmosphere as well as the events of Advanced Camp were replicated for the purpose of preparing cadets psychologically for the test they were about to face. All this meant that ROTC cadets now received from one to two weeks of field training each academic semester. Critics who scored the ROTC for taking too much time now had, what appeared to be at least, a valid basis for their complaints.

To increase the pace and intensity of on-campus training even further, the Cadet Command Commander extended the Ranger Challenge program throughout the entire command. Participation in the program was limited, in most cases, to those cadets who sought a more demanding training experience than was otherwise available. Under Wagner, it also came to be almost a prerequisite for obtaining a Regular Army commission in one of the combat arms.

Under the Ranger Challenge program's provisions, each battalion formed a team. These teams practiced a number of team-oriented military events—rifle marksmanship, rope-bridge construction, a 10-mile road march,
Ranger Challenge
Training at Historically Black Colleges and Universities

The adoption of the TMI system served to uncover some problem areas that had heretofore escaped the notice of ROTC program administrators. One of those problem areas involved ROTC battalions at Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU). The TMI showed that the performance level of HBCU cadets at Advanced Camp fell below the Cadet Command mean. This was very worrisome to the command because HBCUs produced approximately half of the African-American officers for the Army.

To correct HBCU training shortfalls, Cadet Command proceeded along several distinct but parallel lines. In September 1986, it convened the first HBCU Camps Conference immediately following the conclusion of the Camps After Action Review. The conference allowed Wagner to assemble together the PMSs of the 21 HBCU ROTC units at one location (Fort Monroe), present them with the generally disappointing results attained by their cadets at Advanced Camp, and solicit their assistance in finding ways to remedy this situation.

At this September gathering, the Cadet Command staff and PMSs looked at how the training methods and approaches of successful HBCU battalions differed from the others. The intent of this exercise was to boost the performance level of the sub-par battalions by having them imitate the ways of their successful associates. From this effort came a common training strategy for all HBCUs. This strategy was not universally popular because of the new and heavy demands it placed on battalion commanders, but it did achieve the desired results in short order. The performance ratings of HBCU cadets at the 1987 Advanced Camps registered the improvement.

The principal architect of the HBCU Camps Conference was Lieutenant Colonel Leonard M. Jones, Jr., himself a product of an HBCU and the former PMS of Hampton University. Jones was also instrumental in transforming another HBCU-ROTC conference—the annual HBCU Conference—into a
more productive event. This conference had originated in 1971 (it was then called the ROTC Minority Recruiting Conference) as a forum to promote closer ties between Army ROTC and HBCUs. Over the years, however, the conference lost its sense of direction and purpose. By the mid-1980s, it operated without a charter; its annual gathering did not even have an agenda.

Wagner wanted things done differently and, at the March 1986 HBCU Conference at Alabama A&M University, told the assembled HBCU officials the new direction he purposed to take. In communicating his vision, he outlined for them some of the problems their cadets were having at Advanced Camp as well as the difficulties HBCU commissionees were having at their Officer Basic Courses. Informally, Major General Wagner also called the HBCU PMSs aside at the conference and reminded them in rather blunt terms that they (i.e., the PMSs) were members of Cadet Command and that he expected them to carry out loyally and enthusiastically the policies and programs adopted by the command. Such a step was necessary, Wagner thought, because of their attitude and comments during the conference, which had not always borne witness to a whole-hearted acceptance of the new Cadet Command ways of approaching precommissioning training. Some of the friction between the new commander and the PMSs, no doubt, was due to methodological differences, but some was also related to the increased workload and stress that came with the new order. Rejoining the Active Army was a painful experience for some of these officers—especially those that had become ensconced in their positions in the pre-Cadet Command era and were accustomed to the old ways.

When he arrived back at Fort Monroe, Wagner gave the task of remaking the conference into something that could further the goals of the command to Lieutenant Colonel Jones. Over the course of the next year, Jones worked out a plan to accomplish this end. To facilitate the plan’s implementation, he invited both HBCU presidents and PMSs to the annual meetings. This occurred for the first time in 1987 and had the effect of more closely integrating ROTC instruction into the academic curriculum. In addition, he formed an HBCU Task Force to keep attention focused on the HBCUs in the intervals between meetings.

Enhancing the academic skills of minority cadets, especially in reading, writing, and mathematics became a prime component of Cadet Command’s effort to upgrade precommissioning education and training at HBCUs. The relatively high failure rate of ROTC graduates at the various branch Officer Basic Courses was due in large measure, surveys indicated, to substandard
competency levels in these basic skills. The Army's recognition of the existence of this problem predated the establishment of Cadet Command. In March 1984, attendees at the HBCU Annual Conference agreed that something should be done to raise the math and reading skills of HBCU cadets. Almost a year later, (February 1985), after discussions with numerous HBCU officials and educators, the DCSROTC circulated a proposal that he called Enhanced Skills Training: ROTC Cadet Skills Development Program. It took the DCSROTC another year to come up with several alternative approaches for the actual conduct of the program.

Upon assuming command in March 1986 (shortly after he returned from the HBCU Annual Conference at Alabama A&M University), Wagner chose one of the DCSROTC's alternatives. The alternative selected rested on the premise that Cadet Command had neither the expertise nor the manpower to carry out this venture on its own; it needed the cooperation and material support of the HBCUs. However, the command did agree to contribute $3 million for the establishment and operation of an Enhanced Skills Training Program at each HBCU hosting an ROTC unit.

In the final arrangement worked out between the two parties, Cadet Command was given the responsibility of prescribing the standards to be attained and monitoring the proficiency testing; the schools were to provide the instructors for and actually conduct the program. Under the provisions of the Enhanced Skills Training agreement, each HBCU was to administer a diagnostic test to all of its cadets in three areas—reading, writing, and mathematics—and place those failing to meet the standards in a remedial program designed to enhance basic skills. A cadet was to enroll only in those programs in which he had scored below the acceptable standards.

Cadet Command also made a concerted effort to improve the communicative skills of Hispanic cadets in Puerto Rico. This was important, it was believed, because Puerto Rican institutions of high learning produced the majority of the Army's bilingual Hispanic officers. The command approached this task by taking the floundering English-as-a-Second Language program, which had run into trouble because of a lack of instructors and money, and attempting to revitalize it.

Language specialists from the Defense Language Institute's English Language Center were brought in to replace instructors from the University of Puerto Rico. At the same time, the instructional staff was increased from three to 10. The revised program offered an informal English language workshop at no cost to the cadet during the academic year and two consecutive
five-week intensive language training courses during the summer. All language training followed the American Language Course of Instruction, and the institute's staff used the English Comprehension Level test to assess progress.

Officer Basic Course results testified to the success achieved by the HBCU and Puerto Rican initiatives. After 1987, the minority Officer Basic Course failure rate was low, less than one percent, in fact. The key to the Cadet Command success lay in the early diagnosis of basic skill problems. Once a general diagnostic system was in place, the rest followed naturally. An even fuller test of the efficacy of the skill enhancement project and the English-as-a-Second-Language program would come in the late 1990s when Cadet Command's products would begin to enter the field grade ranks.

The Leader Development Study

Shortly after its establishment, Cadet Command also became involved in promoting an officer professional development project of a different sort. In August 1986, the TRADOC Commander, General Carl E. Vuono, chartered a special study group and appointed Brigadier General Gordon R. Sullivan, the Assistant Commandant, Army Command and General Staff College, as its chief. Its mandate was to formulate a leader development strategy for guiding the TRADOC officer education system into the next century. The group was to put particular emphasis on the education and development of junior officers. To help Sullivan shape his strategy, school commandants were told to review their curricula to determine their effectiveness in instilling desired leadership traits in officers, while Cadet Command was tasked to evaluate the linkage between MQS I and MQS II training. The special study group began work on what was to become the Leader Development Study after the strategic plan prepared by Sullivan and his assistants had been completed.21

The Cadet Command Commander wanted to use the forum provided by this study to change the focus of leadership development both within the ROTC and the Army. In the officer education system then in existence, he believed that there was too much theoretical classroom instruction and not enough hands-on training in the field. Wagner took it as his mission to steer the discussion of officer professional development along more practical lines. To further this end, he put forward the Leadership Assessment Program as a model which should be used in all phases of officer development.

To make the program truly useful in the expanded role envisaged for it, it
had to be modified. The Cadet Command Training Division was tasked to revise it in such a way as to make it applicable to all levels of the Military Qualifications Standards system and make it suitable as an evaluation device for field training. Accordingly, the Training Division effected several modifications to the LAP, the primary one involving an increase in the number of leadership dimensions. Instead of 12, the new model contained 16 dimensions. The added dimensions were: physical stamina; technical/tactical competence; mission accomplishment; and followership.

Lieutenant Colonel Frank Audrain, PMS at the University of Nevada-Reno, represented Cadet Command in the special study group. Audrain argued for the use of LAP technology throughout the Army officer education system. Cadet Command got the opening it needed to publicize the LAP when in July 1987, General Maxwell Thurman tasked it to conduct a longitudinal study to chart the leadership progress of cadets from precommissioning to their first unit of assignment. The resultant Gold Bar Transition Program—through which the longitudinal study was accomplished—required Cadet Command to examine all Officer Basic Course operations to determine how leader development was approached after commissioning.

Accordingly, Command representatives visited each basic course to observe the methods of instruction, the mechanics of evaluation, the relationship between leadership development and task mastery, the transition from MQS I to MQS II, the methods for leadership assessment during field training, and the sequence of instruction. The Cadet Command evaluation team found, like other evaluation teams that had looked at the Officer Basic Course system over the last three decades, that the system lacked a systematic approach to the development of leadership skills in lieutenants. There was no standardized approach to the measurement of leadership potential. In fact, none of the schools even had a method of gauging leadership ability.

Cadet Command had a solution at the ready—the Leadership Assessment Program. General Thurman agreed and, in June 1988, directed that the LAP technology be integrated into all officer, warrant officer, and noncommissioned officer leader development courses. Cadet Command was charged with the responsibility of training TRADOC LAP assessors, assisting the Officer Basic Courses with introducing the LAP in their curricula, and coordinating final program design with the Center for Army Leadership. Even a number of National Guard OCS programs (the South Carolina program being perhaps the most notable) and the Military Academy introduced a version of LAP in their summer training program. Heretofore, they had been without a
device to systematically evaluate leadership development.

The results attained did not completely satisfy Cadet Command's Commander. He would have liked to see the LAP accepted on an even wider scale—in line units as well as throughout the entire school system. But there could be no denying that the introduction of LAP in ROTC, at the Military Academy and in the Officer Basic Course system gave a uniformity and coherence to MQS I and MQS II that they had previously lacked.

The School of Cadet Command

Attaining standardization in the ROTC program, Major General Wagner realized, required that a single center be established for the indoctrination and training of all Cadet Command cadre members. Only in this way could the command's philosophy along with its standards, policies, and procedures be firmly implanted in and uniformly spread throughout the command. To create this center, he wanted to take the extant ROTC School, which at the time of Cadet Command's founding was located at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, modify its curriculum and organization, and remake it into an institution that could serve his purposes. However, in order for the proposed school to accomplish the goals he had in mind, he was convinced that it had to be moved to Fort Monroe where he could personally superintend its operation. His efforts to establish such an institution culminated in January 1987 with the opening of the School of Cadet Command (SOCC) at Fort Monroe. Before detailing the story of the SOCC, it is first necessary to relate something about its origins so that its place in the command's development can be better understood.

The roots of the SOCC can be traced back to the late 1970s during the tenure of Major General Daniel W. French as the DCSROTC. Recurring difficulties in meeting production goals along with his own personal observations persuaded the DCSROTC that ROTC instructors were poor recruiters. The problem called for the creation of a course designed to improve the recruiting and interviewing skills of ROTC instructors. At his prompting, a group of veteran ROTC enrollment officers assembled at TRADOC Headquarters on 12 February 1979. Their mission was to develop a course curriculum to teach ROTC cadre the requisite recruiting skills and techniques. The end result of the group's deliberations was the TRADOC Enrollment and Retention Course.

The DCSROTC introduced the Enrollment and Retention Course on 4 June 1979. The Chamberlain Hotel at Fort Monroe hosted a pilot class of 20
students. The course’s five-day program of instruction emphasized both product knowledge and recruiting techniques. On 9 July, the normal sequencing of classes began by iterations of 40 students each, and by year’s end over 200 cadre had completed the training.

In the summer of 1980, the DCSROTC embarked upon a parallel cadre training venture when it opened a cadre training center at the University of Chicago under the direction of Morris Janowitz, the eminent military sociologist. At the center, the Atlanta-based Sales-Management firm, under contract with the Army, offered a course that it called “ROTC Action-Management Training.” In all, 30 ROTC instructors attended the first class. The following summer, the course was repeated, but this time enrollment was limited to PMSs. In April 1981, an orientation course for Active Guard/Reserve officers opened at the National Guard Professional Education Center at Camp Robinson, Arkansas again featuring “ROTC Action-Management Training.”

The “ROTC Action-Management Training” was something of a misnomer, for it did not always result in much action—at least not of the type desired by Cadet Command. Extended motivational exercises crowded out classes on product knowledge. In the opinion of Cadet Command staff members who inherited the program, recipients of this training often returned to their campuses little better prepared for their duties than they had been before they left.

After 1981, the TRADOC-taught Recruiting and Cadre Orientation Course, which itself left much to be desired in the way of preparing ROTC instructors for campus duty, grew rapidly in size and cost. TRADOC instructors trained more than 400 officers in 1982 and almost 800 in 1983. To accommodate this enrollment increase, the DCSROTC had to establish 14 additional training sites at other locations throughout the country. Moreover, in 1983, a five-day Marketing Manager’s Course, designed exclusively for PMSs, and an Experienced ROTC Instructor Course, a refresher course for veteran cadre, were added to the DCSROTC’s training program.

The proliferation of cadre training programs soon began to alarm TRADOC staff officers. They were concerned that the DCSROTC’s instructor training efforts had no central focus and were not realizing the economies which could be achieved by closer Recruiting Command-DCSROTC interaction. The upshot of all this unease was the decision to consolidate all ROTC cadre training at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, and to establish an ROTC school within the U.S. Army Soldier Support Center located at that installation. The signing of a memorandum of understanding in February 1984

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by Major General Prillaman and Major General French, who by this time was the Soldier Support Center Commander, formally marked this decision. The new program, named the TRADOC Orientation and Enrollment Program, introduced a single curriculum for all ROTC cadre.

The ROTC School held courses throughout the year, with five to six iterations being offered in the summer and 16 iterations during the academic year. The Orientation and Enrollment Course was taught in two phases. Phase I (30 to 40 classroom hours) covered ROTC product knowledge and the Leadership Assessment Program while Phase II (40 classroom hours) taught sales and communications techniques.

Not everyone, including many ROTC instructors who took the course, was enamored of the new format. Some objected to its unstructured nature—an objection that related to the fact that there was no unifying philosophy or outlook to give coherence to the course. Discrete and unrelated blocks of instruction followed one another in apparently random order.

It was Phase II—the portion dealing with sales and communication techniques—that drew the most fire. Like the instruction given by the Sales-Management Corporation at the training center in Chicago and at the National Guard Professional Education Center in Arkansas, Phase II represented an attempt to apply the salesmanship and marketing techniques of the business world to the military. Unfortunately, the techniques that proved useful selling used cars were not as valuable in an organization whose primary mission was the molding of professional Army officers. Moreover, Phase II instruction did not address marketing and recruiting at the detachment level, the level at which the students operated. It tended to be overly theoretical, focusing on general marketing and recruiting principles rather than emphasizing practical application.

The policy of requiring attendees to wear civilian clothes without name tags was also the butt of much student criticism. Some officers objected because it made getting acquainted with other cadre members more difficult and inhibited the informal exchange of information and sharing of experiences among students—some of the most valuable aspects of the course. There was an even more deep-seated and fundamental objection to this policy, however. Cadre members understood that, at bottom, the wearing of civilian clothes without name tags represented a symbolic loosening of the ties between the ROTC on the one hand and the Army and the military ethos on the other. In light of the disturbing comments that the DCSROTC was getting from the field about the indifferent quality of and lack of career motivation in the ROTC
product, many officers associated with the program felt that the further demilitarization of the ROTC was something that ROTC cadets and the Army could not afford.23

It was not long after the establishment of the Orientation and Enrollment Program in February 1984 that TRADOC began to make adjustments and additions to the curriculum of the ROTC School and thus triggered yet another round of course proliferation—the prevention of which had been one of the original purposes behind the school's founding. In July 1985, for example, the ROTC School introduced the Instructor Training Course. The inspiration for this course, which had been designed by the Fort Benjamin Harrison Staff and Faculty Development Division, came from General Richardson. After becoming TRADOC Commander in 1983, he made a series of visits to ROTC detachments across the country and came away convinced that the quality of ROTC instruction had to be elevated. Because of faculty and facility constraints at Fort Benjamin Harrison, the Instructor Training Course was taught by civilian educators under contract by the U.S. Army. Therein lay the major problem with the course and the reason for its subsequent abolition; the Instructor Training Course geared instruction to the educational philosophies current in the academic world but neglected the unique instructional needs of the ROTC cadre member.

In an attempt to remedy the deficiencies of both Orientation and Enrollment Course and the Instructor Training Course, the ROTC School replaced them with two other courses. The ROTC Leader's Course consisted of three weeks of lecture and practical exercises on enrollment and retention, the Leadership Assessment Program, English composition, and instructional techniques. The ROTC School also developed a similar two-week ROTC Commander's Course for Area Commanders and PMSs. All "inbound" cadre attended one or the other of these new courses en route to their ROTC assignment. The first iterations of the Commander's Course and the Leader's Course began on 5 May and 1 October 1986, respectively.

It was at this juncture (i.e., when the Commander's Course and Leader's Course were instituted) that Cadet Command became involved in cadre training. Wagner came to Cadet Command with a three part plan at the ready to restructure the way ROTC instructors were prepared for their assignment. The first plank in the restructuring effort, which Wagner borrowed from Prillaman, called for a change in setting. Like his predecessor, he wanted to exercise a direct personal influence on the school and its day-to-day operations and realized that in order to achieve this end the ROTC School would have to be
moved from Benjamin Harrison to Monroe. Richardson quickly lent his approval, because he could see no compelling logic in keeping the cadre training center at a remote site under a "foreign" commander. Improving intracommmand communication was another reason for moving the school to Fort Monroe. With the School of Cadet Command collocated with the headquarters, information about policy changes or policy implementation problems could be quickly spread throughout the ROTC community.

The third and final component of the restructuring plan was educational in nature. Students were to receive a firm grounding in command philosophy, procedure, policies, and methods in order to promote program standardization. Special emphasis was to be placed on demonstrating how these policies, procedures, etc., were to be applied in the field. The emphasis previously placed on making ROTC cadre training compatible with the ethos and style of the civilian business community was dropped.

Between September and December 1986, Cadet Command effected the restructuring plan. Faculty selection was the first order of business. The instructional staff was chosen from among veteran ROTC cadre members who had excelled as educators and trainers on campus. Their reporting date was set as 5 January 1987, affording them limited preparation time. Concurrent with the selection of a faculty, a curriculum was developed. In its final form, it consisted of five major subject areas—a command orientation; the Goldstrike Management System; ROTC recruiting and retention; instructor training; and the Precommissioning Assessment System. Instructor designees were told to have their lesson plans ready when they reported to Fort Monroe.

To house the School of Cadet Command, TRADOC gave the command a rather unimposing building in the general vicinity of Cadet Command Headquarters. At the same time, it awarded a contract for the badly needed renovation of this wooden World War II vintage structure. The building's dilapidated condition was an indication of the importance that many TRADOC staff officers attached to the new command.

When the first School Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Michael E. Hodson, reported to Fort Monroe on 5 January 1987, preparations for the school's opening were far from complete. No furniture had arrived and the interior of the building was in shambles. With the assistance of the post engineers, Hodson and his staff set about making the necessary alterations and improvements. This involved painting the walls, clearing away debris, rewiring the electrical circuitry, and arranging the furniture when it finally arrived. The instructors had to wedge in class rehearsals between repair projects.
Notwithstanding the last minute complications, everything was ready for the official opening of the School of Cadet Command on 20 January 1987. The TRADOC Commander, General Carl E. Vuono, and Major General Wagner presided over the ribbon cutting ceremony and welcomed the inaugural class of 40 ROTC cadre members, composed of both officers and noncommissioned officers, from all four regions.

Over the ensuing years, several major additions and revisions were made to the school’s curriculum. In 1988, a guest speaker program was established
for the purpose of impressing on future ROTC instructors the critical role they were about to assume in the Army’s precommissioning education and training system. Guest speakers included some of the highest ranking officers in the Army—Generals Vuono and Thurman being among them.

In another major move that same year, Cadet Command eliminated the National Guard ROTC instructor course at Camp Robinson and integrated reserve officers into the school at Fort Monroe. This course consolidation eliminated redundancy, ensured uniformity of training, and achieved monetary savings. It also integrated reserve component and active component cadre together before instead of after they arrived on campus. By undergoing the same training, the differences in outlook and attitude that existed between active and reserve cadre members, it was hoped, could be reduced. Finally, it rid Cadet Command of ROTC Action-Management Training. Wagner had never liked the fadishness of the Sales-Management approach and was only too happy to redirect the reserve cadre training along other lines.

In an attempt to keep the SOCC curriculum attuned to campus needs, Lieutenant Colonel Hodson introduced a course evaluation system that provided both short-term and long-term feedback. In this system, instructor-students completed abbreviated course critiques upon graduation. It was assumed that cadre could not give a fully informed evaluation of instruction until they had a chance to apply their newly acquired knowledge and skills in a university environment so they were required to complete a second critique three to six months after their arrival on campus. The evaluation results formed the basis for quarterly curriculum revisions.24

Because its staff members were in a position to keep abreast of current trends on campus and because they all were seasoned instructors with recent battalion experience, Major General Wagner saddled the School of Cadet Command with an additional responsibility—writing doctrine and policy guidance for the command. The school’s staff wrote and compiled Cadet Command Pamphlet series 145-1 through 145-3. These publications provided guidelines on all major aspects of on-campus operations. They included:

Cadet Command Pamphlet 145-1, *Operation Goldstrike:*
*The Goldstrike Management System*
Cadet Command Pamphlet 145-2, *Operation Goldminer:*
*The Goldminer Team Management System*
Cadet Command Pamphlet 145-3, *Staking Your Claim:*
*The Goldminer Recruiting Handbook*
The school produced other reference guides to assist ROTC faculty. The most useful of these was the Cadet Battalion Operation Guide. The guide listed 2,063 significant events that take place on the typical ROTC-affiliated campus and arranged them by military science level (i.e., MS I, MS II, MS III, and MS IV). In another section of the guide, events were organized by function (i.e., recruiting and retention, marketing, training, supply, administration, etc.) to help instructors track their particular areas of responsibility. The guide provided the kind of compact guide to ROTC unit operations that ROTC instructors had long desired.

Some officers in the Cadet Command Headquarters, including the commander and his training director, wanted to widen the scope of the school’s responsibilities even further. The success attained by the school’s faculty in the areas of cadre training and policy formulation suggested their use as a kind of on-campus directed telescope in much the same manner as “Barky” Norman’s Evaluation Team served as a directed telescope for Advanced Camp. Accordingly, SOCC instructors were formed into mobile training teams and dispatched to battalions to conduct so-called assistance visits. In reality, these visits were done more with an eye toward selectively sampling the field to determine whether or not battalions were following Cadet Command directives than with helping the unit in question although, of course, the latter purpose was also served. In the end, the visits were discontinued because they were too manpower intensive and diverted time and energy away from the school’s primary mission.

The manner in which the School of Cadet Command was launched and used tells much about the way Cadet Command operated during its formative years and about Wagner’s personal command philosophy and style. This manner can be summed up in one phrase—abrupt revolutionary change. A naturally impatient man to begin with, Wagner abhorred evolutionary change, which to him merely meant delay and procrastination. In order for reforms or changes to overcome the historical and organizational inertia they would inevitably encounter, he believed, they had to be implemented quickly, thoroughly, and if need be, firmly. If he sensed that his subordinates did not fully share his enthusiasm for a particular project or if their zeal for it seemed to lag, he would, one way or another, get them into line. Disrupting old patterns and changing traditional ways of thinking, in Wagner’s estimation, simply could not always be accomplished with patience, understanding, and diplomacy.
CHAPTER V

RECRUITING CADETS

An uncharacteristic uniformity ran through ROTC advertising at all levels. Cadet Command Headquarters, the regions, and individual battalions now pushed a single theme—personal success—and adopted almost identical packaging for all advertising products. The contrast with the old way of doing business was glaring.

Previous chapters have noted ROTC’s perennial inability to draw its proportionate share of students from the upper echelons of America’s collegiate population. In the mid-1980s, ROTC product quality was still a major Army concern. Echoing the observations of the earlier RETO Board Study (1978), a January 1986 report by the U.S. Army Audit Agency noted that “significant quality problems existed” in the ROTC cadet corps—an assessment found in other official studies and in the military periodical literature of the era.¹

Enrollment numbers were also a source of worry and, as we have seen, had been since the end of the Vietnam War. ROTC fell short of its FY 1984 production mission of 9,402 officers by approximately 12 percent. As a result, the Army felt compelled to slash ROTC production missions by a like percentage and thereby established the dangerous precedent of tying output to existing capability rather than need. Pessimistic demographic forecasts heightened Army concerns. The ROTC Study Group Report, published in May 1986, noted that the overall aging of the U.S. population had “particularly significant implications” for the ROTC program. The group cited studies projecting that the 18-24 year age group—the group from which ROTC drew most of its participants—would shrink by 20 percent between 1985 and 1996. Only after this latter date would this age group once again begin to grow. The meaning of this was clear to the study group; ROTC would have to struggle for at least the next decade just to maintain its pre-1986 levels of production.²
Past Recruiting Practices

To get the type of officer corps it wanted, the Army had to do a better job of recruiting for the ROTC. Unfortunately, Cadet Command inherited a recruiting structure that was, as the Army Audit Agency Report stated, in need of "refinement." In actuality, the situation was worse. ROTC recruiting and marketing were in need of a drastic overhaul. Two civilian scholars, Dr. Donald Jugenheimer of the University of Kansas and Dr. Vernon Fryburger of Northwestern University, completed studies of ROTC recruiting and marketing practices in 1984. They prepared separate reports on their findings but there was general agreement between the two about what was wrong with the extant system. Fryburger was critical of the "highly decentralized" ROTC recruiting and advertising apparatus. Such decentralization, he noted, inevitably led to a fragmented and incoherent marketing effort and forfeited the advantages and economies that could be achieved with a coordinated advertising campaign. He recommended centralizing the marketing and advertising campaign in the Office of the DCSROTC at Fort Monroe.

Jugenheimer took the ROTC marketing effort to task for the tremendous variety of advertising and promotional materials it used. During the course of his study, officers provided him with 32 different promotional items—brochures, booklets, self-mailers, flyers, etc. He questioned the cost-effectiveness of investing so heavily in such materials and believed that such a diversified collection of promotional items reflected a lack of advertising focus. His solution to the recruiting problem involved providing the recruiting program with a clearer mission statement and achieving Army-wide synergies in the ROTC marketing and advertising efforts. Transferring at least some of ROTC's recruiting responsibilities to the Recruiting Command, Jugenheimer believed, would create such synergies.

All of the flaws in the ROTC advertising program were not caused by decentralization. Some were due to a lack of training and guidance. ROTC cadre, the individuals responsible for conducting local advertising, received no instruction about how to put together an ad campaign or design an advertisement. The usual result was advertising directed at a broad range of people rather than targeted at a specific audience. Nor were ads normally linked to the academic calendar. Ads would be run whenever the PMS became concerned about recruiting.
RECRUITING CADETS

The Contribution of the DCSROTC

The overhaul of the ROTC advertising and marketing management system began under Major General Prillaman. A key event in this overhaul was the creation of the Operations Division in June 1984. The new organization grew out of the old Advertising, Media, and Marketing Division. It retained the existing Advertising and Marketing Branches but added a Plans and Analysis Branch. Filled by robbing the regions of many of their operations research systems analysts, the new branch performed the heretofore neglected functions of market analysis, the formulation of marketing strategies and the “selling” of its strategies to the Army DCSPER, the office responsible for managing officer accessions.

The advantages connected with this headquarters reshuffling quickly became apparent. Because of the increased analytical capability that the new division brought to the headquarters, the DCSROTC could more persuasively articulate his needs to decision-makers at TRADOC and at the Department of the Army. It was no accident that the DCSROTC’s advertising budget shot up from $6.5 million in FY 1984 to $9.5 million in FY 1985, a 46 percent increase. This, in turn, helped raise ROTC’s “production efficiency ratio”—the number of commissionees per cadre officer—by 20 percent over the same period (from 5.1:1 to 6.1:1).6

The 1984-1985 marketing plan reflected the DCSROTC’s increased analytical capabilities. The plan was something of a milestone in that it allowed regions to assign recruiting missions (or quotas) on the basis of market potential in addition to past performance. It also called for greater marketing and recruiting efforts in high schools. To further these efforts, the DCSROTC staff drafted a high school recruiting plan for the regions and extended the Fourth Region’s Goldminer Team model throughout the ROTC community. Three Goldminer Teams were put in place in each region.7

In concert with the moves made possible by the restructuring of the Operations Division, N.W. Ayer, the Army’s advertising agency during this era, came up with new ways to publicize the ROTC to the American public. Ayer’s proposals sprang from a survey it did of high school and college students who were not enrolled in ROTC and had, in marketing jargon, a “neutral propensity” toward the military. The results of the survey were startling. Ayer’s researchers found that the students interviewed knew very little about ROTC. Most of them, in fact, equated enrolling in ROTC with enlisting in the Regular Army.
To improve matters, Prillaman adopted N.W. Ayer’s suggestion to draw a sharper distinction between Army ROTC and the Regular Army. The DCSROTC directed that henceforth all ROTC advertising and publicity materials would bear the full title “Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps.” At the same time, he ordered that all new ROTC graphics use the official black and gold colors of the Army instead of the green customarily employed in enlisted recruiting ads. Both steps were taken to emphasize that ROTC was a program for producing officers and not just another means to entice young people into the Army.8

The measures discussed in the preceding paragraphs lent ROTC recruiting greater coherence and consistency at the national level, but advertising and marketing in the regions continued pretty much as before. Each of the regions and the 400 and some odd detachments subordinate to them retained their distinctive marketing styles, methods and messages. On college campuses across the country, one could find everything from locally manufactured cartoons to ads prepared by the Recruiting Command. In some cases, it was questionable whether the case of ROTC was helped or hurt by the ads and posters displayed. It was certain, however, that such an uncoordinated campaign could not create a genuine corporate image for the program or even put across a consistent message.9

A New Direction

With the activation of Cadet Command in the spring of 1986, ROTC recruiting began to move along different lines. One of Wagner’s concerns when he took command centered on the relationship that had evolved over the years between N.W. Ayer and the marketing and advertising staff at ROTC headquarters. In the past, this firm had taken the lead in mapping out marketing strategies, selecting advertising messages and, in general, selling ROTC to the American people. The DCSROTC staff played a subordinate role. The problem with this arrangement, from Wagner’s perspective, was that the Ayer’s agents, as a group, had only an incomplete understanding of the concept of officership. Their tendency to approach the selling of officership in the same way that they did the selling of a Chevrolet dismayed him.

The Cadet Command Commander attempted to change the N.W. Ayer-ROTC relationship by importing into his headquarters professional Army officers with civilian marketing experience. These officers were to supply product knowledge, formulate marketing and advertising strategies, and set policy...
while ad agency representatives were to serve as advisers and provide technical assistance. In short, the soldiers were to replace the civilians at the helm. Colonel Alexander Woods and Major Allen R. Resnick, both of whom had completed the Army's extended Training With Industry Program, were the two officers brought in to head up the command's marketing and advertising functions.¹⁰

In June 1986, the headquarters was reorganized to facilitate the adoption of a more uniform approach to recruiting—the necessity of which Jugenheimer and Fryburger had pointed out two years before. The Marketing and Advertising Branches were split off from the Operations Division and formed into a new Marketing Division with Colonel Woods as its chief. The new division retained responsibility for all advertising and marketing research and, in addition, assumed control of the advertising budget as well as the automated Lead Expediting and Dissemination System. Virtually all programs and capabilities that affected the command's ability to recruit were now concentrated in a single staff section.

The new Marketing Division moved at once to break the localism and regionalism that had in the past splintered ROTC recruiting effort into literally hundreds of discrete and disconnected parts. This drive reached a culmination in September 1987 with the publication of Cadet Command Regulation 145-4, Marketing, Advertising, and Publicity to Support Enrollment. This document proscribed many former ROTC marketing practices. The use of cartoons, for example, was eliminated from the advertising repertoire of regions and battalions, and the distribution of promotional items, along with the funding to buy them, was severely curtailed.¹¹

The shift of responsibility for the advertising budget from the Resource Management to the Marketing Division streamlined the decision-making process relative to the allocation of advertising funds. Streamlining was necessary because marketing and advertising opportunities often materialized on short notice. To exploit these fleeting opportunities, funds had to be identified and obligated quickly—something that was now, with the reorganization, possible.

The headquarters' reorganization also cleared the way for the adoption of a regular and time-sequenced marketing planning procedure for the ROTC. Under the provisions of Cadet Command Regulation 145-4, within which the new planning procedure was outlined, Cadet Command Headquarters published its marketing guidance in January, the regions published theirs in March, and the battalions completed their "marketing action" plans by June. This
schedule ensured that battalions were prepared in plenty of time for fall semester enrollment. The regulation further directed that advertising and recruiting be linked to certain critical periods and programs. Thus, there was to be an advertising and recruiting effort aimed at getting students to attend Basic Camp. This effort was to start early enough to attract student interest and allow sufficient time for enrollment but not so early that student interest would wane before camp began. Similar campaigns were to be tied to the ROTC scholarship application cycle and the general enrollment drive at the beginning of the fall semester. The new procedure stood in marked contrast to past marketing practices which, instead of being tied to specific programs or periods, were driven, like so many other things in the ROTC program prior to the establishment of Cadet Command, largely by the impulses of the local ROTC cadre.\footnote{12}

**Young and Rubicam**

On 1 March 1987, Young and Rubicam, an advertising agency based in New York City, took over the Army’s advertising contract from N.W. Ayer. The legal difficulties into which N.W. Ayer had fallen in 1986 paved the way for this takeover. Throughout 1986, Ayer’s Vice President in Charge of Army Film Projects had been under investigation by the Justice Department for accepting kick-backs from a subcontractor. Later that same year, charges of time card improprieties against Ayer surfaced. Under indictment by the Justice Department, Ayer was ruled ineligible to compete for the Army advertising contract when it was put out for bid, allowing Young and Rubicam to step in almost by default.\footnote{13}

Due to the time required to familiarize the agency with the ROTC program and the myriad of regulations and restrictions connected with government contracting and financing, Young and Rubicam’s integration into Cadet Command’s wider marketing program was, by necessity, a gradual process. It was because of this time requirement that Cadet Command decided to stick with the old advertising plan for 1987. Cadet Command’s Marketing Division did, however, start working with Young and Rubicam to come up with a strategy for 1988. Spring Gold 88 was the title attached to this effort. Before real progress in developing such a campaign could be made, certain basic questions had to be answered about the target audience, the message, the end product, the price, and the packaging. The additional research needed to
answer these questions demanded more money—a resource that Cadet Command possessed only in limited quantities. Consequently, the command's marketing research agenda had to be kept within narrow bounds and temporally extended.14

To answer some of the basic questions mentioned above, Young and Rubicam in 1987 undertook a "strategic research study" to ascertain how best to represent the ROTC product—officership—within the selected market, which Young and Rubicam identified as college-bound juniors and seniors in high school. Not surprisingly perhaps, given the acquisitive spirit that appeared to pervade the decade of the 1980s, findings indicated that "personal success" and "career advancement" were slogans that exercised powerful influences on these youths. The theme eventually adopted for 1987—"ROTC leads to personal success"—was a none too subtle attempt to exploit the recruiting potential of these messages. Nineteen hundred and eighty-eight witnessed the completion of a Young and Rubicam survey of college-bound high school students (which was called a "concept research study"). This effort resulted in Cadet Command's adoption of the advertising theme "Army ROTC, the Smartest College Course You Can Take." The latter message was not as direct as the 1987 slogan but it was much more effective, at least in the estimation of the command's marketing experts who retained it as one of their central slogans in the years after its adoption in 1988.15

Finally, Young and Rubicam undertook a so-called "copy research study" in 1989 to evaluate the effectiveness of ROTC advertising in communicating the officership message to the target audience. It found that the themes that it had helped the Cadet Command staff to devise were highly effective. Given the agency's obvious interest in continuing a profitable relationship with the Army, its conclusions came as no surprise. Cadet Command could not, however, translate Young and Rubicam's findings into more advertising dollars. The rub was, as indeed it had always been in the ROTC advertising arena, that no conclusive quantitative proof could be adduced to link advertising campaigns with increased enrollment or production.16

Although they may have been difficult to quantify, the benefits that came out of this extended research effort were undeniable. An uncharacteristic uniformity ran through ROTC advertising at all levels. Cadet Command Headquarters, the regions, and individual battalions now pushed a single theme—personal success—and adopted almost identical packaging for all advertising products. The contrast with the old way of doing business was glaring.
Spring Gold

While Cadet Command market analysts and their Young and Rubicam associates were busy coming up with answers to basic questions about what audiences to target and what advertising themes to use, they were simultaneously working on the Spring Gold marketing plans of 1988 and 1989. Both plans emphasized the integration of national, regional, and local advertising with decision points in the academic life of applicants and called for two advertising surges each year. The first surge was to come in the spring when the high school senior made decisions about what college to attend and what academic major to pursue; the second in the autumn when the freshman arrived on campus and registered for classes. Other decision points were identified but a limited budget prevented the command from targeting them.  

See Figure 5-1.

Figure 5-1. Cadet Command Recruiting Publicity Brochures, 1991
Many ads grew out of the Spring Gold marketing plans. Like other aspects of the marketing program, most of them were designed to appeal to a particular audience, at a particular time, and at a particular level. A television commercial entitled “Businessman” was one of the more notable of these ads. Command market analysts used “Businessman” to compliment and reinforce national and regional advertising efforts.

In the commercial, two businessmen were pictured discussing how to fill an intermediate-level management position in their company. One of these men recommended the hiring of a recent ROTC graduate who through his military training and experience had built up what the two businessmen considered to be an impressive management background. To supplement “Businessman,” the command’s Marketing Division contemporaneously released a magazine ad entitled “Resume.” In this ad, the credentials of two college graduates were compared: one had gone through ROTC, one had not. The ROTC resume was much longer and reflected more management experience than the non-ROTC graduate. Like “Businessman,” “Resume” was intended to capitalize on the spate of newspaper and magazine articles that came out in the late 1980s reporting how well junior military officers fared when they left the service and entered the civilian job market. See Figure 5-2. The inspiration for this theme, for which there was a considerable body of supporting empirical evidence, came from Young and Rubicam marketing agents who had included the idea in their firm’s original 1986 bid for the Army’s advertising contract.18

The Advertising Media Mix

The use of television to advertise ROTC declined after 1988. The command simply did not have a sufficiently large advertising budget to sustain a vigorous television effort. Beginning in the fall of 1989, funding constraints limited the airing of the “Businessman” to a few cable channels.19

Magazine advertising, a much less expensive advertising means, was a different story. The command could put together an extensive magazine campaign aimed to support recruiting at the national and regional levels with the financial resources at its disposal. This campaign was conducted in two phases—a “fall flight” and a “spring flight,” which coincided with the larger advertising surges that the command used to affect students at critical decision points in their academic careers. The “Resume” ad, which was found to be especially effective in reaching high school seniors, was a mainstay of this
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Direct mailings constituted the final element in Cadet Command's national advertising campaign. This effort was based on lists of secondary school students who had taken the Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Tests (PSAT), the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), and the American College Test (ACT). High school juniors scoring above average on the PSAT and indicating an interest in engineering, nursing, or one of the “hard sciences” were the focus of the junior mailings. These talented students, who were likely to win merit-based scholarships, started exploring their options well before the beginning of their

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**Figure 5-2. 1991 Version of the Resume Ad**

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senior year. Consequently, they received detailed information about ROTC financial assistance and scholarships. Senior mailings, on the other hand, went after a more diverse audience. The minority market received special attention in this set of mailings. The information provided to this group was somewhat less detailed about the financial benefits associated with the ROTC program but gave greater emphasis to the command’s personal success theme and the leadership training available through the ROTC.  

Cadet Command also strove to integrate local advertising initiatives with regional and national ones. It designed standard packets and booklets that could be used by battalions in their own local campaigns. Ads focusing on a particular aspect of the ROTC program were produced for local use. Through such ads, the command promoted Basic Camp attendance, participation in the Simultaneous Membership Program, and on-campus scholarship programs. The Marketing Directorate compiled a Strategic Marketing, Advertising, and Recruiting Tool (SMART) Kit to provide battalions with advertising materials and ideas designed to build on the ads and standard packets mentioned above. The kit contained examples, which the command expected battalions to follow closely, of press releases, radio spots, feature stories, publicity items, direct mail schedules, and other materials useful in conducting a local ad campaign. SMART Kits were updated biannually to keep up with a changing market. If a battalion wanted to deviate from the program set down from above, it had to get the permission of Cadet Command Headquarters.

GOLDQuest

Prior to Cadet Command’s founding, a central element in the ROTC advertising scheme had been the Lead Expediting and Dissemination System. The system functioned essentially as a clearing house for students or prospective students who requested information about the ROTC. Individuals who indicated interest in the ROTC were sent general information about the program via mail. The names and addresses of the respondees were forwarded to the ROTC detachment at the college they planned to attend. If they failed to specify a particular college, their personal information was sent to the ROTC detachment located in the respondent’s zip code area. Local cadre were then supposed to contact the individuals identified by the system and talk to them in more detail about the program.

Research conducted by the ROTC Study Group showed that ROTC instructors did not highly value the system. They considered it too cumbersome
and time-consuming and felt that it produced more work than benefit. Many detachments simply deleted students from the system upon the receipt of their names to avoid the tiresome and largely unprofitable exercise of contacting hundreds of students who in all probability would not or could not enroll in the ROTC.22

Cadet Command’s answer to the Lead Expediting and Dissemination System was a new program, which was given the name GOLDQuest. It involved a substantial revision to the existing data base and the adoption of a fundamentally different approach to managing the thousands of enrollment leads received by the national processing center each year. Under the new program, the prospect’s name was entered into the data base as soon as a response card was received. The information requested by prospect was then sent out by the GOLDQuest processing center. The individual’s name was maintained on the data base until the student was a senior in high school. At that time, and this was a key factor in the new system, the processing center contacted the prospect by telephone to reconfirm his interest in ROTC. If the prospect indicated continued interest, the center determined his college of choice. The resultant names were transmitted electronically to the PMS at the designated institution. GOLDQuest uncluttered the system by eliminating students who no longer had an interest in ROTC and, at the same time, enhanced the usefulness of the system to the PMS by providing him with prospects who were more likely to enroll in the program.

GOLDQuest performed another service. It allowed the command to track prospects up to the point of their enrollment in ROTC—something that the Lead Expediting and Dissemination System could not do or, at least, could not do well—which, in turn, made possible the measurement of advertising effectiveness. With GOLDQuest, Cadet Command could gauge what type of advertising worked best and get ideas about how to make the marketing system more cost-effective.23

The Goldstrike Management System

The production problem in the pre-Cadet Command era was related to ROTC’s decentralized command structure. The absence of uniform eligibility criteria and a systematic method of setting production quotas (or missions in Cadet Command jargon), the inevitable results of decentralized command, meant that broad discretionary powers devolved upon the region commander and PMS in determining who and how many would be commissioned
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each year. This in turn led to an unevenness of product quality and to the perception of arbitrariness in the officer selection process.

Upon its establishment, the command began the task of installing the Fourth Region's Operation Goldstrike in the other three regions. This, Cadet Command staff officers hoped, would go a long way towards eliminating the abuses associated with past recruiting management practices. A milestone in this effort occurred in August 1986 when the command published Cadet Command Pamphlet 145-1, Operation Goldstrike: The Goldstrike Management System, which contained the outlined of the mechanism by which the command planned to turn things around.

Before the institution of the Goldstrike Management System, the ROTC method for establishing recruiting and commissioning goals had been irregular. Region commanders received recommended production goals from their higher headquarters. They, in turn, gave only recommendations to their subordinate PMSs about the quantity and quality of cadets to be commissioned and set no production floor (or production minimum). PMSs were, in many respects, semi-autonomous agents who determined both the quality and quantity of the cadets they were to put into the Army.24

To standardize recruiting and production functions, the new system contained a management device called the mission process. This process, which gave the command the ability to measure production effectiveness in both quantitative and qualitative terms, engaged each level of the chain-of-command in negotiating the number of cadets (or the mission) to be contracted and commissioned during a given fiscal year. In practice, of course, there was much more direction by, than negotiating with, Cadet Command Headquarters, but it was nonetheless true that with the mission process, the PMS became more aware of how his battalion fit into the overall ROTC production scheme than had previously been the case.

The annual mission cycle began in November when the Department of the Army sent Cadet Command production missions for seven years into the future. In January, at the annual commander’s conference, the Commanding General gave “directed missions” to each region commander for three years into the future. Upon receipt of a directed mission, each region headquarters analyzed it and then negotiated with Cadet Command Headquarters to adjust the mission upward or downward. The final step in the process took place in April or May during separate region “adjudication conferences.” Here, each region commander presented an analysis based on market potential to the Cadet Command Commander. After further discussion, the two men then agreed
on a mission. The commanders formalized these adjudicated missions at the conclusion of the conference through the signing of contracts, which were subsequently used as a gauge of success or failure.\textsuperscript{25}

Cadet Command's Operations Directorate (it was elevated from a Division to a Directorate in January 1988) measured the accomplishment of regional missions through "mission sets." A mission set corresponded to all cadets commissioned or scheduled to be commissioned during a particular fiscal year. For example, those MS III cadets contracted for Advanced Course participation in the fall term of School Year 1987-1988 belonged to "mission set 89." Normally, the regions were expected to contract at least 40 percent of each year's MS II class for the new mission set and to retain 80 percent of that number for commissioning. The rest of a mission set was filled out by enrolling cadets through Basic Camp or by awarding advanced placement credit to cadets with prior military training. The goal was for each battalion to achieve the cadre-to-commissionee ratio of 1:6—a goal that had been originally established in 1984.\textsuperscript{26}

The Department of the Army insisted that in addition to meeting overall production goals, Cadet Command should turn out officers with the requisite blend of academic backgrounds to meet the needs of the Army. To measure the command's success in achieving this latter goal, the Army Staff used the device of the Academic Discipline Mix ratio. In 1986, discipline mix goals were set as follows: Engineering - 20 percent; Social Studies - 20 percent; Physical Sciences - 20 percent; Business - 30 percent; and other disciplines - 10 percent.\textsuperscript{27}

To manage the Goldstrike Management System, the Operations Directorate developed an administrative tool called the Goldstrike Blitz Report. Every PMS in the command had to complete this monthly summary of the enrollment status of his battalion. The Blitz reporting cycle started with battalion reports, due to the region headquarters on the 10th of each month. The regions had to consolidate these reports and forward a regional compilation of the results to Cadet Command by the last working day of the month. Each battalion and region reported on three mission sets: the future MS III mission set—the year group about to be contracted; the current MS III mission set—the year group about to become the MS IV class; and the current MS IV mission set—the year group about to be commissioned. Due to differences between schools in the opening and closing of academic years, the September Blitz Report was the base from which the various mission sets were computed.

The report gave the command the capacity to identify impending
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production shortfalls. Provided with early warning, commanders of troubled units could work to boost retention rates and get the most out of the human material they had on hand. Focusing the attention of the chain-of-command on the production mission was a broader purpose served by the report. It was a tangible reminder to all cadre that big brother at Cadet Command Headquarters was watching. If anything slipped, it had better not be production. 28

Goldminer Teams

Of all the recruiting initiatives undertaken by the ROTC community in the 1980s, the formation of Goldminer Teams was the most significant. The first Goldminer Team started operating in the Los Angeles area at the beginning of School Year 1983-1984. By the fall of 1986, 18 such teams were engaged in ROTC recruiting in major metropolitan areas spread throughout the country. (See Figure 3-7, page 85).

The uniqueness of the Goldminer Teams stemmed from their mission, which was to function as the command’s principal agents for high school recruiting. No other agency or unit, it is important to note, focused on penetrating the high school marketplace for the purpose of identifying prospects for ROTC. The Recruiting Command, it is true, performed this function, but it had other missions as well. Most of these other missions, unfortunately, had a higher priority than recruiting high school students for the ROTC.

The PMS also was expected to canvas local high schools for prospects. However, two factors worked against the PMS becoming an effective high school recruiter. First, more pressing duties limited the time available to devote to this task. Second, high school students indicating an interest in ROTC often did not plan to attend a local college. There was thus little incentive for the PMS to spend a lot of time on a group of prospects who would join other programs if they joined at all. The result was that prior to the appearance of the Goldminers, the high school/ROTC interface was, in many sections of the country, tenuous. 29

keep the teams current on changes to policies and programs. This institution-
alization of the Goldminer program gave the command a formal instrument
with which to canvass that portion of American youth that would, by neces-
sity, constitute the future enrollment base of ROTC.  

**Green to Gold**

The Army’s enlisted force has been a traditional source of cadets for the
ROTC. Federal law permitted students with prior military service to enter
directly into the ROTC Advanced Course because they possessed a level of
military skills that was at least on a par with cadets who had completed the
Basic Course. ROTC program administrators had never done a particularly
good job of exploiting the enrollment potential of this group. The Office of
the DCSPER tried to tap this market when it introduced the Green to Gold
program as part of the Training Management Program in 1986. It gave the
mission of administering Green to Gold to installation education centers. The
critical flaw in this DCSPER program was its lack of an adequate supervisory
apparatus. Like so many other past programs designed to regulate the ROTC,
tremendous latitude was given to local authorities. As a result, Green to Gold
was administered in a hundred different ways.

To revitalize the program, the DCSPER gave control over it to Cadet
Command in 1987. The command’s first move was to establish an organiza-
tional mechanism with which it could strongly affect, if not exactly direct, the
administration of the Green to Gold program by installation education cen-
ters. It designated 41 ROTC units as Counterpart Battalions and entrusted
them with the task of working with nearby installations to identify enlisted
soldiers with the requisite qualifications and abilities to become officers. The
names of the soldiers thus identified were sent to the PMS at the college that
the soldier indicated that he planned to attend. The process sketched above
was outlined in detail in Cadet Command Regulation 145-6, *Green to Gold
Prospecting.*

The linchpins of the system were the so-called enrollment counselors,
ROTC instructors from Counterpart Battalions appointed to perform this task.
These counselors targeted enlisted men and women planning to leave the Army
after their period of enlistment expired and attend a four-year college. Lists
of soldiers contributing to the Army College Fund or the New GI Bill, avail-
able through the post’s education center, gave them plenty of prospects. Since
the success of the enrollment counselors depended on the cooperation of the
installation chain-of-command, the counselors devoted a considerable amount of time cultivating good relations with local authorities. Those college-bound enlisted people interested in becoming an officer were linked up with the PMS at the school of their choice through the GOLDQuest computer network. By 1990, the Green to Gold system was fully operational, with counselors working on virtually every major Army installation in the nation.\textsuperscript{32}

The program increased in significance in subsequent years. In 1995, approximately 20 percent of ROTC commissionees were Green to Gold products (as compared to about 10 percent in the late 1980s and early 1990s). Major General James M. Lyle, the Cadet Command Commander in 1995, was an ardent proponent of the program. He raised the number of Green to Gold scholarships by over 80 percent (193 to 350) after he assumed command in 1993 and flooded the TRADOC school system and his fellow general officers with Green to Gold brochures, letters, and fact sheets. Lyle felt that the combination of ROTC leadership training, a college education, and enlisted experience gave the newly commissioned Green to Gold lieutenant a huge initial advantage over his peers. He dubbed the program the Army’s “new OCS” in recognition of its importance to Cadet Command and the Army.\textsuperscript{33}

**Cadet Command-Recruiting Command Cooperation**

Another facet of Cadet Command’s effort to improve ROTC recruiting centered on forging a closer working relation with the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. In the past, the relationship had not always been a complementary one. In fact, many times the Recruiting Command and the ROTC community found themselves working at cross purposes.

The absence of a formal mechanism by which the two commands could interact and provide each other information about possible prospects other than at the local level did not help matters. Neither did the fact that they had fundamentally different missions serve to allay antagonism and misunderstanding. The Recruiting Command concentrated on filling the enlisted force; the ROTC focus was on filling its own ranks with students qualified to be officers. Recruiters received no credit and were given no incentives for identifying students interested in ROTC, even though they regularly visited high school and college campuses as part of their normal duties. Shunting students toward ROTC, in fact, could actually hurt the recruiter, for it meant the loss of a potential enlistee. ROTC cadre, on their
part, often viewed the recruiter as a threat, fearing that if given the opportunity, he would try to entice the student away from ROTC into the Army with talk of the Army College Fund and the New GI Bill (a fear that was greatly exaggerated but not altogether groundless). 34

The process of bringing the two communities closer together started in February 1985 with the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Major General Prillaman and the Recruiting Command Commander. The understanding established a common ROTC-Recruiting Command data base which the DCSROTC staff and later the Cadet Command Headquarters monitored to determine how aggressively ROTC instructors were pursuing the prospects provided to them. In 1989, an even more momentous step was taken to create the kind of ROTC-Recruiting Command synergies advocated by Jugenheimer several years before. This effort, which came to be known as Operation Partnership, bound the two commands together even more firmly by, among other things, giving recruiters access to the GOLDQuest system. If this access provided the means, a change in Recruiting Command management policy, which gave recruiters credit (or points) for directing students toward ROTC, provided the recruiters with the motivation to cooperate with Cadet Command. 35

The Recruiting Command found Operation Partnership to be helpful in fulfilling its enlisted recruiting mission. Operating under the cloak of ROTC, its recruiters could approach high school students without inciting the hostility and fear of high school guidance counselors and teachers who were often loath to see their more able students spirited away into the Regular Army. Participation in the ROTC was a much more palatable alternative to these educators. Operation Partnership also helped the Recruiting Command by energizing ROTC cadre to do a better job referring cadets who, because of financial or other difficulties dropped out of ROTC, to recruiters. Often, through such programs as the Army College Fund and the Montgomery GI Bill, formerly financially pressed students were able to return to college and the ROTC program and complete their degree. 36

**Scholarship Program**

One of the primary tools possessed by the command to attract its share of the nation’s most talented and intellectually capable high school students was the Army ROTC scholarship program. Established by the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964, the program drew into the ROTC ranks students of
exceptional quality. Between 1980 and 1985, the number of scholarship applications jumped up by 62 percent, a reflection both of the enhanced popularity of the military among American youth and the increased number of scholarship awards (which rose from 6,500 to 12,000 in 1980) authorized by Congress. During this same period, the proportion of contracted cadets on scholarship rose from one-third to over one-half. Army ROTC scholarships, which covered tuition, books, supplies, and equipment and provided each recipient with a $100 a month subsistence allowance during the academic year, varied in value from school to school depending on tuition rates and the length or term of the scholarship. All scholarship cadets incurred an eight-year service obligation and most were required to spend between two to five years on active duty.37

In the early 1980s, the Army divided ROTC scholarships into 16 separate categories, each designed to attract a particular type of student. Scholarships were also of different durations; there were four-, three-, and two-year varieties. After 1982, the academic discipline mix ratio began to weigh more heavily in the scholarship selection process. Engineering and physical science majors were given preferential consideration because of the difficulties the Army was experiencing getting such students into the program.

The Army was not convinced that it was getting its money’s worth from the scholarship program. Neither, for that matter, was Cadet Command Headquarters. Colonel Joseph G. Cretella, chief of the command’s Personnel and Administration Division, spearheaded the effort to make the program more economical and more effective from a recruiting perspective.38

Cretella advanced along several axes. First, as might be anticipated, he standardized things. One application form and one application process now sufficed for all categories of scholarship. Second, he simplified things. From 1986 to 1989, he reduced the number of scholarship categories from 16 to 12.

He also addressed two other particularly thorny problems that had long plagued the ROTC scholarship program. One was the Army’s failure to realize its goal of awarding all authorized scholarships. Every year, many scholarship winners, because of the receipt of other financial awards, acceptance at a service academy, and a host of other reasons, decided to decline the ROTC offer. To eliminate this slippage problem, Project TWA was launched. This project provided a means of estimating the acceptance rate of ROTC scholarships in a given year. After the acceptance rate was calculated, it was held up against the number of available scholarships. Cadet Command would thus “over-award” scholarships (just as TWA and other airlines overbooked airplane seats
to ensure maximum fill on their flights) and be assured that most scholarships were used.³⁹

An even more difficult problem was the one posed by the tremendous dropout rate of four-year scholarship winners. The ROTC Study Group Report, dated May 1986, set the historical retention rate for four-year scholarship cadets (MS I to commissioning) at 57 percent. According to Defense Department policy, a scholarship recipient could drop ROTC after his first year in college without incurring a service obligation or repaying the financial assistance already received. Many students, in fact, accepted an ROTC scholarship fully intending to drop ROTC after one year.⁴⁰

To reduce such waste and abuse—it could not be eliminated because the four-year scholarship provided the Army with, in the words of the ROTC Study Group, “an inroad to the high quality, high school market” it otherwise would not have had—Colonel Cretella devised the mechanism of an Advanced Designation Scholarship of both a three-year and two-year variety. These scholarships, which were awarded to high school students, did not become effective until the awardee attained sophomore or junior status and had successfully completed at least one year of ROTC. Under the terms of the Advanced Designation Scholarship, no grace period was extended to the recipient. He incurred a service commitment and an obligation to pay back the funds upon enrollment in ROTC.⁴¹

**Officer Accessioning**

The Personnel and Administration Division was given the task of first restructuring and then managing the cadet accessioning system. Cadet accessioning referred to the process by which cadets were given a particular type of commission (Regular Army or reserve), chosen for active duty or for assignment to one of the reserve components, and assigned to a particular specialty or branch (i.e., infantry, armor, artillery, quartermaster, etc.). When Cadet Command was established in April 1986, this process was a joint responsibility of the Army DCSPER and the Commander, U.S. Army Military Personnel Center. It was not until September 1987, after observers on the Cadet Command staff had a chance to become familiar with the existing system, that Cretella took control of the process.

Under DCSPER/Military Personnel Center auspices, accessioning was handled by a single annual board, which met in November. This board decided who would get a Regular Army commission and who would not, who
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would be placed on active duty and who would not, and the branch to which each commissionee, regardless of component or status, would be assigned. Representatives from each branch sat on the annual board.

Besides the obvious diffusion of authority and responsibility such a system entailed, this joint control over accessioning had several flaws. First, the annual board that made the accessioning decisions contained many members who had but a passing familiarity with ROTC and its cadet evaluation mechanisms. Even members who were ROTC graduates were often unclear about what the modern program was all about.

A second flaw involved the system's propensity for arbitrariness. Since many branch representatives on the board had little knowledge of how the program operated, their criteria for selecting cadets for their branch were often narrow and quirky. One year, for example, the Infantry Branch Chief instructed his representative on the board to select only those cadets who had attained an Advanced Camp score of 5—reserved for the top 10 percent of cadets. On another occasion, the Military Police Branch Chief indicated that he wanted only cadets with a grade point average of 3.0 and above.

The problem of arbitrariness was compounded by the single board format that ruled accessioning. In this system, one bad decision sent ripples throughout the entire boarding process. The Infantry Chief who insisted that only cadets with camp scores of 5 be allowed into his branch opened the way for such anomalies as a cadet with a 2.0 grade point average and a ranking at the bottom of the order of merit list back at home campus but who had performed well at a six-week camp to be selected over another cadet with a much higher overall evaluation but who had received a 4 or 3 at Advanced Camp. Because decisions about what type of commission was to be awarded (Regular Army or reserve) and whether or not an individual would be assigned to active duty were made by branch, anomalies of the type described above resulted in further inequities and the inefficient use of the human resources at the Army's disposal.

To eliminate these problems, Cretella placed a Cadet Command representative on each board. This representative guided the board in its deliberations and served as a source of information. The Personnel and Administration Division also split the accessioning process into three district components or phases. In Phase I, an order of merit list that rank-ordered every commissionee was developed using the composite score mentioned previously. Then, in the next phase, two decisions were made on every cadet: first, whether the individual in question would be given an active duty or reserve
assignment (active duty assignments were more sought after and tended to go to cadets on the higher end of the order of merit list) and, second, whether the individual would get a Regular Army or reserve commission (with Regular Army commissions generally reserved for cadets at the top of the order of merit list). Each cadet was assigned to a branch in the third and final phase of the accessioning process. The delinking of the discrete components of cadet accessioning dampened the rippling effect of initial bad decisions and greatly reduced if not completely eliminated the inequities and inanities that were so much a part of the previous system.\textsuperscript{44}
CHAPTER VI

ERA OF DOWNSIZING

The collapse of the Iron Curtain, the dissolution of the USSR's East European satellite governments, and the implosion of the Soviet state heralded a new era in global politics. These momentous events changed many of the fundamental strategic assumptions under which the Army had operated since 1945.

On 24 April 1990, coincident with the fourth annual Spring Review, Cadet Command conducted its first change of command. Reporting in as the new Commanding General from his previous position as Commander of the First ROTC Region was Major General Wallace C. Arnold. He had been commissioned in 1961 through the ROTC program at Hampton University in Hampton, Virginia and had served as Military Assistant and Executive Officer for the Office of the Under Secretary of the Army, Commander of the 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, and Director for Personnel and Administration of the U.S. European Command before taking over First Region in June 1987.¹

The circumstances and challenges facing Major General Arnold in the spring of 1990 were very different from those encountered by his predecessor when he assumed command in the spring of 1986. The collapse of the Iron Curtain, the dissolution of the USSR’s East European satellite governments, and the implosion of the Soviet state heralded a new era in global politics. These momentous events changed many of the fundamental strategic assumptions under which the Army had operated since 1945.

Beginning in the late 1980s, the Army saw its budget steadily shrink as the congressional focus shifted from containing the communist threat to reducing the national deficit. To help achieve this latter end, the Defense Department came out with a plan in the summer of 1990 to cut Active Army end...
strength from 750,000 to 580,000 by 1995. This was not ambitious enough for Congress. It set the goal at 520,000. Later, this number was lowered again—to 495,000.

To meet the congressionally-imposed end strength objectives, the Army had to reduce the flow of new officers and enlisted people into its ranks. Cadet Command, principally because it was the Army’s largest commissioning source and possessed no costly physical infrastructure, had to absorb the bulk of the officer reductions. In May 1990, the DCSPER slashed the command’s FY 1991 production mission from 7,800 to 5,800. Over the next several years, the command’s mission fell further—to 4,600. By 1998, the DCSPER told Cadet Command in September 1995, the ROTC production mission would stand at only 3,800.²

**Major General Arnold's Emphasis on Quality**

Major General Arnold viewed the post-Cold War demobilization in which the command was caught up as an opportunity to raise commissioning standards and produce a better junior officer for the Army. Fewer lieutenants, the
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theory was, meant better lieutenants, at least when considered in the aggregate. He gave explicit expression to this vision:

As the Army gets smaller, it is imperative that we increase the quality of our officer corps. During this austere period more than ever, vibrant leadership which vigorously recruits, trains and retains the best college students available, is needed to assure we are better in the future...

Building a Four-Year Program

When Arnold came to Fort Monroe, he brought with him a well-developed agenda, which he had put together during his three year tenure as First Region Commander. One item on that agenda called for the invigoration of the Junior ROTC program, to be discussed in Chapter 9. Another enjoined raising product quality by transforming the Senior ROTC into a predominantly four-year program. To the new Commanding General, the relationship between the four-year course and product quality was an extremely close one. He instructed his brigade commanders to: “Build your programs from the ground up. Four-year programs have the stability and continuity that produce the best lieutenants upon commissioning.”

To strengthen the four-year program, Major General Arnold effected a number of programmatic changes. One such change was the de-emphasis of Basic Camp. Brought into being by the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964, Basic Camp was a so-called lateral entry program, designed for students who for one reason or another did not complete the ROTC Basic Course. By substituting a six-week summer camp for the Basic Course, it allowed an individual to get a commission in two years. As a result of the Cadet Command Commander’s decision to restrict this avenue into the Advanced Course, Basic Camp attendance in 1991 hit a two-decade low. See Figure 6-1.

It was generally believed within Cadet Command Headquarters that Basic Camp turned out an inferior product. A considerable body of quantitative evidence lent support to this belief. Comparisons of grade point averages, Scholastic Aptitude Test scores, and Advanced Camp results all showed non-scholarship Basic Camp cadets at the bottom of the order of merit list.

There were two primary reasons for this qualitative inferiority, it was felt. Unlike the student who completed the on-campus Basic Course, the graduate of Basic Camp did not have a lengthy exposure to military skills, knowledge and traditions. Everything he knew about the Army came from
one compressed summer session. Secondly, the cadre who evaluated the leadership potential of Basic Camp cadets had only a month and a half to do their job. Their assessments of potential would by necessity be less thorough than the ones performed on Basic Course cadets, who the cadre could observe over a period of two years.  

Abolishing the two-year on-campus scholarship (also called the PMS incentive scholarship) at the beginning of School Year 1991-1992 was also, in part, a reflection of the Commanding General’s determination to bolster the four-year program (budget cuts likewise played a role). Before 1991, money had always been set aside for this type of award, which had the successful completion of Basic Camp as an eligibility prerequisite. Students vying for this scholarship did not have to face national competition, as was the case with most other varieties of award. PMSs could select almost any student they wanted, provided that the student in question met certain minimum qualifying criteria. Although it proved useful as a recruiting and retention device, it did not, in the main, attract into the ROTC a student of the highest caliber.

After seeing how the elimination of the PMS incentive scholarship played out on campus, however, Arnold came to the conclusion that he might have proceeded too hastily. His action did raise product quality but it also took a valuable tool away from the PMS and perhaps went too far in
promoting quality over quantity. After a period of deliberation, he made the decision to reinstate the incentive scholarship for School Year 1992-1993. To do this, Major General Arnold had to take funds away from the more competitive three- and four-year scholarship programs.6

Another move Major General Arnold made to enhance quality was to adjust the criteria used to measure unit success. Under Wagner, production totals were paramount. Arnold gave more weight to Advanced Camp scores and the academic mix ratio, factors used to assess quality in precommissioning preparation. So much weight was attached to Advanced Camp performance that, in some battalions, cadets who appeared incapable of achieving a superior summer rating were discouraged from continuing in the ROTC. With greater emphasis placed on the academic mix ratio, students pursuing “high tech” majors like engineering and physics were at a premium. In an era when the officer corps was shrinking, the feeling was, the command could afford to be more discriminating in the type of individual it commissioned.7

Elimination of the Early Commissioning Program

Of all the measures taken in the Arnold regime to promote product quality, the elimination of the Early Commissioning Program (ECP) in 1991 was perhaps the most far-reaching and consequential. After 1991, the program lived on only in the six Military Junior Colleges associated with Cadet Command. While downsizing pressures did not directly cause the abandonment of the Early Commissioning Program, they did create conditions that made the abandonment practicable.

The roots of the ECP went back to 1966. Prior to that year, the granting of an ROTC commission implied the concurrent award of a baccalaureate degree. To meet the manpower requirements of the Vietnam War, the Congress approved in 1966 a measure that allowed cadets at Military Junior Colleges who had completed all the requirements of the ROTC Advanced Course to be commissioned as second lieutenants and to be called to active duty. In some respects, it was an officer’s version of “McNamara’s 100,000”.8

After the war, widespread anti-military sentiment left over from Vietnam and the elimination of the draft led to officer recruiting problems, especially in the reserve components. To address these difficulties, the ECP was introduced in 1978. The program permitted cadets who had successfully completed Advanced Camp and their MS IV year but who had not yet earned their four-year degree to be commissioned in the reserves, provided that they were slotted against a valid lieutenant vacancy in a troop program unit.9
Despite the implementation of the Early Commissioning Program, the number of so-called completion students (i.e., those who had completed ROTC but had not yet received a degree) continued to increase. This increase was attributed to two principal reasons. First, more cadets were receiving credit for the Basic Course. Prior enlisted service, attendance for one year at a service academy, and the completion of three years of Junior ROTC all qualified students to enter directly into the Advanced Course. Secondly, students were taking longer to fulfill graduation requirements. Many “high-tech” disciplines such as engineering had evolved into essentially five-year programs. In addition, the rising costs of university attendance were forcing growing numbers of students to work at the same time as they were pursuing their degree, forcing many to postpone their graduation dates.¹⁰

The increasing number of completion students created headaches for the Army. Since many of them could not find a unit vacancy, they were not commissioned. Many eventually dropped out of school or transferred to another university and accountability was lost. According to the DCSROTC, approximately 1,000 cadets per year were being lost to the officer accessions system in the late seventies and early eighties. This represented an annual loss of one million dollars in subsistence payments.¹¹

To rectify the situation, the DCSPER authorized the initiation of the Commission of Completion Students Program in 1982. This program permitted cadets to be commissioned in the reserves without joining a unit and gave the Army some control over students who would otherwise have been lost to the system. After commissioning, these officers were assigned to the U.S. Army Reserve Control Group in St Louis, Missouri. Eventually, the term Commission of Completion Students Program was dropped and all completion students, whether they joined a reserve unit or not, were referred to as ECP officers.

Throughout the 1980s, the Early Commissioning Program played a big role in officer production. In some years, ECP officers constituted over 60 percent of all ROTC commissionees. See Figure 6-2. The program was a major financial incentive for students with prior military service. They could receive their commissions early and serve as officers in reserve units while still attending college. The program became extremely important to the National Guard and the Army Reserve. In 1984, the California Guard received 95 percent (74 out of 78) of its ROTC lieutenants from the Early Commissioning Program. The Army Reserve had a similar experience. Reserve component commanders felt that a lieutenant without a degree was
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better than no lieutenant at all.\textsuperscript{12}

But the Early Commissioning Program had a negative side. Since only officers with degrees could be considered for active duty upon commissioning, the perception arose that a lower caliber of officer was being sent into the reserves—a perception that was not entirely groundless. Both General Richardson and Wagner had felt this way. In June 1985, Richardson had told the DCSPER that the Early Commissioning Program was:

...fundamentally wrong and contrary to our efforts to upgrade quality. To allow thousands of officers, who are commissioned without a college degree, to serve in reserve units (TPU) lowers our standards and, in effect, establishes a double standard for the AC and the RC.\textsuperscript{13}

Although ECP officers were supposed to get their degrees eventually, many, due to academic failure, lack of motivation, or a shortage of financial resources, never did so. Some enrolled in college for the sole purpose of

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{rotc_commissions_1986-1992.png}
\caption{ROTIC Commissions: 1986 - 1992}
\end{figure}
obtaining a reserve commission; the thought of graduating never crossed their minds. Neither did ECP officers as a group perform well at Officer Basic Courses. Many had to wait several years after being commissioned to attend a basic course—the average period between graduation and commissioning for ECP cadets was 24 months. It was not surprising that many did not look or act particularly military when they reported and had difficulty passing the physical fitness test and meeting Army weight standards.

The Early Commissioning Program also adversely affected reserve unit readiness. The pursuit of a bachelor’s degree was, according to Army policy, to be the primary purpose of ECP officers. This meant that completion of a resident Officers Basic Course had to be postponed in many cases because basic course and academic schedules were impossible to reconcile. A six-month basic course simply could not be squeezed into a three-month academic summer break. Without completing a basic course, the ECP officer was nondeployable.

Major General Arnold’s recommendation to eliminate the Early Commissionary Program rested on three basic considerations. First, the program lowered product quality, a condition that, in the post-Cold War era, the command no longer had to tolerate. Second, the program had, for the time being, created a surplus of lieutenants in the Individual Ready Reserve. This surplus could be drawn upon to fill shortages that did occur. Third, the downsizing of the Army reduced officer production requirements.

It was this final consideration—reduced officer production requirements—that perhaps carried the greatest weight. Richardson and Wagner had tried to do away with the Early Commissioning Program but were prevented from doing so by the determined resistance of the program’s supporters in Congress. This resistance was led by congressional backers of the Military Junior Colleges, who viewed the program’s abolition as the death knell of the institutions they were trying to protect. And, in fact, the Early Commissioning Program was one of the most powerful incentives that these junior colleges had in their recruiting arsenal. By 1991, however, the necessity for cutting back on officer output had become apparent even to the most fervent champions of the junior colleges and the ECP. Bowing to the inevitable, they acquiesced in the ECP’s demise, at least for the most part. They did manage to insert in the legislation that abolished the Early Commissioning Program a proviso directing that the program would be kept alive in the six Military Junior Colleges affiliated with the Army ROTC.
Elimination and Reinstatement of the Active Guard/Reserve Force

As the demobilization proceeded in the early 1990s, the Army ROTC program was subjected to severe personnel reduction pressures from a number of quarters. Two overarching factors made the command more vulnerable to these pressures than most other Army organizations. One was that it was generally considered, especially by Army personnel managers, a manpower intensive enterprise that could be cut without affecting the quality of the precommissioning experience. Stationing five or six cadre members at one university was a luxury, it was believed, that the Army could no longer afford; two or three instructors could effectively run even the largest unit. After all, how difficult and time-consuming could it be, many asked, to teach a couple of classes a week and conduct an occasional field training exercise? Cadet Command found itself constantly battling these antiquated and erroneous notions of ROTC instructor duty. A second reason for its vulnerability was related to the lack of an ROTC constituency within the ranks of the Army’s senior leaders. Unlike Military Academy graduates, ROTC graduates did not band together or present a common front on issues affecting precommissioning education and training. They tended to give their allegiance to the institution from which they graduated, not to the ROTC. When Cadet Command faced manpower losses, few rushed to its defense.16

Arnold’s biggest test in the personnel arena came in 1991 when an effort was made to take all full-time reservists out of Cadet Command. The assignment of Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) officers to ROTC units began in 1981 when, as part of the Expand the Base initiative, 101 officers in the grades of captain and major reported to ROTC Instructor Groups at selected host institutions scattered across the country. The goal of the Army at that time was to have a National Guard or Reserve officer at each of the extant host colleges and universities (314 at the time), a goal that was achieved by School Year 1983-1984. During that year, TRADOC, in response to an Army directive to boost ROTC officer production, ordered an increase in cadre strength and established a production efficiency target of six commissionees to one cadre member. To accomplish this end, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army approved the assignment of an additional complement of 314 AGR officers to the ROTC program. This new complement was to be phased in during FY 1985 and FY 1986. By the end of the latter year, there were to be two reservists at each host campus (one Army Reserve, one National Guard) and the
total reserve officer commitment to ROTC was to rise to 628. This target was achieved and in the five years after FY 1986, AGR strength remained in the 600-plus range.\textsuperscript{17}

In FY 1991, however, two events occurred which drastically cut AGR strength. One was the inactivation of 62 ROTC units, part of Operation Horizon— to be discussed in Chapter 8. These inactivations brought total AGR authorizations down to 550. The second, more far-reaching event came as a result of the congressional approval of the FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act. The act, in effect, prohibited the assignment of full-time reservists to the ROTC program after 30 September 1991. Section 687 was added to Chapter 39, Title 10, U.S. Code; it read,

\begin{quote}
...A member of a reserve component serving on active duty or full-time National Guard duty for the purpose of administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve components may not be assigned to duty with a unit of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

The passage of the act stunned Cadet Command. It was known that AGR strength was to be reduced by 30 percent over the next six years in consonance with the institutional drawdown projected by Operation Horizon. But no one in the ROTC community had a presentiment that such a radical initiative was in the offing.\textsuperscript{19} It was apparent that since AGR officers constituted fully a third of ROTC cadre strength nationwide, their withdrawal from campuses by the September 30 deadline would have disastrous results.

Accordingly, appeals were made to Congress in an attempt to soften the impact of the legislation. Senator John Glenn of Ohio made it known that he for one considered the use of full-time reserve officers as ROTC instructors an abuse of the original intent of the Active Guard/Reserve program and would not weaken in his resolve to rid ROTC of all AGRs by the end of FY 1991.\textsuperscript{20} Fortunately for Cadet Command, a majority of his colleagues in the House and Senate recognized the impracticability of such a precipitous move and approved a measure, incorporated into the FY 1992 National Defense Authorization Act, which allowed a phased reduction of AGR personnel by normal attrition.

Concerns about economy, reserve readiness and functional efficiency motivated congressional proponents of the AGR ban. A Senate Armed Services Committee report noted that although the Army’s ROTC program was a direct source of officers for selected reserve units, the duties of an ROTC
instructor could be performed by active component soldiers and did not specifically require reserve expertise. Moreover, many decision makers believed that AGR officers could be better employed elsewhere. An ROTC assignment, they felt, contributed little to reserve readiness and therefore represented a waste of both time and money. Some legislators even saw the use of full-time reserve officers in ROTC units as an attempt to circumvent the congressionally mandated end strength of the Army.21

Not everyone in the Army favored the assignment of AGR personnel to ROTC units. Senior Guard and Reserve leaders had indicated in the past that they would prefer to employ their full time personnel in other ways—to bolster the support given to troop program units, for example. Like some legislators, they viewed the reserve ROTC instructor program as detracting from their primary mission. Many active component officers also wanted AGR officers taken out of cadet battalions. Reserve instructors, they felt, did not project the appropriate image or possess the necessary experience to be entrusted with the task of shaping and mentoring future officers.

Congressional approval of a phased elimination of reserve instructors gave the command some breathing room but did not solve its fundamental dilemma. It was clear that unless the AGR force was reinstated, there would be tough times ahead for the ROTC. Accordingly, Cadet Command began a campaign to garner congressional support for an AGR restoration. Letters were sent to Congress explaining the importance of the AGR contribution to the ROTC and pointing out the adverse effects that would inevitably follow a reserve pullback. Major General Arnold took a personal hand in this effort and used all the formal and informal tools at his disposal to get the command’s case across to the appropriate people.22

Representatives from Cadet Command stressed five principal reasons for continued reserve involvement in ROTC. First, the Army was the only service that commissioned ROTC lieutenants directly into the reserve. Until the early nineties, over 50 percent of the annual intake of new lieutenants into the reserve components came from ROTC. Second, the reserve component presence on campus was necessary to “sell” reserve duty as a service option and to provide role models and advisers for aspiring reserve officers. Third, AGR officers were necessary to manage those programs designed exclusively for the reserve. These programs included the Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty Scholarship program—intended to attract high quality lieutenants into the Guard and Reserve—and the Simultaneous Membership Program, which enabled cadets to serve in reserve units while attending college. Fourth, AGR
Cadro members established close working relationships with local reserve units, thus permitting ROTC cadets to take advantage of training resources, equipment and professional development opportunities otherwise not available. The training programs of some battalions were almost totally dependent upon reserve support. Last, AGR officers were uniquely qualified to instruct and advise cadets on reserve component issues and concerns such as home station drill periods, annual training, mobilization planning and personnel management systems. Few active component officers were sufficiently familiar with the complexities and peculiarities of the reserve system to explain them to cadets.\textsuperscript{23}

Cadet Command also emphasized the wider implications that the AGR withdrawal held in store. It would, in the words of one full-time reservist, take the “R” out of ROTC and give the program even more of an active duty orientation than it already had. Moreover, the AGR ban would entail a manpower loss that, together with the already scheduled drawdown of active duty cadre, would result in the closure of an estimated 100 heretofore productive ROTC units (a 29 percent reduction in the national total).\textsuperscript{24}

In the end, the arguments advanced by Cadet Command and its allies at the Department of the Army and in Congress carried the day—at least partially. The FY 1993 Defense Authorization Act repealed the AGR ban and recognized the contribution that full-time reserve officers made to the ROTC program. Major General Arnold requested a total AGR authorization of 275, which equated to one reservist for each host college and university. This was far below where the authorization had stood two years before but it was much better than zero. The Congress gave Arnold 200 of the reservists he had requested.

Over the course of the next year, Cadet Command pressed to get the additional 75 AGR officers it felt it needed. Again, the command got its way with Congress. The FY 1994 Defense Authorization Act raised the AGR authorization level to 275. But Cadet Command soon learned that victory in Congress did not necessarily mean victory in the field. The National Guard and Army Reserve, who were also feeling the effects of demobilization, told Cadet Command that they did not have the 75 additional officers authorized by Congress available for assignment. The command would simply have to make do with the 200 full-time reservists it currently had.\textsuperscript{25}
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Change in Command Functions

In 1991, Major General Arnold decided to adjust the functional rubric under which the command operated. This functional adjustment represented the command’s response to the new and more austere post-Cold War political and social environment and reflected its organizational maturation. Arnold had the list of six functions for the Senior ROTC program bequeathed to him by his predecessor, Major General Wagner, expanded and modified. See Table 1.

<table>
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<th>ARNOLD</th>
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<td>Recruit</td>
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<td>*Select</td>
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<td></td>
<td>*Access</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Denotes functions that appear on only one list.

Under Arnold, Cadet Command added the market function to emphasize to everyone involved in the ROTC program that something more than recruiting, as that term had been traditionally understood in the ROTC community, was now necessary. In the mid-to late eighties, when money was relatively plentiful and the military was generally looked upon as a desirable and stable career option, traditional recruiting methods sufficed. But by the early 1990s, perceptions had changed. Seemingly endless rounds of base closures and personnel cutbacks convinced many that a military career was no longer a secure proposition. A more comprehensive and broadly based approach to informing the collegiate community about the program had to be taken. Cadre now had to be marketing agents as well as recruiters.

But college and college-bound students were not the only targets Cadet Command Headquarters had in mind when it added market to the functions
list. The new function was also intended to encompass senior Army leaders. It was these senior leaders who determined how the Army’s dwindling supplies of money, people and resources were distributed among subordinate elements. In an era of scarcity, Cadet Command had to sell itself to this influential group or face organizational decline—perhaps even extinction.28 Evaluate and access replaced select on the command function list. This change reflected more than anything else the command’s maturation as an organization. Wagner had emphasized select because, at the time he arrived on the scene, the ROTC was not doing a very good job of culling unsuitable officer candidates from its ranks. By the time Arnold assumed command, this was no longer a problem. Consequently, Arnold and his personnel chief, Colonel Joe Cretella, shifted the command’s focus to another area—that of cadet accessioning of which evaluation was an important part.

In the world of precommissioning military training, accessioning referred to the process by which cadets were brought into the Army. It involved, among other things, evaluating officer potential, assessing military and academic records, assigning branches, determining the type of duty (active or reserve) to be assigned and the type of commission (regular or reserve) to be awarded, and scheduling attendance at an Officer Basic Course. At the Military Academy, the process was simple. Branches were assigned on the basis of class rank. Everyone, until recently at least, went on active duty and reported to a branch basic course approximately two months after commissioning. Officials at the academy oversaw the entire operation.

Accessioning in the ROTC was a much more complex enterprise. All cadets obviously did not graduate in June, as at the Military Academy, and did not receive their commission at the same time. This greatly complicated Officer Basic Course scheduling. Prior to 1991, it was not uncommon for cadets to wait an entire year between commissioning and reporting to their basic course. The scheduling problem was particularly acute in the case of commissionees assigned to the Aviation Branch where the difficulties caused by a multiplicity of commissioning dates were compounded by a shortage of aircraft at the Aviation School. The shortage severely limited class size. In addition to representing a loss to the Army, the hiatus between commissioning and attendance at a branch basic course created difficulties for the newly commissioned lieutenant who often had a hard time finding meaningful employment during this period. For individuals going into the reserves, it often meant that they had to place the pursuit of their long-term career goals on hold for months. Establishing an order of merit list (or almost anything else for that
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matter) for individuals coming from the hundreds of different institutions that were affiliated in some way with the ROTC also presented major challenges.29

Many accessioning problems could be traced to the unwieldy and fragmented organization that regulated this process. In 1991, numerous Army organizations ran a portion of it. The DCSPER, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, eighteen branch chiefs, and Cadet Command all played semi-autonomous roles. Together, Arnold and Cretella engineered a mechanism by which Cadet Command was inserted into each step of the accessioning process, starting with the cadet’s completion of ROTC Advanced Camp and ending with his reporting to an Officer Basic Course. Other agencies remained involved but Cadet Command’s influence became pervasive and, in most respects, dominant. What the Army once approached in a fragmented way was now handled in an integrated fashion. To be sure, the new arrangement did not change things overnight. Difficulties remained. There were, for example, still cases of delayed entry into the basic course. Yet the contrast with the old accessioning system was, by the time Major General Arnold relinquished command, very evident.30

The addition of access to the command’s list of essential functions had another purpose. Prior to 1990, accessioning had a very narrow meaning in the ROTC, at least at many schools. For the cadre, it often consisted of having MS IV cadets fill out a preference statement, indicating whether they wanted to go on active duty or into the reserves and listing their branch preference (or, to be more exact, their branch preferences, since they were required to list three choices). The whole process took several days. During Arnold’s tenure in command, access came to connote a mentoring process instead of a two or three day flurry of administrative activity. Cadre were charged with the responsibility of helping cadets make an informed choice about an Army career. Part of this involved explaining to them how their initial choices would affect their subsequent career in the Army. Much of this mentoring could fit under the rubric of “service orientation,” which, according to CONARC and TRADOC records, had never been a forte of the Army ROTC program. The listing of access as an essential function at the very least focused attention on this heretofore largely neglected aspect of the command’s mission.31
Lyle Takes Command

On 17 June 1993, Major General Arnold handed over the command of the U.S. Army ROTC Cadet Command to Major General James M. Lyle. Arnold left Fort Monroe to become the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in Headquarters, Department of the Army. He could leave with a feeling of satisfaction because he had accomplished most of the major goals he had set for the command. The Junior ROTC was booming (see Chapter 9), product quality had never been higher, and the proportion of four-year progression cadets in the Advanced Course had increased by 10 percent (from 50 to 60 percent).

Lyle had been commissioned in 1962 from the ROTC program at William and Mary College in Williamsburg, Virginia. He came to Cadet Command from the Pentagon where he had been the Director of Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Prior to that, he had been the Commander, Combined Arms Training Activity, Deputy Commanding General for Training, Combined Arms Command, and Commander, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.

His long experience as a trainer had prepared Major General Lyle for the precommissioning training responsibilities that he inherited. However, as Lyle himself soon discovered after his arrival at Fort Monroe, it was not the command’s training function that was having problems. It was recruiting. In fact, in the early 1990s, the effectiveness of the ROTC training program and the high quality of the Cadet Command product were recognized throughout the Army. Testimonials from general officers, branch basic course performance date, and input from the field all testified to the command’s success in this area.

Unfortunately, recruiting and officer production were altogether different stories. The new Cadet Command Commander was frankly startled when he found out about sinking officer production. It had plummeted by almost 50 percent and total enrollment by over 40 percent since the late 1980s. Analysts on the Cadet Command staff warned him that, under the prevailing conditions, the command faced the distinct possibility of being unable to produce enough officers to accommodate the stated needs of the Active Army, let alone meet its reserve officer production goals, in the near future.

During the Arnold years, ROTC production shortfalls occurred but they were not a source of major concern. The production missions, or objectives, that the Army had given Cadet Command had been “soft,” that is, the Army
had assigned them without being certain of exactly how many officers it would need in the future. This was to be expected because, as we have seen, Army end strength projections were being constantly adjusted downward. The tendency on the Army Staff was to err on the side of caution and set the goal on the high side of what was felt to be necessary.

The existence of a commissioning queue in the early nineties was another factor that worked to lessen Army concerns about officer output. This queue was the natural result of the ROTC being an essentially four-year program. At the beginning of School Year 1990-1991, freshmen, sophomores, and juniors were lined up, waiting for graduation and commissioning, which for most of them lay years in the future. These cadets could not be summarily dismissed from the program unless the Army was willing to break its commitment to them, which, for a variety of ethical, financial and public relations reasons, it was not. In any event, it is doubtful that the Congress would have sanctioned such a move. As it was, the Command had to resort to a voluntary release program in 1991 to avoid overproduction. More than 1,000 Advanced Course cadets took advantage of this option and walked away from their military
obligation. But to accommodate those cadets in the queue who did want a commission, ROTC production had to be reduced more gradually than actual Army requirements dictated. That is one reason why when in 1992 the command fell 500 short of its assigned production mission, no one in the Pentagon was too concerned.

By the time Major General Lyle arrived at Fort Monroe, conditions had changed. The queue had disappeared. Cadet Command over the previous several years had reduced enrollment levels and curtailed recruiting efforts, especially at the battalion level, to correspond to decreased production requirements. The Army also had a better, if not exactly clear, view what its eventual end state would likely be in the post-Cold War era. Lyle’s initial estimate of the situation was that if the command wanted to meet the 4,500 production mission that the Department of the Army had set for it, it had better get its recruiting and marketing apparatus back in high gear immediately. Arnold had become concerned about the production mission during his last months as commander but, due to the short amount of time left to him, could do little about it.

The new commander’s sense of urgency was further heightened by his worries about the future state of the Individual Ready Reserve, a pool of reserve soldiers managed and administered by the Army Reserve Personnel Center in Saint Louis, Missouri. The Army relied upon this manpower pool for individual replacements and augmentees in emergencies. By the summer of 1993, it was becoming apparent to some observers, Major General Lyle prominent among them, that the Individual Ready Reserve was not an inexhaustible resource. The glut of junior officers that had accumulated in this pool in the late eighties and early nineties coincident with the post-Cold War demobilization would begin to dry up after mid-decade as the eight-year military obligation of these individuals began to expire. If the Army did not act soon and make provision for restocking this pool, the feeling was, it could find itself in a critical situation in a few years.34

Major General Lyle attacked the problem on three fronts. First, he pointed out to all senior Army leaders who would listen that Cadet Command had a recruiting and production problem. With the Army shrinking in size and the Individual Ready Reserve brimming with officers, many found this difficult to believe. The new commander explained that, in order for Cadet Command to accomplish its mission, he had to project two to six years into the future. He had arrived at Fort Monroe in June 1993; anything he might do to increase output would not begin to register until the summer of 1995 and the full effects
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of any action would not be felt until the summer of 1997. This meant that tomorrow’s projected officer production shortfall must be addressed today.  

Second, Major General Lyle “turned up the heat” on the ROTC cadre in the recruiting arena. Before his appearance on the scene, discussions about summer camp and other training issues dominated the agenda in command councils; after his arrival, recruiting took top billing. The message to battalion commanders was unmistakable — they were expected to shift gears and refocus on the officer production mission.

Finally, the new commander, responding to a request he had received from the Army Chief of Staff, directed his staff to explore ways for Cadet Command to accomplish its mission more efficiently and more economically. Alternative staffing proposals, various school closure plans (which focused on eliminating ROTC battalions at those institutions that were either ineffective or inefficient producers of officers), an Army version of the Marine Corps’ Platoon Leader’s Course along with a number of other schemes were studied with an eye toward boosting and, at the same time, reducing the costs of officer production.  

Officer Production in the Post-Cold War Era

During the tenures of both Arnold and Lyle, Cadet Command fell short of its officer production goals. See Figure 6-3. While the command turned out a sufficient number of new second lieutenants to meet Active Army requirements, it consistently missed its reserve objective. The reasons behind this production slump were numerous and complex. Before going on, some of the more significant of these reasons will be briefly discussed. This will help the reader more fully understand subsequent sections of this book and add to a comprehension of why, in a time of demobilization, production could still be a very real problem.

Declining Propensity

In the early nineties, the Army, along with the rest of the services, lost some of its allure with young men (but not, it seems, with women). The Defense Department’s Youth Attitude Tracking Study indicated that the willingness of young males between the ages of 16 and 18 to enlist in the military dropped off dramatically after 1990. Interest among the 19-21 age group also declined. This trend affected the ROTC as much as it did the rest of the Army. Lieutenant Colonel Greg McGuickin, the Army’s marketing and advertising chief, called
the drop-off in “propensity” (or inclination to join the military) “alarming” and warned: “It’s getting worse, and there’s no indication it’ll get better right away.”

Being killed or being posted to some remote corner of the earth might have been a factor in this decline in propensity but, according to the results of the tracking survey, it was by no means the dominant one. The negative image created by downsizing and cutbacks seemed to have been a much more powerful force. Base closings, forced early retirements, involuntary separations, and reductions in Army end strength all did their part in convincing many young Americans that the Army no longer offered the prospect of a stable and long-term career. Neither did press reports featuring former or retired service members who were finding it difficult to get a permanent job after separating from the service help matters. Such stories had a particularly strong effect on college students who were anxious to launch their careers. Talk about the changing roles of the Army and the pervasive, if erroneous, notion that the Army was becoming obsolete in the post-Cold War era reinforced the perception of irrelevancy and instability brought on by the drawdown.37

Many saw the transformation that the Army had undergone over the past several years as ushering in a period in which the status of the military officer
would be steadily reduced. With the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat, military leaders seemed less vital to national security and well-being than they once were. The skills, knowledge and perspective they brought to national decision-making councils also appeared less relevant. Getting a commission no longer seemed to be one of the primary avenues to the top.38

**Declining Advertising Budget**

Compounding the problems posed by a declining propensity for military service among the young was a sharp reduction in the amount of money available for advertising. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the command saw its advertising budget steadily shrink; after 1991, the budgetary decline was precipitous (See Table 2). It was ironic that the advertising budget was slashed just when advertising dollars were most needed.

**Table 2**

Cadet Command Advertising Budget 39 1980-1995

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*Estimated totals as of 24 January 1996
U.S. ARMY CADET COMMAND: THE 10 YEAR HISTORY

Fewer advertising dollars, of course, made the task of keeping the face of the Army and ROTC before the American public much more difficult. Wide and frequent public exposure was increasingly critical in an era when the military was steadily losing popularity as a career option. Complicating things still further, Cadet Command market analysts noted a declining benefit from past advertising campaigns. All this meant trouble for a program that needed to garner all the positive publicity it could to hold its own in an increasingly competitive academic marketplace.

Increased Market Competition

The intense competition that the Army ROTC encountered in the academic marketplace also took a toll on enrollment. Capable students were in great demand. Corporate America as well as the other military services were doing everything in their power to lure these students into their ranks, including offering them attractive scholarship packages. Colleges and universities themselves were willing to provide highly qualified applicants with financial incentives far more lucrative than anything the Army could offer.

Attracting talented minority students into the program posed particular difficulties. In addition to the competition it faced from the academic and business communities, the command had to contend with the resistance of some Afro-American leaders who no longer viewed the Army as a path for upward social mobility. In fact, many of these leaders discouraged young black Americans from pursuing a career in the military. Rather than devote their talents to national defense, young blacks were urged to enter fields and professions that offered greater financial rewards and were afforded greater societal respect.

Increased Time to Graduate

The fact that by the early 1990s it took longer for the average student to complete a baccalaureate degree also hurt enrollment. College was not, and for many had not been for some time, a four-year proposition. In 1993, the average length of time for a student to complete an undergraduate degree stood at approximately 5.5 years.

Difficult economic times and tuition hikes certainly helped explain this trend. Students had to work longer and harder to put themselves through school. Reductions in federal funding for colleges and universities also had an effect. Fewer government dollars meant fewer faculty members which in turn meant fewer course offerings. Moreover, the faculty that did remain felt intense
pressure to compete for income-generating research grants—an activity that took time away from their teaching responsibilities.

Students were often caught in a crunch having both less time to study and fewer course offerings from which to choose. On many campuses, students found it difficult to get the courses they needed. The problem was particularly acute in the California state system. There, some students had to wait until their senior year to take English 101, a basic prerequisite for graduation.

The lengthening of the undergraduate experience had a number of untoward consequences for the ROTC program. One was an increased drop-out rate. The longer students extended their college career, research indicated, the lower were their chances of graduating. With the virtual elimination of the Early Commissioning Program in 1991, an individual without a degree, even though he might have successfully completed all prescribed ROTC course work and training, was ineligible for a commission. Another consequence was the aggravation of ROTC academic alignment problems, which arose when cadets took five or six, instead of four years to graduate. Enrollment data showed that attrition rates for so called completion cadets, i.e., cadets who have met all ROTC commissioning requirements except for the attainment of a baccalaureate degree, were every bit as high as those for cadets enrolled in the ROTC Advanced Course.

Financial Squeeze/Time Constraints

Skyrocketing college costs compelled many students to work to finance their education. According to a 1994 Cadet Command survey, approximately 67 percent of Army ROTC cadets were employed. Students who worked to put themselves through school often felt that they did not have time for a demanding program like the ROTC. It was not uncommon for cadets in the ROTC Advanced Course to spend 18 to 20 hours per week during the academic year in ROTC-related activities. Cadets also had to devote most of one summer to ROTC Advanced Camp—a summer that would otherwise have been available to earn money in a more remunerative undertaking. Many students could not, or believed they could not, withstand the financial loss that participation in the ROTC sometimes entailed.

The Defense Department's Exclusionary Policy

The Defense Department's exclusionary policy toward homosexuals was another factor that, in the opinion of many in Cadet Command, worked to lower ROTC production totals. That policy prohibited military officials from
asking about a recruit’s sexual orientation but at the same time barred homosexual service members from declaring their sexual preference or from engaging in homosexual conduct. Certain academic officials, faculty members and student groups on campuses across the nation viewed the policy as a form of discrimination based on sexual orientation and as a violation of institutional policy. In many instances, the ROTC program became the focus of opposition to the rule.\textsuperscript{46}

In 1994, the issue sparked controversy at a number of Army ROTC-affiliated colleges. Spirited debate about or protests against the exclusionary rule took place at the University of Arizona, the University of Connecticut, the University of New Hampshire, the University of Northern Iowa, Texas Tech University, the University of California at Berkeley, California State University at Sacramento, and San Jose State University. In the autumn of 1994, a Rutgers University dean proposed that the university terminate its association with the ROTC because it discriminated against homosexuals. A panel was put together to consider the proposal. At the University of California at Los Angeles, the Defense Department’s homosexual policy brought forth a similar motion to sever the university’s relationship with the Army. If UCLA and Rutgers eliminated the program, they would have been following the lead of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, the California State University at Chico, and the California State University at Sacramento— institutions that had already or were on the verge of banning precommissioning military training from their premises.\textsuperscript{47}

All schools that had difficulty with the policy did not take such drastic action. Some merely disassociated themselves with the exclusionary rule by placing special statements in university catalogues and associated documents. The effect of all this on recruiting was problematic, but Major General Lyle estimated in 1995 that the program was “fragile” on about 20 percent of ROTC-affiliated campuses as a result of this question.\textsuperscript{48}

Cadet Command sought to be relieved of the Department of Defense imposed requirement to brief all non-contracted Basic Course cadets on the exclusionary rule. It took this stance because non-contracted MS Is and MS IIs did not incur a military obligation when they enrolled in ROTC courses and the requirement, it was believed, was a disincentive to participation in the program. The move was, in fact, in consonance with a larger effort spearheaded by the Commanding General to remove all unnecessary barriers to enrollment.\textsuperscript{49}
Department of the Army Complacency

Despite the unenviable production track record in the 1990s, authorities at the Department of the Army were not overly concerned about the shortfalls. Their unconcern was at least partly attributable to the fact that Cadet Command always achieved its active duty objective; it was the reserve components that have suffered the shortages. In 1994, for example, Cadet Command met its active duty mission of 3,078 officers, but fell 576 short of its reserve goal. The active component simply did not see underproduction as its problem.

The indifference of the reserve components to the production shortfalls reinforced the active component attitude. Reserve force structure was being reduced and the Individual Ready Reserve was filled to excess. Army Reserve leaders, far from being worried about not having enough lieutenants, were worried that they were getting too many and pressed for a reduction in the number of accessions from the ROTC. They pointed out that, in any case, they did not have enough money to send all the lieutenants that were being commissioned to their basic branch Officer Basic Course. Some officers suspected that the reserve position had more to do with priorities than with money. High priority projects were funded, low priority ones were not.

Certain analytical difficulties clouded the picture even more. Both the Army Reserve and the National Guard had in the past reportedly had trouble in determining just how many new officers they needed each year. In the environment in which the armed services had to operate in the 1990s, where personnel and force structure cuts followed one another in rapid succession, this was not difficult to understand.

Personnel Shortages

Personnel cutbacks constrained Cadet Command’s recruiting and officer production capabilities. At the national and regional levels, Cadet Command Headquarters and the various regional headquarters spearheaded the marketing and recruiting effort. Recruiting for a specific ROTC program, however, could only be done on or near the campus in question by the local ROTC cadre and cadet battalion. In any unit, there were a variety of administrative, training and instructional tasks that had to be accomplished. Unfortunately for the production mission, this left recruiting as the only discretionary part of the battalion’s activity schedule. When personnel cuts came, it was the recruiting function that suffered first.

After 1990, Cadet Command saw its manning level steadily reduced. (See Table 3). Until 1993, TRADOC was able to avoid the full effects of these
reductions by drawing on the glut of officers created by the drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe. That source dried up in 1993 and TRADOC was forced to make some unpleasant choices. General Frederick Franks, the TRADOC Commander, found it impossible to support service schools, battle labs, Cadet Command and “excepted” activities like the Command and General Staff College and the Combat Training Centers at past levels. On 30 July 1993, he told the Army Chief of Staff that “unless other directed,” he intended to fill “excepted” activities at 90 percent and Cadet Command at 80-85 percent of their authorized level under the TRADOC Officer Distribution Plan.54

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A particularly heavy blow fell at the beginning of School Year 1993-1994, when Cadet Command lost its “must fill” status with the U.S. Army Personnel Command, the organization responsible for allocating active component officers throughout the Army. After that time, Cadet Command had to compete with other organizations for the dwindling pool of high quality officers. The Active Guard/Reserve officer shortage also hurt. In January 1996, the command still had only 202 of the 275 full-time reservists authorized by Congress. Major General Lyle had, over the previous two years, made numerous appeals to the Army Staff and the heads of both the National Guard and the Army Reserve, requesting that they provide Cadet Command with the additional 73 officers, but to no avail. The Simultaneous Membership Program particularly suffered from this shortage since fewer AGR officers were on hand to publicize the benefits of belonging to a reserve unit.56

College and university officials whose ROTC units were threatened with closure for producing too few officers upbraided the Army for not providing enough instructors to get the job done. The Army, it seemed to these officials, was placing them in an impossible situation. “It baffles me to know,” wrote Hazo W. Carter, the President of West Virginia State College, “that the Army can provide inadequate support and then threaten the college with
the possibility of closure.\textsuperscript{57} Frank D. Brown, the President of Columbus College, asserted that—

...I do not believe there is any way to achieve the assigned mission in our ROTC activity until we have the number of officers we are authorized...I feel strongly that we have not been supported in good faith fashion but we are moving forward with a genuine team spirit at Columbus College.\textsuperscript{58}

The President of Michigan Tech, Curtis J. Thomkins, contrasted the Army’s support of the ROTC program with that of the Air Force:

...Adequate staffing with quality cadre and continuity are critical elements which will have an immediate impact on the success of Michigan Tech’s Army ROTC Program. Despite manpower reductions in both services, the Air Force has been able to maintain a fully staffed ROTC cadre. Unfortunately, the Army has not done so.\textsuperscript{59}

The situation would have been even more dismal had not the Personnel Command permitted the assignment of non-branch qualified captains to ROTC duty. These recently promoted captains, who were to serve a 24-month instead of the normal 36-month ROTC tour of duty, started to arrive on campus at the beginning of 1994. By November 1995, there were 217 of them in the command. Prior to this, only experienced captains who had already commanded a company were permitted to serve as ROTC instructors. If the expedient of assigning non-branch-qualified officers to the command had not been adopted, the command’s assigned officer strength would have been 34 percent instead of 24 percent below the 1990 level. In terms of training effectiveness, the use of non-branch-qualified captains was a success, at least in the opinion of the Cadet Command Commander. Major General Lyle on several occasions expressed his satisfaction with the performance of these, as he referred to them, “high quality officers.”\textsuperscript{60}

But the employment of these junior officers represented something of a risk—both for Cadet Command and for the officer involved. It was a risk born of necessity. The Army in the autumn of 1993 simply did not have enough branch-qualified captains to go around. Cadet Command Headquarters initially had some reservations about how well these comparatively inexperienced
captains would do in an ROTC battalion. They without question could teach any subject in the precommissioning program of instruction. But could they, with their shallow military background, effectively act as role models and mentors for cadets. The answer, it turned out, was yes but it took some time for the command to be certain that this was the case.

An ROTC assignment was a dangerous career proposition for the non-branch qualified captain. This was because, in order to become branch-qualified and hence eligible for promotion, an officer had to command a company. There were no companies to command in the ROTC world. Even if the non-branch qualified captain was assigned to a tactical unit (where there were plenty of companies to command) after he completed his ROTC tour, his problems would be far from over. In fact, they would have just begun because the contemporaries of the non-branch qualified captain would have arrived at the tactical unit at least two years previously, and would be at the head of the command “queue”—i.e., the list of captains waiting for a command. The non-branch qualified officer would have to take his place at the end of the queue and wait another two or three years before being given such an opportunity. By the time he did arrive at the head of the queue, it would be too late. He would have already been rejected for promotion. His career would be for all practical purposes at an end.

To protect the career prospects of the non-branch qualified officers in his command, Lyle took two steps. First, he guaranteed that all of these officers would attend the resident phase of the Combined Arms Service Staff School upon completion of their ROTC assignment. Like company command, this school was prerequisite for promotion to major. He also extracted a verbal agreement from the DCSPER that, for command purposes, time spent in an ROTC battalion would count as time in the command queue in a tactical unit. This would mean that the non-branch qualified captains would be on an equal footing with their contemporaries who were posted directly to a tactical assignment. How effective the verbal agreement will prove to be will not be known until the late spring of 1996 when the first non-branch qualified captains begin to show up at tactical units.61

Personnel Turbulence

Personnel turbulence exacerbated the problems caused by officer shortages. Cadet Command's high turnover rate of over 400 officers per year (representing over 35 percent of assigned officer strength) placed a tremendous burden on the remaining ROTC faculty and disrupted the continuity of many
units. Many officers accepted the Voluntary Separation Incentive or the Selective Separation Bonus, incentive measures intended to help the Army achieve congressionally mandated manpower reductions, shortly after their posting to Cadet Command. In most cases, these officers then left the Army from 90 days to six months after they submitted the appropriate paperwork. The problem with this, from the Cadet Command perspective, was that the officer assignment system did not replace these individuals in a timely fashion. Many units had to operate with a diminished staff for extended periods.

The problem became particularly acute when the Professor of Military Science—the senior officer on campus and head of the ROTC program—decided or was forced to retire. Because the Personnel Command assigned many “at risk” field grade officers (i.e., who face the distinct possibility of being involuntarily retired) to Cadet Command, many campuses were assigned a succession of PMSs who served for only a brief time and then left.

In 1992, for instance, the PMS was replaced in 97 out of 175 host institutions. This represented a much higher than average turnover rate since many PMSs were on four-year tours or had extended their normal three-year assignments. A significant portion of the 97 officers mentioned above were victims of the Selective Early Retirement Board. Many ROTC programs fell victim to successive involuntary separation boards. The Chancellor of Vanderbilt University told of the ill effects such a succession of events had on the ROTC program on his campus:

...the students (i.e., the ROTC cadets at Vanderbilt University) were not well served by the Army. They had three Army ROTC Directors in three years. ...the Army did not do as good a job as it might in providing stable leadership...given serious lack of continuity by Army personnel, I am not surprised by your assessment that our students do not perform well at camp.

And the Vanderbilt case was not the most egregious one. Texas Christian University had five PMSs in four years and Texas A&M had six in five years.

The disproportionately large number of “at risk” officers assigned to ROTC duty added to the problem of personnel turbulence. The command’s selection rate for attendance at the Command and General Staff College was 11 percent while that of the Army as a whole was 21 percent. Its promotion rate from major to lieutenant colonel was also significantly below the Army
average (20 percent versus 65 percent). The results of the 1995 lieutenant colonel to colonel promotion board revealed that not one of the 95 Cadet Command lieutenant colonels considered were selected for promotion.

This is not to say that Cadet Command had a quality problem. Field grade officers in the bottom half of their year group in 1995 had been in the top half a few years before. Nevertheless, “at risk” officers were far more likely to leave the service early or to retire than were officers with greater promotion potential. As a group, they were also more likely to lose focus on the task at hand. Cadre who recognized that their assignment to ROTC duty probably signaled the end of their career often divided their attention between their job and their search for follow-on employment. Recruiting, retention, and instruction all suffered as a result.

**Enrollment Increase**

Despite the many impediments with which it had to contend, there were indications by School Year 1994-1995 that Cadet Command was beginning to turn the negative production trend around. MS I enrollment was one of these positive signals. Between September 1994 and September 1995, it shot up 23 percent. Basic Camp attendance, Cadet Command’s primary means of lateral entry into the ROTC Advanced Course, also increased 23 percent over the same period. Headquarters analysts began to become more optimistic about the command’s ability to meet its future production missions. In the following few paragraphs, the reasons for enrollment gains and for the optimism about future officer production will be discussed.

**Command Emphasis on Recruiting**

One of the reasons the production picture improved after 1994 was that Major General Lyle threw the full weight of his position behind the recruiting effort. He used every opportunity to indoctrinate ROTC cadre with his plan for turning things around. One point he constantly stressed was the necessity to increase MS I enrollment. Without establishing a firm enrollment base at this level, he reasoned, officer production would always remain a problematic venture. One percent of the freshman class he set as the minimum MS I enrollment standard, but told his host battalion PMSs that 100 MS Is should be their goal.

The “Five Chances to Say Yes” initiative was another means by which the Commanding General attacked enrollment shortfalls. As its name implies,
the purpose of the program was to provide the student with five separate opportunities to enroll in the ROTC. All too often in the past, students arrived on campus knowing little or nothing about the ROTC. No cadre member had contacted them beforehand to inform them about the program. Once the semester began, the stress of adjusting to college life and the academic demands of the freshman year left most students with little time or energy to thoroughly consider what the ROTC had to offer.

This problem had a long history. In a study published in 1962, Robert L. Lathrop reported that a situation similar to the one just described existed at the University of Minnesota. He found that only a very small percentage of Minnesota freshmen had talked to or heard from an Army representative before coming to the university. The first exposure most incoming students had to the ROTC was at freshmen orientation. But in the short span of time between orientation and registration, they could not reach a decision about enrolling in the program. Enrollment consequently suffered.\(^7\)

Under the “Five Chances to Say Yes” plan, the first student-ROTC contact (Chance 1), was made through the university. Descriptions of the ROTC program and ROTC marketing materials were to be included in application packages, informational brochures, and other correspondence that the university routinely sent to prospective applicants. Getting ROTC information included in university publications required that the ROTC cadre establish a close working relationship with the university administration, especially the admissions office.

The second contact (Chance 2), a joint university-ROTC venture, was made when or shortly after a student had been accepted at a particular college. ROTC information was to be included in mailings to accepted students and, ideally, the acceptance letter itself would contain an endorsement of the ROTC by the university president along with a discussion of the financial incentives available through the ROTC. Chance 3 occurred while the incoming freshman was making final preparations to attend college. An ROTC Basic Course brochure was to be inserted into university welcome packets and students were to be contacted by telephone and through direct mail.

The fourth exposure to the ROTC (Chance 4) took place during new student orientation. In this phase of the plan, ROTC activities were to be scheduled as part of the orientation and special presentations were to be given to incoming freshmen and to the parents of incoming freshmen. The presentation to the parents was to emphasize above all the availability of ROTC scholarships. An on-campus direct mail campaign and specially staged publicity
events were also to be parts of this phase. The final ROTC-student contact (Chance 5) was to be made throughout the drop/add period. On-campus telephone and direct mail efforts were to be the highlights of Chance 5.

All PMSs, it was realized, could not carry out the plan exactly as outlined above. Each PMS was expected, however, to follow the basic thrust of the plan and ensure that the overwhelming majority of incoming students were made cognizant of the opportunities and incentives available through ROTC. The Commanding General directed that cross-enrolled schools and extension centers were to be incorporated into the “Five Chances to Say Yes” campaign.72

Lyle also challenged the cadre to do everything in their power to raise retention and progression rates so that the command would no longer have to depend so heavily on Basic Camp and other lateral entry programs—programs that by their very nature are unstable from an enrollment projection point of view. PMSs, according to Lyle, should raise both the MS I to MS II and MS II to MS III retention rates, which stood at 40 percent and 36 percent respectively, to 50 percent and boost the Advanced Camp to commissioning rate from 80 percent to 90 percent.73

Cadre were also told to increase enrollment through the Simultaneous Membership Program. Every ROTC host battalion and extension center, the Commanding General asserted, should know how many company size reserve units were in their market area. He set two to four cadets per company-sized unit as the goal toward which cadre should aim.74

College and university incentive packages for ROTC cadets were yet another facet of Lyle’s recruiting concept. All PMSs, he stated, must enlist the aid of their local school administrations to help with ROTC recruiting and retention efforts. This was especially important, he continued, for colleges and universities that were on the Effective Management Program and for Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU). This aid could take one of several forms—room and board for scholarship students, tuition assistance, endorsements of the ROTC program in official school publications, etc. The important thing was to get the institution to enter into an active and supportive partnership with the ROTC. The underlying assumption in all of this was that if a particular college or university did not want to support the program, it might be better for all parties involved if Cadet Command concentrated its efforts and resources at institutions that did actively support Army ROTC.

Finally, Major General Lyle stressed marketing and recruiting at the high school level. ROTC cadre members, he maintained, were an integral part of this effort. They must, therefore, adopt suitable themes and convey appropriate
messages in order to attract high school students into the program. He urged
ROTC instructors to focus on the fact that ROTC was a college course that led
to a commission. It taught leadership (a subject that, in many colleges, no
other department attempted to teach) and life skills and led to an above-average paying job. Obtaining a commission through ROTC, he went on to observe, should be especially attractive in an era when, although the number of jobs was going up, the average starting salary for these jobs (with a few exceptions) was going down.75

Subsistence Allowance Increase

Cadet Command’s ability to draw college students into the Army ROTC program was also enhanced by an increase in the cadet subsistence allowance from $100 to $150 per month. This increase, approved by Congress in August 1994 and going into effect on 31 August 1995, partially restored the attractiveness of ROTC’s most basic financial incentive. Such financial incentives had become especially important in recent years as the rising costs of education made it increasingly difficult for middle class households to bear the financial burdens of matriculation at a college or university.

The previous subsistence allowance of $100 per month was set in 1971. At that time, it represented a substantial sum ($350 per month in FY 1995 dollars) for a college student. At $6 per hour, a student enrolled in college today would have to work between 14 and 15 hours per week to earn its equivalent. Over the years, inflation took its toll and by 1994, the $100 per month allowance did not go far toward defraying living expenses. A student has only to work between 4 and 5 hours per week (at $6 per hour) for an amount equal to the stipend.

The three services had approached their respective service secretaries and the Congress on numerous occasions between 1972 and 1994 requesting a raise in the ROTC stipend. The effects of inflation and comparisons of the relatively generous monthly emoluments afforded service academy cadets with the more modest sums given ROTC cadets were factors advanced to justify these requests. Only in 1994, with the ROTC program facing officer production problems, did these arguments have their desired effect.

While Cadet Command was obviously pleased with the stipend increase, it realized that more had to be done. Accordingly, it submitted a proposal in 1994 to raise the monthly subsistence allowance to $200 per month beginning in FY 1996. Even if Cadet Command got this increase, the ROTC stipend would be significantly below its 1971 level.76
Scholarship Tiering

In 1994, Cadet Command formulated a plan for reallocating its scholarship budget. This plan promised both to enhance the Command’s attractiveness to certain segments of America’s undergraduate population and to alter the institutional and demographic composition of the Army ROTC. Because of the tremendous impact that this program (which the Command designated Scholarship Tiering) is likely to have on the future evolution of ROTC, it will be treated in a separate chapter.

Command Name Change

On 19 November 1993, a request was submitted to change the name of the command from U.S. Army ROTC Cadet Command to U.S. Army Cadet Command. Major General Lyle initiated the request because he wanted the command’s name to more accurately reflect its mandate, which included, in addition to directing the ROTC program, the responsibility for monitoring all U.S. Army precommissioning training and acting as the TRADOC Commander’s implementing agent for precommissioning Military Qualification Standards for all commissioning sources.77

As we have seen, the command’s official name had been a source of contention before. Surprisingly, Cadet Command’s 1993 request excited little opposition within TRADOC Headquarters or at the Department of the Army. The command received written approval for the new title on 5 January 1994, just 47 days after the submission of the request. The reasons for the quick acceptance years after the original controversy were not entirely clear but it appeared that some parties who would have objected had they known that such a proposal was being floated were “caught sleeping.”78

The Commanding General’s request for a new name reflected the close personal and philosophical relationship he had with Cadet Command’s first chief, Major General Wagner. The former was a protege of the latter. The two had served together in Europe from 1977 to 1981, when Wagner commanded the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and Lyle was one of his squadron commanders, and had developed very similar training philosophies. When Wagner returned to the United States to command first the Fourth Region and then Cadet Command, Lyle continued to follow his mentor’s career. His personal friendship with Wagner was one reason for his continued interest but an even more powerful one was his daughter’s enrollment in the ROTC program at Texas A&M University in 1986. Thus, the reforms that Wagner introduced in
the ROTC held both a personal and professional significance for Lyle.

Although the two men shared common training philosophies, they differed substantially in style and method. Wagner's combative and often abrasive manner contrasted sharply with Lyle's almost cherubic and affable demeanor. The affability of Major General Lyle, however, masked a determination and exactitude that brought some officers up short when they did not live up to the Commanding General's expectations. Methodological differences between the two men were just as pronounced as stylistic ones. Nowhere were these differences more evident than in the discussion that led to the revamping of the cadet evaluation system.79

**Cadet Evaluation System**

The cadet evaluation system, as it had evolved under Wagner and Arnold, had three parts: grade point average, the PMS evaluation, and the Advanced Camp score. Before a particular year group could be commissioned, the data on each cadet had to be fed into the accessioning system. There, a national order of merit list was developed using the three factors cited above as well as any other factors deemed important by the head of the accessioning board. The weight attached to each part varied from year to year, from branch to branch, and, indeed, from individual to individual. Who sat on the accessions board was therefore of great significance.

This evaluation system was, in certain respects, amorphous and irregular. Grade point averages, for example, were interpreted in various ways. Some officers on the accessions board would attach greater weight to a 3.2 from a prestigious private university than 3.2 from a lesser known state institution. In the same way, a 3.2 in mechanical engineering often counted for far more than 3.2 in history. There was no guide for the interpretation of grade point averages. Each board member was left to decide for himself what they meant.

The PMS evaluation was, in most cases, even more subjective in nature. To come up with a score for this evaluation, the PMS rank-ordered all MS IV cadets in his battalion according to their perceived potential as an officer. No standard evaluation methodology guided this endeavor. Evaluation algorithms, when they did exist, reflected the efforts of individual cadre members. It was not unknown for the PMS to construct such an algorithm after he had completed his evaluation in an attempt to put a facade of objectivity on a very subjective process.80
A cadet’s camp score was based on the rating he received from his platoon tactical officer at Advanced Camp. The rating primarily reflected the cadet’s leadership ability as measured by the 16 dimensions of the Leadership Assessment Program. Every tactical officer had to attend a class before the beginning of camp so that his ratings would be “calibrated” with those of his fellow tactical officers. The end result was that platoon tactical officers looked at cadet performance and approached their evaluation chores in very similar ways. At the end of camp, the platoon tactical officer would rank-order the cadets in his platoon using the results of the Leadership Assessment Program evaluations as his compass. Cadets would then be given a score of 5, 4, or 3, depending on where they stood relative to their platoon mates.

This forced distribution evaluation system had many advantages. It imparted a sense of urgency and intensity to Advanced Camp, helped shift the focus of Advanced Camp from the acquisition of basic military skills to leader development, and gave decision makers a means by which to determine who would get active duty and who would be assigned to the reserves. This last advantage was a very important one in the five years before 1991, when over 50 percent of every ROTC graduating class went into the reserve components.

After Major General Lyle had become familiar with the command and the ROTC program, he began to have reservations about the cadet evaluation system as he had found it. His two main reservations about the system centered on its subjectivity and its lack of standardization. The lack of standardization was of particular concern to him because of the tremendous personnel turbulence that the command was experiencing. With cadre coming and going at an extremely rapid rate, standard, uniform, and objective methods for gauging cadet performance and leadership capacity, he felt, had become essential.

With the guidance of the Commanding General as its anchor, Cadet Command’s Training Directorate developed a new evaluation system. It was based on a 3,000 point scale; grade point average was worth a maximum of 1,000 points; the PMS evaluation a maximum of 1,000 points; and the Advanced Camp score a maximum of 1,000 points. The new system was introduced in the summer of 1995. Its results will be used in the accessions process for the first time in the fall of 1996.

Objectivity and standardization were built into the new system. For grade point averages, this was accomplished by adjusting or normalizing by both institution and major. Every cadet was to receive a score calculated on the basis of a comparison of his grade point average with the mean grade point
average for his particular school and his particular major. The PMS evaluation consisted of four distinct elements: military science grade point average; a leadership evaluation score; a PMS “roll-up” or summary of leadership scores; and a whole person score. Cadets could attain whole person points by participating in student organizations, cadet activities, athletics, honor societies, student government, etc. The other parts of the PMS evaluation were likewise scored against specified performance criteria.

The Advanced Camp evaluation system experienced a major overhaul under Lyle. The forced distribution system was abandoned. In its place, a system that measured cadets against a set of absolute performance standards (instead of against each other) was introduced. The Commanding General thought this only appropriate since the rest of the Army had been using absolute standards to gauge training effectiveness for some time. The new evaluation system was not received with universal approbation within the command. Some objected that normalizing grade point averages by major and college did not take into account qualitative differences between institutions. But Cadet Command Headquarters operated under the assumption that diligence, determination, and demonstrated performance were better gauges of officer potential than mere intellectual attainment. The command, after all, was in the business of producing soldiers, not sociologists. And the normalized grade point average was the best means available to measure what the command wanted to measure.

One got the impression that many who objected to the normalized grade point average did so without great conviction. Their real objection, it appeared, was to the new method for computing the PMS (or on-campus) evaluation score. Formerly, as we have seen, the score reflected the PMS’s subjective appraisal of a cadet’s officer potential relative to those of the other cadets in a particular commissioning class. The new evaluation system substituted a set of specific performance criteria for the relative scale of the old system and, in so doing, seemed to take away much of the PMS’s power. It was this perceived loss of power that really bothered most of the critics.

At a meeting of Cadet Command’s senior leaders held at Fort Monroe in February 1995, Colonel Robert B. Sauve, the First Region Chief of Staff, spoke for many in the command when he pointed out to Major General Lyle the advantages of the old way of doing things. The old way, he said, allowed the PMS to sit down “eyeball to eyeball” with cadets and, the implication was, get a measure of their character that the new system, with its specific performance criteria, simply could not do. Lyle was unimpressed. New conditions,
he felt, required new methods. With the tremendous personnel turnover rate in the command, a more objective system of cadet evaluation, in his opinion, had become a necessity. It was as much a question of fairness as anything else.\textsuperscript{84}

The new Advanced Camp evaluation scheme also stirred up a great deal of controversy and opposition. Cadre members protested because it took power away from the platoon tactical officer. By the end of the first summer of its implementation—i.e., the camp of 1995—this source of discontent had been greatly reduced. Most platoon tactical officers discovered to their surprise that the new evaluation system had many advantages. The intensity of training and their authority over their platoon had not diminished as some had expected.\textsuperscript{84} One of the most vocal opponents of the new system, initially at least, was Major General Wagner. Wagner had retired in the Fort Monroe area and had accepted a position as special assistant to the President of Norfolk State University. His proximity to Fort Monroe allowed him to keep abreast of developments in the command.

Wagner objected to the new system because it did away with the forced distribution evaluation scheme—a scheme that, as we have seen, he had instituted when he was Cadet Command Commander. The old system had generated an intensity and a sense of urgency in training that, Major General Wagner felt, had helped raise ROTC summer training to a new level. It might have not been the essence of Wagner's system but it was undeniably an important part of it. Wagner passionately entreated his old comrade Lyle to retain the old system, but to no avail. Lyle was determined to alter it.

In addition to his pronounced philosophical predilection for absolute performance standards, there were at least two other reasons why the Commanding General felt that a change was in order. First, he believed that the forced distribution evaluation system had outlived its usefulness. In the command's early years, it had been an effective device for selecting cadets for active duty. Less than 50 percent of ROTC graduates were given the opportunity for active duty during that era, but in the post-Cold War world, virtually everyone who wanted active duty got it. A winnowing mechanism was no longer necessary. Second, he felt that the forced distribution scheme sent the wrong message to the aspiring officer. It engendered competition, which was a destroyer of unit cohesion. What was needed, he felt, was a cadet training experience that taught cooperation, which was a builder of unit cohesion. Major General Wagner gradually came around to his old friend's point of view, but it took a great deal of persuading to get him to that point.\textsuperscript{86}
CHAPTER VII

THE ARMY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM

The idea of awarding federally funded scholarships to encourage enrollment in the ROTC predated the formal establishment of the program itself in 1916.

The Army scholarship program began with the passage of the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964. Since the act’s passage, scholarships have become a vital component of the Army ROTC program. At the beginning of 1995, over 70 percent of ROTC cadets were receiving some form of scholarship assistance. Without scholarships, Cadet Command could not have approached even the modest production goals that the Army set for it after 1990.

But the importance of scholarships and the scholarship management system goes beyond the matter of meeting production goals. It also has to do with the question of what type of officer corps the U.S. Army will have in the future. This has become especially true in the 1990s when between 40 and 50 percent of the annual intake of new lieutenants into the Army has been composed of ROTC scholarship recipients. It is a program of far greater significance than some senior Army leaders realize. Before Cadet Command’s role in the revamping of the scholarship management system can be fully appreciated, it is necessary to know something about the creation and subsequent development of the ROTC scholarship program.

Pre-World War II

The idea of awarding federally funded scholarships to encourage enrollment in the ROTC predated the formal establishment of the program
itself in 1916. A General Staff study, dated November 1915, expressed the fear that the proposed ROTC course would not attract students in sufficient numbers to satisfy the Army's need for reserve officers. To head off the anticipated production shortfall, the authors of the study suggested that military scholarships be provided by the federal government. Similar recommendations had previously been made by the Association of Land-Grant Schools and Colleges and by the Association of Military Colleges and Schools. Nothing came from these proposals.

In the fiscally constrictive environment of the inter-war years, the case for ROTC scholarships could make no headway. Indeed, the Army had a difficult time just maintaining the budgetary status quo. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, however, an opportunity arose to introduce scholarships — an opportunity missed by the Army and the fledgling Air Force, but eagerly grasped by the Navy.

**Post-World War II**

The Naval ROTC scholarship program, fashioned in accordance with the so-called Holloway Plan, received congressional approval on 20 July 1946. The Holloway scholarship covered the costs of tuition, books, and laboratory fees and included a small subsistence allowance. For a young person who came from a family of limited financial means, it was a very attractive assistance package.

According to Lyons and Masland, the Navy's success in getting this legislation through Congress was bound up with prevailing post-war political sentiment which favored federal educational subsidies of various types. The belief was that in order for the nation to retain its edge in such areas as science, technology, and military affairs — areas vital to national security — the federal government had to take the lead and provide incentives for college students to go into these fields. Otherwise, they would tend to choose more lucrative professions and the country might find itself in serious trouble in the not too distant future.

The Navy was able to steal a march on the Army in part because it had definite plans for the Naval ROTC, it implemented these plans early, and it committed sufficient resources to execute them. The Navy, in fact, approached America's colleges and universities with its program early in 1945, even before the war ended. It based its planning on the assumptions that a separate and well-defined naval service would continue to exist after the war (which
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during that era was by no means certain) and that the Naval ROTC would function as a major source of active duty naval officers. The Navy further strengthened its case when it successfully argued that the professional development of a naval officer was necessarily different from that of an Army officer. This meant, advocates of Naval ROTC scholarships insisted, that the naval service had unique and, the obvious implication was, more stringent commissioning standards. In fact, many did view the Navy’s program as being on a higher professional plane than the Army ROTC — a perception that was reinforced by the clustering of naval units on the campuses of the nation’s “best” universities.

The Army, on the other hand, proceeded more tentatively. It instituted an interim ROTC program after World War II, awaiting congressional action on the Universal Military Training (UMT) Bill (which the Truman Administration was then in the process of preparing) before it made final ROTC arrangements. If the UMT bill passed, as many felt it would, the specter of an inescapable military obligation would serve as a powerful inducement for college students to enroll in ROTC, or so it seemed to some observers. Scholarships, in that case, would not be needed. When the Congress rejected the UMT legislation, Army leaders had to scrap existing plans and begin again.2

There was much more behind the Army’s failure in the scholarship issue than its tactical miscalculation about the UMT legislation, of course. One of its major problems was that its ROTC program, in contrast to that of the Navy’s, continued to be viewed as primarily a producer of reserve officers. Because of this reserve orientation, the Army ROTC found it difficult to compete with the Naval ROTC for funding, being unable to justify the higher per capita costs of a system of subsidized military education. The larger size of the Army also worked against it. The Naval program had only to produce 1,500 ensigns per year to meet the modest needs of the Navy. The corresponding figure for the Army was 20,000.

Moreover, not everyone within the Army was in favor of Army scholarships. To be sure, the Army’s G-1 urged that the ROTC be considered an integral part of the overall officer procurement plan and warned that if the Army failed to provide scholarships to ROTC cadets, it would lose the cream of America’s college students to the Navy. The Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC affairs, however, took a contrary position. This office, which was responsible for protecting the interests of the reserves within the Army, was understandably wary of any initiative that would refocus the ROTC away from its traditional mission of producing reserve officers. In testimony
before the House Committee on Armed Services, Major General Edward S. Bres, the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, asserted that the production of large numbers of active duty officers was not the principal function of the Army ROTC. The Army program, he explained, needed less generous incentives than the Navy to fulfill its purpose of producing second lieutenants for the National Guard, Army Reserve, and, through the Thomason Act of 1935, the Regular Army. In taking this approach, Bres was implying that the Navy was paying too much for its reserve officers.3

Anti-scholarship sentiment was also prevalent at the grassroots level. Major George H. Rankin, an active duty officer commissioned through the ROTC program at Clemson University in the 1930s, expressed the sentiments of many officers when he asserted that—

The mission of the Army ROTC is to produce reserve officers not Regular Army officers. An optional and subsidized Army plan would devolve into two (2) programs, one competing against the other—one program producing officers for the Regular Army and the other producing Reserve Officers. Every ROTC student would desire to be in the subsidized program, the end result being a strong subsidized program and a weak contact one.4

The issue of ROTC scholarships surfaced again in 1948 with the release of the Gray Committee Report. This committee had been convened to consider, among other things, the role of reserve forces in the nation’s defense system. One of its recommendations was to drop the “R” from ROTC to reflect the program’s growing importance as an integral part of the officer procurement system for the active forces. It also recommended that the system of subsidized military education for regular and extended active duty officer candidates be expanded to include all three services. The latter recommendation of the Gray Committee was not adopted but it was subsequently cited almost every time a proposal was made to extend ROTC scholarships to the Army and Air Force. The Army, on its part, officially endorsed the Gray Committee’s scholarship recommendation although, once again, the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs posited that such incentives were not necessary to draw college students into the officer corps.5

In 1949, the Service Academy Board revisited the ROTC scholarship question. Unlike the Army’s Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, the Board saw the ROTC developing into a major source of regular and non-regular active
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duty officers. It seconded the Gray Committee’s call for a program of subsidized military education for all three services, recommending that cadets “receive tuition, fees, books, uniforms, and training equipment, together with an emolument of perhaps $25 per month.” Because of its concern about costs, the Service Academy Board wanted the services to grant three- instead of four-year scholarships.6

Korea

The Truman Administration presented a bill to implement the recommendations of the Gray Committee and the Service Academy Board to Congress in 1950. Before this legislation could be considered, however, the Korean War broke out and pushed it into the background. During the war, Congress passed two measures that seemingly rendered ROTC scholarships unnecessary. The first was a bill to extend World War II-era GI Bill benefits to Korean War veterans. The second was the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, which provided the incentives of draft deferment and the opportunity to fulfill one’s service obligation as an officer for college students to join the ROTC.7

Despite the diminished prospects for subsidized military education, promoters of Army and Air Force ROTC scholarships tried in 1952 and again in 1953 to get their agenda through Congress. They championed a bill that proposed two types of four-year scholarships. One type was intended to turn out reserve officers who would complete an extended active duty tour before going into one of the reserve components. The second type was designed to produce career officers.

The bill was doomed from the start. By 1953, the Army and Air Force were inundated with second lieutenants as a result of the Korean War build-up. They had to eliminate their glut of junior officers, not entice more college students into officer-producing programs. Moreover, the three services could not reach an agreement on the bill’s provisions. The Navy feared that its extant scholarship program, with which it was very satisfied, would be placed in jeopardy if this new piece of legislation was passed. It especially opposed the provision inserted by the Bureau of the Budget (to which the Army and Air Force had no objection) to cap tuition payments at $600 per year. This would, Navy officials believed, cripple the Naval ROTC program at many of the major private colleges and universities. Cadets at these institutions would have to pay part of the tuition themselves or drop out of that particular program. The Army and Air Force, whose programs had a distinct state/
land-grant university flavor, were more accepting of the tuition restriction because it would save money and make the idea of military scholarships more palatable to Congress.

There were still other complications. The service retention rate of Naval ROTC scholarship recipients had been disappointing. In addition, the Air Force reported it had attained better retention results with its cadet aviation program than it did with its Air Force ROTC. Many legislators, therefore, were reluctant to pour money into a program of subsidized military education that seemed to hold little chance of achieving the desired effects.  

Post-Korea

The year 1958 witnessed yet another attempt to expand the Naval ROTC scholarship program to the other services. The Army Ordnance Corps came forward with a plan, patterned after the Navy’s model, that was designed to meet its need for technically trained officers. The Army DCSPER took up the Ordnance plan and reconfigured it to apply to the Army as a whole. Yet once again, not enough support could be generated in the cost-conscious Congress to get the measure passed.

In that same year, the Navy felt compelled to modify its ROTC scholarship program to compensate for recent tuition hikes. In April 1958, the Chief of Naval Personnel informed officials at 15 institutions, most of which were private, that the number of scholarships awarded to members of their freshman class in the upcoming academic year would be cut. Because they had been given no forewarning of this move, officials receiving the notices were shocked. It was subsequently explained to the colleges and universities affected that since the start of the scholarship program in 1946, there had been an average increase of $500 in annual tuition at high-cost institutions. By decreasing quotas at high-tuition schools and increasing them at low-tuition schools, the Navy could boost the number of scholarships it awarded annually from 1,600 to 1,800. When the heads of some private colleges objected to this move, the Navy added that the retention rate of Naval ROTC graduates from high-cost schools was lower than the overall mean.

Critics expressed two major objections to the Navy’s action. First, they complained that the Navy would be losing high-quality talent from some of America’s best colleges. Secondly, they argued that ROTC graduates of high-cost institutions would later become influential spokesmen for the Navy among the American public as they rose to occupy positions of power and responsibility in the professional and business communities. The Navy simply could
not afford to lose these future advocates of naval power, or so the argument ran. Many naval officers and officials of state and land-grant institutions took a different view of the matter. An officer assigned to the Bureau of Naval Personnel commented:

The mission of the NROTC...is NOT to finance higher education, BUT to educate and train future naval officers...Those colleges which look upon the Regular NROTC Program as a means of financial assistance, most assuredly have overlooked the fundamental mission of the Regular NROTC Program and the essential purpose for which it was inaugurated.

The executive secretary of the American Association of Land-Grant and State Universities took exception to the assumption that high-cost necessarily equated to high-quality. He contended that the tuition charged by a particular institution was not a suitable measure of the value of the educational services it offered.¹⁰

The ROTC Vitalize Act of 1964

In 1964, proponents of Army and Air Force ROTC scholarships finally got their way. The ROTC Vitalize Act of 1964 extended to the Army and the Air Force the benefits of the Navy's Holloway Plan. The growing trend among colleges and universities to abolish compulsory participation in ROTC coupled with continuing officer production shortfalls helped generate the congressional support necessary for the passage of this bill.

Under the provisions of the Vitalization Act, scholarship recipients were to receive an amount covering the costs of tuition, fees, books, and laboratory expenses. In addition, the act raised the stipend for Advanced Course cadets from $27 to $50 per month and instituted a two-year ROTC program for junior college transfers and other undergraduates who, for one reason or another, could not or did not complete the Basic Course.

According to the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Mr. Stephen Ailes, the principal purpose for the program was to raise cadet quality, not to boost production. Several representatives expressed surprise when Ailes indicated in testimony before a House subcommittee that the Army did not project an increase in the number of commissions granted annually as a result of the new incentive. The Assistant Secretary assured them that quantity was not
a problem and left it at that (his view was not shared by all Defense Department representatives who testified, however). Many Defense Department and Army officials like Mr. Ailes recognized that, in respect to the ROTC scholarship program, selling quality to Congress was easier than selling quantity.

The scholarship provisions of the Vitalization Act did not reflect the specific desires of the Department of Defense, the Army, the Air Force, or the majority of land-grant and state universities. The Department of Defense, in fact, championed a scholarship scheme that differed markedly from the one finally approved by Congress. The Defense Department, with the support of both the Army and Air Force, pushed for a two-year scholarship with an $800 tuition cap. Mr. Normal S. Paul, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), told the House Armed Services Committee that the $800 figure reflected the average “across the country” tuition cost. The Department’s objective in imposing an $800 tuition cap, Mr. Paul explained to the committee, was “to make the program available to the most people at the lowest cost.” It was also for this reason that the Defense Department proposed, in addition to the $800 tuition limitation, that retired personnel and reserve officers be used in the ROTC program.

O. C. Aderhold, the President of the University of Georgia and spokesman for the Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, opposed both the Holloway Plan and the tuition cap option, although he objected more strongly to the former than the latter. As an alternative, he suggested a scholarship program modeled after the Korean GI Bill, which provided each student-veteran with a “flat sum per month covering retainer pay, tuition, fees, supplies, books, and equipment.”

The flat sum scholarship, Aderhold argued, had two principal advantages. One was that it would greatly reduce the “undue administrative detail” that would necessarily be a part of the other scholarship schemes, thereby streamlining administration and cutting costs. An even more important advantage, from his perspective, was that it would eliminate the “inequality among universities with respect to reimbursement for educational services.” The tuition charges of colleges and universities, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “are set in accordance with a variety of institutional considerations not necessarily related to the cost of educating undergraduate students in a particular curriculum or program.” His obvious point was that high-cost education did not necessarily equate to high-quality education.

Aderhold’s proposal was met with the objection that a flat sum scholarship
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program would drive ROTC off the campuses of many prestigious private institutions. To counter this objection, he recalled the case of the Korean GI Bill. It was charged, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee, that the Korean GI Bill —

....would cause students to seek institutions with lower tuition charges. A survey by the U.S. Office of Education showed that this was not the case: that Korean GI Bill students tended to distribute themselves in the same general ratios as non-veteran students. It is absurd to think that a young man who desires to go to a particular college will go to one which charges a lower fee simply because he has a scholarship to help him to this end.\(^\text{14}\)

In the congressional hearings leading up to the passage of the Vitalization Act, neither the Army nor the Air Force evidenced a desire for the four-year, full-tuition scholarship of the type that the Congress eventually authorized. The Army, in fact, was decidedly cool toward the idea. In his testimony before Congress, Mr. Ailes pointed out that the Army did not need Holloway-type benefits because its scholarship program would have a “different purpose” than the Navy’s. The Navy, he asserted, goes out and gets “very talented, very able men in scientific fields, mathematicians and people like that.” The Army, on the other hand, “could better be served by not going for these men that have this great, particular isolated talent” but instead targeting “different kinds of people.” The “different kinds of people” he never specified. But it does seem clear that neither he nor the Army believed that a 750 math score on the SAT was by itself a particularly good indicator of a young person’s aptitude or suitability for the officer profession. A two-year scholarship with an $800 limitation would suffice to attract the type of individual that the Army wanted as an officer.\(^\text{15}\)

CONARC and TRADOC Initiatives

The passage of the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 coincided with a shift in the administrative and operational control of the program from the Department of the Army to the Continental Army Command (CONARC). Originally, the Department had directed that CONARC would assume the responsibility for the management of the scholarship program, except for certain policy and budgetary functions, in School Year 1970-1971, when the number of ROTC
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Scholarships in effect was scheduled to reach its statutory limit of 5,500. Later, the date for CONARC's assumption of management responsibility was moved up to 1 July 1968.

Refining the Scholarship System

At CONARC Headquarters at Fort Monroe, Virginia, it was determined that scholarship management functions properly belonged to both the ROTC/NDCC Directorate within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training (DCSIT) and the Adjutant General's Office. Accordingly, representatives from both staff entities attended the Department of the Army Scholarship Selection Board held in March 1968. A CONARC officer even served as the board's recorder. The experience with the board opened the eyes of CONARC staff officers to flaws in scholarship program management. The "inadequacy of the method of recording field interview board results" was identified as a particular problem. A revision of the field interview worksheet was subsequently accomplished and distributed to the field in October 1968, although the available evidence suggests that this revision did little to rectify the system's inadequacies.16

A problem of greater magnitude came to light when the first scholarship cadets started reporting to Advanced Camp. During these early years, the scholarship selection process was heavily weighed in favor of academic and intellectual prowess. Leadership and physical aptitude got little consideration. Indeed, a physical fitness test was not even part of the application procedure. As a result, according to Brigadier General Archelaus L. Hamblem, Jr., Commander of the Fifth United States Army Advanced Camp at Fort Riley in 1971, there were too many "fat and flabby people" among the scholarship students who showed up at camp. Many of them, he complained, were so out of shape that they could not do a single pull-up. Not only did they fail to meet standards, but they held back other cadets. "It seems to me," he told the assembled crowd at the CONARC camp commanders conference, "that it is high time that we require our scholarship candidates to pass a minimum set of physical tests."17

Brigadier General Milton E. Key, chief of CONARC's ROTC Directorate, echoed Hamblem. He observed to attendees at the Tenth Annual CONARC ROTC Conference in 1972:

In his eagerness to obtain his fair share of cadets from this mountain of pedantic humanity (those students with the very highest
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levels of intellectual and academic attainment), the PMS must not lose sight of the fact that the students enrolled will be officers and probably lead troops within four years. Their intelligence is very important; but equally important is their physical ability; their common sense; their emotional stability; and their overall versatility... I saw too many obese misfits, without stamina or perseverance, at our camps this past summer. We do not need these types.¹⁸

The CONARC Commander, General Ralph E. Haines, agreed with Hamblem and Key. He too was startled by the number of cadets who failed the physical fitness test. From this, he concluded that it was necessary to change the way CONARC evaluated scholarship applicants. Award winners, in his estimation, should be selected with the whole-man concept in mind. “We don’t want just the academician in our ROTC program; we want the men with brains but with balance too.” Scholarship selection criteria were indeed changed but how much and when is difficult to establish. Complaints about the lack of physical vigor and leadership ability among scholarship recipients continued to be voiced throughout the next decade. It appears that the Army’s adoption of a more broadly-based gauge of officer potential in scholarship applicants was an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process.¹⁹

CONARC Scholarship Study

A CONARC study of the Army ROTC scholarship program was sent to the Army DCSPER in May 1969. The authors of the study based their findings on a survey of the academic performance of scholarship cadets, comments from PMSs and CONARC staff officers, and the collective experience of the ROTC/NDCC Directorate with the program. In the study, they recommended that: the number of scholarships in force be raised from 5,500 to 10,000; one- and three-year scholarships be awarded in addition to the traditional two- and four-year scholarships; two-year (lateral entry) cadets be made eligible for scholarships; and the subsistence allowance be increased to one-fourth the pay of a second lieutenant for nonscholarship and one-third the base pay of a second lieutenant for scholarship cadets.²⁰ Only the second recommendation—the one that called the introduction of one-, and three-year scholarships—was accepted, at least at that particular time. The Department of the Army authorized CONARC to award one-year scholarships “on a limited basis” to “highly qualified MS IV cadets who are motivated for

Scholarship Diversification

The CONARC study was something of a milestone, for after its publication, the scholarship program began to expand in both scope and purpose and assume the form with which we are familiar today. The pattern of American higher education had become more diverse and complex since the end of World War II and the scholarship program, if it was to be effective, had to allow for this increased diversity and complexity. As a result, the types of scholarships began to proliferate as ROTC program managers in CONARC and later TRADOC attempted to exploit the recruiting potential of various “market niches.”

Two special scholarship programs designed to encourage economically disadvantaged students to enroll in ROTC, for example, were introduced in School Year 1971-1972. One program resulted in 75 three-year scholarships being reserved for ROTC cadets at institutions whose average family income was $6,000 per year or less. The other program, which was only to be in effect for one academic year, earmarked one four-year scholarship for each Junior ROTC/NDCC program located within a poverty area, as defined by the Office of Economic Opportunity.

Public Law 92-171 and Public Law 92-166

Anxious about the ill-effects that the end of conscription would likely have on officer procurement, and alarmed about the pessimistic enrollment forecasts coming out of CONARC, Congress passed two pieces of legislation in late 1971 that had a significant impact on the ROTC scholarship program. Public Law 92-171 (24 November 1971) increased the ROTC subsistence allowance for scholarship and Advanced Course cadets to $100 per month for the 10 month academic year. Public Law 92-166 (24 November 1971) permitted two-year “non-progression” cadets to participate in the scholarship program and raised the total Army scholarship authorization by 1,000, from 5,500 to 6,500.

The CONARC, as we have seen, had originally requested that the number of authorized scholarships be raised to 10,000 instead of 6,500—making P.L. 92-166 something of a disappointment to that headquarters. The House had trimmed the request when it ascertained that there were more non-scholarship...
than scholarship cadets in the ROTC program. This realization stimulated some representatives to question whether the policy of subsidizing virtually the entire education of some cadets while paying only subsistence allowance to others was the best way of boosting enrollment. As a result, the House asked the Defense Department to conduct a study to determine whether a more effective officer procurement program could be obtained by raising the subsistence allowance for all cadets and reducing the number of scholarship students.

In an attempt to save money, the House appended to Public Law 92-166 a provision mandating that at least 50 percent of ROTC scholarship cadets must qualify for in-state tuition rates at their respective institutions and that they receive tuition benefits at that rate. During the congressional hearings on the bill, it was brought out that the in-state tuition rate of the University of California was $500 per semester while the out-of-state rate was $1,500. Most House members agreed that the government would get more for its money by limiting the number of students who could attend out-of-state schools. Such a limitation, it was believed, would not impose an undue hardship on either the student or the service.

This provision, however, had little practical effect. When the law was passed, 50 percent of award recipients were already being reimbursed at in-state rates so that no adjustment to the scholarship distribution matrix was necessary. In any case, in-state tuition was a meaningless term at high cost private universities where four-year scholarship recipients tended to seek admission.

Congressional sentiment in favor of extending benefits to two-year "non-progression" cadets was strengthened by the testimony of Defense Department witnesses who pointed out that by 1980, more than half of the students enrolled in institutions of higher learning would be in junior and community colleges. Something, it was obvious, had to be done to get at this growing market.24

More Scholarship Varieties

The passage of the two aforementioned laws did not slow diversification. Women were made eligible for ROTC scholarships in May 1972. Due to the experimental nature of female participation in Army ROTC, however, a strict limitation was initially imposed on the number of scholarships that could be awarded to women.25 A two-year scholarship program for active duty enlisted personnel was approved by the Army in June 1973 and took effect at the
beginning of School Year 1974-1975. An early selection cycle for four-year scholarship applicants was introduced in School Year 1975-1976.

Not all scholarship initiatives undertaken in the 1970s were federally sponsored. A few were state-funded. One school, Ohio University, was saved from disestablishment in 1976 because it agreed to take advantage of Ohio Army National Guard scholarship awards to bolster its ROTC enrollment.

The trend of scholarship diversification continued in the 1980s. Public Law 96-357, signed by President Jimmy Carter in September 1980, expanded the program to include the "Total Force"—i.e., the National Guard and the Army Reserve as well as the Active Army—by providing for Reserve Forces Duty scholarships. The same piece of legislation set aside scholarships exclusively for Military Junior Colleges (MJC), extended the age of scholarship eligibility for prior service cadets, and removed the prohibition on awarding scholarships to two-year "lateral entry" cadets. By School Year 1985-1986, the four basic types of Army ROTC scholarships that had been available in the late 1960s had blossomed into 16 different varieties.

See Figure 7-1.

**Figure 7-1. 1985 - 1986 Army ROTC Scholarship Programs**
Adjusting the Scholarship Mix

Another means by which the Army attempted to get more out of its scholarship dollars was by adjusting its mix of two-, three-, and four-year scholarships. "Clearly," members of the RETO Study Group noted, "more scholarship students could graduate annually at the same resource level if significant numbers of scholarships were offered for two or three years rather than four." It was recognized that a drop in quality (as defined by SAT scores and grade point averages) would inevitably accompany such an adjustment. In light of the low service retention rate of four-year scholarship recipients, this was a price the Army was willing to pay.

The adjustment began in earnest in the mid-1970s, an era when the Army was experiencing large production deficits. During School Year 1973-1974, 56 percent of Army ROTC scholarships were of the four-year variety. Five years later (School Year 1978-1979), this percentage had dropped to only 35 percent.

Criticism directed against the Army by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and other outside agencies was one factor that propelled ROTC administrators to adjust the scholarship mix. General Accounting Office reports written in 1973 and 1977 noted that many ROTC participants whose education was being supported by a full scholarship dropped out of the program each year. The greatest exodus of four-year award recipients took place before or at the end of their second year, prior to their incurring a service obligation.

There was also a problem, albeit of smaller dimensions, with scholarship recipients dropping out of the Advanced Course. Although these cadets did have a service obligation (two years service), it was rarely enforced. The Army's policy, the General Accounting Office noted, was to ignore the active duty obligation unless it was evident that the student in question was willfully evading the terms of his contract. Many Army officials believed that "impressed" service was inconsistent with the concept of a volunteer army. In any case, of the approximately 800 contracted cadets who withdrew from the Advanced Course in School Year 1974-1975, two were ordered to active duty.

The General Accounting Office pressed for drastic action. One of its suggestions was to convert scholarships into loans for cadets who did not fulfill their obligations. Another was to require cadets who left the program prematurely to reimburse the government for education and training costs. The Army, however, felt that changing the scholarship mix was a more appropriate course to take. It took congressional action to force the Army to recoup scholarship monies from program drop outs. 30
The Army Scholarship Analysis

In the mid-1980s, attention was focused once again on the scholarship mix issue. The DCSROTC found it necessary to undertake a study—the Army ROTC Scholarship Analysis—to determine the optimum scholarship mix to attain peak production. Such an analysis was needed, the Office of the DCSROTC believed, because no one really knew if the Army was getting the maximum production return on its scholarship investment. Existing methods for allocating two-, three-, and four-year awards were little more, it contended, than a “corporate best guess.”

The study yielded several recommendations. First, it urged that the number of four-year scholarships be reduced. A maximum of 1,500 offers were to be made; no “turn-downs” were to be filled with alternates. It was estimated that this would yield about 750 four-year recipients annually, representing about 15 percent of the yearly total. Second, advanced designee scholarships were to be offered to what were formerly four- and three-year alternate winners. Students who won advanced designee awards would start to collect benefits the year after they enrolled in the ROTC program. Finally, the study recommended that the proportion of two- and three-year awards be increased.

Although the study recommendations were approved by the DCSROTC in November 1985, they were never fully implemented. Apparently, the DCSROTC could not get enough qualified applicants to fill all the two- and three-year awards it allocated and thus had to give more four-year scholarships than it wanted. Nevertheless, the number of two- and three-year awards was increased as much as the market would support.

Taking up where the Office of the DCSROTC had left off, Cadet Command was able to effect a modest reduction in the proportion of four-year awards in subsequent years. At the time of the study cited above, it stood at 25 percent; by 1994, it had been lowered to about 22 percent.31

TRADOC Consolidation of the Scholarship Program

The TRADOC DCSROTC also strove to streamline and make more equitable the scholarship selection process after 1973. This was attempted by consolidating and centralizing the scholarship selection function at TRADOC Headquarters. When the Steadfast reorganization took effect in July 1973, TRADOC, the four regions, and several other parties all played key and
semi-autonomous parts in the process. Region headquarters, for example, had final selection authority for two-, and three-year scholarship recipients. The regions, along with Headquarters USAEUR, were also responsible for the preliminary screening of four-year scholarship applicants. The Basic Camp Commander exercised control over the two-year scholarships awarded in his domain while TRADOC Headquarters had the responsibility for the one- and four-year scholarship programs as well as for two-year scholarships reserved for active duty enlisted personnel.

The system outlined above was duplicative, wasteful, and resistant to any sort of positive control by the DCSROTC. Moreover, it was inherently unfair since, under this system, the imposition of common selection standards over the wide range of scholarships offered was, for all practical purposes, impossible. Consolidating the selection function in the Office of the DCSROTC cured at least some of the aforementioned ills and unquestionably placed the scholarship program on a firmer managerial foundation.32

**Push to Increase Scholarships**

Army downsizing in the wake of the American withdrawal from Vietnam coupled with the end of conscription created a major officer production problem for the Army ROTC. From an all-time high in FY 1969, ROTC production sank to a period low in FY 1974. See Appendix B. One of the ways ROTC officials responded to this situation was by seeking from Congress authorization for more scholarships. Anticipating future production shortfalls, the authors of the 1969 CONARC Scholarship Study, as we have seen, urged that the scholarship ceiling be raised from 5,500 to 10,000. This, of course, did not happen; Congress in Public Law 92-166 (November 1971) granted only an increase of 1,000.

This rebuff did not deter DCSROTC staff officers from pursuing the issue. Indeed, they could not afford to let it since ROTC production fell substantially short of the goals set for it by the Army throughout the 1970s. In 1974, 1975 and again in 1978, the DCSROTC historical records indicate that requests were submitted to the Department of the Army to raise the scholarship ceiling to 10,000. The RETO Study Group, worried about both the quantity and quality of ROTC output, recommended in its 1978 report that the ceiling be set even higher—at 12,000. This latter figure apparently came from a revised scholarship/officer production model developed by the TRADOC DCSROTC. The Army Chief of Staff accepted the RETO recommendation
and in April 1978 approved a legislative proposal to boost the number of authorized scholarships to 12,000. On 24 September 1980, President Carter signed H.R. 5766 which (in additional to authorizing several new categories of scholarships) authorized the increase requested by the Chief of Staff. The number of annual awards was to be increased each year until the prescribed limit was reached in FY 1983.

In an attempt to ensure that the funds expended on the expanded scholarship program had maximum effect, the new law also required scholarship recipients who voluntarily terminated their involvement with ROTC to reimburse the government for monies received. Thus, the suggestions made by the General Accounting Office auditors in 1973 and 1977 were finally accepted.

Along with the scholarship authorization increase came a rise in the number of scholarship applications. Indeed, the number of applicants shot up 20 percent between School Year 1981-1982 and School Year 1982-1983 alone. The DCSROTC attributed this rise to the cumulative expansion of scholarship types, diminished employment prospects in the civilian job market, the increased prestige of the military within society, the Army’s emphasis on recruiting “hard skill” disciplines into the officer ranks, and a more broad-based approach to recruiting.

Increasing Importance of Scholarships

The Army’s dependence on ROTC scholarships to maintain officer production at the desired level increased sharply after 1980. In the early 1980s, about a third of contracted cadets were on scholarships; by 1993, this portion had climbed to over two-thirds. See Figure 7-2.

The chart revealed a great deal about economic and employment trends, changing student perceptions about the viability of a military career, and student motivation for joining the ROTC. It also reflected the steadily declining propensity of college and college-bound students to serve in the military after 1990. Increasingly, financial incentives had to make up for what the attraction of a stable and secure career once provided.

Raising the Eligibility Age

In a report published in May 1983, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) noted that “a growing number of ROTC participants” were taking longer than four years to complete their baccalaureate degrees. This reflected
a wider trend within the community of higher education—a trend that was particularly apparent in the engineering disciplines. At the time of the report’s publication, fewer than 40 percent of college graduates were completing their undergraduate studies in four years. The average time for engineering majors was 4.7 years.

The committee recommended that scholarship benefits and subsistence allowance payments be extended ten additional months to accommodate cadets caught up in this trend. However, it was stipulated that the beneficiary of this extended assistance was to incur an additional service obligation commensurate with the amount of additional aid received. These recommendations were, in fact, incorporated into Public Law 98-94, the Defense Authorization Act of 1984.\(^\text{35}\)
After 1984, the average graduation time lengthened still further. It stood at 5.5 years in 1992, according to one source. A 1992 study conducted by the National Collegiate Athletic Association indicated that only 53 percent of the full-time freshmen at the 197 universities surveyed graduated within six years. In some areas, the average was still higher. Officials representing the California State University system and the University of New Mexico reported that it took 10 years or more for half of their students to complete baccalaureate programs. In the ROTC program, the prolongation of undergraduate studies has been evidenced by the aging of its cadet corps. In 1985, approximately 20 percent of the ROTC commissionees were over 24 years of age. By 1994, this figure had risen to 35 percent. Rising college costs, a reduced level of government support for higher education, fewer course offerings and a number of other factors help explain this trend. (See Chapter 6, page 166).

Cadet Command responded to the changing demographics of its cadet corps by attempting to raise the age of scholarship eligibility. From 1989 to 1993, repeated requests were submitted to increase the scholarship age limit for nurses, a group which has proven especially reluctant to enroll in the Army ROTC. All of these requests, however, came up empty. Then, in December 1993, Major General Lyle received a letter from Senator Robert Bennett of Utah, soliciting his opinion about the current legislation that prohibited cadets commissioned after the age of 25 from getting ROTC scholarships. At the same time, Senator Bennett informed the Commanding General that he intended to introduce a proposal to raise the age limit for scholarship cadets from 25 to 29. It seemed incongruous that a cadet could get a commission at 29 but not be eligible for financial assistance.

Bennett pointed out that the scholarship age restriction presented “a particular problem” in Utah where there were a large number of cadets who belonged to the Church of Latter Day Saints (LDS). Many LDS members upon or shortly after graduation from high school served on religious missions which lasted up to two years. Their delayed entry into college often resulted in their commissioning date being pushed past the age of 25 and thus made them ineligible for Army ROTC scholarships. Lyle assured the Senator that he would lend his full support to the initiative.

Nevertheless, the proposal got nowhere. In order for an issue affecting all ROTC programs to go before Congress, it must have the backing of all of the services. In this case, the Air Force would not give its support. (The reasons for the Air Force’s opposition were not clear to observers in Cadet Command...
Headquarters). In December 1994, the Defense Department suggested that the maximum commissioning age for scholarship cadets be increased from 25 to 27. At the time of this writing, that suggestion is still being evaluated by the other services.  

The Army Allocation Program

School Year 1982-1983 saw the introduction of the Army ROTC Scholarship Allocation Program. The Army initiated the program to attract more students with what the Army had variously termed "hard skill" or "high tech" academic majors into its officer corps. Engineering, the physical sciences, business, and nursing all fell into this category. ROTC program managers at various levels were given "scholarship utilization" objectives based on academic discipline. For School Year 1982-1983, the objectives were: engineering—30 percent, physical sciences—25 percent, business—20 percent, social sciences—10 percent, nursing—7 percent and other—8 percent. In subsequent years, these objectives changed little.  

The Scholarship Allocation Program targeted "high-tech" disciplines
Army Preference for “High-Tech” Disciplines

Although School Year 1982-1983 was the first time the Army imposed a scholarship quota to get engineers and physicists into the ROTC, its predilection for this kind of individual was not new. The curriculum of the U.S. Military Academy had a “hard skill” orientation since its inception. In more recent times, the push to create a more technologically knowledgeable officer corps took off after World War II. It gathered more momentum after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, which many observers saw as ushering in a new age in warfare. A more technologically sophisticated form of warfare, the assumption was, needed a more technologically sophisticated officer to wage it.

In 1978, the Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) Study Group voiced its concern about this issue. The group deplored “the absence of any control over the academic disciplines being pursued by (ROTC) scholarship students.” This lack of control, it complained, meant that many ROTC graduates pursued fields of study that had “no reasonable direct application to the military environment.” What was desperately needed, it concluded, was “a better link” between precommissioning education and post-commissioning requirements.  

The Army’s preference for the engineer, physical scientist and mathematician over the person of letters, however, went beyond utilitarian considerations. It was in part a reflection of national attitudes. Americans have always prized technical know-how. They have not been content with merely manipulating a piece of equipment, they have had to master it. In a similar way, the Army expected an officer not only to be able to use a laser range finder, but to understand the physical and optical principles that governed its operation as well. The Army’s technological bias was also tied to social origin. Few members of the officer corps came from the leisured classes. Most of their middle and lower middle class parents had to work to provide for their families. “Education” to this group was not about expanding one’s intellectual horizons or about exploring the source of one’s convictions but about getting a well-paying job. Engineering, business and medicine were disciplines that were highly valued because of their income potential.

Reinforcing this predisposition for “high tech” disciplines was the belief that quantitative and scientific studies were uniquely suited to promote clear, straightforward, analytical thinking—the type of thinking that made for a successful staff officer. As Lyons and Masland observed, the focus of introductory courses in these fields was not on developing skeptical, inquisitive minds
but on arriving at single, definitive answers to concrete questions. The mindset encouraged by the study of these "hard skill" disciplines had an obvious appeal to a certain type of military officer.\textsuperscript{42}

**Failure to Reach "High-Tech" Goals**

Despite the Allocation Program, the Army still was not able to attract high quality engineers in the numbers it wanted into the ROTC. A lack of command emphasis may have played a part in this. Cadet Command Commanders have generally subscribed to the thesis that one can effectively employ and manage technology without necessarily understanding the scientific principles that underlie its functioning. In this sense, they have adhered to the tradition of the British officer corps which has a decidedly operational as opposed to a technological bent.

Also at work was the problem of getting capable engineering students interested in military service. More lucrative jobs awaited many of them in the civilian sector. A majority of the ones that did enter the Army saw their professional skills erode in jobs that the Army may have identified as engineering-related but, in reality, could be performed by any reasonably intelligent college graduate regardless of academic background. They were consequently at a disadvantage if and when they got out of the service and sought civilian employment as an engineer.

Moreover, those engineering majors that did stay with the ROTC program were not, in general, exemplars of the "warrior-leader"—an assertive and determined mesomorph who could by his presence and demeanor command the respect of subordinates. They tended to be more comfortable behind a computer screen than in front of an infantry platoon. As a result, many did not perform particularly well at Advanced Camp, which was, according to those in Cadet Command who measured leadership ability, a good indication that they did not have what it took to be an Army officer.

Finally, students pursuing "high tech" academic majors found it difficult to meet the course requirements of their career field and still find time to satisfy the demands of the ROTC program. This has been a problem for the Army since the 1950s. To accommodate the aspiring engineer and physicist, the Army modified its ROTC curriculum in 1960, decreasing "purely military" instruction from 480 to 360 contact hours and adding 120 hours of electives. The modifications permitted the Army to meet the letter if not the spirit of the National Defense Act of 1916 whose provisions required that a cadet
must take three hours of ROTC per week during the junior and senior years. Congress took a step in the same direction in 1964 when it passed the ROTC Vitalization Act, which removed the legislative requirement to devote a specified number of hours to military training. This was done to make the curriculum more "flexible" and reduce the amount of time a student had to spend on ROTC related activities. The so-called Option C Curriculum, introduced in the early 1970s, had a similar intent. These measures, like the Allocation Program, were only partly effective for after their adoption, the Army still did not bring high quality engineering and physical science students into the ROTC in the desired numbers.\textsuperscript{43}

**The Scholarship "Cap"

The relaxation of international tensions that began during the second term of the Reagan Administration ushered in an era of steadily declining military spending. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent dismemberment of the Soviet Union only strengthened the resolve of Congress to cut the defense budget and to reduce the Army to a size commensurate with the threats it would likely face in the post-Cold War world. The 35 percent drop in Army end strength between 1990 and 1995 clearly demonstrated that resolve.

Cadet Command had to absorb its share of the cuts. Limiting the amount spent on scholarships was one obvious way of economizing. Rapidly escalating tuition levels and associated educational costs in the 1980s had made the Army ROTC scholarship program, in the minds of many observers, prohibitively expensive. Accordingly, the total number of scholarships in effect had been steadily trimmed back from 12,000 in 1986 to only 8,600 by 1993.\textsuperscript{44} This, it was hoped, would bring scholarship outlays on line with diminished production requirements and in consonance with the spirit of the Gramm-Rudmann Act.

Nevertheless, it became apparent early on that reducing the total number of awards was not an effective means of achieving the desired economies. The problem was that an Army ROTC scholarship covered the recipient's complete costs of tuition, books and fees as well as provided for a small subsistence allowance. Rising tuition rates combined with the propensity of scholarship recipients to take their awards to high-cost, private institutions to nullify the savings effected by reducing the number of scholarships. It took more money to produce fewer lieutenants and the system defied effective
THE ARMY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM

budgeting. The Army and Cadet Command were, in a sense, at the mercy of those university officials who established tuition and fees. By the late 1980s, the ROTC scholarship program had become, in short, a managerial nightmare.

To redress what had become an almost intolerable situation, Cadet Command devised a plan to “cap” tuition and fees paid to ROTC scholarship cadets. Under the plan, the amount of money awarded to scholarship recipients was not to exceed $7,000 or 80 percent of annual tuition, whichever amount was greater. Maximum rates for fees, textbooks and classroom supplies were also established. The latter measure was occasioned by a management study conducted by the Resource Management Directorate which showed that aviation fees (some of which were in excess of $20,000 per year), hair cuts at military schools, post office boxes, country club fees, and private music lessons had been paid for with scholarship funds. Upon full implementation of the cap, it was estimated, an annual savings of more than $2 million would be realized.  

Some worried that the cap would substantially reduce Cadet Command’s presence on the campuses of elite, expensive schools. These fears were dismissed by command analysts who pointed out that reducing the scholarship funding to the 80 percent tuition level would not be a significant disincentive to ROTC participation for students attending expensive colleges. There were some within the command who did not view a diminished ROTC presence in elite universities as an entirely bad thing.

The cap became effective at the beginning of School Year 1990-1991. The constantly rising costs of higher education soon forced Cadet Command to raise its tuition ceiling. It was boosted to $7,500 (or 80 percent) in School Year 1991-1992 and to $8000 (or 80 percent) the following academic year. After this last increase, certain congressmen let it be known that, in their opinion, not enough was being done to hold down scholarship costs. They floated a motion to limit the amount of an award to the out-of-state tuition charged by the most expensive public university in the state. This proposal was never adopted but it did send shock waves through ROTC battalions located on the campuses of some expensive, private institutions. By mid-1993, it was clear that the particular type of tuition cap then in place did not offer a long-term solution to the scholarship problem. The program was becoming increasingly intractable as tuition rates soared.
One of the principal challenges facing Major General Lyle when he took over Cadet Command in the summer of 1993 was bringing the scholarship program under control. The challenge had two aspects. One had to do with making the program amenable to fiscal management, something that the Army had been unable to do since the inception of the scholarship program in 1964; the other with the need to make scholarships work to boost officer production, which had fallen precipitously over the last two years.

The Scholarship Allocation Plan, more commonly known as scholarship tiering, was the system devised to effect the requisite changes. The plan provided for four award tiers or levels, each of which had an upper limit or ceiling. Tier I scholarships had a ceiling of $12,000, Tier II of $8,000, Tier III of $5,000, and Tier IV of $2,000. A specified percentage of the scholarship budget was allocated to each level. Under the tiering system, students could not receive an amount in excess of their tuition and fees. Thus, a Tier I student could not take his $12,000 award, matriculate at a university that carried a $4,000 per year tuition price tag, and pocket the remainder. The new system had the effect of increasing the number of scholarships but, as we will see in subsequent paragraphs, reducing the average value of the award. See Figure 7-3.

The pre-tiering and post-tiering scholarship programs differed in many respects. Perhaps the most apparent and, to certain staff officers at the Pentagon and certain members of the academic community, disconcerting difference centered on the relatively low percentage of scholarship awards allocated to Tier I. See Figures 7-4 and 7-5. Only 17 percent of award recipients, accounting for 36 percent of the scholarship budget, received the most generous award. With the $12,000 limit, even individuals in this select group could not cover tuition payments at many private institutions with Army scholarship money alone.48

Preliminary evidence suggested that scholarship tiering had, in fact, resulted in lowering ROTC enrollment at some of the nation’s most expensive schools.49 Alarmed by the implications that the new scholarship system held for their school, officials at the University of Miami even decided to sever their connection with the Army ROTC entirely. In a letter dated November 13, 1995, Edward T. Foote, II, President of the University of Miami, informed Major General Lyle that:

Our decision to terminate our partnership with the Department of the Army was based strictly on the declining (to almost
nothing) interest of students in the program. That lack of interest was based entirely on the Army’s decision to drastically reduce scholarship money available...We remain in partnership with the Air Force ROTC, because the Air Force still provides reasonable scholarship assistance.\textsuperscript{40}

The “reasonable scholarship assistance” mentioned in President Foote’s letter referred to the Air Force policy of covering the entire cost of tuition and fees for a selected group of scholarship recipients regardless of the school they attend.

![Scholarship Offers - Past, Present & Future](image)

*Figure 7-3. Scholarship Offers - Past, Present & Future*
U.S. ARMY CADET COMMAND: THE 10 YEAR HISTORY

SCHOLARSHIP ALLOCATION BEFORE TIERING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Out-State</th>
<th>In-state</th>
<th>CAT II</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>$2,000</td>
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</tr>
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<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4068</td>
<td>1291</td>
<td>3267</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>8835</td>
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</table>

Figure 7-4. Scholarship Allocation Before Tiering

SCHOLARSHIP ALLOCATION AFTER TIERING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tier I</th>
<th>Tier II</th>
<th>Tier III</th>
<th>Tier IV</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>$5,000</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg Cost by Tier</td>
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<td>$3,700</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9%</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Percent Scholarships</td>
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<td>21%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4460</td>
<td>3040</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7-5. Scholarship Allocation Plan After Tiering
Objections to Scholarship Tiering

Many believed that an ROTC pullback from elite educational institutions would have dire consequences for both the Army and the nation. Eliot Cohen, professor at Johns Hopkins University, viewed the continued ROTC presence at these schools as key to the maintenance of a healthy state of civil-military relations. Because the graduates of these elite universities comprised a significant portion of our national leaders, he reasoned, it was desirable that they be given the opportunity to learn something about military affairs in their undergraduate years. The knowledge they thus acquired would permit them to be less dependent on their uniformed military experts when they attained positions of great responsibility.51

Cohen’s argument was by no means a new one. A version of that argument had been advanced in the late 1950s when the Navy announced its intention to reduce the number of scholarships allocated to expensive, private institutions (see page 188) and had been subsequently reiterated almost every time someone seriously questioned the wisdom of spending such a large proportion of the scholarship budget on these schools. The assumption that four years of ROTC followed by a brief stint in a reserve component would equip the future civilian leader with an experiential base sufficiently broad to enable him to intelligently critique the plans and recommendations of senior military leaders, however, seems problematic at best.

Others advanced a more fundamental objection. They saw scholarship tiering and the resultant movement away from prestigious universities as lowering the overall quality of officer accessions and ultimately the officer corps as a whole. Cadet Command, they charged, was sacrificing quality for quantity. Some uniformed critics feared that scholarship tiering would in the long run severely reduce the Army’s ability to understand and guide technological development. With fewer MIT and Cal Poly graduates in its ranks, their argument ran, the Army would become vulnerable to manipulation by civilian techno-warriors, who, in the main, would lack tactical expertise and have no understanding of the officer ethos. Tier III and IV schools, in their estimation, could not produce the type of technologically sophisticated officer the Army needed to lead it into the next century.52

Defenders of Tiering

On its part, Cadet Command did not view its pullback from elite schools as in any way harmful to the long term health of the officer corps. The forces behind this “anti-elitist” sentiment were numerous and complex. In the
following several paragraphs, some of the prominent forces and currents of opinion will be briefly discussed.

Major General Wagner represented one strain of thought on this topic. He downplayed the role of prestigious colleges as a source of junior officers because he felt that their graduates possessed personality characteristics that were either inimical or irrelevant to the development of a professional soldier. Sensitivity, abundant intelligence, and creativity—qualities highly valued at prestigious institutions—were not the prime prerequisites for an effective military officer, at least in the opinion of Wagner and the considerable number of other Army leaders who thought like him. Physical stamina, decisiveness, and "massive common sense" were the traits which lead to victory on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{53}

S.L.A. Marshall, the famous officer-historian, voiced similar sentiments. To him, military leadership was not a matter of "brain trusting and whiz kidding." What was known about the greatest military leaders in the present age, he once noted, "should discourage the idea that only a genius may scale the heights." While there were "niches" for the "pedant," character was "at all times at least as vital as intellect, and the main rewards go to him who can make other men feel toughened as well as elevated."\textsuperscript{54}

Such a view is by no means new nor is it shared only by professional military officers. In congressional hearings on the proposed establishment of an Air Force Academy in the early 1950s, for example, a number of representatives were adamant about not restricting entrance to the new precommissioning institution to "bright boys" and "bookworms," the assumption being that such character types would not make very effective pilots.\textsuperscript{55} At a regional ROTC conference held in 1934 at Layfayette, Indiana, Professor of History Louis M. Sears contrasted the human material that matriculated at Purdue and other land-grant institutions with the students at "academic schools" on the eastern seaboard. "I am confident," he asserted,

...after long experience with students, that there is just as much intelligence, probably more, in the minds of just steady, straightforward, plain students, as one is apt to find in the self-conscious "intellectual" of the academic schools. I think these straightforward students (in land-grant institutions) are apt to be sounder in mind and keener in their thinking than some with more pretensions and assumptions. One of my rewards for teaching in an institution like Purdue...is that I always feel when I face a
class that I am dealing with intelligent persons whose feet are on
the ground. If I were in an academic school, I might encounter
more of these pseudo-intellectuals prone to go off half-cocked.\textsuperscript{56}

There was no doubt about which type Sears believed would make the more
effective officer.

There were those within the command who were even more skeptical
than Wagner about the suitability of expensive, prestigious universities as cen-
ters of precommissioning military training. Many in this group bristled at the
suggestion that these schools had cornered the market on academic excel-
ence. To them, America's private, distinguished colleges represented privi-
lege and exclusiveness—qualities that they felt should have no place in the
officer procurement process.

Major General Lyle's coolness toward elite universities stemmed prima-
arily from his concerns about cost-effectiveness. According to available infor-
mation, these schools tended to produce relatively few officers and the offic-
ers that they did turn out usually stayed in the Army only a short time. The
fact that a disproportionately large number of four-year scholarship recipients
took their awards to these universities compounded the problem. The picture
that thus emerged was not, in most respects, a very attractive one. The ROTC
programs situated on these campuses produced at great expense to the gov-
ernment a relative handful of officers who left the Army at the earliest avail-
able opportunity.\textsuperscript{57}

The pattern just described was not of recent origin. Indeed, it had char-
acterized the Army scholarship program since its inception in 1964. The Army
had never been able to get a significant number of the graduates of these insti-
tutions to stay in its ranks. One reason for this was that many of these indi-
viduals had more financially rewarding career opportunities available to them.
Also at play was the fact that many alumni of these institutions were not suited
by temperament or inclination to excel at the routine tasks that were an inte-
gral part of the daily life of most junior officers.

Lyle dismissed fears that scholarship tiering would result in a qualitative
debasement of the ROTC product. He did this because he, like the military
sociologist Morris Janowitz, gauged the elusive concept of quality differently
than some others. With Janowitz, Lyle felt that success as an officer depended
as much on motivation and training as on intellectual ability and analytical
skills. Thus, in the Commanding General's estimation, performance scores
at summer camp were just as important as SAT scores in predicting officer potential. The slight drop in the SAT average for four-year scholarship winners that occurred with the School Year 1995-1996 scholarship application cycle was not a source of worry to him. In fact, he saw it as an almost encouraging development. The ideal candidate for an ROTC commission, in his opinion, was the above average student at a state supported school. Such a student was more likely than the graduate of a prestigious college to make the Army a career and was more likely to succeed as an officer.\textsuperscript{58}

Major General Lyle believed that Cadet Command would reap three important benefits from scholarship tiering. First, he was convinced that it would produce more officers for the Army than the old system. Second, he was certain that these officers would be, as a group, more committed to a military career but, at the same time, every bit as competent as their forebears in earlier year groups. And finally, the new award distribution system, he believed, would permit the Army to manage the scholarship budget—something that it had heretofore not been able to do.

In many respects, the tiering initiative represented a return to the philosophies and beliefs expressed by Defense Department and Army officials during the congressional hearing on the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964. These spokesmen had shown a clear preference for a program which had a tuition ceiling attached to it—a feature which would have freed it from its dependence on those university administrators at expensive schools who set tuition levels. Unfortunately for the Army and for the taxpayer, three decades would pass before such a system would be adopted.
CHAPTER VIII

RESTRUCTURING
CADET COMMAND

"Disestablishment (of uneconomical ROTC units) is a politically sensitive area. It is doubtful any program can be disestablished without the institution's concurrence." 25

Cadet Command's most challenging task in the post-Cold War era has been the restructuring of the ROTC command and control apparatus. Contrary to the assumptions of certain General Accounting Office (GAO) auditors, aligning structure with resources and production goals goes far beyond considerations of economic efficiency. The quality of precommissioning training and education are also intimately bound up with this very important issue.

Of particular significance to Cadet Command has been the question of how many units should be maintained in operation. Sustaining too many or too few both create problems but historically it has been the former problem that has presented the ROTC program with its greatest difficulties. The existence of uneconomical and ineffective units (commonly referred to by the General Accounting Office and other government bodies as "non-productive" or "unproductive" units) becomes an especially contentious issue during periods of demobilization when officer requirements are curtailed. To enable the reader to understand Cadet Command's contribution in this arena, this chapter will begin with a review of how the Army has dealt with nonproductive units in the past.
Pre-World War II

Eliminating marginally productive ROTC units has been a perennial problem for the U.S. Army. Indeed, the problem existed long before the formal establishment of the modern ROTC program in 1916. As early as 1883, the Army’s Adjutant General, R. C. Drum, had urged that Army officers be withdrawn from campuses where the military enrollment fell below 150, the enrollment standard set by Congress in 1866. Drum’s successors made similar requests in 1893 and 1895. If these requests had been carried out (which they were not), the agricultural colleges of 20 states (representing about 25 percent of extant collegiate military units) would have lost the Army officer assigned to them.\(^1\)

The Army redoubled its efforts to eliminate military training programs at colleges with small military enrollments in the demobilization that followed the Spanish American War. Personnel and resources were both in short supply and readiness was a major concern. Collegiate military training, many believed, was an expensive luxury and diverted people and money away from more pressing tasks. One senior army leader complained that the detail of officers to college duty “depletes the line and deprives the troops of the services of...excellent officers when they are most needed.”\(^2\)

Despite these protests, only a handful of active duty officers were recalled from detached duty on college campuses.\(^3\) Even in the few cases where regulars were withdrawn, units continued to function because retired officers were invariably appointed to take their place. The difficulties the Army experienced in divesting itself of non-productive programs stemmed primarily from the vigorous and effective opposition it encountered from the association of land-grant colleges and the association’s supporters in Congress. The political clout of the land-grant institutions was simply too much for the Army to surmount. It is interesting to note that many institutions evidenced no particular interest in their military training programs until the War Department threatened to withdraw its support — a fact which many cadre members recognized and tried to use as leverage to get more institutional support for their military training programs.\(^4\)

There was another, albeit less significant, obstacle to closing units before World War I. It had to do with the problem of measuring enrollment. At some agricultural schools, for example, attendance dropped off dramatically at the end of the academic year when many students returned home to help out on the family farm. In 1904, drill attendance at one institution sank from 541 at mid-year to only 80 at the close of the year. And farm chores represented
only one category of training distractor. There were a host of other factors and excuses, as diverse as the body of colleges and universities that hosted military training programs, that resulted in widely varying attendance totals from week to week throughout the collegiate community.3

Nonproductive units became more of a problem after World War I. The reductions in military spending imposed by a cost-conscious Congress forced the Army to take a careful look at those units whose enrollment totals did not meet the standard prescribed by the National Defense Act of 1920. This act dictated that no ROTC unit was to be established or maintained at an institution that failed to enroll “at least one hundred physically fit male students” in its program of military instruction. With this legislation, the Army closed some uneconomical units (17 according to one count) although not nearly as many, it appears, as it would have liked or which production figures indicate was warranted. Again, external forces in the form of congressional and institutional pressures worked against the goal of attaining production efficiency.6

**Post-World War II Demobilization**

The move to rid the ROTC of unproductive units was renewed after the Second World War. The disestablishment criteria contained in the National Defense Act of 1920 remained in effect. The 1948 annual history of the Office, Chief, Army Field Forces (OCAFF), contained the following entry:

> OCAFF took steps to establish the ROTC on a sounder basis by requiring all armies to submit recommendations concerning the withdrawal of unsatisfactory and uneconomical units. This action resulted in the withdrawal of ROTC units from seven institutions prior to the opening of the 1948-49 academic year.7

In the 1949 annual history of the Army Field Forces, the issue surfaced once again:

> A continuing problem in connection with the efficient and economical conduct of the ROTC program is the elimination of unproductive units. As a result of an extensive study by the ROTC branch of this office (i.e., Office, Chief, Army Field Forces) and presented to the Director of O&T in the spring of 1949, six (6) units were deactivated out of a total of twenty-four (24) so
recommended. A similar program for the weeding out of ineffective units was initiated by OCAFF in December (1949) with the dispatch of a letter to Army commanders and Chiefs of Technical Services on this subject.\textsuperscript{5}

According to the records of the Adjutant General’s Office, at least 10 of the 13 closures mentioned in the 1948 and 1949 historical reports of the Army Field Forces involved medical units, most of which were located on a campus that hosted another ROTC detachment. (The medical unit at the University of Cincinnati Medical School closed in 1948, but the “regular” detachment at that institution remained open.)

On the whole, the Army did not enjoy great success in its campaign to eliminate uneconomical ROTC units in the immediate post-war period. In 1949, fully 30 percent (55 out of 182) of all ROTC detachments graduated fewer than 10 lieutenants. Another 13 percent (24 out of 182) turned out between 10 and 15.\textsuperscript{9} True, some of the units with low production totals were affiliated with technical and specialty branches, which operated under different rules. Nevertheless, it is clear that more needed to be done in the way of closing down ineffective units than was actually accomplished.

**Post-Korean War Demobilization**

Because the administration did not declare full mobilization and because of the bulk of the fighting was over in the first year, the Army chose to rely on the ROTC with its long lead time to meet its officer needs during the Korean War. Accordingly, the Army boosted the ROTC production goal by several thousand and expanded the number of ROTC units from 181 to 251 (a 39 percent increase). Figure 8-1. Colleges, especially private colleges, were eager to get ROTC units established on their campuses. Indeed, 250 applications for new units could not be accommodated. This new found enthusiasm for ROTC was due to the increasing dependence of private institutions on tuition income and to the fear of college presidents that unless they could offer prospective students the benefit of draft deferment, which participation in the ROTC program did, they would see their enrollments decimated.\textsuperscript{10}

The ROTC program’s long lead time made it difficult to turn off the officer production machine once hostilities ceased. The Army thus found itself with a huge surplus of newly commissioned second lieutenants. The problems created by this surplus could have been quickly solved if the Army
would have resorted to what is today euphemistically called involuntary re-
lease programs. These programs, however, would have involved breaking com-
mitments to students and would not have been popular with the public, the congress, or with the university community. The problem was partially solved with the passage of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, which allowed ROTC graduates to serve a six-month stint of active duty, usually at a branch school, instead of an extended tour.

Disposing of excess units, however, presented a thornier set of difficulties than disposing of excess production. The Army’s predicament at the end of the war revolved around two factors: there were many more units after the war than there had been before it; and officer production requirements were decreasing. To complicate matters still further, it was projected that this downward trend in the production mission would continue in the near future. Unless appropriate actions were taken to balance the ROTC institutional base with production objectives, there would inevitably be a proliferation of small uneconomical units."

Figure 8-1. ROTC Units (Host + Extension Centers)
With the threat of imminent budget cuts looming on the horizon, the Army addressed the problem in 1953 by developing a new set of decision making criteria for school closures. The methodology was summed up in the slogan “100 in—25 out.” In other words, a unit was considered viable if it could enroll 100 freshmen each year and commission 25 graduates. The first year a unit failed to attain the prescribed standard, it was to be placed on a one-year probationary status. At the end of this one-year probation, it was to be closed if it did not attain the prescribed production and enrollment levels. In School Year 1953-1954, almost 10 percent of participating schools did not meet the viability criteria.

In trying to effect ROTC unit closures based on this methodology, the Army met stiff resistance. Some schools, it was pointed out, had better retention rates than others. They did not enroll 100 freshmen but they produced 25 or more second lieutenants annually. Some also complained that this methodology tended to rob the Army of graduates of the most distinguished colleges and universities, many of which did not meet the minimum production or enrollment standards. Distinguished schools, the argument ran, made up in quality what they lacked in quantity. Moreover, a majority of colleges and universities wanted to retain their programs and protested vigorously when threatened with closure. As a result of this resistance, the requirement for enrolling 100 freshmen was dropped, or at least ignored, although the minimum commissioning standard of 25 was retained, at least in principle.

Some doubted the usefulness of the new closure methodology. Lyons and Masland, the authors of a 1959 study of the ROTC program, concluded it was ineffective. The new viability standard, they wrote, “has not offered the Army a very effective means of paring its program down to the strong viable basis called for by its impending manpower demands.” They offered no statistical data to support their conclusion, but the available evidence supports them. The records of the Adjutant General’s Office indicate that 17 percent of ROTC units in 1957 did not graduate 25 commissionees. This would suggest that the problem actually grew worse between 1953, the year the new criteria were introduced, and 1957.

The Vietnam Build-Up

When the Army attempted to boost ROTC production in the early 1960s, the issue of non-productive units intruded yet another time. Colonel Robert Evans, chief of the ROTC Division in the Office of Reserve Components,
explained the problems posed by such units in an address he made to a group of educators in 1964. He told the group that:

Coincident to any expansion will be the problem of substandard units. We have a number of institutions now that because of low enrollment or low quality of production fail to meet standards. These institutions also tend to be the most expensive ones from the point of view of the Army. It would thus seem reasonable that at the time any decision is made to take in additional colleges and universities, some of our expensive, substandard units would be dropped. This problem is being studied with great care for it has many ramifications, which I need not mention to you gentlemen.\textsuperscript{16}

Although Evans never precisely spelled out these ramifications, he was undoubtedly referring to the “political” problems that often accompany the closure of ROTC units, especially those associated with high-priced prestigious schools.

In 1965, the Department of the Army entrusted the so-called Haines Board, which was comprised of a group of distinguished military officers and educators, with the task of determining “the adequacy and appropriateness” of the Army’s system of officer education and training. In its analysis of precommissioning training, it found that the Army was having difficulty maintaining viable ROTC units “in universities with high academic standing.” Board members pointed to the fact that in 1965, nine of America’s most prestigious colleges (Stanford, Rice, Georgia Tech, Johns Hopkins, Cornell, MIT, Yale, Princeton, and Harvard) together produced only six Regular Army second lieutenants.\textsuperscript{17}

In the mid-1960s, congressional worries about the growing trend within the academic community to abolish compulsory ROTC and about slumping ROTC production totals stimulated that body to pass the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964. This act provided for, among other things, the bifurcation of the ROTC into a two- and four-year program and the awarding of Army ROTC scholarships. Both provisions were designed to boost program participation.

The termination of compulsory ROTC programs became a matter of particular concern to the Army for it usually resulted in an almost immediate drop in enrollment on affected campuses. To counter this trend and ensure its ability to sustain ROTC output at desired levels in the future, the Army decided
to cast its institutional net wider and thereby broaden its production base. It was a course of action that the Army had adopted during the Korean Crisis and was to repeat on an even grander scale in the early 1980s during another build-up. As the number of units increased, however, the size of the average unit decreased. Figure 8-2. Most of the schools that gained new ROTC units during the late 1960s were small to medium-sized state institutions located in the South or Mid-West. They were, in the main, schools without a tradition of political activism and, according to some worried Defense Department officials, without a reputation for academic excellence.18

During the Vietnam War, the Army's unit disestablishment policy was based on a memorandum, dated 9 December 1965, from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower to each of the service secretaries. This document set a production minimum of 15 for four-year units and 10 for two-year

Figure 8-2. Enrollment Per Unit
RESTRUCTURING CADET COMMAND

programs. It also directed that the service secretary must begin the disestablishment process—i.e., issue a preliminary warning letter—if output dropped below the prescribed minimum. Unit viability ratings were to be based on the following factors: faculty and administration support, student attitudes, facilities, quality and costs of production, the amount of academic credit given, and the retention rate of graduates. Lowering production minimums to the 15/10 level was a necessary adjustment to the emerging pattern of more but smaller units.¹⁹

Units were indeed inactivated in the 1960s, but not very many. A majority of those that were eliminated fell into the category of voluntary disestablishments in which the university, not the Army, took the lead in getting the ROTC off campus. In periods of military expansion like the one that occurred coincident with the Vietnam build-up, officer requirements are on the increase and the consensus necessary to closing unproductive units is, quite naturally, difficult to form.

Post-Vietnam Demobilization

America’s disengagement from Vietnam and the consequent drawdown of its Army once again pushed the issue of unproductive ROTC detachments to the fore. The Army had faced a similar situation after the Korean Conflict. The additional units created to meet wartime officer needs left the ROTC with a bloated institutional establishment when hostilities ceased. After Vietnam, however, the problem was of a greater magnitude. From 1964 to 1973, the number of Army ROTC units expanded from 232 to 293 (a 26 percent increase) while enrollment decreased from 168,742 to 72,459 (a 57 percent decrease). The enrollment decline was closely related to the end of conscription and the advent of the all-volunteer Army in the early 1970s.

Department of Defense Directive 1215.8

The June 1971 edition of DOD Directive 1215.8, Policies Relating to Senior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), unlike previous versions of that publication, contained specific guidance concerning the disestablishment of ROTC units. It retained the minimum production standard of 15 officers per year for four-year programs and 10 officers per year for two-year programs (with production being calculated on the basis of a four-year average) established in 1965. It further directed that units failing to meet the prescribed production minimum be placed in an evaluation status for a two-year period,
during which time the Army was supposed to “work closely with the (affected) institutions to seek measures which would make the ROTC units fully productive.” Disestablishment procedures were to be initiated if the unit failed to meet prescribed standards by the end of the evaluation period.

The intended effect of the directive, however, was diluted by the inclusion of a paragraph that permitted the Army to apply “other criteria” when evaluating unit viability. These “other criteria” included: cost per officer produced; quality of officer produced; institutional support; and retention rate of graduates by institution.20

**Defense Department and Army Concerns**

By December 1971, the Department of the Army had become so concerned about the problem that it directed CONARC to survey all Senior ROTC programs that had been in operation for at least four years for the purpose of identifying those that did not meet officer production objectives, as defined in the 1971 edition of Department of Defense Directive 1215.8. CONARC’s response, which listed six units as substandard, was forwarded to the department in March 1972. Another survey was conducted the following year. This time, 12 units were deemed marginal.21

Outside agencies soon took up the question. A General Accounting Office report, published in February 1973, took the Army to task for retaining “unproductive” units. It found 22 Army Senior ROTC detachments in School Year 1970-1971 that did not meet minimum Defense Department production criteria. The same report criticized the Defense Department, along with the three services, for calculating unit viability on the basis of a four-year production average rather than on annual output.22

Stung by this criticism, the Army made a show, at least, of getting tough with nonproductive units. Strict guidance was issued to the field demanding that the viability criteria contained in the Department of Defense Directive be strictly adhered to and its provisions about placing substandard units in an evaluative status be enforced.23 Detachments failing to meet production standards by the end of their two-year probation, it was reiterated, were to be disestablished.24

In 1974, the Defense Department again addressed the problem by publishing new and more stringent viability criteria for ROTC units. The department mandated that four-year programs must contract a minimum of 17 and two-year programs a minimum of 12 MS III cadets. Substandard units were to be placed on probation for one year during which time the local military
RESTRUCTURING CADET COMMAND

科学部门和主办机构将合作提高生产。同一指令规定，在第一个评估期间不达标单位将在一年后被解散。指令发布后不久，167所机构收到“关注函”，通知它们未达到新的生产标准，因此它们是解散或进入 probation 的候选人。不久之后，国防部门意识到关闭大约65%的机构（167所167/291所ROTC单位）并不“可行或合适”，于是放松了立场，通过增加某些合格性条款，稀释了其关闭标准。

防御部门宣布其新关闭方法的突然性激怒了学术界和军队界。该公告并未事先与TRADOC或ROTC地区总部协调。一些大学校长首次通过报纸得知新标准。

根据第三ROTC地区总部的一位旁观者从该事件的角度所观察，这是一次对非经济单位的严厉态度，就像许多先前和随后的此类尝试一样，因为处境艰难和有效的抵抗，该计划在大学管理的强烈反对下失败了。他观察到，“解散”是一个政治敏感的领域。任何项目的解散都必须得到该机构的同意。”

25 根据以官方身份观察事件的第三ROTC地区总部的证人，这是一次对非经济单位的严厉态度，就像许多先前和随后的此类尝试一样，因为处境艰难和有效的抵抗，该计划在大学管理的强烈反对下失败了。他观察到，“解散”是一个政治敏感的领域。任何项目的解散都必须得到该机构的同意。”

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27 27 根据以官方身份观察事件的第三ROTC地区总部的证人，这是一次对非经济单位的严厉态度，就像许多先前和随后的此类尝试一样，因为处境艰难和有效的抵抗，该计划在大学管理的强烈反对下失败了。他观察到，“解散”是一个政治敏感的领域。任何项目的解散都必须得到该机构的同意。”

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to the contention of the General Accounting Office that the Army was not serious about enforcing the Defense Department standard. ROTC program managers at the Pentagon came forward with a proposal to close 20 substandard units. The Department of Defense approved the projected inactivations. Before closure action could be implemented, the TRADOC Commander, at the instigation of his DCSROTC, intervened. He first convinced the Army Chief of Staff and then the Secretary of the Army that only two units should be eliminated. He made it clear that he would effect a large-scale closure only if so ordered by the Defense Department.

To understand why the TRADOC Commander acted as he did, one must remember that the Army in the late 1970s was experiencing a severe officer production deficit. In 1975, TRADOC had been instructed to increase annual ROTC officer production from its existing level of about 4,600 to 10,000 by 1980. One of the ways it planned to do this was through the creation of new units, most of which were to be a new category of unit that came to be known as the extension center. These centers were to be considerably smaller than host detachments and consume less manpower. Thus, far from looking to shrink the ROTC's institutional base, TRADOC was bent on expanding it.

It was this attitude that prompted the Comptroller General to accuse the services of a "lack of commitment" in their effort to rid the ROTC program of unproductive units. The chief of the General Accounting Office recommended to Congress that the services be required to inactivate immediately all units not meeting prescribed minimum production levels, with the Defense Department approving any exceptions.

The Department of Defense naturally took exception to this recommendation. It pointed out that a unit's value may be more accurately reflected in its production capacity than in its past production totals. Furthermore, it argued, service requirements for certain scientific and technical skills and for adequate minority representation in the officer corps may override purely numerical standards. In any case, the Defense Department believed, the immediate inactivation of substandard units without affording them a reasonable opportunity to overcome their production shortfalls would necessitate a "continual and costly restructuring."

The Comptroller General remained unconvinced. The services could meet their needs for minorities and individuals with special skills, he insisted, by means other than retaining marginally productive units. In the end, the Defense Department agreed to tighten up its inactivation guidelines although little if anything was actually done along these lines.
Congressional Criticisms of the Closure Process

Congress also weighed in on the issue of uneconomical ROTC units in the 1970's. Congressional concern, in turn, heightened service interest in the problem. In 1976, a member of the House Appropriations Committee observed:

...We have 31 Army (ROTC) units that for five consecutive years have not produced 15 graduates. We have one Navy and six Air Force units in that category. The numbers of units not hitting 15 in any one year during the past five years is a high percentage of the ROTC detachments.\textsuperscript{31}

Another congressman noted that the cost of an OCS graduate was about 1/10th the cost of an ROTC graduate and insisted that unproductive ROTC units would have to be eliminated.\textsuperscript{32}

As a result of its dissatisfaction with the way Defense Department was handling this issue, Congress, in 1977, added Section 855 to P.L. 95-111. This legislation prohibited the expenditure of funds for any ROTC detachment that had failed to meet the MS III enrollment standard for four successive years (except that at least one detachment was to be maintained in each state and at each state operated maritime academy).\textsuperscript{33} The same provision was inserted into the National Defense Act every year through 1984. These repeated legislative assertions of congressional intent, however, had little, if any, practical effect.

In 1978, the House attempted to further tighten up the closure process by reducing from four to three the number of years that an ROTC unit could operate below the Department of Defense standard. The Senate, however, rejected this measure. Its collective position was that the standard prescribed in the Defense Department Directive, since it used enrollment as the principal measure of a unit's value, was too simplistic. Consequently, the Senate urged that:

...a more systematic and objective set of factors should be drawn up by the Department (of Defense) to evaluate the performance and cost effectiveness of ROTC detachments.\textsuperscript{34}

The Department of Defense standard drawn up in 1974, though, had many congressional and military supporters. They felt that it was a useful device
because it made it clear to both the PMS and the university president when a unit was marginally productive. It involved no complicated cost figures or arguments about quality. Moreover, the standard was flexible enough to be manipulated. The difficulty was that it was obvious to almost everyone that the services considered other factors besides those specified in the directive when deciding whether or not to disestablish a particular unit. Some decisions, for example, had been manifestly influenced by political considerations.35

DCSROTC Viability Standards

In conjunction with the instructions issued by Congress and the Department of Defense, the Office of the DCSROTC at TRADOC Headquarters developed viability criteria of its own to help decide which units should be retained and which units should be disestablished. In October 1973, one such viability matrix was completed. It was supposedly designed to implement congressional and Defense Department guidance, although in practice it proved to be a very imperfect tool for achieving this end. The matrix was based on a 1000-point scale. The factors considered and the weights attached to each were as follows:

1. officer production 150 points
2. potential (for production) 150 points
3. rate of production 150 points
4. OBC performance 70 points
5. leadership potential 180 points
6. curriculum 50 points
7. academic credit 50 points
8. Barron’s profile rating 50 points
9. Army ROTC within the state 50 points
10. geographical proximity 20 points
11. other ROTC collocated with Army ROTC 20 points
12. personnel furnished the ROTC department 20 points
13. location of the ROTC department 15 points
14. monetary support “possible” 20 points
15. faculty support “subjective” no points

To instill more regularity in the management of unit productivity, TRADOC, in School Year 1976-1977, instituted the Intensive Management Program. The stated purpose of this program was to provide early warning of
failing detachments and to give the requisite "intensified management" to get troubled units healthy again. The Intensive Management Program could also be used to determine which units should be eliminated.

TRADOC, publicly at least, expressed satisfaction with the Intensive Management Program. In a 1979 report, the TRADOC historical officer commented that the impact of the program had been "extremely positive in that it promotes the sense of urgency at all levels of command and provides the visibility needed to effect change." However, the figures he cited to demonstrate its effectiveness were not very convincing. For School Year 1976-1977, there were 53 units on evaluation status but only three unit closures. In School Year 1977-1978, there were 214 units on an evaluation status but only one candidate for elimination.36

A 1979 RAND Study concluded that the 1974 Defense Department closure criteria (and by implication, the TRADOC's program for disestablishing unproductive units) were ineffective. The probationary period accorded to underachieving units, it complained, was too long. Any detachment could enroll enough MS IIIIs once every four years to stave off closure. It also took the standard to task because it failed to identify units which performed poorly on the basis of cadet quality and average cost per graduate.37

In truth, the Army's poor track record in shutting down uneconomical units in the late 1970s was due more to an unwillingness to enforce the Department of Defense standard than to the standard itself. In an era when the ROTC program was not meeting its prescribed production mission, sentiment for a large-scale inactivation of marginally performing units in the Office of the DCSROTC or among senior Army leaders was, understandably, not very strong.38

Substandard Training

The retention of substandard units had an adverse effect on the quality of ROTC training and preprofessional education—an effect which neither the Congress nor the General Accounting Office mentioned in their critiques of the ROTC program. William Snyder, a former member of the political science faculty at Texas A&M and PMS at Princeton University, noted that one-half of all Army and Air Force ROTC detachments in the mid-1970s enrolled fewer than 100 students. This was unfortunate, he believed, for two reasons. First, the small size of these units coupled with the "inevitable absence of students because of required collegiate activities" reduced the effectiveness of much on-campus military training. Second, a "meaningful leadership experience" was a near impossibility when the number of cadets
did not reach a certain critical mass—which he evidently felt was around 100 students. Indeed, Snyder attributed many of the ROTC program’s qualitative shortfalls in the 1970s to the presence of a large number of small units. General Bruce C. Clarke, a recognized authority on leadership development, wholeheartedly agreed with Snyder on this point. It was a problem that was to grow worse in the first half of the next decade as the number of small units mushroomed.

The Reagan Build-Up

DCSROTC historical reports say little about nonproductive units in the early 1980s. This is not surprising since this was the era of Expand the Base (ETB), a TRADOC initiative that was to increase the institutional size of the ROTC program by nearly 40 percent between 1980 and 1984. It was to be by far the largest institutional expansion of the ROTC since its inception, dwarfing previous enlargement efforts. With Expand the Base, the DCSROTC hoped to meet the Army’s projected annual production requirement of 10,500 by 1985.

The early 1980’s were years in which people and resources were available in relative abundance. The Army was expanding and its officer needs were growing. Culling out uneconomical units was not a priority. Indeed, the Army was seemingly reluctant at this time to disestablish any unit that displayed the slightest chance of one day becoming productive.

Because most of the extension centers created under Expand the Base could not meet the production or enrollment minimums specified in the 1974 edition of Defense Department Directive 1215.8, the directive was revised. The new edition (1982) eliminated numerical standards, leaving the establishment of such standards entirely to the services, but ordered, instead of allowed, the services to consider four viability factors, namely: the quality of officer produced; the cost of maintaining the unit; the kinds of officer produced; and the number of officers produced. It said nothing, however, about how they were to compute the factors. The revised guideline neither streamlined nor simplified the increasingly complicated and confusing closure process.

The Effective Management Program

In 1985, the Army refocused on the problem of uneconomical units. In that year, TRADOC submitted a plan to the Department of the Army for replacing the “ineffective” Intensive Management Program with a new method of managing unit productivity. It designated the new method the Effective
Management Program (EMP). TRADOC took this step, according to the DCSROTC records, because it was burdened with certain detachments that had no growth potential and that had a long history of substandard production (a situation that was by no means new). TRADOC program managers placed much of the blame for this on the Intensive Management Program. That program, they charged, identified substandard units but did not provide a mechanism to improve their performance or eliminate them in a timely manner. Under the Intensive Management Program, the typical response to the problem of an unproductive unit, it seems, was to reduce cadre at the school in question until an appropriate cadre-to-cadet ratio was achieved. This course of action made sense in terms of cost effectiveness but not in terms of training effectiveness. In fact, it made, in many cases, an already bad training environment even worse.

The Effective Management Program contained provisions designed to correct the ills associated with the old method. According to the officers who framed the new procedure, it defined effective and ineffective units, permitted the early identification of substandard detachments, and provided a realistic means of purging marginal unit performers from the ROTC program. The Effective Management Program’s unit viability formula set a commissioning objective of six lieutenants per cadre officer and took into consideration the quality and type of lieutenants commissioned. It also provided for a lengthy probationary period—up to four years—to give every marginal producer a real opportunity to get back on course.

The new viability formula was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the 414 extant ROTC programs in 1986. Thirty-one detachments were identified as marginally effective in this survey. The substandard programs were notified of their status and provided with “individually tailored” guidance and assistance for the purpose of helping them achieve an acceptable level of productivity. How much or whether the performance of these marginal producers was improved was not recorded.

TRADOC instituted the Effective Management Program when it did because it was facing a dilemma. It had to boost production (it turned out 8,000 lieutenants in FY 1985 but its mission was 10,500) but had to do so without additional personnel or resources. By 1985, the defense spending boom of the early 1980s had run its course and the Army, along with the other services, was starting down the path of fiscal retrenchment. Under these circumstances, the only way to close the production gap, it seemed, was to achieve operational efficiencies by redistributing personnel. This meant withdrawing
cadre from unproductive locations and assigning them to areas with growth potential. What had been viewed as merely a desirable end was increasingly coming to be looked upon as almost an operational necessity.

Post-Cold War Demobilization

No sooner had the Effective Management Program been implemented than it, along with many other parts of the newly created Cadet Command administrative control apparatus, was put to the test. The test came as a result of the relaxation of international tensions and the consequent acceleration of the process of military downsizing. Downsizing began in the personnel arena at the beginning of FY 1987. Prior to that time, the Army was expecting increases in officer end strength at least through 1991. The calculus of officer production changed abruptly at the start of FY 87 when Congress ordered reductions in ROTC cadre authorizations and mission requirements. The challenge from then on was cutting output and reducing the institutional base without destabilizing and debasing the program.

As the Army had discovered in the aftermath of Korea and Vietnam, this was no easy task. Because it takes two to four years to produce an officer through the ROTC, the Army’s short-term ability to regulate the production flow was limited. To deal with this immediate problem, the Army took two steps. One was to authorize a one-time voluntary release program to non-scholarship cadets who had been selected for reserve duty. In FY 1990, a total of 1,128 cadets accepted this offer and “walked away” from their military obligation. The other was to place its “excess” graduates in the Individual Ready Reserve. Of course, the Army would have preferred to shunt these lieutenants into reserve troop program units but the reserves themselves were faced with end strength limitations and could not absorb the excess.43

The magnitude of the production problem was and is a matter of debate. The General Accounting Office estimated that between FY 1987 and FY 1990, the Army overproduced a total of 8,216 officers. In FY 1990 alone, it maintained, 60 percent of Army ROTC output was “unneeded.” The Army, on the other hand, put the excess production figure at only 153. The diverging estimates stemmed from diverging definitions of overproduction. Whereas the Army viewed overproduction as the number of commissions exceeding the mission, the GAO included both the cadets who “walked away” from their military obligation in 1990 and those graduates assigned to the Individual Ready Reserve in their definition.44
RESSTRUCTURING CADET COMMAND

Operation Horizon

As demonstrated in previous periods of demobilization, eliminating uneconomical units is more difficult than slashing production. Cadet Command encapsulated its restructuring ideas (such as they were at this early stage) in a plan that it named Operation Horizon. At the time of its implementation, Horizon represented the largest institutional drawdown in the history of the ROTC program. The origins of this operation can be traced back to a series of briefings held at the Pentagon in November 1989, which had as their focus the Effective Management Program. At these briefings, Major General Wagner and members of his staff got wind of a study then in progress that was designed to determine the best and least disruptive way of reducing Army end strength (Operation Quicksilver) from approximately 750,000 to 580,000. TRADOC, it was evident, would have to take its share of cuts. Cadet Command would not be in a particularly good position to resist these reductions because it was of recent creation and because it was the command with the greatest number of officers assigned to it and hence the biggest target. 45

By the beginning of December 1989, the command, through contacts at the Pentagon, had learned that the Quicksilver plan projected a 36 percent reduction in its overall mission over the next fiscal year (from 7,800 to 5,000) and a 33 percent reduction in ROTC active duty accessions (from 4,300 to 2,900) over the next two fiscal years—FY 1990 and FY 1991. Wagner believed such drastic cuts portended disaster for Cadet Command because of the disruptive effects they would have on the officer accessions process and because of the morale problems it would create among cadets. In a 30 November 1989 letter to the TRADOC Commander he warned:

The Army is literally losing a national treasure. We are executing precipitous changes driven by the MPA (Military Personnel, Army) account and aimed at a six hundred thousand man Army which we will not reach for several years. The cut is too rapid and could damage our young officer corps...We must correct the accessions problem by boosting the ROTC active duty accessions by at least 550, achieving a 3,450 active duty level. This is a time for incremental reductions...or we run the risk of devastating the officer accession system, the leadership development contributions of Cadet Command, cadet morale and the Army image on the university campus.
Cadet Command’s chief sought to pre-empt the Quicksilver plan by coming up with a downsizing scheme of his own. Operation Horizon was the result. The Horizon plan reflected both his determination to retain as much of the ROTC institutional structure as possible and his fears about the organizational turbulence that would inevitably accompany such a large scale closure action. In the past, not all parties had demonstrated an appreciation for the disruption that sudden and wholesale unit inactivations can bring in their wake. The 1977 General Accounting Office recommendation to Congress clearly demonstrated the point (see page 226).

The procedure that the command had developed for eliminating unproductive units, the Effective Management Program, could not be the exclusive means by which Horizon was effected. That program rested on a four year inactivation process but Cadet Command had to make major cuts in only one year. To effect the drawdown with the necessary rapidity, therefore, the command relied upon the expedient of the “contract” closure. A review of the standardized contract between the Army and institutional authorities revealed that a host institution could be closed in one academic year and an extension center in one semester if either the school concerned or the Army terminated the contract for whatever reason. (Several private universities in the late 1960s had used the contract closure to terminate Army ROTC programs on their campuses.)

Selecting units for inactivation was accomplished through the use of the Army ROTC viability algorithm, a device designed to identify colleges with low production potential. The 1990 version of the algorithm favored quantity over quality. It gave equal weight to past (1/4), current (1/4), anticipated near term production (1/4), and to quality (1/4). A sensitivity analysis of this algorithm indicated that schools with low production potential did not improve their relative standing when increased importance was given to quality. In retrospect, one can see this as a clear signal that something was amiss with the viability algorithm. In the press of events that accompanied Horizon, however, such a methodological error went undetected.

From March to August 1990, Cadet Command Headquarters refined the Horizon Plan, while keeping in close contact with both the TRADOC and Army Staffs. In its August 1990 form, Horizon called for the inactivation of 50 Senior ROTC units (31 hosts and 19 extension centers), the elimination of two brigade headquarters, and the selective drawdown of cadre at certain schools. With this plan, the command’s end strength was to shrink from 4,499 to 3,761 and its officer production capacity from 7,800 to 6,200. All this was to be accomplished by October 1991.
In addition to effecting a rapid drawdown, the Horizon plan had several other stated objectives. One was to preserve the traditional form of the command. Thus, under Horizon, the old camp structure (i.e., three Advanced Camps and one Basic Camp) was retained. Eliminating one or more camps, which some outside of Cadet Command Headquarters had suggested, would have saved money but also would have reduced the cadre-to-cadet ratio at camp, which would have lowered the overall quality of training.

The plan also provided for a “ramp-up” capability in case of national emergency and an “infrastructure” capable of maintaining “the Army’s presence on America’s college campuses.” There was an obvious tension between Horizon’s primary goal of closing unproductive units and these latter two objectives. “Preserving the Army’s presence on campus” (a rather nebulous concept to which a variety of definitions have been attached) often has meant keeping units with a long history of substandard production while maintaining a “ramp-up” capability (in the way it has traditionally been understood, at least) necessarily entailed the retention of a larger institutional base than officer requirements dictated. How seriously the Army took these latter two objectives is not entirely clear. There were officers at Cadet Command Headquarters and in the Pentagon who regarded them primarily as convenient justifications to ward off even more drastic unit cuts in the future.  

The Secretary of Defense directed the Army to implement Operation Horizon on 12 July 1990. A little over 14 months later, Cadet Command had closed 62 Senior ROTC units, which represented 15 percent of extant programs at the time. Fifty of these closures had been part of the original Horizon plan. The other 12 were Effective Management Program closures. However, all 62 actions are commonly lumped together under the Horizon label because they were developed and worked at approximately the same time.

Major General Arnold, the Cadet Command Commander who superintended the execution of Horizon, clearly regarded it as a huge success. He attributed the success to superb coordination by his headquarters staff. Besides keeping TRADOC, the Department of the Army and the Defense Department in the planning loop, his staff worked closely with congressmen, general officers, Adjutant Generals of state National Guard organizations, distinguished alumni, and others who had a stake in the operation. According to Arnold, the end result of all this was that no closure decisions had to be reversed—a remarkable achievement given the number of institutions and individuals involved and the intense emotions that unit inactivations often incite.

The General Accounting Office, however, was less enthusiastic about
Horizon's results. In a report published in May 1991, that agency charged that the Horizon inactivations were "insufficient to match the Army's lower accession needs" and that far too many "consistently unproductive units" still remained in operation. It conceded that long officer production lead times coupled with budgetary and end strength uncertainties greatly complicated the task of effecting institutional retrenchment but insisted that such difficulties did not excuse the failure of the Army to develop a comprehensive long-range plan to guide the downsizing process.

The May 1991 report placed a major portion of the blame for the continuing existence of marginally productive units on the inadequacy of DOD Directive 1215.8. That directive, it asserted, neither defined "adequate production" nor provided sufficiently precise criteria to be of any real value in making productivity and closure determinations. Although the Defense Department mandated that the services consider the cost of unit maintenance and the number, quality and kinds of officer produced, it did not provide guidance on how to measure those factors. The agency also found that the directive contained nothing about assessing the "qualitative benefits" of an ROTC detachment. In short, the General Accounting Office found Cadet Command's closure methodology, to include its unit viability algorithm, to be seriously flawed.49

The problem of nonproductive units had been exacerbated, according to the General Accounting Office, by the Defense Department's failure to oversee productivity and closure decisions. The department had no mechanism to ensure that the services were complying with congressional intent, its own directive, or service regulations. It was the lack of oversight coupled with the imprecision of the closure criteria that permitted the services to give diverse and widely varying interpretations to the specific provisions of the Department of Defense Directive—interpretations, the General Accounting Office noted, that were not always in accord with the expressed desires of Congress.

One particularly deleterious result of the Defense Department's failure to provide adequate oversight had been, in the opinion of the authors of the May 1991 report, the creation of extension centers. Neither the Congress nor the Defense Department had sanctioned these units. They were created, it was alleged, solely for the purpose of protecting unproductive ROTC units from inactivation and epitomized the kind of unilateral, ill-considered and uneconomical measures that the services, when left to themselves, were prone to take in a misguided attempt to protect their turf.50 As a kind of parting shot, the General Accounting Office reminded the Congress that the Army's retention
of uneconomical ROTC detachments was not a new development. It cited its March 1977 report, which, as we have seen, scored the services for maintaining substandard units despite guidance to the contrary.\textsuperscript{51}

As might be anticipated, the Department of Defense, the Army, and Cadet Command did not agree with the GAO's assessment. They admitted that the retention of unproductive units was a problem but observed that many unit closure decisions were strongly resisted by external forces—often, in fact, by members of Congress. The case of Savannah State College in Georgia was put forward as an illustration. Upon notification of the pending inactivation of the Naval ROTC unit at that institution, the affected representative in the House informed the Secretary of the Navy by letter that: "I am fully prepared to use every means at my disposal to protect the Naval ROTC unit at Savannah State during this very critical period...." The Georgia representative's response, it was pointed out, was a "typical" reaction to a closure decision and helped explain why the Army had such difficulty in the past in divesting itself of ROTC units it neither wanted nor needed.\textsuperscript{52}

The Army also defended its extension centers against the GAO's accusations. It maintained that while these centers usually did not meet the criterion of 17 contracted MS III cadets, their staffing levels and costs were significantly below those of host units and their cost per commission was much lower. Nevertheless, the Army and the Defense Department apparently felt that extension centers should be dealt with in a more forthright and above board manner for they agreed to address them in the next revision of Department of Defense Directive 1215.8.\textsuperscript{53}

In their response to the General Accounting Office report, the Defense Department and the three services at least tacitly accepted part of the responsibility for the continuance of non-viable units. In the past, they conceded, justifications for the retention of marginal units was done informally by the services. Such a procedure invited irregularities of many kinds. To remedy this flaw, they promised to incorporate justification procedures along with improved viability criteria in the next edition of the department's directive.\textsuperscript{54}

**Phoenix/Alternative Strategies**

In the winter of 1990-1991, the "Phoenix" work group was assembled at Cadet Command Headquarters to study the impact that impending resource reductions would have on the ROTC program and develop strategies that would cushion the command from the full force of this impact. Phoenix had a broad mandate. It was charged with the tasks of revamping the command's missioning
strategy, adjusting the viability algorithm, refining the cost to commission model, and developing organizational templates (management tools that specified the minimum manning level required to attain a given level of production). In addition, the group had the job of planning the next round of inactivations.

By the beginning of the summer, Phoenix had identified 23 institutional candidates for elimination. It presented its target list, along with its other proposals, to officials at the Department of the Army in July 1991. These officials, however, flatly rejected the closure recommendations, citing political sensitivity as the reason. Following up Horizon with more cuts in the near term simply would not be palatable to certain segments of the academic community or with certain members of Congress. They promised to give Cadet Command more people to adequately staff existing units, but this additional assistance never materialized.

Before long, the accelerating pace of the drawdown made it evident that the reductions called for by the Phoenix Group had been on much too modest a scale. Beginning in the fall of 1991, mission reductions followed one another in rapid succession. First, the ROTC production objective was sliced from 6,200 to 5,800; then to 5,200; and finally to 4,500. While the Army was lowering the ROTC mission, it was also taking away personnel. In 1992, 392 active duty officer authorizations (enough to staff 100 ROTC units) were lost to Cadet Command as a consequence of the Total Army Analysis study. Almost simultaneously, Congress passed legislation prohibiting the use of AGR officers on ROTC duty. This was a severe blow to Cadet Command because it had a complement of over 550 full-time reserve officers assigned to it. Although Congress later reversed its AGR ban, AGR support was restored at less than 40 percent of its pre-1992 level (550 vs 202). As a result of all this, Cadet Command began work on a more aggressive plan to eliminate units.55

This time the effort was to be known as Alternative Strategies. As was the case with Operation Horizon, the contract closure, rather than the Effective Management Program, was the instrument chosen to effect the planned reductions.56 In a memorandum to the DCSPER dated 30 April 1992, Major General Arnold recommended that 56 units be deactivated over a two-year period—25 in FY 1993 and 31 in FY 1994. Originally, Alternative Strategies had targeted 94 schools for elimination, but the Commanding General, fearful of the political fallout that such a huge and sudden reduction would occasion, cut the number to 56.57

Cadet Command planners targeted three distinct categories of ROTC units
for closure: units with “low viability” located near more viable ROTC units; units that depended on “cross-enrolled” schools to sustain their enrollment; and units that gave the least return on investment and that had evidenced “declining viability” in the recent past. The proposed reductions would have affected 731 cadets or approximately 2.2 percent of Cadet Command’s total enrollment. Units slotted for the first round of inactivations (FY 1993) were concentrated in the Northeast. See Table 4. 58

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Unit Closures</th>
<th>Units Remaining</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Montana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only if an ROTC unit was the only one in the state, an Historically Black College or University (HBCU), or located in the state of Arkansas was it excluded from consideration. Wide geographic representation and cultural diversity, it was believed, were important qualities of the ROTC program that had to be preserved—even at the expense of production efficiency if need be. The prohibition against eliminating Arkansas units stemmed from the command’s experience in Operation Horizon, which had resulted in six of the state’s 10 programs being shut down. Arnold was determined that Arkansas would suffer no further cuts. 59

Both the TRADOC Commander, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., and the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Michael Stone, accepted Major General Arnold’s closure recommendation. (The Secretary of the Army gave his approval with
the proviso that closure announcements be made as discreetly as possible so as not to arouse opposition in the affected areas.) In a contract closure, the inactivation process officially begins with Cadet Command exercising the termination clause in the ROTC-university contract. That contract allows either party to eliminate the ROTC program by issuing a notice of intent one year in advance. In this case, the closure notifications were to be delivered to the affected university presidents on 1 July 1992 and all closures were to be completed by 30 September 1993.  

Accordingly, notification letters were drawn up and officers detailed to deliver them to college presidents. On 1 July 1992, with officers standing by ready to deliver the notices, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Richard Cheney, unexpectedly ordered an indefinite hold on the closure actions. He gave no explanation for his decision, but the fact that the proposed inactivations would be unpopular in an election year escaped the attention of almost no one involved. The decision not to close the schools targeted in Alternative Strategies illustrated once again that it has not always been the Army or ROTC program administrators that have stood in the way of eliminating ineffective and uneconomical units.  

The Defense Department’s failure to go through with the inactivations resulted in a dramatic decrease in the size of the average ROTC unit. Indeed, during this period, that average sank below 100 for the first time in ROTC history. It was a trend that did not bode well for the future of the program. See Figure 8-2 on page 222.

The Drawdown Continues

After the election of 1992, pressure to further reduce the size of the ROTC program resumed with an even greater intensity. Part of this pressure was bound up with personnel reductions. In FY 1992 alone, Cadet Command lost 25 percent of its assigned officer strength (346 out of 1348 officers). Consequently, Major General Arnold decided in January 1993 to shut down an additional 15 extension centers.

In compliance with instructions received from the Department of the Army, these inactivations were “sold” as Effective Management Program (EMP) closures. Many officials in the department, it seems, considered the EMP a useful political device because it gave affected schools ample advanced warning of the impending action, operated according to a regular methodology, gave protesting congressmen and university officials less
cause for objection, and appeared to be the most equitable means at hand to select programs for elimination.\textsuperscript{62} All of the 15 inactivations, however, were manifestly not Effective Management Program actions. Some of the institutions targeted had been on the EMP for only one year. A few had not been on it at all. The University of Santa Clara fell into this latter category. Its president reacted angrily when he learned that his ROTC unit was about to disappear without being afforded the courtesy of advanced warning. Nevertheless, because the necessity for program reduction was so apparent and because the closures for the most part involved schools without a long ROTC tradition, no one could block the inactivations.\textsuperscript{63}

Operation Horizon, Alternative Strategies, and the January 1993 round of inactivations represented immediate responses to an immediate need, i.e., the need to bring the institutional base of the ROTC program in line with fiscal and personnel realities and diminished officer production requirements. Given the time available to formulate and implement these plans and given the atmosphere in which they were carried out (no one knew how far the end strength of the Army would sink or how many officers would be required in the future), the above mentioned initiatives were, on the whole, creditable and capably executed undertakings. Nevertheless, they were not, and probably could not have been with the prevailing uncertainty, directed toward any specific long-term objective or stable end state.

**Region Closure**

The inactivation of units carried out under Operation Horizon along with the decision made in 1990 to reduce the number of Advanced Camps from three to two, suggested to authorities at the Pentagon that a streamlining of Cadet Command’s intermediate supervisory layers was in order. On 12 June 1992, the Department of the Army announced that the Third Region Headquarters, located at Fort Riley, Kansas, was to close and its assets and subordinate units were to be distributed among the remaining three regions. The official inactivation was to occur on 31 December 1992. See Figure 8-3 and Figure 8-4.

Cadet Command did not want to eliminate a region. It argued that it needed four region headquarters to facilitate administration and exercise command and control. But the Army authorities held a different view. Officers within the DCSPER were especially eager to see a region headquarters disappear. In 1991, the DCSPER replaced the departing region commander,
Brigadier General Floyd J. Walters, Jr., with a colonel, J.C. Parrish, and indicated that henceforth the Third Region would not get a general officer as a commander. The message was clear. Major General Arnold had no choice but to go along.

Before the decision to eliminate a region was made, a study was conducted to assess the ability of the existing region headquarters to support summer
RESTRUCTURING CADET COMMAND

training. The number of Active Army battalions stationed on the installation and the overall capacity to host an Advanced Camp (taking into consideration such factors as acreage, ranges available, etc.) were the selection criteria. Forts Bragg and Lewis were found to be more suitable than Riley for the Advanced Camp mission.\(^{65}\) Hence, the two former posts were retained while Fort Riley was eliminated as an ROTC command headquarters.

![Three Region Command Structure](image)

Figure 8-4. Three Region Command Structure (After December 1992)
The Five Year Plan

Nineteen ninety three was a landmark year in the post Cold-War demobilization, for it was in that year that budgetary and personnel cutbacks became palpable throughout the Army and at every level within the Army. What had been principally a concern of Pentagon planners became a source of anxiety at even the small unit level. Travel funds, phone bills, reproduction expenses—everything, in short, upon which units and headquarters depend to conduct day-to-day operations began to be subjected to an ever increasing scrutiny.

To Cadet Command and the ROTC, the new operating environment called for a thorough and long-range reassessment of structure and organization. The essentially reactive approach to unit closures adopted by the framers of the Horizon plan could not guide the command toward a stable end state. The idea of a massive and discrete chop had to be replaced with a comprehensive scheme that outlined a smooth yet flexible “glidepath” toward achieving institutional stability. Without such a scheme, the ROTC stood in danger of being superseded, in whole or in part, by other precommissioning programs—like college option OCS or an Army version of the Marine Corps’ Platoon Leader’s Course. Indeed, in July 1993, almost coincident with Major General Lyle’s assumption of command, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed TRADOC to study the feasibility of adopting these precommissioning alternatives.66

Between July 1993 and February 1994, the Cadet Command staff put together a downsizing plan. Part of the plan involved adjustments to the viability algorithm. The 1991 General Accounting Office critique of Horizon had suggested that all was not right with the way the command selected units for elimination. Units with higher viability ratings were inactivated before units with significantly lower ratings. Cadet Command analysts discovered that a defect in the algorithm partially explained this anomaly. The quality factor, it seems, was not a true independent variable, being too closely linked to quantity. The algorithm was then changed to make the quality factor statistically independent.67

Major General Lyle ordered an even more fundamental adjustment. Alarmed by the command’s growing enrollment and officer production shortfalls, he directed that greater weight be attached to quantity in the algorithm. One can “shape” quality, he told ROTC cadre members, after one had enrolled sufficient quantity.68

The new formula, and all that it implied for the daily operation of the
Restructuring Cadet Command

Rotc program, did not go down particularly well in Cadet Command. Accustomed over the last several years to devoting themselves almost exclusively to the training of cadets, Rotc instructors chafed under the new mandate to recruit, which was what the new algorithm meant at the unit level. There were and are at least two principal reasons behind the dislike of recruiting among professional military officers. First, it is hard work. Cadre members would much prefer to spend their time training and teaching cadets than performing the routine and often grueling tasks associated with recruiting. Second, it is unpredictable. Success in recruiting, it is believed, is more dependent on chance and circumstances than upon diligence and sound planning.

By far the most significant part of Cadet Command's reorientation to the new international and fiscal realities of the 1990s, however, involved a plan to slash Rotc's institutional base by between 23 percent and 34 percent between FY 1994 and FY 1999. The plan was dubbed, for obvious reasons, the Five-Year Plan. In its final form, it provided for the time-phased elimination of up to 100 Rotc units, including both host battalions and extension centers, and outlined both the manpower and monetary savings that would be attained in each phase. It was the most ambitious measure of its kind in the history of the Rotc program.69

The Five Year Plan, unlike previous plans, contained several decision points at which determinations could be made about the pace and scope of the downsizing process. Such built-in decision points were considered necessary to give the Army and Cadet Command the flexibility to respond to future events and conditions. See Figure 8-5.

Another consideration that guided the plan's formulation was program stability. It was to guarantee stability that the plan provided for the incremental reduction in institutional and cadre strength at a rate of approximately 20 schools per year. The gradual or "time-phased" feature of the plan was added to forestall the practice of cutting cadre before cutting units—a practice that the Army had adopted several years before and from which Cadet Command still had not recovered. The effects of such premature personnel decrements were most evident at the battalion level. Before Horizon, there were on average 5.5 officers assigned to each host school. By 1995, this number had fallen to only 3.5. See Figure 8-6.

In an Rotc battalion, the first area to suffer when personnel shortages exist is recruiting. This is because recruiting is the only discretionary part of the unit's schedule. Other functions, i.e., training, administration, and
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instruction, simply have to be accomplished. However, because the forced inattention to recruiting soon results in a smaller enrollment, training eventually deteriorates as well. The PMS finds himself with too small a battalion and too few cadre to provide cadets with a meaningful leadership experience or with adequate training in all required areas. The emphasis of the battalion’s training program then tends to shift from leader development to the acquisition of individual military skills. The scenario outlined above frequently did occur in the 1970s to the great detriment of the Army and its officer corps.

The danger that abrupt personnel decrements pose to Cadet Command was underscored in the spring of 1994, not long after the Five-Year Plan had received the official blessing of the TRADOC Commander. Analysts on the TRADOC staff, pressured to realize substantial and immediate manpower and budgetary savings, advised the TRADOC Commander to “front load” the personnel reductions outlined in the Five Year Plan (i.e., cutting people before cutting units). This front loading would have made impossible the orderly drawdown of the ROTC and disrupted the entire collegiate military training and education system. Fortunately for the command, this expedient was rejected, thanks in no small part to the existence of a Cadet Command downsizing scheme that clearly delineated both an end state and an orderly method for arriving at the end state.

THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Figure 8-5. The Five Year Plan
According to Major General Lyle, another principal objective of the plan was to preserve the traditional essence of the ROTC program.\textsuperscript{72} Contrary to the assumptions of many who possess only a superficial knowledge of the ROTC and its history, this essence is not primarily about combining a college degree with military training. Officer Candidate School, the Marine Corps' Platoon Leader's Course, and the Military Academy can effect such a combination. Rather, it has to do with the fostering of an intimate military/university relationship in which the military training, education and professional development of an aspiring officer is conducted not on some self-contained military installation, but on the college campus. Another part of the ROTC tradition is linked to its continuous leader development process where the regular reinforcement of training and instruction is provided on a year-round basis, instead of in spurts, as in OCS and the Platoon Leader's Course. Finally, the ROTC essence is bound up with the almost daily interaction which occurs between the cadet and his ROTC instructor. This interaction not only forms the basis of a very thorough officer screening process but also permits the type of individualized mentorship so necessary to develop the prospective officer's leadership skills and professional outlook.\textsuperscript{73}

The closures envisaged in the Five Year Plan will be, in certain respects, much more difficult than earlier disestablishments. This is because the Horizon inactivations and those that followed shortly thereafter, involved units that in the main did not have a long ROTC tradition and in which ROTC had not taken firm root. Indeed, of the more than 80 closures effected since 1990, almost two-thirds of the affected units were established during the Expand the Base era in the early 1980s. ROTC was more firmly rooted in many of the institutions targeted in the Five-Year Plan.\textsuperscript{74}

Nevertheless, Cadet Command took into the restructuring battle one significant advantage. That advantage was the Effective Management Program—a program introduced in the mid-1980s but one which has heretofore not been used to effect unit disestablishments on a large scale. Its regular methodology and lengthy probationary period rendered it less vulnerable to outside manipulation and pressure than the contract closure.

The Effective Management Program was given quasi-official recognition in 1994 when Senator John C. Danforth of Missouri, in arguing against the closure of the ROTC battalion at Washington University in St. Louis on the floor of the Senate, invoked the Effective Management Program and commended it as an equitable and orderly method of making the necessary reductions in the ROTC program. Cadet Command had attempted to shut down the unit on
the basis of a contract violation on the part of the university but was prevented from doing so by the intervention of Senator Danforth. As a result of the Senator’s efforts, a provision requiring the Army to place all host battalions and extension centers on probation for the full evaluation period was incorporated into the FY 1995 defense appropriations bill. Although Cadet Command experienced tactical failure in this case, it achieved a kind of operational success since the procedure it had developed to disestablish uneconomical units was now supported by law.

Major General Lyle does have one major concern about the Effective Management Program, however. This concern centers on the program’s apparent unsuitability for effecting large-scale closures of the type envisaged in the Five Year Plan. The long probationary period and the requirement to actively assist uneconomical units might deflect outside pressures but it also, the feeling is, slows down the disestablishment process. Whether the command can use the Effective Management Program to accomplish the remainder of its restructuring agenda is still to be determined.

**General Accounting Office Critique**

In its audit of the President’s FY 1995 budget, the General Accounting Office had again criticized the services for maintaining unproductive units. There were 111 ROTC units, it reported in the summer of 1994, that at the end of the last fiscal year did not meet the congressional enrollment criteria of 17 MS IIIs. It suggested that the Congress might want to trim
the services’ FY 1995 operations and maintenance budget requests to force them “to comply with previous congressional direction.”

Cadet Command responded that the congressionally imposed MS III enrollment minimum had been eliminated. The operative guidance relative to unit closures was now contained in Department of Defense Directive 1215.8, dated March 25, 1994, which set a production minimum of 15 for host battalions but said nothing about contract minimums. The General Accounting Office citing of the 17 MS III enrollment standard cast into doubt its knowledge of current Defense Department disestablishment procedures. The suggestion that Congress should reduce the services’ operations and maintenance budget indicated, many felt, that the General Accounting Office auditors did not fully appreciate “the four-year nature of ROTC” and the effects that the wholesale disestablishment of units would have on program stability.

Attempt to Close Second Region

By the beginning of 1994, projected personnel cuts, unit closures, and production mission decrements seemed to recommend further reductions in camp structure and the intermediate command and control apparatus. Accordingly, proposals calling for the elimination of an additional region headquarters, four brigade headquarters, and a summer training site were drawn up and appended to the Five-Year Plan. It was hoped that the personnel savings achieved with these reductions could be redistributed within the command so as to shore up and restore to health undermanned battalions and extension centers.

Cadet Command representatives presented these proposals to the Army Chief of Staff in November 1994. The Chief approved them in concept. To actually do away with a region headquarters—and hence with a summer training site since the latter was collocated with the former—a preliminary study had to be conducted assessing the cost-effectiveness of the action and investigating, among other things, the effects of the proposed closure on the civilian job force in the affected area and on the local environment. Army Regulation 10-5 provided the regulatory basis for the study. Because of the small number of people involved, the shutting down of brigade headquarters was allowed to proceed as outlined. These disestablishments are expected to be completed by the end of FY 1996.

Based on such considerations as the amount of training space and the number of FORSCOM troop units available, billeting potential, and the suitability of available ranges, Cadet Command Headquarters decided to retain
region headquarters at Forts Bragg and Lewis and eliminate the Second Region Headquarters at Fort Knox, Kentucky. It proposed that the Second Region's command, control, and administrative functions along with its Basic Camp responsibilities be split between the remaining two regions. The name "split camp option" was attached to this scheme because it entailed holding a combined Advanced/Basic Camp at both Bragg and Lewis, thus splitting Basic Camp between two posts.

The plan to close Second Region met resistance from a number of quarters. At the Pentagon, the Judge Advocate General expressed concern about the format of the plan while engineers questioned the adequacy of billeting at Fort Bragg. At the same time, Senator Wendell H. Ford and Representative Ron Lewis from Kentucky put up a determined fight against the closure. They, along with many of their constituents, were worried that the closure of Second Region Headquarters would destroy the viability of Fort Knox as an Army post. Lewis and Ford amended the 1995 defense appropriations bill in both the House and Senate to include language that prohibited the movement or closure of Army ROTC regional headquarters or camps. Section 8074 of the Senate version (10 July 1995) specifically forbade the elimination of Second Region and the removal of First Region Headquarters from Fort Bragg until the Comptroller General had reviewed the data and findings of the Army's closure investigation.

The two congressmen inserted the provision about the First Region into the legislation because they feared that the move of that region headquarters to Fort Benning, Georgia—a move that was and still is being seriously considered by the Army—would diminish Fort Knox's chances of retaining an ROTC presence. To understand this rather complex connection, one must be aware of the effort made by FORSCOM Headquarters in 1995 to kick the ROTC region headquarters off Fort Bragg. FORSCOM, in fact, had wanted Cadet Command to vacate Bragg before General John H. Tilelli, Jr. took over as FORSCOM Commander in the summer of 1995. That headquarters received an apparent nod of support when the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis Reimer, who had been Tilelli's predecessor as the FORSCOM chief, ordered TRADOC Headquarters to study possible alternatives to Bragg as an ROTC summer training site.

FORSCOM's concern was that the presence of an ROTC regional headquarters and Advanced Camp at Fort Bragg hurt the readiness posture of the Army corps stationed at that post—the 18th Airborne Corps. The hundreds of soldiers needed to support and assist in the conduct of an ROTC summer camp,
FORSCOM authorities contended, took away valuable training time and diverted attention away from supposedly more pressing operational responsibilities. It was by no means a new concern. Numerous complaints about the alleged negative impact summer camp exerted on unit readiness are contained in DCSROTC and Cadet Command historical files. In the past, such complaints have been dismissed as, in the words of one former DCSROTC, a “red herring.” This time around, though, these time-worn complaints seem to have gotten a more sympathetic hearing.\(^8\)

Cadet Command just as strenuously insisted that Advanced Camp had to be conducted on a post with FORSCOM troop units in residence. In the discussions preceding the Steadfast reorganization of 1973, the colocation of tactical units with ROTC Advanced Camps had been a subject of heated debate. But in those discussions, ROTC program administrators successfully made the point that exposure to the atmosphere and ethos of a tactical unit was a vital part of a cadet’s education—or should be. Their experience in the 1950s and 1960s with camps held at posts that did not host troop units convinced them of the correctness of their position.

The TRADOC study ordered by General Reimer identified Fort Benning as a possible site for the First Region Headquarters and Advanced Camp. At the same time, it attached two conditions to its recommendation of Benning. First, the study emphasized that an extensive renovation of temporary buildings would be necessary before that post could house the Advanced Camp population during the summer months. Second, it pointed out that FORSCOM troop units would have to be imported to assist in the conduct of camp, since there were not enough at Benning to accomplish this task. Fort Knox was specifically ruled out by the authors of the TRADOC study because it lacked sufficient training and maneuver space. Senator Ford and Representative Lewis questioned the wisdom and cost-effectiveness of moving to Benning and away from Knox when the latter post already had a regional headquarters and the Basic Camp organization in place. This explains why they included the prohibition against moving the ROTC region headquarters away from Bragg in the defense appropriations bill. As of January 1996, a final determination about the fate of Second Region Headquarters had not been made.\(^8\)

**More Personnel Cuts**

In September 1995, TRADOC informed Cadet Command that it (i.e., Cadet Command) was about to lose an additional 100 officers (roughly 9 percent of the command’s officer strength). As had happened so often in the
past, people were taken away before structure was reduced. To avoid becoming a "hollow" organization, Cadet Command began to reconsider the inactivation timetable outlined in the original Five-Year Plan, with an eye toward accelerating the pace of disestablishments.

The Effective Management Program, with its long probationary period and provisions requiring that attempts be made to resuscitate failing units, was not, it appeared to many in the command's headquarters, a suitable mechanism for effecting closures with the necessary rapidity. The contract closure seemed to be better suited for the task at hand but it, if used on a scale which circumstances seemed to dictate, would inevitably arouse a storm of protest. The likelihood that such protests would slow or even halt the disestablishment process was, as had been demonstrated on numerous previous occasions, great. As of January 1996, Cadet Command was still evaluating its options relative to carrying through with the accelerated unit inactivation timetable that it felt it was necessary for the future health and stability of the ROTC program. 83

Five Year Plan Results

The command's effort to carry through on the Five Year Plan have so far been a qualified success. In FY 1995 and FY 1996, Cadet Command disestablished 18 and 15 schools respectively, ten short of its two year goal of 43. Its 77 percent success rate might appear unimpressive but, compared to the Army's performance in earlier demobilizations, Cadet Command's record with the Five-Year Plan has actually been quite good. 84

There is no denying, however, that Cadet Command has encountered stubborn obstacles in its drive to bring its institutional base in line with its human and material resources. One of these obstacles has been the pressure that influential supporters of certain colleges and universities have brought to bear in the United States Congress. The case of Washington University, whose ROTC battalion was saved from inactivation largely through the efforts of Senator Danforth of Missouri, and of Second Region Headquarters, where Senator Ford and Representative Lewis took a leading role in derailing plans for that organization's inactivation, were merely two of the most recent in a series of such instances that stretch back for well over a century. Military and civilian officials within the Defense and Army Departments have also proven vulnerable to such pressures. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and most recently, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and the DCSPER have either postponed or canceled school closings when confronted with spirited protests from the targeted institutions
or from friends of the targeted institutions.

The reluctance of government officials to close certain unproductive programs should not be viewed solely as a response to the pressures mentioned above. Their reluctance also reflects a concern with the maintenance of what many consider to be a healthy balance in university-military relations. If reductions in the ROTC institutional base cut too deeply or proceed too quickly, it is feared, the Army profile or "footprint" on America's college campuses would be diminished. This could result in the Army being increasingly separated from the society it is supposed to serve.85

Even within Cadet Command, sentiment for closings has not been universal. A sense of ownership sometimes has impelled subordinate regions to retain substandard units. Also at work has been the natural, if illogical, human inclination to associate the elimination or reduction of anything with failure. If we had 100 units in the past and have only 70 today, we must be going downhill, or so, at least, many seem to believe. In addition, the narrow, tactical focus of many staff officers and analysts at both the regional and national levels sometimes obstructed their strategic vision. Their concern has been with the viability of individual schools, not with the viability of the program as a whole.86

The Commanding General has on several occasions noted the irony of his position. Most other commanders in the post-Cold War era have tried to hold on to as much of their organization's structural base as they could, and have been told by their civilian and military superiors that they must cut further. Major General Lyle has tried to pare down the ROTC structural base and has been told by his civilian and military superiors that he must retain uneconomical units.

**Cadet Command's Contribution**

Through the measures it has taken to address the unproductive unit problem, Cadet Command has turned the Army ROTC into a more efficient and effective producer of officers. It has eliminated more substandard units in the space of four years than the Army had done in the previous 70. Some have argued that this achievement was due principally to historical circumstances. Post-Cold War political and economic forces, they contend, have created a broad consensus among decision makers for cutting units; Cadet Command has merely ridden the wave generated by these forces. What they fail to consider is that there was a similar consensus at the end of the Korean and
Vietnam Conflicts and, as we have seen, effective action against substandard units was not taken. Indeed, the number of units actually increased during these periods.\textsuperscript{87}

Even more significant than the command's success in paring down the institutional size of the program has been its articulation of a desirable ROTC end state. Previous to the completion of the Five-Year Plan, ROTC downsizing blueprints were essentially reactions to fiscal pressures. Budgetary and political exigencies dictated the pace and scope of unit deactivations. The downsizing strategy was to hold on to as many units as the Defense Department and Congress would permit.\textsuperscript{88}

The approach to restructuring changed with the publication of the Five Year Plan. In the plan, Major General Lyle provided a vision of what, in his estimation, ROTC programs should look like in the future. At the macro level, the Commanding General envisioned a stable institutional base of from 230 to 270 "robust" units. A base larger than this, the command's analysis of the problem indicated, would result in the maintenance of units too small to sustain effective training or to be operated on a cost-effective basis. A base smaller than this would so shrink the collegiate foundation that other precommissioning alternatives would have to be employed to supplement officer production even in peacetime.

The Five Year Plan also provided for a "ramp-up" capability, albeit of a new type. In the past, a "ramp-up" capability was achieved by retaining more units than necessary to meet officer production requirements. In the event of a crisis, the idea was, there would be enough "flex" in the system to satisfy increased demands. If the crisis was a prolonged one, more units could be created. This model has the ROTC program expanding and contracting like an accordion in an effort to adjust to fluctuating objectives. One of the many problems with this model is that (if experience is a valid guide) it is always easier to expand the accordion than to contract it.

The "flex" in the new plan came from regulating the output of already established units by offering more or fewer incentives (scholarships, subsistence pay, etc.), raising or lowering commissioning objectives, expanding or diminishing the advertising effort, etc. It reflected the recognition that the ROTC is essentially a four-year program that is structurally unfitted to sudden and dramatic changes—either increases or decreases—in its institutional base. For not only do such swings eventually produce fiscal inefficiencies, they also create instability and, in most cases, degrade training.
At the micro (or unit) level, Lyle was intent on fashioning an ROTC program comprised of relatively large, abundantly staffed, host battalions with a production capacity of 15 second lieutenants per year. The name he attached to this model was “Cadet Command 2000.” The individual unit in this model was to be large enough to sustain truly vital training and leadership development programs. The minimum enrollment level necessary to achieve this purpose was, in Lyle’s estimation, around 200.

In addition to establishing a baseline size, the model specified the number and kinds of officers needed in a host battalion. A minimum of five officers would be assigned to every unit—enough to perform the full range of functions—i.e., training, recruiting, administration, teaching, etc.—associated with the ROTC mission. A PMS in the grade of 0-5 (lieutenant colonel) would head the program on campus. Command-wide, 15 percent of the PMSs would be female, roughly equating to the female portion of total ROTC enrollment. The PMS was to have a major (0-4) as his deputy or executive officer. This officer was to be both branch-qualified (i.e., have been either a battalion S-3 or executive officer) and a graduate of the Command and General Staff Officer’s Course. The remaining three officer instructors were to be captains. Two would be from the active component and one from the reserves. Fully half were to be combat arms officers with the remainder being evenly split between Combat Support and Combat Service Support. In short, the ROTC battalion was to be a reflection of the Army, considered in its totality. The high proportion of combat arms officers in the model reflected the Commanding General’s view that the Army’s leaders will continue to come primarily from among the ranks of “warrior-leaders” in the foreseeable future.

By specifying that the ROTC battalion executive officer be branch-qualified, Lyle was making a statement about the quality of officer he wanted in the program. In the post-Cold War Army, only top performers were given the opportunity to be S-3s or executive officers. Such assignments were virtual prerequisites for promotion and higher command. Without them, one’s career prospects were bleak. The Commanding General’s determination to get this type of officer assigned to the college campus, which will undoubtedly prove to be a formidable task, was an affirmation of his belief that few missions were more important than the precommissioning training of the future officer corps.

Underlying the Five Year Plan was the assumption, occasionally hinted at in the past but never fully articulated by senior ROTC leaders, that in order for the ROTC to be a stable, effective, and economically efficient instrument
for precommissioning military training and leader development, three factors—the number of units, the number of cadets, and the number of cadre—had to be in balance. The relationship that each of these factors had with the others can be conceptualized using the metaphor of a three-legged stool. If one leg of this stool was shorter or longer than the other two, then the entire structure became unstable. One of Major General Lyle’s most enduring contributions to Cadet Command and the ROTC will likely be the recognition and articulation of the relationship that exists among the three factors.  

See Figure 8-7.

Figure 8-7. A) Units, Cadets, Cadre in Balance, B) Units, Cadets, Cadre off Balance
CHAPTER IX

THE JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS

The JROTC was one of the few ways that the U.S. Army served American society in other than a warfighting capacity.

One of the responsibilities assumed by Cadet Command upon its creation in the spring of 1986 was the management of the Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC). Throughout most of its history, the program had been treated as a poor and intrusive relative by the Army. Many had wanted it to go away. The JROTC, the feeling had been, consumed money and personnel but produced nothing of any tangible benefit to the Army. The present chapter will consider the JROTC and the part that Cadet Command has played in changing its focus and overseeing its rapid expansion.

Early History

The Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps, like its senior counterpart, came into being with the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916. While the senior program encompassed baccalaureate degree-granting institutions, the focus of the JROTC was on secondary schools. Under the provisions of the 1916 act, high schools were authorized the loan of federal military equipment and the assignment of active or retired military personnel as instructors on the condition that they followed a prescribed course of training and maintained a minimum enrollment of 100 students over 14 years of age.

At its inception, the JROTC course consisted of three hours of military
instruction per week for a period of three years. Any JROTC graduate who completed this course of military instruction was authorized a certificate of eligibility for a reserve commission to be honored at age 21 (although this provision was allowed to lapse after World War I as the need for reserve officers sank). However, once the United States entered the conflict in 1917, there were few resources to spare for the JROTC. Between 1916 and 1919, the Army established units at only 30 schools.¹

Federal support for and assistance to the JROTC program remained limited between the world wars. Due to funding constraints and a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Army, the number of JROTC units increased only gradually during this era. By 1939, 295 JROTC units were in operation—not an impressive total for a program that had been in existence over two decades.²

If federal backing of the JROTC in this era was lukewarm, the backing of certain secondary schools was downright frigid. Many high schools scheduled military classes and training at inconvenient and undesirable times. Some restricted JROTC instruction to the lunch hour while others accorded it time in the late afternoon or early evening. Student participation and enthusiasm both suffered as a result. Shortages of space and resources also plagued many units. If his facilities were merely inadequate, a Professor of Military Science and Tactics could count himself fortunate. Many of his counterparts had to operate virtually without facilities, sometimes without even so much as a desk.³

During the interwar period, there arose another high school training program that in many respects resembled the JROTC. It became known as the National Defense Cadet Corps (NDCC). The main difference between the competing programs centered on the amount of support they got from the federal government. Whereas JROTC units received instructors and uniforms from the Army, NDCC programs did not. Weapons and a few training aids were the most NDCC schools could expect in the way of material assistance. Many NDCC units wanted to join the JROTC program but were unable to do so due to a lack of funds to support JROTC expansion.

Because the supervision and funding of NDCC units rested almost entirely in the hands of local school authorities, the Army’s ability to exert its influence over them was tenuous. Consequently, the Army exhibited even less interest in the NDCC than it did the JROTC. Thus, the NDCC took on a second class status and never attained the degree of military acceptance enjoyed by the JROTC. This lack of acceptance was evidenced by the fact that in 1939, only 34 units were in operation — a mere 27 percent of the JROTC total.⁴
THE JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICERS’ TRAINING CORPS

Post-World War II

The two decades after World War II were austere ones for the JROTC. In fact, from 1947 until the passage of the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964, the Army froze JROTC growth due to funding and manpower constraints. This freeze was something of a boon to the NDCC, which did not rely on federal funding for its growth or maintenance. Seventy-five of the 109 NDCC units extant in 1963 were established after the imposition of the 1947 freeze — after, that is, the schools on the JROTC waiting list (of which there were approximately 400 in 1963) realized that they had practically no chance of getting a unit.

When Robert S. McNamara became the Secretary of Defense in 1961, the JROTC entered upon a period of intense scrutiny. The $4.7 million needed annually to run the program and the 700 active duty personnel needed as instructors McNamara found to be an excessive price to pay for a program that, despite its title, produced no officers and made no “direct contribution to military requirements.” Secretary McNamara's solution to this problem was to convert JROTC into NDCC units. He saw the two programs performing the same mission but differing in one critical respect—cost. The entire NDCC cost less than $100,000 a year to administer. As a result, the FY 1964 budget contained no provision for funding the JROTC, with the exception of military high schools. Monies were set aside, however, for those JROTC schools agreeing to convert to the NDCC.

Ironically, McNamara’s attempt to eliminate the JROTC resulted in the program’s enlargement. Shortly after McNamara’s intentions were announced, members of Congress were inundated with letters and telegrams insisting that JROTC was an irreplaceable national asset. Its salutary effect on juvenile delinquency alone, its defenders claimed, was worth the cost of maintaining it. JROTC supporters in the House of Representatives introduced legislation proposing the expansion of the program from the existing 254 to a maximum of 2,000 units, and its extension to both the Navy and the Air Force. During the course of the congressional hearing on the JROTC legislation, the Defense Department, taken aback by the storm of criticism which its proposal had unleashed, backtracked and requested that it be allowed to reconsider the matter. Its reconsideration was to take the form of a review of the JROTC/NDCC for the purpose of assessing the desirability of maintaining its support for the program. The House subcommittee holding the hearings agreed and an 11-member Defense Department commission was appointed to undertake
the review. The commission surveyed a cross-section of secondary school officials, community leaders, and parents and published its findings and recommendations in a report entitled “Future Operations of the Junior Division ROTC and the National Defense Cadet Corps,” dated June 1963.⁶

While the report did reiterate the Defense Department’s position that the JROTC produced no officers and served no direct military purpose, it conceded both the desirability of program expansion and the importance of the JROTC to the nation. It also admitted that the program provided the military and the nation with certain benefits. Foremost among these benefits was the fostering of favorable attitudes among American youth toward military service. An important ancillary benefit, the report went on to say, was the promotion of “good citizenship.” No part of the curriculum during this period, it is important to note, specifically aimed at instilling “good citizenship” traits in cadets; but the military training and indoctrination received during the normal course of instruction, it was believed, inculcated in the impressionable adolescent discipline, orderliness, respect for authority, and other character traits conducive to the development of docile and law-abiding citizens.

The Defense Department, realizing that it could not block the expansion, wanted to guide it along the most cost-effective lines. It was to achieve this end that the Department of Defense commission recommended that, in the future, greater use be made of military retirees as JROTC instructors. This would free up 700 active duty personnel for employment elsewhere and save a substantial sum of money. The commission’s assessment of the NDCC’s future was decidedly less optimistic than the one it had given to the JROTC. The lack of resources and general Army support for the program, it was felt, were harbingers of the NDCC’s eventual demise.⁷

On 13 October 1963, 40 days before his assassination, President John F. Kennedy signed Public Law 88-647, the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964. The law required the services to increase the number of JROTC programs under their jurisdiction and, at the same time, charged them to achieve a more homogeneous geographical distribution of units across the nation. The 1916 rule mandating a minimum enrollment of 100 U.S. citizens, ages 14 or older, was retained for the continuation or establishment of JROTC units as were many other of the provisions of the original legislation.

To facilitate the expansion envisaged in the Vitalization Act, a new provision was added that gave incentives to high schools that hired military retirees as JROTC instructors. These retired military employees were to be paid by the school district in an amount which, when added to their retired pay,
equaled their active duty base pay plus allowances (subsistence, quarters, and uniform allowances). Furthermore, half of the cost incurred by the school district would be reimbursed by the military departments. Similar incentives were not extended to NDCC schools and, as a result, the NDCC lost what appeal it still possessed. By 1973, only 17 NDCC units remained in operation.8

President Kennedy directed Secretary McNamara to conduct a thorough study of the ROTC program for viability and cost-effectiveness before implementing the ROTC Vitalization Act. The recommendations of the Department of Defense study group charged with this task were codified in a Defense Department directive on ROTC published in 1965. The directive contained a number of provisions designed to make the program more popular among high school students and of greater value to the Army. First, it authorized advanced placement for those junior cadets entering the Senior ROTC or enlisting in the Armed Forces. Second, it established a two-track academic curriculum with a college preparatory academic track and a technical track, which combined military with vocational instruction. Third, the directive specified that, with the exception of military high schools, the JROTC was to be completely staffed with retired military personnel. Finally, the Army was authorized a maximum of 650 units, twice as many as the other services. This gave the Army the capacity to accept both NDCC schools wishing to convert to JROTC and schools on the JROTC waiting list (some of which had been on the list since the 1930s). The Vitalization Act did deliver the intended boost to the JROTC. Between School Year 1963-1964 and School Year 1973-1974, the program grew from 294 to 646 units, while enrollment increased from 74,421 to 110,839.9


The end of the Vietnam War and the elimination of military conscription in the early 1970s ushered in a new era for the JROTC, along with a set of new challenges. At a time when public esteem for the military profession was low, the Army felt compelled to exploit more fully the junior program’s potential as a recruiting source. Accordingly, junior cadets were authorized to enlist in the Regular Army in the advanced grades of E-2 through E-4 depending on their performance and experience in JROTC. Qualified JROTC graduates were given a special honors category for nomination to the United States Military Academy.10 JROTC received another stimulus in July 1976 when
President Gerald R. Ford signed Public Law 94-361, which raised the authorized number of JROTC units from 1,200 to 1,600. The Army received 200 of these new units. Due to the lack of funding, however, only 20 new units were actually brought on line before 1980.¹¹

During this same period, women won the right to enroll in the JROTC. A court ruling in the summer of 1972 declared the exclusion of females from JROTC to be “discriminatory.” As a result, the first female cadets entered the program at the beginning of School Year 1972-1973. Over the next two decades, female representation in the JROTC grew steadily. By 1993, female cadets comprised over 40 percent of the corps.

The beginning of the 1980s witnessed another flurry of official activity relative to the JROTC. It was at this time that the Army Recruiting Command Commander, desiring to tap the new-found enthusiasm of American adolescents for military service, directed his subordinates to work closely with JROTC cadre members to identify recruitment prospects. This step underlined once again the Army’s traditional view of the JROTC as a source of enlisted recruits. Moreover, in September 1980, Congress passed Public Law 96-342, which lowered the mandatory JROTC unit enrollment level from 100 to an amount not less than 10 percent of the host institution’s enrollment, thus paving the way for increased institutional participation in the program.

The measures outlined in the preceding paragraphs reversed the post-Vietnam slump in program growth. By 1983, enrollment stood at more than 5,600 above its 1974 level. These promising results encouraged Army leaders to proceed with the expansion provided for in Public Law 94-361, enacted during the Ford Administration. Over the next two years, 120 additional units were brought into the JROTC fold. Enrollment experienced a proportional increase.

Unfortunately, JROTC growth proceeded in a haphazard fashion. No clear design or idea guided the expansion process. Indeed, the JROTC did not even have a mission statement. Units were brought on line with a minimum of prior planning and the results clearly showed it.¹²

Many of the program’s ills were due to inadequate staffing levels, a reflection of the low priority the Army attached to the JROTC. There was no permanent staff to select new units, supervise or inspect the cadre, or look after the resource needs of the junior division. In the Office of the DCSROTC, one full-time civilian (GS-9) supervised the entire operation. Some ROTC regions did not have a JROTC management cell.
The diffuseness of the JROTC management structure compounded JROTC's troubles. It allowed the regions to run the program in essentially any manner they saw fit. The result was that no two regions staffed, organized, or administered their JROTC divisions (if, indeed, they had one) in the same way. They adopted different job titles and authorized different grades for the same position, allocated personnel differently, and substituted civilian for officer positions differently. JROTC staffing and administration became so confused that the Chief of Staff of the Army's ROTC Study Group could not determine the "real" staffing levels at region headquarters.13

The Program of Instruction

From World War I through the 1970s, JROTC textbooks reflected the program's emphasis on military training. Interwar editions of JROTC manuals differed surprisingly little from those published in the 1960s and 1970s in their basic thrust. The 1939 edition of the Junior ROTC Manual, for example, contained chapters on the organization of the infantry, military sanitation, drill and command, the rifle and rifle marksmanship, scouting and patrolling, map reading, combat principles—rifle squad, and musketry. An edition of the manual published some 30 years later included such topics as the characteristics and principles of military organization, small unit tactics, technique of fire of the rifle squad, tactics of the rifle squad, crew-served weapons, the 40-mm grenade launcher, the 3.5-inch rocket launcher, and the 66-mm HEAT rocket M72. Both editions could have been used as a primer in basic training.14

The first really significant change in the JROTC curriculum occurred in the mid-1980s with the adoption of the JROTC Improvement Plan (JRIP). The central plank in the JRIP's program of instruction was a recommendation that at least 50 percent of the JROTC curriculum be devoted to the field of technology. The intent of the recommendation was to motivate high school students to become scientists and engineers, both of which the Army desperately needed in its officer corps, and attract more "academically-oriented" students and schools into the JROTC, which historically had been concentrated in "poor schools that did not send people to college." The emphasis that the JRIP placed on science and technology meant that purely military training was relegated to a lesser though still prominent place in the curriculum.15

Closely related to the regular JROTC program of instruction was the encampment program. In 1973, the JROTC had received the authorization to
conducted summer camps. From the very beginning, however, the Defense Department provided very limited support to summer training. It authorized temporary duty pay, for example, only for the JROTC cadre who directly administered the camps. Everybody else, including cadets, had to pay their own way. In 1985, TRADOC requested funds to subsidize JROTC cadet attendance at summer training, but the request was denied. One reason cited for the denial was the absence of any legal authorization for JROTC camp support. How important this consideration actually was, however, is open to question. The service comptrollers, into whose lap the issue fell, questioned how the Defense Department would profit from monies spent on encampments, since JROTC enrollment levels had been satisfactory for some time without the advantage of additional funds. In light of such lukewarm support by the Defense Department, it is perhaps surprising that JROTC summer encampments took place at all.\footnote{16}

**Attempts at Reform, 1985-1986**

The rapid expansion of the JROTC between 1980 and 1985 overwhelmed the management capabilities of the regions. In the First Region, for example, the number of units increased by 33 percent (225 to 298) between 1983 and 1985. In his 1984 annual assessment, Brigadier General Curtis F. Hoglan, the First Region Commander, candidly spelled out what this dramatic growth meant for the junior program in his area:

> A year ago, I cautioned that we were close to the straw breaking the camel’s back. We are there now in First Region. While much lip service has been given to the JROTC Program and new emphasis placed on high school recruiting, I am forced to treat this area with benign neglect because the priority of our effort is to the college program directly.\footnote{17}

The passage of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), which mandated a federal program of stringent financial austerity, complicated the task of JROTC management still further. Funds for supplies, equipment, and travel were slashed. As a result, inspections of existing JROTC units and the establishment of new ones had to be postponed. Senior units were asked to take up the slack and
THE JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS

give more support to junior units. Unfortunately, the increased demands were not matched by any increases in administrative personnel or other support.\textsuperscript{18}

As a result of the difficulties encountered in the administration of the JROTC, the Army Chief of Staff, General John A. Wickham, tasked General Richardson in November 1985 to conduct a detailed review of JROTC operations and formulate a plan which would streamline program management and improve instruction. The resultant plan, the JROTC Improvement Plan (JRIP), outlined a three-year program to achieve these ends.\textsuperscript{19}

In addition to the curriculum changes discussed earlier, the JRIP, in its original form, involved a substantial revision of the regulations and laws governing the JROTC and addressed a number of exigencies. The new plan called for, among other things, higher staffing levels, the funding of summer camps, an automated statistical analysis system and the acquisition of texts and other instructional materials. An especially pressing need addressed in the JRIP was the development of a formal and coordinated JROTC growth policy since, heretofore, programs had been established with no thought given to the overall distribution of JROTC units. The lack of such a policy helped explain why there was no junior division representation in a number of states. The JRIP also gave TRADOC greater control over the selection of cadre and provided for improved cadre training through the establishment of regional instructor orientation/refresher courses.\textsuperscript{20}

While TRADOC conducted its internal review of JROTC operations, General Wickham directed the Army DCSPER, Lieutenant General Elton, to undertake an independent evaluation of the entire ROTC program and determine what steps were required to develop a more robust precommissioning military education system. This study included an assessment of the junior program. After a year of investigation, the Chief of Staff's ROTC Study Group, the body charged with making this evaluation, found that the full potential of the JROTC was not being exploited. Indeed, the study group viewed the past performance of the JROTC as a failure. The program had not yielded many candidates for enlistment, for the Senior ROTC program or for the service academies. To improve the program's productivity, the study group advanced three recommendations.\textsuperscript{21}

The first recommendation was that TRADOC should clearly delineate the goals of the JROTC. The junior program had functioned since 1916 without a mission statement. The study group saw this as a fundamental weakness, which caused confusion over the true purpose of the JROTC and led to a
tradition of neglect. In January 1985, TRADOC proposed a mission statement which highlighted the citizen-leadership aspect of the junior program. It read:

To develop informed and responsible citizens and to provide an understanding of the U.S. Army in support of national objectives.²²

However, it was rejected by the study group because, in its collective opinion, it did not address all the Defense Department’s objectives or the program’s need for academic credibility. General Wickham then recommended a more detailed and ambitious mission statement:

To help develop informed and responsible citizens, aid the growth of their leadership potential, strengthen their character through teaching of the values associated with Service life, acquaint them with the technology inherent to a modern Armed Force, and promote an understanding of the historical role of Citizen-Soldiers and their service and sacrifice to the Nation, thereby creating an interest in military service as a career.²³

Another recommendation of the study group centered on making the JROTC a more prolific source of recruits for the U.S. Army. It believed that a more thorough exploitation of the sponsorship program, which matched up JROTC units with local Army organizations, was one way to promote this end. TRADOC was urged to develop a plan to define and institutionalize JROTC-Army relationships across the nation. The plan, the study group felt, should include provisions for the Army to provide training support and equipment loans to and conduct displays and demonstration for the JROTC.

A third recommendation was for TRADOC to create a centralized management system for the JROTC. Such a system could enforce JROTC regulations, set standards and policy, accomplish inter-service coordination, act as liaison with education institutions, and monitor the accrediting process for establishing or disestablishing units—all tasks that were not being handled very effectively with the existing system. The study group called for the creation of a separate directorate within the Office of the DCSROTC charged with the responsibility of managing all aspects of the JROTC.²⁴

The DCSROTC, Major General Prillaman, took exception to many of the report’s findings, especially those that recommended a closer and more visible JROTC-Army relationship. He did not want the JROTC to be
perceived as primarily a recruiting device for the Regular Army, a perception that inevitably would have developed if the study group’s agenda had been adopted. Thus, when the JRIP was submitted to General Richardson on 27 February, it included few of the study group’s recommendations.

General Wickham approved the JRIP on 30 April 1986. He told the TRADOC Commander to proceed as far as he could with available resources and directed his DCSPER to assist with those parts of the plan that were beyond TRADOC’s capacity. The final version of the JRIP was designed to improve the JROTC in three ways: to enhance the program’s image by upgrading cadet appearance and discipline and conducting summer camps; to raise cadre quality and performance by clarifying and stiffening selection and retention criteria; and to improve JROTC management by establishing an evaluation plan and developing a computerized information system. The JRIP initiatives scheduled for implementation in 1987 included a contract for training materials, regulations detailing cadre and cadet appearance standards, and cadre performance appraisals and certification procedures. General Wickham’s mission statement was adopted but never really used.

When considered in its totality, the JRIP, as designed and implemented by the DCSROTC, represented incremental not revolutionary change. True, the program of instruction was revised to make the JROTC more relevant to the needs of the Army and national defense establishment in the 1980s and program administration was streamlined to promote greater efficiency, but the JROTC’s bottom line remained the same. The program continued to be viewed as it traditionally had—as a source of enlisted recruits, as a way to create sympathy for and an appreciation of the military in the society at large, and as a means by which adolescents could be indoctrinated with the ideals and values of American nativist culture.

**Establishing a New Azimuth, 1986-1990**

When Major General Wagner took over Cadet Command in May 1986, the JROTC did not figure prominently in his plans. The new Commanding General, in fact, shared the misgivings harbored by many Army officers about the program. To him and to them, Cadet Command was primarily about producing “warrior leaders,” not about providing high school students with another extracurricular activity.

Nevertheless, the realization soon dawned upon the new commander that he could not divest himself or the command of responsibility for the JROTC.
He would have to, despite his predilection to the contrary, attack its problems in the same way he did those of the senior program.

Centralizing and standardizing JROTC operations he identified as the first order of business. When Wagner arrived at Fort Monroe, a single desk within the Training Division oversaw the entire JROTC program, which at the time encompassed almost 900 schools and 135,000 cadets. Labeling this organizational arrangement inadequate would be a gross understatement of the case. To turn things around, a new high school division (expanded to a directorate in 1988) was created. This division included an operations branch (later division), which directed the administrative and personnel aspects of the junior program and a training branch (later division), to monitor and manage JROTC educational programs and encampments. The functions of this later division were gradually expanded and by December 1987 included policy formulation, curriculum development, and resource management.

Upgrading the quality and appearance of JROTC instructors was another objective high on Cadet Command’s list of priorities. In the past, far too many JROTC cadre members had been overweight (sometimes grossly so), out of shape, and lethargic in their approach to their duties. The general impression was that many of them had become JROTC instructors because they could not find employment elsewhere. The command moved to correct this situation by raising the qualification standards for instructor certification and enforcing these standards more stringently. Army Regulation 145-2, Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps and National Defense Cadet Corps Organization, Operations, and Support was revised to reflect the new conditions for employment. Every instructor applicant, the regulation directed, had to meet Army height and weight standards and undergo an interview by regional authorities before being hired. The new regulation also emphasized that JROTC cadre members had to answer both to local school authorities and the Army—a fact that had been lost on some instructors. Unsatisfactory instructors could and would be “decertified” (i.e., in effect, fired).

Major General Wagner also sought to bring the JROTC under centralized control by linking it closely with the Senior ROTC. Captain Charles Dollar, an action officer in Cadet Command’s Training Directorate, developed a management system to accomplish this end. Under this system, which was dubbed the Umbrella Management System, every JROTC unit was placed under a senior battalion in its geographic proximity. Cadre members from senior units were required to inspect, visit, and assist JROTC programs in
their area of responsibility on a regular basis. A military rating system was instituted to reflect this new organization. The rating chain ran from ROTC brigade commanders through senior ROTC battalion commanders down to individual JROTC unit leaders.29

Developing a new mission statement was another priority of Cadet Command. The one finally adopted (1987) was: “To Motivate Young People To Be Good (later changed to Better) Americans.”30 This mission statement was intended, initially at least, as much to deflect political criticism as it was to express the actual purpose of the program. From the very inception of the JROTC, there had been critics who viewed it as little more than an attempt by the Army and the federal government to militarize American adolescents and loudly voiced this view. While the new mission statement may have worked to counteract the political sniping from that quarter, it exposed the program’s flanks to its enemies in the Pentagon, who began to question anew why the Army should support an undertaking which was not designed to put soldiers in its ranks.

Improving instruction was another facet of the command’s campaign to upgrade the JROTC program. Although the JRIP program of instruction had been adopted in 1985, it had never been fully implemented. Part of the problem lay in the instructional materials used in its support. JROTC instructors had to make due with an odd assortment of manuals and instructor guides that did not correlate with the textbooks they used. Workbooks had been developed to correct these inconsistencies but, because of their poor quality, failed to do so. Funds had been identified to publish better instructional materials but they had been diverted to improve the program of instruction. Only when General Richardson, on the urging of Cadet Command, put his foot down and refused to publish the JRIP program of instruction without the supporting instructional materials did Lieutenant General Elton finally free up the $1.7 million needed for their publication.31

It was deemed essential that the new JROTC literature be pertinent to both the environment and the educational objectives of the average secondary school student. Accordingly, the JRIP took educational publications geared toward soldiers and Senior ROTC cadets and reworked them for use in the JROTC. For example, students were introduced to map reading through the use of local city maps before being exposed to military maps. The new training materials were also “flexible” publications that allowed each instructor to tailor them to his or her specific needs.32
“Operation Young Citizen,” was the name that Cadet Command attached to its restructuring of the JROTC. Through this operation, high school students were to be prepared for “success” through the accomplishment of certain objectives; namely,

- Develop leadership and patriotism.
- Develop informed and responsible citizens.
- Strengthen character.
- Acquaint students with the technical requirements of the modern age.
- Develop an interest in the military services as a possible career.
- Develop oral and written communication skills.
- Familiarize students with the MQS I.
- Acquaint students with the history, purpose, and structure of military services, emphasizing the accomplishments of the U.S. Army.
- Develop an appreciation of the value of physical and mental fitness.
- Develop the basic skills necessary to work effectively as a team member.
- Provide the motivation and means to graduate from high school.
- Develop self-confidence, responsibility, and a respect for authority.  

Ms. Donna Marks, the chief of the JROTC Branch of the Training Division, headed up the program of instruction review process that included a comprehensive cadre survey, a series of national workshops, and numerous consultations with civilian educators. The results obtained from this review process were used to prepare a final curriculum outline which contained the following major subject headings: introduction to JROTC, military history, technology, citizenship, communications, leadership and leadership lab, Cadet Challenge, map reading, first aid, and drug awareness. For each of the four Leadership Education and Training instruction levels, student texts, student workbooks, instructor guides, and test banks were produced. The project was completed and the program of instruction fully implemented by the spring of 1990. The new curriculum differed markedly from the old one, which had been adopted in 1980. Gone were the weapons training and tactical instruction that had been such a big part of the JROTC curricula in pre-Cadet Command days.
Since 1989, program objectives and the program of instruction have undergone further refinement. Under Major General Arnold, the JROTC assumed even more of a citizenship development emphasis that it had under Wagner. Lowering school drop-out rates became a program objective and the military skills portion of the curriculum was further reduced. Table 5 shows the subjects included in the JROTC program of instruction in School Year 1995-1996 and illustrates the direction the JROTC took after Wagner handed over the command to Arnold, a direction that was maintained under Lyle.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JROTC Program of Instruction, 1995-1996</th>
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<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
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<td>Self-esteem</td>
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<td>Goal setting</td>
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<td>Ethics/Values</td>
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<td>Citizenship</td>
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<td>Life Skills</td>
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<td>American History</td>
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<tr>
<td>Role of the Armed Forces</td>
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<td>Current Events</td>
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The Cadet Challenge program had been started by Major General Wagner for JROTC cadets when he was the commander of the Fourth Region. He introduced it into the rest of the ROTC community when he came to Fort Monroe. Cadet Challenge was a physically demanding activity that was designed to test the strength, speed, agility, and endurance of the high school student and at the same time build teamwork and esprit de corps through individual and platoon competition. It served a purpose similar to that served by Ranger Challenge competition in the senior program.35

To improve the overall management of the JROTC, Major General Wagner placed the High School Division under the Operations Directorate in December 1988. He took this step not because the High School Division necessarily belonged there in an organization sense, but because Lieutenant Colonel Hodson, chief of the Operations Directorate at the time, was the officer in the headquarters who knew the most about the JROTC. The move was in keeping
with the task force orientation of the command in its formative years—an orientation which resulted in the organization being sculpted to fit the capabilities of the personnel on hand.\textsuperscript{36}

**Operation Capital**

Of all JROTC initiatives introduced during Wagner’s tenure as Cadet Command Commander, Operation Capital was by far the most ambitious in scope. The inspiration for this program came from a visit made by Wagner and his long-time associate, Calvin Foster, to Roosevelt High School in Washington, D.C. in March 1989. During the visit, they saw first-hand the deplorable condition of an inner-city school. Upon entering the school, they saw in the foyer a marble copy of the school creed:

\begin{quote}
I believe in Roosevelt High School, as a citadel of learning, where democracy is a permanent part of the curriculum of every subject, and where the law of fair play and sponsorship are taught.

I believe in Roosevelt High School as a bulwark against ignorance and prejudice.

I believe it is my duty to work in Roosevelt High School and to be sincere in my attitude toward it and its traditions, so that I may receive the very best benefits it offers.

I further believe that such an attitude will reflect well upon my school and thus preserve those traditions which are my heritage as a student.
\end{quote}

The creed had been defaced, spray-painted, and marked with vulgar graffiti. The hallways of the school were in a similar condition.

When they reached the school’s small gymnasium, the two men saw the JROTC battalion drawn up in formation and standing at “present arms.” This scene offered a striking contrast to the one they had just witnessed. According to their later recollections, this episode was a defining experience for them. From then on, both were convinced of the necessity of devoting more resources to inner-city JROTC programs.\textsuperscript{37}
By mid-summer 1989, the High School Division had developed the Operation Capital concept into a program that the District of Columbia's educational administrators could endorse. It represented a partnership between the Army and the Washington, D.C. school system aimed at improving the quality of education by reducing drug abuse and drop-out rates and promoting good citizenship.

One advantage of Operation Capital was that it could function within the existing JROTC infrastructure without any additional resources or funding. The operation involved a total of 874 Army cadets in JROTC battalions at eight District of Columbia high schools. To ensure adequate coordination between its headquarters and school authorities, Cadet Command assigned a captain as liaison officer to the staff of the Washington, D.C. school administration.

The program action plan consisted of eight activities intended to supplement the Leadership, Education and Training program of instruction, namely: enrollment and retention, role model program, drill competition, summer camp, data collection, mentorship, orientation clinic, and peer counseling. Based on these categories, each school was asked to devise its own action plan, capitalizing on the strengths of its program, and, at the same time, promoting cooperation and interaction between schools. In this way, those schools with successful programs in one of the areas (such as drill competition or enrollment) would help the others to reach comparable levels of achievement.

The objective of the enrollment and retention program was to encourage students to join JROTC. This was done primarily by soliciting the help of officials in the high schools. In the role model program, cadets were treated to a series of military and civilian guest speakers who advocated remaining in school and staying drug-free as the keys to a good future. Drill competition meets were considered necessary to build self-discipline, pride, unit cohesion and teamwork. They were also intended to bring visibility to the benefits of belonging to a JROTC battalion. Cadet Command and city school administration-sponsored summer camps satisfied the student need for sports, adventure, and individual skill development. Data collection (surveys, file searches, and interviews) kept the information flow between the school authorities and Cadet Command going and helped to develop programs relevant to the needs of the students. A one-on-one relationship (or mentorship) was encouraged between local businessmen or university students and cadets to give them encouragement and support. Peer counseling allowed mature
cadets, trained in proper counseling techniques, to convince other cadets of the importance of obtaining an education and the dangers of using drugs. The orientation clinic was a program in which senior high school cadets would canvas junior high schools for the purpose of explaining to the students the benefits of joining JROTC. 39

On 17 August 1989, Cadet Command representatives briefed District of Columbia public school officials about the program. Although initially reluctant, the educators finally bought into it. On 24 October 1989, Dr. Andrew E. Jenkins, Superintendent of D.C. schools, signed a memorandum of agreement with Major General Wagner to implement Operation Capital. There followed
a series of briefings intended to enlist the support of influential officials within the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of Education, and the Department of Health and Human Services for the new endeavor. When Mr. William Clark, the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army, heard about Operation Capital in October 1989, he became excited about it and proposed that it be presented before the Army Policy Council. That body heard the program described in a briefing conducted in November. Such efforts helped clear a path for the program through government channels.

Meanwhile, through the work of region commanders, the operation was extended to encompass eight additional cities. The new cities were: Baltimore, Detroit, Chicago, Denver, El Paso, Shreveport, Dallas, and San Diego. By mid-1990, Operation Capital was in full swing.

The reorientation of the JROTC that occurred during Wagner’s watch represented a break with the past. Major General Wagner, while not abandoning the traditional aims of the program, recast it in a different mold, transforming it into what amounted to an instrument of social engineering. The Chief of Staff’s ROTC Study Group in its 1986 report had expressed concern about the disproportionately large number of JROTC units hosted by inner-city “poor schools that did not send people to college.” It recommended that the DCSROTC focus on bringing “better schools” into the JROTC fold to boost the program’s image. Cadet Command’s first chief targeted for inclusion into the JROTC community precisely the type of school that the study group was so anxious to exclude.

Arnold and the JROTC Expansion

In the two decades before 1992, the number of high schools participating in the U.S. Army variant of the JROTC program rose only moderately. The last significant spurt of growth occurred from FY 1980-1986 during the tenure of Major General Prillaman as the TRADOC DCSROTC. In that six-year period, the number of JROTC units rose by 199, or 30 percent. The expansion that began in 1992, however, was to dwarf this previous effort. The JROTC grew by over 60 percent between 1992 and the beginning of 1996.

The JROTC was one of the few ways that the U.S. Army served American society in other than a warfighting capacity. The JROTC mission had taken on a new importance in an era when the traditional assumptions that had guided the employment of American military forces during the Cold War were in the process of being replaced by others more relevant to the new global and
domestic order that was emerging. There was a growing recognition that national power rested not upon military strength alone but upon a host of other political, social and economic forces not the least of which was the quality of education afforded to the nation’s youth.

The most recent JROTC expansion had its beginning on August 24, 1992, when President George Bush announced during a speech at the Lincoln Technical Institute in Union, New Jersey, that:

Today I’m...doubling the size of our Junior ROTC program...We’re going to expand it (from 1500) to 2900 schools...(JROTC is) a great program that boosts high school completion rates, reduces drug use, raises self-esteem, and gets these kids firmly on the right track.\(^42\)

The 2,900 high schools to which President Bush was referring included those sponsored by the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy as well as the Army. Due to subsequently imposed funding constraints, however, the services could not quite reach the stated objective.

The Bush idea reflected an earlier proposal of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, dated 8 June 1992, General Powell had characterized JROTC as the “best opportunity for the Department of Defense to make a positive impact on the Nation’s youth.” General Powell urged particular emphasis should be placed on establishing JROTC units in the nation’s inner cities—areas where drugs, gangs and juvenile delinquency flourish.\(^43\)

The Los Angeles riots of April 1992 provided the immediate stimulus for the JROTC initiative. Powell visited the site of the disturbances and was touched by what he saw. The Chairman, it seems, felt that the junior program’s emphasis on responsible citizenship, leadership development and respect for constituted authority would prepossess American youth to eschew such expressions of frustration in the future and encourage them to channel their energies along more productive avenues.

The U.S. Army ROTC Cadet Command was the organization given the mission of planning and carrying out the expansion. It was a mission that, in a way, had been anticipated by the commander of Cadet Command. In his command guidance for School Year 1990-1991, issued shortly after he assumed command, Major General Arnold vowed that he would “get the JROTC
out of the closet” and give it an emphasis equal to that afforded the senior program. He also advocated expansion of the program:

JROTC will not be on the back burner during my tenure. I want growth, more summer camps, full implementation of the new POI and better interaction and support from Senior ROTC. We have the capacity to do more for high school students.44

The Commanding General convened a task force and charged it with developing a campaign plan to implement JROTC expansion. The task force met from 9 September to 13 September 1992 at the Sheraton Inn in Hampton, Virginia. Its leader was Colonel Robert B. Sauve, the Chief of Staff of the Third Region. In addition to individuals from the Cadet Command staff, representatives from each subordinate region and selected JROTC cadre comprised the task force.45

Major General Arnold briefed Lieutenant General Thomas P. Carney, the DCSPER, about the campaign plan on 15 September 1992. Fifteen days later (1 October), Congress passed the JROTC expansion project into law. At the same time, it authorized $18.7 million for Army JROTC expansion in FY 1993.

While awaiting formal guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Major General Arnold issued interim instructions to his region commanders for the expansion. In a memorandum dated 20 October 1992, he told them to contact all high schools in their respective regions that had previously applied for a JROTC unit and offer them one. A similar offer was to be made to cross-enrolled schools that had not yet submitted an application. Arnold also stressed the importance of providing information and the appropriate application materials to all secondary schools that expressed an interest in the program.46

Cadet Command received the official Defense Department guidance it sought on 29 October. In addition to discussing questions of funding and the payment of instructors salaries, the guidance set out the broad parameters under which the expansion was to proceed. It prescribed that:

Schools requesting a JROTC unit should specify which service program (e.g., Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) they desire ... Schools requesting a new unit from any service should list desired Service affiliation in order of preference. Resolution of
multi-Service requests from individual schools will be made at the DOD level through a joint working group under the supervision of (the) Director of Accession Policy.\textsuperscript{47}

The final draft of Cadet Command’s campaign plan was approved for execution on 13 November. To help subordinate units implement the plan, elements of Cadet Command Headquarters conducted a logistics conference from 15-17 November 1992 at Fort Monroe for the purpose of developing “push packages” for the establishment of new JROTC units. These push packages were designed to provide the prospective unit with all the administrative and logistical guidance it would need to complete the application process and to get the new unit off the ground.\textsuperscript{48}

Operation Young American, the Cadet Command code name for the JROTC expansion, was a two-phased enterprise. Phase I, which called for the establishment of 200 new units throughout the nation, was to be completed by October 1993. Slated to run from the beginning of FY 1994 through the end of FY 1997, Phase II projected a regular annual addition to the number of units until the goal of 1,682 was met. Later, however, that goal had to be adjusted downward. Bowing to post-Cold War fiscal realities, the Department of the Army in March 1995 instructed Cadet Command to halt the expansion at its existing level, which was 1400 schools.\textsuperscript{49} See Figure 9-1.

In the expansion, special provisions were made for the financial support of institutions which, according to Defense Department and Army criteria, qualified as educationally or economically disadvantaged schools. Under these provisions, schools agreeing to host a JROTC unit could receive up to five years of financial assistance (three years at the 100 percent level and two years at the 75 percent level). Many inner-city schools qualified for this assistance. In fact, since the expansion kicked off in 1992, approximately 35 percent of the schools that have joined the program have received this assistance.\textsuperscript{50}

Young American had very ambitious distribution objectives. JROTC, it was decided, should have a presence in every state. On the eve of the expansion, the program was geographically unbalanced. The Northeast was greatly underrepresented — there were no units in Vermont, New Hampshire, and Connecticut — while the Southeast was overrepresented. To correct this geographic imbalance, Cadet Command placed special emphasis on establishing units in New England and the Mid-Atlantic states. Major General Arnold personally took a hand in the effort to penetrate this untapped market as did his successor in command, Major General Lyle. Lyle himself was a 1958
product of the JROTC program at Rogers High School in Newport, Rhode Island, and had a particular interest in seeing the command represented in this region. When a JROTC unit was established at White Mountains High School in Whitefield, New Hampshire in September 1995, the command attained its distribution objective of being represented in every state.\textsuperscript{51}

The JROTC expansion did run into some problems. Some of these problems were created by members of the military community. Within the Department of Defense, there were, and had been for many years, detractors of the JROTC who resented funds being siphoned off from more traditional military missions to support JROTC units. They considered JROTC to be a non-military endeavor whose management needed to be the responsibility of an agency other than the Defense Department. A 1990 Department of Defense proposal to abolish JROTC reflected, in part, the sentiments of these critics. With General Powell being one of the prime sponsors of the JROTC program, however, these detractors had to be somewhat discreet and indirect in their opposition to the expansion initiative.\textsuperscript{52}

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**Figure 9-1. JROTC Expansion Status: School Year 1995-1996**

Existing Programs SY 95-96

- **ALASKA**: 5
- **ARIZONA**: 10/1
- **CALIFORNIA**: 65/18
- **COLORADO**: 11/1
- **CONNECTICUT**: 1/2
- **DELAWARE**: 2/1
- **FLORIDA**: 15/4
- **GEORGIA**: 6/2
- **HAWAII**: 15/0
- **IDAHO**: 1/2
- **ILLINOIS**: 1/3
- **INDIANA**: 1/3
- **IOWA**: 1/1
- **KANSAS**: 6/2
- **KENTUCKY**: 41/0
- **LOUISIANA**: 44/4
- **MAINE**: 1/0
- **MARYLAND**: 3/4
- **MASSACHUSETTS**: 1/0
- **MICHIGAN**: 3/1
- **MINNESOTA**: 1/0
- **MISSISSIPPI**: 41/0
- **MISSOURI**: 26/5
- **MONTANA**: 1/1
- **NEVADA**: 1/1
- **NEBRASKA**: 8/0
- **NEW JERSEY**: 1/0
- **NEW MEXICO**: 6/2
- **NEW YORK**: 176
- **OHIO**: 18/1
- **OKLAHOMA**: 15/4
- **OREGON**: 1/1
- **PENNSYLVANIA**: 178
- **RHODE ISLAND**: 2/1
- **SOUTH CAROLINA**: 60/0
- **SOUTH DAKOTA**: 1/4
- **TENNESSEE**: 55/3
- **TEXAS**: 139/8
- **UTAH**: 5/2
- **VERMONT**: 1/0
- **VIRGIN ISLANDS**: 5/0
- **WASHINGTON**: 6/1
- **WISCONSIN**: 41/0
- **WEST VIRGINIA**: 1/0
- **WYOMING**: 2/1

**DODDS**
- 1 HAWAII
- 2 CANAL ZONE
- 3 GUAM
- 4 AM SAMOA
- 5 NORTH MARIANAS

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The U.S. Congress also contained JROTC critics. Representative Robert Dornan of California was among the most vocal. He questioned the wisdom of funding JROTC expansion at a time when drastic cuts were being made in Army end strength. Thus far, a sufficient number of his colleagues have recognized the benefits bestowed on the nation by JROTC to keep the program and the expansion on track. The most recent threat to the JROTC program occurred in August 1995 when the Senate Armed Services Committee proposed a 10 percent cut in JROTC funding for FY 1996. Through the combined efforts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, who took the lead in defending the JROTC in the Senate, the provision was removed from the defense appropriations bill.

Penetrating the inner city schools of the Northeast has also presented difficulties. Why it has been so difficult is not entirely clear but, certainly, tradition and political culture in this region do not foster in the population an affinity for military service. To counteract the pervasive negative market forces at work in the region, Cadet Command developed an awareness campaign designed to explain to targeted school systems the advantages of JROTC. The campaign employed all the standard marketing tools as well as enlisted the personal involvement of successive commanding generals. It has enjoyed some success. The beginning of School Year 1995-1996 saw JROTC units at certain public high schools in New York City and Buffalo that had in the past been resistant to the program.

Retiree Recall

As it began preparations to implement Phase I of the expansion program, Cadet Command discovered that it needed additional manpower. On 27 October 1992, it requested permission from the Department of the Army to recall 25 retired officers to active duty to assist in the expansion. Three retirees were to be employed in the Cadet Command Headquarters (two in the High School Directorate and one in the Training Directorate), two in each region headquarters, and one in each of the 16 brigades of the command. The request received formal approval on 24 December. In granting his approval for the recall, Mr. William D. Clark, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), cautioned that the recall was only for a limited period of time and was meant to handle the immediate "surge" staff support requirements of JROTC expansion; it was clearly not a long-term solution to personnel shortfalls.
Shortly after receiving approval for the officer recall, Cadet Command submitted another request for the recall of 16 retired NCOs. One NCO retiree was to be allocated to each brigade commander. They were to assist JROTC expansion by performing a variety of administrative and logistical duties at the brigade level as well as by promoting awareness campaigns for the start of new JROTC units.

For both the officer and NCO retirees, the recall was restricted to individuals with unique skills or with specialized training and experience. Over half of the officer retiree recalls were from the special branches. The program was carefully watched at the Department of the Army because officers recalled to active duty were counted against Army end strength. In addition, Cadet Command requested and received 20 civilian authorizations from TRADOC to support the expansion at the headquarters level. These positions were placed in the High School and Resource Management Directorates to handle increased budgetary and logistics requirements.

**JROTC Instructor Course**

One way in which Cadet Command sought to fulfill Major General Arnold's vow to place JROTC on an equal footing with the senior program was to establish a JROTC Instructor Orientation Course (known as the Junior School of Cadet Command, JSOCC). The course was patterned after the School of Cadet Command and was designed to give the JROTC a firm and homogeneous instructor base upon which to build. Arnold approved the course on 24 September 1992 and instruction actually began on 31 May 1993. Two of the retirees assigned to Cadet Command Headquarters were detailed to assist in the administration of the course.

**National Science Center**

Forming a partnership with the National Science Center (NSC) was another initiative undertaken by Cadet Command in 1992 that had the purpose of promoting the education of American youth. The NSC concept itself originated at the U.S. Army Signal Center and School at Fort Gordon, Georgia. Its developers aimed at enhancing the quality of science and mathematics education and improving the general understanding of communications and electronics technologies among the secondary school population of the United States.

The National Science Center initiative was a cooperative arrangement
U.S. ARMY CADET COMMAND: THE 10 YEAR HISTORY

between the NSC Foundation, the private sector and the U.S. Army. A memorandum of understanding signed in 1984 formalized the relationship between the Army and the Foundation. This understanding was amended in 1988 and again in 1991 so that the evolving requirements of the project could be more effectively met. The legal basis for the joint venture was Public Law 99-145 (1985), which lent official sanction to the U.S. Government’s relationship with the National Science Center.\textsuperscript{56}

In August 1992, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan, expressed his support for the center’s outreach program and directed the National Science Center Task Force to explore ways to expand it within the fiscal constraints imposed by the Base Force. General Sullivan approved a pilot program for program expansion in October 1992 and directed the task force to brief the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, on the Army’s plans.

The program had two principal facets: the Preview Discovery Center (PDC) and the educational outreach programs which supported the goals of the America 2000 program. The Army had operated the PDC since 1989. The Center hosted exhibits and presentations designed to stimulate interest among young people in mathematics, applied science and technology.

Of more immediate concern to Cadet Command, however, was that facet of the joint educational venture involving educational outreach programs. Those programs managed by the Army were implemented by the National Science Center Task Force—a committee consisting of two military and 27 civilian members—and included: the National Electronic Educational Distribution System, a computer data base that electronically distributed electronics training information; the National Program for Electronics Training, which shared information on electronics training with vocational educators through workshops, seminars, and instructional materials; a science-by-mail program, interactive satellite teleconferencing programs; summer and special workshops, and a Mobile Discovery Center van program.\textsuperscript{57}

By virtue of its close ties with the nation’s secondary schools developed through the JROTC program, Cadet Command was destined to play a leading role in the NSC project. The command established a formal partnership with the NSC on 10 August 1992. A more extensive use of the Mobile Discovery Center was one initiative the command decided to pursue. Housed in an eighteen-wheel tractor-trailer rig, the Mobile Discovery Center was essentially a miniature version of the Preview Discovery Center at Fort Gordon. Like its parent, it contained exhibits and hosted demonstrations intended to increase
public awareness of and interest in science, mathematics and technology. The JROTC program, embedded as it was in school systems across the country, was the primary medium through which this command publicized the Mobile Discovery Center.58

The Army Chief of Staff’s pilot program for educational outreach also included several provisions that fell almost exclusively within Cadet Command’s domain. One provision directed the inclusion of mathematics and science workshops into five 1993 JROTC summer camps. These math and science modules are now included in every summer camp training schedule. Another prescribed the inclusion of these workshops into the JROTC curriculum and in the Cadet Command sponsored Career Academies (discussed in the next section).59

Career Academies

The year 1992 also witnessed the establishment of the JROTC Career Academies program, a joint venture between the Defense Department and the Department of Education, designed to provide “at risk” students with leadership, academic and vocational training. The academies operated as “schools within schools” and were jointly funded by both agencies mentioned above. In accordance with a formal interagency agreement signed by the two departments, the Department of Education transferred $1 million to the Defense Department to begin the implementation of the career academies initiative in FY 1993.60

In addition to providing academic and vocational instruction, the career academies attempted to install in their charges confidence, discipline and a sense of responsibility—personal attributes that equip students for success in life. JROTC, of course, had been in the business of character development since its inception in 1916 and was ideally suited to undertake this task. Army Junior ROTC Career Academies were established in urban school districts throughout the United States.61

JROTC Expansion Goals Refined

Soon after Major General Lyle took command, he modified and refined the JROTC expansion goals set by his predecessor. Concerned about the JROTC’s absence in many northern regions of the nation, he set an objective of establishing at least five units in every state. Lyle made this the command’s first priority. The Commanding General was also anxious to boost the command’s presence in medium-sized cities with populations between 100,000
and 150,000, so placing units in these cities was made the command’s next priority. He did attach one stipulation to this last priority, however. To avoid JROTC saturation in one city, he ordered that the command focus on those cities where less than 25 percent of the high schools have units affiliated with any service. Of the 186 cities across the country that fall into this last category, only 64 remained without a JROTC program by the autumn of 1995.62

**JROTC Summer Camps**

Since 1973, summer camps have been an important part of the JROTC program. For the first twenty years of their existence, however, these camps had an improvised air about them. This was due in large measure to a lack of money and legal standing. The law did not even authorize travel and living expenses for many of the cadre who put on the camps.

All this changed in 1993 when Congress inserted into Title 10 of the United States Code provisions that allowed the Army to subsidize the camp-related travel and subsistence expenses of JROTC cadre. The summer camp program subsequently mushroomed. In 1995, approximately 19,000 cadets attended summer camps at 36 separate locations spread throughout the United States and Germany. Only 8,000 cadets had participated in these summer activities as recently as 1992. See Figure 9-2.

To regulate and standardize JROTC summer camp operations, Cadet Command published a new regulation—Cadet Command Regulation 145-14, *Organization and Operation of Summer Camps*—in August 1993 and established a standardized program of instruction. The program was divided into three instructional components: required, integrated, and additional. See Table 6.

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<th><strong>Table 6</strong></th>
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<td>Physical Training</td>
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<td>Drill and Ceremonies</td>
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<td>Math and Science</td>
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<td>Water Safety</td>
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<td><strong>ADDITIONAL</strong></td>
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<td>Marksmanship</td>
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<td>Substance Abuse</td>
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<td>Jump Tower</td>
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<td>Field Training</td>
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</table>
THE JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICERS’ TRAINING CORPS

Figure 9-2. Junior ROTC Camps

The command was careful to ensure that the essential thrust of the program was on leadership development and citizenship. Military tactics and combat weapons training were specifically excluded from the program of instruction. This was done to refute critics who allege that the JROTC’s main purpose was to serve as a recruiting instrument for the armed services.

JROTC Cadet Creed

The idea of a creed for the JROTC originated not in Cadet Command Headquarters but in various high schools across the nation. During the many visits he made throughout the command in his first year as ROTC chief, Major
General Lyle frequently encountered junior units that had on their own initiative come up with a creed. It seemed to the Commanding General that this reflected a deep-seated need among cadets for such a statement of purpose. Accordingly, he charged his High School Directorate with the task of drafting one. Mr. Cal Foster took the lead in this project. Using a creed developed in the Fourth Region as a base and incorporating suggestions received from the field, he produced a creed that in its final form read:

I am an Army Junior ROTC Cadet. I will always conduct myself to bring credit to my family, country, school and the Corps of Cadets.

I am loyal and patriotic. I am the future of the United States of America.

I do not lie, cheat or steal and will always be accountable for my actions and deeds.

I will always practice good citizenship and patriotism.

I will work hard to improve my mind and strengthen my body.

I will seek the mantle of leadership and stand prepared to uphold the Constitution and the American way of life.

My God grant me the strength to live by this creed.

This JROTC Cadet Creed was used for the first time during the 1995 Cadet Command Spring Review.

**Cadet Command and the JROTC**

Under Cadet Command, the JROTC diverged from the path it had followed since its creation in 1916. Once looked upon primarily as a source of enlisted recruits and officer candidates, it became a citizenship program devoted to the moral, physical, and educational uplift of American youth. Although the program retained its military structure, and the resultant ability to infuse in its students a sense of discipline and order, it shed most of its military content. The study of ethics, citizenship, communications, science,
technology, life skills and other subjects designed to prepare young men and women to take their place in adult society, replaced instruction in military skills as the core of the program.

Because of the expansion, which began in 1992, and which extended the JROTC to every state in the nation, the new JROTC curriculum is having a direct impact on over 200,000 high school students, more than the program has ever reached. And the program is not standing still. Even as this book goes to press, new initiatives are underway that promise to keep the JROTC curriculum relevant to the needs of today's student, and ensure that the program continues to produce outstanding citizens for the nation in the twenty-first century.
CONCLUSION

Although standardization and centralization touched and changed virtually every aspect of the ROTC program, in no area did they have more profound effects than in training.

The establishment of Cadet Command gave the ROTC program an organizational structure that allowed it, at long last, to realize its potential as a source of commissioned officers. Plagued by a decentralized command apparatus and administrative structure during the first seven decades of its existence, the program had been unable to assert its claim to the resources, attention and personnel it needed to become a really effectual precommissioning training institution. But putting the American system of collegiate military training on a sound organizational footing was no easy matter. Few recognized this more clearly that those General Staff officers who framed the plan for the original ROTC program that came into being in 1916. The task of imposing a standardized program of instruction upon such a diverse set of institutions as those represented by the American collegiate community, they realized, was a truly daunting one. Over the years, numerous attempts were made to improve the situation—the curriculum was modified, ROTC regions were created, management staffs were enlarged—but, owing to various organizational irregularities and lack of emphasis on the part of the Army, none of these expedients had the desired effect.

The commitment to reform that permeated the Army in the aftermath of Vietnam coupled with the Reagan Administration's determination to expand and modernize the armed forces created the national setting in which the long-delayed overhaul of the ROTC could begin. With the establishment of the command in April 1986, new initiatives and management mechanisms touching virtually
CONCLUSION

every aspect of the ROTC were introduced. The ways in which cadets were recruited, selected, motivated, and trained were drastically altered to reflect the new emphasis on product quality.

Although standardization and centralization touched virtually every aspect of the ROTC, in no area did they have a more profound effect than in training. Advanced Camp assumed an unprecedented uniformity of style, substance and spirit. A sequential and progressive training format replaced the illogical one of past camps and leader development replaced the acquisition of basic skills as the core of summer training. On-campus instruction soon followed suit.

In addition to standardizing precommissioning military training, Cadet Command moved forward with several other initiatives designed to ensure that it would be able to turn out enough lieutenants of the desired quality in the future. An organizational restructuring of the command was one of these initiatives. Through the agency of the Five Year Plan, a concerted effort was made to bring the number of units on line with cadet enrollment and the number of instructors available. The Army, in previous periods of demobilization, had not done this and a “hollow” ROTC had been the outcome.

While the institutional drawdown has not progressed as far or as fast as certain senior leaders in Cadet Command have desired, it has achieved substantial results, especially when compared to previous efforts made along these same lines. But more important than any success the command has enjoyed in eliminating unproductive units has been its articulation of a desirable organizational end state. In this projected end state, the number of units, cadets and instructors were in balance and the ROTC was insulated against large and sudden institutional expansions and contractions, which inevitably bring a degradation of training, leader development, and production efficiency in their wake. Stability, continuity, and a sense of permanence, qualities essential to the long-term health of any institution, were thus built into the system of precommissioning education and training outlined in the Five Year Plan.

A fundamental reordering of the way the Army managed its ROTC scholarship program was another Cadet Command initiative. Until recently, the scholarship program was extremely resistant to budgetary control. University officials who set tuition rates, rather than the Army, determined how far ROTC scholarship dollars would stretch. The fact that a disproportionately large share of the scholarship budget went to cadets attending expensive private schools aggravated the management problem.

Through scholarship tiering, Cadet Command changed all of this. The introduction of a variety of award levels, each of which had a definite limit attached to it, enabled the scholarship budget to be effectively controlled. Tiering allowed the command to give more scholarships and raise production without an increase in funding. However, enrollment at many high cost private schools dropped, and
caused concern among senior Army leaders. The drop of scholarships at private schools was an abrupt departure from the past and seen as a threat to close university-Army relations. Thus, on 22 February 1996, a Tier 1A was established at $20,000 to ensure continued diversity in the officer corps.

Perhaps the most profound effect that Cadet Command had on the Army, however, lay not in the programs it instituted or in the specific improvements it made but in the psychological and inspirational boost it gave to cadets. Former training methods, recruiting practices, accessions policies, cadre assignment procedures, etc. imparted to cadets a sense that their precommissioning preparation was inadequate. Many of them entered the Army with a distinct feeling of inferiority. Cadet Command, by providing outstanding role models, offering challenging training and applying stringent selection criteria, was able to turn the situation around and give cadets who made it through the program a sense that they had indeed accomplished something worthwhile. They embarked upon their military career not only better prepared but, more importantly, more confident in their abilities. The ROTC lieutenants and captains who served in the Persian Gulf War, as a group, had no doubts about their capabilities or the adequacy of their preparation. It is these junior officers who give the most convincing proof of Cadet Command's achievement.

While Cadet Command can be proud of its achievements, it cannot afford to rest on its laurels. Many challenges await the command as it begins its second decade of existence, and readies itself to enter the twenty-first century. The process of downsizing the command to bring its institutional base and intermediate command layers on line with reduced officer production requirements and reduced cadre strength, must be pursued with even more vigor. A reevaluation and readjustment of the summer camp structure must be included as an integral part of this downsizing process. The command must continue to seek efficiencies in staffing, organization and training, and to explore alternative staffing schemes designed with an eye toward achieving both fiscal and personnel economies. Maintaining a close Army-university connection, an important role of the ROTC since 1916, and adjusting the scholarship program to ensure that the Army is getting enough officers of the right types and of the requisite diversity of backgrounds, must also remain top priorities. And, all this must be accomplished while maintaining Cadet Command's high product quality. While accomplishing all this will certainly not be easy, Cadet Command, unlike the other organizational expedients that in previous periods of demobilization had directed the ROTC program, is equipped for and equal to the task.
CADET TRAINING

Cadet Command gave the Reserve Officers' Training Corps a new enthusiasm.
Training at summer camps, Ranger Challenge, and field training exercises were revamped to give cadet training more of a Regular Army flavor.
Training assumed a new intensity with the establishment of Cadet Command.
MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT E. WAGNER
Commanding General
U.S. Army ROTC Cadet Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia
MAJOR GENERAL WALLACE C. ARNOLD
Commanding General
U.S. Army ROTC Cadet Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia
MAJOR GENERAL JAMES M. LYLE
Commanding General
U.S. Army Cadet Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia
APPENDIX A

DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR
ROTC (DCSROTC) AND
CADET COMMAND COMMANDERS

BG Wilfrid K.G. Smith
July 73 - Aug 75 (DCSROTC)

MG Charles C. Rogers
Sept 75 - Nov 78 (DCSROTC)

MG Daniel W. French
Nov 78 - Jun 81 (DCSROTC)

COL Richard L. Elliott
Jul 81 - Sept 81 (DCSROTC)

MG Robert A. Sullivan
Oct 81 - Sept 82 (DCSROTC)

COL Richard L. Elliott
Oct 82 - Dec 82 (DCSROTC)

MG John P. Prillaman
Jan 83 - Mar 86 (DCSROTC and CDR, ROTC Command)

MG Robert E. Wagner
Mar 86 - Apr 90 (CDR, ROTC Cadet Command)

MG Wallace C. Arnold
Apr 90 - Jun 93 (CDR, ROTC Cadet Command)

MG James M. Lyle
Jun 93 - Present (CDR, Cadet Command)
## APPENDIX B

### SENIOR ROTC ENROLLMENT 1919 - 1995

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SCHOOL YEAR</th>
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### APPENDIX B

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*ROTC cadets commissioned through OCS
() Female cadets in parenthesis

NOTE: Enrollment totals do not include completion cadets or participating cadets.
## APPENDIX C

### JUNIOR ROTC
ENROLLMENT 1919 - 1995

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### APPENDIX C

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Female cadets in parenthesis
## APPENDIX D

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14. War College Division, General Staff Corps, Study on Educational Institutions Giving Military Training as a Source for a Supply of Officers for a National Army, p. 7.

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32. Composition of Officer Strength, RG 319, Entry 324, Box 29, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
33. Lyons and Masland, Education and Military Leadership, p. 29.
35. (1) Lathrop, Student Attitudes Toward Reserve Officer Training Corps Program, p. 5. (2) Rankin, The Administration of Army ROTC Units, p. 130.
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30. (1) Message, ATRO-PP, MG French to LTG Richardson, MG Dinges, and region cdrs, 2 March 1981, subject: Officer Standards. (2) Memorandum, ATRO-PP, MG French to Cdr, USA MILPERCEN, 3 December 1980, subject: Attrition Rate at Officer Basic Courses.

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25. (1) Author interview with Dr. Larry Brown, 4 October 1995. (2) Memorandum, ATCC-TE, COL Robert S. Cox, Director of Training, for region cdrs, 1 February 1989, subject: Cadet Command Responsibilities for National Guard Officer Candidate School (NGOCS) Visitation Program. (3) Even before he initiated the NGOCS site visits, Wagner's stock with the National guard was not high. The National Guard-Wagner antagonism reached a kind of culmination in August 1990 when the Washington Post published excerpts from a supposedly confidential memorandum MG Wagner had written to GEN Carl Vuono, when the latter was TRADOC Commander. In the memorandum, Wagner deplored the RC's readiness posture—especially that of the National Guard—and told his chief that "Our service (i.e., the Army) is literally choking on our RC." Someone in Cadet Command HQ, it is alleged, leaked the memorandum to the press.


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8. Senior Division Program of Instruction, Army ROTC.


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17. Oral history interviews of MG Wagner by Dr. Lee Harford.
26. Memorandum, ATCC-TT, COL Cox, Director of Training, to region cdrs, 8 December 1989, subject: Cadet Command Camps Follow-On Workshops.
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51. (1) Fact Sheet, ATCC-TE, Dr. Larry Brown, 6 September 1989, subject: Leadership Assessment Program (LAP)/Integration into TRADOC Leader Development Course. (2) Interview with Dr. Larry Brown, 11 October 1995.

52. (1) TRADOC Annual Historical Review, 1 October 1979 - 30 September 1979, p. 183. (2) DCSROTC TRADOC, Semiannual Historical Report, 1 October 1978-31 March 1979, pp. 16-1 HRDC. (3) DCSROTC TRADOC, Semiannual Historical Report, 1 April 1978-30 September 1979, pp. 21-22, HRDC. (4) See also the ROTC Curriculum, COL John C.
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56. Memorandum, ATZI-IG, LTC George Kovac, Jr., Inspector General, SSC to MG Daniel W. French, Cdr, SSC, 12 September 1984, subject: ROTC Course.

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6. (1) Memorandum, ATCC-MA, COL Robert R. Thompson, Marketing Director, 15


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17. Letter, ATCC-MR, MG Wagner to Region Cdrs, 15 April 1987, subject: FY 88 Marketing Plan (Operation Spring Gold 88), HRDC.


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15. Author interview with LTC Victor R. Coffenberry II, 2 January 1996.
17. DCSROTC TRADOC, Semiannual Historical Reports, April - September 1981, Sections 18 and 20; October 1981 - March 1982, Sections 16-18; October 1982 - March 1983, Sections 20 and 30, HRDC.
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42. Author interview with LTC James Janele, 5 April 1994.
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45. Fact Sheet, ATCC-MP, LTC Smith, 30 March 1995, subject: Implications for Army ROTC of the Policy on Homosexual Conduct, HRDC.
46. (1) J. Jennings Moss, "Military may not be meeting intent of 'don't ask, don't tell';," Washington Times, March 24, 1995, p. 3. (2) Author interview with Mr. Paul Kotakis, 30 March 1995.
47. (1) Comments made by MG James M. Lyle, during a briefing to MG Sikora, Deputy DCSPER, 6 March 1995. (2) Fact Sheet, ATCC-MP, LTC Smith, 30 March 1995, subject: Implications for Army ROTC of the Policy on Homosexual Conduct.
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83. Comments made by COL Robert B. Sauve, First Region Chief of Staff, during Cadet Command Commanders' Miniconference, 20-23 February 1995.

84. Author interview with COL Thomas Maclver, 12 January 1996.


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16. COL Robert F. Evans, Chief, ROTC Division, Office of Reserve Components, State of ROTC Program, 1964, p. 3.
19. (1) Letter, Thomas D. Norns, ASD (Manpower) to Secretaries of the Military Departments, 9 December 1965, subject: Disestablishment of Uneconomical ROTC Units. (2) Briefing Notes, BG C.P. Hannum, Director of ROTC Affairs, DCSPER, DA, for CG, USCONARC, 9 January 1969, subject: Academic Credit for ROTC Courses. (3) The Memorandum identified an ROTC detachment as "uneconomical" if, in the case of 4-year units, its average annual production was less than 25, or in the case of 2-year units, it was below 12.
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41. DCSROTC, TRADOC, Semiannual Historical Report, 1 April - 30 September 1985, p. 7, HRDC.
42. USAROTCCC, Semiannual Historical Report, 1 October 1985 - 31 March 1986, p. 7, HRDC.
44. Ibid.
45. USAROTCCC Annual History, January to 31 December 1990, pp. 38-39, HRDC.
46. Memorandum, ATCC-PA, MG Robert E. Wagner to CG, TRADOC, 30 November 1989, subject: Officer Accessions.
48. (1) Memorandum, ATCC-ZA, MG Wallace C. Arnold, thru DCSPER to CSA, 4 June 1990, subject: Cadet Command ROTC Battalion Closure Alternatives. (2) Memorandum, DAPE-MPO, BG Theodore G. Stroup, Jr., Director of Military Personnel Management, Army, thru CG, TRADOC, for CG, Cadet Command, n.d., subject: Revised ROTC Missions for FY 91-97. (3) Memorandum, LTC Michael Hodson, for ROTC Region Cdrs, 13 June 1990, subject: Memo of Instruction (MOI) for ROTC Unit Closures, HRDC.
49. Author interview with MG Wallace C. Arnold, 15 January 1993.
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57. (1) USAROTCCC Annual Historical Summary, 1 January to 31 December 1991, p. 35, HRDC. (2) Author interview with LTC Michael Hodson, 31 May 1995.
58. Letter, ATCC-ZA, MG Wallace C. Arnold to DCSPER, 30 April 1992, subject: Resource Strategies for the Future, HRDC.
60. Author interview with LTC James Janele, 1 March 1992.
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71. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
73. Author interview with MG James M. Lyle, 10 February 1995.
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17. First ROTC Region Historical Review, 1984-1986, "Junior Division," p. 11, HRDC.


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47. Memorandum, LTG Robert M. Alexander, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Manpower and Personnel Policy) for Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Military Personnel Management and Equal Opportunity Policy), Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Force Support and Personnel), 29 October 1992, subject: Policy Guidance for Junior ROTC Expansion.


49. Author interview with Mrs. Carol Hetler, 20 October 1995.

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51. (1) Author interview with Mr. Calvin Foster, 20 October 1995. (2) Author interview with Mrs. Carol Hetler, 20 October 1995.

52. Author interview with Mrs. Carol Hetler, 20 October 1995.


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57. Ibid.

58. Author interview with Mrs. Louise Banton, 4 May 1993.


60. (1) Ibid. (2) Author interview with Mrs. Carol Hetler and Mr. Cal Foster, 20 October 1995.

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# LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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GLOSSARY

Accession Board
A board composed of between eight and 12 PMS/APMS who have at least two years experience on campus and at Advanced Camp. The board develops the overall order of merit list for all ROTC cadets whose graduation date falls within the accession window.

Advanced Camp
Required field training period conducted at a military installation. Advanced Camp is a part of the advanced course that is usually attended between MS III and MS IV.

Advanced Course
The last two years of the Senior ROTC program (MS III and MS IV) including Advanced Camp. This is normally pursued by the cadet during the junior and senior years in college. For Military Junior College (MJC) cadets, the advanced course includes freshman and sophomore years.

Alternate Entry Option Student
A student who completes the Senior ROTC Advanced Course in the following progression: MS III, Basic Camp, MS IV, and Advanced Camp.

Assistant Professor of Military Science
The primary instructor for ROTC cadets enrolled in Military Science. APMS duties include, but are not limited to: recruiting, training, administration, coaching and commissioning the future officer leadership of the Army.

Basic Camp
The six-week ROTC training course conducted at a military installation, normally attended before the applicant's junior academic year, and a prerequisite for enrollment in the two-year ROTC program.

Basic Camp Commander
The officer designated to command the ROTC Basic Camp.

Basic Course
The two-year Senior ROTC primary course of study (MS I and MS II), normally pursued by the cadet during freshman and sophomore years in college.
GLOSSARY

Battalion Commander
See Professor of Military Science.

Cadet
A term that applies to all enrolled members of the ROTC program, including alien students enrolled in MS I and MS II. As a grade of rank, this term applies only to advanced course and scholarship cadets.

College Freshman
A student who is in the first year of college and has earned between one and 30 semester credit hours or between one and 45 quarter credit hours.

College Sophomore
A student who is in the second year of college and has earned more than 30 semester credit hours or 45 quarter credit hours, but less than 60 semester credit hours or 90 quarter credit hours.

Completion Cadet Program
Cadets who complete all military science requirements but who do not yet meet graduation requirements are administered under this program.

Distinguished Military Graduate
An ROTC graduate who has maintained a distinguished military student status throughout MS IV and has graduated from a degree granting institution.

Early Commissioning Program
A program that allows ROTC cadets who have completed all ROTC requirements except that of obtaining a baccalaureate degree to be commissioned. The program now pertains only to graduates of Military Junior Colleges.

Enrollment Officer
The Army officer who conducts a recruiting and publicity program both on the campus of the host institution and within the geographical area assigned by the appropriate commander.

Military Junior College
A two-year institution that has contracted with the Secretary of the Army to provide military science instruction. It provides high school and college-level instruction but does not confer a baccalaureate degree.

MS I/II/III/IV
Designations for the different levels of Military Science. For example, MS I is the first year, while MS IV is the fourth year. MS III and MS IV are the designations for the Advanced Course.

Military Qualification Standards
A system of sequential and progressive training designed to qualify cadets/officers to perform duties at the second lieutenant level of professional development.
U.S. ARMY CADET COMMAND: THE 10 YEAR HISTORY

Minor
A student under age 18 unless the state of legal residence has set legal majority at a later age.

Mission Set
That year group of cadets that are commissioned and accessed into the Army.

Order of Merit List
A listing that rank orders cadets.

Precommissioning Assessment System
The primary vehicle used for the evaluation of cadets. The PAS consists of several elements which are used to evaluate a cadet's potential to be an Army officer.

Professor of Military Science
The academic and military position title of the senior commissioned officer assigned to duty with a Senior ROTC battalion.

Program of Instruction (POI)
A formal course document which prescribes the training content, hours, and types of instruction and all resources required to conduct peacetime and mobilization training in an institutional setting (resident training).

Senior ROTC Host Institution
A four-year college, university, or institution or a two-year Military Junior College that has concluded a contract with the Secretary of the Army to provide military science instruction.

Simultaneous Membership Program
An officer training program that requires Reserve Component enlisted status in a Troop Program Unit for eligibility. Enlisted members of RC units who contract in the ROTC Advanced Course must assume SMP status, or be discharged from their unit. RFD scholarship winners must participate in the SMP.

Student
A person who is enrolled in and attends a regular course of instruction full-time at an institution. At Class MC (Military College) and Class C (Civilian College) schools, the course of instruction must lead to a degree in a recognized academic field. Persons enrolled in a “cooperative” program are included.

Student Potential Index (SPI)
Evaluation of student’s potential to complete the ROTC Advanced Course and academic degree requirements.
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