

# IDA

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

## Conference on Force Integration: Seeking Better Reserve Component Capability and Credibility

Charles F. Hawkins  
John R. Brinkerhoff  
Stanley A. Horowitz, Project Leader


19961021 186

May 1996

Approved for public release;  
distribution unlimited.

IDA Document D-1849

Log: H 96-001425



DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

**This work was conducted under contract DASW01 94 C 0054, Task T-M7-1450, for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs). The publication of this IDA document does not indicate endorsement by the Department of Defense, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official position of that Agency.**

**© 1996 Institute for Defense Analyses, 1801 N. Beauregard Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1772 • (703) 845-2000.**

**This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (10/88).**

## CONTENTS

I. Introduction.....	I-1
A. The Premise .....	I-2
B. What Is Integration?.....	I-2
C. A Taxonomy for AC/RC Integration .....	I-2
D. Structural Integration .....	I-3
II. Background.....	II-1
A. Army RC Combat Unit Training .....	II-1
B. Long-Term Evolution of AC/RC Integration.....	II-3
C. Current Status of AC/RC Integration.....	II-5
III. Conference Presentations.....	III-1
A. E-Brigade Training Strategy .....	III-1
B. Quantifying RC Pre-Deployment Training Duration.....	III-2
C. Discussion of the Presentations .....	III-3
1. E-Brigade Training Strategy .....	III-4
2. Quantifying Training Time .....	III-5
3. AC/RC Integration .....	III-5
IV. Conference Working Group Sessions.....	IV-1
A. Training and Pre-Deployment Training Time.....	IV-1
B. AC/RC Integration .....	IV-2
1. Integration and RC Role .....	IV-2
2. AC Perception of RC Leadership Capability .....	IV-3
3. Ground Forces Readiness Enhancements .....	IV-3
4. Division-Level Integration: Roundout and Roundup.....	IV-4
5. Corps-Level Integration of RC Brigades .....	IV-6
6. Forming a Brigade-Based Corps.....	IV-8
7. Forming Divisions With AC Headquarters and RC Brigades .....	IV-9
8. Integration at the Theater Army Level .....	IV-10

V. Conclusion ..... V-1  
Appendix: Conference Participants ..... A-1  
Abbreviations ..... B-1

**TABLE**

III-1. IDA Estimates of Pre-Deployment Training Days for RC Combat Units ..... III-3

## I. INTRODUCTION

Greater integration and cooperation is required between Active and Reserve Components. Seamless integration is the key to effective Reserve support of the Total Force.

—Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM)

On 14 November 1995, a group of 20 people—military officers, Department of Defense officials, and Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) staff members<sup>1</sup>—met to discuss the CORM's recommendation to integrate more closely the military services' Active Components (AC) with their Reserve Components (RC). The participants focused on how AC/RC integration of various kinds could influence both the capability and credibility of Army RC combat forces—brigades and divisions of the Army National Guard.

The one-day conference began with presentations and discussions on issues related to training Army RC combat forces before they could deploy overseas:

- the enhanced brigade (E-brigade) training strategies developed at Fort Benning and Fort Knox, currently being reviewed at Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and at Forces Command (FORSCOM), and
- an approach to quantifying pre-deployment training time for Guard combat brigades and divisions.

The attendees then broke into working groups focused on integration issues and on pre-deployment training issues. The conference concluded with a plenary session to discuss the reports of the working groups.

This paper was prepared by the IDA staff members attending the conference. It first presents the background information available to the participants on the topics of RC training and AC/RC integration, and then presents the highlights of the conference's working groups and plenary session.

---

<sup>1</sup> Participants are listed in the appendix at the end of this paper.

## A. THE PREMISE

The CORM's recommendation is based on the premise that integration of AC and RC personnel and units can improve Total Army capability by increasing RC capability significantly, with little or no harm to AC capability. Integration will also expose the capability of the RC to more members of the AC. This will be instrumental in changing misperceptions about RC professionalism and combat readiness, thereby lending credibility to the RC. Capability and credibility were important themes at the conference.

## B. WHAT IS INTEGRATION?

The CORM's report neither defines the word *integration* nor explains how it applies to the Active and Reserve Components. The CORM uses the word in conjunction with cooperation and states that seamless integration<sup>2</sup> is critical to effective support of the Total Force.

Webster's Dictionary defines *integration* as follows: "to bring together the parts of" and "to consolidate" or "to do away with societal or legal restrictions on (members of a racial group)." So integration can be viewed in two ways: (1) in a *functional context*, as a result that leads to some further purpose, or (2) in a *societal or legal context*, as a process correcting a fault or establishing a new condition for its own inherent value. Put in the context of Active and Reserve Components of the military services, functional integration is the way to achieve the desired result of maximum military capability when needed, and societal integration is the way to reduce misperceptions about the RC's true capabilities.

Next, let's look at the forms integration takes in the military services.

## C. A TAXONOMY FOR AC/RC INTEGRATION

Integration of Active and Reserve Components has taken several forms:

- *Structural integration* mixes elements of different components at various levels within the military organizational hierarchy.

---

<sup>2</sup> The term *seamless integration* appears to have been borrowed from the world of object-oriented computer programming and artificial intelligence research, where different software modules are combined in a larger application program in ways that are indistinguishable to the user. It is not clear that seamless integration is desirable in all cases. Although it may be important to integrate AC and RC forces, it is also important they retain their individual identities at some level and in some instances.

- *Training integration* inculcates common methods and understanding among the components.
- *Administrative integration* establishes common support systems and structures.
- *Cultural integration* fosters common customs, traditions, and beliefs among the components.

Each of these forms of integration can be used to achieve the CORM's objective of uniting the components into a unified force to accomplish military missions. Because structural integration is so fundamental to achieving this objective, we discuss it in further detail in the next section.

#### D. STRUCTURAL INTEGRATION

Structural integration implies uniting the components within the organizational hierarchy as illustrated below:

Level	Example
Force	Mix of AC and RC organizations in a corps
Organizational	Mix of AC and RC units in a brigade or battalion
Unit	Mix of AC and RC personnel in a company

Integration at the *unit level* is achieved by assigning personnel from more than one component to a unit. This kind of integration is common in major headquarters, where active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve personnel work together. Integrating individual RC members in active units or active personnel in RC units is the simplest form of structural integration, but it is hindered by different chains of command, different administrative systems for pay, promotion, and personnel accounting, different rules of conduct, and different loyalties for the personnel of each component.

Integration at the *organizational level* is achieved by subordinating units of different components to the same battalion, brigade, or division headquarters. A supply and service battalion headquarters, for example, could command a mix of active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve companies, as was done frequently in the Gulf War. Similarly, a brigade or division headquarters from one component could command battalions from different components.

Integration at the *force level* is achieved by including major reserve organizations in a corps or theater army. A Guard separate brigade or division could be assigned to a

corps. At the theater level, a functional command headquarters from the Army Reserve (which could itself be an integrated unit) could command active Army, Reserve, or National Guard brigade headquarters, which in turn could command battalions and companies from one or more of the components. Structural integration at the force level was common during the Persian Gulf War.

Integration may occur between hierarchical levels and may exist simultaneously at more than one level. In the mid-1980s, when the 2nd Brigade, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) conducted a training rotation at the National Training Center (NTC), it consisted of an AC tank battalion and an RC mechanized infantry battalion with a high degree of integration:<sup>3</sup>

- Each battalion was task organized with infantry and armor companies from both components.
- Individuals from the RC served at the AC brigade headquarters, and AC individuals worked at RC battalion headquarters.
- Individual fillers from the RC helped bring the AC tank battalion to full strength.

Administrative barriers to structural integration include the components' different policies, personnel, and pay systems that make it hard to use personnel or units of different components in the same unit, organization, or force. Other factors militating against integration include the attitudes and perspectives of AC and RC persons, the full-time soldier-citizen versus the part-time citizen-soldier budget pressures, poorly defined roles for the RC, and inertia inherent in large bureaucracies.

Some degree of structural integration of AC and RC forces already exists, and so is often taken for granted. However, the Army today is less integrated than any other service. It is the only service whose combat forces are less integrated than they were in the recent past, due in large part to the termination of the CAPSTONE alignment program for wartime integration of the RC divisions and the elimination of roundout brigades for active divisions.

---

<sup>3</sup> Tillson, John C., Philip A. Brehm, John R. Brinkerhoff, and Charles F. Hawkins. "Reserve Component Roles, Mix, and Employment." Institute for Defense Analyses, Document D-1708, Appendix C, May 1995.



## II. BACKGROUND

The Conference on Force Integration originated as a way to evaluate assessments of pre-deployment training times for RC combat brigades and battalions.<sup>1</sup> Conference planners consulted case studies on RC training and deployments and on alternative combat unit training concepts. This research revealed the significant role that integration plays in forging an effective AC/RC team for either training or operational missions. It also revealed both similarities and differences in the AC/RC relationship and culture in each of the military services.

- The cultures of the Air Force and Marine Corps value AC/RC integration. The AC and RC forces are tested to a common standard. Their Reserve Components are widely viewed as able to train combat and support units to carry out operational missions effectively.
- In the Army, AC/RC integration is not a cultural feature, although there are individual examples of effective integration for specific operations and training events.<sup>2</sup> Active Component commanders generally do not accept Reserve Component units—particularly combat units—as part of their culture.

These observations pointed to the benefits of integration, and so conference planners decided to broaden the conference scope to include integration. In this section, we present background information on the conference's two main topics: Army RC combat unit training and AC/RC integration in the Army.

### A. ARMY RC COMBAT UNIT TRAINING

Before and during World War II, General George C. Marshall, believing that simplicity was the best counter to confusion in battle, insisted that combat units train to

---

<sup>1</sup> Lippiatt, Thomas F., Michael Polich, and Ronald E. Sortor. "Post Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat Units." The RAND Corporation, MR-124-A, 1992, and Sortor, Ronald E. "Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for Major Regional Contingencies." The RAND Corporation, Arroyo Center, 1995.

<sup>2</sup> One example of an effective AC/RC integration program, with positive results for both AC and RC units, was found in a case study of the Georgia National Guard's, 48th Brigade, which "rounded out" the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, Georgia, in the 1980s.

perform a single, simple combat task—the holding attack. In his book *There's a War to Be Won*, Geoffrey Perret describes the holding attack as follows:

It could be taught in less than five minutes. It didn't matter what the terrain was like, what the weather was like, or what size force was involved—it was always the same. This tactic worked all the way from platoon to division. An officer could advance from second lieutenant to major general and know only one tactic, simply making the same attack on an ever-increasing scale within a structure that repeated itself from one echelon to the next. Never had battlefield organization and tactics been integrated so smoothly.<sup>3</sup>

That simple formula had an added advantage: if a unit could perform all the tasks necessary to execute a holding attack effectively, it would also be trained in a majority of tasks essential to performing other missions.

More recently, the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, recognized a similar need and developed the E-brigade training strategy.<sup>4</sup> The strategy, designed explicitly for the National Guard enhanced brigades (E-brigades), is based on a thorough analysis of critical task training for heavy combat brigades (armor, mechanized infantry) and light infantry brigades. The core critical task analysis is based on three essential missions for a combat brigade: movement to contact, deliberate attack, and defense. Nearly all core critical tasks of each essential mission are common to the others. Thus, if a scout platoon can conduct an area reconnaissance mission effectively in a movement to contact, it will also have demonstrated a capability to do the same for deliberate attack and for defense.

The concept of core critical tasks applies to both AC and RC units, but it has greater importance for the RC because of the limited amount of training time available in an annual training cycle. Units will be able to train to standard during drill weekends and annual training, and, once a wartime mission is assigned, quickly move on to a specific set of Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, and Time (METT-T) factors.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Perret, Geoffrey. *There's a War to Be Won*. Random House: New York, 1991.

<sup>4</sup> There are actually two strategies—Fort Benning's strategy for infantry and Fort Knox's strategy for armored or mounted brigades—but both derive from the same need and their differences are less important than their common features.

<sup>5</sup> METT-T are the critical factors considered when preparing for specific operational or tactical missions. These cannot be known with certainty beforehand and are necessarily the elements of focus during pre-deployment training.

Like Marshall's tactical innovation in preparing the Army for World War II, the E-brigade training strategy applies easily at all echelons from squad through division. It is a good way to prepare RC combat units for wartime missions. The concept has been deemed worthy by both AC and RC senior Army commanders.

But the modern battlefield is more complex than it was in World War II, partly due to different combat force structures and partly due to new technology. However, technology also promises training advantages today that were not possible even as recently as the 1970s. Whereas simplicity was Marshall's antidote to battlefield chaos, military simulation can be the answer to contemporary battlefield complexity. Battlefield simulation is an inexpensive alternative to field training for force-on-force exercises. It permits training for a wide array of military operations, without regard for remote terrain or bad weather.

Military simulations have already proved their worth in combat and support operations. Yet simulation's advantages are just beginning to be realized by U.S. forces. A suite of military simulations called SIMITAR—developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) specifically to address the training needs peculiar to National Guard units—has been fielded for testing in two of the E-brigades.<sup>6</sup>

## **B. LONG-TERM EVOLUTION OF AC/RC INTEGRATION**

Since World War I, the role of the RC in U.S. national military strategy has changed several times. Before World War II, the RC's role was to provide cadres of officers and some understrength units to be filled with conscripts for a major war. In that era, the active leadership realized that the reserves were essential to the national military strategy of mobilization and, as a result, military planning and training involved integrated Active and Reserve Components.

After World War II and during the first half of the Cold War, the RC continued to provide a second-echelon, balanced combat force to reinforce the AC. The AC was structured fully for operating without reserve assistance during the initial months of a short war. The RC required extensive resourcing and lengthy training before being capable of fighting. Integration of the two components was minimal in this period because the national military strategy of massive retaliation did not envision needing the reserves.

---

<sup>6</sup> The 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Georgia, and the 116th Armored Brigade, Idaho.

Starting in 1961, the United States adopted a military strategy of flexible response based on the ability to wage a major war in Europe, or smaller wars elsewhere, without having to resort to nuclear weapons. This required a new role for the Reserve Components. As the initial and primary source of reinforcement for the AC, the RC had to be ready a few weeks after mobilization. The RC was reorganized into fewer units that were better staffed, equipped, and trained than before. Gradually, reservists were required to meet the same accession, training, and education standards as members of the Active Components. Reserve combat and support units were included in war plans and the time-phased deployment list. Some reserve support units were required to be available days after mobilization.

During the 1960s, several key events changed the character of reserve forces.

- National Guard divisions were mobilized to deter war rather than to fight war during the Berlin Crisis of 1961. This broadened the strategic and national policy potential of RC forces.<sup>7</sup>
- Congressional reaction to Secretary of Defense McNamara's attempted military reforms led to a better-defined force structure and new roles for RC units.
- While the Vietnam War involved mostly active forces, substantial RC combat power continued to play an important role as a strategic reserve against the threat of Soviet attack in Europe. Also, the National Guard's resources were used to counter the wave of racial and antiwar violence on the domestic front. To cope with these new dimensions of national and local security, RC forces had to improve their performance.
- Desegregation mandated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, though unpopular then with some members of all-white National Guard units, was an accomplished fact by the early 1970s, giving the RC a corporate racial identity similar to that of the AC.

The end of conscription in 1973 removed the incentive for men and women to enter the RC to avoid active duty service in Vietnam. In the All Volunteer Force, both the AC and the RC would be composed entirely of personnel who volunteered for military service. Reservists joined the Army and stayed in because they wanted to serve.

The adoption in 1973 of the Total Force Policy affirmed the role of the RC as the initial and primary source of augmentation for the AC. The Total Force Policy also led to

---

<sup>7</sup> Crossland, Richard B., and James T. Currie. "Twice the Citizen: A History of the USAR, 1908-1983." Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984. Texas's 49th Armored Division and Wisconsin's 32d Infantry Division were called to active duty.

an increase in professionalism in the AC and RC commissioned officer corps and the noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps.

### C. CURRENT STATUS OF AC/RC INTEGRATION

Since the end of the Cold War, the role of the RC has been to be an immediate source of units and individuals to augment and reinforce the AC, both in war and in operations other than war. The post-Cold War plans provided for reserve support units in the initial phases of contingency operations, with individual reservists augmenting active units that were below wartime strength. As active force size declined, but missions did not, it became necessary to use reserve units to provide periodic, temporary relief for overtasked active units. Reserve volunteers routinely assisted the Active Components by performing operational missions on training or active duty status.

During the Persian Gulf war, Reserve Component units and individuals were used extensively and were integrated completely (if not always smoothly) into the Active Components. However, National Guard roundout combat brigades were not used to augment their associated active units in the Gulf War. While the immediate cause of this deviation from the plan was uncertainty about the availability of callup authority, it has also been attributed to a low state of readiness in the brigades. The actual state of readiness of the roundout brigades is a subject of considerable contention.

Following the Gulf War, the CAPSTONE alignment of active and reserve units was eliminated, and the RC divisions and brigades lost their wartime ties to AC corps and divisions. At the same time, Congress passed Title XI, the ARNG Combat Reform Initiative, to improve the capability of Army National Guard (ARNG) combat forces, and the Army initiated the Bold Shift program, which sought to evaluate active and reserve units objectively according to the same set of criteria.

Today, the situation has evolved as follows:

- The Army RC is more similar to the AC than it has ever been in terms of readiness, experience, and professionalism,<sup>8</sup> and it is a larger and more critical part of the Total Army than any time since 1941.

---

<sup>8</sup> In his book, *The Soldier and the State* (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., and Random House Inc.: New York, 1957, p. 20), Samuel P. Huntington outlines five measures of military professionalism: (1) the qualifications for entry into the officer corps; (2) the means of advancement within the officer corps; (3) the character of the military educational system; (4) the nature of the military staff system; and (5) the general *esprit* and competence of the officer corps. In the past 25 years, the RC officer corps has become almost identical the AC officer corps in these measures. RC officers meet the same qualifications as the AC for entry, have the same requirements for advancement and education as the

- The Army AC and RC are less integrated than they were at the end of the Cold War, with no plan for RC combat force operational integration into the Total Force in peacetime and wartime operations (i.e., a CAPSTONE-like program).

With that as background, we now move to the events at the conference itself.

---

AC, use the same doctrine as the AC, and have a high degree of enthusiasm and competence. Despite the significant improvement in professionalism over the past 25 years, negative stereotypes about the Guard and Reserve remain a part of the active component culture. See Hawkins, Charles F. "An Army Divided Against Itself Is Intolerable," *The Washington Times*, December 22, 1995, p. A26.

### III. CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

A major theme of the conference was how AC/RC integration could influence both the capability and credibility of Army RC combat brigades and divisions. The initial presentations dealt with RC capabilities already established or demonstrated in training and deployment missions.

- The first presentation dealt with the E-brigade training strategy, its development, plans for application, and future refinements.
- The second presentation addressed estimating the post-mobilization/pre-deployment training time necessary for RC combat brigades and battalions.

#### A. E-BRIGADE TRAINING STRATEGY

The RC E-brigade training strategy is a departure from AC training. The strategy recognizes the different training needs and mission focus of RC combat units.<sup>1</sup> The primary difference is the concept of core critical missions or tasks.

- AC combat units tend to complete a level of training (individual, collective, maneuver) through a wide range of missions and tasks before moving on to the next phase.
- The E-brigade training strategy recognizes that a small set of missions and tasks are critical to any operational environment, while others may not be as important or are extremely difficult to forecast. This approach emphasizes the "must do's" in peacetime pre-mobilization training, leaving broader, mission-specific training for the crisis (or wartime) pre-deployment period.

Without knowing the deployment mission area and the role to be assigned, the essential factors of METT-T cannot be incorporated into pre-mobilization training without guesswork. The E-brigade training strategy ignores METT-T factors before mobilization in favor of training to core critical missions and tasks. In other words, the strategy trains for what will have to be done regardless of situation, and leaves until later those things that are specific to a particular operation.

---

<sup>1</sup> Active forces train to a specific Mission Essential Task List (METL) because they have specified missions to perform in wartime. The RC combat units have only a generic focus. Core critical tasks—a simplified, generic version of a METL—are a logical way to deal with this different focus.

The following are the basic tenets of the E-brigade training strategy:

- E-brigade training will bring the combat battalions to combat readiness at the company-team level in 2 or 3 years. Battalion/task force maneuver training will focus more on company and lower echelon needs than on battalion needs.
- Once training standards have been achieved at a given level under the core critical mission concept, a unit will not have to retrain in those tasks during pre-deployment training. A unit will begin pre-deployment training at the level achieved in peacetime instead of starting over from scratch.
- Because of inevitable turnover in unit personnel, the strategy will allow individuals to qualify in their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) during pre-deployment training.<sup>2</sup>
- For armored or mounted E-brigades, the strategy includes an alternative method for gunnery qualification of Bradley and Abrams crews. Although the method for achieving gunnery proficiency is not in full accord with TRADOC training doctrine, the logic behind it is sound, and it is worth testing and evaluating.<sup>3</sup>

In sum, the E-brigade training strategy is a departure from the norm for RC combat brigades and battalions. Deriving in part from the Operation Desert Shield/Storm experience, the E-brigade strategy is an attempt to codify what it will take to prepare RC combat brigades to deploy to participate in a real-world operation, as well as an effort to improve their training performance and readiness.

## **B. QUANTIFYING RC PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING DURATION**

Efforts to develop models of RC combat unit pre-deployment activities (of which training is the largest part) have been useful in surfacing the challenges RC combat units face in training for mobilization missions. However, most of these efforts attach little value to the ongoing peacetime training of RC units.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Up to 30 percent may be non-MOS qualified at mobilization. In addition, wiggle room is provided for administrative training assemblies, state training, and so forth.

<sup>3</sup> It is not clear whether such tests will be authorized when the E-brigade training strategy proposal passes from TRADOC to FORSCOM for implementation.

<sup>4</sup> More substantive quantitative and qualitative work in this area is intended as additional information is collected and training regimes of National Guard units are examined. The underlying premise that RC combat units can begin pre-deployment training at levels above squad and platoon, however, appears to be sound. Interviews with AC Regional Training Brigade personnel for the 48th Brigade and AC advisers to the 29th Infantry Division (Light) confirmed their charter to "pre-validate" these RC combat units at the squad, platoon, or even company levels in terms of pre-deployment training readiness.



IDA has developed a model for post-mobilization/pre-deployment training time that builds on the extensive analysis underlying the E-brigade training strategy. It extends the analysis of training times needed to perform missions and tasks in peacetime to a pre-deployment training regime. The method gives durations consistent with analysis of best times of previous analogous experience. The training times are shorter than those in other models, (e.g., developed by RAND) largely because the model accepts the effectiveness of the E-brigade training strategy to approach company-level proficiency in peacetime.

The pre-deployment times the IDA model estimates for RC combat brigades and battalions are shown in Table III-1. Although certain missions will require more pre-deployment training based on METT-T considerations, and other missions will require less time, the times in the table are conservative estimates.

**Table III-1. IDA Estimates of Pre-Deployment Training Days for RC Combat Units**

Event	Infantry	Heavy
Mobilization and movement	14	14
Company training	4	35
Battalion training	5	5
Brigade training	10	10
Recovery and preparation	10	10
<i>Total</i>	43 days	74 days

As noted, the assessment of post-mobilization/pre-deployment activities is based on use of the E-brigade training strategy. RC brigades that are not designated E-brigades, and RC divisions with lower priority for readiness resources, would take longer to achieve acceptable readiness status before deployment. However, the E-brigade training regime can be applied to RC divisions and non-E-brigade units. Their required pre-deployment train-up time will depend on the training resources available to them in peacetime.

One conclusion that can be drawn from the IDA pre-deployment activity model is that E-brigades and battalions can be combat ready and capable of deploying to meet national military strategy requirements as expressed in the Defense Planning Guidance.

### **C. DISCUSSION OF THE PRESENTATIONS**

Following the two presentations at the conference, attendees raised a range of issues and topics (none of which were addressed completely). Some of the more salient points made by participants are summarized here.

## 1. E-Brigade Training Strategy

- *The active Army usually uses event-based training, as opposed to the task-based training in the E-brigade training strategy.* Events can be derived from tasks (or missions), and an accumulation of tasks can be viewed as a training event.
- *E-brigades are more complex than divisional brigades and have more different kinds of units.*<sup>5</sup> The additional units impose an additional training requirement on RC brigade commanders, but also add additional capability. The E-brigades have no organic aviation units and would depend on corps aviation assets during combat. (This makes an additional argument for integration and shows a function in which it can occur).
- *The E-brigade gunnery training for armor units reduces redundancy within current methods without changing tasks, conditions, or standards.* The E-brigade alternative allows armor units enough time to train to proficiency within a compressed time period. (It is not, however, in accord with training doctrine currently sanctioned by TRADOC.)
- *AC and RC leaders aspire to different standards for tank crew qualification.* The AC looks at the percentage of crews that qualify on their first run while the RC focuses on the overall percentage of crews qualified on all runs. Within the armor community, first-run qualification is deemed macho, but the standard permits several runs in order to qualify.
- *The E-brigade training strategy must be tested and refined.* FORSCOM would be the logical headquarters to be responsible, but FORSCOM has neither the resources nor the plans for such an evaluation at present. Such testing is also an opportunity for AC/RC integration.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> E-brigades have organic units not found in divisional brigades. Headquarters companies of E-brigades have a signal platoon, chemical platoon, and military intelligence company—none of which are part of the headquarters companies of divisional battalions. Each E-brigade has an organic direct support artillery battalion, cavalry troop, engineer company, and forward support battalion. In a division, all of these units are subelements of larger organizations in the division base and are placed in support of divisional brigades for operations.

<sup>6</sup> One participant announced that the Army was going to test the alternative tank gunnery strategy, even though it did not meet doctrinal criteria for tank crew qualification. Although the units involved would not get credit for gunnery training or qualification not done in accordance with established doctrine, it would be difficult to change doctrine without some sort of testing.

## 2. Quantifying Training Time

- *The Army concept of a band of excellence in training and readiness status is a good thing, but is difficult to measure or assess.*<sup>7</sup>
  - One view is that platoon-level readiness should represent the lower range of the band, and brigade proficiency, the higher range.
  - A different view is that each unit in the hierarchy has its own band of excellence based on other measures, such as MOS qualification status or time passed since the most recent collective or maneuver training event.
- *The conferees viewed the IDA estimates of pre-deployment training requirements (presented in Table 1) as reasonable in the context of the E-brigade training strategy.*
- *The Army and the Marine Corps differ on the need for RC units to qualify for deployment by first completing an “NTC equivalent” experience.*
  - The Army policy is: “We’ll train the RC first, then see if they’ll go.”
  - The Marine view, on the other hand, is: “You’re a Marine first. You will go!”<sup>8</sup>

## 3. AC/RC Integration

- *The Army should see integration as leading to greater capability and also producing greater RC credibility. If RC forces aren’t considered credible, “they won’t get used.” This can become a downward spiral: “No credibility means fewer resources, which leads to reduced capability.”*
- *The Army National Guard used to be a second-echelon force, but that is no longer true. AC/RC integration is needed to change attitudes so that RC combat forces can be effective in assuming new roles and missions as part of the first-echelon.*
- *If integration takes too large a commitment of time and effort by AC units, then—given their current OPTEMPO<sup>9</sup>—the desired results from integration will not take place.*

---

<sup>7</sup> Measuring training effectiveness and training readiness status is important, but it continues to be a highly subjective process. This may be due in part to an adverse reaction in the Army to evaluating training as opposed to observing training.

<sup>8</sup> The Marine Corps deployed one infantry regiment, one tank battalion, four infantry battalions, and several combat companies to Southwest Asia for Operation Desert Storm with 60 days or less pre-deployment processing. They performed well. One unit, B Company, 4th Tank Battalion, had the best enemy-to-friendly kill ratio in the war. See Tillson et al. “Reserve Component Roles, Mix, and Employment,” Appendix D, May 1995.

- *Integration is a two-way street that can have pluses for both the AC and the RC.*
  - III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, wants the 49th Armored Division to conduct battle command and battle staff training (a simulation-based and controller-observed program) in 1996. This shows that III Corps has confidence in the 49th Armored Division's ability to do the job.
  - The 48th Infantry Brigade (in Georgia) achieved a high degree of integration with AC units because of its proximity to the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart. Integration of the 48th Infantry Brigade and the 24th Infantry Division did no apparent damage to AC senior officer careers.<sup>10</sup>
- *The perception that combat support and combat service support units are more closely integrated among AC and RC commands than combat units means that something is different about combat commands.* Some AC senior leaders have suggested—consistent with the culture of the active Army—that maneuvering combat forces is the forte of the AC, and that the RC cannot hope to match their capability.

---

<sup>9</sup> OPTEMPO, or operating tempo, is loosely applied as an aggregate measure of readiness status. It is derived from vehicle miles driven in training, which has been associated with training performance at the NTC, among other training environments. OPTEMPO provides a convenient way to assess training costs and resource use and availability.

<sup>10</sup> All the division commanders of the 24th Infantry Division during the period that the 48th Infantry Brigade was designated to round out the division were promoted to three- or four-star rank.

## IV. CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP SESSIONS

Each of two working groups conducted a morning and an afternoon session during the conference. One working group addressed heavy and infantry brigade pre-deployment training and the time required to train for certain roles and missions. The other group looked at how integration affects the capability and credibility of RC combat units. Both working groups were given time to present their findings and judgments.

### A. TRAINING AND PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING TIME

Judgments on several issues were made in the working group sessions on training and pre-deployment training time.

- *Early RC mobilization increases attention to METT-T factors associated with a particular mission and increases the likelihood of pre-deployment training with the assigned AC headquarters. Later callup dilutes the training effort and makes integration with AC forces during pre-deployment preparation far more difficult.*
- *An agreed method is needed for documenting where RC brigades stand in their training cycle so that they may "plug in" after mobilization at the appropriate training level for pre-deployment training. Otherwise, the AC trainers will require the RC units to begin from scratch when they are mobilized. This notion of documenting readiness status ties in with the E-brigade training strategy.*
- *Standardization in standard operating procedures (SOPs) among Army commands is important for wartime integration. Traditionally, SOPs differ among most major AC (and RC) commands. An RC unit that has worked to a particular SOP in integrated training with one AC headquarters will have difficulty adjusting to new procedures and standards prescribed by another AC headquarters.<sup>1</sup>*
- *Deployment standards describing the required end state for a unit should be used to determine when an RC combat unit is ready to deploy. Why must RC*

---

<sup>1</sup> The 48th Infantry Brigade had to accommodate three different sets of SOPs during its active duty training during Operation Desert Shield and Storm, according to the Brigade S-3. The Air Force cites commonality of SOPs as a prerequisite to achieving satisfactory AC/RC integration.

combat units prove via battalion/task force exercises (the NTC-like experience) that they're prepared for deployment?

- *The first two steps to an E-brigade training strategy have already been accomplished, and when the last two steps are finished, the E-brigade training strategy will be complete.* The four steps to building an effective E-brigade training strategy are (1) identify core critical tasks, (2) group these tasks within major training events, (3) devise ways to improve training effectiveness in a limited time (using simulations or revised or new methods), and (4) synchronize all units into the brigade training strategy.

## **B. AC/RC INTEGRATION**

The integration working group discussed integration in general during the morning session and several models of integration during the afternoon session. The following subsections summarize highlights from these two sessions.

### **1. Integration and RC Role**

“Integration” does not mean the same as “role.” Integration has to do with the nature and validity of relationships among the components, while a role is the part played by units and individuals in the overall operation of the Army. While not completely independent, these two things respond to different factors.

In the 1930s, the role of the U.S. Army Reserve was to provide extra officers to staff the new units planned to be formed upon mobilization. The National Guard's role was to provide units—understrength and poorly equipped, but at least organized—to provide the basis for filling them and readying them for war. At the planning level, the Army was integrated because the RC was part of the war plan, but the role did not demand much intimacy in their relationships.

Recently, the role of the RC has changed to be one of primary and immediate reinforcement of the AC even for small operations—a more demanding role than ever before and one that requires intimate relationships in planning, training, and operations. However, integration has not increased as the role has become more demanding, and, in fact, relationships among the Army's three components are not good.

One member of the working group characterized the relationship among the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve as follows:

The Army is like a family of three brothers. While they are closely related, they do not get along very well, and they quarrel almost constantly. The

biggest brother likes to dominate the other two, while the middle brother is feisty and has access to bankers, and the smallest brother gets into scrapes just trying to maintain his position. The three brothers don't work together, and they always seem to oppose each other on most issues. There does not seem to be a "papa" or a "mama" to make these brothers work together as a family.

## **2. AC Perception of RC Leadership Capability**

A real obstacle to integration is the belief held by many AC generals that senior Guard and Reserve officers cannot do their wartime jobs properly.

- Some AC leaders believe that National Guard officers cannot become proficient in the highly demanding jobs of combat battalion and brigade commanders and staff officers in modern combat; maneuver commanders—responsible for synchronizing maneuver, fire, and support for battalion task forces and brigades—must possess a skill level that cannot be learned or maintained on a part-time basis.
- Some AC leaders also believe that RC commanders and staffs of *support* battalions, groups, brigades, and commands are not up to their jobs. This belies the conventional wisdom that the AC leadership has accepted that RC support units can do a good job and serves to reinforce the professionalism hypothesis.

The real problem may be a general lack of AC confidence in the competence of senior RC officers. If so, this is a difficult problem. The AC has been reluctant to relieve incompetent RC general officers during periods of active duty because they are sensitive to being accused of anti-RC bias. Thus, the AC often prefers simply not to have to rely on senior RC headquarters.

It is easy to understand why AC leaders would not have high confidence in senior RC leaders. To believe otherwise would call into question AC professionalism—its cultural core. This attitude underlies much of the AC's opposition to National Guard combat brigades and divisions.

## **3. Ground Forces Readiness Enhancements**

As a result of the Title XI legislation, 7,781 AC soldiers—mostly officers and noncommissioned officers—have been dedicated to support training and readiness in RC units. About 1,000 of them have been assigned to the Army Reserve, and the remainder to the Army National Guard. The following new Ground Force Readiness Enhancements

(GFRE) have been formed to provide special assistance to the E-brigades and to the high-priority support units:

- *Readiness Training Detachments* (RTDs) are 49-person units in support of each of the 15 E-brigades. RTDs are turning out to be highly effective. They work closely with the brigades and, if requested by the brigades at the time, will go to war with them.
- *Readiness Training Teams* (RTTs) are similar to RTDs but are smaller and work at lower echelons to assist the RC.
- *Regional Training Brigades* (RTBs) are being formed to provide support for lanes training and battle staff training during annual training and drill weekends for the E-brigades. Six of these RTBs will be formed to provide regional coverage.
- *Readiness Groups* remain in the force and provide advice to combat support and combat service support units, particularly those not in high-priority pools.

Some in the group thought that the GFRE would *reduce* AC/RC integration because they interposed a new layer of training and advisory detachments between the AC organizations and the RC brigades. They pointed out that establishing military advisory groups was how the AC traditionally trained troops of other nations. True integration would mean that the RC units were part of the AC organizations, but GFRE causes them to be separate and distinct. While not doubting the sincerity or value of the AC advisors, these people thought that it would have been better to integrate them into the RC units as members instead of forming separate military advisory groups.<sup>2</sup>

#### **4. Division-Level Integration: Roundout and Roundup**

*Roundout* is the use of an RC separate brigade to fill out an understructured AC division that has only two brigade headquarters and six or seven maneuver battalions (instead of 9 or 10). The roundout brigades were given the same priorities as their divisions for modern equipment and for equipment fill. The idea was that these roundout brigades would mobilize when their divisions were alerted for deployment, train in the continental US and then join their divisions after the brigades were validated for combat.

One participant pointed to the structural impediments to complete integration of the roundout brigades. The roundout brigades were separate brigades complete with their

---

<sup>2</sup> The opposite view was that GFRE enhances AC/RC integration. The AC is willing to pay the personnel cost associated with these dedicated resources, and believes that this is a strong expression of the AC's desire for integration of high-priority RC units once mobilization occurs.



own brigade base, including an artillery battalion, engineer company, and support battalion. The AC division base was simply short these things, but the base units were in different organizations. The roundout brigade units reported to the brigade commander, who was in turn responsible both to the AC division commander and the adjutant general of the state from which the brigade came. AC lack of understanding of administrative and funding differences also made integration difficult. As a result, only a few roundout brigades became integrated into their respective divisions.

Another participant, with extensive experience in a roundout brigade, said that his experience was positive, and that the structural barriers to integration were not important. The engineer company commander of the brigade worked closely with and was rated by the division engineer battalion commander, and a similar arrangement existed between the brigade support battalion and the division support command. This officer thought that the roundout concept got a bad name because of the three National Guard brigades that were called late for the Gulf War. Although DoD said that they were not called initially due to uncertainty about involuntary call-up authority, the general impression was that the AC lacked confidence in the brigades.

*Roundup* brigades and battalions were assigned to some fully structured AC divisions to provide them with additional combat power. The current plan for the RC-E-brigades was to assign one to each of the ten active divisions in a loose form of peacetime training association and mentorship. The group thought that this form of association would not provide real integration:

- Association does not mean or even imply that the E-brigade would go to war with its AC division.
- The manner in which the E-brigades were allocated indicates a lack of purpose for them, and no real plan for their use; for example, these brigades are not yet included in war plans.
- The Army divisions are structured to provide a base, a mix of maneuver battalions and three tactical brigade headquarters. Having a fourth brigade around, with its own separate support base, would be awkward. One participant stated that there is no doctrine on the employment of a fourth brigade as part of a fully structured division and that the division commander and staff are busy with their own units.

The general view was that using E-brigades to roundup AC divisions is not a good form of integration.

## 5. Corps-Level Integration of RC Brigades

The Army's doctrinal organization for the Army-in-the-field contemplates the corps as the major combined arms organization in the theater army. A corps consists of a corps support command, engineer, artillery, signal, and air defense brigades to provide combat support, and from two to five divisions, an armored cavalry regiment and one to three separate combat brigades.

Many in the group associated Corps-level integration with a wartime role for the RC, and argued strongly for restoring the CAPSTONE alignment (or a similar pre-assignment program) instead of a general pooling concept for forces. CAPSTONE integrated AC and RC units in a chain of command that was designed for wartime employment as well as peacetime training. This chain of command enabled units and headquarters at battalion level and above to work together on war plans, common SOPs, and readiness issues. When the AC and RC headquarters and units were in the same CAPSTONE trace, the key personnel got to know each other and work together. During the Gulf War, CAPSTONE paid off in many instances by allowing headquarters to work closely together with confidence and trust from the start. It took some time for units without previous peacetime association to achieve a high level of wartime integration.

The group generally agreed that integration of the E-brigades at the corps level would be better than roundup at the division level and extensively discussed assigning E-brigades to AC corps and providing them with real wartime missions. This approach would automatically get the E-brigades into the fight upon alert and mobilization. At present the E-brigades are listed as reinforcing or additive, and not all of them are even considered wartime assets. Assigning E-brigades to the corps would facilitate writing them into the war plans.

The separate brigades in a corps provide the corps commander flexibility in task organizing his combat power for fighting battles. Unlike a division commander, who focuses on the close battle, the corps commander must also control the flanks and the rear areas. A corps of 100,000 personnel is a much larger organization, and has many more missions, than a division of 16,000 personnel. Most of the fighting will be done by the divisions of the corps, but the following are important operational missions for the separate brigades (and the armored cavalry regiment):

- rear area security,
- flank protection,
- secondary combat missions (e.g., a holding attack),

- economy of force missions,
- corps reserve,
- augmenting a division, and
- supporting a Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Force or allied division.

The assignment of separate brigades to corps could be done both by adding more of the same kinds of capability or by adding complementary capability. The Army consists of two types of combat units and organizations: (1) heavy (or mounted) units that ride to battle and fight from armored vehicles and (2) infantry units that move and fight primarily on foot. The fifteen E-brigades include eight heavy brigades (two armored, five mechanized infantry, one armored cavalry regiment) and seven infantry brigades.

Integrating RC brigades at the corps level promotes flexibility. Infantry brigades could be assigned to a heavy corps to provide extra dismounted infantry and increased operational agility. Heavy brigades could provide shock power and anti-armor capability to light corps, such as the XVIII Airborne Corps. Alternatively, I Corps, which currently has no combat organizations assigned, could have a substantial combat capability in the form of two heavy and two light brigades from the RC. If this corps also picked up the two AC divisions in Hawaii and Korea for a contingency in Korea, for example, the two RC heavy brigades would provide additional anti-armor capability for these light AC divisions.

Some factors are not important in assigning E-brigades to corps.

- The home station locations of the E-brigades are not important. It is not necessary in a digitized Army for divisions and brigades to be close to their corps headquarters.
- Equipment compatibility and modernization (except for communications) are not as stringent for separate brigades assigned to corps as for roundout or roundup brigades assigned to divisions.
  - At the division level, the separate brigade units need to be equipped with the same items as the parent division's subordinate units.
  - At the corps level, it is not essential for the brigade to have the same makes and models as the divisions, but only that the equipment be compatible and interoperable.

Several factors are important in assigning E-brigades to corps.

- Communications compatibility is important. A corps has the signal assets to tie the separate brigades to corps communications nets, if they have compatible equipment.
- Agreement between the corps and the various Adjutants General about the training strategy for the E-brigades is necessary. I Corps has already done this kind of preparation with National Guard units, including its corps artillery headquarters.
- Additional funding in the corps' training and readiness budget is needed to support corps-directed training and exercises for all of its assigned elements, including E-brigades and other RC headquarters and units.

Assigning E-brigades to corps would be treating the National Guard organizations like AC organizations. The corps would have to foster staff supervision and support arrangements to replace the direct unit-to-unit relationship implicit in the roundup method of pairing E-brigades with active divisions. These additional duties would expand the scope of corps headquarters operations in peacetime and afford excellent training for wartime.

This method of integrating the E-brigades could be tested using I Corps as the testbed. Because of its lack of major AC combat organizations, I Corps has been forced to rely heavily on RC combat support and combat service support organizations. It would be a natural progression for I Corps to assume responsibility for training and readiness of several E-brigades.<sup>3</sup>

## **6. Forming a Brigade-Based Corps**

The group also considered the idea of forming a corps consisting entirely of enhanced separate brigades. Under this approach, seven of the E-brigades would be assigned to an AC corps headquarters. The right numbers and kinds of combat support and combat service support units and headquarters would also be assigned so that it would be a genuine corps organization. This brigade-based corps would be available to participate in responding to a situation involving two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (e.g., in response to an adverse contingency).

The advantage of a corps composed entirely of E-brigades is that its combat power of two or more division equivalents would be available in only 90 days, the time required

---

<sup>3</sup> In fact, I Corps is responsible for training and readiness of the E-brigades in its area of operations, the 41st and 81st. The corps commander has been personally involved in the training and training assistance effort, all done under the training association relationship.

to prepare an E-brigade for combat after it has been mobilized. The stated time for availability of a National Guard division is 365 days. So, by training the separate brigades in parallel, the seven brigades would be available 275 days earlier than if they were packaged into standard divisions.

Many members of the working group pointed out that some of this advantage was illusory because the true availability time for a Guard division is more likely 120 days or 180 days instead of the Army's estimate of a full year.

One disadvantage of a corps composed entirely of separate brigades is that there is no real doctrine yet for its use. While a corps commander and staff could provide effective command for seven maneuver elements, it could be awkward to have three of the Army's corps consisting primarily of divisions and one consisting entirely of brigades. Generally, however, the group thought this idea was feasible—particularly if the entire Army adopted the separate brigade as its basic combined arms organization.

A second objection to forming a brigade-based corps is that it reduces AC/RC integration by segregating the RC brigades in a corps with no AC combat forces.

## **7. Forming Divisions With AC Headquarters and RC Brigades**

An additional concept considered by the group was divisions that would consist of three enhanced RC brigades under an AC division headquarters. The AC division commander would be responsible for the training and readiness of the E-brigades, and the division would be staffed and trained to do this, perhaps by having a readiness and training group. This arrangement increases integration by having an AC commander whose advancement depends on the condition of RC units. Integration would be improved by having some of the AC advisors relate to the National Guard personnel at the lower levels in the brigade—company and below.

The concept of an AC division headquarters with RC brigades could be tested using the XVIII Airborne Corps to provide a division headquarters for three assigned E-brigades. This would provide the advantages of integration at the corps level with the advantages of integration at a lower level.

## 8. Integration at the Theater Army Level

The group discussed assigning some of the E-brigades to the theater army headquarters for utility missions at echelons above corps. These missions could include the following:

- Protection of ports and logistical areas distant from the corps areas against missiles, terrorists, or special forces attacks.
- Defense of key terrain outside the combat zone but facing a threat of attack.
- Providing combined arms organizations to support the Marine Corps or serve with allied forces, without degrading the combat power of the corps.

Provision for these missions could be made by assigning one or two of the E-brigades to Third Army for Southwest Asia or to Eighth Army for Korea. These headquarters would be responsible for tailoring, training, and taking these brigades to war.

Assignments at theater army level could also be considered for brigades that are not "enhanced" but have capability that could be useful in wartime. For example, the 92nd Infantry Brigade, Puerto Rico, could be assigned a wartime mission to augment Southern Command and provide security for the Caribbean and Panama.

## V. CONCLUSION

Although no formal conclusions were drawn by the conference participants, consensus emerged on several reasonable hypotheses:

- RC training and readiness
  - The E-brigade training strategy, focusing on the ability to perform particular high-value tasks, is a viable approach to improving the readiness of RC combat organizations.
  - The IDA estimates of pre-deployment training time appear to be reasonable if the E-brigade training strategy is successful. Based on the E-brigade training strategy, it should be possible to get a light brigade ready with 45 days of pre-deployment training and a heavy brigade with 75 days.
- AC/RC integration
  - A system like CAPSTONE—providing formal AC/RC links for wartime roles—should be reestablished.
  - Of the alternative approaches to organizational integration considered, corps-level integration of RC brigades seems to be the most attractive and feasible. Divisions with AC division headquarters and RC brigades should also be considered.

## **APPENDIX**



## **CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS**

### **OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESERVE AFFAIRS)**

Major General Robert A. Goodbary, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Readiness, Training, and Mobilization

Joel Resnick, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Strategic Plans and Analysis

Colonel David L. McGinnis, Director of Strategic Plans and Analysis

### **DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

Major General Donald Davis, Deputy Commander, First US Army

Colonel H. Lobdell, Training Division, US Army Forces Command

Colonel Michael McKean, Directorate of Training, The Infantry School

Colonel Jerry Veach, Special Assistant to Commander, The Armor School

Lieutenant Colonel Don Capps, Training Directorate, Department of the Army Staff

Lieutenant Colonel Dario Compain, Training Directorate, Department of the Army Staff

Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Glise, National Guard Advisor, The Infantry School

Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. King, National Guard Advisor, US Army Training and Doctrine Command

Major Greg Christenson, Directorate of Training, The Infantry School

### **ARMY NATIONAL GUARD DIRECTORATE**

Major General E. W. Stevens, Texas National Guard, Retired

Colonel Richard O'Connor, Washington Army National Guard

Lieutenant Colonel Richard Dubuque, Army National Guard Training Division

Major Mark Baker, Army National Guard Training Division

### **INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES**

Jesse Orlansky

Stanley A. Horowitz

Charles F. Hawkins

John R. Brinkerhoff

## **ABBREVIATIONS**

## ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Active Components
ARNG	Army National Guard
CORM	Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
E-brigade	enhanced brigade
FORSCOM	Forces Command
GFRE	Ground Force Readiness Enhancements
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
METL	Mission Essential Task List
METT-T	Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, and Time
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NTC	National Training Center
OPTEMPO	operating tempo
RC	Reserve Components
RTB	Regional Training Brigade
RTD	Readiness Training Detachment
RTT	Readiness Training Team
SOP	standard operating procedure
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command

UNCLASSIFIED

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 2220-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE May 1996	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final Report, Nov 1995-May 1996	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Conference on Force Integration: Seeking Better Reserve Component Capability and Credibility			5. FUNDING NUMBERS DASW01 94 C 0054  T-M7-1450	
6. AUTHOR(S) John J. Brinkerhoff, Charles F. Hawkins, and Stanley A. Horowitz			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER IDA Document D-1849	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Institute for Defense Analyses 1801 N. Beauregard Street Alexandria, VA 22311-1772			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) DASD/RA (RT&M) Room 2E515, The Pentagon Washington, DC 20301			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12A. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.			12B. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) <p>The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces has suggested that integration and cooperation between the Active Components (AC) and the Reserve Components (RC) of the military would yield more effective support from the Reserve Component. A group of representatives from the DoD, the Army, the Army National Guard, and IDA met in November of 1995 to explore how to bring more capability and credibility to the RC. This document presents background information on the conference's two main topics: Army RC combat unit training and AC/RC integration in the Army before summarizing activities during and outcomes of the conference. The conference consisted of opening presentations and discussion, followed by working group sessions. The presentations were on (1) the development of the enhanced brigade training strategy and (2) an IDA-developed model for estimating the post-mobilization/pre-deployment training time necessary for RC combat brigades and battalions. One of the working groups addressed heavy and infantry brigade pre-deployment training and the time required to train for certain roles and missions. The other group looked at how integration affects the capability and credibility of RC combat units. Though participants drew no formal conclusions, consensus was reached on several issues about training, readiness, and integration.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Army Operations; Military Capabilities; Military Reserves; Military Training; National Guard			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 40	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT SAR	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18  
298-102

UNCLASSIFIED