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TASK ANALYSIS FOR

DIRECT AND LEAD UNITS DURING THE PREPARATION FOR THE BATTLE (CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTION 19)

AS ACCOMPLISHED BY A BATTALION TASK FORCE

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ARI Contractor Report 96-39

Task Analysis for Direct and Lead Units During the Preparation for the Battle as Accomplished by a Battalion Task Force. Critical Combat Function 19 (CCF 19)

Bartholomew J. McIlroy, Jr.

BDM Federal, Inc.

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August 1996

United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

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REPORT	DOC	UMENTATION	PAGE		Approved No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington DC 20503.					
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED					
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Task Analysis for Dir	ect a	nd Lead Units Dur	ing the		INDING NUMBERS 903-92-D-0075-0005
Preparation for the Battle as accomplished by a Battalion					4
Task Force: Critical Combat Function 19 (CCF 19) 6. AUTHOR(S)				CO1 665	803 D730
Bartholomew J. McIlroy Jr.					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) BDM FEDERAL INC.					RFORMING ORGANIZATION
DOD CENTER MONTEREY B	AY				FORTNOMBER
400 GIGLING ROAD					
SEASIDE, CA 93955					
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING A U.S. ARMY RESEARCH IN			S)		PONSORING/MONITORING GENCY REPORT NUMBER
BEHAVIORAL AND SOC					GENOT REPORT NUMBER
5001 EISENHOWER AVENU				¢onti	ractor Report 96-39
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22333-	5600				
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The COR is Michael R.	Macl	ugkou mit	ort is published	to mod	of logal and
contractual requireme	nts a	nd may not meet A	RI's scientific	or pro	ofessional stnadards
for publication.					
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILIT				12b.	DISTRIBUTION CODE
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC R DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIM		ш <i>;</i>			
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readiness and the status of planning and coordination. 3) The TF Commander is able to appraise his plan based on the current situation to determine that the plan remains					
valid or become invalid. 4) The TF Commander initiates and completes the decision to					
produce a feasible, acceptable, and suitable plan and issue it in time for subordinate					
commanders to conduct troop leading procedures. 5) The TF Commander provides command presence and maintains unit discipline so that TF soldiers are motivated to accomplish					
the mission. 6) The command posts provide sufficient communications to enable the TF					
Commander to control the TF during preparation to be ready to execute the TF mission.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES				15. NUMBER OF PAGES	
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backbriefs					16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		CURITY CLASSIFICATION	19. SECURITY CLASSIF	ICATION	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED		THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIE	D	UNLIMITED
NSN 7540-01-280-5500	.1		1		Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
					Prescribed by ANSI Std 239-18 298-102

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PREFACE

This task analysis of **Direct and Lead Units In Preparation for the Battle**, Critical Combat Function 19 (CCF 19), is an intermediate product of the process of developing a training strategy for the CCF. The analysis reflects tasks, products, participants and processes required by the battalion task force to prepare an operation in compliance with the commander's concept and intent.

CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTIONS: The integration of related participants and tasks that represent a source of combat power. The synchronization of critical combat functions provides maneuver commanders at any echelon with a definable outcome that materially affects the battle.

The battle phases PLAN, PREPARE, and EXECUTE relate to the entire battalion task force battle vice phasing for this particular CCF.

This task analysis addresses the function of preparing for battle at the task force level. The process outlined in this CCF never starts from a standing start. However, for the purposes of analysis and for portrayal, we elected to depict the function as beginning with the completion of the issuance of the battalion task force OPORD and ending at the beginning of actual execution of the mission by the battalion task force.

The function of directing and leading the battalion task force during the preparation phase of the mission is a responsibility of the battalion task force Commander, his staff, and his subordinate commanders. This analysis outlines these critical tasks and subtasks. The focus is on the battalion task force Commander.

The following model reflects that the battalion task force Commander goes through a decision making process based on his knowledge of his unit's operations plan and what changed about the situation since he formed his plan. He processes and appraises the information received through his C3I system and/or by directly viewing the task force as it prepares for the mission.

The Commander's visualization of the state of the task force's preparation is largely a process of synthesizing what he sees and what others see and report to him about the task force and, what is reported about the enemy, the terrain, the weather and so forth. He will never have all the facts. His understanding of what is happening and the implications thereof, comes from what he knows and does not know. His judgement on the preparedness of the task force and actions he must take to change or sustain preparation tasks is based on the significance he attributes to information he receives and the conclusions he draws from it. The battalion task force Commander also receives recommendations from higher headquarters, subordinate commanders, and his staff.

The Commander leads the task force through his personal presence. The Commander "Monitors, Plans, and Directs" (MPD) to ensure the task force can achieve the desired end state and intent. The Commander, staff, and subordinate leaders set the conditions for the Commander's concept and implementing details to be prepared and rehearsed prior to execution. The plan is continually analyzed based on information and guidance from higher headquarters to determine its validity. The Commander performs the MPD process by providing information to and receiving information from higher, adjacent, and subordinate units; assessing information changes; and by appraising plans and operations in light of changes to the situation.

The process of "monitor, plan, and direct" is continuous and occurs in seconds or hours depending on the time available, tempo of preparation, the decisions made, and the impact on subordinate units. Many decisions may be "working" at any one time at any part of the process.

The planning phase resulted in an OPORD that articulates the Commander's concept and implementing details. The preparation phase is used to set the conditions for the concept of be executed. The Commander and his staff continually monitor the validity of the concept through the use of "running" estimates and satisfaction of the CCIR. Information collected by the staff can be divided into two categories: information which directly contributes to the CCIR; and information which is required by staff officers or subordinate commanders so that they can accomplish their responsibilities. The Commander's concept and the task force OPORD may require refinement based on various factors: changes to situation and METT-T; new information and intelligence collected in support of and driven by CCIR; new guidance from the Brigade Commander; and changes due to friendly conditions not being met.

The Commander assesses information to determine its impact on the concept and plan. Upon completion of his analysis, the Commander comes to a decision that leaves the plan as it is, refines it, or makes radical changes to it. Decisions to leave the plan as it is requires no additional measures. Decisions to refine the plan and concept must be implemented through the issuance of FRAGOs. In the event that the plan and concept must be drastically altered in order to achieve the desired end state and intent, the Commander uses the decision making process to develop new plans. Depending on how much time is available to the task force, the Commander may have to modify the traditional decision making process. At the time of this writing, the Army's doctrine and techniques for planning and decision making are under review. The decision making processes outlined in the 1993 publication of FM 101-5 "Draft" and the 1994 publication of ST 101-5 are the basis of the processes described in the task analyses of CCF 18, 19, and 20.

Whatever his decision, the Commander must ensure that it is implemented. He achieves that through the efforts of his subordinate commanders and his staff, as well as through his own supervision. He directs the task force through rehearsals, guidance, and refinements to plans and orders, using his experience, knowledge, judgement, and intuition to verify that his intent is understood and that all preparations support achieving his intent.

The staff supports the Commander in collecting information, assessing and evaluating the impact of new information, and providing recommendations to the Commander. The Commander uses his staff to coordinate and supervises execution of his decisions. The TF Executive Officer, as the director of the TF staff, calls "huddles" as required in order to ensure information is shared throughout the staff and to identify gaps in information and coordination which require additional staff work.

The level of detail and the tasks outlined in this task analysis were selected by the analyst as important to the analysis of the CCF from the perspective of the battalion task force training strategy. Compliance with branch training strategies and proficiency at MTP tasks and sub-tasks are recognized to be the responsibility of the battalion task force subordinate commanders. However, some tasks and sub-tasks are critical to battalion task force success; these, then, are included in this analysis because the battalion task force Commander may wish to emphasis them in his training guidance.

The tasks and sub-tasks of this analysis have been integrated with the tasks and sub-tasks identified in CCF 20 (Direct and Lead Units in Execution of Battle). This integration was necessary due to the impact of decisions made and the posturing of the battalion task force during the preparation phase for rapid transition into the mission. This task analysis has also been

structured to follow the Blueprint of the Battlefield (DA Pam 11-9) as it relates to the Command and Control BOS.

In this analysis, an effort was made to identify specific task titles taken directly from the appropriate ARTEP Mission Training Plan (MTP). Those tasks not taken from the MTP's are: derived titles that may apply only to a part of an MTP sub-task or some other element of the MTP; multiple sub-tasks from several different, but related, tasks; or from tasks that are not directly stated in the MTP, but are implied by other tasks or requirements in an applicable field manual (FM) or other related document. While the wording of each task is sometimes a direct quote from the MTP, generally, the wording of the tasks in an integration of tasks and requirements from the MTP's, applicable FM's, and other related documents.

INDEX of CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTIONS

Grouped By Battlefield Operating System (BOS)

INTELLIGENCE	(1) (2) (3) (4)	Conduct Intelligence Planning Collect Information Process Information Disseminate Intelligence
MANEUVER	(5) (6)	Conduct Tactical Movement Engage Enemy with Direct Fire and Maneuver
AIR DEFENSE	(16) (17)	Take Active Air Defense Measures Take Passive Air Defense Measures
FIRE SUPPORT	 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 	Employ Mortars Employ Field Artillery Employ Close Air Support Conduct Electronic Collection and Jamming Conduct Battlefield PsyOps Employ Chemical Weapons Conduct Counter Target Acquisition Operations Employ Naval Gunfire Coordinate, Synchronize and Integrate Fire Support
MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY	 (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 	Overcome Obstacles Enhance Movement Provide Countermobility Enhance Physical Protection Provide Operations Security Conduct Deception Operations Provide Decontamination
COMMAND AND CONTROL	(18) (19) (20)	Plan for Combat Operations Direct and Lead Unit During Preparation for the Battle Direct and Lead Units in Execution of Battle
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39)	Provide Transport Services Conduct Supply Operations Provide Personnel Services Maintain Weapons Systems and Equipment Provide Health Services Treat and Evacuate Battlefield Casualties Conduct Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) Operations Conduct Law and Order Operations Conduct Civil Affairs Operations Provide Sustainment Engineering Evacuate Non-combatants from Area of Operations Provide Field Services

STRUCTURE OF CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTIONS RELEVANT TO BATTALION TASK FORCE OPERATIONS

Critical Combat Function: The integration of related players and tasks that represent a source of combat power. The synchronization of critical combat functions provides maneuver commanders at any echelon with a definable outcome that materially affects the battle.

- I. **Intelligence BOS** The ways and means of acquiring, analyzing and using knowledge of the enemy, weather and terrain required by a commander in planning, preparing and conducting combat operations. These CCF are continuous throughout the planning, preparation and execution phases of the battle.
 - 1. **CCF (1) Conduct Intelligence Planning** The development and coordination of information relative to the enemy, weather and terrain prior to and during the development of the unit OPORD; the planning to collect information from battle-field sources and to acquire intelligence from other headquarters. Focus of this CCF is the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). This CCF addresses:
 - a. Reconnaissance and Surveillance plan.
 - b. Integrated threat templates (doctrinal; event; input to DST).
 - c. Terrain and Weather analysis.
 - 2. **CCF (2) Collect Information** Obtaining information in any manner from TF elements and from sources outside the TF (e.g., higher headquarters; adjacent units): this CCF includes the tasks associated with managing the processes and activities necessary to collect battlefield information which may eventually be used to provide intelligence relative to the enemy, terrain and weather. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Information collected as a result of R & S plan.
 - b. Continuous information collection and acquisition from all sources.
 - 3. **CCF (3) Process Information** The conversion of information into intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation in a continual process. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Evaluation of threat information.
 - b. Evaluation of physical environment information.
 - c. Integration of intelligence information.
 - d. Development of enemy intentions.
 - e. Development of targeting information.
 - f. Preparation of intelligence reports.
 - g. Update of situational template.
 - h. Provision of battlefield area reports.
 - 4. **CCF (4) Disseminate Intelligence** Transmission of information by any means (verbal, written, electronic etc.), from one person or place to another to provide timely dissemination of critical intelligence to all appropriate members of the combined arms team. This CCF addresses:
 - a. The sending of processed intelligence in a timely manner to those on the combined arms team who can by its receipt, take appropriate actions to

accomplish the mission. This includes intelligence on the enemy, terrain and weather.

- b. The sending of raw intelligence directly from those responsible for reconnaissance and surveillance to the commander should that raw intelligence be time sensitive (and not be subject to receipt and processing by intelligence analysts).
- c. Dissemination of battlefield reports.
- II. Maneuver BOS The employment of direct fire weapons, platforms and systems through movement and fire and maneuver to achieve a position of advantage in respect to enemy ground forces, in order to accomplish the mission. The direct fire weapons are: tank guns; BFV 25mm; anti-tank guns and rockets; attack helicopter guns and rockets; small arms; crew served weapons; directed energy weapons systems.
 - 1. **CCF (5) Conduct Tactical Movement** Position direct fire weapons systems relative to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage making full use of terrain and formations. Tactical movement occurs when contact with the enemy is likely or imminent but direct fire engagement has not yet occurred. Units supporting maneuver units are included. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Subordinate element OPORD preparation and dissemination.
 - b. Preparation for movement.
 - c. Movement, mounted and dismounted; on and off road.
 - d. Closure of movement tactical assembly area; tactical positions.
 - e. Navigation.
 - f. Force protection.
 - g. Air movement.
 - 2. **CCF (6) Engage Enemy with Direct Fire and Maneuver** —Entering into ground combat with the enemy using direct fire and/or close combat in order to destroy the enemy or cause him to withdraw. This CCF relates only to those direct fire weapons systems associated with the Maneuver BOS. This CCF is initiated with the OPORD at the completion of the planning phase of the battle and includes all tasks associated with subordinate echelon planning, preparation and execution of the battle. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Subordinate element OPORD preparation and dissemination.
 - b. Preparation of engagement areas.
 - c. Rehearsals of battle plans.
 - d. Pre-combat prepare to fire checks.
 - e. Target acquisition.
 - f. Fire control and distribution.
 - g. Fratricide.
 - h. Conduct close combat.
 - i. Integration of direct fire with maneuver.
 - j. Control of terrain.
 - k. Prestocked ammunition.
 - I. Resupply during operations.
 - m. Maintenance during operations.
 - n. Consolidation and reorganization.
- III. Fire Support BOS The collective, coordinated, and synchronized use of target acquisition data, indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft (less attack helicopters) and other

lethal and non-lethal means against ground targets in support of maneuver force operations and to achieve the commanders intent and scheme of maneuver. The Fire Support BOS addresses these weapons: mortars; field artillery; close air support; electronic measures; naval gunfire.

- 1. **CCF (7) Employ Mortars** Employment of mortars by the maneuver unit to place fires on the enemy or terrain to support the commander's concept and intent. This CCF initiates with the receipt of an OPORD by the maneuver commander and address those tasks required during the preparation and execution phases of the battle. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Subordinate element OPORD preparation and dissemination.
 - b. Prepare to fire checks.
 - c. Pre-combat checks.
 - d. Development of order to fire.
 - e. Tactical movement.
 - f. FDC operations.
 - g. Target engagements with illumination, smoke, HE.
 - h. Sustainment operations.
 - i. Rehearsals.
- 2. **CCF (8) Employ Field Artillery** The ways and means employed by the maneuver unit to cause indirect artillery fires to be placed on the enemy or terrain to support the commander's concept and intent. This CCF initiates upon receipt of an OPORD by the maneuver commander and includes tasks performed during the preparation and execution phases of the battle. The Fire Support Coordination tasks necessary to integrate the field artillery and the maneuver units are the primary focus. This CCF does not address those field artillery tasks associated directly with those actions taken by the batteries of the artillery battalion in the conduct of their support mission such as FDC operations, gun operations, etc. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Fire Support Maneuver unit rehearsals.
 - b. FSE operations during the preparation and execution phase of the battle.
 - c. FSO and FIST operations in coordination with their maneuver commander.
 - d. Positioning and movement within the maneuver unit sector or zone.
 - e. Indirect fire missions in support of maneuver commander's concept and intent.
 - f. Sustainment operations.
 - g. Indirect fire planning as battlefield METT-T change.
- 3. CCF (9) Employ Close Air Support Planning for, requesting and employing armed aircraft (less attack helicopters) in coordination with other fire support (lethal and non-lethal) against ground targets in support of the maneuver force commander's concept and intent. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Air-ground attack requests.
 - b. Air space coordination and management.
 - c. Air Liaison Officer, Forward Air Controller; other Army Fire Support Coordination Officer; USN/USMC Bde Team Commander, SALT-O and FCT-O tasks that enable air to ground attacks.
- 4. **CCF (10) Conduct Electronic Collection and Jamming** —Actions taken to deny the enemy effective command, control and communications of his own tactical force in support of maneuver commander's concept and intent. This CCF includes jamming, deception, and collection.

- 5. **CCF (11) Conduct Battlefield PsyOps** Conduct psychological activities as an integral part of combat operations to bring psychological pressure to bear on enemy forces and civilians under enemy control in the battle area, to assist in the achievement of tactical objectives in support of maneuver commander's concept and intent.
- 6. CCF (12) Employ Chemical Weapons Employ chemical agents or other means to degrade enemy capabilities in support of maneuver commander's concept and intent.
- 7. CCF (13) Conduct Counter Target Acquisition Operations —Suppress (e.g. using smoke or dazzling illumination) or degrade enemy direct observation, optics, radar, sensors, electronic DF equipment, and imaging systems in support of maneuver commander's concept and intent.
- 8. CCF (14) Employ Naval Gunfire The means and ends to provide naval gunfire in support of the maneuver commander's tactical operation.
- 9. CCF (15) Coordinate, Synchronize and Integrate Fire Support Coordination of all fire support means in support of the maneuver commanders concept and intent. This CCF addresses the preparation and execution of tasks necessary to integrate the fire support detailed in the OPORD. The CCF integrates CCF 7-14 in support of maneuver commander's concept and intent.
- IV. Air Defense BOS The means and measures organic or assigned to the maneuver commander which when employed successfully will nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack by hostile aircraft or missiles after they are airborne.
 - 1. **CCF (16) Take Active Air Defense Measures** Application of firepower to destroy enemy air targets. This CCF addresses the coordinating tasks which enable the maneuver commander to successfully employ any attached or assigned air defense weapons system as well as the tasks necessary to employ all organic weapons systems against enemy air targets. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Employment of Air Defense Artillery guns and missiles.
 - b. Employment of maneuver unit weapons systems such as small arms, automatic weapons, BFV 25 mm and TOW missiles, tank main gun against enemy air.
 - c. Airspace management.
 - d. Early warning.
 - e. Sustainment.
 - CCF (17) Take Passive Air Defense Measures The protection of the maneuver force from enemy air by means other than weapons. This CCF will focus on the preparation and execution phases of the battle. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Early warning.
 - b. Dispersion.
 - c. Cover and concealment.
 - d. Air watch.
 - e. Deception.

- V. **Command and Control BOS** The way and means a maneuver commander exercises authority and direction over organic and assigned combat power in the accomplishment of the mission.
 - 1. **CCF (18) Plan for Combat Operations** The integration of all members of the combined arms team in the coordinated development of the maneuver unit Operations Order which will guide the activities of the combined arms team in conducting combat operations to accomplish assigned missions. The product/outcome of this CCF is a briefed, understood OPORD. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Receipt and analysis of higher HQ OPORD.
 - b. Issuance of Warning Order.
 - c. Restated mission statement.
 - d. Commander's estimate process/troop leading procedures.
 - e. Commander's guidance.
 - f. Mission analysis (includes course of action development).
 - g. Decision brief to commander.
 - h. Development of a synchronized OPORD.
 - i. Reproduction and distribution of OPORD to all participants.
 - j. Briefing of OPORD; understanding of order by participants.
 - k. FRAGO planning and issue.
 - 2. CCF (19) Direct and Lead Unit during Preparation for the Battle The ways and means to prepare combined arms task force for the battle so that the combined arms task force is ready to support the maneuver commander's concept and intent. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Commander's activities.
 - b. Communicating information.
 - c. Briefbacks and backbriefs.
 - d. Rehearsals.
 - e. Management of the means of communicating information.
 - f. Maintaining and updating information and force status.
 - g. Managing information distribution.
 - h. Decisions to act or change ongoing actions.
 - i. Confirming IPB through the reconnaissance effort.
 - j. Determining actions to implement decisions.
 - k. Providing command presence.
 - I. Maintaining unit discipline.
 - m. Synchronizing tactical operations (e.g., execution matrix DST).
 - n. TOC operations (e.g., staff integration and battle tracking).
 - o. Continuity of command.
 - p. Second in command (2IC responsibilities).
 - q. Continuous and sustained operations.
 - r. Communications (e.g., planning, installation and operation of system, management, site selection).
 - 3. CCF (20) Direct and Lead Units in Execution of Battle The ways and means to command and control in the combined arms task force execution of the battle plan (engaging the enemy in battle) to accomplish the maneuver commander's concept and intent. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Directing the conduct of the battle.
 - b. Issue orders.
 - c. Command presence.

- d. Information distribution.
- e. Decide on need for action or change.
- f. Maintaining unit discipline.
- g. Synchronizing tactical operations.
- h. TOC operations (includes CP displacement, security, survivability).
- i. Continuity of command (e.g., C2 redundancy).
- j. Second in command (2IC) responsibilities.
- k. Continuous and sustained operations.
- 1. Consolidation and reorganization.
- VI. **Mobility and Survivability BOS** The ways and means of the force that permit freedom of movement, relative to the enemy, while retaining the task force ability to fulfill its primary mission as well as the measures the force takes to remain viable and functional by protection from the effects of enemy weapons systems and natural occurrences.
 - 1. **CCF (21) Overcome Obstacles** Enabling the maneuver force to maintain its mobility by removing or clearing/reducing natural and man-made obstacles. This CCF will initiate after receipt of the OPORD and address subordinate echelon planning as well as task force preparation and execution tasks necessary to achieve the maneuver commander's concept and intent. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Breach obstacle. Clearing a path or lane for personnel and equipment through a battlefield obstacle.
 - b. Cross gaps. Passing through or over any battlefield terrain feature, wet or dry, that is too wide to be overcome by organic/self bridging.
 - 2. **CCF (22) Enhance movement** Provision of adequate mobility for the maneuver unit in its area of operations. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Construction and repair of combat roads and trails.
 - b. Construction or repair of forward airfields.
 - c. Facilitating movement on routes. (This includes control of road traffic and control of refugees and stragglers.)
 - d. Tracking status of routes.
 - e. Host nation support.
 - 3. CCF (23) Provide Countermobility Delaying, channeling, or stopping offensive movement by the enemy consistent with the commander's concept and intent by enhancing the effectiveness of friendly direct and indirect weapons systems. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Emplacement of mines and complex obstacles.
 - b. Digging tank ditches.
 - c. Creation of road craters with explosives.
 - d. Terrain enhancement.
 - 4. **CCF (24) Enhance Physical Protection** Providing protection of friendly forces on the battlefield by enhancing the physical protection of personnel, equipment and weapons systems, and supplies. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Construction of fighting positions.
 - b. Preparation of protective positions.
 - c. Employment of protective equipment.

- 5. **CCF (25) Provide Operations Security** Denying information to the enemy about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Analysis to determine key assets and threats to them.
 - b. Cover and concealment.
 - c. Camouflage.
 - d. Noise and light discipline.
 - e. Counter reconnaissance.
 - f. Smoke/obscurants.
 - g. Physical security measures.
 - h. Signal security.
 - i. Electronic security.
- 6. CCF (26) Conduct Deception Operations Taking actions to mask the real objectives of tactical operations in order to delay effective enemy reaction. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Physical deception.
 - b. Electronic deception.
- 7. CCF (27) Provide Decontamination Making any person, object or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Decontamination of individual soldiers and equipment.
 - b. Decontamination of weapon systems and supplies.
 - c. Hasty and deliberate decontamination.
- VII. Combat Service Support BOS The support, assistance and service provided to sustain forces, primarily in the area of logistics, personnel services and health services.
 - 1. **CCF (28) Provide Transport Services** Providing or coordinating for transportation which will assure sustainment support operations in support of the maneuver commander. Upon receipt of an OPORD, this CCF addresses preparation and execution tasks necessary to achieve transportation support of the maneuver force. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Movement of cargo, equipment and personnel by surface or air.
 - b. Loading, transloading and unloading material and supplies.
 - 2. CCF (29) Conduct Supply Operations Providing the items necessary to equip, maintain and operate the force during the preparation and execution phases of the battle. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Requesting, receiving, procuring, storing, protecting, relocating and issuing supplies to the specific elements of the force.
 - b. Providing munitions to weapons systems.
 - c. Providing fuel and petroleum products to equipment and weapons systems.
 - d. Reporting status.
 - 3. **CCF (30) Provide Personnel Services** Management and execution of all personnel-related matters to sustain the force. This CCF addresses:

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- a. Personnel Administrative Services.
 - 1) Replacement, casualty reporting.
 - 2) Awards and decorations.
 - 3) Postal Operations.
 - 4) Promotions, reductions.
- b. Financial services.
- c. Unit Ministry team.
- d. Legal.
- e. Public Affairs.
- f. Reporting personnel status.
- g. Preservation of the force through safety.
- h. Management of stress.
- 4. CCF (31) Maintain Weapons Systems and Equipment Preservation and repair of weapons systems and equipment. This CCF includes the provision of repair parts and end items to all members of the combined arms team before, during and after the battle. Included also is doctrinal echeloning of maintenance (organization, DS, GS). This CCF addresses:
 - a. Preventative Maintenance.
 - b. Recovery.
 - c. Diagnosis, substitution, exchange, repair and return of equipment and weapons systems to the combined arms force.
 - d. Reporting status.
- 5. **CCF (32) Provide Health Services** Performance, provision or arrangement for health services regardless of location, to promote, improve, conserve or restore the mental or physical well-being of individuals or groups. This CCF addresses
 - a. Preventive medicine.
 - b. Field sanitation.
- 6. CCF (33) Treat and Evacuate Battlefield Casualties Application of medical procedures on battlefield casualties beginning with "buddy aid" through trained medical personnel. The CCF includes movement of casualties from the forward edge of the battlefield back to division-level medical facilities. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Triage of battlefield casualties.
 - b. Treatment and movement of casualties to rear (medevac).
 - 1) Identification of levels of care and locations.
 - 2) Synchronization and coordination of movement of medical facilities to ensure continuity of care.
 - 3) Establishment and maintenance of communications with redundant means.
 - 4) Rehearsals.
 - 5) Resupply.
 - c. Evacuation:
 - 1) Ground ambulance.
 - 2) Aero medevac.
 - 3) Non-standard evacuation.
 - d. Handling and processing the remains of soldiers who have died of wounds.
 - e. Reporting status.

- 7. CCF (34) Conduct Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) Operations The collection, processing, evacuation and safeguarding of enemy prisoners of war. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Collecting and evacuating EPW.
 - b. Searching, segregating, safeguarding, silencing, and rapid rearward movement of EPW.
- 8. CCF (35) Conduct Law and Order Operations Enforcement of laws and regulations and maintenance of units and personnel discipline.
- 9. CCF (36) Conduct Civil Affairs Operations Conduct of those phases of the activities of a tactical commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities, and the citizens in a friendly or occupied country or area when U.S. military forces are present.
- 10. CCF (37) Provide Sustainment Engineering The repair and construction of facilities and lines of communication. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Rear area restoration.
 - b. Construction and maintenance of lines of communication (roads, railroads, ports, airfields).
 - c. Construction support:
 - 1) Marshaling, distribution and storage facilities.
 - 2) Pipelines.
 - 3) Fixed facilities.
 - 4) Drill wells.
 - 5) Dismantlement of fortifications.
- 11. CCF (38) Evacuate Non-combatants from Area of Operations The use of available military and host-nation resources for the evacuation of US forces, dependents, US government civilian employees, and private citizens (US and other). This CCF addresses:
 - a. Medical support.
 - b. Transportation.
 - c. Security.
 - d. Preparation of temporary shelters.
 - e. Operation of clothing exchange facilities.
 - f. Operation of bathing facilities.
 - g. Graves registration.
 - h. Laundry.
 - i. Feeding.
- 12. **CCF (39) Provide Field Services** Performance of service logistics functions by and for Army elements in the field. This CCF addresses:
 - a. Clothing exchange.
 - b. Bathing facilities.
 - c. Graves registration.
 - d. Laundry and clothes renovation.
 - e. Bakeries.
 - f. Feeding (rations supply, kitchens).
 - g. Salvage.

OUTCOMES AND PURPOSE OF CCF 19

OUTCOMES


- 1. Subordinate leaders demonstrate understanding of the critical elements of their own missions, the Task Force (TF) mission, TF Commander's intent, and mission essential tasks.
- 2. The TF Commander is able to assess TF mission preparedness based on his inspections, reports from the TF staff and subordinate commanders on unit readiness and, the status of planning and coordination.
- 3. The TF Commander is able to appraise his plan based on the current situation so as to determine that the plan remains valid or has become invalid.
- 4. The TF Commander initiates and completes the decision making process to produce a feasible, acceptable, and suitable plan and issues it in time for subordinate commanders to conduct troop leading procedures.
- 5. The TF Commander provides command presence and maintains unit discipline so that TF soldiers are motivated to accomplish the mission and know the situation.
- 6. The command posts provide sufficient communications support to enable the TF Commander to control the TF during preparation so as to be ready to execute the TF mission.

PURPOSE

To provide leadership, direction, command and control during preparation for the battle.

TASK FLOW

Note 1



CCF


(outside) Input or Output (inside) Task

left to right, the flow is continuous and simu

TASK FLOW

Note 1


CCF 19 - Direct and Lead Unit Duri



Note 1: While these flowcharts are based on a time flow from left to right, the flow is continuous and simultaneous


January 2, 1995





time flow from simultaneous


TASK FLOW (Continue



(outside) Input or Output (inside) Task Note 2: At the time this task analysis was developed, the Army's doctrine and technique for plann The decision making process, outlined in the 1993 publication of FM 101-5 and the 1994 j is the basis for the process described in the task analyses of CCF 18, 19, and 20.

TASK FLOW (Continued)


CCF 19 - Direct and Lead Unit During



alysis was developed, the Army's doctrine and technique for planning are under review. rocess, outlined in the 1993 publication of FM 101-5 and the 1994 publication of ST 101-5 tess described in the task analyses of CCF 18, 19, and 20.

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OTHER CCF WHICH INTERACT WITH CCF 19

CCF #	TITLE	LOGIC
CCF 1	Conduct Intelligence Planning	Intelligence planning results in continuous up- dating of information available and identifica- tion of gaps in intelligence needed to enable the Commander to appraise the situation as it changes in terms of what is known and not known.
CCF 2	Collect Information	Information is collected to fill gaps in intelli- gence requirements and to support the collec- tion of CCIR.
CCF 3	Process Information	Processing of information must be timely and accurate to deliver critical intelligence informa- tion to the Commander in time to appraise plan validity; to support subordinate unit mission and task preparation; and to support accom- plishment of staff functions.
CCF 4	Disseminate Information	The sharing of information about the battlefield environment among all elements of the TF is essential.
CCF 5	Conduct Tactical Movement	Combat, CS, CSS, and C2 elements move based on TF Commander's scheme of maneu- ver, decisions, and intent. Tactical movements help shape the battlefield for transition from preparation to mission execution.
CCF 6	Engage Enemy With Direct Fire and Maneuver	Commanders' decisions and orders given during backbriefs, rehearsals, and visits can cause change to plans for battle.
CCF 7	Employ Mortars	Mortars and FDCs are positioned and prepared to support or conceal the TF during mission preparation and, to support TF mission execu- tion. Plans are refined. Counterreconnaissance battle and reconnaissance and surveillance op- erations are supported.
CCF 8	Employ Field Artillery	Artillery batteries and radars are positioned and prepared to support or conceal the TF during mission preparation and, to support TF mission execution. Plans are refined. Counterrecon- naissance battle and reconnaissance and sur- veillance operations are supported.

CCF #	TITLE	LOGIC
CCF 9	Employ Close Air Support	CAS plan is refined, rehearsed, and synchro- nized. Status of CAS requests are monitored.
CCF 15	Coordinate, Synchronize and Integrate Indirect Fire Support	Measures to accomplish the coordination, synchronization, and integration of artillery, CAS, and mortars are finalized during the preparation phase. Fires support counter- reconnaissance battle, reconnaissance and surveillance operations, and OPSEC measures.
CCF 16	Take Active Air Defense Measures	ADA systems are positioned and prepared to protect the TF during mission preparation and, to support TF mission execution. Plans are refined.
CCF 17	Take Passive Air Defense Measures	Passive measures are employed to accomplish OPSEC.
CCF 18	Plan for Combat Operations	The TF plan reflects the Commander's concept and provides implementing details. As METT- T changes, it is necessary to change the plan. As changes in the situation become identified, the Commander adjusts his assessment or "run- ning estimate" and gives directions that change the plan. The traditional Deliberate Decision Making Process (DDMP) may be used by the Commander to make changes to the plan dur- ing the preparation phase. It is also probable that the TF will be planning for future opera- tions during the conduct of mission prepara- tion.
CCF 20	Direct and Lead Units In Execution of Battle	Rehearsals, briefings, and visits contribute to common understanding at all echelons of Commander's intent and plan implementing details. Any changes to the TF plan necessitat- ed by change to METT-T will be based on the thoroughness of the Commander's estimate of the situation and knowledge of the detail of integrating and synchronizing his plan devel- oped during the preparation phase.
CCF 21	Overcome Obstacles	Obstacle breaching plan is refined and re- hearsed; changes to task organization occur during the preparation phase.
CCF 23	Provide Countermobility	Countermobility plan is refined and rehearsed; obstacles are emplaced during the preparation phase.
CCF 24	Enhance Physical Protection	Measures to provide physical protection are implemented during the preparation phase.

CCF #	TITLE	LOGIC
CCF 25	Provide Operations Security	The TF Commander must conceal his plans and intentions from the enemy through security measures in order to allow the TF to achieve surprise and to exercise initiative during the execution phase.
CCF 27	Provide Decontamination	Decontamination plan is refined; process is briefed and rehearsed. Sites, equipment, and supplies are prepared, inspected, and are avail- able for use during the preparation phase and for the execution phase.
CCF 28	Provide Transportation	Transportation activities to move equipment, personnel, and supplies are continuous to sus- tain the TF during the preparation phase and, to prepare the TF for the execution phase.
CCF 29	Conduct Supply Operations	Supply activities are conducted continuously to bring the TF to basic load levels for all classes of supplies and to sustain the preparation phase and, to stockpile supplies or otherwise prepare the TF for the execution phase.
CCF 30	Provide Personnel Services	Personnel strength reporting and tracking, and replacement of personnel losses are conducted so as permit action to fix problems. Personnel services are conducted continuously. TF units conduct personnel replacement operations and are provided routine services. Changes to per- sonnel situation are appraised for impact on TF capability to execute the plan.
CCF 31	Maintain Weapons Systems and Equipment	Equipment evacuation, evaluation, repair, and reporting are conducted to permit timely action to fix problems. Maintenance operations are conducted continuously. TF units conduct maintenance during mission preparation to prepare weapons systems, vehicles, and equip- ment for the battle. Changes to availability of equipment are appraised for impact on TF capability to execute the plan.
CCF 33	Treat and Evacuate Battlefield Casualties	Casualties are treated and evacuated whenever they occur; treatment and evacuation plans to support the mission are refined and rehearsed during preparation phase. Medical assets are positioned to execute the plan.

KEY PARTICIPANTS BY TASK DIRECT AND LEAD UNITS DURING PREPARATION FOR THE BATTLE - CCF 19

 1. Task Force Command Posts Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status
 B

Brigade Commander, Brigade staff, DS FA CP, FSB CP, TF Commander, XO, S3, Main CP "Battle Captain", Operations NCOIC, S2, BICC, FSO, ALO, AVN LNO, Engineer, AD LNO, ADA Platoon Leader, CMLO, CSM, S1, S4, BMO, Surgeon/Medical Platoon Leader, CESO, Scout Platoon Leader, Mortar Platoon Leader, Company/Team Commanders, HHC Commander

- 2. Assess Situation; the TF Commander Visualizes the Battlefield
- 3. Determine Actions; the TF Commander Directs Changes to the Operation or Plan
- 4. TF Commander Directs and Leads Subordinate Forces
- 5. Task Force's Command Posts Locate Where They Can Control the Preparation for and Transition to Battle

TF Commander, XO, S3, S2, BICC, Main CP "Battle Captain", FSO, Engineer, S1, S4, Scout Platoon Leader, ALO, AVN LNO, Mortar Platoon Leader, AD LNO, CMLO, CESO, Company/Team Commanders, HHC Commander

Brigade Commander, Brigade staff, TF Commander, TF XO, S3, S2, BICC, Main CP "Battle Captain", FSO, ALO, AVN LNO, AD LNO, CMLO, CESO, S1, S4, Scout Platoon Leader

TF Commander, TF XO, S3, S2, CSM, Main CP "Battle Captain", FSO, Engineer, Scout Platoon Leader, ALO, AVN LNO, Mortar Platoon Leader, AD LNO, CMLO, CESO, Company/Team Commanders, chain of command

TF Commander, TF XO, S3, Main CP "Battle Captain", Operations NCOIC, CESO, S1, S4, HHC Commander

KEY INPUTS AND OUTPUTS TO CCF 19 (w/ CRITICAL INFORMATION)

KEY INPUTS

B-1 Brigade OPORD

- a. Five Paragraph Order
 - 1) Division Commander's Intent
 - 2) Brigade Commander's Intent
 - 3) Brigade Commander's CCIR
 - 4) Concept of the Operation
 - a) Maneuver
 - b) Fires
 - c) Intelligence
 - d) EW
 - e) Deception
 - 5) PIR, EEFI, FFIR
 - 6) Mission Timelines
 - 7) Rehearsal/Backbrief Timelines
 - 8) Task Organization
- b. Operations Graphics/Overlays
- c. DST/Synchronization Matrix
- d. Intelligence Annex with Graphics/Overlays
 - 1) Situation Template
 - 2) Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO)
 - 3) Event Template
 - 4) NAIs/TAIs
 - 5) PIR
 - 6) Intelligence Acquisition Tasks
 - 7) Measures for Handling Personnel, Documents, and Material
- e. Fire Support Annex/Field Artillery Support Plan
 - 1) Commander's Guidance for Fire Support
 - 2) Concept of Fires
 - 3) CAS Operations (ATO)
 - 4) Allocation of Ammunition
 - 5) Field Artillery Support
 - 6) Naval Gunfire Support
 - 7) Offensive EW
 - 8) Target Acquisition
 - 9) Priority of Fires
 - 10) Fire Support Execution Matrix
 - 11) Target List
 - 12) Artillery Task Organization
 - 13) Observer Plan

- 14) HPT
- 15) Target Refinement Cut-off Time
- 16) Schedule of Fires
- 17) Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM)
- f. Engineer Annex
 - 1) Scheme of Engineer Operations
 - 2) Linkage of Obstacle Plan to Maneuver Scheme
 - 3) Brigade Directed Obstacles, Obstacle Priority, Work, and Responsibilities
 - 4) Guidance on FASCAM Allocation and Employment
 - 5) Engineer Execution Matrix and Target List
 - 6) Class IV and V (Obstacle) Distribution Plan
 - 7) Host Nation Support
- g. Service Support Plan/Annex (Brigade and FSB)
 - 1) Controlled Supply Rate (CSR)
 - 2) Supply Distribution Plan
 - 3) Transportation Plan
 - 4) Services Plan
 - 5) Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization
 - 6) Personnel Plan
 - 7) Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
 - 8) MSR/ASR
 - 9) Traffic Control
 - 10) Maintenance and Recovery
 - 11) Rest and Fuel/ROM Sites
 - 12) FSB and MSB Area Support Plan
- h. Army Aviation
 - 1) Aviation Concept of Operation
 - 2) JAAT Guidance
 - 3) SEAD
 - 4) Aviation Timing
- i. Air Defense Annex
 - 1) Concept of Air Defense Operations
 - 2) Active Air Defense Guidance
 - 3) Passive Air Defense Guidance
 - 4) Weapons Control Status
 - 5) Air Defense Warning System
- j. ROE
- k. OPSEC Annex
- I. Deception Annex
- m. PSYOPS Annex
- n. NBC Defense Operations Annex/Graphics

- 1) Enemy NBC Capabilities
- 2) Known/Suspected Contaminated Areas
- 3) OEG
- 4) MOPP Guidance
- 5) Decontamination Sites
- o. Civil Affairs Annex

B-2 Guidance from the Brigade Commander (WARNO, FRAGO, OPORD)

- a. Mission Changes
- b. Direction Given during Rehearsals, Backbriefs, Visits

TF-1 TF Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TSOP)

- a. Passage of Lines
- b. Immediate Action Drills
- c. Formations
- d. Movement Techniques
- e. OPSEC Requirements/Procedures
- f. Load Plans
- g. Pre-combat Checklists
- h. Passive and Active Air Defense Measures
- i. Obstacle Gap Closure
- j. Obstacle Preparation and Engineer Asset Management
- k. Obstacle Site Security
- I. Siting of Obstacles
- m. Obstacle reports (e.g., SCATMINWARN, DA Form 1355 and 1355-1)
- n. Movement and Distribution of Obstacle Material and Supplies
- o. Responsibility for Completed Obstacles
- p. Succession of Command
- q. Briefings and Rehearsal Procedures/Techniques
- r. Situation Update Format

TF-2 TF CP SOP

- a. Communications
- b. CP Organization/Layout
- c. Staff Duties and Responsibilities
- d. Plan Development
- e. Coordination
- f. Exchange of LNOs
- g. Shift Schedules
- h. Log/Journal Requirements
- i. Displacement/Movement of CPs
- j. Split CP Operations
- k. Battle Tracking Charts and Boards
- I. Order Production
- m. Graphics Displays
- n. Security
- o. Dissemination of Information

TF-3 TF OPORD

- a. Five Paragraph Order
 - 1) Brigade Commander's Intent and CCIR
 - 2) Commander's Intent and CCIR
 - 3) Written Concept of the Operation
 - a) Maneuver
 - b) Fires
 - c) Intelligence
 - 4) Designation of routes, axis, areas, sectors, or battle positions
 - 5) Designation of main and supporting efforts
 - 6) Coordinating Instructions
 - 7) PIR, IR
 - 8) Task Organization and Effective Times
 - 9) Designation of Order of March/Formations
 - 10) Security Force Operations/Battle Handoff
 - 11) Communications and Frequency Hopping
 - 12) Rehearsal Schedule
 - 13) OPSEC Requirements
 - 14) Mission Timelines
 - 15) Rehearsal/Backbrief Timelines

- b. Intelligence Annex/Overlays
 - 1) Situation Template
 - 2) Terrain Analysis
 - 3) Weather Analysis
 - 4) Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)
 - 5) Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Plan
 - 6) Event Template
 - 7) MCOO
 - 8) Event Template
 - 9) NAIs/TAIs
 - 10) Intelligence Acquisition Tasks
- c. Fire Support Annex
 - 1) Commander's Guidance for Fire Support
 - 2) Target List
 - 3) Fire Support Execution Matrix (FSEM)
 - 4) Schedule of Fires
 - 5) High Pay-off (HPT) Targets
 - 6) Priority of Fires, by Unit and Target
 - 7) Fire Support Coordination Measures
 - 8) Concept of Fires
 - 9) CAS (ATO)
 - 10) FA Support
 - 11) Naval Gunfire Support
 - 12) Target Acquisition Plan
 - 13) Observer Plan
 - 14) Target Refinement Cut-off Time
- d. Engineer Annex/Overlays
 - 1) Time schedule for Use of Engineer Assets
 - 2) TF Commander's Priority for Engineer Support (Obstacles, Assets)
 - 3) FASCAM Targets, Employment and Criteria
 - 4) Execution Matrix for Obstacles
 - 5) Obstacles (Brigade directed, TF directed, locations, responsibility for emplacing and emplaced obstacles)
 - 6) Resource Requirements
 - 7) Engineer Linkup with Maneuver Units
 - 8) Countermobility and Survivability Timelines
 - 9) CL IV and V (Obstacle) Distribution Plan
- e. Operations Overlay
 - 1) Maneuver Scheme and Concept of the Operation
 - 2) Maneuver Control Measures
 - 3) Mission and Objectives
 - 4) Main and Supporting Efforts
 - 5) Employment of Reserves
 - 6) Recon and Surveillance Operations
 - 7) Force Protection Operations
 - 8) Fire Support Coordination Measures
 - 9) Movement Plan to Position Dires (direct and indirect)

- f. Admin/Logistics Annex/Overlay
 - 1) Location and Disposition of Combat and Field Trains
 - 2) CSS Overlays with Critical Information About:
 - a) MSR/ASRs
 - b) Locations (current and planned) for Supply Points
 - c) Medical Positions (casualty collection points, ambulancle transfer points, aid station locations)
 - d) Logistic Release Points (LRPs)
 - e) Maintenance Unit Locations
 - 3) CSR
 - 4) Transportation Plan and Schedule
 - 5) Logistics Priorities and Allocation of Supplies, by unit and type of support/supplies
 - 6) Maintenance Timelines
 - 7) Maintenance Priorities by Unit, Type of Weapons System/Vehicle/ Equipment
 - 8) Established Controlled Exchange Procedures
 - 9) Medical Evacuation Plan
 - 10) Personnel Plan
- g. Air Defense Annex
 - 1) Concept of Air Defense Operations
 - 2) Active Air Defense Guidance
 - 3) Passive Air Defense Guidance
 - 4) Weapons Control Status
 - 5) Air Defense Warning System
- h. NBC Defense Operations Annex/Graphics
 - 1) Enemy NBC Capabilities
 - 2) Known/Suspected Contaminated Areas
 - 3) OEG
 - 4) MOPP Guidance
 - 5) Decontamination Sites
- i. ROE

TF-4 Decision Support Template

- a. Enemy Events, Activities, and Targets
- b. Friendly Events, Activities, Scheme of Maneuver, and Control Measures (from synchronization matrix and operations overlay)
- c. Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)
- d. Time Estimates to Implement Decisions Which Lead to Critical Decision Requirements
- e. Reflects: Named Areas of Interest (NAI), Time-Phased Lines (TPL), Decision Points (DP), Targeted Areas of Interest (TAI), and Triggers (Event to Cause Action)

TF-5 Synchronization Matrix

- a. Decision at each TPL
- b. Enemy Actions and Activities
- c. Friendly Dispositions and Actions

TF-6 Input from Staff, R&S Forces, and Subordinate Leaders to Support the CCIR

TF-7 Guidance from the Battalion Commander (WARNO, FRAGO, OPORD)

- a. Mission Changes
- b. Direction Given During Rehearsals, Backbriefs, Visits

KEY OUTPUTS

TF-8 FRAGO Reflecting Changes to TF Order/Graphics/DST/SYNC MATRIX (based on Commander's Decisions on Validity of Plan or Development of New Plan and Concept)

Note: TF-3, -4, -5 components are refined to comply with results of TF Commander's decisions.

- a. Mission Statement
- b. Commander's Intent and Concept of the Operation
- c. Pertinent Extracts Taken From More Detailed Orders
- d. Task Organization, if Modified
- e. Control Measures that Promote Initiative, Synchronization, and Agility While Minimizing Exposure to Fratricide
- f. Graphics
- g. DST and Synchronization Matrix
- h. Fire Support Plan, FESM, FSCM

TASK LIST SUMMARY DIRECT AND LEAD UNITS IN PREPARATION FOR THE BATTLE - CCF 19

- 1. Task Force Command Posts Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status (TRADOC Pam 11-9, Section IV; "Battle Command" (Draft), BCBL-Ft. Leavenworth publication, pg 43 and 65; ARTEP 71-2-MTP, task 7-1-3903, 3015/2, 3035, 3036, 3901/11, 3902/9, 3902/11, 3901/1; FM 34-130, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1 - 4; FM 101-5, Chap 3, 5, Appendix J)
- Assess Situation; the TF Commander Visualizes the Battlefield (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, task 7-1-3001, 3002, 3005, 3008, 3009, 3010, 3011, 3012, 3013, 3014, 3016, 3017, 3018, 3019, 3020, 3024, 3025, 3027, 3901, 3912, 3913, 3914; ARTEP 63-085-MTP, task 12-1-C303R; FM 34-130, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1 - 6, 8, Annex A; FM 101-5, Chap 3, Appendices F, J)
- 3. Determine Actions; the TF Commander Directs Changes to the Operation or Plan (TRADOC Pam 11-9, Section IV; ARTEP 71-2-MTP, task 7-1-3901/1, 3901/2, 3901/3, 3901/4, 3901/6, 3901/7, 3901/8, 3902/2, 3904/12; "Battle Command" (Draft), BCBL-Ft. Leavenworth publication, page 12; FM 71-123, Chap 1, 2; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 101-5, Chap 2, 4)
- 4. **TF Commander Directs and Leads Subordinate Forces** (TRADOC Pam 11-9, Section IV; "Battle Command" (Draft), BCBL-Ft. Leavenworth publication, pages 7, 10; ARTEP 71-2-MTP, task 7-1-3901/10, 3003/2, 3003/4, 3010/2, 3015/3, 3016/1, 3902/10; FM 71-123, Chap 2, 3, 6)
- 5. Task Forces Command Posts Locate Where They Can Control the Preparation for and Transition to Battle (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, task 7-1-3904, 3035, 3036, 3913/11; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

TASK LIST

DIRECT AND LEAD UNITS IN PREPARATION FOR THE BATTLE - CCF 19

- 1. Task Force Command Posts Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status (TRADOC Pam 11-9, Section IV; "Battle Command" (Draft), BCBL-Ft. Leavenworth publication, pg 43 and 65; ARTEP 71-2-MTP, task 7-1-3903, 3015/2, 3035, 3036, 3901/11, 3902/9, 3902/11, 3901/1; FM 34-130, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1 - 4; FM 101-5, Chap 3, 5, Appendix J)
 - a. Communicate Information.
 - 1) General:
 - a) For the Commander:
 - (1) The Commander alone decides what information is critical to him for decision making, based on:
 - (a) His mission.
 - (b) The Brigade and Division Commanders' intents.
 - (c) His experience.
 - (2) TF staff and subordinate leaders use the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) to focus gathering and immediately communicating mission critical information that the TF Commander needs to conduct his decision making process. CCIR consists of:
 - (a) Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR): those intelligence information requirements regarding the enemy and his environment which need to be collected and processed for which the Commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his planning and decision making.
 - (b) Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI): how the Commander views his unit from the enemy commander's perspective to discern what information would be essential to the enemy in order to defeat him.
 - (c) Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR): how the Commander views his own unit, information he must have on his own unit in order to make a decision.
 - (d) CCIR is changed based on:
 - 1. Prior planning and designation of new CCIR to accommodate progress of the battle or the situation (e.g. changes in battle phasing).
 - 2. Changes to METT-T which alter the TF Commander's information requirements.
 - <u>a.</u> Commander's visualization of current and desired end state.

- b. New guidance or missions from higher headquarters Commander.
- (3) The XO manages the flow of information in the TF headquarters and establishes a system to keep the Commander informed about what he needs to know without distracting him with information he doesn't require.
- (4) Routine information is communicated to the Commander per TF SOP.
- (5) The TF Commander schedules and conducts a final coordination session with key staff members and subordinate leaders prior to mission execution.
 - (a) Latest intelligence on the enemy is disseminated by the TF S2.
 - (b) Modifications to the plan are reviewed to verify understanding.
 - (c) Staff officers and subordinate leaders perform final coordination.
 - (d) Problems are identified and compensated for.
 - (e) The session is timed to ensure final coordination and plan modification can occur in a timely manner (e.g. fire support plan adjustments can be processed with the FSE and supporting indirect fire systems, boundary changes are disseminated throughout the TF).
- (6) TF staff officers provide recommendations relative to their functional areas as appropriate to the TF Commander.
- b) For the TF staff:¹
 - (1) Each staff officer requires information to enable him to coordinate TF actions and plans, monitor the situation and direct actions within his areas of responsibilities, e.g.:
 - (a) To develop mutual support and to synchronize operations between the TF and adjacent units.
 - (b) To modify TF preparation activities.
 - (c) To support his direction of relevant parts of TF preparations for mission execution.
 - (2) Each staff officer collects information from the other staff officers and provides information to them.
 - (3) Each staff officer ensures that his information requirements are known by the other staff officers.

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- (4) TF staff members perform external coordination and liaison to disseminate and collect information relevant to CCIR, IR and their own information requirements.
 - (a) Performed continuously.
 - <u>1.</u> Personal contact.
 - 2. Through LNOs.
 - (b) Performed with staff counterparts in forward, adjacent, supporting, and supported units.
- (5) Each staff officer collects information to support the Commander's CCIR; adjusts information collection efforts to satisfy CCIR changes directed by the Commander.
- (6) Staff officers record and integrate TF Commander's guidance generated during rehearsals, backbriefs, and the Commander's visits.
- 2) The S2 and Intelligence Section receive, evaluate and identify significant changes to the IPB and, transmit intelligence information.
 - a) Brief patrol leaders and other R&S forces on collection tasks.
 - b) Receive:
 - (1) Changes from the TF Commander to guidance and mission concept, and his requirements for information determined during rehearsals and backbriefs.
 - (2) INTSUMs and spot reports from Brigade and higher headquarters.
 - (3) Information from Brigade and adjacent units based on previously submitted information queries.
 - (4) OPSEC reports from the TF S3/Operations Section and subordinate units which contribute to analysis of TF security posture.
 - (5) Information from debriefing patrols and other R&S forces performing TF directed information collection activities.
 - (6) Spot (SALUTE) reports from TF elements.
 - (7) Information on current situation learned by eavesdropping on Brigade and adjacent unit command and O&I nets.
 - (8) Reports from R&S elements:
 - (a) Completion of and changes to task organization.
 - (b) Mission progress and debriefs on completion.
 - (c) Repositioning.
 - (d) IR, PIR.

- (9) Updates from the Brigade S2 on enemy activity based on reports from the CEWI Bn.
- (10) IPB information from TF special staff officers and Liaison Officers (LNOs) acquired through coordination with their counter-parts in higher, adjacent, and "parent" units and passed to the TF S2.
- (11) Changes to Company/Team and subordinate units' R&S plans and activities and, Company/Teams missions and plans to execute their missions.
- (12) Information from other resources:
 - (a) Aerial photographs.
 - (b) Prisoners, deserters, and civilian population.
 - (c) EW, radars, and sensors.
- c) Track enemy.
 - (1) Location (confirmed and suspected).
 - (2) Activity.
 - (a) Indications of possible intent.
 - (b) Enemy reactions to friendly battle techniques.
 - (c) Specific enemy actions triggered by friendly actions or events.
 - (3) Adherence to, or deviation from, postulated enemy COA.
 - (4) Losses so as to analyze strengths and capabilities.
- d) Evaluate information.
 - (1) Guidance/direction and information, comparing desired TF end states with what is possible based on current TF situation, trends, IPB, and R&S plans.
 - (2) Impact of information which confirms or refutes IPB information relative to achieving the Commander's intent:
 - (a) IR/PIR.
 - (b) Initial IPB.
 - (c) NAIs and TAIs.
 - (3) Determine whether R&S plan/operations continue to meet TF Commander's intent.
 - (a) Positioning of assets to collect PIR and IR.
 - (b) Positioning of assets to maintain constant observation of NAIs and TAIs.

- (c) Positioning of assets to detect and track HPTs, provide observation for attack of HPTs, and provide BDA on HPT following attack.
- (4) Battlefield indicators of enemy activities are evaluated to determine enemy intentions, e.g.:
 - (a) NBC weapons usage or activity as prelude to offensive operations.
 - (b) Presence of reconnaissance forces as prelude to attack.
 - (c) Conduct of counter-reconnaissance operations as an indicator of defense.
 - (d) Presence and massing of maneuver forces as initiation of offensive operations.
 - (e) Increase of enemy helicopter activity as indication of air assault operations.
 - (f) Increase in enemy fighter activity and massing of transport fixed wing aircraft as indicators of airborne assault or start of offensive operations.
 - (g) Increase of enemy field artillery and rocket unit activity:
 - 1. Massing of fires and targeting as indicators of start of offensive operations.
 - 2. Massing of artillery units present and positioning on the battlefield as indicators of offensive operations.
 - (h) Presence and activity of enemy engineer systems as indicators:
 - 1. Defensive operations: preparation of deliberate or hasty defensive positions.
 - 2. Offensive operations: presence of mobility assets.
 - (i) Meconing, Interference, Jamming, Interception (MIJI) and other changes in enemy electromagnetic activity as prelude to offensive operations.
 - (j) Increase of enemy radio and electronic message traffic, or lack of traffic, which can provide opportunities and advantages to the TF on the battlefield.
- (5) Evaluate information provided by TF special staff and LNOs to determine relevance to IPB (e.g. validity, invalid based on new information).
- (6) Evaluate adjusted maneuver plans from subordinate units to determine the need to change TF R&S plans.

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- e) Update intelligence products.
 - (1) "Running" intelligence estimate (may or may not be in written form).
 - (2) Situation template.
 - (3) Event template.
 - (4) Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO), with support from the TF Engineer
 - (5) DST.
 - (6) Intelligence collection plan.
 - (7) Data base.
 - (8) Intelligence overlays and graphics.
 - (9) Enemy Order of Battle (OB).
 - (10) INTSUMs.
- f) Immediately report PIR and other critical information concerning ongoing and future missions along with recommendations to:
 - (1) TF Commander.
 - (2) TF S3.
 - (3) TF XO.
- g) Report enemy's situation, evaluation of enemy capabilities, and analysis of PIR, IR and routine information to:
 - (1) Company/Teams.
 - (2) Scout Platoon.
 - (3) CTCP.
 - (4) TF Main CP.
 - (5) TF staff (including responses to intelligence queries and IR from the staff to the S2).
- h) Communicate information to Brigade S2 and adjacent unit headquarters which supports their collection requirements.
- i) TF S2 coordinates with the TF S3 and TF units to deconflict terrain requirements and projected locations for:
 - (1) R&S forces.
 - (2) Division CEWI Battalion assets.
- 3) S3, Assisted S3/"Battle Captain", S3/Air, and Operations Section receive, evaluate and identify significant changes to combat power and mission preparation and, transmit operational information.
 - a) Receive:
 - (1) Direction from the TF Commander.
 - (a) Changes to mission concept.
 - (b) Requirements for information determined during rehearsals and backbriefs.
 - (c) Other guidance and directives.

- (2) New orders from Brigade (e.g. WARNOs, FRAGOs).
- (3) Situation updates from Brigade (e.g. SITREPs).
 - (a) Responses on queries and requests submitted by the TF.
 - (b) Changes to Brigade OPSEC posture which necessitate changes to TF OPSEC posture.
 - (c) Changes to enemy situation (e.g. enemy reconnaissance activity, electronic warfare activity).
- (4) Subordinate units' OPLANs/OPORDs with graphics.
- (5) Changes to Company/Team and subordinate units' plans.
- (6) Reports from subordinate units (e.g. company/teams, Scout Platoon, R&S forces, security elements, other subordinate units):
 - (a) Enemy contact:
 - <u>1.</u> Ground.
 - 2. Fires.
 - <u>3.</u> Other.
 - (b) Current strength and combat power.
 - (c) Status of preparation activities and other tasks as outlined in mission time lines.
 - <u>1.</u> Security forces.
 - <u>2.</u> Company/Teams.
 - 3. Other TF elements.
 - (d) Status of task organization.
 - (e) OPSEC reports.
 - 1. Electronic, information, and signal security changes (e.g. loss of SOI, graphics).
 - 2. MIJI reports.
 - (f) Results of local security operations.
 - <u>1.</u> Security patrols.
 - 2. LP/OPs.
 - (g) Direct fire plans, sector sketches, and other products as directed by TF SOP and the TF Commander.
- (7) Requests for resources from subordinate units based on their mission analyses and determination of their needs to accomplish their assigned tasks.

- (8) Recommendations from subordinate commanders on changes to the TF plan based on their mission analyses, current status, and projected status.
- (9) Information about the current situation learned by eavesdropping on Brigade and TF subordinate units' command nets.
 - (a) Orders to other TF Commanders.
 - (b) Situation reports by other TF Commanders.
- (10) Information from the TF S2 and Intelligence Section which confirms or refutes operations estimate of requirements to achieve the TF Commander's intent.
- (11) Updates from S1/S4.
 - (a) Personnel and unit status.
 - (b) Vehicle and equipment status.
 - (c) Status of all classes of supply.
- (12) Updates from ALO on employment plans and status of CAS requests.
- (13) Updates from Aviation LNO on employment of attack and lift helicopter units.
- (14) Updates from CESO on TF communications links and systems.
- b) Evaluate information.
 - (1) Subordinate units' OPLANs/OPORDs to insure synchronization with TF OPLAN/OPORD.
 - (2) Impact of information which confirms or refutes IPB information relative to achieving the Commander's intent.
 - (3) Guidance/direction and information, comparing desired TF end states with what is possible based on current TF situation, trends, and TF maneuver plan.
 - (a) Maneuver units.
 - (b) Fire support.
 - (c) Engineer support.
 - (d) CSS.
 - (e) Other.
 - (4) Impact of changes to the TF maneuver plans on subordinate units' maneuver plans.
 - (5) Assessment of information relative to TF OPSEC, received from Brigade sources and internal TF sources, to determine success of TF OPSEC measures or, to identify corrections/refinements to OPSEC measure to correct deficiencies.

- c) Update operations products.
 - (1) DST.
 - (2) Synchronization matrix.
 - (3) Operational graphics.
 - (4) "Running" operations estimate (may or may not be in written form).
 - (5) TF status boards and charts which track Combat Power and preparation status.
 - (6) Time line of TF preparations for battle.
 - (7) TF Operations Journal/log.
- d) Report CCIR and other critical information concerning the ongoing and future missions along with recommendations to:
 - (1) TF Commander.
 - (2) TF S3.
 - (3) TF XO.
- e) Pass directives and coordinating instructions, reports of the TF situation, evaluations of TF state of preparedness, recommendations, and information that fulfill CCIR and IR to:
 - (1) TF XO.
 - (2) TF staff.
 - (3) Company/Teams.
 - (4) Scout and Mortar Platoons.
 - (5) CTCP.
 - (6) Brigade Main CP.
- f) Perform coordination with adjacent units to exchange information, e.g.:
 - (1) Zones of attack or axes of advance, objectives, bypass criteria, and actions on contact.
 - (2) Battle handover location, criteria, and time or event at which handover is complete.
 - (3) Checkpoints, coordination points, phase lines and contact points.
 - (4) Direct and indirect fire plans, control measures, and restrictive fire lines.
- g) Perform coordination with unit TF will pass through or which will pass through the TF, e.g.:
 - (1) Exchange orders and graphics, SOIs.
 - (2) Arrange to exchange LNOs.

- (3) Establish two-way communications to disseminate, coordinate, and exchange maneuver and direct fire plans and to provide and/or receive mutual support.
- (4) Arrange for collocation of CP's as required to facilitate synchronization and mutual support when the TF is operating in close conjunction with other TF's.
- (5) Exchange information on number and types of units and vehicles to pass, marking systems.
- (6) Exchange information on movement sequence, time lines, and traffic control measures.
- (7) Agree on approach routes and passage points/lanes.
- (8) Exchange information on friendly dispositions and assembly areas, attack positions.
- (9) Exchange information on R&S and Security operations information to synchronize joint efforts and prevent fratricide.
- (10) Agree on battle handover.
- h) Coordinate with Brigade Main CP to gain assistance in determining effectiveness of TF OPSEC measures.
- i) Provide information to the TF S2 to support TF IPB.
- j) TF S3 coordinates with TF staff and TF units to deconflict terrain requirements and projected locations for units external to the TF operating in the TF area.
- 4) The FSO and FSE receive, evaluate and identify significant changes to the fire support plan and supporting documents and, transmit information.
 - a) Receive:
 - (1) Changes from the TF Commander to guidance and mission concept, and requirements for information.
 - (2) Intelligence information from the Brigade FSO/FSE and DS FA Battalion.
 - (a) Enemy capabilities to attack the TF with indirect fires.
 - (b) Responses to information and intelligence queries submitted by the TF previously.
 - (3) Task organization, personnel and equipment status, and status of preparations from fire support assets.
 - (a) COLTs.
 - (b) FISTs.
 - (c) Mortars.

- (4) Artillery status from Brigade FSO/FSE and DS FA Battalion.
 - (a) Organization for combat.
 - (b) Locations and status of batteries, platoons, and radars.
 - (c) Ammunition status, including special munitions.
 - 1. Ammunition types.
 - 2. Ammunition quantities.
- (5) Mortar Platoon status from the Mortar Platoon Leader.
 - (a) Mortar tubes and vehicles.
 - (b) Personnel.
 - (c) Locations of sections and FDCs.
 - (d) Ammunition status.
 - 1. Ammunition types.
 - 2. Ammunition quantities.
- (6) Updates from ALO and Aviation LNO.
 - (a) Employment plans and status for Army Aviation (from Aviation LNO) and Air Force Air (from ALO).
 - (b) Availability of CAS support based on ATO from ALO.
 - (c) Status updates on availability and capability of TACP to coordinate and execute CAS from ALO.
 - (d) Aviation requirements for TF fire support (e.g. SEAD based on routes, fire support coordinating measures).
- (7) Information from the TF S2 and Intelligence Section which confirms or refutes estimate of fire support requirements.
 - (a) Targeting to support maneuver plan.
 - (b) Enemy indirect fire capabilities.
- (8) Fire support plan changes in terms of projected locations, targets, and time lines based on bottom-up refinements from:
 - (a) Maneuver Company/Teams.
 - (b) Scout Platoon.
 - (c) COLTs and other observers.
- (9) Adjustments to FASCAM employment from the TF Engineer based on plan refinement.
- (10) Updates on positioning and preparation status of observers.
- (11) Fire support requirements from the S4 and HHC Commander to support RACO.
- b) Evaluate information.

- (1) Guidance/direction and information, comparing desired TF end states with what is possible based on current TF situation, trends, and fire support plan.
- (2) Comparison of Company/Team fire support plans with TF fire support plan to insure synchronization.
- (3) Impact of information which confirms or refutes IPB information relative to achieving the Commander's intent.
- (4) Impact of changes to engineer FASCAM requirements on the fire support plan.
- (5) Changes to Army aviation and Air Force requirements which cause refinements to the fire support plan.
- (6) Impact of restrictive fire measures imposed by Brigade, other headquarters.
- c) Update fire support products.
 - (1) "Running" fire support estimates (may or may not be in written form).
 - (2) Fire Support Execution Matrix.
 - (3) Target lists.
 - (4) Fire support graphics.
 - (5) Priority targets.
 - (6) Fire support coordinating measures.
 - (7) Observation plan.
 - (8) Aviation plan (with ALO and Army Aviation LNO):
 - (a) ACAs.
 - (b) SEAD plan.
- d) Report CCIR and other critical information concerning ongoing and future missions along with recommendations to:
 - (1) TF Commander.
 - (2) TF S3.
 - (3) TF XO.
- e) Report TF fire support situation and analysis of CCIR, IR and routine information to other TF staff sections and other headquarters/staff officers.
 - (1) TF Engineer.
 - (2) TF S2.
 - (3) TF S3.
 - (4) Brigade FSO/FSE.
 - (5) DS FA Battalion.
 - (6) Subordinate FSO/FISTs and Company/Team Commanders.
 - (7) ALO and Army Aviation LNO.
 - (8) TF staff officers who need the information.

- f) Perform coordination with subordinate and adjacent units, TF staff, and DS FA Battalion headquarters to exchange information.
 - (1) With TF Mortar Platoon to:
 - (a) Refine mortar fire support, schedules of fires, fire plans, ammunition status, capabilities, and fire support coordination measures.
 - (b) Determine mortar positioning, displacement timing, and scheme of maneuver.
 - (2) With adjacent and higher FSE's, supporting FA units, and subordinate units.
 - (a) Ensure planned TF fire support will not interfere with other fire support systems, will not disrupt adjacent unit operations, and will not jeopardize troop safety.
 - b) TF FSO, as DS FA Battalion Liaison Officer, coordinates with the TF Commander and staff on needs and requirements of FA units operating in TF area.
 - c) Fire support information and products (target lists, Fire Support Execution Matrix, CAS requests and ATO) are exchanged and refined.
 - (3) Coordination with TF S3, TF staff, subordinate units, higher and adjacent units to determine:
 - (a) Control measures delineating mutual boundaries.
 - 1. Directed by Brigade and higher HQ.
 - 2. Internal boundaries (Co/Tm; Scouts; Security Forces).
 - (b) Air space control measures and to deconflict air space in support of CAS plan.
 - (c) Fire control lines and fire support coordinating measures.
 - (d) Confirm signals and conditions under which restrictive measures will be emplaced or lifted.
- g) Provide information to the TF S2 to support TF IPB.
- 5) The Engineer receives, evaluates and identifies significant changes and, transmits information.
 - a) Receives:
 - (1) Changes from the Commander to guidance and mission concept and, requirements for information.

- (2) Reports from manager of engineer assets on use and employment of engineer systems and, status of equipment.
- (3) Countermobility status:
 - (a) Obstacle/barrier construction starting and completion times from engineers and subordinate units.
 - (b) Status on delivery of CL IV and V materials from engineers, subordinate units, S4, and Support Platoon Leader.
 - (c) Updates on adherence to obstacle preparation time lines from engineers and subordinate units.
 - (d) Updates on preparations for FASCAM employment from the TF FSO.
- (4) Survivability status:
 - (a) Position construction starting and completion times from engineers and subordinate units.
 - (b) Updates on adherence to survivability position construction time lines from engineers and subordinate units.
 - (c) Status on delivery of survivability materials from engineers.
- (5) Mobility status:
 - (a) Updates on availability of engineer materials from Engineer Company Commander, Platoon Leaders, and Squad/Section Leaders.
 - (b) Updates on availability of engineer systems (operational, non-operational) from Engineer Company, Platoon Leaders, and Squad/Section Leaders.
 - (c) Updates on availability of mobility equipment organic to TF maneuver units (e.g., plows, rollers, breach kits).
- (6) Task organization status from engineer and subordinate assets, including adherence to established time lines.
 - (a) CEVs and ACEs.
 - (b) AVLB.
 - (c) AVLM/MICLIC.
 - (d) Mine clearing blades and rollers.
 - (e) Breach kits.
 - (f) Cleared Lanes Marking Systems (CLAMS).
- (7) Reports from engineer reconnaissance units and Scouts on terrain and enemy obstacles.
- (8) Intelligence information from Engineer Battalion headquarters.

- (9) Information from the S2 and Intelligence Section on weather, terrain, and other information which confirms or refutes estimate of engineer requirements.
- (10) Changes to Company/Team and subordinate units' plans in terms of projected locations, M-CM-S requirements, and time lines.
- b) Evaluates information.
 - (1) Guidance/direction and information, comparing desired TF end states with what is possible based on current TF situation, trends, and engineer plan.
 - (2) Actual progress on engineer tasks compared to time lines and required end states.
 - (3) Information which confirms or refutes IPB information relative to achieving the Commander's intent.
 - (4) Answers to intelligence queries which alter initial enemy engineer capabilities and assessment:
 - (a) Changes to enemy mobility capabilities to determine impact on TF countermobility and survivability plans.
 - (b) Changes to enemy countermobility actions or capabilities to determine impact on TF mobility plan and task organization.
 - (c) Changes to enemy survivability measures or capabilities to determine impact on TF mobility, direct fire, and indirect fire plans (through coordination with TF S3 and FSO).
 - (5) Impact of adjusted plans from subordinate units on TF engineer plans.
 - (6) Changes to mobility estimate based on differences in terrain from initial IPB or the effect of current weather on the terrain.
- c) Updates engineer products.
 - (1) "Running" engineer estimate (may or may not be in written form).
 - (2) Priorities and schedules for engineer effort.
 - (3) Survivability position and obstacle graphics.
 - (4) Engineer time lines.
 - (5) FASCAM employment plan.
- d) Reports CCIR and other critical information concerning the ongoing and future missions along with recommendations to:
 - (1) TF Commander.
 - (2) TF S3.

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(3) TF XO.

- e) Reports TF engineer situation and analysis of CCIR, IR, and routine information to other TF staff sections and external headquarters/staff officers.
 - (1) Engineer Battalion Commander.
 - (2) Assistant Brigade Engineer.
 - (3) TF subordinate commanders and leaders.
 - (4) TF staff officers who need the information.
- f) Performs coordination with TF subordinate units, adjacent units and, Engineer Battalion headquarters to exchange information.
 - (1) With TF units to ensure that countermobility plans are in accordance with the TF order.
 - (a) Obstacles support the TF scheme of maneuver and subordinate unit tactical plans, reinforce engagement areas, and are tied in to other obstacles and terrain.
 - (b) All obstacles are covered by observation, direct fires, and indirect fires.
 - (c) Movement control measures, passage of lines routes, lanes/gaps and, closure responsibilities are established.
 - (d) Existing obstacles' locations and types are recorded, including lanes and passage points.
 - (e) Obstacle security is maintained by unit responsible for the obstacle.
 - (2) With TF units to ensure that types and locations of required survivability positions are in accordance with the TF order.
 - (a) Position construction is based on priority (including positions for Security Force units).
 - (b) Locations are jointly sited by:
 - 1. Maneuver commander (responsible for site selection).
 - 2. Vehicle and weapons systems crews. (Vehicle commander is responsible for site selection that provides for observation and direct fire coverage of assigned sector).
 - 3. Engineer leader (responsible for providing equipment, material, expertise, and for preparation to standard of vehicle positions).
 - (3) With adjacent units and Engineer Battalion headquarters.
 - (a) To exchange information on obstacle status, type, and location.

- (b) To ensure Brigade directed obstacle requirements are satisfied.
- (c) To exchange information on mobility plans (TF, Brigade, and other TFs).
- g) Provides information to the TF S2 to support TF IPB.
- h) TF Engineer coordinates with the TF S3 and TF units to deconflict terrain requirements and projected locations for:
 - (1) TF engineer units.
 - (2) Brigade engineer units.
 - (3) Division and higher engineer units.
- 6) The CMLO receives, evaluates and identifies significant changes to TF and enemy NBC status and, transmits information.
 - a) Receives:
 - (1) Changes from the TF Commander to guidance and mission concept and, requirements for information.
 - (2) NBC Warning and Reporting System (NBCWRS) updates from Brigade.
 - (3) Status and location updates for NBC equipment and supplies from subordinate units and TF S4.
 - (4) Status and location updates of decontamination assets from S4 and Decontamination Unit leaders.
 - (5) NBC monitoring and surveillance reports from subordinate units.
 - (6) Information from the S2 and Intelligence Section which confirms or refutes estimate of NBC requirements.
 - (7) Changes to Company/Team and subordinate units' plans in terms of projected locations, decontamination requirements, and time lines.
 - b) Evaluates information.
 - (1) Guidance/direction and information, comparing desired TF end states with what is possible based on current TF situation, trends, and TF NBC reconnaissance and decontamination plans.
 - (2) Impact of information which confirms or refutes IPB information relative to achieving the Commander's intent.
 - (3) Answers to intelligence queries which alter initial assessment of enemy NBC capabilities.
 - (4) Impact of adjusted plans from subordinate units on TF NBC plans.

- c) Updates NBC products.
 - (1) "Running" NBC estimate (may or may not be in written form) and MOPP analysis.
 - (2) Enemy NBC capabilities.
 - (3) NBC equipment and supplies inventories.
 - (4) NBC overlays and graphics.
- d) Reports CCIR and other critical information concerning ongoing and future missions along with recommendations to:
 - (1) TF Commander.
 - (2) TF S3.
 - (3) TF XO.
- e) Reports TF NBC situation and analysis of CCIR, IR, and routine information to other TF staff sections and external headquarters/staff officers.
 - (1) Brigade CMLO.
 - (2) TF subordinate commanders and leaders.
 - (3) Supporting NBC units (e.g. decontamination, reconnaissance).
 - (4) TF staff officers who need the information.
- f) Performs coordination and liaison with the Brigade CMLO and supporting decontamination units to confirm and organize deliberate decontamination plans and preparations.
- g) Performs coordination and liaison with Brigade CMLO, Company/ Team Commanders, Scout Platoon Leader, and supporting NBC Reconnaissance units to confirm NBC reconnaissance plans and preparations.
- h) Provides information to the TF S2 to support TF IPB.
- i) TF CMLO coordinates with the TF S3 and TF units to deconflict terrain requirements and projected locations for:
 - (1) TF decontamination assets.
 - (2) NBC reconnaissance units.
 - (3) Division and higher chemical units.
- 7) AD LNO receives, evaluates and identifies significant changes to enemy air capabilities and, transmits information.
 - a) Receives:
 - (1) Changes from the TF Commander to guidance and mission concept and, requirements for information.
 - (2) Disposition of ADA assets from the ADA Battery Commander and subordinate ADA elements.

- (3) ADA weapons systems and ammunition status from supporting ADA elements.
- (4) Intelligence information from the ADA Battalion and Battery headquarters.
- (5) Information from the TF S2 and Intelligence Section which confirms or refutes estimate of ADA requirements.
- (6) Weapons control status from the Area Air Defense Commander.
- (7) Air Defense Warning System updates from ADA Battalion and Division.
- (8) Changes or additions to USAF or Army aviation routes through the TF sector.
- (9) A2C2 updates from Brigade S3, S3/Air, and AD LNO.
- (10) Changes in positions of TF assets to be defended.
- (11) Changes to Company/Team and subordinate units' plans in terms of projected locations, routes, and time lines.
- b) Evaluates information:
 - (1) Guidance/direction and information, comparing desired TF end states with what is possible based on current TF situation, trends, and TF passive and active air defense plans.
 - (2) Impact of information which confirms or refutes IPB information relative to achieving the Commander's intent.
 - (3) Answers to intelligence queries which alter initial assessment of enemy air capabilities.
 - (4) Impact of adjusted plans from subordinate units on TF air defense plans.
- c) Updates Air Defense products.
 - (1) "Running" Air Defense estimates (may or may not be in written form).
 - (2) Air defense coverage.
 - (3) ADA command and control system.
 - (4) Friendly air corridors.
 - (5) Probable enemy air routes into the TF area.
 - (6) TF Weapons Control and Air Defense Warning status.
- d) Reports CCIR and other critical information concerning the ongoing and future missions along with recommendations to:
 - (1) TF Commander.
 - (2) TF S3.
 - (3) TF XO.

- e) Reports TF ADA situation and analysis of CCIR, IR, and routine information to other TF staff sections and external headquarters/staff officers.
 - (1) Brigade AD LNO.
 - (2) Air Defense Battery Commander.
 - (3) TF subordinate commanders and leaders.
 - (4) TF staff officers who need the information.
- f) Performs coordination with adjacent units and ADA Battery and Battalion headquarters.
 - (1) Coordination with Division and Brigade A2C2 section and adjacent units to confirm scheme of maneuver, IFF codes, and AD weapons area coverage.
 - (2) Confirms weapons control status with higher and adjacent units.
 - (3) Confirms events and reporting systems which will cause the TF to upgrade weapons control status.
- g) Provides information to the TF S2 to support TF IPB.
- h) Coordinates with the TF S3 and TF units to deconflict terrain requirements and projected locations for:
 - (1) TF ADA units.
 - (2) Brigade ADA units.
 - (3) Division and higher AD units and systems.
- 8) TF CESO receives, evaluates and identifies significant changes to TF communications capabilities and, transmits information.
 - a) Receives:
 - (1) Changes from the TF Commander to guidance and mission concept and, requirements for information.
 - (2) Status of communications links from TF CPs to Brigade CPs.
 - (3) Disposition and status of communications assets from the Brigade CESO and Signal Battalion.
 - (4) Updates from subordinate units on communications status.
 - (a) Status of communications links from TF CPs.
 - (b) Equipment (secure and non-secure).
 - (c) SOIs.
 - (d) Availability of subordinate unit communications personnel.
 - (5) Intelligence information from the Division Signal Battalion headquarters.
 - (6) Information from the TF S2 and Intelligence Section.

- (a) Which confirms or refutes estimate of communications requirements.
- (b) Updates enemy electronic and communication capabilities.
- (7) Updates from retrans stations.
 - (a) Positioning.
 - (b) Equipment serviceability and capability.
 - (c) Communication ranges and dead spaces.
- (8) Information from the TF XO or S3 about changes to proposed TF CP locations and projected time lines.
- (9) Changes to Company/Team and subordinate units' plans in terms of projected locations and time lines.
- b) Evaluates information:
 - (1) Guidance/direction and information, comparing desired TF end states with what is possible based on current TF situation, trends, and TF communications plan.
 - (2) Impact of information which confirms or refutes IPB information relative to achieving the Commander's intent.
 - (3) Answers to intelligence queries which alter initial estimate of enemy electronic and communications capabilities.
 - (4) Impact of adjusted plans from TF CPs and subordinate units on TF communications planning.
- c) Updates communications products.
 - (1) "Running" signal estimates (may or may not be in written form).
 - (2) Communications network overlay, area coverage overlay, and dead space overlay.
 - (3) SOIs and secure equipment keying devices.
- d) Reports CCIR and other critical information concerning the ongoing and future missions along with recommendations to:
 - (1) TF Commander.
 - (2) TF S3.
 - (3) TF XO.
- e) Reports TF communications situation and analysis of CCIR, IR, and routine information to other TF staff sections and external headquarters/staff officers.
 - (1) Brigade CESO.
 - (2) Signal Battalion Commander.
 - (3) TF subordinate commanders and leaders.

- (4) TF staff officers who need the information.
- f) Performs coordination with adjacent units and Signal Battalion headquarters.
 - (1) Confirm allocation and locations of signal assets and capabilities.
 - (2) Acquire signal equipment to supplement TF CPs and subordinate units which require special communications equipment.
- g) Provides information to the TF S2 to support TF IPB.
- h) TF CESO coordinates with the TF S3 and TF units to deconflict terrain requirements and projected locations for:
 - (1) TF retrans.
 - (2) Brigade retrans.
 - (3) Division and higher signal units and systems.
- 9) Aviation LNO receives, evaluates and identifies significant changes to friendly air capabilities and, transmits information.
 - a) Receives:
 - (1) Changes from the TF Commander to guidance and mission concept and, requirements for information.
 - (2) Updated status from Army Aviation Battalion on helicopter availability, support, and plans.
 - (3) Intelligence information from Aviation Battalion and Aviation Brigade headquarters.
 - (a) Enemy ADA weapons and electronics capabilities.
 - (b) Enemy ground to air threat.
 - (c) Enemy air to air threat.
 - (4) Information from the S2 and Intelligence Section which confirms or refutes estimate of weather constraints and enemy ADA capabilities.
 - (5) Information from the TF FSO on SEAD, other fire support, and lazing support for Army aviation operations.
 - (6) Status from the S3 and S3/Air on concept for employment of Army aviation and desired effects.
 - (7) Updates from Brigade or Aviation Brigade on aviation activities in TF sector (e.g. ingress or egress routes before/after a deep attack).
 - (8) Status from the ALO on USAF operations to deconflict Army aviation operations.
 - (a) Times.

- (b) Locations.
- (9) Changes to Company/Team and subordinate units' plans in terms of projected locations and time lines.
- b) Evaluates information.
 - (1) Guidance/direction and information, comparing desired TF end states with what is possible based on current TF situation, trends, and allocated Army aviation support for TF mission.
 - (2) Impact of information which confirms or refutes IPB information relative to achieving the TF Commander's intent.
 - (3) Answers to intelligence queries which alter initial assessment of enemy air and air defense capabilities, objective area or EA, and targets.
 - (4) New information is evaluated to determine impact on planned ACAs, Army aviation employment, and USAF operations.
 - (5) Impact of adjusted fire support plans on Army aviation employment plans.
 - (6) Impact of changes to weather on Army aviation employment plans.
 - (7) Impact of changes to enemy ADA capabilities on Army aviation employment plans.
 - (8) Impact on Army aviation plan resulting from changes to the TF plan and to the CAS plan.
 - (9) Impact on TF plans resulting from changes to Army aviation employment under control of the Aviation Brigade and the Brigade.
- c) Updates Army aviation products.
 - (1) "Running" Aviation estimate (may or may not be in written form).
 - (2) ACAs.
 - (3) Army Aviation plan.
 - (4) SEAD and indirect fire support plans (with TF FSO).
- d) Reports CCIR and other critical information concerning the ongoing and future missions along with recommendations to:
 - (1) TF Commander.
 - (2) TF S3.
 - (3) TF XO.
- e) Reports TF Army aviation situation and analysis of CCIR, IR, and route information to other TF staff sections and external headquarters/ staff officers.

- (1) Brigade Aviation LNO and Aviation Battalion.
- (2) Battalion and Brigade ALOs (re Army aviation integration with USAF operations.
- (3) TF subordinate commanders and leaders.
- (4) TF FSO.
- (5) TF S3 and S3/Air.
- (6) TF staff officers who need the information.
- f) Provides information to the TF S2 to support TF IPB.
- g) TF Aviation LNO coordinates with the TF S3, TF S3/Air, and TF units to deconflict terrain requirements and projected locations for Division Aviation Brigade units.
- 10) USAF ALO receives, evaluates and identifies significant changes to friendly air capabilities and, transmits information.
 - a) Receives:
 - (1) Changes from the TF Commander to guidance and mission concept and, requirements for information.
 - (2) Updated information from Brigade ALO on ATO and CAS support status (e.g. times, routes).
 - (3) Intelligence information through Air Force channels.
 - (a) Enemy ADA weapons capabilities and electronics signatures.
 - (b) Enemy ground to air threat.
 - (c) Enemy air to air threat.
 - (d) Enemy ground activities.
 - (4) Information from the S2 and Intelligence Section which confirms or refutes estimate of weather constraints and enemy ADA capabilities.
 - (5) Information from the TF FSO on SEAD, fire support, and lazing support for Air Force operations.
 - (6) Status from the TF S3 and TF S3/Air on concept for employment of CAS and desired effects.
 - (7) Status from the Army Aviation LNO on helicopter operations.
 - (8) Changes to company/team and subordinate units' plans in terms of projected locations and time lines.
 - (9) Updates from the AFAC.
 - (a) In-flight reports.
 - (b) CAS on-station times.
 - (c) Modifications to SEAD and lazing requirements.
 - b) Evaluates information.

- (1) Guidance/direction and information, comparing desired TF end states with what is possible based on current TF situation, trends, what USAF support is allocated to support TF mission.
- (2) Impact of information which confirms or refutes IPB information relative to achieving the Commander's intent.
- (3) Answers to intelligence queries which alter initial assessment of enemy air and air defense capabilities as well as CAS targets.
- (4) Impact on planned ACAs, changes to CAS employment, and integration with Army aviation operations based on updated information.
- (5) Impact of adjusted fire support plans on USAF employment plans.
- (6) Impact of changes to weather on USAF employment plans.
- (7) Impact of changes to enemy ADA capabilities on USAF employment plans.
- (8) Impact on CAS plan resulting from changes to the TF plan and to the Army aviation employment plan.
- (9) Impact on TF plans resulting from changes to CAS employment by Brigade and USAF headquarters.
- c) Updates Air Force air products.
 - (1) "Running" Air Force air estimate (may or may not be in written form).
 - (2) ACAs.
 - (3) SEAD and indirect fire support plans (with TF FSO).
- d) Reports CCIR and other critical information concerning the ongoing and future missions along with recommendations to:
 - (1) TF Commander.
 - (2) TF S3.
 - (3) TF XO.
- e) Reports CAS situation and analysis of CCIR, IR, and route information to other TF staff sections and external headquarters/staff officers.
 - (1) Battalion Aviation LNO Battalion.
 - (2) Brigade ALO.
 - (3) Subordinate commanders and leaders.
 - (4) TF FSO.
 - (5) TF S3 and S3/Air.
 - (6) TF staff officers who need the information.
- f) Provides information to the TF S2 to support TF IPB.

- g) TF ALO coordinates with the TF S3, TF S3/Air, and TF units to deconflict terrain requirements and projected locations for USAF ground units.
- 11) TF CSS officers (S1, S4, Chaplain, Surgeon/Medical Platoon Leader, Support Platoon Leader, and Maintenance Officers) receive, evaluate and identify significant changes to CSS plans and, transmit logistical information.
 - a) Receive:
 - (1) Changes from the TF Commander to guidance and mission concept and, requirements for information.
 - (2) CSS status reports from subordinate units.
 - (3) Requests from subordinate units for:
 - (a) Resupply.
 - (b) Recovery of vehicles or maintenance support.
 - (c) Evacuation of casualties.
 - (d) Religious support.
 - (e) JAG support.
 - (f) Personnel actions support (e.g. awards, promotions).
 - (4) Information from maneuver, fire support, Army aviation, and other TF units directed to support TF Rear Area Combat Operations (RACO) operations.
 - (5) Task organization and status of CSS elements.
 - (a) Subordinate maneuver units.
 - (b) CTCP.
 - 1. Aid station.
 - 2. Push packages.
 - 3. Support Platoon decontamination equipment.
 - <u>4.</u> UMCP.
 - (c) FTCP integration with the BSA.
 - (6) Status reports from subordinate units on resupply operations.
 - (7) Status from the FTCP on:
 - (a) Reconstitution of basic loads.
 - (b) Stock piling of classes of supplies to support emergency resupply and the mission.
 - (8) Medical, maintenance, transportation, and supply updates from FSB SPO and Brigade S4.
 - (9) Updates on transportation assets and movement schedules from:
 - (a) Support Platoon Leader for ground assets.
 - (b) S3/Air for aviation assets.

- (10) EPW processing and evacuation information from subordinate units and Brigade MP's.
- (11) Information from the S2 and Intelligence Section which confirms or refutes estimate of CSS requirements.
- (12) Updates from the Medical Platoon Leader:
 - (a) Positioning and readiness of medical assets.
 - <u>1.</u> Forward Aid Station (FAS).
 - 2. Main Aid Station (MAS).
 - 3. Ambulances and Ambulance Exchange Points (AXPs).
 - (b) Status of capability to receive casualties.
 - (c) Reports on casualty tracking.
- (13) Updates from the TF BMO.
 - (a) Status and positioning of maintenance assets.
 - <u>1.</u> UMCP.
 - 2. Recovery assets.
 - 3. HETs for equipment transfer.
 - (b) Capability to recover and perform maintenance on TF vehicles and equipment.
- (14) Changes to Company/Team and subordinate units' plans in terms of projected locations and time lines.
- b) Evaluate information.
 - (1) Comparing desired TF end state with what is possible based on current personnel, maintenance, transportation, medical, and supply status.
 - (2) Impact of information which confirms or refutes IPB information relative to achieving the Commander's intent.
 - (3) Answers to intelligence queries requested by CSS officers which could affect initial CSS plan.
 - (4) Impact of adjusted plans from subordinate units on TF CSS plans.
- c) TF S4 and HHC Commander update transportation information and status.
 - (1) Transportation portion of "running" CSS estimate (may or may not be in written form).
 - (2) Schedules and priorities.

- (3) Status of supplies, equipment, and materials requiring transport.
- (4) Availability of ground transport assets.
- (5) Availability of air transportation assets (from TF S3/Air).
- (6) LOGPAC convoys organization, loads, times, and schedules.
- (7) Transportation recovery plan and back-haul plan.
- (8) MSR and ASR traffic and route conditions.
- d) TF S4 updates supply information and status.
 - (1) Supply portion of "running" CSS estimate (may or may not be in written form).
 - (2) Combat basic loads (e.g. vehicles uploaded with CL V; vehicles topped off with CL III) and on-hand supply status of subordinate and supported units.
 - (3) Configuration and location of immediate and emergency resupply (CL III and V) loads and push packages.
 - (4) CSS supply assets.
 - (a) Type.
 - (b) Readiness.
 - (c) Location.
 - (5) Supply priorities as directed by the TF Commander.
 - (6) Establishment and fill of stockpiles and caches.
- e) TF S1 updates personnel information.
 - (1) Personnel portion of "running" CSS estimate (may or may not be in written form).
 - (2) Personnel status of subordinate and supported units.
 - (3) Casualty feeder reports.
 - (4) Reception and processing of replacements.
 - (5) Forecast of replacements.
 - (6) Personnel actions (awards, decorations, promotions, legal action).
 - (7) EPW processing and evacuation.
 - (8) Soldier morale and welfare activities.
- f) TF BMO updates maintenance information.
 - (1) Maintenance portion of "running" CSS estimates (may or may not be in written form).
 - (2) Number and type of systems on hand and operational.
 - (a) Combat.

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(b) Combat Support.

- (c) Combat Service Support.
 - <u>1.</u> Recovery.
 - <u>2.</u> MSTs.
 - <u>3.</u> CMTs.
- (3) Systems non-mission capable and repairable.
- (4) Projections for repair and return of fighting vehicles and equipment.
- (5) On-hand Class IX, ASL, and PLL stockage levels.
- (6) Maintenance activities performed by CMTs and MSTs, including the location of the maintenance activities.
- (7) Maintenance priorities and guidelines as directed by the TF Commander.
- g) TF Surgeon/Medical Platoon Leader updates medical information.
 - (1) Medical portion of "running" CSS estimates (may or may not be in written form).
 - (2) Casualty evacuation records.
 - (3) Class VIII stock availability and resupply activities.
 - (4) Reinforcement and reconstitution of medical assets.
 - (5) Disposition and capability of TF Forward Aid Station (FAS), Main Aid Station (MAS), medic teams attached to subordinate units, and medical/ambulance support from the FSB Medical Company.
- h) TF S4 and HHC Commander update RACO information.
 - (1) Threat (levels I, II, and III).
 - (2) Base and base cluster defense plans integrated with TF and Brigade defense plans.
 - (a) Forces available for local security operations and reaction force.
 - (b) Indirect fire support.
 - <u>1.</u> Targets.

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- 2. Observers.
- (c) Communications capabilities.
- i) TF CSS officers report CCIR and other critical information concerning the ongoing and future missions along with recommendations to:

- (1) TF Commander.
- (2) TF S3.
- (3) TF XO.
- j) TF CSS officers report logistical situation and analysis of CCIR, IR, and routine information to TF staff and external sources:
 - (1) TF subordinate commanders and leaders.
 - (2) Brigade S4.
 - (3) FSB staff.
 - (4) TF staff officers who need the information.
- k) TF CSS staff performs coordination with TF staff and TF units:
 - (1) To identify additional requests for support.
 - (a) Transportation assets.
 - (b) Medical augmentation.
 - (c) Maintenance support for vehicles and weapons systems and for recovery of damaged vehicles or return of repaired vehicles.
 - (2) To coordinate the transportation of supplies and cargo through TF units.
 - (3) To coordinate routine, emergency, and critical resupply operations (e.g. delivery times, types and quantities of supplies required.
 - (4) For receiving and processing replacements.
 - (5) To track evacuation of personnel and casualties.
 - (6) To process awards, decorations, promotions, and legal actions.
 - (7) For security and protection of CSS units operating forward.
 - (8) TF S4 coordinates with the TF S3 and TF units to deconflict terrain requirements and projected locations for:
 - (a) TF CSS units.
 - (b) Brigade and FSB CSS units.
 - (c) Division and higher CSS units.
- 1) TF CSS staff performs coordination with Brigade staff and supporting CSS headquarters:
 - (1) To process requests for support of TF.
 - (a) Additional transportation assets.
 - (b) Medical augmentation and support.

- (c) Support of resupply operations.
- (d) IDS/DS/IGS maintenance support for vehicles and weapons systems and for recovery of damaged vehicles or return of repaired vehicles.
- (2) To coordinate the transportation of TF supplies and cargo through adjacent units based on the locations of the BSA and other Brigade or Division supply points.
- (3) To coordinate routine, emergency, and critical resupply of the TF (e.g. delivery times, types and quantities of supplies required).
- (4) For receiving and processing TF replacements.
- (5) To track evacuation of TF personnel and casualties.
- (6) To process awards, decorations, promotions, and legal actions of TF personnel.
- m) CSS officers provide information to the TF S2 to support TF IPB.
- 12) Company/Team Commanders and other subordinate leaders (including Security and R&S forces) send reports to the TF Commander, CPs, and adjacent units (reporting according to unit SOP).
 - a) The TF Commander emphasizes cross-talking between subordinate commanders with supporting elements on the TF command net and O&I net.
 - (1) Coordinate information, such as locations, activities, plans for direct and indirect fires, schemes of maneuver.
 - (2) Coordinate mutual support.
 - b) Progress of mission preparation and compliance with TF time lines.
 - c) Submit Company/Team OPORD and graphics to the TF S3 for synchronization with the TF plan.
 - d) Fire support preparedness.
 - (1) Updates on positioning of observers (primary and back-up), FOs, FIST-V.
 - (2) Company/Team fire support plan refinement.
 - e) Development of supporting schemes of maneuver and direct fire plans.
 - f) Reports from Company/Team platoons and attached/OPCON elements on:
 - (1) Status of TLP and preparations.
 - (2) Platoon and other elements' OPORD, graphics, and fire plans.

- g) Changes to combat power status (Green-Amber-Red).
- h) Disposition and status of forces.
 - (1) Subordinate maneuver platoons.
 - (2) Attached combat support units.
 - (a) Engineer.
 - (b) ADA.
 - (c) Fire support.
 - 1. FSO.
 - <u>2.</u> FOs.
 - <u>3.</u> FIST-V.
 - <u>4.</u> COLTs.
 - (d) GSR and other radar systems.
- i) Actions taken to detect and destroy/repel enemy elements entering the TF sector.
- j) Results of internal rehearsals, including modifications to subordinate unit plans and schemes of maneuver.
- k) CSS status, task organization of CSS units, requests for additional support (e.g., classes of supply, transportation).
- l) Scout Platoon.
 - (1) Updates on equipment and personnel status.
 - (2) Status of preparedness to begin R&S operations.
 - (a) Troop leading procedures.
 - (b) Fire support planning.
 - (3) Coordination with forward units through which the Platoon will move to get into position.
 - (4) Routes to occupy R&S positions.
 - (5) Positions.
- m) Mortar Platoon.
 - (1) Updates on equipment, personnel, ammunition status.
 - (2) State of preparedness to support indirect fires plan.
- n) Information which supports the TF Commander's CCIR and IR.
- o) Local security operations.
 - (1) Patrols.
 - (2) LP/OPs.
 - (3) Reaction forces.

- p) Company/Team Commanders and subordinate unit leaders coordinate with the TF S3 and TF staff to deconflict terrain requirements and projected locations for units and systems operating in their areas.
- 13) The CSM advises the TF Commander.
 - a) Matters pertaining to the enlisted personnel in the TF.
 - b) Observations of units' preparations.
 - c) Observations of CSS system.
 - d) Other duties as assigned.
- b. TF CP's manage means of communicating information.
 - 1) The TF Commander appoints an "Information Manager" from the staff to:
 - a) Facilitate the flow of information and communication of information from staff members and subordinate units.
 - b) Outline and monitor the performance and responsibilities of the staff in processing mission information, preparation status, and the Commander's information requirements.
 - 2) The TF Commander or XO selects a "Battle Captain" to:
 - a) Manage the operations of the Main CP and the Operations Section.
 - (1) Coordinate and integrate staff activities.
 - (2) Initiate staff action as directed by the Commander, XO, and S3.
 - (3) Insure that all critical information concerning TF situation, ongoing actions, and future requirements is passed when shifts change.
 - b) Collect mission information from other staff members (internal and external) which impact on the maneuver plan.
 - c) Collect information on and initiate planning for future operations.
 - d) Identify critical information:
 - (1) Significant changes to friendly situation.
 - (2) Significant changes to enemy situation.
 - (3) CČIR.
 - 3) Staff "huddles" are conducted as directed by the TF XO to:
 - a) Allow each staff officer to disseminate information relevant to the entire staff.
 - b) Appraise information for completeness and, to determine information gaps which require additional staff work.

- c) Initiate staff planning as part of an accelerated decision process.
- CP's maintain communications (FM radio and multi-channel, wire, messenger) with subordinate units, adjacent units, supporting and higher headquarters.
- 5) TF CESO ensures TF communications systems and links (e.g. retrans) are operational and support the Commander, staff, and subordinate leaders.
 - a) Manages TF communications, including positioning of command and control elements.
 - b) Controls SOI issue and use.
 - c) Provides retrans capabilities to the TF.
 - d) Directs the Communications Section's efforts on inspecting and testing TF communications equipment and systems.
- 6) LNO's provide information to the TF Commander and staff and, to the headquarters they represent or to whom they represent the TF.
 - a) Responses to specific questions asked of LNO.
 - b) Unit locations, activities, capabilities, status, and intentions.
 - c) Coordination problems.
 - (1) Inability to reach/meet with specific people or staff positions.
 - (2) Receipt of information which invalidates or should change estimates and plans.
- 7) All TF CP's eavesdrop on higher and adjacent unit Command and O&I nets for sources of information.
- 8) Command Group and Tactical Command Post (TAC).
 - a) TF S-3 facilitates control and coordination for the Commander through communication with adjacent and supporting elements.
 - Passes processed information and keeps the Commander updated on new information through concise consolidated updates by eavesdropping on:
 - (1) Brigade command and O&I nets.
 - (2) TF A/L net.
 - (3) Adjacent unit command and O&I nets.
 - (4) Subordinate unit command nets.
 - c) Operates and monitors communications nets.
 - (1) TF Command.
 - (2) Brigade Command.
 - (3) Fire Support.

- (4) O&I.
- 9) Main Command Post.
 - a) TF Executive Officer, as the TF 2IC, directs the Main CP operations and controls CS actions the commander cannot.
 - b) Acts as NCS for command net.
 - (1) Communicates to subordinates the commander cannot reach.
 - (2) Disseminates critical new information quickly to the Commander, staff, and subordinate/supporting headquarters.
 - c) Establishes and maintains communications between the TF and bases, base clusters, or other units in support of RACO operations.
 - d) Air Defense Early Warning Net is maintained with Brigade and higher air defense headquarters, AD teams/weapons within the TF, and all subordinate units.
 - e) NBC section manages the NBCWRS for the TF through coordination and communication with external headquarters (Division, Brigade, and adjacent units).
 - f) Manages communications networks in support of counter-reconnaissance and R&S operations in order to maintain reporting linkages for critical sources of information.
 - g) Operates and monitors communications nets.
 - (1) TF Command.
 - (2) Brigade Command.
 - (3) Fire Support nets.
 - (4) Brigade O&I.
 - (5) TF O&I.
 - (6) TF A/L.
 - (7) AD early warning.
 - (8) Surveillance (Scout Platoon).
- 10) Rear Command Posts.
 - a) Manage Line of Communications (LOC) operations on TF and Brigade MSR's and ASR's.
 - b) Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP).
 - (1) The TF S4 manages information as the OIC of the CTCP.
 - (2) Manages the TF Admin/Log (A/L) net; maintains communications with subordinate and supporting units and headquarters.
 - (3) Monitors the tactical situation and maintains communications to ensure it is prepared to assume duties of the TF Main CP.

- (4) Operates on and monitors communications nets.
 - (a) TF Command.
 - (b) TF A/L.
 - (c) Brigade A/L.
 - (d) Prepared to switch to cover the same nets as the TF Main CP in the event the Main CP is incapacitate.
- c) Field Trains Command Post (FTCP).
 - (1) The TF HHC Commander manages information as the OIC of the CTCP.
 - (2) Maintains communications through physical liaison with Brigade CSS units, the Brigade Rear CP, and the FSB.
 - (3) Operates on and monitors communications nets.
 - (a) TF Command.
 - (b) Brigade A/L.
 - (c) TF A/L.
- c. TF CP's maintain information and force status.
 - 1) Common to all CP's and staff.
 - a) Provide briefings to the Commander on the status of mission preparedness.
 - b) Information is communicated within the staff.
 - (1) To ensure each staff representative has critical information needed to:
 - (a) Coordinate TF actions and plans.
 - (b) Monitor the situation.
 - (c) Direct TF actions.
 - (2) All staff officers remain alert for and insure that critical information they receive is passed to other staff officers who require the information as soon as it is received.
 - c) Information is communicated between staff officers during shift changes on the situation:
 - (1) Enemy activities.
 - (2) Status of subordinate units.
 - (3) On-going actions which must be monitored and tracked.
 - (4) Time lines and suspenses which must be met.
 - (5) Planning for future missions.
 - 2) Command Group/TAC maintains/updates:
 - a) Information which supports the Commander's CCIR.

- b) Current and projected combat power status of subordinate units (e.g. Green-Amber-Red).
- c) Current operations and intelligence map.
 - (1) Operations overlay (TF, higher, and adjacent units).
 - (2) Intelligence overlay.
 - (3) Situation template overlay.
 - (4) Event template overlay.
 - (5) Modified combined obstacle overlay.
 - (6) Fire support overlay.
- d) DST.
- e) Synchronization matrix.
- f) Fire Support Execution Matrix (FSEM).
- 3) Main CP maintains/updates:
 - a) Current operations and intelligence map.
 - (1) Operations overlay (TF, higher and adjacent units).
 - (2) Intelligence overlay.
 - (3) Situation template overlay.
 - (4) Event template.
 - (5) Modified combined obstacle overlay.
 - (6) NBC overlay.
 - (7) CSS overlay.
 - b) CSS overlays and information per TF SOP.
 - c) Intelligence information from Brigade and higher headquarters.
 - d) Dispositions of collection assets.
 - e) Information on external units conducting R&S and security operations to prevent fratricide.
 - f) Dispositions and status of patrols and other R&S and security forces.
 - g) Status of preparation activities to ensure compliance with stated mission time lines.
 - h) Current and projected combat power status of subordinate units (e.g. Green-Amber-Red).
 - i) Status on task organization (into the TF, within the TF, and detachments out of the TF).
 - (1) R&S and Security forces.
 - (2) Company/Teams.
 - (3) Fire support systems.
 - (a) FISTs, FIST-Vs, FOs.

- (b) COLTs and aerial observers.
- (c) Mortars.
- (4) Engineer assets.
 - (a) Engineer Platoons and Squads.
 - (b) Engineer systems.
 - (c) Engineer material (CL IV, V).
- (5) GSR and other radar systems.
- (6) ADA assets.
 - (a) Stinger Teams.
 - (b) Vulcan/Bradley AD systems.
 - (c) Avenger systems.
 - (d) Early warning radars.
- j) Obstacle and survivability position construction and progress as compared to time lines.
- k) Utilization of engineer assets and materials as compared to time lines.
- 1) DST.
- m) Plans map (with overlays for future operations).
- n) Synchronization matrix.
- o) Journals/logs:
 - 1) Operations.
 - 2) Intelligence.
- 4) CTCP maintains/updates:
 - a) Current operations and intelligence map.
 - (1) Operations overlay (TF, higher and adjacent units).
 - (2) Rear operations, security, and threat overlay.
 - (3) Intelligence overlay.
 - (4) Situation template overlay.
 - (5) Event template overlay.
 - (6) Modified combined obstacle overlay.
 - (7) Fire support overlay.
 - b) DST.
 - c) FSEM.
 - d) CSS situation map and overlays.
 - (1) MSR and ASR.
 - (2) CSS locations, current and projected.
 - (3) Decon sites.

- e) Synchronization matrix.
- f) CSS staff journal.
- g) Current and projected personnel and equipment status.
 - (1) Personnel strength.
 - (2) Operational equipment strength.
 - (3) Status of supplies.
 - (4) Casualties.
 - (5) Replacement personnel status/location.
 - (6) Damaged and NMC vehicles and equipment.
 - (a) Recovery status.
 - (b) Repair status.
 - (c) Replacement status.
- h) Status on location and evacuation of EPW and their equipment.
- i) Status on location and evacuation of displaced persons.
- Assess Situation; the TF Commander Visualizes the Battlefield (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, task 7-1-3001, 3002, 3005, 3008, 3009, 3010, 3011, 3012, 3013, 3014, 3016, 3017, 3018, 3019, 3020, 3024, 3025, 3027, 3901, 3912, 3913, 3914; ARTEP 63-085-MTP, task 12-1-C303R; FM 34-130, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1 - 6, 8, Annex A; FM 101-5, Chap 3, Appendices F, J)
 - a. Review current situation; the TF Commander visualizes the current situation in regard to time, space, and purpose, and determines if there are any significant changes from his last visualization or estimate of the situation.
 - 1) Sources of information:
 - a) Own observations.
 - b) Reports and situation updates from the staff and subordinate leaders.
 - (1) CCIR.
 - (2) Other information.
 - c) Analyses performed by the staff on the situation.
 - d) Other reports (e.g. from TF LNOs).
 - 2) Assessment criteria; the TF Commander uses his own criteria to determine significant changes. A METT-T based assessment guide follows:
 - a) Mission:
 - (1) Whether there are changes to:
 - (a) The Brigade and Division Commanders' Intents.
 - (b) The Brigade concept of the operation.
 - (c) The TF mission.

- (2) Status of preparation actions in terms of progress and completion to determine if required TF preparation activities will be completed so as to achieve the needed end state for the TF before the battle.
 - (a) Planning and, refinement of plans.
 - (b) Coordination.
 - (c) TF elements' preparations.
- b) Enemy:
 - (1) Estimates:
 - (a) Whether the estimates of enemy strength, capabilities, and projected COA are still valid.
 - (b) Whether the TF Commander's visualization of EEFI is valid.
 - (2) Collection: whether collection plan is resulting in collecting and acquiring necessary information.
 - (a) PIR and IR:
 - 1. Whether they are being filled.
 - 2. Whether they are adequate to focus requirements for information on the enemy.
 - (b) Whether positioning and activity of TF collection assets and whether external sources for acquiring information are meeting collection plan requirements.
 - L. Scout platoon.
 - 2. TF security elements and subordinate units tasked to perform collection requirements.
 - 3. FISTs, FOs, and COLTs.
 - 4. Army aviation elements.
 - 5. FAC, CAS aircraft.
 - 6. UAVs, GSRs.
 - 7. Brigade staff and assets.
 - 8. Adjacent and forward units.
 - (3) The TF Commander assesses the initial IPB and threat analysis documents to determine if they are still valid.
 - (a) Situation Template.
 - (b) Event Template.
 - (c) Order of Battle.
 - (d) Obstacles and fortification locations.
 - (e) Intelligence estimate.
 - (f) Intelligence graphics.
- c) Troops:
 - (1) Whether the TF Commander's visualization of FFIR is valid.

- (2) Required capability to accomplish the TF mission and achieve the visualized end state are compared to present and projected capabilities.
 - (a) Systems (vehicles, weapons) which are ready for battle.
 - (b) Combat systems which became available since initial force ratio analysis.
 - (c) Projections from BMO of combat systems which will be available prior to mission execution and those which will not be available.
 - (d) Adequacy of TF level OPLAN/OPORD synchronization, coordination, integration, and refinements based on rehearsals, backbriefs, reports from the TF S3, and personal inspections.
- (3) Locations, activities and intentions of adjacent units (left, right, front, rear, and higher) are appraised to determine impact on TF preparations for battle.
 - (a) TF planning and actions which could cause adjacent units to change or alter their plans.
 - (b) Adjacent units plans and actions which require change or alteration of the TF plan.
- (4) Subordinate unit plans and preparation activities:
 - (a) Platoon leaders' and company commanders' understanding of TF commander's intent, and their plans to achieve the intent.
 - (b) Physical preparations of companies and platoons to accomplish their missions.
 - 1. Troop leading procedures.
 - 2. Pre-combat inspections.
 - (c) Adequacy of Company/Team and other TF elements' synchronization, integration, and coordination of maneuver, direct fire, and indirect fires, to include:
 - 1. Rehearsals.
 - 2. Backbriefs.
 - 3. Reconnaissance.
 - (d) Construction of obstacles, fighting positions, and protective positions in accordance with time lines.
- d) Terrain:
 - (1) Whether the initial estimate of the terrain and the appraisal of the impact of terrain on the concept of the operation are still valid.

- (a) Terrain factors (OCOKA).
 - <u>1.</u> Observation and fields of fire.
 - <u>2.</u> Cover and concealment.
 - <u>3.</u> Obstacles.
 - <u>4.</u> Key terrain.
 - 5. Avenues of approach.
- (b) Obstacles and progress of TF efforts to reinforce the terrain.
- (2) Weather and forecasted weather factors are still valid as factored in the development of the plan and preparation time lines.
 - (a) Visibility (including fog and cloud cover) and light data.
 - (b) Effects of weather.
 - 1. Wind speed and directions.
 - 2. Precipitation data.
 - <u>3.</u> Temperature and humidity.
 - <u>4.</u> Impact on trafficability.
 - (c) Information which changes the initial assessment of weather factors.
- e) Time:
 - (1) Whether key mission preparation events and activities are being accomplished in accordance with planned time lines.
 - (2) Based on what has been accomplished and what has yet be done, is sufficient time available to complete all tasks.
- 3) The TF Commander refines his "running" estimate of the situation based on his assessment.
- 4) The TF Commander provides guidance and directives to the staff and subordinate leaders to provide missing information required to fill gaps in his ability to assess the TF's state of preparation.
- b. Project whether additional requirements are needed to achieve the mission. The TF Commander compares his current "running" estimate of the situation with his current visualization of needed end states for the current mission and with his concept for achieving those end states. He decides whether there are shortfalls in his plan or the preparations. And, he reacts to FRAGOs or OPORDs from Brigade which direct new missions in regard to time, space, and purpose.
 - 1) Based on change to his estimate of the current situation and/or new order, the TF Commander decides whether his visualization of the end state necessary for the TF will still accomplish the TF mission.
 - 2) The Commander assesses whether there is need for additional requirements to achieve the required end state for the current mission. A METT-T based assessment guide follows:

- a) Mission:
 - (1) The Brigade and Division Commanders' Intents (as contained in the Brigade order) are continuously appraised as the situation changes in terms of friendly capabilities and what is understood about the enemy's capabilities, to determine if directed end states can still be achieved as planned.
 - (2) His (TF Commander's) Intent and concept of the operation are reviewed to determine whether they are still sufficient for the mission based on any change(s) to the situation.
 - (3) Branches, sequels, and alternative COAs for the current mission are reviewed to determine need for modification based on available information.
 - (4) The TF can achieve the TF Commander's intent without exceeding the plan's risk assessment criteria.

b) Enemy:

- (1) Changes to the enemy situation based on analysis of PIR, IR, and other intelligence information are assessed to determine if there is need to change the concept or details of the operation.
 - (a) Enemy's mission and intent are no longer the same as initially predicted.
 - (b) Confirmed enemy dispositions are not the same as initially templated.
 - (c) SIT TEMP and Event Templates, updated to reflect new information, are assessed to determine the plan's potential to achieve the Commander's intent.
 - (d) The TF Commander decides whether present PIR and IR still meet his requirements for information he needs for decision making. If they do not, he identifies new PIR and IR.
 - (e) The TF Commander decides whether there is need to change designation of NAIs, TAIs, and HPTs.
- (2) Present positioning of R&S forces and other collection assets are compared to requirements to satisfy new PIR/IR and to identify or confirm changes to the SIT TEMP, Event Template, NAIs, TAIs, and HPTs.
 - (a) Scout platoon.
 - (b) TF and other reconnaissance elements tasked to perform collection requirements.
 - (c) Army aviation elements.

- (d) FAC, CAS aircraft.
- (e) FISTs, FOs, and COLTs.
- (f) UAVs, GSRs.
- (g) Brigade and Division assets.
- (h) Adjacent and forward units reconnaissance to determine gaps or to adjust units for mutual support.
- (3) The TF Commander assesses impact of changes to IPB to determine if there are additional information requirements.
- c) Troops:
 - (1) Changes in subordinate units' capabilities are assessed for sufficiency to perform required tasks.
 - (a) Combat power, current and projected, required to achieve new or previously unidentified tasks.
 - (b) Equipment and personnel status.
 - (c) Ability to move and maneuver based on changes to terrain factors.
 - (d) Rehearsal results that change time factors.
 - (e) Capability to provide mutual support as required to meet new conditions or missions.
 - (f) Changes to force ratios of friendly force capabilities to updated enemy force capabilities are compared to assess TFs ability to achieve desired end state.
 - (2) An analysis is made to determine if it is necessary to change the positioning of TF security elements and subordinate unit local force protection activities in comparison to enemy activity.
 - (a) To counter threats not previously identified during the initial IPB.
 - (b) To meet requirements generated by changes to requirements for withdrawal, battle handover, reconstitution, or preparation for follow-on missions.
 - (c) To replace losses in order to continue force protection actions.
 - (3) An analysis is made to determine whether the planned role and employment of fire support assets remain adequate to meet all new requirements.

- (a) Mortar platoon movement, dispositions, type of munitions, and observer placement.
- (b) Artillery positions, fires, type of munitions, and observer placement.
- (c) CAS availability as outlined in ATO updates.
- (4) Impact of changes to adjacent units' (left, right, front, rear, and higher) dispositions, activities, missions, and concepts of operations is assessed for new requirements.
 - (a) Impact of TF plan on other units' plans.
 - (b) Impact of other units' plans on TF plans.
- (5) Adequacy of supplies and ammunition supply to meet new requirements is appraised.
 - (a) Stockpiles.
 - (b) CL III, IV, and V basic loads for TF units.
 - L. Combat.
 - 2. Combat Support.
 - 3. Combat Service Support.
 - (c) All other classes of supplies.
- (6) The TF Commander reviews the FFIR to decide whether they still meet his requirements for information he needs for decision making to meet new conditions or missions. If it does not, he identifies new FFIR.
- d) Terrain:
 - (1) Impact of terrain factors on latest estimate of the situation and new requirements to accomplish the mission.
 - (a) Effects of terrain.
 - (b) Effects of obstacles.
 - (2) Impact of current weather factors on latest estimate of the situation and new requirements.
 - (a) Visible light.
 - (b) Weather.
 - (c) Use of obscurants.
- e) Time:
 - (1) Impact of difference between preparation achieved as compared to anticipated preparation requirements caused by subordinate units' inability to accomplish directed preparation tasks.

- (2) Changes to mission time lines necessitated by enemy activities and/or decisions to change TF and/or subordinate elements' missions.
- 3) The Commander assesses the impact of new FRAGOs or OPORDs from Brigade which direct new missions.
 - a) Time required to plan and prepare for new mission based on current mission time lines.
 - b) Ability of TF to respond to the new situation based on level of mission preparedness.
 - (1) Maneuver forces available to respond without impacting TF ability to perform the current mission.
 - (2) Availability of CS, CSS and supplies to support the new situation without impacting on support necessary for the current mission.
 - c) Capability of the staff to dedicate time and effort to plan and coordinate new missions; impact of diverting key staff members from monitoring preparations for the current mission to planning for a new mission.
- c. Decide on need for action or change.
 - 1) The Commander analyzes information relative to the plan and TF situation, and makes a decision; choices:
 - a) Plan can be conducted without any adjustments or modifications; TF Commander allows mission preparation to continue.
 - b) Initial plan still remains valid, however minor modifications are necessary which can be initiated through the issuance of FRAGOs. TF Commander issues, or directs to be issued, FRAGOs to modify the plan.
 - c) The Commander determines that the plan is no longer valid and can not be corrected by FRAGOs to achieve the required end state. The Commander determines that he must develop a new plan.
 - d) The TF staff assists the TF Commander in his analysis of the plan by providing information.
 - (1) Reviews "running estimates" and provides information based on queries.
 - (2) Provides input on previous COAs which could be used as the new plan without detailed COA development.
 - 2) The Commander decides to initiate a decision making process to change the plan.

- a) The TF Commander has two options when he identifies the need to develop a new plan.
 - (1) Consider COAs previously developed which can be modified and developed as the new plan.
 - (2) Develops an entirely new plan.
- b) The TF Commander, when determining the need to change the initial plan, considers:
 - (1) Whether sufficient time is available to develop, coordinate, and implement the new plan.
 - (2) The impact of the new plan and task organization changes on subordinate units ability to complete new preparation requirements.
 - (3) The impact of planning requirements on the TF staff; detracting from monitoring and directing current TF activities.
- 3) The Commander determines the decision making process to use based on complexity, ambiguity of situation, and time available. The Commander decides whether to use the Deliberate Decision Making Process (DDMP), Combat Decision Making Process (CDMP), or the Quick Decision Making Process (QDMP).²
 - a) Deliberate Decision Making Process (DDMP).
 - (1) Used before current combat operations begin; or if sufficient time (and staff) are available and their involvement will not impact on monitoring and directing the current mission.
 - (2) The TF Commander has the time and staff to conduct a methodical estimate of the situation and explore the full range of possible enemy and friendly COA's.
 - b) Combat Decision Making Process (CDMP).
 - (1) Used during the preparation and execution phases of combat operations.
 - (2) The TF Commander has limited time and, he has enough time to use the help of the staff available to modify COAs developed during the DDMP or to support the development of a new plan.
 - c) Quick Decision Making Process (QDMP).
 - (1) Used during execution phase of combat operations.
 - (2) The TF Commander has little time and develops the plan without the assistance of his staff, or with limited staff assistance.
 - d) The process selected by the TF Commander can be based on the decision making processes described in doctrine or a combination of

those processes which can be performed in the time available and with or without staff assistance.

d. Critical considerations for integration of the BOS in visualizing the battlefield (extracts from other CCF).

Intelligence

- 1) Information is analyzed to confirm or contradict the IPB.
- 2) Reconnaissance elements are positioned and repositioned to maintain contact with the enemy.

Maneuver

- 3) The Commander assesses planned movement and repositioning criteria to ensure the mission can be achieved as visualized.
 - a) Routes are reconnoitered, marked, and prepared for use.
 - b) Movement and maneuver can be conducted as envisioned; the TF is not exposed to enemy fire during disengagement and displacement.
 - c) Movement and repositioning times allow the TF to fight as visualized.
 - d) Engagement and disengagement criteria support the concept of the operation.
 - e) Distances and terrain factors which impact on displacement and repositioning are compensated for.
- 4) In-depth and on-order positions (e.g. primary, alternate, supplementary, support-by-fire and overwatch positions) are prepared and meet the plan requirements and Commander's intent.
- 5) Scheme of maneuver (including contingencies, branches, and sequels) is reviewed to determine its potential to achieve the Commander's intent and the visualized end state.
- 6) The Commander assesses changes to direct and indirect fires based on new enemy and terrain information.
 - a) Fire plans and sector sketches are developed and modified to ensure fires can be massed as visualized by the Commander.
 - b) Direct and indirect fire coordination measures are disseminated and confirmed by subordinate commanders to achieve the Commander's Intent.
 - (1) Trigger lines.
 - (2) Events which initiate movement to subsequent positions or the initiation of fires.
 - c) Boundaries, contact points, and other control measures:

- (1) Promote mutual support and prevent gaps between units.
- (2) Support planned withdrawal and repositioning.
- d) Direct and indirect fire plans are synchronized and integrated with all other combat multipliers, including physical tie-in between the TF and units to flanks.
- 7) The Commander assesses employment criteria and events for the use of Reserves to achieve the impact visualized.
 - a) Triggers and events which result in units breaking contact to gain a mobility advantage are reviewed.
 - b) Visualizes the plan to assess the TFs ability to maintain the initiative based on analysis of updated information.
- 8) The Commander assesses plans for NBC units and systems positioning to ensure capability to perform reconnaissance and decontamination operations as visualized.
- 9) Reconnaissance and results of TF rehearsals and back-briefs confirm initial decision on where the TF will accept decisive engagement.
 - a) The line which the enemy will not be allowed to cross or penetrate.
 - b) The place where the enemy's destruction is essential for mission success.
 - c) Attack is directed against the enemy's most vulnerable areas.
 - d) Attack is synchronized with all other combat multipliers.
- 10) Subordinate commanders have demonstrated knowledge of the positions (e.g. primary, alternate, subsequent, attack, support-by-fire), the criterion to occupy positions, breach actions, their objectives, and their tasks and actions once contact is made with the enemy during:
 - a) The Commander's inspections and visits.
 - b) Back briefs delivered by subordinate leaders to the Commander.
 - c) Rehearsals.

Fire Support

- 11) The Commander visualizes the uses and opportunity for massing and shifting fires and, changing fire support priorities.
 - a) Changes or additions to priorities (units, targets).
 - b) Timing of shifts of priority.
 - c) Back-up plans to engage targets with alternate systems.

- d) Integration of additional fire support assets based on earlier requests to Brigade.
- e) Indirect fires support for the transition from mission preparation to mission execution based on updated information (e.g. intelligence, availability of fire support systems, changed to the scheme of maneuver).
- f) Changes to fire support systems for R&S and counter-reconnaissance forces.
 - (1) Positions of firing and target acquisition assets and readiness to provide planned fires.
 - (2) Mortar platoon, when tasked to support specific units, conducts coordination and is prepared to provide required support.
- 12) The TF Commander assesses the fire support plan to ensure indirect fires (artillery, mortars, CAS) will achieve desired results (e.g. suppression, neutralization, or destruction) and intent.
- 13) Changes are directed to methods of target acquisition and updates on dispositions and locations of FIST-Vs, COLTs, FOs, TACP, back-up observers, and subordinate units.
- 14) Change or addition to fire support control measures (RFLs, NFAs, ACAs, boundaries) are specified to support changes to the concept of the operation.
- 15) The Commander, with assistance from the FSO and S3, assesses Target Lists, Fire Support Execution Matrix (FSEM), and other fire support documents.
 - a) Subordinate units, higher headquarters, and supporting fire support agencies have updated copies and can provide the required support.
 - b) Target lists are continually updated by the FSO and subordinate fire supporters based on:
 - (1) Subordinate unit mission analysis.
 - (2) Subordinate unit mission preparation.
 - (3) Completion and precise siting of obstacles.
 - (4) Updated enemy information.
 - (5) Are synchronized with modifications to the TF scheme of maneuver.
 - c) Changes to supporting DS Artillery Battalion plans and Brigade fire support plans are appraised for impact on the TF.
- 16) Changes to fire support plans are made based on registration of artillery and mortar fires.
 - a) Time of flight.
 - b) Confirmation of indirect fires trigger lines.

c) Synchronization of indirect fires with the direct fire plan.

Air Defense

- 17) Changes to ADA coverage are assessed to ensure support of adjusted priorities, concept of the operation, and Commanders intent.
- 18) Changes to availability of AD systems and modifications to the weapons control status are made based on changes to the enemy air threat.
- 19) Options for TF passive air defense measures are considered based on changes or updated information.

Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

- 20) Adjustments needed to complete required engineer tasks and missions are identified.
 - a) Priorities.
 - b) Time which assets are available to units.
 - c) Engineer task organization.
- 21) Changes to TF mobility plan.
 - a) The Commander assesses impact of friendly obstacles and engineer efforts required to clear lanes through them for TF maneuver.
 - b) The Commander assesses the TFs ability to conduct obstacle breaching as visualized in the plan.
 - (1) Support Force can apply effective suppressive fires as planned, and consideration of necessary modifications based on updated information.
 - (2) Changes to the plan on employment of Assault Force(s) influenced by updated information.
 - (3) Changes to the plan on employment of the Breach Force influenced by updated information.
 - c) The Commander assesses impact of new information which might require changes to the point of penetration or breach.
 - d) The Commander, with the Engineer and FSO, assesses adjustment to the fire support plan to support breaching operations.
 - e) The Commander assesses information gained from scout and engineer reconnaissance of terrain and enemy obstacles to determine impact on the mobility plan and engineer task organization.

- 22) Changes to TF countermobility plan.
 - a) The Commander appraises TF obstacle effort to ensure that obstacles will meet his intent.
 - (1) Obstacles are:
 - (a) Sited by the maneuver unit commander and the engineer responsible for obstacle emplacement.
 - (b) Prepared to standard.
 - (c) Security and manpower support from maneuver units are provided during construction.
 - (d) Maneuver commander accepts final responsibility.
 - (e) Marked and recorded.
 - (2) Observers are positioned to overwatch TF obstacles and are prepared to provide direct and indirect fires.
 - (3) Obstacle placement supports the Commander's visualization of the battle.
 - (a) In depth throughout the TF sector to slow and canalize the enemy and, shape the battlefield.
 - (b) Close-in protective obstacles are emplaced to break enemy momentum.
 - (c) Supports the concept of the operation by facilitating break in contact, disengagement, and repositioning.
 - (d) Obstacle gap and lanes closure signals and triggers support the concept of the operation.
 - (4) The Commander reviews FASCAM employment plans with the TF FSO and Engineer to determine modifications based on new information.
 - b) The Commander assesses status and type of obstacles/barriers to determine the need for modifications to the plan.
- 23) Changes to the TF survivability plan.
 - a) The Commander assesses the status of subordinate unit fighting position preparation to determine whether the force will be ready or if there is a need for changes to the plan.
 - (1) Positions are or are not constructed to standard.
 - (2) Construction times are longer or shorter than initially planned.
 - (3) Construction material is not available in required quantities.
 - (4) Engineer assets are or are not able to construct positions as planned.

- b) Planned location of position changes resulting from the physical siting by maneuver leaders and engineers.
- 24) Changes to TF OPSEC; security forces and subordinate unit local force protection operations:
 - a) The TF is protected as it prepares for the mission.
 - b) The enemy is denied information that provides indications of the Commander's concept of the operation (e.g., TF disposition and activities).

Combat Service Support

- 25) The Commander assesses transportation operations to ensure compliance with his guidance and intent.
 - a) Required supplies, equipment, and personnel are being delivered to subordinate units on designated and approved MSR's and ASR's; assets are used to back-haul.
 - b) Availability and serviceability of assets are reviewed to ensure mission related material is being transported in accordance with requirements. If not, the Commander:
 - (1) Determines need to request additional assets to supplement the TF.
 - (2) Assesses need to change the planned employment of TF assets.
 - c) Changes to MSR and ASR conditions by weather or enemy action are assessed.
- 26) The Commander assesses supply operations to ensure compliance with his guidance and intent.
 - a) Routine resupply activities are reviewed to determine whether plan can be supported.
 - b) Emergency resupply activities are reviewed to determine adequacy of uploaded, pre-configured Class III and Class V push packages.
 - c) Priorities for resupply are reviewed to determine changes based on new conditions or information.
- 27) The Commander assesses personnel operations to ensure compliance with his guidance and intent.
 - a) Morale, welfare and recreation support is reviewed to determine that it is meeting requirements.
 - b) Replacement operations are reviewed to ensure new personnel are received and assigned in accordance with the Commander's guidance.
 - (1) Personnel are received and processed rapidly.

- (2) Personnel are inspected, issued equipment, and trained (if time is available) to ensure they are prepared for combat.
- (3) Personnel are assigned in accordance with TF Commander's guidance.
- (4) Personnel linked-up with units and are oriented on the TF and unit situation.
- c) Subordinate unit personnel status is reviewed to assess the ability to perform assigned tasks and mission.
 - (1) Unit strength matches TO&E requirements or provides sufficient strength to accomplish assigned missions and tasks.
 - (2) Critical MOS and skills shortages are reviewed to determine if units can accomplish assigned missions and tasks.
- 28) The Commander assesses TF maintenance operations to ensure compliance with his guidance and intent.
 - a) Priorities for repair are performed to bring units to Fully Mission Capable (FMC) status in accordance with the Commanders guidance.
 - b) The Commander assesses maintenance, cannibalization and controlled substitution/exchange guidance; changes guidance to meet updated maintenance status.
 - c) The Commander reviews PMCS and periodic services to ensure subordinate units sustain combat power.
 - d) The Commander reviews maintenance support to assigned, attached, DS and OPCON units to ensure support is provided in compliance with his guidance.
- 29) The Commander assesses TF medical operations to ensure compliance with his guidance and intent.
 - a) Reviews activities performed by subordinate leaders to prevent, reduce, and combat battlefield stress to ensure personnel strength is available for the mission.
 - b) Changes to the employment of TF Aid station(s) and medical evacuation plans are made based on updated information.
 - (1) Aid station(s) are prepared to receive and evacuate casualties.
 - (2) Medical personnel, supplies, and equipment are available and positioned to support the concept of the operation.
 - (3) Evacuation plan and casualty tracking system is coordinated between the Medical Platoon, the S1, and maneuver units.

Command and Control

- 30) The Commander assesses priorities of work and mission time lines; determines need for modifications to TF preparation guidance.
- 31) Changes are directed to the positioning of the TF Commander, Command Group and CP's to provide effective and rapid guidance during preparation, transition to mission execution, and for future operations.
- 32) Changes to the mechanisms and aids of command and control (e.g. communications, computers, and other technology-based information systems) are directed based on updated information.
- 33) Command and control measures to coordinate and synchronize TF combat power during the mission are maintained and allow the TF Commander, staff, and subordinate leaders with an effective means of exchanging information and instructions.
- 3. Determine Actions; the TF Commander Directs Changes to the Operation or Plan (TRADOC Pam 11-9, Section IV; ARTEP 71-2-MTP, task 7-1-3901/1, 3901/2, 3901/3, 3901/4, 3901/6, 3901/7, 3901/8, 3902/2, 3904/12; "Battle Command" (Draft), BCBL-Ft. Leavenworth publication, page 12; FM 71-123, Chap 1, 2; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 101-5, Chap 2, 4)
 - a. The TF Commander analyzes information and determines that the plan is still valid (see task 2c1).
 - b. The TF Commander determines that the plan is no longer valid, and cannot be corrected by issuing FRAGO's to modify the initial plan (see task 2c2).
 - c. TF Commander and staff conduct the Deliberate Decision Making Process (DDMP). (See CCF 18 for detailed explanation of the DDMP subtasks.)³
 - 1) Receive order from higher headquarters.
 - 2) Conduct mission analysis.
 - 3) Issue the warning order.
 - 4) Commander issues guidance.
 - 5) Update staff estimates.
 - 6) Staff develops a course of action.
 - 7) Staff/Commander analyze course of action.
 - 8) Staff compares courses of action.
 - 9) Commander announces decision.
 - 10) Staff prepares OPORD/FRAGO.
 - 11) Issue the OPORD/FRAGO.
 - 12) Refine the plan.
 - d. TF Commander conducts the Combat Decision Making Process (CDMP), with staff assistance.⁴
 - 1) Products developed during the DDMP for the current mission are used as reference points from which modifications are made to predetermined branches and sequels.
 - a) Weather analysis.

- b) Terrain analysis.
- c) Enemy Order of Battle and updated IPB products.
- d) Current "running" staff estimates.
 - (1) TF capabilities.
 - (2) Constraints.
- e) PIR, EEFI, and FFIR the Commander needs to visualize the current situation and required end states.
- 2) The TF Commander and staff simultaneously monitor, plan, and direct all aspects of TF operations (e.g., execution of the counterreconnaissance battle, preparations for the current mission, changes to the current plan, and the next mission being formulated).
- 3) The TF Commander and staff maintain the pace of TF preparations so as to be ready NLT the designated time, make changes in a timely manner, and, if appropriate, plan for a future mission.
- 4) The Commander uses the Concept, Planning and/or preparation, Execution, and Assessment (CPEA) methodology while performing the CDMP.⁵
 - a) The TF Commander assesses requirements to achieve the needed end state. The TF Commander's assessment is developed while he is assessing the situation and visualizing the battlefield (Task 2).
 - (1) Typically, one enemy and friendly COA are assessed due to time-constrained environment, which limits and streamlines his decision-making process.
 - (2) Assessment goal is to anticipate the outcome of the current fight in order to begin considering future requirements and actions.
 - (3) Components of the TF Commander's assessment, based on his assessing of the situation and visualization of the battlefield, are:
 - (a) Visualization of current situation compared to required battle end states of friendly and enemy forces.
 - (b) Recognition of similarities and/or differences between initial plan and requirements.
 - (c) Assessment of friendly force posture, enemy probable actions and/or postures, and battlespace.
- 5) TF staff assists the Commander in developing the new concept.
 - a) Utilizes products and analyses developed during the initial mission DDMP to define branches and sequels for consideration.
 - b) Provides recommendations to modify existing branches and sequels to meet new requirements.
 - c) Provides recommendations on developing new branches and sequels based on new requirements.

- 6) The TF Commander develops the new concept by considering:
 - a) The current situation and information.
 - b) Whether the TF has the means to execute the new mission.
 - c) Brigade and Division Commander's intent and desired end state.
 - d) The desired end state for the TF as compared to that of the enemy.
 - e) The Commander may request information from the staff to support his COA development.
 - (1) BOS specific information from selected staff members.
 - (2) Information available in products developed during the initial mission DDMP.
 - f) METT-T factors:
 - (1) Mission: Identifies specified and implied tasks which his TF must accomplish.
 - (2) Enemy: The TF Commander identifies:
 - (a) Single or limited number of enemy COA which the TF must defeat.
 - (b) Enemy strength, location, disposition, activity, equipment, and capabilities.
 - (c) Terrain and weather: The TF Commander identifies relevant or specific aspects of OCOKA, vegetation, soil type, hydrology, climatic conditions, and visibility.
 - (d) Troops: The TF Commander analyzes the TF's and Company/Teams' combat power in terms of capability relative to what he believes necessary to accomplish the mission.
 - 1. Capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of subordinate commanders and units.
 - 2. Weapon systems and equipment.
 - 3. Disposition.
 - 4. Supplies.
 - e) Time: The TF Commander determines the time available for planning, preparing, and executing the operation for both enemy and friendly forces.
- 7) The Commander creates a new concept/tentative plan; he describes:
 - a) His intent.
 - b) A single COA.
 - c) A limited number or a single enemy COA(s) to be considered.
 - d) CCIR information requirements.

- e) Limitations.
- f) Risks.
- 8) TF Commander describes his COA to his staff.
 - a) Commander's COA concepts explicitly expresses:
 - (1) His intent and desired end state.
 - (2) Concept of operations.
 - (a) Major components of maneuver.
 - (b) Integrate combat multipliers.
 - (c) Critical points and center of gravity.
 - (3) Enemy COA(s) to consider.
 - (4) CCIR.
 - (5) Limitations.
 - (6) Risk.
 - b) The Commander provides the concept and guidance to the staff for detailed COA development and mission analysis.
 - c) If time is available, TF staff conducts mission analysis and:
 - (1) Develops details on COA provided by the Commander.
 - (2) Develops branches and sequels to the selected COA which adhere to the Commander's guidance.
 - d) The Commander issues, or directs to be issued, a WARNO.
 - (1) May direct task organization changes.
 - (2) Initiates reconnaissance.
 - (3) Alerts subordinate units of new plan.
 - (4) Initiates subordinate units to perform troop leading procedures.
- 9) The Commander performs a suitability-feasibility-acceptability analysis of the new plan. The Commander can perform the analysis by himself, or with staff assistance.
 - a) Suitability aspect considers:
 - (1) Does new concept accomplish the TF mission?
 - (2) Does new concept meet Brigade and Commander's intent?
 - (3) Does the plan meet the TF Commander's intent and desired end state?
 - b) Feasibility aspect considers:
 - (1) Time: is there time to execute the plan(s) as designed?
 - (a) Duration of events.
 - (b) Time and distance factors for maneuver and fires.

- (2) Space: is there sufficient ground and air space to accomplish the plan(s) as designed?
 - (a) Do roads and terrain support the plan?
 - (b) Depth of action.
 - (c) Adequate ground and air space.
- (3) Means: does the TF have the means to execute the plan(s) as designed?
 - (a) TF combat power versus the enemy (force ratios).
 - (b) Does the TF have the special equipment and personnel to accomplish the mission (e.g., bridging equipment, mine clearing, Army Aviation, CAS, etc.)?
 - (c) Impact on on-going preparation activities.
 - (d) Impact on subordinate units and combat multipliers.
 - (e) Requirements to alter task organization.
- c) Acceptability aspect considers, whether concept:
 - (1) Achieves the desired end state.
 - (2) Can be conducted within acceptable costs/risks.
- d) Mission risk assessment to ensure conditions most likely to cause mission failure and accidents (including fratricide) have been considered.
 - (1) TF units have been tasked within their capabilities.
 - (2) Procedural and positive risk-reduction control measures have been implemented.⁶
- 10) The Commander approves the new plan.
 - a) Issues, or directs to be issued, a new order.
 - b) Provides guidance to the staff to prepare supporting documents:
 - (1) Graphics.
 - (2) DST.
 - (3) Synchronization Matrix.
 - (4) FSEM.
 - c) TF Staff coordinates internally and with higher, adjacent, and supporting elements to synchronize the new plan.
- 11) The Commander reviews his initial CCIR to determine:
 - a) If the initial CCIR are still valid to provide the TF Commander with the information he requires to continue to assess the situation.

- b) If new CCIR are required to provide the TF Commander with the information he requires to make decisions about the plan.
- e. TF Commander conducts the Quick Decision Making Process (QDMP), with staff assistance. (See CCF 20 for detailed explanation of this modified process).⁷
 - 1) Receive the mission.
 - 2) Issue the Warning Order.
 - 3) Make a tentative plan.
 - 4) Start movement.
 - 5) Conduct reconnaissance.
 - 6) Complete the plan.
 - 7) Issue the order.
 - 8) Supervise and refine the plan.
- 4. **TF Commander Directs and Leads Subordinate Forces** (TRADOC Pam 11-9, Section IV; "Battle Command" (Draft), BCBL-Ft. Leavenworth publication, pages 7, 10; ARTEP 71-2-MTP, task 7-1-3901/10, 3003/2, 3003/4, 3010/2, 3015/3, 3016/1, 3902/10; FM 71-123, Chap 2, 3, 6)
 - a. TF prepares plans or orders.
 - 1) The TF XO:
 - a) Supervises the staff in the execution of the Commander's decisions by managing plan refinement.
 - b) Manages internal and external coordination by the staff to synchronize plan refinements.
 - 2) The staff takes prompt action to accomplish the guidance given by the Commander.
 - a) Publishes refinements to orders and, planning and execution products such as DST, Synchronization Matrix, FSEM.
 - b) Initiates requests to higher and adjacent units for additional support.
 - 3) The staff at the Main CP refines plans, facilitates planning for future operations, identifies and corrects problems identified during subordinate unit preparations, and coordinates additional support from brigade.
 - 4) The Commander and/or staff issue WARNOs to alert staff members and subordinate elements to changes to the plan. WARNOs may include:
 - a) The enemy situation; events; and the mission, task, or operation.
 - b) The higher headquarters' mission.
 - c) The Commander's intent statement.
 - d) The earliest time of movement or degree of notice the Commander gives to the main body.

- e) Orders for preliminary action, reconnaissance, surveillance, and observation.
- f) Service support instructions, any special equipment necessary, regrouping of transportation, or preliminary moves to assembly areas.
- g) The rendezvous point or time for assembly of an orders group; whether commanders or representatives are to attend; and time needed for issuing written orders.
- 5) Staff develops FRAGOs reflecting changes to the initial plan for the TF Commander's approval:
 - a) Graphics and control measures for the operation.
 - b) DST and Synchronization Matrix.
 - c) Fire support plan, FSEM, FSCM.
 - d) Communications plan.
 - e) CSS plan.
- b. The TF issues orders.
 - 1) The Commander:
 - a) Approves FRAGOs.
 - b) Directs members of the staff to issue FRAGOs based on his approval or in compliance with his guidance.
 - 2) FRAGOs contain:
 - a) Mission statement.
 - b) Commander's intent and concept of the operation.
 - c) Pertinent extracts taken from more detailed orders.
 - d) Task organization, if modified.
 - e) Control measures that promote initiative, synchronization, and agility while minimizing exposure to fratricide.
 - f) Timely changes to existing orders.
 - Time dependent, the Commander collects the TF leadership to conduct leaders reconnaissance, and to brief and disseminate updated orders, DST, Synchronization Matrix, and other mission documents.
 - 4) The TF Commander and staff refine the plan to correct problems identified during rehearsals.

- 5) The TF staff works within the Commander's intent to:
 - a) Direct and control units.
 - b) Allocate resources to support the desired end state.
 - c) Alert the Commander to changes to the enemy or friendly situations that may require change to the orders and plans.
- 6) S3 informs higher and adjacent headquarters of changes to orders and plans.
- c. The TF Commander provides command presence.
 - 1) The Commander exercises three key elements of Battle Command while conducting visits and inspection.
 - a) <u>LEADERSHIP</u>: exercised by inspiring and directing soldiers through personal contact. The Commander is able to motivate soldiers with the desire to win through ensuring that their soldiers understand why they are engaged in a particular operation or course of action and how it supports and is essential to the overall mission and intent.
 - b) INFORMATION ASSIMILATION: the Commander learns the situation and state of mission preparation throughout the TF during inspections and visits.
 - c) <u>COMMUNICATION</u>: allows the Commander to reinforce his Intent which in turn focuses all subordinate leaders on a common goal. By establishing a climate conducive to open and honest communications, the Commander is able to express his guidance and directives while receiving from concerns and issues from subordinate leaders and soldiers.
 - 2) The Commander determines the TF state of mission preparedness through inspections and visits.
 - a) Questions subordinate leaders down to platoon leaders and compares their concepts of the operation with his to insure that the TF plan is synchronized at all levels.
 - b) Concentrates on those units and officers that demonstrate leadership weaknesses; checks/listens to be sure tasks are understood.
 - c) Inspects and spot-checks known weaknesses to ensure that they are corrected.
 - d) Makes a subjective assessment of cohesion, morale, and esprit.
 - e) When actions taken are not in accordance with decisions, SOPs, Army standards, and the OPORD, refines plans and preparation efforts to counter weaknesses.
 - f) Expedites actions, fixes problems, ensures compliance with guidance, and sets/refines standards.

- g) Manages his time and prioritizes his visits so that he visits at least those units most critical to the execution of his intent, e.g.:
 - (1) The Company/Team making the main effort.
 - (2) The unit he will maneuver with during the battle.
- h) Ensures that all units and all positions (primary, secondary, alternate) and activities are visited to determine the level of mission preparedness.
- i) Informs TF XO and the Commander's representatives inspecting preparations of any changes or refinements to the plan which he has directed.
- 3) The Commander extends his command presence by directing members of his staff (TF XO, CSM, or one or more TF staff members) to perform inspections and visits.
- 4) Inspections and visits are scheduled; units may be informed of times.
 - a) Inspections and visits do not significantly interfere with, delay, or artificially sequence subordinate units' combat preparations.
 - b) The Commander determines and outlines those items and activities he will inspect based on:
 - (1) His experience.
 - (2) In-depth knowledge of the TF and its equipment.
 - (3) His assessment of the current status of the units (each company, platoon, special platoon, attachments).
 - (4) Points and areas that mean the difference between mission success or failure (e.g. main effort, key positions, breach force, obstacle construction).
 - (5) Items which serve as indicators of maintenance, readiness, or morale trends within the unit.
 - c) TF Commander's representatives conducting inspections and visits inform him of refinements and adjustments that they have directed as well as problems that they have observed.
- d. Maintain unit cohesion and discipline; Commander exercises leadership.
 - 1) The Commander checks and ensures that orders are executed; reinforces discipline by demanding compliance to standards and his guidance.
 - 2) The Commander observes subordinates:
 - a) For indicators of shortfalls in performance or manner of performance, and takes corrective action as necessary.
 - b) For noteworthy performance so that he can praise accomplishments.

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- 3) The Commander displays a calm presence to subordinates while clearly delineating guidance, providing precise and simple orders and instructions.
- 4) The Commander maintains a moral presence.⁸
- 5) The Commander monitors subordinates and his self for degradation of mental and physical capability.
 - a) TF Commander monitors his own physical and mental state and gets rest.
 - b) TF XO monitors the TF Commander's and staff members' physical and mental state and recommends rest periods.
 - c) TF Commander ensures that subordinate commanders and staff are rested and prepared for battle.
- e. The TF synchronizes tactical operations.
 - 1) Backbriefs.
 - a) The Commander conducts back briefs with TF staff and subordinate commanders.
 - (1) Conducted during and after the Commander's inspections and visits.
 - (2) Conducted as directed by the Commander.
 - (3) Conducted during rehearsals.
 - (a) To ensure understanding of the concept of the operation.
 - (b) To disseminate information and changes which occur as a result of plan refinement during the rehearsal.
 - b) TF and subordinate commanders perform backbriefs and are responsible for:
 - (1) Describing in detail how their schemes of maneuver and fires will be conducted.
 - (2) Describing how their concept of the operation supports the TF Commander's intent and contributes to the TF mission.
 - (3) Describing the level of preparation achieved; preparation activities still requiring to be completed; and how they will adhere to the mission time lines.
 - 2) Rehearsals. The Commander uses the DST and Synchronization Matrix as the framework to test and measure the TF's ability to synchronize combat power through rehearsals of the mission.

- a) Rehearsal planning.
 - (1) Earlier concepts and guidance for rehearsals are reviewed to ensure rehearsals can be conducted as initially visualized.
 - (a) Rehearsal goals and focus.
 - (b) Technique/method of rehearsal.
 - (c) Rehearsal participants.
 - (d) Rehearsal times and places.
 - 2) Rehearsal planning is updated based on:
 - (a) Time available.
 - (b) Training status of troops.
 - (c) Complexity of the operation.
 - (d) Unit familiarity with rehearsal techniques and SOPs.
- b) The Commander and S-3 prioritize tasks to be rehearsed based on:
 - (1) Key (critical) events and activities to be performed in battle.
 - (2) Complexity.
 - (3) Those tasks which leaders and soldiers are not trained on.
- c) The Commander, S3, and other key staff officers conduct rehearsal AARs to ensure critical tasks are rehearsed to acceptable levels of competence.
- d) TF and subordinate unit rehearsal preparation.
 - (1) Subordinate units develop at least a tentative plan prior to their participation in a TF rehearsal in order to allow effective feedback on the TF plan.
 - (2) Subordinate units conduct their own rehearsals and prepare vehicles, equipment, and soldiers prior to TF rehearsals.
 - (3) TF level rehearsals are not so numerous or so closely spaced together that subordinate units are not afforded time for their rehearsals nor are subordinate commanders required to be in two different places at the same time.
- e) Roles of participants in TF rehearsals, regardless to type of rehearsal:
 - (1) TF Commander.
 - (a) Controls rehearsal.
 - (b) Ensures that rehearsal meets his goals.
 - (c) Briefs participants (or gives guidance to the XO to brief) prior to the rehearsal.
 - 1. Each participant is introduced with a brief description of their duties and roles for the mission.

- <u>2.</u> Overview of:
 - a. Missions and tasks to be rehearsed.
 - b. Sequence of activities rehearsed.
 - <u>c.</u> Rehearsal time lines (e.g. time to rehearse each event /phase of the mission).
 - d. Description of rehearsal site.
- (d) Establishes the standard and outcome/goals to be achieved.
 - 1. Subordinate commanders, staff and leaders fully understand their responsibilities within the parameters of the TF Commander's intent.
 - 2. Identify vulnerabilities in the plan and determine the means to negate them.
- (e) Exercises the decision making process he expects to be faced with during the mission, paying particular attention to:⁹
 - 1. Identifying times or events during the mission which will require him to make decisions.
 - 2. Observing how his decisions are implemented by TF units and the staff.
 - 3. Identifying which decisions produce the outcome which supports his intent and desired end state; and which decisions will not contribute to achieving his intent and desired end state.
 - 4. Utility of his decision support aids (e.g., DST).
- (f) Tracks the effect of TF actions to achieve the desired end state (with TF S3 assistance).
- (2) TF XO.
 - (a) As the 2IC, ensures that he is prepared to lead and direct the TF in the event of the loss of the TF Commander.
 - (b) Ensures that the TF staff:
 - 1. Is prepared to receive and evaluate information and, disseminate it to the TF Commander and subordinate units.
 - 2. Synchronizes combat multipliers to support the TF during the mission.

- (c) Ensures CS and CSS operations are synchronized with and support the concept.
- (d) Describes the positioning and movement of TF CPs during the mission.
- (e) Briefs participants in the place of the TF Commander as directed.
- (f) Ensures that all changes to the plan are recorded, coordinated, and supporting products (e.g. DST, Sync Matrix, FSEM) are updated.
- (3) TF S3.
 - (a) Describes overall operation.
 - (b) Ensures TF combat power is synchronized in terms of timing to support TF movement and maneuver.
 - (c) Describes the positioning and movement of the TF Command Group during the mission.
 - (d) Assists the TF Commander in tracking the effect of TF actions to achieve the desired end state.
- (4) TF S2.
 - (a) Portrays enemy actions and responses.
 - 1. Replicates all plausible and possible events and activities.
 - 2. Ensures enemy actions are properly depicted and understood so TF Commander, subordinate commanders and staff are able to anticipate actions during execution.
 - 3. Portrays actions of HPT, and activities at NAIs and TAIs.
 - (b) Provides updated enemy and terrain information.
- (5) TF S4 (representing CSS staff).
 - (a) Describes CSS support of TF.
 - (b) Portrays positioning and movement of CSS assets.
- (6) TF FSO, subordinate unit FSOs, COLTs, FOs.
 - (a) Describe engagement of TF targets and HPT.
 - <u>1.</u> Artillery target groups and series.

- 2. Special munitions (i.e. FASCAM, smoke, DPICM, Copperhead).
- 3. CAS and Army aviation.
- <u>4.</u> Describes impact of overall fires in support of the TF.
- (b) Control measures (e.g. trigger lines and execution criteria), restrictions, and communications (primary and alternate) between observers and fire support elements are practiced.
- (c) Ensures Co/Tm fire support plans comply with the Commander's guidance.
- (d) Describes observer and back-up observer positioning, responsibilities.
- (e) Ensures indirect fires "triggers":
 - (1) Are demonstrated by observers.
 - (2) Can be executed by the fire support system (e.g. FA, mortars, CAS) based on ranges and timing.
 - (3) Are synchronized with ground maneuver.
- (f) Describes FA battery movement (e.g. routes, timings) and firing positions.
- (7) TF Engineer.
 - (a) Describes movement of engineer assets in support of the TF.
 - (b) Ensures M/CM/S operations are synchronized with maneuver.
- (8) TF AD LNO.
 - (a) Describes ADA coverage of the TF to include routes and positions.
 - (b) Portrays enemy air avenues of approach and expected activity.
 - (c) ADA elements rehearse early warning and weapons control status changes to ensure the TF is capable of engaging enemy aircraft with all weapons systems.
- (9) TF CMLO.
 - (a) Describes NBC Decon support of the TF (e.g. sites, equipment, procedures if other than SOP).

- (b) Describes NBC Recon support of the TF.
- (c) Portrays potential enemy use of chemicals against the TF.
- (d) Describes employment of smoke and other obscurants.
- (10) Scout Platoon Leader (or PSG, if PL not available).
 - (a) Describes movement and reconnaissance objectives.
 - (b) Describes reporting system (to facilitate eaves-dropping on net by Company/Teams, others).
- (11) Mortar Platoon Leader (or PSG, if PL not available).
 - (a) Describes mortar platoon movement (e.g. routes, timings) and firing positions.
 - (b) Describes impact of mortar fires in support of the TF fire support plan.
- (12) ALO.
 - (a) Describes positioning of ALO personnel to control CAS in support of the TF.
 - (b) Describes CAS sorties, targets, and timing of attacks.
 - (c) Identifies CAS ingress and egress routes.
- (13) Aviation LNO.
 - (a) Describes positioning of aviation liaison assets on the battlefield to direct and control helicopters.
 - (b) Describes helicopter operations in support of the TF.
 - (c) Describes Army aviation operations conducted by the Brigade and Division which impact on the TF (e.g. ingress and egress routes for deep attack).
- (14) TF S3/Air.
 - (a) Describe fixed and rotary wing aviation support of the TF.
 - (b) Provides assistance to the S3 in capturing rehearsal changes and modifications.
- (15) Subordinate maneuver commanders and, if time and situation allow, subordinate maneuver platoon leaders.
 - (a) Describe their missions.
 - (b) Demonstrate how they will accomplish their assigned mission.

- Maneuver. 1
- 2. Fire support.
- (c) Describe actions on contact.
- f) Rehearsal execution.
 - (1)Techniques:
 - (a) Level I: small-scale rehearsals that do not involve mounted or dismounted maneuver. Techniques include:
 - 1. Map: limited number of participants due to map size, used when time and space constraints are limited.
 - <u>2.</u> Sand table/terrain model: key leaders only, used to compensate for lack of sufficient time.
 - 3. Rock/stick drill: same characteristics as sand-table/ terrain models, except that participants replicate their actions or their units actions.
 - <u>4.</u> Radio/Telephone: participants as directed by the TF Commander, used when time and enemy situations do not allow gathering of personnel; used to test radios and determine backup systems in the event of communications equipment failure.
 - Level II: focused rehearsals using selected personnel, (b) usually key leaders, mounted in wheeled or tracked vehicles over similar terrain; technique used is TEWT, where key leaders participate, conducted on actual mission terrain, or similar terrain.
 - Level III: TF Combined Arms Maneuver, full-scale dress (c) rehearsal involving use of real time mounted and dismounted maneuver over actual or similar terrain.
 - Rehearsal types, which identify participants. (2)
 - Type A: (a)
 - TF Commander.
 - TF XO.
 - S3.
 - S2.
 - FSO/FIST.
 - 1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8. ALO.
 - Primary staff.
 - BMO.
 - <u>9.</u> Subordinate commanders with their FSO/FIST.
 - <u>10.</u> Specialty Platoon Leaders (e.g. Scout, Mortar, Support).
 - 11. CS unit commanders.

- (b) Type B:
 - 1. TF Commander.
 - <u>2.</u> TF XO.
 - <u>3.</u> S3.
 - <u>4.</u> S2.
 - 5. FSO/FIST.
 - <u>6.</u> ALO.
 - 7. Subordinate commanders with their FSO/FIST.
 - 8. Scout Platoon Leader.
 - 9. Mortar Platoon Leader.
 - 10. CS unit commanders.
- (c) Type C:
 - 1. TF Commander.
 - <u>2.</u> S3.
 - <u>3.</u> S2.
 - 4. FSO/FIST.
 - <u>5.</u> ALO.
 - <u>6.</u> Subordinate commanders.
 - 7. Scout Platoon Leader.
 - 8. Mortar Platoon Leader.
 - 2. CS unit commanders, as required by the mission.
- (d) Type D:
 - 1. TF Commander.
 - <u>2.</u> S3.
 - <u>3.</u> S2.
 - <u>4.</u> FSO/FIST.
 - <u>5.</u> ALO.
 - 6. Subordinate commanders.
- g) Time dependent, the entire operation is thoroughly rehearsed.
- h) The TF conducts multiple rehearsals if time is available, to include rehearsing contingency plans.
 - (1) Combined arms maneuver rehearsal.
 - (2) CSS/logistics rehearsal.
 - (3) Fire support rehearsal.
 - (a) TF FS rehearsal.
 - (b) Brigade FS rehearsal.
 - (c) FA Battalion technical rehearsal.
- i) Conduct of rehearsals.
 - (1) A slow walk through of the mission is performed, with staff and subordinate leaders explaining their actions at every step to ensure understanding; then at combat speed with minimal guidance.

- (2) Rehearsals are conducted from the point of threat identification up to the point where the TF is able to complete the mission and achieve the destruction of the enemy.
- (3) All TF systems (vehicles, troops, combat multipliers) participate if time is available; representative portions of TF systems participate if time or space is not available.
- (4) During the rehearsal, participants execute exactly as they would in combat.
- (5) The rehearsal is realistic, with an accurate replication of the enemy.
- f. Critical considerations for integration of BOS in directing and leading subordinate forces.

Intelligence

- 1) The Commander and S-2 review the DST and enemy SIT TEMP to ensure that threat courses of action are clear and understood.
- 2) The S2 processes information and disseminated updated intelligence of enemy situation, terrain, and weather.
 - a) Descriptions and locations of obstacles, fortifications, and known or potential contaminated areas and available NBC delivery systems.
 - b) Threat locations (CP's, weapons systems), strengths, capabilities, probable boundaries, known vulnerabilities, and threat probable courses of actions and intentions.

Maneuver

- 3) Subordinate units' maneuver plans are verified and synchronized with the TF plan.
 - a) Direct fire plans.
 - (1) With units in positions.
 - (2) Trigger lines for the initiation of direct fires.
 - (3) Disengagement and engagement criteria.
 - (4) Direct fire control measures.
 - b) Maneuver plans include:
 - (1) Actions in the objective area.
 - (2) Actions on contact.
 - (3) Movement techniques.
 - (4) Loading/unloading aircraft and staging operations are complete during air assault operations.
 - c) Security and covering force plans:
 - (1) Passage of lines.

- (2) Battle-handover.
- (3) Integration of fire support.
- (4) Reconstitution.
- d) Movement plans during the battle fight are verified.
 - (1) Routes are selected, reconnoitered, and marked.
 - (2) Movement to alternate and supplementary positions, including overwatch covering displacement, takes advantage of available cover and concealment.
 - (3) Direct and indirect fires are synchronized with movement and repositioning to preserve the force and to attrit and delay the enemy.
 - (4) Commitment of the reserve is checked to verify timing and to ensure that it can occupy a position to the flank or rear of the enemy without detection.
- 4) TF contingency plans, branches, and sequels are verified and synchronized.
- 5) Reactions to NBC attacks are integrated to ensure force protection and reinforce the TF's ability to perform its mission on a contaminated battle-field.
 - a) NBC reports and NBCWRS, including agent detection/identification and MOPP posture changes, is continuously assessed and disseminated.
 - b) Decontamination sites and equipment are prepared to support hasty and deliberate decontamination.
 - c) TF units and soldiers can perform basic decontamination skills.

Fire Support

- 6) Fire support plan is checked to ensure that it can be initiated simultaneously with and is synchronized to support direct fires and the TF maneuver plan.
- 7) Refinements to the fire support plan are integrated into FRAGOs, the DST, the Synchronization Matrix, and the FSEM, including:
 - a) Shifts in priorities of fires and timing for preplanned and targets of opportunity engagements in each phase of the operation.
 - b) Positioning of primary and back-up observers to allow observation on all priority targets and EAs.
 - c) Priority of fires and priority targets for each phase of the mission, including method for prioritizing calls for fire.
 - d) Finalized artillery target groups and series.
 - e) Employment concept for special munitions (i.e. FASCAM, smoke, DPICM, Copperhead) is completed.

- f) CAS and Army aviation refinements.
- 8) Subordinate unit fire support plans are verified and synchronized with the TF fire support plan.
 - a) Subordinate leaders understand their responsibilities for TF priority targets; observers are positioned to and understand the criteria for executing the mission.
 - b) Company/Team FSO's and observers are prepared to call for and adjust of indirect fires on all known and suspected enemy positions, and provide BDA.
 - c) TF Mortar platoon is prepared to execute assigned fire missions and displace as planned.
- 9) Control measures (trigger lines and execution criteria), restrictions, and communications (primary and alternate) between observers and fire support elements are verified.
- 10) Alternate attack systems, including positioning and displacement, are verified to ensure that indirect fires can be executed as planned.
- 11) TF FSO coordinates with the DS FA Battalion and Brigade FSO/FSE to verify that the TF fire support plan can be supported by and is synchronized with the Brigade fire support plan.

Air Defense

- 12) ADA crews are prepared to acquire and engage enemy air attacks along single and multiple air avenues of approach.
- 13) AD assets are ready to move with maneuver elements to ensure planned support is provided without interfering with the subordinate units maneuver.
- 14) The TF Commander and AD LNO review ADA coverage plans to identify weaknesses.
- 15) Subordinate units perform passive air defense measures during the preparation phase and are prepared to perform those measures during the mission.

Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

- 16) Mobility assets are task organized, positioned, and prepared to respond to potential obstacles and choke point congestion.
 - a) TF units are prepared to conduct in-stride and deliberate breaching.
 - b) Timing and coordination for each separate TF counter-obstacle breach is finalized to ensure synchronization between the Support, Breach, and Assault Forces.
 - c) Engineers and subordinate units are prepared to perform obstacle reconnaissance in order to physically confirm TF breach sites.

- 17) Counter-mobility plan is checked to ensure integration of direct and indirect fire for each obstacle.
- 18) Survivability positions for vehicles, personnel, and equipment are completed as planned.

Combat Service Support

- 19) CSS assets are prepared to provide planned supply, medical, and maintenance support to the TF during the mission, without interfering with the TF maneuver.
- 20) Push packages of emergency resupplies are configured and ready.
- 21) Designated MSR and ASR's are reviewed to ensure CSS assets can provide timely response.
- 22) Medical assets and operations are prepared to support the TF.
 - a) Ambulances are ready to provide planned support.
 - b) Ambulance transfer points/collection points are disseminated throughout the TF.
 - c) TF Aid Station(s) are ready to receive and treat casualties.
- 23) Vehicles and equipment are recovered, repaired, and returned to user or delivered to higher maintenance echelons during the preparation phase.
- 24) Maintenance assets are task organized and are prepared to provide support; UMCP is prepared to displace and provide planned support.

Command and Control

- 25) The TF Commander reviews the DST, Synchronization Matrix, and FSEM to ensure:
 - a) Plan modifications are integrated.
 - b) Mission details to achieve the Commander's Intent are adequately reflected.
 - c) Combat power is synchronized and massed:
 - (1) Against the enemy.
 - (2) At the decisive point as visualized by the TF Commander.
- 26) Subordinate unit commanders demonstrate to the TF Commander understanding of:
 - a) When and where the TF Commander plans to destroy the enemy.
 - b) TF Commander's intent and desired end state.

- c) Their mission and how their plans are synchronized with each battle phase of the TF plan.
- 27) The TF Commander reviews the criteria for the employment of reserves to verify that his intent and visualized end state can be achieved.
- 28) Command and control measures planned for the mission are reviewed by the TF Commander, staff, and subordinate leaders to ensure completeness and understanding.
 - a) Maneuver graphics and control measures (e.g. phase lines, objectives, routes, check and coordination points).
 - b) Signals and quick execution code words.
 - c) DST.
 - d) Synchronization Matrix.
 - e) FSEM and FSCM.
- 29) CPs and staff are prepared to support the mission.
 - a) Ready to receive, process, and disseminate information.
 - b) Move and position to support the TF Commander during the battle.
 - c) Coordinate and synchronize combat multipliers.
 - d) Exchange information with Brigade and adjacent units.
- 5. Task Forces Command Posts Locate Where They Can Control the Preparation for and Transition to Battle (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, task 7-1-3904, 3035, 3036, 3913/11; FM 71-123, Chap 1)
 - a. Command Posts positioning enhances the TF Commander's exercise of command and control.
 - 1) Positioning is such that the Commander can maintain communications with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.
 - a) The Commander is able exercise command and control during mission preparation.
 - b) Command Posts displace prior to LD time/ mission execution time to facilitate command and control during the transition from preparation to the initiation of the battle.
 - c) CPs are not detected by the enemy.
 - 2) The Commander and TAC CP position prior to mission execution to exercise command and control during the initial stages of execution.

- a) The Commander is able to observe the TF as it transitions into the fight.
- b) The Commander can assess the situation and respond to battlefield events.
- c) The Commander can observe and control the main effort.
- d) The Commander can react to events.
 - (1) Reposition forces.
 - (2) Change missions of Company/Teams.
 - (3) Redirect fires.
 - (a) Direct.
 - (b) Indirect.
 - 4) Change priorities.
- e) The FSO and ALO may be directed to position with the Commander to help control fires during transition from preparation to the mission.
- 3) The Main CP positions prior to mission execution.
 - a) The staff is able to effectively collect, analyze, and pass critical information prior to mission execution.
 - b) The Main CP maintains voice and digital communications with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.
 - c) The Main CP receives and disseminates situation updates to allow a smooth transition from the preparation phase to mission execution.
 - d) The Main CP is able to rapidly assume the functions of CTCP as required.
- 4) The CTCP positions prior to mission execution.
 - a) The CTCP is able to conduct rapid movement of emergency CL III and V forward to support the TF.
 - b) The CTCP is able to monitor the TF admin/log net to determine subordinate unit CSS requirements.
 - c) The CTCP is able to rapidly assume the functions as the Main CP if required.
- 5) The FTCP is positioned prior to mission execution.
 - a) FTCP communications are fully integrated with the BSA and subordinate unit CSS elements.
 - b) The FTCP is able to provide rapid response to subordinate unit requests for support beyond CTCP capabilities.

- b. The CPs survive:
 - 1) The CPs use cover, concealment, and routes which reduce detection by the enemy.
 - 2) Local security is structured to provide early warning, provide perimeter protection, and a reaction force for immediate response.
 - 3) OPSEC is continually monitored.
- c. Communications are maintained without interruption with all subordinate elements and higher headquarters to allow the TF Commander and staff to exercise command and control.

CALL LESSONS LEARNED RELEVANT TO CCF 19 (EXTRACTS FROM LESSONS LEARNED BULLETINS)

1. NTC Lessons Learned: Commanders Memorandum - November 85

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).

The S-2 is a key player, but it is a mistake to think of IPB as strictly an S-2 function. Decision making and IPB are part of the same whole. IPB must be done by the commander and his entire staff.

IPB drives reconnaissance and surveillance planning and execution. Templates must be confirmed by physical reconnaissance. Key named and targeted areas of interest must be monitored by dedicated and, if possible, redundant assets.

In the OPORD, priority intelligence requirements and the decision support template need to be explained in detail so that reporting requirements are understood by all leaders and staff. Communicating IPB during the orders process helps focus task force leaders on the commander's intent.

Templates must be updated throughout operational planning and execution with significant changes rapidly passed to the commander. All possible sources should be exploited. Besides organic assets and requests to brigade, direct queries to adjacent and forward elements, ground and airborne FAC's, and Army aviation assets in the area can produce useful and timely information.

Reconnaissance and Counterreconnaissance.

For both offense and defense, reconnaissance must be continuous over time and throughout the depth of the battle area.

Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance actions are most effective when controlled at battalion level, normally by the S-2 in close coordination with the S-3 and FSO.

The S-2 and commo officer must provide for continuous communications with patrols, to include liberal use of radio nets. A reporting schedule and negative reports are essential.

Fire Support.

By definition, a commander's concept is both a scheme of maneuver and fires. The concept of fires needs to be expressed in terms every bit as specific as that for maneuver.

Specific guidance from battalion concerning where, when, and what to shoot rather than an allocation of priorities to specific companies is often the most effective method of synchronizing fires with maneuver.

Hitting targets requires a great deal of preparation which should not be underwhelmed. Commo between companies, FSOs, and FDCs needs to be thoroughly checked before the battle to include necessary corrective action.

Defensive Chemical Measures.

Formal NBC reports should not be transmitted on battalion and company command nets due to their disruptive impact. The preferred procedure is for platoons and companies to send initial spot reports on the command net, followed by NBC reports on the admin/log net.

The TOC must temporarily switch a radio to admin/log or use one of the XO's radios if they have been remoted into the TOC.

MOPP posture decisions, to include when to unmask, must be made at battalion -- the first level with the staff to make a risk assessment.

Getting NBC warnings to elements not organic or attached to companies requires the use of all battalion nets, to include admin/log and mortar FDC. Each element in the task force area must monitor at least one battalion net, regardless of the support or command relationship.

Attack Techniques.

Effective reconnaissance is the key to detailed planning, but in-depth planning must begin long before much of the reconnaissance is accomplished. Plans are then refined as more is learned about the enemy.

Also, a "review the bidding" session a few hours before LD time can be very beneficial. Commanders and staff are updated on intelligence that was not available when the OPORD was briefed; modifications to the plan are explained; and final coordination is effected.

Combat Service Support.

Accurate and near real time loss reporting is essential both for prompt repair and for effective synchronization of available combat power. Timely information on overall status and an indication of significant losses are passed to the TOC on the command net with details provided to the ALC shortly thereafter on admin log.

Command and Control.

Command and control must be a major consideration in the planning process and simplicity is a critically important factor.

To effectively control forces, a commander must "SEE" the battle, i.e., he must know the positions, activities, and status of both enemy and friendly elements. Commanders see by positioning themselves to physically observe as much as possible without becoming personally involved in the battle; by demanding fast, accurate, concise reports; by having the TOC provide processed information, partially from nets the commander cannot monitor; and through the use of scouts, OPs, and patrols.

Negative reports and updated status are important.

A disciplined flow of information on the battalion command net is extremely important. Radios must operate properly with relays planned and established as necessary to ensure continuous communications.

TOC reflex responses should include dropping to the internal net of an unanswering company, relaying from distant stations, checking compliance with the commander's instructions, and keeping a radio on old frequencies to police up stations that have not made the change.

Cross talk between company commanders is often a prerequisite for success. Given an understanding of the intent of the battalion commander, company commanders must help each other and not depend totally on instructions and information from battalion.

The rapid distribution of well through out and complete written orders is necessary to provide time for reconnaissance, changes in task organization, rehearsals, and all of the other planning/preparation activities needed to make a solid concept workable under the stress of combat.

The liberal use of easily recognizable graphic control measures is recommended.

While warning orders, frag orders, and face to face coordination are essential, the contention that there is no requirement for written orders at battalion level is simply incorrect. Leaders should be provided a written order or, at a minimum, an annotated overlay in all but the most rapid reaction situations.

Verbal frag orders must go to everyone in the orders group, not just selected company commanders. If circumstances are such that the TF commander discusses the order with something less than the total group, the S-3 and/or TOC should provide pertinent information and specific implementing instructions to the others, e.g., mortars, ADA, engineers, S-1/S-4.

Synchronization of combat power is often best accomplished when battalion directly controls and assigns tasks to attached and supporting units.

Frequent changes in task organization should be avoided. The teamwork advantage is often more important than a slightly more desirable mix of forces. Also, the timing of a change requires careful analysis. The significant advantages of a daylight link-up and the time required to receive the OPORD and to coordinate SOPs and LOGPACs must be considered.

The consequences of a lack of synchronization are so severe that OPSEC measures should not be permitted to degrade command and control at battalion level.

COMSEC requirements which complicate command and control for marginal improvements in security, must be culled. Secure nets are wonderful. In addition to dramatically improving OPSEC, more information can be passed in less time.

2. NTC Lessons Learned No 1: Seven Operating Systems - January 86

A thorough terrain analysis by the S2 contributes to the production of the situational template in the IPB process.

The scout platoon is a vital intelligence gathering asset to be considered when developing the intelligence plan.

3. NTC Lessons Learned No 2: Intelligence - May 86

The establishment and use of an O&I net has several advantages:

- It clears the command net for critical information and instructions.
- The O&I net permits TOC personnel to analyze non-critical information from reconnaissance elements before putting in out to the task force.

There are times when units, especially the scouts, pass information directly on the command net, even if the O&I net is operational.

Reconnaissance elements pass information directly on the task force command net when it is critical to the operation and no analysis is required.

An O&I net clears the task force command net of a great deal of routine or unconfirmed information.

Intelligence updates:

This technique involves a preplanned assembly of the battalion orders group. At this update leaders are briefed on intelligence gained since the OPORD briefing. The task force commander briefs his subordinates on any final modifications to the original plan based on this intelligence. Final face-to-face coordination is made.

Actual assembly of the orders group for the intelligence update is beneficial, especially:

- When plans must be modified and new graphics are required.
- To facilitate final face-to-face coordination after subordinates have finalized their plans.

4. CALL Bulletin, No 1-86 - July 86

The 24 hours a day war demands that TOC personnel be trained in all aspects of the TOC operation.

Shift changeovers can cause a loss of continuity during an operation. No matter how good the changeover briefing is, there will be something lost. The shift schedules also gets disrupted because of TOC displacements which should occur frequently.

There aren't going to be any breaks in the battle, especially where TOCs are concerned. The planning, coordinating and controlling of the battle will always be occurring.

All TOC personnel must understand the commander's concept and intent and what is supposed to happen at TAIs and NAIs. Supervisory personnel must be able to make basic tactical decisions, based on the situation, in the absence (for whatever the reason) of key leaders.

It is important to allocate time in the troop leading procedures/preparation for combat operations sequence for test firing weapons, especially small arms.

5. Lessons Learned by/for Division Commanders - September 86

Ethics:

Set the example for standards and early on issue clearly defined guidance on standards of conduct.

Develop a forum where you, your commanders, staff, and sergeants major come to a consensus on a set of values which can be publicized to the lowest level.

Don't set a standard of 100% all the time. You'll generate and perpetuate unethical situations to "meet" this standard.

6. CALL Bulletin No 3 - September 86

Exchanges of unit SOPs or SOP extracts are essential to close coordination between supporting and supported units.

The task force S2 section must continuously anticipate "tomorrow's battle" requirements to facilitate future planning.

The BICC performs the preliminary analysis for future operations. The S2 receives, analyzes, and disseminates current battle information to the commander. The next battle is an extension of the current operation. The BICC continues to develop the IPB to support the next operation.

7. NTC Lessons Learned CALL Bulletin No 4: Command and Control System -February 87

Offensive IPB enables the commander and his staff to maintain the initiative with all available combat power by focusing the reconnaissance and surveillance effort.

Proper reporting and dissemination of collected combat information is essential to success of the reconnaissance effort.

Once the Decision Support Template (DST) is complete, a copy is provided each commander so that if the task force commander, S3, or XO are out of the battle, the next senior officer can continue the fight or modify the plan, as necessary.

The Admin/Log Center (ALC) assumes TOC operations when the TOC is destroyed or incapacitated, and continues until the TOC becomes operational or a replacement headquarters assumes control of task force operations. Criteria for assumption of this on-order mission must be specified in the unit tactical SOP.

Destruction of the TOC, while a catastrophic loss, must not prevent the task force from continuing its mission.

Staff personnel from the ALC must be cross-trained to perform TOC functions with minimal loss of continuity of command and control.

Situation maps and unit status boards reflecting the current tactical status of each company/team are examples of the equipment that must be available in the ALC for immediate use upon assumption of the TOC mission.

ALC personnel must track the battle and keep abreast of the current tactical situation at all times.

At a minimum, the ALC must have all friendly situation information posted, the most recent intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) update, the most current doctrinal and situational templates of suspected enemy locations, and known enemy locations. Both the obstacle plan and target overlay must be posted and kept current.

Communications equipment must be available to provide the ALC with an equivalent capability to exercise command and control over subordinate elements as well as communicate with higher headquarters (brigade) and attached or supporting elements.

The commander must ensure everyone understands how he intends to fight the battle.

The task force commander must have an effective TOC to react to the fast pace on the AirLand battlefield.

The TOC should analyze all sources of information and make recommendations to the task force commander. The TOC must keep abreast of adjacent units and advise the commander, companies and separate platoons accordingly. The TOC should be able to plan for the next battle and direct functions for the commander which he is too busy to personally direct.

TOCs should:

- Track the Battle. This consists of monitoring current location, activity and combat power of task force elements; monitoring the progress of adjacent and supporting units and updating templates.
- Analyze Data. The TOC must analyze all incoming reports from the company/teams, other task force elements, higher headquarters, adjacent units and supporting units. After the TOC analyzes these reports they pass the results to the task force commander and recommend any changes to the present course of action.
- Plan for Future Operations. The significant activity in adjacent and higher units or receipt of the warning order initiates planning. The TOC staff must immediately begin to consider possible courses of actions, probable enemy actions, support requirements, etc. The TOC must also initiate a task force warning order and ensure the S1-S4 are immediately brought in on the planning.
- Disseminate information. The TOC should keep the battalion/task force informed of any action or development that might influence the battle. One technique is to provide an intel summary from analyzed reports off of the O&I net. This summary should be concise and given periodically over the battalion net. This summary could also be used to inform higher headquarters.

The most important consideration when selecting a location to position the TOC is communication with the brigade TOC and with forward elements of the task force.

The TOC must be able to break-down, move and set-up quickly and with the minimum disruption to its operation.

The TOC must be able to write and produce overlays in the field under all conditions.

8. CTC Lessons Learned No 88-2 - May 88

Dedicate redundant communications to all recon assets.

Disseminate intelligence using "eavesdrop" and intelligence updates. Subordinates monitor (eavesdrop) the scout's sport reports to the CP.

9. CALL Compendium, Vol 1: Heavy Forces - Fall 88

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB):

Physical reconnaissance, on the ground, is necessary to confirm or refute the situation template.

The recon mission is to find the enemy and report this to the commander and S2. Any and all elements of the task force or brigade can fill in missing elements of combat information through the reporting system, SALUTE, spot reports, etc.

All key leaders and staff must realize that the IPB process never stops. Templates require continuous updating throughout all aspects of operational planning and execution. Notifying all key personnel of all significant changes is critical to the process. IPB is not a process separate and distinct from all the other staff processes. It applies staff actions to gathering information toward answering certain questions relative to ongoing mission.

The Avn LNO must track crew and equipment status and relay this information to the ground maneuver commander.

MOPP decisions, to include unmasking, should be made at the task force TOC after a thorough risk assessment.

Information flow must be lateral as well as vertical. Commanders of separate support companies must keep each other informed of tactical developments.

Command and Control:

Adhere to a disciplined system of time management. Someone must establish a timed critical list based on each mission and enforce it. The 1/3-2/3 rule is a guide but METT-T dependent.

One of the best forms of commander's guidance is rough maneuver and fire support graphics drawn by the commander and given to the staff to focus staff planning.

Employ clear/concise written orders:

- Clear written orders greatly reduce the fog of war to tired leaders. They provide a checklist for exhausted leaders to remind themselves what their mission and the commander's intent really is.
- The limiting factor on the conciseness of the order is how well the unit understands the commander's intent.

Use backbriefs:

- Immediately after the commander issues the order, his subordinates backbrief the commander on their tentative concepts of operations. If these are in line with the commander's intent, his subordinates understand the order. If not, the commander clarifies the plan. Ensure all slice elements backbrief.
- During preparation, the commander meets subordinates individually or together on the battlefield. Here, his subordinates backbrief their concept based on their actual recon. This ensures that any minor changes a subordinate implemented to make the plan fit ground truth still support the commander's intent.

Rehearsals are critical to the successful execution of the operation.

Commanders must visualize the battlefield:

- Study enemy order of battle, doctrine, and tactics. A thorough knowledge of the enemy will allow the commander to visualize enemy actions as certain cues are seen or reported.
- A thorough IPB to include verification of the situation template by recon assets will add to the mental picture.
- Detailed, yet concise reports from trusted agents or subordinates regarding both friendly and enemy movements or activities throughout the course of the battle is a necessity.
- The unit tactical operations center must forward concise reports to the commander on information gained from higher and adjacent units. This must include both friendly and enemy activities.
- Personal reconnaissance of the battlefield must be done for each new mission regardless of previous familiarity with the terrain.
- Backbriefs and rehearsals provide the commander a visualization of what his subordinate units are/or should be doing at any point in the battle.
- The commander must plan and rehearse his own position and movement on the battlefield as carefully as is done for the overall TF plan. He must be forward to personally see critical points in the battle, yet protected in order to survive.
- Finally, practice and more practice is a necessity in learning to "see" or visualize the battlefield. No opportunity can be wasted to gain experience in this most critical warfighting skill.

10. CALL 89-1: Non-Mechanized Forces - Spring 89

Commanders must demand that key leaders discipline themselves to obtain a minimum level of rest.

Command and control elements are the first to feel the effects of CONOPS. Judgement abilities degrade more rapidly than physical strength and endurance.

Leaders must give the greatest amount of available time to subordinate leaders. Use no more than 1/3 of the available time for planning and preparation of the order. Provide no less than 2/3s of the available time for subordinate units to prepare for combat.

Prioritize critical tasks and use available time to concentrate on those tasks.

Use daylight hours for preparation of operations. Preparation (i.e. selection of defensive positions, inspection of soldiers, reconnaissance, etc.) requires more visibility than execution or planning.

Time available dictates the amount of detail allowed in planning.

Reverse planning is an indispensable technique for time management. Begin with the time an event must take place (i.e. LD time) and estimate the time each prior event will take.

Attachments and OPCON units require lead time to conduct operations to support the task force (i.e. time to develop fire support plans or emplace obstacles to support the scheme of maneuver). Commanders and staff officers must make these needs known and integrate these times into the task force plan.

The task force Command Sergeant Major is a critical asset to the task force commander. He knows the standards the commander expects and needs. A task force, like any unit, needs to have high standards, tight discipline and loyalty to one commander. Establishing and maintaining loyalty and standards in a task force is a unique challenge, and the task force Command Sergeant Major is the soldier best suited to perform this task.

On the battlefield the Command Sergeant Major can position himself where leadership is most needed.

The Command Sergeant Major has the maturity, the wealth of experience and the rank to significantly and positively influence these missions. Commanders must consider METT-T and decide where this valuable asset can best be employed to affect the battle.

11. CALL 89-2: Heavy-Light Lessons Learned - August 89

A brief order that clearly defines the intent of the commander requires less effort to execute. It is better to provide a good plan quickly and to refine it later, than to delay preparation until the best plan is completed and time limited.

12. CALL: NCO Lessons Learned - October 89

All the NCOs, and even some of the more experienced soldiers of lower rank, must stay aware of the tactical situation and be prepare mentally to take charge.

The Command Sergeant Major:

The Command Sergeant Major is the "ramrod" of the battalion. He makes sure things happen.

He advises the battalion commander on troop and logistical welfare and discipline manners.

NCOs must help set priorities of work by clarifying through the chain of command what must be done.

The troops must be kept informed and the NCO must do it.

The NCO must know and understand the commander's intent if he is to be effective and accomplish the unit's mission.

TACSOPs are critical in keeping the NCO chain, and thus the soldiers, informed of the right information at the right time.

Without precombat checks and follow-up, no one knows if the unit is ready for battle.

Ensure soldiers and units are tasked evenly. Over tasking soldiers degrades combat performance. It is more than a question of combat effectiveness.

NCOs must instill and enforce field discipline in themselves first.

Ensure the TACSOP is complete, includes standards, is understood, and is used every time the trooper goes to the field. NCOs ensure compliance with the TACSOP.

Command Sergeants Major Assist the Task Force Commanders:

The CSM is a vital source of information to the commander and is a key leader in dealing with NCOs.

The command sergeant major has a tremendous impact on the soldier's performance, team cohesion, and unit effectiveness. He looks out for the welfare of their men and can foster a positive command climate.

The CSM can greatly assist by:

- Identifying, correcting, and bringing to the commander's attention NCO leadership problems.
- Moving with the commander to assess unit morale and logistics problems.

13. CALL: Corps-Division Lessons Learned - November 89

Control of FRAGO's and Warning Orders. Many units are running into difficulty when the TAC, Rear, and the Main issue FRAGO's and Warning Orders, especially when duplicate numbers are issued.

Hard copy follow-up on verbal orders/decisions. Many decisions are made in face to face discussions between commanders. Sometimes problems arise when these discussions are away from the CP. This causes problems for the staff in synchronizing the various aspects of the operation as well as keeping the other players informed. Hard copy back up needs to be generated to assist in this process.

14. CALL 90-1: Fire Support for the Maneuver Commander - February 90

The maneuver commander must state the role that fire support is to play in the overall operation.

The commander defines the areas where indirect fires are to be planned, engagement areas where fires must support maneuver, and any areas critical to the battlefield that require fire support.

Only after the commander's guidance and intent is clearly defined and understood can the FSO conduct planning, war gaming, and rehearsing of the operation with the commander and his battle staff.

15. CALL 90-6: The Musicians of Mars - June 90

Establish a time line that includes all critical events. Stick to it religiously. Time management is essential to effective planning and preparation.

Doing all oneself simply will not work. There may be short-term success; but in the long run only disaster will result. Give subordinates responsibilities, train them to standard, give them authority, and hold them accountable.

Plan for contingencies. Have redundant systems in place, and rehearse their use before the battle starts. If you are not prepared you are doomed to fail.

16. CALL Newsletter No. 90-8: Winning in the Desert II - September 90

There are many factors that can create stress in combat operations: fatigue, anxiety, time, intense heat, battlefield uncertainty, etc. Reactions to stress are varied, but there are clear indications, from combat experience and less stressful research and training environments, that soldier performance in command and control C2 operations can suffer.

Maintain a realistic, balanced perspective on enemy capabilities. Plan ahead. The reality of violent combat can cause commanders and staffs to concentrate on just the immediate battle.

Eliminate future surprises by planning for the next battle during the current fight. See the entire battlefield. Under stress it is more comfortable to narrow your focus to your immediate control and within your own boundaries.

Commanders and staffs must consider the bigger picture when planning and conducting their operations. Decide early, then plan in detail.

Keep plans simple, but plan them in detail. Achieving synchronization depends on working out the time, space, and force details.

Situation assessment is not something you do just during mission analysis. It must be a continuous activity to avoid delays in comprehending important changes and events and to maintain the ability to respond rapidly.

Good communications is always difficult, but stress and fatigue will greatly increase misunderstandings. Just because something is very clear to you, do not assume that it is clear to everyone else. Double-check communication. Use backbriefs and rehearsals. Staff visits and followups also foster good communication and can keep problems from recurring.

Widespread agreement among the staff is not necessarily a healthy sign. It could mean that the desire to find an agreement is overriding critical thinking.

17. CALL 90-9: Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned, Volume I (Soldiers and Leadership) - October 90

Every soldier must know the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and have the discipline and training to apply these rules in the absence of supervision.

Training and discipline are key when the ROE change, becoming more restrictive on the use of force and leaders are unable to direct the actions of individual soldiers.

U.S. soldier conduct must be of the highest standard. It will influence how the world and U.S. public view the operation.

18. CALL 90-9: Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned, Volume II (Operations) - October 90

Leaders/soldiers must conduct detailed reconnaissance whenever possible.

Utilize backbriefs to check subordinate leaders' understanding of the overall plan and the commander's intent.

Understand the commander's intent two levels up.

Use troop-leading procedures effectively. Planning and rehearsals are often much more important than trying to create a perfect plan at the higher headquarters.

Exchange LOs. They are critical to successful operations.

Plan to provide LO support staffed for a 24-hour capability for continuous operations.

Provide adequate communications packages to LOs to maintain communications with parent headquarters and units.

19. CALL 90-9: Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned, Volume III (Intelligence, Logistics & Equipment) - October 90

Unit S2s must conduct a thorough review and prioritization of each piece of information. Commanders must develop command post exercises (CPX) scenarios that tax the reporting system to allow realistic exercise play. Make unit SOPs explicit in reporting requirements and formats; adherence to these directives will help keep reporting nets open. Subordinate commands must also stay appraised of the first echelon collection, management and dissemination (CM&D) plan.

Information overload on the operations and intelligence net may occur quickly. Unit S2s must screen and prioritize incoming information. Attach time limits to even high priority information which will expire after a certain point.

A periodic review and re-prioritization of battlefield information ensures that only pertinent data is acted on. As time permits, secondary information must be reviewed.

Subordinate elements must understand the priority intelligence requirements, and intelligence requirements and be updated when friendly units operate within their areas of operations (A). This will deconflict reporting and negate duplicative traffic.

20. CALL Newsletter No. 91-1: Rehearsals - April 91

If problems are found during a rehearsal, plans must be developed at all levels that allow incorporation of these changes into mission planning.

21. CALL 92-5: Logistics Preparation of the Battlefield - November 92

The essence of planning is to anticipate events. This includes sustainment planning. Anticipating support requirements means synchronizing support actions so that combat power is sustained or reconstituted in concert with the tactical plan.

Commanders also need to know the duration of their units' sustained combat power for the mission at hand, as well as the projected profile of the unit's fighting strength on the objective and for the "Be prepared ..." mission. They need to know how long fuel and ammunition supplies will allow them to fight - how and when combat power will be sustained or reconstituted.

22. CALL Newsletter No. 93-3: The Battalion and Brigade Staff - July 93

Staffs must collect and organize information to provide the commander with necessary details he needs to analyze the situation.

Commanders and staffs must analyze and plan the use of available time in detail and not waste planning and preparation time.

Time Management Lessons:

- Commander: Preserve subordinate commander's time.
- Commander and staff: Develop a planning and preparation timeline.
- Commander and staff: Refine the timeline by listing tasks to be accomplished during planning and preparation and the person responsible to complete the task.
- Commander and staff: Use the timeline to track the progression or preparation.

Commanders and staffs must be organized and prepared to produce operations orders quickly.

23. CTC Bulletin No. 93-4 - July 93

Each staff officer and LO must properly advise the staff to ensure the proper employment of his assets as well as the focusing of combat power.

Units should establish planning and TOC operational procedures that promote staff cross-talk.

Staff members need to work together to analyze information and provide updated estimates to the staff and commander to support the current battle and plan for future operations.

Commanders and staffs must schedule rehearsals to allow subordinate units time to complete their orders process.

Failure to render complete and accurate reports often results in the commanders not having the information they need to make informed decisions regarding tactical maneuvers and the allocation of combat power. The consequences could mean complete mission failure, or the unnecessary loss of lives and resources. Often a reporting system is contained in the unit SOP, but it is not properly trained or used.

24. CALL 93-9: Force Protection - December 93

RISK MANAGEMENT is a tool that helps leaders make sound logical decisions.

Risk management, in theory, is a five-step process that is easily integrated into he decision making process.

RISK ASSESSMENT is a part of risk management. A risk assessment causes leaders to identify hazards and threats and place them in perspective relative to the mission or task at hand.

LESSONS LEARNED INTEGRATED INTO CCF 19 TASK LIST

1. Task Force Command Posts Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status.

a. Communicate information.

Formal NBC reports should not be transmitted on battalion and company command nets due to their disruptive impact. The preferred procedure is for platoons and companies to send initial spot reports on the command net, followed by NBC reports on the admin/log net.

Getting NBC warnings to elements not organic or attached to companies requires the use of all battalion nets, to include admin/log and mortar FDC. Each element in the task force area must monitor at least one battalion net, regardless of the support or command relationship.

Also, a "review the bidding" session a few hours before LD time can be very beneficial. Commanders and staff are updated on intelligence that was not available when the OPORD was briefed; modifications to the plan are explained; and final coordination is effected.

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Negative reports and updated status are important.

Cross talk between company commanders is often a prerequisite for success. Given an understanding of the intent of the battalion commander, company commanders must help each other and not depend totally on instructions and information from battalion.

There are times when units, especially the scouts, pass information directly on the command net, even if the O&I net is operational.

Reconnaissance elements pass information directly on the task force command net when it is critical to the operation and no analysis is required.

Exchanges of unit SOPs or SOP extracts are essential to close coordination between supporting and supported units.

Proper reporting and dissemination of collected combat information is essential to success of the reconnaissance effort.

TOCs should: Disseminate information. The TOC should keep the battalion/task force informed of any action or development that might influence the battle. One technique is to provide an intel summary from analyzed reports off of the O&I net. This summary should be concise and given periodically over the battalion net. This summary could also be used to inform higher headquarters.

Disseminate intelligence using "eavesdrop" and intelligence updates. Subordinates monitor (eavesdrop) the scout's sport reports to the CP.

The recon mission is to find the enemy and report this to the commander and S2. Any and all elements of the task force or brigade can fill in missing elements of combat information through the reporting system, SALUTE, spot reports, etc.

Information flow must be lateral as well as vertical. Commanders of separate support companies must keep each other informed of tactical developments.

Commanders must visualize the battlefield: Detailed, yet concise reports from trusted agents or subordinates regarding both friendly and enemy movements or activities throughout the course of the battle is a necessity.

Exchange LOs. They are critical to successful operations.

Plan to provide LO support staffed for a 24-hour capability for continuous operations.

Provide adequate communications packages to LOs to maintain communications with parent headquarters and units.

Subordinate elements must understand the priority intelligence requirements, and intelligence requirements and be updated when friendly units operate within their areas of operations (A). This will deconflict reporting and negate duplicative traffic.

Failure to render complete and accurate reports often results in the commanders not having the information they need to make informed decisions regarding tactical maneuvers and the allocation of combat power. The consequences could mean complete mission failure, or the unnecessary loss of lives and resources. Often a reporting system is contained in the unit SOP, but it is not properly trained or used.

b. TF CP's manage means of communicating information.

The S-2 and commo officer must provide for continuous communications with patrols, to include liberal use of radio nets. A reporting schedule and negative reports are essential.

Commo between companies, FSOs, and FDCs needs to be thoroughly checked before the battle to include necessary corrective action.

The TOC must temporarily switch a radio to admin/log or use one of the XO's radios if they have been remoted into the TOC.

A disciplined flow of information on the battalion command net is extremely important. Radios must operate properly with relays planned and established as necessary to ensure continuous communications.

TOC reflex responses should include dropping to the internal net of an unanswering company, relaying from distant stations, checking compliance with the commander's instructions, and keeping a radio on old frequencies to police up stations that have not made the change.

COMSEC requirements which complicate command and control for marginal improvements in security, must be culled. Secure nets are wonderful. In addition to dramatically improving OPSEC, more information can be passed in less time.

The establishment and use of an O&I net has several advantages:

- It clears the command net for critical information and instructions.
- The O&I net permits TOC personnel to analyze non-critical information from reconnaissance elements before putting in out to the task force.

An O&I net clears the task force command net of a great deal of routine or unconfirmed information.

The Admin/Log Center (ALC) assumes TOC operations when the TOC is destroyed or incapacitated, and continues until the TOC becomes operational or a replacement headquarters assumes control of task force operations. Criteria for assumption of this on-order mission must be specified in the unit tactical SOP.

Staff personnel from the ALC must be cross-trained to perform TOC functions with minimal loss of continuity of command and control.

Communications equipment must be available to provide the ALC with an equivalent capability to exercise command and control over subordinate elements as well as communicate with higher headquarters (brigade) and attached or supporting elements.

Dedicate redundant communications to all recon assets.

Each staff officer and LO must properly advise the staff to ensure the proper employment of his assets as well as the focusing of combat power.

c. TF CP's maintain information and force status.

All possible sources should be exploited. Besides organic assets and requests to brigade, direct queries to adjacent and forward elements, ground and airborne FAC's, and Army aviation assets in the area can produce useful and timely information.

MOPP posture decisions, to include when to unmask, must be made at battalion -- the first level with the staff to make a risk assessment.

Shift changeovers can cause a loss of continuity during an operation. No matter how good the changeover briefing is, there will be something lost. The shift schedules also gets disrupted because of TOC displacements which should occur frequently.

Offensive IPB enables the commander and his staff to maintain the initiative with all available combat power by focusing the reconnaissance and surveillance effort.

Situation maps and unit status boards reflecting the current tactical status of each company/team are examples of the equipment that must be available in the ALC for immediate use upon assumption of the TOC mission.

ALC personnel must track the battle and keep abreast of the current tactical situation at all times.

At a minimum, the ALC must have all friendly situation information posted, the most recent intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) update, the most current doctrinal and situational templates of suspected enemy locations, and known enemy locations. Both the obstacle plan and target overlay must be posted and kept current.

TOCs should: Track the Battle. This consists of monitoring current location, activity and combat power of task force elements; monitoring the progress of adjacent and supporting units and updating templates.

All key leaders and staff must realize that the IPB process never stops. Templates require continuous updating throughout all aspects of operational planning and execution. Notifying all key personnel of all significant changes is critical to the process. IPB is not a process separate and distinct from all the other staff processes. It applies staff actions to gathering information toward answering certain questions relative to ongoing mission.

Commanders must visualize the battlefield: The unit tactical operations center must forward concise reports to the commander on information gained from higher and adjacent units. This must include both friendly and enemy activities.

The CSM is a vital source of information to the commander and is a key leader in dealing with NCOs.

Unit S2s must conduct a thorough review and prioritization of each piece of information. Commanders must develop command post exercises (CPX) scenarios that tax the reporting system to allow realistic exercise play. Make unit SOPs explicit in reporting requirements and formats; adherence to these directives will help keep reporting nets open.

Subordinate commands must also stay appraised of the first echelon collection, management and dissemination (CM&D) plan.

Information overload on the operations and intelligence net may occur quickly. Unit S2s must screen and prioritize incoming information. Attach time limits to even high priority information which will expire after a certain point.

A periodic review and re-prioritization of battlefield information ensures that only pertinent data is acted on. As time permits, secondary information must be reviewed.

Staffs must collect and organize information to provide the commander with necessary details he needs to analyze the situation.

Units should establish planning and TOC operational procedures that promote staff cross-talk.

Staff members need to work together to analyze information and provide updated estimates to the staff and commander to support the current battle and plan for future operations.

2. Assess Situation; the TF Commander Visualizes the Battlefield.

a. Review current situation, the TF Commander visualizes the current situation in regard to time, space, and purpose.

IPB drives reconnaissance and surveillance planning and execution. Templates must be confirmed by physical reconnaissance. Key named and targeted areas of interest must be monitored by dedicated and, if possible, redundant assets.

Templates must be updated throughout operational planning and execution with significant changes rapidly passed to the commander.

Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance actions are most effective when controlled at battalion level, normally by the S-2 in close coordination with the S-3 and FSO.

TOCs should: Analyze Data. The TOC must analyze all incoming reports from the company/teams, other task force elements, higher headquarters, adjacent units and supporting units. After the TOC analyzes these reports they pass the results to the task force commander and recommend any changes to the present course of action.

b. Project future requirements; the TF Commander visualizes desired end states for the current mission and reacts to new FRAGO's or OPORD's from Brigade in regard to time, space, and purpose.

Effective reconnaissance is the key to detailed planning, but in-depth planning must begin long before much of the reconnaissance is accomplished. Plans are then refined as more is learned about the enemy.

To effectively control forces, a commander must "SEE" the battle, i.e., he must know the positions, activities, and status of both enemy and friendly elements.

It is important to allocate time in the troop leading procedures/preparation for combat operations sequence for test firing weapons, especially small arms.

The task force S2 section must continuously anticipate "tomorrow's battle" requirements to facilitate future planning.

The BICC performs the preliminary analysis for future operations. The S2 receives, analyzes, and disseminates current battle information to the commander. The next battle is an extension of the current operation. The BICC continues to develop the IPB to support the next operation.

Commanders must visualize the battlefield:

- Study enemy order of battle, doctrine, and tactics. A thorough knowledge of the enemy will allow the commander to visualize enemy actions as certain cues are seen or reported.
- A thorough IPB to include verification of the situation template by recon assets will add to the mental picture.

Maintain a realistic, balanced perspective on enemy capabilities. Plan ahead. The reality of violent combat can cause commanders and staffs to concentrate on just the immediate battle.

Eliminate future surprises by planning for the next battle during the current fight. See the entire battlefield. Under stress it is more comfortable to narrow your focus to your immediate control and within your own boundaries.

Situation assessment is not something you do just during mission analysis. It must be a continuous activity to avoid delays in comprehending important changes and events and to maintain the ability to respond rapidly.

c. Decide on need for action or change.

There aren't going to be any breaks in the battle, especially where TOCs are concerned. The planning, coordinating and controlling of the battle will always be occurring.

The TOC should analyze all sources of information and make recommendations to the task force commander. The TOC must keep abreast of adjacent units and advise the commander, companies and separate platoons accordingly. The TOC should be able to plan for the next battle and direct functions for the commander which he is too busy to personally direct.

MOPP decisions, to include unmasking, should be made at the task force TOC after a thorough risk assessment.

Commanders must visualize the battlefield: Personal reconnaissance of the battlefield must be done for each new mission regardless of previous familiarity with the terrain.

Time available dictates the amount of detail allowed in planning.

Commanders and staffs must consider the bigger picture when planning and conducting their operations. Decide early, then plan in detail.

d. Critical considerations for integration of the BOS in visualizing the battlefield.

3. Determine Actions; the TF Commander Directs Changes to the Operations or Plan.

- a. The Commander analyzes information and determines that the plan is still valid.
- b. The Commander determines that the plan is no longer valid, and cannot be corrected by issuing FRAGO's to modify the initial plan.
- c. Commander and staff conduct the Deliberate Decision Making Process (DDMP).
- d. Commander and staff conduct the Combat Decision Making Process (CDMP) to modify a branch or sequel.

The S-2 is a key player, but it is a mistake to think of IPB as strictly an S-2 function. Decision making and IPB are part of the same whole. IPB must be done by the commander and his entire staff.

By definition, a commander's concept is both a scheme of maneuver and fires. The concept of fires needs to be expressed in terms every bit as specific as that for maneuver.

Specific guidance from battalion concerning where, when, and what to shoot rather than an allocation of priorities to specific companies is often the most effective method of synchronizing fires with maneuver.

Command and control must be a major consideration in the planning process and simplicity is a critically important factor.

Frequent changes in task organization should be avoided. The teamwork advantage is often more important than a slightly more desirable mix of forces. Also, the timing of a change requires careful analysis. The significant advantages of a daylight link-up and the time required to receive the OPORD and to coordinate SOPs and LOGPACs must be considered.

A thorough terrain analysis by the S2 contributes to the production of the situational template in the IPB process.

The scout platoon is a vital intelligence gathering asset to be considered when developing the intelligence plan.

TOCs should: Plan for Future Operations. The significant activity in adjacent and higher units or receipt of the warning order initiates planning. The TOC staff must immediately begin to consider possible courses of actions, probable enemy actions, support requirements, etc. The TOC must also initiate a task force warning order and ensure the S1-S4 are immediately brought in on the planning.

Physical reconnaissance, on the ground, is necessary to confirm or refute the situation template.

One of the best forms of commander's guidance is rough maneuver and fire support graphics drawn by the commander and given to the staff to focus staff planning.

Reverse planning is an indispensable technique for time management. Begin with the time an event must take place (i.e. LD time) and estimate the time each prior event will take.

Attachments and OPCON units require lead time to conduct operations to support the task force (i.e. time to develop fire support plans or emplace obstacles to support the scheme of maneuver). Commanders and staff officers must make these needs known and integrate these times into the task force plan.

The maneuver commander must state the role that fire support is to play in the overall operation.

The commander defines the areas where indirect fires are to be planned, engagement areas where fires must support maneuver, and any areas critical to the battlefield that require fire support.

Only after the commander's guidance and intent is clearly defined and understood can the FSO conduct planning, war gaming, and rehearsing of the operation with the commander and his battle staff.

Plan for contingencies. Have redundant systems in place, and rehearse their use before the battle starts.

Keep plans simple, but plan them in detail. Achieving synchronization depends on working out the time, space, and force details.

Widespread agreement among the staff is not necessarily a healthy sign. It could mean that the desire to find an agreement is overriding critical thinking.

Leaders/soldiers must conduct detailed reconnaissance whenever possible.

Understand the commander's intent two levels up.

Use troop-leading procedures effectively. Planning and rehearsals are often much more important than trying to create a perfect plan at the higher headquarters.

The essence of planning is to anticipate events. This includes sustainment planning. Anticipating support requirements means synchronizing support actions so that combat power is sustained or reconstituted in concert with the tactical plan.

Commanders also need to know the duration of their units' sustained combat power for the mission at hand, as well as the projected profile of the unit's fighting strength on the objective and for the "Be prepared ..." mission. They need to know how long fuel and ammunition supplies will allow them to fight - how and when combat power will be sustained or reconstituted.

Commanders and staffs must analyze and plan the use of available time in detail and not waste planning and preparation time.

RISK MANAGEMENT is a tool that helps leaders make sound logical decisions.

Risk management, in theory, is a five-step process that is easily integrated into he decision making process.

RISK ASSESSMENT is a part of risk management. A risk assessment causes leaders to identify hazards and threats and place them in perspective relative to the mission or task at hand.

e. Commander conducts the Quick Decision Making Process (QDMP) using the Troop Leading Procedures.

4. TF Commander Directs and Leads Subordinate Forces.

a. Prepare plans or orders.

The liberal use of easily recognizable graphic control measures is recommended.

Leaders should be provided a written order or, at a minimum, an annotated overlay in all but the most rapid reaction situations.

The TOC must be able to write and produce overlays in the field under all conditions.

Leaders must give the greatest amount of available time to subordinate leaders. Use no more than 1/3 of the available time for planning and preparation of the order. Provide no less than 2/3s of the available time for subordinate units to prepare for combat.

Time Management Lessons:

- Commander: Preserve subordinate commander's time.
- Commander and staff: Develop a planning and preparation timeline.
- Commander and staff: Refine the timeline by listing tasks to be accomplished during planning and preparation and the person responsible to complete the task.
- Commander and staff: Use the timeline to track the progression or preparation.

b. Issue orders.

In the OPORD, priority intelligence requirements and the decision support template need to be explained in detail so that reporting requirements are understood by all leaders and staff. Communicating IPB during the orders process helps focus task force leaders on the commander's intent.

The rapid distribution of well through out and complete written orders is necessary to provide time for reconnaissance, changes in task organization, rehearsals, and all of the other planning/preparation activities needed to make a solid concept workable under the stress of combat.

Verbal frag orders must go to everyone in the orders group, not just selected company commanders. If circumstances are such that the TF commander discusses the order with something less than the total group, the S-3 and/or TOC should provide pertinent information and specific implementing instructions to the others, e.g., mortars, ADA, engineers, S-1/S-4.

Once the Decision Support Template (DST) is complete, a copy is provided each commander so that if the task force commander, S3, or XO are out of the battle, the next senior officer can continue the fight or modify the plan, as necessary.

The commander must ensure everyone understands how he intends to fight the battle.

Employ clear/concise written orders:

- Clear written orders greatly reduce the fog of war to tired leaders. They provide a checklist for exhausted leaders to remind themselves what their mission and the commander's intent really is.
- The limiting factor on the conciseness of the order is how well the unit understands the commander's intent.

Use backbriefs:

- Immediately after the commander issues the order, his subordinates backbrief the commander on their tentative concepts of operations. If these are in line with the commander's intent, his subordinates understand the order. If not, the commander clarifies the plan. Ensure all slice elements backbrief.
- During preparation, the commander meets subordinates individually or together on the battlefield. Here, his subordinates backbrief their concept based on their actual recon. This ensures that any minor changes a subordinate implemented to make the plan fit ground truth still support the commander's intent.

Commanders must demand that key leaders discipline themselves to obtain a minimum level of rest.

Command and control elements are the first to feel the effects of CONOPS. Judgement abilities degrade more rapidly than physical strength and endurance.

A brief order that clearly defines the intent of the commander requires less effort to execute. It is better to provide a good plan quickly and to refine it later, than to delay preparation until the best plan is completed and time limited.

Control of FRAGO's and Warning Orders. Many units are running into difficulty when the TAC, Rear, and the Main issue FRAGO's and Warning Orders, especially when duplicate numbers are issued.

Hard copy follow-up on verbal orders/decisions. Many decisions are made in face to face discussions are made in face to face discussions between commanders. Sometimes problems arise when these discussions are away from the CP. This causes problems for the staff in synchronizing the various aspects of the operation as well as keeping the other players informed. Hard copy back up needs to be generated to assist in this process.

Establish a time line that includes all critical events. Stick to it religiously. Time management is essential to effective planning and preparation.

Doing all oneself simply will not work. There may be short-term success; but in the long run only disaster will result. Give subordinates responsibilities, train them to standard, give them authority, and hold them accountable.

Utilize backbriefs to check subordinate leaders' understanding of the overall plan and the commander's intent.

Commanders and staffs must be organized and prepared to produce operations orders quickly.

c. Provide command presence.

The task force Command Sergeant Major is a critical asset to the task force commander. He knows the standards the commander expects and needs. A task force, like any unit, needs to have high standards, tight discipline and loyalty to one commander. Establishing and maintaining loyalty and standards in a task force is a unique challenge, and the task force Command Sergeant Major is the soldier best suited to perform this task.

On the battlefield the Command Sergeant Major can position himself where leadership is most needed.

The Command Sergeant Major has the maturity, the wealth of experience and the rank to significantly and positively influence these missions. Commanders must consider METT-T and decide where this valuable asset can best be employed to affect the battle.

The Command Sergeant Major:

The Command Sergeant Major is the "ramrod" of the battalion. He makes sure things happen.

He advises the battalion commander on troop and logistical welfare and discipline manners.

The CSM can greatly assist by:

- Identifying, correcting, and bringing to the commander's attention NCO leadership problems.
- Moving with the commander to assess unit morale and logistics problems.

Good communications is always difficult, but stress and fatigue will greatly increase misunderstandings. Just because something is very clear to you, do not assume that it is clear to everyone else. Double-check communication. Use backbriefs and rehearsals. Staff visits and followups also foster good communication and can keep problems from recurring.

d. Maintain unit discipline.

Set the example for standards and early on issue clearly defined guidance on standards of conduct.

Don't set a standard of 100% all the time. You'll generate and perpetuate unethical situations to "meet" this standard.

All the NCOs, and even some of the more experienced soldiers of lower rank, must stay aware of the tactical situation and be prepare mentally to take charge.

The troops must be kept informed and the NCO must do it.

TACSOPs are critical in keeping the NCO chain, and thus the soldiers, informed of the right information at the right time.

Ensure soldiers and units are tasked evenly. Over tasking soldiers degrades combat performance. It is more than a question of combat effectiveness.

NCOs must instill and enforce field discipline in themselves first.

Ensure the TACSOP is complete, includes standards, is understood, and is used every time the trooper goes to the field. NCOs ensure compliance with the TACSOP.

The command sergeant major has a tremendous impact on the soldier's performance, team cohesion, and unit effectiveness. He looks out for the welfare of their men and can foster a positive command climate.

There are many factors that can create stress in combat operations: fatigue, anxiety, time, intense heat, battlefield uncertainty, et. Reactions to stress are varied, but there are clear indications, from combat experience and less stressful research and training environments, that soldier performance in command and control C2 operations can suffer.

Every soldier must know the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and have the discipline and training to apply these rules in the absence of supervision.

Training and discipline are key when the ROE change, becoming more restrictive on the use of force and leaders are unable to direct the actions of individual soldiers.

U.S. soldier conduct must be of the highest standard. It will influence how the world and U.S. public view the operation.

e. Synchronize tactical operations.

Synchronization of combat power is often best accomplished when battalion directly controls and assigns tasks to attached and supporting units.

The consequences of a lack of synchronization are so severe that OPSEC measures should not be permitted to degrade command and control at battalion level.

Intelligence updates: This technique involves a preplanned assembly of the battalion orders group. At this update leaders are briefed on intelligence gained since the OPORD briefing. The task force commander briefs his subordinates on any final modifications to the original plan based on this intelligence. Final face-to-face coordination is made.

Actual assembly of the orders group for the intelligence update is beneficial, especially:

- When plans must be modified and new graphics are required.
- To facilitate final face-to-face coordination after subordinates have finalized their plans.

All TOC personnel must understand the commander's concept and intent and what is supposed to happen at TAIs and NAIs. Supervisory personnel must be able to make basic tactical decisions, based on the situation, in the absence (for whatever the reason) of key leaders.

Adhere to a disciplined system of time management. Someone must establish a timed critical list based on each mission and enforce it. The 1/3-2/3 rule is a guide but METT-T dependent.

Rehearsals are critical to the successful execution of the operation.

Commanders must visualize the battlefield:

- Backbriefs and rehearsals provide the commander a visualization of what his subordinate units are/or should be doing at any point in the battle.
- The commander must plan and rehearse his own position and movement on the battlefield as carefully as is done for the overall TF plan. He must be forward to personally see critical points in the battle, yet protected in order to survive.
- Finally, practice and more practice is a necessity in learning to "see" or visualize the battlefield. No opportunity can be wasted to gain experience in this most critical warfighting skill.

Prioritize critical tasks and use available time to concentrate on those tasks.

Use daylight hours for preparation of operations. Preparation (i.e. selection of defensive positions, inspection of soldiers, reconnaissance, etc.) requires more visibility than execution or planning.

NCOs must help set priorities of work by clarifying through the chain of command what must be done.

The NCO must know and understand the commander's intent if he is to be effective and accomplish the unit's mission.

Without precombat checks and follow-up, no one knows if the unit is ready for battle.

If problems are found during a rehearsal, plans must be developed at all levels that allow incorporation of these changes into mission planning.

Commanders and staffs must schedule rehearsals to allow subordinate units time to complete their orders process.

5. Task Force's Command Posts Locate Where They Can Control the Preparation for and Transition to Battle.

a. Command Posts positioning enhances the Commanders exercise of command and control.

Commanders see by positioning themselves to physically observe as much as possible without becoming personally involved in the battle; by demanding fast, accurate, concise reports; by having the TOC provide processed information, partially from nets the commander cannot monitor; and through the use of scouts, OPs, and patrols.

The 24 hours a day war demands that TOC personnel be trained in all aspects of the TOC operation.

Destruction of the TOC, while a catastrophic loss, must not prevent the task force from continuing its mission.

The Admin/Log Center (ALC) assumes TOC operations when the TOC is destroyed or incapacitated, and continues until the TOC becomes operational or a replacement headquarters assumes control of task force operations. Criteria for assumption of this on-order mission must be specified in the unit tactical SOP.

Staff personnel from the ALC must be cross-trained to perform TOC functions with minimal loss of continuity of command and control.

The most important consideration when selecting a location to position the TOC is communication with the brigade TOC and with forward elements of the task force.

The TOC must be able to break-down, move and set-up quickly and with the minimum disruption to its operation.

b. CP security and survivability.

CCF 19 CRITICAL TASKS AND OTHER LINKAGES

TASK

1. Task Force Command Posts Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status

OTHER LINKAGES

- TF elements send SALUTE reports, personnel reports, and equipment reports to the Main CP and CTCP (STP 21-1-SMCT, 071-331-0802)
- Provide Unit Supply Support (ARTEP 7-94-MTP, 7-3-1306)
- Establish radio communications (ARTEP 7-94-MTP, 7-3-1404)
- Establish/maintain radio teletypewriter comms (ARTEP 7-94-MTP, 7-3-1405)
- Control maintenance operations (ARTEP 7-94-MTP, 7-3-1704)
- Prepare maintenance estimate (ARTEP 7-94-MTP, 7-3-1701)
- Subordinate elements prepare for future operations, establish and maintain comms: prepare for combat (ARTEP 7-94-MTP, 17-2-0101)
- Perform logistics planning (ARTEP 7-94-MTP, 17-2-0701)
- Command and control the Battalion Task Force (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3901)
- Perform S3 operations (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3902)
- Command group operations (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3903)
- Operate Main Command Post (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3904)
- Maintain communications (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3401)
- Operate FTCP (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3914)
- Operate CTCP (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3913)
- Operate Fire Support Section (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3908)

OTHER LINKAGES

- Report enemy information (STP 21-1-SMCT, 071-331-0803)
- Send a radio message (STP 21-1-SMCT, 113-571-1016)
- Use an Automated SOI (STP 21-24-SMCT, 113-573-8006)
- Transmit a voice United States Message Text Form (USMTF) message (STP 21-24-SMCT, 113-572-4008)
- Receive a USMTF message (STP 21-24-SMCT, 113-572-5005)
- Write a USMTF message (STP 21-24-SMCT, 113-572-6005)
- Read a USMTF message (STP 21-24-SMCT, 113-572-6006)
- Protect classified informatin and material (STP 21-24-SMCT, 301-348-6001)
- Prepare a Battalion SITREP (STP 21-24-SMCT, 071-332-5022)
- Coordinate Air Defense Artillery activities with Battery/Battalion staff (STP 44-14II-MQS, 01-0401.21-0003)
- Perform as ADA Liaison Officer (STP 44-14II-MQS, 01-0401.31-0019)
- Communicate effectively (STP 21-II-MQS, 03-9001.12-0002)
- Communicate effectively as a Commander or staff officer (STP 21-II-MQS, 03-9001.12-0003)
- Perform duties as TOC shift officer (STP 17-12II-MQS, 01-1250.00-0006)
- Provide communications support using FM voice communications (STP 11-25II-MQS, 01-5704.04-9001)
- Manage secure voice communications systems (STP 11-25II-MQS, 01-5735.04-0001)

TASK

OTHER LINKAGES

- Direct a Net Control Station operation (STP 11-25II-MQS, 01-5704.04-0003)
- Analyze battlefield spectrum management (STP 11-25II-MQS, 01-5701.07-0003)
- Direct communications requirements for a heavy light or light heavy integrated Task Force (STP 11-25II-MQS, 01-5840.07-0002)
- Employ communications system of a maneuver Brigade or Battalion (STP 11-25II-MQS, 01-5841.07.0001)
- Perform duties as a tactical operations center shift officer (STP 7-11II-MQS, 01-3317.04-0006)
- Evaluate engineer intelligence for dissemination (STP 5-211I-MQS, 01-2250.20-1005)
- Provide input to Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (STP 5-21II-MQS, 01-2250.20-1006)
- Conduct asset management (STP 34-35II-MQS, 01-3381.06-4007)
- Record intelligence and combat information (STP 34-35II-MQS, 01-3381.39-4003)
- Analyze intelligence and combat information (STP 34-35II-MQS, 01-3381.39-4004)
- Brief and debrief R&S assets (STP 34-35II-MQS, 01-3381.06-4012)
- Direct asset management (STP 34-35II-MQS, 01-3381.06-5001)
- Direct analysis and dissemination of information (STP 34-35II-MQS, 01-3381.41-5002)
- Conduct intelligence liaison (STP 34-35II-MQS, 01-3381.16-5001)
- 2. Assess Situation; the TF Commander visualizes the Battlefield
- TF elements maintain contact with the enemy and report: perform a route reconnaissance (ARTEP 17-57-10-MTP, 17-3-1017)

TASK

TASK

OTHER LINKAGES

- Perform an Area Reconnaissance (ARTEP 17-57-10-MTP, 17-3-1019)
- Conduct a Screen (ARTEP 17-57-10-MTP, 17-3-1023)
- Execute a dismounted patrol (ARTEP 17-57-10-MTP, 17-3-1024)
- Establish an Observation Post (ARTEP 17-57-10-MTP, 17-3-1039)
- Perform reconnaissance (ARTEP 17-57-10-MTP, 17-2-0202)
- Perform in IPB (all staff officers, e.g. ADLNO Perform in intelligence preparation of the 3d dimension battlefield activities [STP 44-14II-MQS, 01-0401.21-0013])
- Analyze Air Defense Artillery perspective of terrain (STP 44-14II-MQS, 01-0401.21-0002)
- Advise the Commander on the use of terrain for combat operations (STP 50-1II-MQS, 01-2250.20-1008)
- Advise maneuver Commander on employment of available of fire support assets (STP 6-13II-MQS, 01-2999.94-0106)
- Advise the Commander on NBC threat (STP 3-74II-MQS, 01-5090.02-2044)
- TF subordinate elements execute troop leading procedures: prepare for combat (ARTEP 71-1-MTP, 17-2-0101)
- Prepare battalion combat orders (STP 21-II-MQS, 01-3303.03-0013)
- Prepare an oral OPORD (STP 21-24-SMCT, 071-326-5626)
- Prepare an operations overlay (STP 21-24-SMCT, 071-332-5000)
- The TF staff and subordinate commanders lead and direct their sections and companies: build a cohesive unit or organization (STP 21-II-MQS, 01-9001.17-0003)

3. Determine Actions; TF Commander Directs Changes to the Operation or Plan

4. TF Commander Directs and Leads Subordinate Forces **OTHER LINKAGES**

- Establish a positive command climate (STP 21-II-MQS, 03-9001.11-0002)
- Conduct company and battalion operations according to the Law of War (STP 21-II-MQS, S1-9060.10-3000)
- Supervise construction of a fighting position (STP 21-24-SMCT, 071-326-5704)
- Supervise PMCS (STP 21-24-SMCT, 091-309-0710)
- Motivate subordinates to accomplish unit missions (STP 21-II-MQS, 03-9001.14-0002)
- Apply the ethical decision- making process as a Commander or staff officer (STP 21-II-MQS, 03-9001.10-0004)
- Administer military justice at company and battalion level (STP 21-II-MQS, 03-9080.10-3001)
- Inspect Personnel/Equipment (SPT 21-24-SMCT, 071-328-5301)
- Perform Battle Damage Assessment and Repair (ARTEP 7-94-MTP, 7-3-1711)
- Move a command post (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3035)
- Establish a command post (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3036)
- Operate battery/platoon command post (STP 44-14II-MQS, 01-0401.21-0018)
- Implement displacement of communications nodes (STP 11-25II-MQS, 01-5754.04-0002)
- Direct command post and tactical operations center internal security operations (STP 3-74II-MQS, 01-3761.00-1103)

TASK

5. Task Force's Command Posts Locate Where They Can Control the Preparation for and Transition to Battle

DIRECT AND LEAD UNITS IN PREPARATION FOR THE BATTLE REFERENCES

FMs

71-1	Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, Nov 88		
71-2	The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, Sept 88		
71-3	rmored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade, May 88		
71-123	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Battalion/Task Force, and Company/Team, Sept 92		
101-5	Command and Control for Commanders and Staff, "Final Draft", August 1993		
ARTEPs			
7-94-MTP	MTP for the Infantry Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Combat Support/Combat Service Support Platoons, Oct 89		
17-57-10-N	MTP for the Scout Platoon, Dec 88		
71-1-MTP	MTP for the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company and Company Team, Oct 88		

- 71-2-MTP MTP for the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, Oct 88
- 71-3-MTP MTP for the Heavy Brigade Command Group and Staff, Oct 88

TRADOC Pam

11-9 Blueprint of the Battlefield, May 91

Battle Command Battle Laboratory Publication

BATTLE COMMAND: Leadership and Decision Making for War and Operations Other Than War, Battle Command Battle Laboratory, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 94

CGSC ST

ST 101-5 Command and Staff Decision Processes, Jan 94

STPs

3-74II-MQS Military Qualification Standards II, Chemical Branch (74), Company Grade Officer's Manual, Mar 91

- 5-21II-MQS Military Qualification Standards II, Engineer (21), Company Grade Officer's Manual, Mar 91
- 6-13II-MQS Military Qualification Standards II, Field Artillery Branch (13), Company Grade Officer's Manual, Mar 91
- 7-11II-MQS Military Qualification Standards II, Infantry Branch (11), Company Grade Officer's Manual, Jul 91
- 11-25II-MQS Military Qualification Standards II, Signal Corps (25), Company Grade Officer's Manual, Aug 91
- 17-12II-MQS Military Qualification Standards II, Armor Branch (12), Company Grade Officer's Manual, Feb 91
- 21-II-MQS Military Qualification Standards II, Manual of Common Tasks for Lieutenants and Captains, Jan 91
- 21-1-SMCT Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Level 1, Oct 90
- 21-24-SMCT Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Levels 2-4, Oct 92
- 34-35II-MQS Military Qualification Standards II, Military Intelligence Branch (35), Company Grade Officer's Manual, Sept 91
- 44-14II-MQS Military Qualification Standards II, Air Defense Artillery Branch (14), Company Grade Officer's Manual, Jun 91

Lessons Learned Bulletins

- NTC Lessons Learned: Commanders Memorandum, Nov 85
- NTC Lessons Learned No 1: Seven Operating Systems, Jan 86
- NTC Lessons Learned No 2: Intelligence, May 86
- CALL Bulletin, No 1-86, July 86
- Lessons Learned by/for Division Commanders, Sept 86
- CALL Bulletin No 3, Sept 86
- NTC Lessons Learned CALL Bulletin No 4: Command and Control System, Feb 87
- CTC Lessons Learned No 88-2, May 88
- CALL Compendium, Vol 1: Heavy Forces, Fall 88
- CALL 89-1: Non-Mechanized Forces, Spring 89
- CALL 89-2: Heavy-Light Lessons Learned, Aug 89
- CALL: NCO Lessons Learned, Oct 89

CALL: Corps-Division Lessons Learned, Nov 89

CALL 90-1: Fire Support for the Maneuver Commander, Feb 90

CALL 90-6: The Musicians of Mars, Jun 90

CALL Newsletter No. 90-8: Winning in the Desert II, Sept 90

CALL 90-9: Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned, Volume I (Soldiers and Leadership), Oct 90

CALL 90-9: Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned, Volume II (Operations), Oct 90

CALL 90-9: Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned, Volume III (Intelligence, Logistics & Equipment), Oct 90

CALL Newsletter No 91-1: Rehearsals, Apr 91

CALL 92-5: Logistics Preparation of the Battlefield, Nov 92

CALL Newsletter No. 93-3: The Battalion and Brigade Staff, Jul 93

CTC Bulletin No 93-4, Jul 93

CALL 93-9: Force Protection, Dec 93

END NOTES

1. The 1993 publication of FM 101-5 "Draft" addresses the TF staff as follows:

<u>ronsonaroun</u> .		tive Officer and Sergeant Major	
Command Sergean Major			
Coordinating Staff Officers:		S1 (Personnel Officer/Adjutant)	
		S2 (Intelligence Officer)	
		S3 (Operations Officer)	
		S4 (Logistics Officer)	
		S5 (Civil-Military Officer, if assigned)	
Special Staff Officers:		S3/Air	
		Assistant S3	
		Fire Support Officer (FSO)	
		Communications-Electronics-Signal Officer (CESO)	
		Engineer	
		Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO)	
		Chemical Officer (CMLO)	
		Surgeon	
		Medical Platoon Leader	
		Chaplain	
Liaison Officers:	Air De	efense Liaison Officer (AD LNO)	
	Air Li	aison Officer (ALO)	
Aviat		on Liaison Officer (Avn LNO)	

2. At the time this task analysis was developed, the Army's doctrine and techniques for planning and decision making are under review. The Deliberate Decision Making Process (DDMP), Combat Decision Making Process (CDMP), and Quick Decision Making Process decision making process outlined in the 1993 publication of FM 101-5 "Draft" and the 1994 publication of ST 101-5 are the basis of the processes described in the task analyses of CCF 18, 19, 20.

The DDMP is described in CCF 18; the CDMP is described in CCF 19; and the QDMP is described in CCF 20.

3. See End Note 2.

4. See End Note 2.

5. The Concept, Planning and/or preparation, Execution, and Assessment (CPEA) methodology is contained in the 1994 publication of ST 101-5 and the 1994 publication of "Battle Command - Draft" from Fort Leavenworth Battle Command Battle Laboratory.

6. The 1993 publication of FM 101-5 "Draft" outlines Procedural and Positive (P2) Control, and how P2 affects the Commanders Risk Assessment. Procedural control and positive control differ in how commanders obtain control and in the degree of flexibility with which commanders make decisions. Specifically:

<u>Procedural Control</u> is indirect. Commanders use regulations; policies; doctrine; and tactics, techniques or procedures (TTPs)(including SOPs) to control subordinates' actions. However, procedural controls are unreliable when trying to predict the correct actions for all contingencies. They are also inflexible and restrictive and, consequently, tend to stifle individual initiative. Procedural controls are most effective in situations where:

- A commander must make a decision concerning future events.
- The situation is clear.
- Task identification is easy and reliably made.

Task accomplishment is implicitly understood and conforms to prescribed actions.

<u>Positive Control</u> is direct. It requires the active involvement of leaders to accomplish complex or vague tasks. However, positive control tends to overload leaders with information (or requests for information); increase their fatigue (as they attempt to be at all places at all times); and could cause subordinates to rely on the leader to make all important decisions. Positive control is most useful in dynamic situations where:

- Future events require a decision to implement one of several solutions.
- The situation is dynamic.
- Task identification is difficult.
- Task accomplishment if complex, implementing actions are multifaceted, and several sets of solutions are possible; each explicitly described and involving multiple means.

7. See End Note 2.

8. Moral Presence is described in the 1994 publication of "Battle Command" DRAFT, from the Fort Leavenworth Battle Command Battle Laboratory. The definition for moral presence is: 1. The commander's impact on the character or will of his subordinates. Results in businesslike attitude that permeates the command despite enemy contact and pressures; 2. The manner or demeanor the commander conveys to his troops and outsiders.

9. See End Note 2.