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RESTRUCTURING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD  
COMBAT DIVISIONS:  
ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS

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## ABSTRACT

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Force structure issues have been at the forefront of public debate especially since the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the Armed Forces released their report in May 1995. Much debate centers on the CORM recommendation to eliminate forces with low priority tasks or reorganize them to fill force shortfalls in higher priority areas. As an example, the CORM offered that the eight Army National Guard (ARNG) combat divisions could be used to fill Total Army shortfalls in combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) requirements. The CORM suggested this would still leave excess combat spaces that should be eliminated from the Active or Reserve Components. This paper examines issues relevant to force structure decisions and supports the CORM in that the ARNG combat divisions should be used to fix the CS/CSS force structure shortfalls. The paper also posits that the remaining ARNG combat divisions are relevant to maintaining an affordable cost-effective Total Army.

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LTC Carlow graduated from the University of Nebraska in 1968 and was commissioned as an Infantry lieutenant. He left active duty following a tour of duty in Vietnam and later joined the Nebraska National Guard. He earned an M.S. and Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and held mid management positions with the Farm Credit System for several years. He entered the Active Guard Reserve (AGR) program in 1985 after nearly 14 years as a traditional national guardsman. He served in several Infantry and Quartermaster assignments as a traditional guardsman. His AGR service includes assignments as National Guard Advisor to the Quartermaster General and Director of Army National Guard Programs at the Army Logistics Management College. He most recently served as Commander of Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny and is currently an Army Fellow at the Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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**RESTRUCTURING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD  
COMBAT DIVISIONS:  
ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS**

“Since significant elements of the eight National Guard divisions are located in 25 states which control 363 electoral votes, the precipitous restructuring . . . mandated by the PDM could very well affect the 1996 elections.”<sup>1</sup> The Department of Defense PDM (Program Decision Memorandum) was not issued.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, restructuring the eight Army National Guard combat divisions is not a dead issue. The purpose of this paper is to assess force structure issues and their implications for the future of the Army National Guard combat divisions.

Force structures, like roles and missions, are generally hotly contested issues. Despite the PDM not being issued, three factors are keeping force structure issues in the forefront of public scrutiny. First, the end of the Cold War has led to changes in our national security strategy and national military strategy. Second, expectations of peace dividends to finance social programs or reduce taxes are driving military budgets down at a faster pace than infrastructure and force structure adjustments. And third, the ongoing revolution in military affairs is expected to bring about fundamental changes in the ways in which the Army functions.

The latest rounds of force structure debates have been further fueled by the report of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the Armed Forces. The CORM was established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994



to "review . . . the appropriateness . . . of the current allocations of roles, missions, and functions among the Armed Forces; evaluate and report on alternative allocations; and make recommendations for changes in the current definition and distribution of those roles, missions, and functions."<sup>3</sup> One recommendation made by the CORM was to "[s]ize and shape the Reserve Component forces according to principles reflecting Total Force needs."<sup>4</sup> Five principles were identified as follows:

First, the Total Force should be sized and shaped to meet the military requirements of the national security strategy.

Second, because not all units need to maintain the same level of readiness, the Secretary of Defense should fully implement the policy of "tiered" resource allocation.

Third, Reserve Component forces with lower priority tasks should be eliminated or reorganized to fill force shortfalls in higher priority areas.

Fourth, the Services should ensure that individuals and units of the Reserve Components are fully incorporated into all relevant operational plans and actually used in the execution of those plans.

Fifth, greater integration and cooperation is required between Active and Reserve Components.<sup>5</sup>

As an example for applying the third principle, the CORM offered:

the Army has eight National Guard combat divisions with approximately 110,000 personnel spaces that were required for possible war with the former Soviet Union, but they are not needed for the current national security strategy. At the same time, the Army estimates that there is a shortage of 60,000 combat support and combat service support troops to adequately support the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps in two regional conflicts. The Secretary of Defense should verify this shortfall and direct the Army to restructure its combat divisions to provide the additional support forces needed. This would still leave the Total Army with about 50,000 more combat spaces than required. The excess should be eliminated, from the Active or Reserve Components.<sup>6</sup>

Given the difficulties in trying to field a force to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts with today's fiscal constraints, it is easy to understand why some could interpret the CORM example (versus recommendation) as a mandate or license to "precipitously" restructure the Army National Guard. What would be the impact of such restructuring upon the Army's ability to meet its requirements of the national military strategy? The final outcome remains to be seen but as reported in the September 25, 1995-edition of the Army Times, "a general officer steering committee" is studying the issues and "is to report its findings in March 1996."<sup>7</sup>

#### The Need for Change

In retrospect, the CORM recommendation should not be surprising.<sup>8</sup> There have been several calls for major changes to the military structure. When he unveiled his new defense policy on 2 August 1990--the day Iraq invaded Kuwait--former President Bush emphasized:

The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. If we simply pro-rate our reductions--cut equally across the board--we could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. *What we need are not merely reductions--but restructuring (emphasis added).*<sup>9</sup>

In an address to Congress in 1992, Senator Sam Nunn summarized similar congressional concern:

We should not go into the future with just a smaller version of our Cold War forces. We must prepare for a future with a fresh look at the roles and missions that characterized the past forty years. We must reshape,

reconfigure, and modernize our overall forces--not just make them small. We must find the best way to provide a fighting force in the future that is not bound by the constraints of the roles and missions outlined in 1948.<sup>10</sup>

In addition to statements such as these, both the Base Force<sup>11</sup> and Bottom-Up Review Force<sup>12</sup>, as will be discussed in greater detail later, showed a lessor need for Reserve Component combat power than currently available. But, how much is enough? How much should be cut? And, if tradeoffs are to be made, what should those tradeoffs be?

The Army Times reported four options being explored by the general officer steering committee: (1) redesign the divisions along functional lines; (2) redesign the divisions for specific missions; (3) leave the divisions configured as they are, but tag

**Table 1. Army National Guard Combat Division Redesign Alternatives.**

- |   |
|---|
| <p>1. <b>Function Heavy Divisions:</b> Divisions organized around a standardized division headquarters "heavied up" with units from a specific functional area (Aviation, Field Artillery, etc.). Attached units are composed of standard units that when deployed are placed under the command and control of doctrinal headquarters.</p> <p>2. <b>Specific Mission Divisions:</b> Division size forces organized to perform specific missions not currently primary missions of any military organization. The purpose of each division is to provide expert formations for the accomplishment of a mission required by the national command authority but which distract combat divisions from their primary tasks.</p> <p>3. <b>Active Component Augmentation Divisions:</b> Divisions retain the design of the Army's standard combat divisions. Division elements may be used to satisfy general support requirements at the echelon above division level to meet specific structure shortfalls.</p> <p>4. <b>Combined Arms Divisions:</b> Divisions consist of a division headquarters that provides command and control for a variety of attached combat, combat support and combat service support units. Attached units are composed of standard units that when deployed are placed under the command and control of doctrinal headquarters.</p> |
|---|

Source: HQ U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations briefing to General Officer Work Group, 14 July 1995.

specific units to meet combat support and combat service support shortfalls; and (4) create combined-arms divisions.<sup>13</sup> Table 1 provides a more detailed description of each

of these alternatives. The adjutants general and division commanders within the Army National Guard are also studying a number of alternatives.

Before proceeding to a qualitative assessment of issues which bear upon force structure decisions, it is important to gain a basic understanding of the Reserve Component of the Army.

### The Reserve Component

The Total Army consists of the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC).<sup>14</sup> The RC consists of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR). Because three components form the Total Army, all must be part of any restructure considerations. That makes it important to understand some of the defining characteristics of the RC.<sup>15</sup>

The ARNG basically consists of units, i.e., detachments, companies, battalions, brigades, divisions, etc. These units have both a state and federal mission. As the primary federal military reserve, the ARNG's mission is to "maintain properly trained and equipped units available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency or as otherwise needed."<sup>16</sup> The state mission is to "provide trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or as otherwise required by state laws."<sup>17</sup> The ARNG is in the peacetime "command" of the governors of the several (54) states, territories, and District of Columbia.


In contrast, the USAR does not have a state role. The USAR is a federal reserve which provides trained units and individuals to the Total Army upon

mobilization. Individuals of note for this discussion are Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) and those that make up the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). IMAs, like reservists and guardspeople who belong to units, are members of the Selected Reserve. They actively participate in training and are preassigned to AC units in positions to be filled upon mobilization. IRRs are not members of the Selected Reserve. They are primarily individuals who have had some training or prior service but are no longer required to meet the same training requirements of the Selected Reserve. Most USAR units are in the peacetime command of the United States Army Reserve Command, a subordinate command of the United States Atlantic Command. USAR individuals (IRR and IMAs) are in the peacetime control of the United States Army Reserve Personnel Center.

Under Section 12304 (formerly Section 673b) of Title 10, U.S. Code, the President has the authority, without prior declaration of a war or national emergency, to call up 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve of all military components (includes ARNG and USAR units and IMAs) involuntarily for not more than 270 days.<sup>18</sup> Note this does not include the IRR. To include the IRR in a mobilization according to 10 USC 12302 (formerly 673), the President would first have to declare a national emergency. He then would have the authority to order up to 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve (includes the Selected Reserve and IRR) to serve up to 24 consecutive months on active duty. Full mobilization requires a declaration of war or national emergency and approval of Congress.

## A Model for Assessment of Force Structure Alternatives

The model displayed in Figure 1 serves two purposes. First, it identifies broad issues relevant to force structure decision making. Second, it provides the outline this paper will follow in seeking out and presenting more specific issues and their implications to the future of the eight ARNG combat divisions.



**Figure 1.** A model for assessing force structure alternatives.

The model is meant to portray the interrelationship of the many factors that need to be considered in making force structure decisions. It weighs US national interests with US capabilities to execute the strategy. National interests are expressed in the national security and national military strategies. Capabilities to execute the strategy are encompassed in the Bottom-Up Review force. The model also weighs the costs and risks associated with protecting US national interests. Costs are constrained by the budget. Risks relate to readiness, modernization, and infrastructure. Arrows going up,

down, and diagonally across the model illustrate the complexities involved in force structure decision making. Change in any of the factors will cause change in the others.

At the center of the model are alternatives to the force in being. In this case the force in being is the Bottom-Up Review force. The model shows that alternative force structures will generate different costs and risks in executing the national security and national military strategy.

The umbrella at the top of the figure illustrates the overarching influence of the body politic. The body politic, although not all inclusive, includes the President and his administration, congress, the services and components as institutions, the defense industry, and professional organizations such as the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), the Reserve Officers Association (ROA), and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA).

The discussion which follows will address each component of the model for assessing force structure alternatives. Implications for the future of the ARNG combat divisions will evolve from the discussion.

#### The National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy

The traditional fog of war has a political antithesis, the fog of post-Cold War peace. The fog of the post-Cold War peace is in identifying the threat to our national interests and strategies to deal with the threat. From the end of World War II to the demise of the Soviet Union the threat to US national interests was easy to identify: the Soviet Union. Knowing the threat, strategies could readily be conceived that would

produce the capabilities to ensure that the threat would not infringe on the nation's interests. Now, as MacGregor Knox described the threat situation, "as the end of the twentieth century approaches, the industrial democracies face a prospect increasingly resembling the one Hitler described chillingly in a speech of November 1930 and did his best to realize thereafter".<sup>19</sup>

To the multitudes who now preach that we are entering an era of peace, I can only say my dear fellows, you have badly misinterpreted the horoscope of the age, for it points not to peace, but to war as never before. (Speech at Mannheim, November 5, 1930, transcript, p.5, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, Munich, IfZgFa88, Fasa. 54).

In today's context, what is this "war as never before" and how does the US prepare for it?

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement<sup>20</sup> and the accompanying National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement,<sup>21</sup> both published in February 1995, lay out the current administration's answers to the above question for the US.

The US national security strategy of engagement and enlargement is "based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to [the] nation, . . . allies, and [national] interests."<sup>22</sup> There are three central components to the strategy: "efforts to enhance . . . security by maintaining a strong defense capability and promoting cooperative security measures; work to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth; and . . . promotion of democracy abroad."<sup>23</sup>

The national security strategy recognizes four primary threats to US national interests. First, the threat of regional instability promoted by rogue states, militant



nationalism, and ethnic and religious conflicts pose a serious danger. Second, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to hostile regional powers or terrorist groups is viewed as a grave concern. Third, transnational dangers such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, rapid population growth and refugee flows have serious security implications. And fourth, dangers to democratic reform throughout central and eastern Europe, with Russia in particular, could result in setbacks or reversals that will threaten US interests.

To counter these threats and support the national security strategy, the Administration endorsed the work of the Bottom-Up Review, e.g., to field a force “sufficient to help defeat aggression in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.”<sup>24</sup> In addition to deterring and defeating aggression in major regional conflicts (MRCs), the robust and flexible military forces envisioned must also have the capacity to “[provide] a credible overseas presence . . . [counter] weapons of mass destruction . . . [contribute] to multilateral peace operations . . . [and support] counter terrorism efforts and other National Security Objectives.”<sup>25</sup> The other National Security Objectives include fighting drug trafficking; protecting the lives and safety of Americans abroad; providing training and advice to friendly governments threatened by subversion, lawlessness or insurgency; providing assistance to victims of floods, storms, drought and other humanitarian disasters; and, continuing as a world leader in space.

The national military strategy subsumes those elements in the national security strategy that are military. Those elements fall into one of three components to the national military strategy: peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention,

and fighting and winning our Nation's wars. Peacetime engagement describes a "broad range of non-combat activities undertaken by [the] Armed Forces that demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, relieve suffering, and in many other ways enhance regional security."<sup>26</sup> Peacetime engagement includes such things as military-to-military contacts, nation assistance, security assistance, humanitarian operations, counterdrug and counterterrorism activities, and peacekeeping. Deterrence and conflict prevention is "a combination of efforts to deter threats to our security and interests as well as a series of other actions . . . to restore stability, security, and adherence to international law."<sup>27</sup> Nuclear deterrence receives the highest priority. Other examples of deterrence and conflict prevention include actions to form regional alliances, crisis response, arms control, sanctions enforcement, and peace enforcement. Fighting and winning our Nation's wars remains the primary mission of the Armed Forces. The intent of the military strategy is to be able to commit sufficient force to achieve clearly defined objectives in a prompt and decisive manner. Overseas presence and power projection are key ingredients to the military strategy. Also, imbedded in the military strategy is an increasing reliance on the RC.

The national security and national military strategies have opened the door to debate and speculation, debate over the relevancy of the two-MRC scenario and speculation about the extent to which "engagement and enlargement" or "flexible and selective engagement" will detract the Armed Forces from their primary mission. Both of these issues have major implications for the size and shape of forces needed.

A review of the related literature from outside the uniformed military

establishment reveals a common argument for a force sufficient to fight and win one MRC vice two. Williamson Murray argues that, "two major regional contingencies at the same time . . . has no basis in American historical experience . . . [T]he Department of Defense needs to set a more realistic strategic assessment for the current force structure. Such an assessment would posit that at most the United States will confront one major regional conflict . . . The new force structure would certainly need fewer carrier battle groups, fewer conventional army divisions, and fewer air force fighter wings."<sup>28</sup> Eliot Cohen observed that, "[t]he Bottom Up Review's chief premise was that the next war, and future conflicts for which the United States should size its military, would be reruns of the 1991 Gulf War. This proposition, dubious enough for the next decade, appears absurd if one looks further ahead . . . The military will have to . . . shrink to perhaps a million men and women, reduce its reliance on the permanent forward deployment of combat units, and concede that some missions are simply too large for it to handle alone."<sup>29</sup> Another point of view offered by Andrew Krepinevich noted that in no instances since 1945 while engaged in conflict "did the United States confront a second major regional conflict. Moreover, it is doubtful that a second major regional contingency would occur on short notice . . . [and] . . . It seems unlikely that the American people would sanction involvement in two major regional conflicts if the nation's principal allies refused support for either contingency. Given these considerations, . . . planners appear to be overpurchasing insurance by mandating a U.S. capability to wage two wars unilaterally."<sup>30</sup>

While major regional conflicts may represent the greatest danger to US security,

recent history indicates that the most likely use of military forces will be for peace operations and operations other than war (OOTW).<sup>31</sup> But, at present it is unclear how far the strategy of “engagement and enlargement” will lead in that direction. Certainly there is ample opportunity for major commitments. A recent National Defense Council Foundation report noted 71 little wars where turmoil disrupted economics, politics or security in 1995. This represented one more than in 1994 and double the number in the organization’s first tally in 1989.<sup>32</sup>

The national security strategy outlined a framework for US decision making on when and how to employ US forces. The decision is “dictated first and foremost by our national interests. In those specific areas where our vital or survival interests are at stake, our use of force will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral. In other situations posing a less immediate threat, our military engagement must be targeted selectively on those areas that most affect our national interests . . . [I]n all cases the costs and risks of US military involvement must be judged to be commensurate with the stakes involved.”<sup>33</sup>

The framework poses several questions for consideration before committing military forces: “Have we considered non-military means that offer a reasonable chance of success? Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission? What is the environment of risk we are entering? What is needed to achieve our goals? What are the potential costs--both human and financial--of engagement? Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives? Do we have timelines and milestones that will reveal the extent of success or failure, and, in either

case, do we have an exit strategy?"<sup>34</sup> With troops in Bosnia today it is clear that answers to these questions did not stop their deployment despite polls indicating two out of three Americans opposed the mission a week before it was to get underway and despite the House having voted its disapproval twice.<sup>35</sup>

The issue is not whether the US will engage in peace operations and OOTW, but how to balance force structure between needs for major regional conflicts and needs for peace operations and OOTW. This presupposes peace operations and OOTW demand very different military organizations than we are currently fielding. Certainly there would be a greater need for soldiers on the ground than for aircraft carriers sitting offshore. And the needed mix of soldiers on the ground could be much different from a mix that can be made available from the current divisional structure. Then too, can the US military afford to structure especially for peace operations and OOTW while drawing down, or will existing organizations have to suffice?

#### The Bottom-Up Review

The CORM recognized in a footnote to their example for reorganizing units with low priority tasks to areas of higher priority that the eight ARNG combat divisions were assigned missions under the BUR albeit they did not fit into the war-fight. Those missions were to provide the basis for wartime rotation, serve as a deterrent hedge to future adversarial regimes, and support civil authorities at home. The CORM went on to state that, "We believe eight divisions is too large a force for these secondary missions."<sup>36</sup> Indeed, in their example, the CORM suggested that the Total Army would

remain over strength by 50,000 combat spaces after meeting combat support and combat service support requirements from the ARNG combat divisions.

Much has been written about the BUR and little of it is favorable. Criticism generally centers on arguments that the threat does not justify the size of the force, the force is the wrong composition for the threat, and the force is not affordable. The force structure adjustment example offered by the CORM appeases each of these arguments. The adjustment would leave room to reduce the size of the Total Army, change its composition, and make it less costly.

The Total Army shares of the BUR force and changes which have taken place since the end of the Cold War are shown in Table 2. The five+ reserve division equivalents of the BUR force are in the form of 15 ARNG Enhanced Readiness Brigades. Not shown are the eight ARNG combat divisions and three other brigade size elements. Whereas the 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades are envisioned to be deployable in 90 days to reinforce the AC in a first MRC or enter a second MRC, the remaining ARNG combat forces would not be needed to execute the strategy of winning two nearly simultaneous MRCs.

The force structure to support the "excess" combat capabilities was agreed upon through a series of "off-site" meetings involving the AC, ARNG, and USAR. The "off-site" agreement established the end state force structure numbers. The agreement also established that the ARNG would remain a balanced warfighting force while the USAR would focus on combat service support at echelons above corps. This required some shifting of units between the ARNG and USAR.<sup>37</sup>

**Table 2. Cold-War to Bottom-Up Review Changes to the Army.**

	Cold-War FY 89	Bush Base Force	BUR Force	Reduction Cold-War to BUR
AC Div	18	12	10	44.4%
RC Div <sup>(1)</sup>	10	6 <sup>(2)</sup>	5 <sup>(3)</sup>	
End Strength				
AC	770K	535K	495K	35.7%
RC	776K	550K	575K	25.9%
ARNG	457K		367K	19.7%
USAR	319K		208K	34.8%
Total Army	1,546K	1,085K	1,070K	30.8%

(1) All RC combat divisions are in the ARNG. (2) Represents six full divisions plus two cadre divisions.

(3) Represents 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades.

Sources: William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, (Washington, D.C., February 1995), p. C-1. Leslie Lewis, C. Robert Roll, and John D. Mayer, Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Assessment of Policies and Practices for Implementing the Total Force Policy, (Rand, 1992), p. 54. Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, (Department of Defense, October 1993), pp. 28, 30.

The Army's ability to execute the 2-MRC strategy with the BUR force structure was addressed by General Dennis Reimer, Army Chief of Staff, before a group of RC "off-site" leaders in August 1995 and by General Ronald Griffith, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, before the NGAUS in September 1995. General Reimer stated "his unequivocal opinion that the active duty component of the Army requires 10 combat divisions and 495,000 personnel . . . [and he] . . . also stated his full support for the strength levels in the "off-site" agreement."<sup>38</sup> General Griffith's comments noted, "The Army does not have too much structure. We do have structure that our CINCs [Commanders in Chief] do not require for their war fight, [i.e., the eight Army National Guard combat divisions] but our CINCs also have force shortfalls that we must try to meet."<sup>39</sup>

What are the shortfalls to which General Griffith was referring? It so happens

that the shortfalls are in areas that if addressed would strengthen the Total Army's ability to fight the 2-MRC scenario and conduct peace operations and OOTW. Those shortfalls are in certain combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) structures.

The Total Army has long shorted itself on CS and CSS structure, as evidenced by the unresourced structure carried in COMPO-4<sup>40</sup>, in order to retain combat capabilities. Negative consequences of this practice came to fore with Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm when the Army had difficulty in providing adequate support forces. The problem, partly related to the incremental manner of RC call-ups, was exacerbated by the transition that the Army was undergoing at the time to the Army of Excellence (AOE). Several logistics units, especially RC units, were not yet equipped or structured to perform missions according to AOE doctrine. As a result, improvisation was the norm. To meet requirements, the Army deployed: all available water supply companies and other support units that had been converted to perform this function; all graves registration units; all available pipeline and terminal operations companies; all heavy truck units and virtually all available medium truck units; virtually every unit that handles enemy prisoners of war; and, virtually all available postal units.<sup>41</sup>

Two Government Accounting Office (GAO) studies concluded in early 1995 that the Army will remain challenged to support the national military strategy with the BUR force. The GAO's examination of the requirements for 17 types of support units contained in plans for two particular regional conflicts showed that the Army "(1) lacks a total of 238 units to meet the requirements of a single conflict and (2) has tasked 654



units to support combat operations in both conflicts.”<sup>42</sup> Most unit shortages for the 2-MRC scenario were for medical (96), engineer (59), quartermaster (59), military police (52), and transportation (72).<sup>43</sup> In their review of the impact of peace operations on military capabilities to respond to regional conflicts, the GAO concluded that peace operations have heavily stressed some capabilities, “including certain Army support forces such as quartermaster and transportation . . . [and] . . . it could be difficult to disengage these support units . . . from a peace operation and redeploy them to an MRC [as envisioned in the BUR].”<sup>44</sup>

The Army recently completed the Total Army Analysis 2003 (TAA-03). The Total Army Analysis is a computer assisted process used to determine support force requirements with given combat formations and differing scenarios. TAA-03 confirmed a shortage of close to 60,000 CS and CSS troops to meet requirements. Although the Department of Defense did not completely concur with the GAO findings noted above, the TAA-03 which was completed after the GAO studies seemingly confirms potentially serious shortfalls in CS and CSS capabilities even for 1-MRC.

It is recognized that US involvement in peace operations and OOTW would most likely be as part of a multinational effort. Nevertheless, according to the BUR, the prudent level of forces that should be planned for a major intervention or peace enforcement operation would include the following Army elements; one air assault or airborne division, one light infantry division, one mechanized infantry division, special operations forces, civil affairs units, and CS and CSS units. These capabilities would be provided by the same forces projected to take part in MRCs. Therefore, as stated in the

BUR, "the United States would have to forgo the option of conducting sizable peace enforcement or intervention operations at the same time it was fighting two MRCs."<sup>45</sup>

How should the Army prepare for war and the wide array of potential peace and OOTW missions? According to General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. while commander of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, "[the Army's] decision has been to prepare for the most demanding of these - war. [The Army's] focus [is] on training to develop the right skills, knowledge, and organization for war, and then transition to the specific requirements of each OOTW as it develops. [The Army] also decided to develop a versatile doctrine, one that stresses principles" and therefore, is less prescriptive than past doctrine.<sup>46</sup> This portends evolving rather than rigid perspectives on peace operations and OOTW based on capabilities of the current force structure. As stated by Major General Steven L. Arnold when serving as the Army's Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, "the Army does not believe it is necessary to create units specifically for peacekeeping duties" because a major strength of the Army is its ability to tailor forces to the situation.<sup>47</sup> Will this approach to peace operations and OOTW be sufficient to support the national security strategy of "engagement and enlargement"?

The BUR has been criticized for failing to address unconventional threats.<sup>48</sup> In the past the US has counted on its warfighting capabilities primarily in conventional forces to deter aggression. It would be difficult and speculative at best to identify specific cases where this type of deterrence worked but we know it did not work against Iraq, Vietnam, or Somalia. The US lost the Vietnam War and several would argue that

the Somalia operation was less than a success. The way in which the US pulverized Iraq in 100 hours following a highly successful air war should give reason for potential adversaries to avoid US military strengths and resort to unconventional and other forms of conflict<sup>49</sup> that will neutralize US technological and brute force advantages.

Are there other cracks in the Total Army force structure, e.g., where the Army may have difficulties in providing required forces to execute missions according to doctrine or to fix doctrinal shortfalls? Yes.

One such crack is in post-conflict operations. Post-conflict operations “focus on restoring order and minimizing confusion following the operation, reestablishing the host nation’s infrastructure, preparing forces for redeployment, and continuing presence to allow other elements of national power to achieve the overall strategic aims.”<sup>50</sup>

Robert H. Schultz, Director of the International Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, wrote “US policy and strategy for post-conflict missions is in a very rudimentary state, at best.”<sup>51</sup> Redeployment from war, e.g., the Gulf War and the Cold-War, stressed the Army. Added stress was caused by the significant amount of resources required to demobilize the logistics support.

Another crack in Total Army force structure could become the “Achilles’ Heel” in US power projection. The crack is the absence of adequate forces to provide air base ground defense (ABGD) for forward-based aircraft in hostile environments. Richard F. Ballard, Senior Service College Fellow at the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, demonstrated the need for combat forces versus military police (which are in short supply) to provide external air base ground defense.<sup>52</sup> While this is a mission

which has been largely ignored by the Army and the Air Force, the cost of aircraft and power projection considerations warrant a change in emphasis.

Finally, the BUR requires the ARNG Enhanced Readiness Brigades to be deployable in 90 days. Meeting a 90-day milestone for deployment will necessitate intensive pre- and post-mobilization training programs. The problem is that the AC does not have adequate forces for opposing forces (OPFOR) or training personnel to meet projected requirements.<sup>53</sup>

#### Costs and Budget

No matter how you slice the budget pie, the pieces are not big enough to fill the accounts to finance force structure, readiness, and modernization of the BUR force. That was the general conclusion of several studies following the release of the BUR. Among such studies, the GAO estimated that a five-year funding shortfall could reach \$150 billion or even higher.<sup>54</sup> The Congressional Budget Office estimated a long-term funding shortfall of \$12-\$25 billion per year once the BUR posture was in place.<sup>55</sup> Anthony Cordsman figured the US would need to spend \$260-\$275 billion a year in constant Fiscal Year (FY)-1994 dollars to achieve force improvements, fund readiness, and maintain the defense industrial base.<sup>56</sup>

Department of Defense officials subsequently recognized that they faced a potential gap of \$49 billion between projected and likely Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) 1996-2001 costs. The \$49 billion gap was "fixed" in the FY 1996-2001 budget by adding \$25 billion to the budget, claiming \$12 billion savings from lower inflation

projections, and making \$12 billion in reductions and changes to program plans.<sup>57</sup> The resulting budget totals are depicted in Table 3.

The budget shows some real growth in the last two years of the FYDP. Much of this real growth is to begin the recapitalization of US forces. Budget authority for procurement will experience a real increase of 47% over the FYDP.<sup>58</sup> Some would argue that the increase is too little too late. From FY-1990 to FY-1996 procurement suffered a real decrease of nearly 59% (\$81.4b to \$39.4b in current \$). At the same time research, development, testing and evaluation decreased nearly 20% in real terms (\$36.5b to \$34.3b in current \$).<sup>59</sup>

**Table 3.** Department of Defense National Defense Budget Authority (\$Billions).

	FY1995	FY1996	FY1997	FY1998	FY1999	FY2000	FY2001
DoD Military	\$252.6	\$246.0	\$242.8	\$249.7	\$256.3	\$266.2	\$276.6
DoE <sup>(1)</sup> & other	10.9	11.8	10.6	9.9	9.9	9.9	9.9
Total	263.5	257.8	253.4	259.6	266.3	276.0	286.5
% real change	-1.9	-5.3	-4.1	-0.1	-0.2	+1.1	+1.2

(1) Department of Energy.

NOTE: Includes \$2.6 billion FY 1995 supplemental appropriations request for contingency operations.

Source: William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, (Washington, D.C., February 1995), p. 272.

More recently, concerns for the affordability of the BUR force have been heightened by an ongoing political battle to achieve a seven-year balanced budget. The president declined to veto or sign a \$243 billion defense appropriations bill that became law on 30 November 1995. An FY-1996, \$264.7 billion defense budget was finally

accepted in early February 1996, but the US was still without a federal budget at the end of the second quarter of the fiscal year. And, even though the approved FY-1996 defense budget was \$6.9 billion more than requested, future budgets will surely be much less generous. Don M. Snider sees cutbacks of 20% or more in real terms that will cause a defense "train wreck" if the BUR force is allowed to remain in place.<sup>60</sup>

The Total Army share of the FY-1996-1997 request is shown in Table 4. ARNG and USAR budgeted amounts for personnel, operations & maintenance, and military construction are included in ARNG and USAR totals. The AC budget is broken out by budget category. The Total Army budget for FY-1996 was just more than 24% of the total military budget request. Of the Total Army budget, just more than 9% was to fund the ARNG.

It is readily apparent that major savings for the Total Army cannot be squeezed from the RC. Total elimination of the RC would only "save" 14% of the Total Army budget. Such savings would not even cover the kind of cutback envisioned by Snider.

The eight ARNG combat divisions will cost approximately \$1.5 billion, less than \$200 million per division, for operations in FY-1996. This amounts to only 2.5% of the Total Army budget.<sup>61</sup> Operating costs for AC divisions will be in the range of \$950-\$975 million per division, more than four times the cost of an ARNG division. Nearly 84% of the operating costs of the ARNG divisions are personnel costs; about 48% for drilling soldiers, i.e., part-time soldiers (also referred to as M-Day soldiers), and 36% for full-time support personnel, i.e., Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) and military technicians. The remaining 16% of total costs are for OPTEMPO, flying hours

programmed (FHP), ammunition, and depot maintenance.<sup>62</sup>

**Table 4. Department of the Army Total Obligation Authority (\$Millions).**

	FY1995 <sup>(1)</sup>	FY1996	FY1997
Military Personnel, Army (MPA)	\$20,697	\$19,721	\$19,483
Operation & Maintenance, Army (OMA)	18,662	18,185	17,628
Procurement	6,878	6,250	5,852
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDTE)	5,481	4,444	4,241
Military Construction, Army (MCA)	550	473	492
Base, Realignment and Closure (BRAC)	114	305	325
Family Housing	1,184	1,381	1,400
ARNG	5,956	5,540	5,519
USAR	3,459	3,213	3,110
Total	62,962	59,513	58,050

(1) FY 1995 includes the following requested Emergency Contingency Supplemental funding: MPA-\$69300; OMA-\$958,600 ; OPA-\$28,600 ; Total-\$1,056,500. FY 1995 OMA also includes \$2.5m for the National Board for Promotion of Rifle Practice.

Source: The Army Budget, (Army Budget Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management & Comptroller, HQ, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., April 1995), p. 26.

Restructuring ARNG combat divisions to make up for CS and CSS shortfalls will not produce a panacea for the budget ills. There may be minor long term savings in full-time support requirements assuming CS and CSS structure is not as maintenance intensive as combat formations. However, even today full-time support requirements for the combat divisions are not being met and it is doubtful that the current level of manning would be excessive for CS and CSS requirements. Some savings could come from the 16% of total costs for OPTEMPO, etc., because CS and CSS units are

generally less costly to operate than combat units. However, in the broader scheme of the total budget, a potential savings represented by a small part of 16% of \$1.5 billion is rather insignificant.

Another aspect of restructuring the ARNG combat divisions is the cost of the restructuring itself. The restructuring would involve swapping out equipment, probable restationing of units, and major retraining programs. While these requirements represent a considerable one time cost, finding the dollars to accomplish all requirements from the current budget would be extremely problematic.

### Risks

Risks to the BUR force due to restrictive budgets would be manifested in decreased readiness, inadequate modernization, and deteriorating infrastructure. The question becomes how much risk is acceptable for how long? At some point something has to happen, i.e., increase defense spending, decrease operational demands, and/or change or reduce force structure.

Readiness is the Department of Defense number one priority.<sup>63</sup> To maintain AC readiness, the Army has fixed the Operation and Maintenance (OMA) account to the extent possible at the fiscal year 1995 level. OMA pays for day to day operations of the operating forces, mobilization requirements, training and recruiting, and administration, logistics, communications and other service-wide support functions. High operational demands, i.e., the combination of operating missions and OPTEMPO, are the greatest near term threats to readiness. Not counting soldiers stationed overseas and the Bosnia



mission, on a daily average the Army has approximately 19,000 soldiers deployed to 77 countries. This represents a 300% increase in operational deployments since 1990.<sup>64</sup> Other services have seen like increases in operating demands. In his analysis of the situation, Robert Gaskin stated, "Aside from the rhetoric, one thing is clear, American military forces are approaching burnout."<sup>65</sup>

Readiness has been funded at the expense of modernization. Army Procurement and Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDTE) accounts are down to \$10.6 billion in FY-1996 from \$19.1 billion in FY-1990, a real decrease of nearly 53%. The buildup during the Reagan years and ongoing redistribution of equipment from Europe has cushioned effects of cuts to the Procurement accounts. However, a serious void exists in the budget for current and future needs for tactical trucks and other program funding is precarious at best. Budget shortfalls have already caused the Army to cancel the Armored Gun System.

The Army is banking on Force XXI for the future. A key to getting from here to there is capitalizing on the revolution in military affairs (RMA) brought on by information age technology. This will require a strong commitment to RDTE. "At least \$3 billion more a year is needed if the Army is to reach modernization goals by the year 2010."<sup>66</sup>

Power projection is a major ingredient of the National Military Strategy. To be effective, installations must have an adequate infrastructure. However, infrastructure investments in maintenance (OMA financed) and new construction (MCA) are grossly underfunded. The Army has identified more than \$735 million in infrastructure

improvements alone which will have to be spread over several years. Requirements include rail upgrades, airfield improvements, enhancements in warehousing, shipping containers, and rail cars.<sup>67</sup>

While the military is having difficulty in caring for its infrastructure, it is having even more difficulty in shedding itself of an excess infrastructure. Savings from the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) are slow in coming due to environmental cleanup and other unanticipated costs and delays in completing the closures or realignments. Future savings will be less than envisioned without additional BRACs. The BRAC of 1995 did not result in the "mother of all BRACs" as anticipated.

The RC is also suffering from restrictive budgets. Areas of greatest concern are depot and real property maintenance, new construction, and full-time support manning. In the ARNG alone, full-time support requirements versus authorizations are approximately 79,400 versus 49,100, a fill rate of less than 60%.<sup>68</sup> RC units rely heavily on full-time support personnel to maintain readiness goals.

Depot and real property maintenance budgets for the ARNG will fund only about 33% and 30% of requirements respectively. For the USAR, the funding request will cover about 47% of the total recognized backlogs. In addition, for the ARNG and USAR, the backlog of unfunded construction is on the order of several billions of dollars while new construction is on a virtual hold.<sup>69</sup> Some repair and construction delays may be justifiable while the drawdown and restationing of units occur. However, many requirements will remain regardless of what happens with the drawdown and will only get more costly the longer the delay.

Problems caused by turbulence in the Total Army are magnified in the RC. The number one problem related to readiness is getting the RC soldier retrained to new military occupational skills (MOS) required of new organizations. In the AC soldiers are moved around to meet skill requirements. In the RC, moving M-Day soldiers to fill skill imbalances is not an option. RC units must recruit and train new soldiers, recruit already qualified soldiers, or retrain onboard soldiers. If large numbers are involved, retraining requirements place a considerable strain on the Total Army School System so the process could stretch out for years. In the meantime, the units impacted cannot meet readiness and deployment standards. Even without added requirements caused by restructuring turbulence, projected school and special training requirements in the ARNG for the period FY-1996 through FY-1999 exceeds budgeted amounts by several millions of dollars.<sup>70</sup>

#### The Body Politic and Total Force Policy

Thus far, the model for assessing force structure alternatives (Figure 1) has generated several issues and questions. Responses to the issues and questions will involve the body politic and application of the Total Force Policy.

The Total Force Policy was established and is propagated by the body politic. The policy came into existence and remains in force even though “[f]rom the early 1950s to the late 1980s, the dominant school of strategic theory followed an ahistorical, apolitical method of calculating purportedly correct answers to defense problems.”<sup>71</sup> The Total Force Policy does not fit the mold of an ahistorical, apolitical solution to a

defense problem, that being how to cost effectively structure the total force.

The Total Force Policy was adopted as Department of Defense policy in 1973. The originating concept was a product of the thinking of the late General Creighton W. Abrams and published in 1970 by then Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. General Abrams contended in the late 1960s, when it was evident that the RC was not going to be mobilized for Vietnam, that the US should never again undertake a war of significant proportions without RC involvement. He saw that commitment of the RC was essential to solidify public opinion and support for military engagements. General Abrams also saw the total force concept as the means to reestablish credibility of the US defense establishment.<sup>72</sup>

Aside from the underlying political objective of the Total Force Policy, i.e., to attain and maintain public support for military actions, the Total Force Policy has economic implications. The Total Force Policy Report to the Congress<sup>73</sup> in 1990 noted two principal tenants of the policy. Those tenants were the reliance on reserve forces as the primary augmentation for the active force and the integrated use of all forces available including active, reserve, civilian, and allied. The Total Force Policy objective has been to “maintain as small an active peacetime force as national security policy, military strategy, and overseas commitments permit, and to integrate the capabilities and strengths of active and reserve forces in a cost-effective manner.”<sup>74</sup>


The national military strategy of “flexible and selective engagement” and the CORM have established a foundation for a new era for the Total Force Policy. The national military strategy calls for increased RC responsibility in peacekeeping missions,

early access to the RC for power projection requirements, and early commitment of the RC in any MRC.<sup>75</sup> The CORM calls for full incorporation of the RC into relevant operational plans and greater integration and cooperation between the AC and RC (refer to the fourth and fifth principle for sizing and shaping the RC on page 2). Figure 2 depicts the potential for the new era and contrasts it with the past.

Figure 2 shows the commitment of the RC across the conflict continuum during three time periods. The dashed line depicts reliance on the RC prior to adoption of the Total Force Policy. It shows that, for other than domestic purposes, the RC was only looked upon for mobilization in conflict to reinforce and expand the AC. During the Vietnam war, the political decision was made to expand the AC via the draft rather than mobilizing the RC. With the adoption of the Total Force Policy and the all volunteer Army, the situation changed. As the dotted line shows, the force was structured to rely on the RC across the continuum but primarily with the idea of conflict in mind. Nevertheless, there are some capabilities that the AC is nearly devoid of and must rely on the RC for regardless of the environment. The solid line depicts the Total Force Policy in the new era. It shows an increased reliance on the RC across the continuum, including the lower end, meaning more RC involvement in such activities as peace operations and OOTW.

Will this new era materialize? There are some political implications and paradigms that could forestall the new era from taking hold. Historically, as shown in Figure 2, mobilization of the RC has been for purposes of war. Historically too, war has had clearer meaning. The new international environment begs for new views in regards

to the use of military forces. The national security strategy of “engagement and enlargement” has involved US forces for “unconventional” purposes in such places as Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia and the President used his call-up authority to mobilize the RC in the latter two cases.



**Figure 2.** Reserve component deployment and total force policy.

The AC is concerned about accessibility to the RC because need and commitment to use mobilization authority involves political risks. The new era of the Total Force Policy will happen to the extent that the public sees increased use of the RC across the conflict continuum in the best interest of the US. Accessibility to the RC beyond that level is irrelevant because that is what the Total Force Policy was designed to prevent, i.e., use of military force without the will of the nation.

The RC does provide forces to the AC for operating missions without being mobilized. This is done through volunteerism or while on annual training. RC volunteerism provided 79.7% (72.2% ARNG and 7.5% USAR) of the soldiers making up a light infantry task force, “Desert Panthers,” for six months of duty as part of the

Multi-National Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai mission in 1995.<sup>76</sup> On any given day, hundreds of ARNG volunteers on temporary tours of active duty are participating in real world AC operational missions.

Many operational missions are accomplished incidental to RC training. ARNG training rotations to Central America have provided forward presence and left behind tangible results of humanitarian and nation building activities. Year-round training rotation to the ARNG run Equipment Maintenance Center-Europe whittles away at the tremendous European maintenance backlog. Six operational ARNG RETROEUR (return from Europe) equipment repair sites also provide excellent training grounds while equipment is repaired and redistributed to all components of the Army. In FY-1994, more than 22,000 ARNG soldiers participated in overseas training and operational missions in 36 countries.<sup>77</sup>

In accord with the national military strategy and CORM recommendation, \$25 million was earmarked in the FY-1996 budget to support RC integration into AC operational plans. The CINCS requested RC integration in more than 600 missions. Only 167 could be supported with the constrained budget.<sup>78</sup> The RC has been very supportive of efforts for further integration into operational plans. In an environment of military cutbacks it is a matter of demonstrating relevance to the Total Force. At least through the eyes of the RC, it is also the Total Force Policy. And, the RC has demonstrated the potential to carry much more of the total defense load. The outer limit to the use of the RC would be established by the citizen-soldiers themselves. The outer limit would be that point at which military conflicts with civilian responsibilities

bring down recruiting and retention to levels that cannot sustain the force.

Two factors figure into the cost effectiveness of retaining forces in the AC or RC: costs and capability requirements. RC forces are less costly to maintain than AC forces. How much is somewhat debatable. Estimates depend upon what should legitimately be included in the calculations. Estimates range for costs of RC units from lows of around 20% upwards to about 75% of the cost of AC units. At the lower end of the range, costs include direct operating costs as influenced by levels of manning, equipping, and readiness requirements. As other costs are apportioned for such things as impact on other supporting forces, RDTE, procurement, military construction, overhead force structure (the TDA Army), and infrastructures, the relative cost advantages of RC units go down. The argument against applying all the foregoing cost to AC/RC cost comparisons is that many are costs that would be incurred even if there were no RC. RAND found, in using a heavy division as an example, that most analysts would agree that the long-run annual savings generated by deactivating one active division would be sufficient to support between four and five reserve divisions.<sup>79</sup>

The mobilization for Desert Shield/Desert Storm (DS/DS) has been hailed by many as proof positive that the Total Force Policy works. They point to the thousands of RC soldiers and hundreds of units that were mobilized, deployed, and successfully committed to the war. Others point to the three ARNG "roundout" brigades which were not mobilized to deploy with their AC parent divisions as a failure of the Total Force Policy.<sup>80</sup> Rather than a failure of the Total Force Policy, the delayed mobilization and nondeployment were more attributable to the existing limitations on Presidential



call-up authority and acknowledgment that the "roundout" brigades were never intended to be part of a "rapid deployment" force.<sup>81</sup>

The DS/DS mobilization confirmed some principles for total force planning. It confirmed that RC unit capabilities need to match requirements for time phased entry into the theater of operations and the importance of interoperability between RC and AC forces. The mobilization demonstrated that RC CS and CSS units are rapidly deployable. It also showed those large complex units that require difficult synchronization (combat brigades) can be deployable in 90 days. The 48th Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, was validated as deployable on the 91st day of post-mobilization training. The brigade "achieved validation by maneuvering four battalions [at the National Training Center] -- plus all supporting combat support and combat service support units -- a feat no other unit, Active or Reserve, has been asked to perform."<sup>82</sup> The feat was accomplished even though the Army did not have any preestablished validation procedures and the training program was often adjusted based on the evolving situation in the Persian Gulf.

#### Implications and Alternatives

In consideration of a strategic threat from a peer state, the US military has time on its side for sizing and shaping the force for the long run. The greater threat for the nearer term is the budget. So even though current defense planning guidance justifies the BUR force, the services need to be researching alternatives that will maximize capabilities and provide for modernization in an environment of severely restricted

budgets. The Army especially needs to be looking at alternatives to its current structure since the CORM has already suggested that the Army is overstructured irrespective of CS/CSS shortfalls or budget considerations.

The force structure redesign alternatives listed in Table 1 do not include options for reductions in force structure. Indeed, the general officer work group charter directed them to apply a number of principles to their efforts. First among the principles was that end strength and force structure allowances established by the "off-site" agreement would be the operative parameter. Other principles established the following parameters: the redesign efforts would consider the ARNG's need to remain responsive to their State mission; it was not intended to cause a reduction in ARNG division flags; and, the effort was not intended to circumvent the combat and combat service support structure primacies established by the "off-site" agreement.<sup>83</sup>

The principles just reiterated could apply even when considering force structure adjustments to include reductions. Certainly, a military requirement to support the ARNG's need to respond to state missions is and will remain valid. If the ARNG cannot adequately respond to requirements, federal troops must be called upon such as in the case of the 1992 Los Angeles riots or large natural disasters such as hurricane Andrew. In most conceivable cases, however, structure for the federal warfighting mission is capable of meeting domestic requirements. If problems arise, they are more likely to be unit stationing problems.

Keeping division flags recognizes the politics of force structuring, but there are also some practicable reasons for doing so as well. The most immediate reason is to

ensure adequate peacetime command and control of potentially complex organizations. In the bigger scheme of war and mobilization, these headquarters could serve as the base for expansion of the Army.

The primacies established in the "off-site" agreement were for the ARNG to remain a balanced warfighting force while the USAR would focus on combat service support at echelons above corps. The primacies do not exclude one or the other from combat or combat service support units when force structure allowances can accommodate the units in question. If the billpayers for the Army to fix deficiencies in CS/CSS structure are to be the ARNG combat divisions, the CS/CSS structure could be added back into the ARNG.

From evidence presented through the model for assessment of force structure alternatives, it is clear that the Army has CS/CSS deficiencies that need to be fixed. History is replete with examples where battles and wars have been won or lost on logistics capabilities. There is real meaning to the phrase "amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics." The potential for major regional conflicts and demands of peace operations and OOTW make logistics considerations even more critical today than during the Cold-War when logistics requirements were more geographically concentrated and host nation support capabilities were more sure. If logistics is to be a force multiplier, the Army needs to be able to provide it according to doctrine.

The ARNG could offset some of the CS/CSS deficiencies by dual missioning CS/CSS elements of the existing combat divisions (Table 1, alternative 3). This action should be taken, but only as an interim measure while other force structure is converted

to fill specific shortfalls. There are some problems with dual missioning which makes it acceptable only for an interim solution. Dual missioning is inherently inefficient because it requires units to perform functions that they are not designed to perform. Dual missioning also leaves the parent unit broken while subordinate units are performing secondary missions. The readiness risks that derive from broken ARNG combat divisions would not be too great though since they are not projected to enter the war-fight of a 2-MRC scenario.

A more permanent solution to the CS/CSS problem is the formation of combined arms divisions (Table 1, alternative 4). The ARNG should support this solution for both Total Army and ARNG institutional reasons. The solution increases Total Army capability in dealing with current and foreseeable threats across the conflict continuum. From an institutional perspective, the solution allows the ARNG to retain force structure rather than lose it to the USAR whose primacy is combat service support at echelons above corps. In addition, the solution keeps the ARNG positioned to fulfill its historic role as the first-in-line reserve force. The alternative would be to forfeit that role by staying in "hull-defilade" with units not wanted or needed.

How many ARNG combat divisions will it take to eliminate the CS/CSS shortfalls? It depends on the size of force that the CS/CSS structure has to support. The CORM suggested and the TAA-03 confirmed a CS/CSS shortfall of approximately 60,000 spaces. The CORM also suggested that the Total Army would remain 50,000 combat spaces over strength after converting combat spaces to fill CS/CSS shortfalls. If the 50,000 spaces were eliminated, whether it is because they are not needed or because

of budget cuts, support requirements go down.

Suppose 2-3 ARNG combat divisions are sacrificed for CS/CSS requirements with the remainder of requirements to be met by allies, host nation, contractors, and civilian employees. What happens to the other 5-6 ARNG combat divisions? It depends. Total Force Policy precepts for a cost-effective force and acceptance of the BUR assumption that the ARNG Enhanced Readiness Brigades can be deployable in 90 days, should influence the final outcome.

Rather than being missioned to reinforce or augment AC forces deployed to a first or second MRC, the ARNG Enhanced Readiness Brigades could be moved ahead in the war-fight and become part of the main force for some second MRC replacing AC forces. Two to four ARNG combat divisions, at the cost of less than one AC division, would then be needed for reinforcement, backfilling deployed units, or supporting unit rotations in protracted deployments. This scenario would have early deploying combat units AC pure and ARNG combat units ready for deployment when transportation assets become available. Ways and means of integrating the ARNG Enhanced Readiness Brigades into the fighting force would have to be worked out, i.e., do they remain separate brigades or become divisional brigades and under what divisional command?

Other valid requirements that could be assigned to the remaining ARNG combat divisions include the following: OOTW; receiving, stationing, onward movement and integration (RSOI) of forces in a theater of operation; air base ground defense (ABGD); and, providing opposing forces (OPFOR) for combat training center rotations (Table 1,

alternative 2).

Peace operations and OOTW are valid missions for an ARNG division even if chances of mobilization of an entire RC division for such purposes were slim. The division could make subordinate units available for rotation with AC units or to be tailored into an AC task force if called upon. The division would also be a training base, as would all other ARNG combat divisions, to provide individuals for volunteer duty such as that done in the Sinai. The larger the training base, the more likely it will be that the right numbers and types of volunteers would be available when needed.

The RSOI mission and the ABGD mission would relieve the AC from having to redeploy units from one operation directly into another (RSOI) or divert combat units from the "front line" (ABGD). Units used for these missions could also assist in redeployment of forces and demobilization of accumulated logistics at the conclusion of military operations.

The OPFOR mission increases in importance as the deployment of RC combat units inches closer to the onset of the military operation. Post-mobilization training and validation would have to be done concurrently rather than sequentially. Therefore, OPFOR would need to be available to support more than one training center at a time.

AC force structure reductions place more reliance on the RC. However, for the same dollars, the Total Army can fund 2-5 RC spaces for each AC space. Operating costs for any two comparably structured and equipped AC combat divisions would exceed the costs of operations for all eight ARNG combat divisions. Given the uncertainties of today, it seems a wise choice to save spaces and retain as large a

number of trained soldiers as possible.

From another perspective, there is a continued need to eliminate duplication and reduce overhead. The CORM addressed some duplication issues. For example, the CORM recommended the elimination of Marine Corps ground-based medium-altitude air defense capabilities and nonexpeditionary engineering responsibilities and rely on Army core competencies.<sup>84</sup> Very telling as to the political sensitivity of broader issues relating to RC structure, the CORM avoided questioning the need for both an ARNG and USAR. While eliminating duplication between the ARNG and USAR will not define the future RC combat role beyond the above discussion, it could free up spaces for alternative uses (including saving AC combat spaces) or elimination.

An in-depth consideration of the need for both an ARNG and USAR are beyond the scope of this paper. However, the idea of combining the two is not novel.<sup>85</sup> The idea was also the subject of a recent study conducted by John S. Raschke with the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.<sup>86</sup> The study makes a very strong case for merging the USAR into the ARNG. The bottom line of the study was that there is no practical purpose for having two reserve forces with identical federal missions and accessibility. Since the conditions which fostered the creation and growth of the USAR no longer exist and because the National Guard has its basis in the US Constitution, it follows that the ARNG should become the sole Army reserve force.

## Conclusions

The purpose of this study was to assess force structure issues and their implications for the future of the Army National Guard combat divisions. Resolution of force structure issues will not be, and indeed should not be, ahistorical or apolitical. After all, as Clausewitz noted, “war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means . . . [and] . . . that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs.”<sup>87</sup> Just as war is an instrument of policy, force structure requirements derive from policy and because force structuring is more art than science it is political.

Whatever becomes of the debate of the body politic, it will not be complete without consideration of the conclusions and supporting evidence of this study. This study supports the following conclusions:

1. Total Army CS/CSS shortfalls should be fixed with the ARNG combat divisions being the billpayers.
2. The ARNG combat divisions should be missioned to satisfy CS/CSS shortfalls as an interim fix.
3. The US is poised for a new era of Total Force Policy which will involve greater reliance on the RC across the conflict continuum.
4. There are valid requirements for ARNG combat divisions not needed for billpayers in solving CS/CSS shortfalls.
5. Severe budget constraints should necessitate proportionally greater cuts in



the AC than the RC in order to buy cost-effective force structure for the Total Army.

6. There needs to be continued elimination of duplication and overhead. In those regards, additional BRAC actions should be pursued. And, the need for two Army reserve components should be scrutinized.

## ENDNOTES

1. Text in a letter from Major General Edward J. Philbin (ret.), Executive Director, National Guard Association of the United States, delivered to Secretary of Defense William Perry on August 14, 1995 urging the Secretary to stop issuance of an order which would among other things: (1) cut 50,000 troops out of the eight Army National Guard combat divisions, and (2) convert the remaining 60,000 troops in the eight divisions to combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. The letter was reprinted in the September 1995 issue of National Guard. pp. 10 and 85.
2. Ibid, p. 10. Whether or not such a PDM was about to be issued was not known with certainty but was believed to be based upon reliable sources.
3. U.S. Department of Defense. Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), p. ES-1.
4. Ibid, p. 2-23.
5. Ibid, pp. 2-23 thru 2-25.
6. Ibid, p. 2-24.
7. "Guard's Combat Divisions in Crosshairs," Army Times, 25 September 1995, p.32. GEN Philbin, in his letter to the SECDEF (See footnote number 1) urged him "to hold off on the PDM and assign these issues to the GOSG."
8. Perhaps more surprising and to the consternation of some because recommendations for major fundamental changes and thus savings were lacking, was the CORM's pronouncement that some "problems" visited by past commissions were not problems. "In particular, Army and Marine Corps capabilities are complementary, not redundant; inefficiencies attributed to the so-called 'four air forces'...are found mostly in the infrastructure, not on the battlefield; and more joint training, not fewer Services, is needed to ensure effective close air support." Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions, p. ES-5.
9. George H.W. Bush, Address to the Aspen Institute Symposium, Aspen, Colorado, August 2, 1990.
10. As cited in Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions, p. 1-3.
11. The Base Force was the force established for the mid-to-late-1990's by the Bush administration. For an analysis of the decision process to arrive at the Base Force see Leslie Lewis, C. Robert Roll, and John D. Mayer, Assessing the Structure and Mix of

Future Active and Reserve Forces: Assessment of Policies and Practices for Implementing the Total Force Policy, (Rand, 1992).

12. Les Aspen, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, (Department of Defense, October, 1993).

13. "Many Combat Divisions Could Survive Intact," Army Times, 20 November 1995, p. 24.

14. Department of Defense civilian employees working for the Army are also considered part of the Total Army, however, for purposes of this paper discussion will include military only.

15. The following discussion is not intended to be a complete description of the RC. The intent is to provide the reader with just enough to gain an understanding of those characteristics that bear upon force structure decisions. For a more complete description, the reader may want to refer to National Guard Almanac or Reserve Forces Almanac.

16. National Guard Bureau, 1996 Posture Statement. (Washington, D.C., 1995), p. 1.

17. Ibid. p. 1.

18. Prior to 5 October 1994, the maximum period for which the Selected Reserve could be ordered to active duty under Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up was 90 days with one 90 day extension. The single 270 day period was included in changes to Title 10 USC with Public Law 103-337, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995.

19. MacGregor Knox, "What History Can Tell Us About the New Strategic Environment," in Brassey's Mershon American Defense Annual, ed: Williamson Murray, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Christopher K. Ives (Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, 1995-1996) p. 25.

20. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (The White House, February, 1995).

21. John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, (Joint Chiefs of Staff, February, 1995).

22. National Security Strategy, Ibid, p. 2.

23. Ibid, p. 3.

24. Ibid, p. 9.

25. Ibid, pp. 8 and 9.

26. National Military Strategy, Ibid, p. 8.
27. Ibid, p. 9.
28. Williamson Murray, "Introduction," in Brassey's Mershon American Defense Annual, ed: Williamson Murray, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Christopher K. Ives (Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, 1995-1996), p. xvi.
29. Eliot A. Cohen, "How to Think About Defense," in Brassey's Mershon American Defense Annual, ed: Williamson Murray, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Christopher K. Ives (Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, 1995-1996), pp. 58-59.
30. Andrew F. Krepinevich, "The Clinton Defense Strategy," in Brassey's Mershon American Defense Annual, ed: Williamson Murray, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Christopher K. Ives (Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, 1995-1996), pp. 117-120.
31. For purposes of this paper the terms peace operations and OOTW will follow the CORM convention. Although the Department of Defense regarded peace operations as a subset of the broad category of operations other than war (OOTW) (now called stability and support operations), the CORM chose to differentiate peace operations to include preventing, containing, or ending conflict to give them greater prominence in contingency planning. OOTW includes such tasks as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
32. The Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, 3 January 1996.
33. National Security Strategy, Ibid, pp. 12-13.
34. Ibid, p. 13.
35. "Plan hinges on being big, strong, ready," Army Times, 18 December 1995.
36. Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions, Ibid, p. 2-24.
37. National Guard Bureau, 1995 Posture Statement, pp. 9-12.
38. Edward J. Philbin, "The Precarious Present Requires a Persistent NGAUS," National Guard, September, 1995, p. 10.
39. Kevin McAndrews, "117th General Conference: Laying It On the Line," National Guard, November, 1995, p. 20.
40. COMPO-4 refers to the fourth component of the Total Army. It is that part of the Army which has gone unfunded and unresourced. COMPO-1 refers to the AC, COMPO-2 to the ARNG, and COMPO-3 to the USAR.

41. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Active and Reserve Support Forces," (GAO/NSIAD-92-67), March, 1992, p. 45.
42. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions," (GAO/NSIAD-95-56), January, 1995, p. 29.
43. Ibid, p. 31.
44. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts," (GAO/NSIAD-95-51), March, 1995, p. 3.
45. Bottom-Up Review, Ibid, p.23.
46. Frederick M. Franks, Jr., "Army Doctrine and the New Strategic Environment," in Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions, ed: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993), p. 280.
47. Steven L. Arnold and Christopher A. Yuknis, "Ethnic Conflict: Force Structure and Training Requirements," in Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions, Ibid, p.335.
48. Andrew F. Krepinevich, "The Clinton Defense Strategy," Ibid. p. 121.
49. For a discussion of post-modern forms of conflict see Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future Conflict," in Parameters, (US Army War College, Winter, 1995-96), pp. 18-27.
50. FM 100-5 Operations, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June 1993). p. 3-11.
51. Richard H. Schultz, Jr., "Conflict Resolution: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Assistance Missions," in Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions, Ibid, p.313.
52. Richard F. Ballard, "Air Base Ground Defense: The Achilles' Heel in US Power Projection Capability," (Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Working Draft, December, 1995).
51. Subject of a Rand briefing to the Forces Command, Command Readiness Program, August, 1995.
52. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Future Years Defense Program: Optimistic Estimates Lead to Billions in Overprogramming," (GAO/NSIAD-94-210, July, 1994).

55. Congressional Budget Office, Planning for Defense: Affordability and Capability of the Administration's Program, (Washington, D.C., 1994), pp. 18-19.
56. Anthony H. Cordsman, US Defence Policy: Resources and Capabilities, (London: Royal United Services), p. 69.
57. William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and Congress, (Washington, D.C., February, 1995), p. 271.
58. Ibid. p. 276.
59. Ibid. p. B-1.
60. Don M. Snider, "The Coming Defense Train Wreck," The Washington Quarterly, Winter, 1996, pp. 89-101.
61. Cost estimates were provided by the National Guard Bureau Research and Staff Support Office and were derived from the Cost and Economic Analysis Center model.
62. Operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and flying hours programmed (FHP) are surrogate measures for the cost of field training. OPTEMPO is based on annual track miles for combat vehicles. FHP is based upon flying hours per crew per month for helicopters.
63. Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Ibid, p. 274.
64. Information presented in a briefing by General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff, Army, to the Senior Service College Fellows, Class of 1996, during the summer of 1995.
65. Robert W. Gaskin, "Crack-Up: The Unraveling of America's Military," in Brassey's Mershon American Defense Annual, ed: Williamson Murray, Jeffery S. Lantis, and Christopher K. Ives (Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, 1995-1996), p. 106.
66. Army Budget Fiscal Year 1996: An Analysis, (Association of the United States Army: Institute of Land Warfare, May, 1995), p. 62.
67. Ibid, p. 53.
68. Information presented in a National Guard Bureau Army Personnel Directorate briefing to ARNG Army War College and Senior Service College Fellows, Class of 1996, during the summer of 1995.
69. Army Budget Fiscal Year 1996: An Analysis, Ibid, pp. 56-58.
70. Information presented in a National Guard Bureau Training Division briefing to ARNG Army War College and Senior Service College Fellows, Class of 1996, during the

summer of 1995.

71. Colin S. Gray, "Strategy in the Nuclear Age: The United States, 1945-1991," In The Making of Strategy, Ed: Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, (Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 588.

72. Reflections of the Total Force Concept author former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird who spoke to the Reserve Forces Policy Board on the 25th anniversary of the concept. The speech was reprinted in the December, 1995 edition of National Guard, pp. 20-22.

73. Total Force Policy Report to the Congress, (Department of Defense, December, 1990).

74. Ibid, p. 13.

75. National Military Strategy, Ibid, pp. 9, 14, and 16.

76. National Guard Bureau, 1996 Posture Statement, Ibid, p. 2.

77. National Guard Bureau, 1996 Posture Statement, Ibid, Executive Summary and p. 2, and National Guard Bureau Logistics Division information papers and briefing slides.

78. Army Times, January 1, 1996, p. 28, January, 29, 1996, p. 25, and February, 19, 1996, p. 15.

79. Adele R. Palmer et al., Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Cost Estimation Methodology, (RAND, 1992), p. xvii.

80. The "roundout" program placed ARNG combat brigades in AC divisions to fill the divisions to three brigades. The 48th Infantry (ARNG) rounded out the 24th Infantry (AC), the 155th Armor (ARNG) rounded out the 1st Cavalry (AC), and the 256th Infantry (ARNG) rounded out the 5th Infantry (AC). The 24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry were deployed to the Persian Gulf. The 5th Infantry was not deployed. Once the brigades were mobilized, it took longer than anticipated to train them up to deployment certification standards. A great deal of controversy and tension between the AC and ARNG accompanied the entire process. One result of the experience, right, wrong, or indifferent, was the shelving of the "roundout" program.

81. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for the Gulf War," (GAO/NSIAD-91-263), September, 1991, p. 31. The Presidential call-up authority in effect at the time was for up to 50,000 selected reservist for 90 days with one allowable extension of 90 days. The authority has since been changed to 200,000 for 270 days.

82. Ibid, p. 41.
83. "Charter for the Army National Guard Division Redesign Work Group," Vice Chief of Staff, Army, May 16, 1995.
84. Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions, Ibid, p. 2-29.
85. The Gray Commission appointed in November 1947 by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal recommended that the National Guard should become a wholly federal reserve and other units should be organized under State control for domestic purposes. Forrestal did not endorse the committee's report because of its political implications. In December, 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed merging the ARNG and USAR into the National Guard. Congress killed the merger proposal. See National Defense Research Institute, Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense, (RAND, 1992) pp. 26-27 and 30-31.
86. John S. Raschke, "Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve: Why the Redundancy?" (International Security Studies Program Research Project, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1994).
87. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard, Peter Paret (Princeton, 1984), p. 605.



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