REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
	26 Mar 96	Essay Award Competition Submission

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Strengthening Military Relationships with NGOs During
Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)

SWAN, GUY C. III, COL, USA

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

U.S. Army War College
Root Hall, Bldg 122
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Harvard University
JFK School of Government
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA 02138

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

19960722 022

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release: distribution is
unlimited.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

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has created a need to strenthen the relationships between the military and non-
governmental organizations (NGO). These two communities have in the past found
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Part I is concerned with the cultural gaps found between two vastly different
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Part II looks at the importance of intelligence and information sharing between
military forces and NGOs before and during actual humanitarian operations. Again,
the focus is on feasible prescriptions that can bridge an existing operational gap.

14. SUBJECT TERMS	15. NUMBER OF PAGES
	16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UL

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Colonel Guy C. Swan III

███████████ ████████

Colonel Swan is scheduled to take command 19 June 1996 of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (BLACKHORSE), the Opposing Forces or aggressor regiment, at the US Army's National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.

Colonel Swan was commissioned in Armor upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1976. After graduation he served as a tank platoon leader in the 2nd Infantry Division's 1st Battalion (CRUSADERS), 72nd Armor in Korea. Upon returning to the United States in 1978, he joined the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (BRAVE RIFLES) at Fort Bliss, Texas, serving as a cavalry platoon leader, troop executive officer, and adjutant of the Regiment's 3rd Squadron. From 1982 to 1985 he command Company A, 2nd Battalion, 77th Armor and served as Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division (OLD RELIABLES) at Fort Lewis, Washington. From 1985 to 1987 Colonel Swan served as an Armor Branch Assignment Officer and graduated from the US Army Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

He then served as the Chief, G3 Plans for the 1st Armored Division (OLD IRONSIDES), Ansbach, Germany and later as the division's Deputy G3 in Southwest Asia during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. In 1991 he returned to the cavalry, joining the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (BLACKHORSE) at Fulda, Germany where he served as Executive Officer of the 1st Squadron and as the Regimental Executive Officer.

Colonel Swan commanded the 4th Battalion (TUSKERS), 64th Armor Regiment in the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia from July 1993 to July 1995.

Colonel Swan is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course and the Infantry Officer Advanced Course. He also holds a Master of Arts degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University and a Master of Military Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Military Studies. Colonel Swan recently completed a year of study at Harvard University's JFK School of Government as a US Army War College National Security Fellow. His awards include the Bronze Star Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal, Southwest Asia Service Medal, Kuwait Liberation Medal, Ranger Tab, Parachutist Badge, and is a holder of the US Armor Association's Honorable Order of St. George.

Colonel Swan is married to the former Melanie Taylor ███████████ and they have a son, Ryan (3 yrs) and (baby girl, Melissa, due ██████

Colonel Guy C. Swan III

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TELEPHONE: ████████████

Name: Colonel Guy C. Swan III

SSN: ███████

Address: █████████████████

Phone: ████████████████

Bridging Cultural Gaps
Between Military Forces and NGOs During
# Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

Synopsis

During recent complex humanitarian emergencies (CHE), the military has come into contact with a dizzying array of national and international actors. Key among the participants in most of today's non-warfighting missions are literally hundreds of non-governmental relief organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer organizations (PVOs). These organizations deal in both near-term disaster relief and long-term international development and have become sometimes reluctant partners with military forces during CHEs. Because NGOs and PVOs deal with humanitarian relief issues frequently, military leaders have come to recognize that sound relations with these organizations are crucial to the success of military humanitarian assistance operations and to sound exit strategies. While sheer proximity during CHEs has demanded cooperation between military forces and NGOs, much work still needs to be done to strengthen the relationship.

This article looks at ways to bridge the traditional cultural gaps between military forces and NGOs. Recommendations include: expanding civil-military training to conventional combat units, expanding the pool of civil affairs specialists, encouraging NGO hiring of former military personnel, expanding conference participation, establishing training with NGOs programs, and endowing professors and chairs in humanitarian operations at senior military schools.

Name: Colonel Guy C. Swan III

SSN: ████████

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**Improving Intelligence and Information Sharing
Between NGOs and Military Forces
During Complex Humanitarian Emergencies**

Synopsis

Experts within both the military and the non-governmental (NGO) and private volunteer (PVO) communities have come to realize that as military forces assume a greater role in responding to complex humanitarian emergencies (CHE), the flow of information among the actors has become a vital factor in determining how effective the overall humanitarian relief effort will be. Still, there is much room for improvement. Information sharing is often hit or miss, frequently disorganized, and always subject to bureaucratic roadblocks.

In this article we will look at intelligence and information sharing at three levels (the strategic or policy level, the operational or country level, and the tactical or local implementation level) and focus on ways to improve this important component to humanitarian response.

Unclassified

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STRENGTHENING MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH NGOs DURING COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES

PART I: BRIDGING CULTURAL GAPS BETWEEN NGOs AND MILITARY FORCES

by

Colonel Guy C. Swan III
USAWC Army SSC Fellow
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

Colonel Steven A. Raho III
USAWC SSC Fellowship Program Director

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

26 March 1996

Unclassified

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Guy C. Swan III (COL), USA

TITLE: Strengthening Military Relationships with NGOs During Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

FORMAT: Fellowship Research Paper

DATE: 26 March 1996   PAGES 11   UNCLASSIFIED

The continuing involvement of military forces in complex humanitarian emergencies has created a need to strengthen the relationships between the military and non-governmental organizations (NGO). These two communities have in the past found themselves at odds over their respective roles in humanitarian relief operations. This paper examines two key aspects of this important relationship: the role of organizational culture and the sharing of information and intelligence during humanitarian emergencies.

Part I is concerned with the cultural gaps found between two vastly different communities. The overall purpose is to identify specific recommendations and prescriptions to build broader understanding between the two.

Part II looks at the importance of intelligence and information sharing between military forces and NGOs before and during actual humanitarian operations. Again, the focus is on feasible prescriptions that can bridge and existing operational gap.

The Military's Role in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

As the military becomes increasingly involved in humanitarian assistance operations during international complex humanitarian emergencies[1] (CHE), it is finding that a feasible exit strategy that enables military forces to return quickly to their warfighting focus is key to the success of such operations. Developing an exit strategy that turns short-term military involvement into long-term recovery for failed states is the goal that relies heavily on the military's ability to smoothly hand off its operations to organizations capable of marshaling the resources required for long-term recovery and development.

During recent CHEs, the military has come into contact with a dizzying array of national and international actors. Key among the participants in most of today's non-warfighting missions are literally hundreds of non-governmental relief organizations (NGOs). These organizations deal in both near-term disaster relief and long-term international development and have become sometimes reluctant partners with military forces during CHEs. Because NGOs deal with humanitarian relief issues frequently, military leaders have come to recognize that sound relations with these organizations are crucial to the success of military humanitarian assistance operations and to sound exit strategies. While sheer proximity during CHEs has demanded cooperation between military forces and NGOs, much work still needs to be done to strengthen

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[1]Andrew S. Natsios, Vice President of World Vision, defines complex humanitarian emergencies as "involving some or all of the following elements: civil strife, mass starvation, the collapse of civil society, mass unemployment, refugee and displaced-persons movements, and complex negotiations over the transportation of food and relief commodities through areas of conflict."

the relationship.

These two articles examine ways to improve the interaction of military forces and NGOs by focusing on two aspects of the relationship. In Part I we will look at how to bridge the cultural gaps between military forces and NGOs. Then Part II will offer suggestions on how to improve the intelligence and information sharing so important to successful humanitarian assistance operations.

Sources of Cultural Differences

> The bottom line is that the military commander must work with and depend heavily on civilian relief organizations to complete the military humanitarian assistance mission and taskings. The Joint Task Force's humanitarian assistance mission cannot successfully conclude until in-place organizations are operating effectively. Therefore, successful interaction between organizations is key![2]
>
> Colonel Karl Farris
> Director, US Army Peacekeeping Institute

The interaction between the military and NGOs that Colonel Farris, director of the US military CMOC in Kigali during the 1994 Rwanda crisis, tells us is so important, can be hindered by simple cultural ignorance. Military forces and NGOs all have fairly defined organizational cultures which drive their performance during CHEs. These cultures, and the biases that accompany them, can create roadblocks to cooperation, trust, and efficiency in dealing with human suffering. Understanding cultural differences, finding common ground, and factoring these into planning and execution go a long way to bridging the gap between the military and

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[2]Karl Farris, "Civil-Military Operations Center in Operation Support Hope." Unpublished paper, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, December 1995.

NGOs.

The cultural differences between military organizations and NGOs fall into four distinct categories: values, organizational structure and motivations, decisionmaking processes, and execution or implementation processes.

a. **Values.** There are important personal and organizational values that help define the motivations of the soldier and the civilian relief worker. While both see themselves as part of a noble calling, Hugo Slim, the Director of the Center for Development and Emergency Planning at Oxford Brookes University, UK, reminds us that,

> at a cultural level, there is a certain mismatch between the civilian relief community and military humanitarianism.... Most relief workers see themselves as belonging to organizations which are part of a movement for an alternative society, in opposition to the establishment and status quo. In such a context, many relief workers have ambivalent feelings about seeing military forces as allies and partners. They find it hard to accept that soldiers may be enlightened like them.[3]

The relief worker is often more adaptable to ambiguous or "gray area" situations than his or her military counterpart who may view the humanitarian assistance mission in terms of black or white. Military personnel who are not frequently involved in such missions may also feel more comfortable with a "good guy-bad guy" situational definition. This search for an "enemy" remains a bias, particularly in conventional military units, and can hinder humanitarian assistance missions. It is a bias that military leaders are cognizant of and work to quell throughout a CHE.

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[3]Hugo Slim, "The Continuing Metamorphosis of the Humanitarian Professional: Some New Colours for an Endangered Chameleon." Paper presented at the 1994 Development Studies Association Conference, Lancaster, UK, 9 September 1994, 11.

Ironically, there are a number of significant shared values among members of both communities. Innovation and resourcefulness seem to be common values between soldiers and relief workers who "pride themselves as embodying certain values like logistical skill, courage, and endurance, which are perhaps exemplified more in the army than anywhere else."[4] Likewise, both communities appear to have a strong "can do" ethic in which perseverance and operational experience are highly valued. For the NGO field representatives, "most recruits get the bulk of their operational training on the job.... Field experience in the culture of NGOs is comparable to combat experience in the military, a badge of honor, accorded the highest respect."[5] Understanding these shared values is as important as understanding differences and provides a basis upon which trust and confidence can be built.

b. **Organizational Structure and Motivations.** During the Cold War, military leaders were cautioned against "mirror-imaging" when dealing with their Soviet counterparts. Likewise, NGO leaders and field representatives do not view the world or a particular CHE through the same eyes as a military leader. Acceptable levels of organizational structure are often quite different and what works for one organization will not work for another.

Clearly, military forces and NGOs are vastly different in structure. Further, within the relief community each NGO is likely to have a still different organizational structure. It goes without saying that military forces are more hierarchical, highly disciplined organizations which emphasize efficiency and control over their members and the execution of assigned tasks.

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[4]Slim, 11.

[5]Andrew S. Natsios, "The International Humanitarian Response System." <u>Parameters</u> (Spring 1995): 70.

Military leaders feel comfortable in taking charge of everyone and everything in an assigned geographical area and can become frustrated with an apparent lack of cooperation from what they consider "rogue" NGO operations. Military officers may also find operating in a CHE to be very frustrating from a unity of command standpoint. Often the diversity of participants from other government agencies, UN, and NGO sectors is extensive and there really may not be anybody "in charge." While the relief effort may be marginally structured by the UN lead agency in the country or region, most NGOs participate on a voluntary and frequently ad hoc basis. Unless an NGO is well known or has worked often with military forces, it is possible to find very "disorganized" conglomeration of organizations.

It is unfair (and imprudent) for military leaders to view all NGOs as part of a monolithic block of organizations. Clearly, there are distinct differences among the many members of this complex community. There are wide variations in professionalism, political and religious viewpoints, and scope and scale of operations. There are well-known, well organized NGOs that have extensive experience dealing with military forces, among them CARE, World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, International Rescue Committee, Save the Children, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Oxfam, and Irish Concern. It is important that all players in a CHE, civilian and military alike, understand that each NGO does have a chain of command of sorts, but that chain bears little resemblance to a military chain of command. Each echelon responds to a different agenda. According to Andrew Natsios of World Vision,

> headquarters must respond to donor concerns, budget limitations, and the worldwide institutional consequences of a given policy...(while) the field staff focuses on the daily struggle to overcome operational difficulties and

chaotic working conditions to alleviate suffering or save lives.[6]

Because NGOs vie for funding in a highly competitive environment of government grants and private donations, NGO culture often involves a high degree of self-promotion. In other words, the number of operations each is involved in, the types of relief work undertaken, and the amount of publicity for such operations are vitally important to the NGO culture.

Media coverage of an NGO's participation in a CHE is extremely important to its ability to attract the donations required for future operations. This is a factor that military leaders must recognize and account for in its own dealing with the media. When military forces intervene in a CHE they attract wide media attention, often at the expense of the relief agencies. Portraying humanitarian operations as a cooperative effort between the military and NGOs serves the media agendas of both parties.

NGOs as a community claim to be apolitical in order to maintain the mantle of neutrality, but there are exceptions. By and large, "American NGOS are independent, resistant to authority, politically and culturally liberal (with the exception of some Christian NGOs), sensitive and understanding, with a mission to save lives."[7] They will frequently assume that military forces are deployed to a CHE for purely political reasons. Both sides need to be cautious in making such assumptions and need to be very specific in articulating their motivations for participating in a CHE.

c. **Decisionmaking Process.** Just as there are profound differences in the structure of

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[6]Natsios, 72.
[7]Natsios, 70.

military organizations and NGOs, there are significant variations in their respective decisionmaking processes. Peter Walker, a frequent commentator on NGO-military relations, describes military decisionmaking as "centralized and objective driven although within most Western armies, the authority to implement decisions is devolved downwards. Relief agencies, on the other hand, tend to maximize the delegation of decisionmaking and are thus able to be more reactive to changing circumstances."[8]

Because an NGO empowers fairly low level aid administrators with decisionmaking authority, it is sometimes difficult to establish an overall NGO policy in a CHE. This can be another cause of frustration for local military commanders, but one which can be mitigated by frequent communication and exchange of information. NGO representatives likewise must be cautioned that not every soldier is empowered to make decisions - an equally frustrating situation for the NGO. While the military prides itself on encouraging initiative at low levels, key decisions - especially those regarding issues of policy - are retained at higher levels.

d. **Execution or Implementation Processes.** Relief agencies, for the most part, are very decentralized entities with a great deal of authority to make and implement decisions delegated to field representatives. To the uninitiated military member, this may appear to be an inefficient, even wasteful, way of doing business. Once the military accepts the differences, cooperation can begin.

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[8]Peter Walker, "Foreign Military Resources for Disaster Relief: An NGO Perspective." Disasters (June 1992): 157.

Recommendations for Bridging Cultural Gaps

The rapidly changing nature of a CHE will frustrate military leaders who are unprepared to operate in such an environment. Flexibility in working with NGOs is crucial in order to balance relatively more clearly defined military missions with often chaotic humanitarian relief efforts. Similarly, for both the NGOs and the military, viewing a CHE as a "coalition effort" is preferable to imposing hierarchical chains of command that force unwilling actors under a single authority. It must be understood that each party comes to a CHE for vastly different reasons. Clearly, this will require some rethinking about such operations on the part of the military. As always, though, it is a two-way street and NGOs need to seek ways of providing meaningful structure to their operations which can assist not only in streamlining their own efforts, but also in providing a more recognizable situational framework to their military counterparts. Some ways to improve cross-cultural understanding between military forces and NGOs follow:

a. **Expand Civil-Military Training to Conventional Combat Units.** Army civil affairs units are currently grouped under the Special Operations community for training and employment. Consequently, they tend to be very well trained, versed, and proficient in dealing with CHEs and NGOs. However, as seen in the Bosnian crisis, there simply are not enough civil affairs units or specialists to deal with large scale or multiple CHEs. More and more we are seeing the deployment of conventional combat units to humanitarian assistance missions. Therefore, formal training for combat units must be expanded to include this unfamiliar dimension of military operations; and not just on an ad hoc basis as we have seen in recent US military deployments to support CHEs.

b. **Expand the Pool of Civil Affairs Specialists.** It is clear that the bulk of the civil affairs specialists will remain in the reserve components for the foreseeable future. It is unlikely that in the era of military downsizing that the number of active component civil affairs units will be significantly increased. Therefore, the best way to build the pool of available personnel with the requisite civil-military expertise is to open these occupational fields to other members of the active force as an alternate or secondary professional specialty. Volunteers could then get the required training, professional certification, and cultural understanding necessary for employment as an augmentee to a civil affairs unit, CMOC, G5/S5 section, or conventional combat unit in a CHE. Clearly, special operations parochialism must be put aside in order to make this work.

c. **Encourage NGO Hiring of Former Military Personnel.** There are a number of former military personnel currently working for NGOs, but this practice should be expanded and not limited to just executive-level positions. NGO field operatives with military experience are a valuable resource for NGOs and can assist in bridging cultural gaps.

d. **Conferences.** Expand conferences and exercises to get more personal contact between the two communities. Such exercises do currently exist, such as the First Marine Expeditionary Force's (I MEF) excellent annual Emerald Express series. Unfortunately, at this time these seem to be one-service oriented and need a broader joint military focus.

e. **Training with NGOs.** Each military service should establish a training program which enables appropriate military personnel to train with leading relief-oriented NGOs on a six-month or year-long basis. Model after similar Training With Industry (TWI) programs currently in

effect within the military equipment acquisition arena. The focus group for this program would be civil-affairs personnel, foreign area specialists, logisticians, transportation specialists, and medical personnel who might be called upon to support humanitarian assistance missions.

f. **NGO Participation in Military Exercises and Training.** Attach NGO representatives to military units on a temporary basis during training exercises or real world operations to increase NGO understanding of military operations. Similarly, there is a clear need to expand NGO participation in selected military courses of training. This could be done on an invitational basis with the military assuming the costs of sending NGO personnel to military schools in the areas of military logistics, communications, and transportation.

g. **Writing for Professional Journals.** There has been a recent increase in professional writing among military personnel on the subject of "operations other than war." However, most of this writing is focused on the military audience and not on NGOs. We need to encourage cross-cultural publication of key articles in professional journals. Military authors should contribute to journals like Disasters and International Peacekeeping while their NGO counterparts write for professional military journals like Naval Institute Proceeding, Military Review, and Parameters. This will significantly broaden the dialogue between prospective CHE participants.

h. **Exchange of After Operations Reports.** Encourage wide distribution and judicious application of security classifications so that a free flow of ideas and lessons learned is fostered.

i. **NGO Chairs at Military Schools.** Establish an NGO Chair at the US Army Peacekeeping Institute and other service War Colleges and allow the NGO community to select experienced

humanitarian relief professionals to fill such positions annually.

j. **Military Observers.** Increase "military observer" access to NGO operations in CHEs where US or other military forces are not involved or are playing a minor role. This could be made part of the "training with NGOs" program described above.

As the military services reevaluate their vision for military operations in the next century, humanitarian assistance operations will certainly play a key role. If, however, the military is to keep its focus on warfighting as it continues to downsize, participation in such operations will have to be of short duration. Exit strategies that include an expeditious and cooperative handoff to NGOs and NGOS will be more vital than ever. Strengthening the relationship between the military and humanitarian relief organizations during complex humanitarian emergencies is key to making that transition happen and begins with a clear understanding of each other's culture.

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STRENGTHENING MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH NGOs DURING COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES

PART II: IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN NGOs AND MILITARY FORCES

by

Colonel Guy C. Swan III
USAWC Army SSC Fellow
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

Colonel Steven A. Raho III
USAWC SSC Fellowship Program Director

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

26 March 1996

Importance of Information

> Collecting information in complex humanitarian emergencies is more akin
> to intelligence gathering. (Non-governmental organizations) are recognizing
> that their staff are becoming political analysts, intelligence gatherers, and front
> line negotiators. They need to value these skills and develop them in house.[1]

> Hugo Slim
> Director, Center for Development and
> Emergency Planning, Oxford Brookes
> University, UK

Experts within both the military and the non-governmental (NGO) community have come to realize that as military forces assume a greater role in responding to CHEs, the flow of information among the actors has become a vital factor in determining how effective the overall humanitarian relief effort will be. Still, there is much room for improvement. Information sharing is often hit or miss, frequently disorganized, and always subject to bureaucratic roadblocks. In this article we will look at intelligence and information sharing at three levels (the strategic or policy level, the operational or country level, and the tactical or local implementation level) and focus on ways to improve this important component to humanitarian response.

Strategic/Policy Level

Effective information sharing measures between NGOs and the military begin at the national policy making level. Ideally, confidence-building begins well before a complex humanitarian emergency (CHE) erupts. Early consultation among interagency working groups and executive representatives of major NGOs prior to execution of military operations in a CHE is essential.

We feel, however, that today's interagency process is at best ad hoc and reactive. There is a

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clear need for a more formalized standing body to cultivate NGO relationships with all US government agencies on a more frequent basis. A Humanitarian Policy Advisory Council should be established jointly among the State Department's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and key US NGOs perhaps best represented by InterAction, Inc., the professional umbrella organization of US NGOs. This is not adding bureaucracy to the process but merely a reorganizing of the interagency effort to make it more focused on a continuing worldwide problem. During peacetime (or pre-emergency phase) the Council would meet on a periodic scheduled basis to exchange information on ongoing humanitarian crises and provide policy advice to national leaders as to the appropriate level of US involvement in each. The Council would also become a rapid means of soliciting advice and putting US officials in touch with local NGO networks when a crisis arises. This process would be exercised frequently and made part of interagency wargaming and contingency planning at the national level.

Clearly, such contacts must be managed honestly and openly to safeguard the perceived neutrality and non-partisanship of the NGOs. NGO leaders must, however, understand that they can significantly influence decsionmaking by taking a proactive role in assisting policymakers early in a CHE through mechanisms like the Council. Sharing key background information as well as information on the current situation in the host nation with government officials will enable NGOs to ensure that military intervention, if necessary or requested, is executed in the most effective manner possible.

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Operational or Theater/Joint Task Force/Region/Country Level

At the regional or country level where military commanders begin to translate national objectives and policies into action and NGO country representatives begin coordination for the execution of relief operations, the sharing of information between military forces and NGOs becomes even more important. However, our research shows that in today's CHE environment, this key linkage level between policymakers and field operatives, both military and NGO, requires the most attention.

Much as they can be effective contributors to correct national and agency policy decisions, NGOs can provide military commanders at the regional or country level with key information regarding the existing political situation in the host nation which can then assist commanders in seeking out or avoiding politically sensitive contact that could affect local perceptions of the military's neutrality.[2]

During Operation Support Hope (the 1994 Rwanda crisis), the US Joint Task Force Commander, Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder, found this exchange of information crucial to winning what he described as the "information war" that has become a significant component of military humanitarian assistance missions. The "information war" Schroeder refers to is not the offensive-minded kind of actions that one would find in conventional military operations. On the contrary, information warfare in CHEs consists of three components: acquiring the data required to determine "success," disseminating "ground truth" to appropriate agencies, and *servicing the information needs of other agencies and NGOs.* Having the correct information not

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only permitted the military to be more effective, it became one of the vital benefits that could be brought to the UN and NGO agencies in the field.[3]

Another aspect of the information war at the operational or country level that can significantly influence the success of the joint military-NGO relief effort is countering disinformation. In a CHE military forces and NGOs will face concerted attempts by warring parties to influence the population through media broadcasts. Information exchange and cooperation between military forces and NGOs is essential to providing accurate information to the population so the effectiveness of humanitarian relief efforts can be maximized.

To their credit, NGOs have been forthcoming with key pieces of information as the US military found in Rwanda where most NGOs were eager to share their information and thoughts as long as the exchange was not couched in terms of intelligence gathering.

During future humanitarian assistance missions, military commanders and NGOs must be thoroughly briefed on the importance of the information available through the in-country NGO representatives and on the need to ensure a two-way flow of information in order to encourage continuing information exchanges and dialogue with the relief community.[4]

Tools already codified in joint military doctrine provide a forum where such information sharing can and should occur. For example, Joint Publication 3-08 (Draft) recommends that the unified CINC and/or Joint Task Force Commander establish a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) to link the CINC, embassy and other government agencies (OGA), and NGO regional or country representatives in order to coordinate operations and exchange

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information. Similarly, the UN lead agency in a CHE will establish (often well before any

military intervention) the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) which will conduct

coordination and information sharing among NGOs in the host nation. Even with such forums in

place, the confidence building that begins at the strategic/policy level must continue at the

regional/country level. Military commanders must keep in mind that their perceived neutrality in

a CHE will directly affect their ability to gather vital economic, ethnic, cultural, or military

information from NGOs. This was a constant problem during Operation Restore Hope where

> many NGOs were unwilling to be associated with the US military presence in
> Somalia, for fear that it would threaten their often hard-won relationships with
> the Somalis. Such antagonism complicated US operations as American units
> were deprived of both a potentially lucrative source of information about the
> local population as well as cooperation in food distribution and other humanitarian
> efforts.[5]

However, when such confidence building measures are employed successfully, as in Bangladesh

(Operation Sea Angel) and northern Iraq (Operation Provide Comfort), NGOs provided valuable

information about, and liaison with, the local population.[6]

Clearly, at the JTF level, commanders will rely on a variety of means to gather intelligence

regarding the political/military situation within the host nation. Commanders must be sensitive

to the types of information that can be disseminated to non-US government entities which will

assist NGOs in accomplishing their own tasks. Enhancement of NGO operational success

through the distribution and use of critical information will most likely have the effect of

reducing the NGOs' reliance on military assets and render the military's presence as unobtrusive

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as possible.

However, while military intelligence gathering assets are capable of acquiring significant data about a particular geographic region, Peter Walker cautions us that for NGOs such data may not be a panacea:

> The use of helicopters for reconnaissance in refugee and famine situations can be useful, although it can only provide a small part of the information needed to plan relief work. Equally, aerial photography and other remote sensing data obtained through military resources may provide information on the physical distribution of people and resources, but says nothing about the economic, ethnic, or health status of the affected population.[7]

Tactical or Local Implementation Level

At the local implementation level it appears clear that the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) concept has evolved into an effective clearinghouse for coordination and information exchange among military forces, NGOs, OGAs, and host nation local leaders and institutions. This node appears most effective in a CHE when it limits its role to operations versus policymaking. It is critical at this level that NGO staff and military civil affairs personnel establish strong, mutually supporting relationships. Real-time information exchange is key and the JTF commander should establish clear guidance as to what military information can be shared with NGO operatives. While a good portion of intelligence and information available to military forces in a humanitarian assistance operation will undoubtedly be classified, there are significant resources of an unclassified nature that may be useful to NGO representatives and could be provided with proper coordination. The first step in streamlining such a process is to

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keep access from becoming a bureaucratic roadblock to the free exchange of information. Establishment of "user friendly" standards for requesting intelligence and other information by NGOs is crucial. Once this is done there is a wide variety of assistance that the CMOC can provide in the information arena. Examples include:

a. **Mapping Services.** Providing maps of a certain region which may not be available to NGOs through commercial sources or, if available, not accurate enough to support relief operations.

b. **Transportation Information.** Distribution of international and intra-theater transport schedules (air, ground, and sea) of inbound relief supplies is essential to NGO-run onward movement operations to outlying distribution centers. During a recent Center for Naval Analyses conference, Candace H. Lekic of the UNHCR described frequent situations in eastern Bosnia in which information on military airdrop operations was denied to relief workers in order to maintain operational security. Because such airdrops attracted hostile Bosnian Serb forces, relief workers were sometimes put at risk because of their unintended presence near drop zones.[8]

c. **Hazardous Areas.** Though often provided to the military by NGO representatives on a case-by-case basis, wide dissemination of information on locations of concentrations of landmines and other hazards is vital to the safety and success of all parties in a CHE.[9] Similarly, the military often provides technical information on the capabilities and effects of such munitions to ensure the safety of relief workers. In-country training programs for NGO personnel on how to identify mined areas and what to do when they are encountered is another information-type

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service that can be provided.

d. **Media Assistance.** Military public affairs personnel can assist NGO representatives with media coverage as well as with dissemination of important relief information to the affected population.

e. **Electronic Information Sharing.** A recommendation from I Marine Expeditionary Force's Emerald Express '95 exercise concerned the establishment of an Internet-based, multimedia, information sharing system to enable exchange of unclassified, crisis-relevant information among policymakers, military commanders, international agencies, relief organizations, and the media.[10] We feel the best clearinghouse for such an effort would be at OFDA in its capacity as the US government's lead agency in providing humanitarian relief.

f. **Radio Communications.** Finally, information gathering, analysis, and dissemination between military forces and NGOs can be enhanced through efforts to standardize various means of communication. Coordinating and standardizing radio frequencies among the actors in a CHE will facilitate rapid exchange of vital information.

In the end, exchange of information must be a two-way street. As Hugo Slim tells us,

> in the past, a certain naivete was a useful asset to relief workers, and political ignorance was the bliss in which they thrived on the fringes of many wars and dictatorships. But today political ignorance can be fatal, and good information is crucial to survival in their (NGO workers) new environment. A great part of agency sitreps are now taken up with detailed reports on local patterns of conflict and alliance, and with political maneuvering at the international level. The need to keep pace with the changing political and military configurations of events is vital to the safe and effective operation of a relief agency.[11]

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Military leaders must begin to look at the NGO community as a "combat multiplier" in humanitarian assistance missions. Their expertise is vital to the success of the military's mission in the early stages of a complex humanitarian emergency. Further, NGO success translates into early withdrawal of military forces from such operations, enabling them to return rapidly to their warfighting focus.

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Endnotes

[1]Hugo Slim, "The Continuing Metamorphosis of the Humanitarian Professional: Some New Colors for an Endangered Chameleon." Paper presented at the 1994 Development Studies Association Conference, Lancaster, UK, 9 September 1994, p. 3.[1]

[2]Frederick C. Cuny, Dilemmas of Military Involvement in Humanitarian Relief. Intertect Relief and Reconstruction Corporation, Dallas, 1990, pp. 25-26.

[3]Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder, US European Command After Action Review, Operation Support Hope 1994, p. 5.

[4]Karl Farris, "Civil-Military Operations Center in Operation Support Hope." Unpublished paper, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, December 1995, p. 9.

[5]Jennifer Morrison Taw and John E. Peters, Operations Other Than War: Implications for the US Army. Rand Corporation, 1995, p. 10.

[6]Taw and Peters, p. 10.

[7]Peter Walker, "Foreign Military Resources for Disaster Relief: An NGO Perspective." Disasters, June 1992, p. 156.

[8]Candace H. Lekic comments at CNA Annual Conference: Military Support to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies, Washington, DC, 26 October 1995.

[9]Mary Greczyn, "Warring Sides in Bosnia Still Laying Mines Amid Peace Talks." Defense Week, 20 November 1995, p. 1.

[10]Conference Report, Emerald Express '95, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and I Marine Expeditionary Force, FMF, Camp Pendleton, California, 14 April 1995.

Slim, p. 3.

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