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STABILITY FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA: THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS

BY

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United States Army

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

STABILITY FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA: THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS

by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: David F. Treuting (LTC), USA

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One of the few remaining locations of confrontation left in the world is the Korean Peninsula. As Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have dissolved the number of true Marxist/Communist nation states is severely reduced. The history of the peninsula specifically with the United States and North Korea has been stormy since the Armistice of 1953. The volatility of the peninsula suggests that renewed hostilities remain possible. With serious consequences for the entire Northeast Asia region. A methodology that offers some promise for all parties involved is the arms control process. This strategic research project will analyze the arms control methodology and its potential for stabilizing the Korean peninsula and therefore lessening the potential for war.
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TABLE 4: CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN NORTHEAST ASIA PAGE 12.

FIGURE 5: MAP OF NORTHEAST ASIA PAGE 13.
INTRODUCTION

This strategic research project focuses on the Korean peninsula. During two tours of duty in the Republic of Korea, I came to know and respect the people of that country. I remain intrigued about the situation on the Korean peninsula. The complex relations and many possible outcomes of the situation between North and South Korea have captured my imagination. Although trained and prepared to fight to defend South Korea, I decided to research options other than combat to resolve the current political impasse.

As I began research into the current situation of the peninsula, I quickly recognized that the North Korean economic problems and the suspected nuclear weapons program warranted careful scrutiny. I had to overcome my personal dislike for North Korean ideology. The nearly complete isolation of North Korea certainly does not promote stability within the region. I began seeking options for stability in this very critical region of the Pacific Rim.

This research then has become my strategic research project. It will analyze arms control methodology and its potential for stabilizing the Korean peninsula.
PROBLEM STATEMENT

To attain stability, the Korean peninsula needs first to back away from the current hostility and distrust between North and South Korea. Since 25 June 1950 ideological differences have produced nothing but on-going tension and confrontation, even open war.

The Korean Peninsula remains one of the few locations of confrontation left in the world.\(^1\) As Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have dissolved, the number of true Marxist/Communist nation states has been greatly reduced. The history of the Korean peninsula, specifically the United States and North Korean standoff, has been stormy since the Armistice of 1953. Only a continuing cease fire agreement has halted the war. No formal peace has been established.

The 1993 North Korean refusal to abide by all the inspection requirements of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty almost led to another military confrontation between the United States and North Korea in the summer of 1994. The volatility of the peninsula suggests that renewed hostilities still remain possible, with serious consequences for the Koreas as well as the United States.\(^2\) Renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula would greatly impact upon the regional powers of China, Japan, and Russia, at a time when all three are trying to solve their own economic issues.
A methodology that offers some promise for resolution to all concerned parties is the arms control process. For the Koreas, this process could possibly open the door to stability and peaceful coexistence for the entire peninsula as well as the Northeast Asia region.

DEFINITIONS

Before establishing the context of the research project, I will review key operational definitions.

The first operational definition offers a context for the use of the word stability. In this analysis, stability means the maintenance of a nation-state's political, military, and economic relations by means of accepted diplomacy of members of the world body. Such stability allows for use of force only as a means of self-defense in case of attack or other armed action against the nation-state.

For the purposes of this analysis, arms control and its processes are defined as follows:

Arms control seeks to reduce the risk of war by limiting or reducing the threat from conflicting adversaries rather than relying solely on unilateral military responses to perceived or anticipated changes in military threat. If two conflicting adversaries control the operational and structural aspects of military power under mutual agreements, the danger of an all-out war, as well as a surprise attack that could occur as a result of misjudgment, would be considerably reduced. The term arms control is thus about seeking stable and peaceful coexistence, and contains the two major aspects: the operational and structural control of military forces.
Legitimate arms control reduces the risk of war by limiting or reducing the threat of conflict between two parties. Arms control provides an option to nations other than the resort to combat operations in response to a perceived or real military threat. An arms control protocol lessens the probability of military miscalculation or the premature, unnecessary resort to a military response. It enables one nation to avoid interpreting another nation's motives or actions incorrectly so that the threatened nation does not react as if it were under attack, when in fact it is not.4

The arms control process supports the peaceful coexistence of two or more parties. The process fosters mutual trust; the absence of this trust results in a destabilization which leads to a arms race or, worse yet, a war. One nation-state will not sit idly while another arms itself to the teeth with the perceived intention of doing harm to its potential adversary. The underarmed nation either joins the arms race or seeks an ally willing to defend it or underwrite its sovereignty.5

The arms control process thus requires a modicum of mutual trust to restore stability. Arms control is a process, not a means unto itself. In other words, we do not pursue arms control for its own sake. The nations entering the process share a considerable stake in its outcome. Arms control provides the ability for two distrusting nation states to coexist:
Arms control was meant to take place between states with a profound mistrust and hostility towards one another and there is nothing traditional about military collaboration between potential enemies. The fact that both sides could recognize a common interest in avoiding mutual nuclear annihilation did not mean that they would be able to move from that basic recognition to the achievement of practical cooperation for the purpose of limiting their competition.⁶

This process does not begin in trust. The purpose of arms control dialogue is to attain a mutual balance. The endgame of arms control is a reduction in tension and an avoidance of war.

Confidence-building measures are thus critical to beginning a viable arms control regime. Such measures are:

Military measures for inducing an assurance of mind and firm beliefs in the trustworthiness of the announced intentions of other states in respect of their security policies and the facts with regard to military activities and capacities which are designed to further the objectives of a nation's security policy.⁷

Confidence-building measures run the spectrum from nation-to-nation agreements in principle to military-to-military dialogue. Confidence-building measures provide the foundation of the process which allows the participants ultimately to build a consensus on issues. Such measures are absolutely critical in initiating the arms control process.

Most democratic nations practice transparency, defined for purposes of this analysis as follows:

Transparency is widely viewed as a valuable method of building trust and preventing security dilemmas among states. The premise is that when a neighbor voluntarily makes himself more vulnerable to you
be telling you about his defenses, he does not view you as a threat and is therefore not a threat to you.  

Transparency is not often practiced in the Orient. China, Japan, and the Koreas have a long history of keeping state secrets totally under wraps. But secrecy fosters distrust, even paranoia. It allows for bluffing your adversary into suspecting or believing things that are simply not true—such as believing your nation has friendly intentions so that you become vulnerable to "sneak attacks". On the other hand, transparency obviates the suspicion of a surprise attack. Whereas secrecy prohibits confidence-building, total transparency allows for great confidence regarding a nation's intentions and capabilities. In turn, such confidence fosters mutual trust, which, as we have seen, is requisite for the arms control process.

This analysis employs the foregoing contextual definitions of stability, arms control, confidence-building, and transparency.

CONTEXTUAL SETTING OF THE PROJECT

To understand the Korean problem, we must comprehend the environment of the peninsula and more importantly the setting of the region. The key players in the region are China, Russia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States.
South Korea enjoys a vibrant economy and a rising standard of living; it is considered one of the economic giants of the Orient. In 1993 South Korea elected the first nonmilitary president since Syngman Rhee, an indisputable indication of the nation's maturity. More importantly, it demonstrated that the South Korean military recognized the democratic process. Table 1 (below) shows the rapid growth of the South Korean economy from an economic basketcase to a respected, sought-after trading partner:

VITAL ECONOMIC STATISTICS FOR SOUTH KOREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>%GNP GROWTH</th>
<th>GNP PER CAPITA</th>
<th>GNP BILLIONS</th>
<th>GROSS SAVINGS</th>
<th>GROSS INVEST</th>
<th>TRADE DEBT BILLIONS$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>2,505</td>
<td>102.8</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3,110</td>
<td>128.9</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>4,127</td>
<td>172.8</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4,994</td>
<td>211.2</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>5,659</td>
<td>242.2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6,498</td>
<td>280.8</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6,685</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1

North Korea offers a different economic picture from that of its sister to the south. It has yet to find a nation-provider to replace the aid it received from the former Soviet Union. Concurrent, the North Korean economy is not capable of generating any significant output. Table 2
demonstrates how dependent North Korea was upon the Soviet Union:

### North Korea's Imports, 1986-92

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RUSSIA</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>1,922</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td>1,669</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,003</td>
<td>2,545</td>
<td>3,169</td>
<td>2,831</td>
<td>2,852</td>
<td>1,655</td>
<td>1,668</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2**

While imports from China have recently increased, they have not compensated for the Russian drop-off. The key reason that assistance to prop up the North Korean economy has waned is that both Russia and China are focused on their own economic interests. They also need foreign investment to stimulate their economies, which North Korea obviously cannot supply.11

Crop failures as well as fuel shortages have brought much hardship to the citizens of North Korea. Its industry is falling drastically behind that of other Asian countries in both output and technology.

In July 1994, North Korean communist president Kim Il Sung (Great Leader) died quite suddenly, creating the first dynastic succession within a communist nation. The father left his son, Kim Jong Il (Dear Leader), with serious economic problems brought on by the former's ideology of
juche, which literally translated means self-reliance or subjectivity¹²:

The new North Korean regime led by Kim Jong Il faces grave economic problems. North Korea's industrial production has declined steadily in recent years, and an increasing number of North Korean defectors report serious food shortages. These are desperate years for the North Korean people, who have not known much prosperity since the end of the Korean War. These conditions have led many outside pundits to predict the collapse of the North Korean economy, which would seriously affect North Korea's neighbors, including China and South Korea.¹³

World economists doubt that the North Korean economy will improve without a great deal of reform.

The bad news continues: Along with the energy shortage, bad weather, shortage of fertilizers provided by the former Soviet Union, poor management has created critical food shortages for the North Korean population. This means the North Korean leaders must import grains, an additional drain of capital on a already struggling economy.¹⁴ Table 3 shows North Korea's reliance on grain imports:

**North Korea's Grain Imports, 1989-93**¹⁵
(1,000 metric tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>455</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>204</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
<td>177</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3**

The data indicates an economy isolated not by the world's choice, but by the choice of the leaders of North Korea. Given these bleak circumstances, what constrains the leaders
of North Korea from reforming their economy and improving its political position in the world? The answer to this question resides in the current political situation of the Korean peninsula.

In 1987, the Roh Tae-Woo South Korean government initiated a new economic and political policy towards North Korea. This policy sought to strengthen South Korea politically and economically while isolating its northern protagonist. Nordpolitik was successful beyond any political strategists' wildest dreams. The policy fostered dramatic improvement in political relations between South Korea and the former Iron Curtain countries of East Europe. With Eastern European countries opting for democracy North Korea was further isolated politically. The political power gained from new political ties resulted in both North and South Korea being admitted into the United Nations in September of 1991. Coupled with South Korea's success as host of the 1988 Olympic Games, UN membership brought the Republic of Korea (South Korea) world recognition. South Korea had the political initiative, while concurrently world economists predicted the need for dramatic change within North Korea.

Some political pundits would probably suggest that North Korea's political/economic direction should perhaps mirror China's. China's economic reforms and market growth have vaulted it into the world's fastest growing economy. This in turn has allowed it to modernize and acquire
advanced technologies. But for North Korea to accept capitalist reform, it would have to abandon juche, which is directly tied to Kim Jong Il's political powerbase. Kim Jong Il created the ideology of juche on behalf of Kim Il Sung. Juche is more than a economic/political policy; it closely resembles a state-sponsored religion.\(^\text{18}\) In 1981, North Korea had implemented state-controlled, centrally planned and executed economic reforms with poor results.\(^\text{19}\) Most Northeast Asia experts feel that the answers to the North Korea's economic woes must come from outside the country, unlike the situation in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile North Korea's political leadership attempts to separate economic issues from the political issues.\(^\text{20}\) The North Korean policy of confrontation and brinkmanship during bilateral relations simply does not entice foreign investment, because confrontation creates an inherently unstable environment for investment.

Since North Korea had signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, it has been inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). During the 1993 compliance inspection, North Korea denied IAEA inspectors access to two critical facilities which could be utilized to process plutonium for weapons, claiming the facilities were "military" and thus off limits to inspectors.\(^\text{21}\) This recalcitrance has led to further political and diplomatic isolation of North Korea.\(^\text{22}\) President Clinton's National Security Strategy cites the
absolute criticality of stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons. President Clinton will also use support of nonproliferation as a yardstick in measuring the quality of United States relations with fellow nations. Since it appears to be violating international treaties, North Korea faces even greater difficulty in acquiring outside assistance.

Northeast Asia thus presents the regional flashpoint of two nations standing along a demilitarized zone, technically still in a state of war. Resumption of this conflict, even along conventional lines, would involve a tremendous amount of men and material. This area is one of the world's most heavily armed regions (see Table 4):

### Conventional Forces in Northeast Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
<th>UNITED STATES</th>
<th>RUSSIA</th>
<th>CHINA</th>
<th>JAPAN</th>
<th>NORTH KOREA</th>
<th>SOUTH KOREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TROOPS</td>
<td>333,000</td>
<td>690,000</td>
<td>2,930,000</td>
<td>237,700</td>
<td>1,128,000</td>
<td>633,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANKS</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMORED VEHICLES</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>8,700</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTY</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>18,300</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>9,080</td>
<td>4,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMBAT AIRCRAFT</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>4,970</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HELOS</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIPS</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBS</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4**

With so much hardware in a region known for its long-standing tensions and not known for its reasonableness, the potential for a misstep with drastic consequences is
considerable. The pressures of North Korea's economic problems only exacerbate the situation.

REGIONAL POWER INTERESTS

Stability in the Korean peninsula is historically rooted in the national interest of the regional powers China, Russia and Japan, along with United States global interest. Any viable option will have to address these respective interests with regard to both Koreas. Figure five shows the geostrategic position of the regional powers to
the Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia. The geography of Northeast Asia reveals the dominance of China in the region.

China is emerging as the next potential superpower. In that regard, North Korea provides a strategic buffer for China. A Korea united by means of a peaceful South Korean takeover is not in China's national interests. The following strategic analysis sets forth China's interest in a North Korean buffer state:

China abhors a picture of the sudden collapse of the Kim Dynasty and turmoil in Korea, especially as there are implications for refugees and complications of the Korean minority in the border area. China is extremely sensitive to any instability in border regions whether it is Tibet, Uygur, Mongolia or Korea. China keeps a suspicious eye on the intervention in North Korea by the major powers (particularly the US, Japan and Russia) as she did on the European powers a hundred years ago. China has put subtle pressure on Japan not to be too aggressive in pursuing economic sanctions against North Korea. A high-ranking official told me that he believed that Japan should play a bridge role by persuading the US not to be too tough on North Korea, rather than following the "sanction-mongering" US dictates that prevailed before former US President Jimmy Carter's visit and then Kim Il Sung's sudden death.

China's national interests are thus critical for any stability option in Northeast Asia. China provides the most support to North Korea. China's input and assistance, especially in her dealings with North Korea, must be accounted for in developing any option for regional stability.

Russia's national interest in this region is likewise important to stabilizing the peninsula:
Where the Soviet Union sought expanding influence from the eastern reaches of the Pacific to Australia and a role in all Asia's political, security, and economic affairs, Russia's aspirations are far more modest. Unlike their predecessors, Russia's new leaders do not conceive of their country as by right an architect of the Asian international system. They would like to lessen the effects of military competition in Northeast Asia, but they have no particular security regime in mind. They hope to involve Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the other prospering economies of the region in Russia's economic reconstruction, but they come with no overarching schemes of a new Pacific economic community.  

As Russia reforms and emerges from communism, its interest in the Koreas can either enhance stability or detract from it.  

The Korea peninsula represents a dagger pointed strategically at the heart of Japan. A nuclear-armed North Korea threatens the only nation to have sustained a nuclear attack in the past. Japan is understandably interested in the stability on the Korean peninsula:  

Traditionally, Japan has regarded the stability of the Korean peninsula as a "vital interest" to the extent that outside threats to Korean security have been perceived as menaces to Japan herself. Indeed, Japan's 1894-1895 war with China and 1904-1905 war with Russia were both essentially fought over control of the Korean peninsula. This time, however, the threat is one targeted directly at Japan from Korea. In this most recent crisis, North Korea's foreign ministry has spelled out dire consequences should Tokyo impose sanctions over Pyongyang's suspected nuclear program, asserting that North Korea would regard it as a declaration of war, and Japan would be unable to evade a deserving punishment for it.  

Japan remains a critical cog in the international economics of the Pacific Rim. Its vital interest requires the stability of the Korean peninsula, but it needs full
assurance that the nuclear genie does not fall into the hands of North Korea.

Through its 40-year security agreement with South Korea, the United States has maintained an uneasy status quo with its own soldiers and blood. As the sole current global economic, military, and political superpower, the United States has a critical interest in the stability of Northeast Asia, more specifically in the Korean peninsula. The current CINC of Combined Forces Command, General Gary E. Luck, has succinctly articulated this interest:

We must note from the outset that peace and stability in Northeast Asia are most important to the security and economic well being of the United States. Our history and geography make the United States a Pacific power with major political, military and economic interests in the region. These interests are especially critical to our future since the balance of economic power continues to rapidly shift toward Asia. The Asia-Pacific region is now our largest trading partner and a huge market for American exports. Future American economic growth and well-being will be derived from close interaction with Asia's powerhouses - China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. United States security strategy in Asia must be guided by our own nation interests and regional realities. The Asia-Pacific region will be the World's most dynamic and powerful region in the 21st Century. Therefore, the United States must continue to be an important player in regional security activities.

The United States currently stations 37,000 service members in the Republic of Korea. It has backed up its interest with armed might. The United States has the diplomatic and economic influence and military power to assume the lead in attaining stability for the peninsula. The United States is the best broker for Korea and Northeast Asian stability.
PROOF OF THESIS

Many pundits believe that North and South Korea will follow the German model and reunite into one nation under a democratically elected government. South Korea would certainly dominate this new union financially and politically.\textsuperscript{31} Others postulate that North Korea will simply implode of its own bankrupt internal ideology.\textsuperscript{32} Still others hold that the European model of arms control can be facilely transferred to the Korean peninsula with comparable results to its application elsewhere. Finally, others hold that economics and international political relations among democratic nations will provide the driving force for stability and the lessening of tension within Northeast Asia region.\textsuperscript{33} Despite the arguments of their various advocates, all of these scenarios and solution are based on a narrow perspective of the environment of the Korean peninsula. Successful implementation of the arms control process into the Korean peninsula must account for the specific context of the region and the complex, varied interests of the key players.

The regional powers of China, Russia, Japan and the global power the United States all project different interests militarily, politically, and economically in the Korean peninsula. However, none want to see another Korean war, as the earlier survey of these interests has revealed. The bottom line is that any diplomatic dialogue leading to
arms control must address the interests of the regional powers' and the United States.\textsuperscript{34}

War on the Korean peninsula would jeopardize the economic and military position of China. The material costs of China's support to North Korea to avert a defeat at the hands of a South Korean/US United Nations force would be enormous. Moreover, China's failure to restrain North Korea from starting the conflict would curtail Chinese access to advanced technology.\textsuperscript{35} While it is not in China's national interest to see a reunited Korea under the South, Chinese participation (economic and/or direct military assistance) would close down its economy. China would therefore favor an accord that reduces tension but maintains an independent North Korea friendly to China.\textsuperscript{36} China must participate in the arms control process, which can support Chinese interest in the region (the significance of this point is highlighted by the fact of the first KEDO meeting for the Agreed Framework took place in Beijing), especially in avoiding a costly military conflict with an uncertain outcome.

Russia maintains a defense treaty with North Korea, but Russia's ability to honor that treaty in a conventional conflict, given Russia's current economic and political stability, is highly dubious. Russia has more in common with South Korea than with North Korea.\textsuperscript{37} Russia greatly desires South Korean investment in its economy, something that North Korea cannot undertake. Russia wants to be a party to the political process for the peninsula, but its main concerns
Russia would view the arms control process as a means for lessening tension while concurrently providing stability for a region that Moscow sees as necessary for Russian economic growth.

Any threat to the stability of the region would negatively influence the economic markets which Japan so greatly depends upon for its national vitality. Neither increased tension nor armed conflict would improve the Japanese market position or economy. Strategically, Japan would serve as an intermediate staging base and logistics center for any conflict on the peninsula. This would make Japan a target for North Korea's extended range Scuds. A possible second Korean conflict would not be in the national interest of Japan.

The United States has been the guarantor of South Korean security since 1945. The United States wants democracy to flourish and South Korea's free market to remain unimpeded so that its economy can continue to grow. The United States has recently concluded an Agreed Framework with North Korea which has essentially frozen the North Korean nuclear program in exchange for economic development brokered by the United States, South Korea and Japan. Arms control for the peninsula is decidedly in the national interest of the United States.

World recognition and the establishment of a maturing democracy have added to spectacular economic growth and vibrancy in South Korea, offering solid ground for arms
South Korea has accomplished these economic and political coups under the constant threat of surprise attack and continued North Korean threats to annihilate them. The political dialogue required for arms control would offer an internationally supported opportunity for North Korea to recognize South Korea. The South Korean national interest would likewise best be served by viable arms control for the Korean peninsula, which would remove a long-standing threat for its hostile northern neighbor.

North Korea has poured its meager national assets into defense spending to maintain its self-proclaimed right to liberate the South as well as to provide the control necessary to sustain its leaders in power. However, its leaders are starting to realize that the probability of "liberating" South Korea is indeed nonexistent. North Korea needs guarantees of political survival and strong support in gaining economic solvency without being swallowed whole by South Korea. The arms control process offers a viable option for North Korea to abandon its current brinkmanship approach to international relations.

The Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994, between the United States and North Korea was a rudimentary form of arms control designed to freeze the nuclear weapons program of the North. The principal tenets of the agreed Framework are summarized by the testimony of U.S. Ambassador at Large, Robert L. Gallucci, (the Ambassador was the key US negotiator on the agreement) on 1 December 1994 as:
• **Nuclear Freeze**: The DPRK has ceased construction at its important nuclear facilities. In the meantime, IAEA inspectors remain on the ground at Yongbyon to monitor North Korean activities.

• **Spent Fuel Storage**: The United States is prepared to provide the DPRK with technical assistance in safely storing its spent fuel in a manner consistent with eventual shipment to another country.

• **Alternate Energy**: We are nearing final arrangements for the first shipment of heavy fuel oil, 50,000 metric tons, to North Korea by January 21, the time period specified in the agreed framework. While the U.S. will be funding that shipment, the burden of future shipments will be borne by the international consortium.

• **LWR (Light Water Reactor) Contract**: Under the agreed framework, the DPRK and KEDO (Korean Energy Development Organization: Japan, United States, South Korea have leading roles) are required to reach agreement on a LWR supply contract by April 1995. We will begin those discussions with the DPRK and then hand them over to KEDO once that organization is established. An initial administrative meeting is now underway in Beijing.

• **Establishing Liaison Office**: Following up on our September experts meeting in Pyongyang, we will be holding a second meeting with DPRK experts from December 6-9 in Washington D.C. The two sides will discuss consular and technical issues involved in setting up liaison offices. We will also brief the DPRK on initial steps we will take to begin lifting restrictions on normal commercial relations between our two countries.

The Agreed Framework could segue into continued political dialogue for the region, to include with all the key players. Successful compliance with this agreement could lead to establishment of the first confidence-building measure between North and South Korea.
The European model of arms control mentioned earlier provides lessons for building dialogue and eventually entering into negotiations. However, the Korean peninsula is a completely different milieu than was Eastern Europe during the early 1990's, when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was completed.\textsuperscript{49} The European model was driven by the Eastern European people's desire to improve their standard of living and by the West's desire to avoid war.\textsuperscript{50}

The people of Eastern Europe were tired of doing without; their experience indicated that their communist masters were falling behind their western counterparts in providing for their citizens. Eastern Europe possessed a labor movement, organized religions, and sufficient mobility to gain information so that the people could compare what they were being told by their political masters to reality.\textsuperscript{51}

While the desire to improve their standard of living beyond basic survival is undoubtedly present among the North Korean people, these desires have not yet galvanized into political action. The North Korean people have nothing to compare their standard of living to, for they are shut off from any base of comparison.\textsuperscript{52} They are far more isolated and insulated than were their Eastern European counterparts.

The North Korean leaders have mastered repression of discontent as well as the control of the population. Institutions to bring about change simply do not exist in
North Korea. North Koreans are systematically isolated from Western "contamination" to ensure that their leaders can maintain control and power. In the European model, the institutions and people pressured the leaders for change. We have no reason to believe that comparable circumstances exist in North Korea.

Any confidence-building measures for North Korea must surely acknowledge that neither the North Korean political system nor their leaders will support the process. Their need for outside economic assistance is well-documented; the search for this assistance runs a close second to survival in the minds of the North Korean leaders. The impetus for arms control in North Korea must come from its leaders - a subtle difference from the European model.

South Korea, on the other hand, needs relief from the constant threat of surprise attack against it from North Korea. Its current military posture - the ability to deter that attack and then, if deterrence fails, to defeat the attack - is mandated by the raw military power on its northern border:

The principal threat in Korea today is one of conventional attack posed by massive Northern ground and air forces largely concentrated along the intra-Korean border. The ground forces are organized into 26 infantry divisions, 14 armored brigades, and 23 separate motorized and mechanized infantry brigades. These forces are aggregated into 16 corps, including one "capital defense," and one "special purpose." The portion of the force deployed close to attack positions between Pyongyang and the frontier consists of some 650,000 troops with about 17 divisions and 30 separate brigades. The attack force is augmented by about 5,000 artillery and rocket pieces, many
buried deep inside mountain caves between 20 and 40 kilometers north of the border. Most of the North Korean multiple rocket launchers are committed to the Seoul sector.\textsuperscript{55}

The arms control process has been flaunted by North Korean propaganda machine for the last 15 years. A true arms control process for the Korean peninsula would eventually eliminate the North's ability to strike from the cold and would support the sovereignty of both nations.\textsuperscript{56}

South Korea has more to lose in war, but North Korea would be eliminated as a nation-state in that same war. The conflict could potentially grow beyond the peninsula, involving most of the region—if not the world. But reality and logic often fall victim to a nation's emotional baggage:

To maintain even a "controlled" peace, Korea, the last remnant of the Cold War, desperately needs these preconditions. Having experienced severe fighting, each of the two Koreas are armed to the teeth. South Korea, once having been invaded by the North, learned by experience that military imbalance vis-a-vis the northern half brought a fratricidal war leaving an almost incurable scar on the nation, and that the danger of strategic unbalance can never again be tolerable. North Korea, once having nearly occupied the south by force, seems to remember the effectiveness of military force towards unifying Korea under its own authority and ideology. It still seems to consider the southern part as an area to be absorbed into the North, and employs various kinds of violence and even peace gestures to discredit the South Korean government and form a united front with the dissidents in the South. Under these circumstances, the two Koreas need to overcome certain psychological complexes and, in order to produce some feasible arms control measures, stabilize their respective societies.\textsuperscript{57}

Arms control appears to offer a strong option to provide stability for both North and South Korea, while maintaining the sovereignty of both.
Arms control can lead to more stability and less tension for both nations in the Korean peninsula. The pivotal problem is how to begin a viable arms control process given the current distrust and hostility of both nations. The impediments are numerous. But the potential outcome of the process demands that it is attempted:

There are many obstacles to be removed for the success of arms control in Korea, from the deep-seated mutual distrust to the North's lingering infatuation with the idea of "liberating" the South, to the too-highly emotional desire for unification to the dishonesty of the actors involved. In balance, though, the possibility of arms control in Korea is now more viable than ever. External factors promote it; internal factors demand it.58

Initiation of the arms control process will eventually stabilize the Korean Peninsula and lead to the desired reduction in tension and dramatic reduction of the probability of war, not only for Korea but also for Northeast Asia.

However, the process is totally dependent upon the initiation and maintenance of genuine diplomatic dialogue between North and South which doesn't currently exist. This analysis has duly described the problems. Yet they can be worked out if both nations want peace. This is the enigma. The dialogue has begun between the United States and North Korea with the aforementioned Agreed Framework. So the initiative for arms control has begun. Now, North and South must begin the dialogue to keep it going:
The Korean Peninsula is still troubled by many serious security problems. But an opening now exists for North Korea to set aside its isolationism, take concrete steps to reduce regional tensions, and eventually join the community of nations. Unfortunately, there is no quick or easy fix to the substantial security issues that divide us. However, North Korea does have another opportunity to restart dialogue with the Republic of Korea and to undertake some meaningful confidence-building measures to help reduce tensions. Implementation of the Agreed Framework is a long process with a number of critical milestones. It is not based on trust, and we will continue to monitor closely North Korean compliance with the terms of the Agreed Framework. If North Korea abandons its commitments, the world should consider appropriate measures to reverse North Korean compliance, including the possibility of sanctions.59

The time is now for the Republic of Korea and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea to begin serious dialogue and to enter the process of arms control for stability and peace.

The best political option to conclude the 1950 Korean War and to establish true stability in the region through a viable arms control process. The Koreas need to seize the moment provided by the Agreed Framework. Let the dialogue begin.
ENDNOTES


5 Ibid.,p51.


46 Ibid, p222.


48 Ibid p16.


57 Ibid, p222.

58 Ibid, p239.

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