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THE WORKERS' PARTY OF ETHIOPIA

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PREFACE

Ethiopia's Socialist revolution ultimately brought a Marxist-Leninist regime to power under the military dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam. In September 1984 a ruling Communist party, the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, was established under pressure from the Soviet Union, Ethiopia's crucial military supplier. The new party has caused concern to the West because of the link between the party and the Soviet Union, and the major role played by the Soviet Union in the party's formation.

This paper outlines the history of the revolution, including the military takeover of the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, the steps which led to socialism and a Marxist-Leninist orientation, and the internal political turmoil which produced the turn toward the Soviet Union for military aid in 1977. This is followed by a discussion of the development of the Commission on Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia, including Soviet pressure on Mengistu to form a Soviet vanguard party, Mengistu's reluctance to comply, and the final stages of party formation. Finally, an in-depth examination of the new party follows, including the national formation congress in September 1984, the party's structure, and its ruling membership.

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SUMMARY

Ethiopia's Socialist development under the rule of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) following a military coup in 1974 included a massive land reform program and nationalization of financial institutions and major industries. Although the government reorganized along Marxist-Leninist lines in December 1976, military attempts to form an alliance with the civilian left failed and opponents of military rule were eliminated during the bloody "Red Terror" of 1977 and 1978. Mengistu Haile Mariam seized power in February 1977 and has held it ever since.

PMAC's need for military aid in the face of armed hostilities with Somalia over the Ogaden and the growing strength of Eritrean separatist groups and other groups seeking regional autonomy led to Mengistu's military dependence on the Soviet Union. The Soviets seized the opportunity to pressure PMAC into forming a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. PMAC formed the Commission on Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) in December 1979, but resisted the formation of a ruling Communist party until September 1984 when the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) was formally inaugurated.

Despite Soviet pressure for civilian rule, the Soviets have recognized Mengistu's power and have accepted military leadership. A large percentage of the membership of the ruling structures of the new party is militarily oriented and it is likely that the party will become the political tool of the military regime. There are few changes in personnel from PMAC and COPWE ruling structures. The present economic crisis has not been solved within the Soviet model and will probably lead to increased economic ties between Ethiopia and the West and relatively moderate policies within the WPE. These factors suggest that the prospects for the evolution of a genuine vanguard party are slim.

THE WORKERS' PARTY OF ETHIOPIA

1. INTRODUCTION

Ethiopia under Emperor Haile Selassie was a closed society in which the dominant mode of production was agriculture and society was organized along feudal lines. Although an intelligentsia comprised of students and professionals critical of Haile Selassie's cosmetic political reforms existed in the 1960s, no significant opposition to the regime emerged until the early 1970s. At that time, political discontent within organized labor and the military was heightened by the effects of the devastating drought of 1973-74 which the regime attempted to conceal and the economic drains of the world recession and a military conflict in the province of Eritrea.

The military was able to lead the Ethiopian revolution because of the magnitude of resources possessed by the military which allowed it to exert political influence. Also, the effects of Westernization under Haile Selassie had exposed middle- and low-ranking officers as well as the rank-and-file to significant social change. The military coup which overthrew the Haile Selassie regime was a relatively slow process. In June 1974, a group of junior officers and enlisted men, among whom was Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, formed the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee, or Derg. This group forced the weakening Selassie regime, which was anxious to maintain a rapport with the army, to make certain reforms, but it did not actually depose the Emperor until 12 September 1974. The new government, the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), set as its primary task the drafting of administrative procedures for a future people's government and a new constitution based on the principles of the revolutionary philosophy of Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia First), issued on 20 December 1974 as an announcement of Ethiopia's commitment to socialism. The country's adoption of a one-party state, direct government control of the majority of economic sectors, and collectivization of agriculture established the goal of building HibretteSebawinet, a Socialist society.

Structurally, PMAC, with a membership of 126 military men, included representatives from each branch of the armed forces, military academies, and major units within each service; its main council was divided into 12 groups of 8 to 10 men, each responsible for a specific field of interest. However, an inner core of 8 to 10 men, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, was thought to be the real force behind the revolutionary government.

Despite Mengistu's prominence in the PMAC leadership from its inception, he was preceded as PMAC Chairman by General Aman Andom who was executed by his colleagues in November 1974. Immediately following this event, Mengistu served as one of two Vice Chairmen, but a power play leading to the attempt by other PMAC leaders to move against Mengistu resulted in a gun battle in February 1977. Mengistu emerged as the sole Chairman of PMAC, a position he has reinforced and held to the present.

2. SHIFTS TO THE LEFT

Steps Toward Socialism

The first concrete step taken toward socialism was the nationalization in January 1975 of financial institutions, the insurance business, and major industries. But the keystone of the revolution was land reform which was shaped by three major proclamations accepted enthusiastically by much of the peasant population. The first, in March 1975, was the Proclamation to Provide for the Public Ownership of Rural Land, which nationalized all land and organized the rural population into peasant associations. The following December, a second proclamation outlined the powers of the associations, and in June 1979, processes to form peasants' collectives were introduced under the issue of the Directives on Agriculture Producers' Co-operatives which emphasized the Leninist principle of voluntariness through mass communal cultivation. Soon after the issuance of the first proclamation in March 1975, the National Work Campaign (Zemecha) was introduced, an agricultural program organized by Mengistu under which 60,000 students were sent into the countryside to instruct the rural population in new farming techniques and basic health care. Underlying the active role of Zemecha participants in aiding in the formation of peasant associations was the function of the Campaign to explain to the rural population the goals of the new government. By early 1976, Zemecha participants had organized over 20,000 peasant associations with a total membership of about five million.

In the urban sector, a proclamation was issued in July 1975 to nationalize urban land and abolish landlordism. Urban dwellers' associations (kebeles) were organized in all towns and cities to allocate housing and collect rents. In later years, the role of the kebeles expanded as urban administration was virtually handed over to them, each kebele possessing its own court and volunteer police squad and an executive committee. At present the kebeles give the government a tight hold on the country's towns and cities by exerting grass-roots control. A typical kebele is headed by government-appointed officials and has about 125 volunteer members, each of whom works four shifts per month. The largest city, Addis Ababa, had 189 kebeles in 1983.

A major ideological step was taken in December 1976 when PMAC proclaimed that it was reorganizing along Marxist-Leninist lines under which there would be a Congress consisting of all 40 PMAC members, a Central Committee of 40 members to be elected from members of the Congress, and a Standing Committee of 17 members, also elected from the Congress. The memberships of the two latter bodies would overlap that of the Congress.

b. Alliance With the Civilian Left

In fall 1975, a group of Ethiopian students, charged by PMAC to organize into a 15-man Political Bureau for the purpose of forming a political party, began an ideological discussion in the country which was permitted by the government to appear in the press. The debate centered around the transition process from feudalism to socialism, the basic concept of democracy, and the right of Ethiopia's nationalities to self-determination. Two factions emerged--the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON). Both claimed to be Marxist-Leninist in orientation and both

accepted that Ethiopia would have to go through a phase in which the government could not be based on the proletariat. However, they disagreed on the issue of the military government, the EPRP opposed to the continuation of PMAC rule and MEISON arguing that PMAC could be considered a progressive force.

As it became increasingly clear that the PMAC leadership had no intention of relinquishing power to anyone, the EPRP became an opposition group dedicated to destroying PMAC. By early 1977, when Mengistu had taken power, the EPRP and PMAC forces began to skirmish in the streets of the capital. The kebeles were armed by the government with 20,000 guns to kill the "counter-revolutionaries." From November 1977 to March 1978, a period which became known as the "Red Terror," armed conflict erupted during which over 10,000 people died. In the end, the EPRP was essentially eliminated. MEISON was also finally considered too purely Marxist-Leninist and civilian for Mengistu to tolerate, and the organization went underground.

c. Turn Toward the Soviet Union

Mengistu's orientation toward the Soviet Union in the late 1970s grew out of PMAC's need for military aid to deal with a number of problems. Armed hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia had broken out over the Ogaden, a region of Ethiopia which Somalia claimed. Also, the growing strength of three separatist groups, which had seized 95 percent of Eritrea, threatened Ethiopia's integrity. In addition, various nationalist groups were seeking regional autonomy.

When the United States refused to provide military aid because of Ethiopia's violations of human rights, the Soviet Union communicated to Mengistu that it was prepared to provide military support if he terminated all military links with the United States. Mengistu complied, also attracted by the opportunity to deflect Soviet support from Somalia. The price for Soviet military assistance was Soviet political influence, and to this Mengistu agreed. The result was the first tangible step toward the creation of a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party which, according to Marxist-Leninist theory, plays a central role in replacing an old culture with new values, norms, and institutions of the revolution.

3. THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZING THE PARTY OF THE WORKING PEOPLE OF ETHIOPIA

The Commission to Organize the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) was formally established on 17 December 1979 to launch the political, ideological and organizational activities necessary for the creation of a workers' party. Its organizational basis rested on the principle of democratic centralism while its ideological basis rested on Marxism-Leninism. The link between a vanguard party and the people, of whom 85 percent were peasants, was to be a network of primary party organizations and mass organizations of all societal components. (See Appendixes A and B.)

COPWE's composition changed slowly throughout the years of its existence, reflecting the increasing role of the working class. In November 1981, 2.9 percent of its membership were workers, 1.2 percent peasants, and 95.9 percent the intelligentsia, civil service and military. By the end of 1982, 21.7 percent of the membership were workers, 3.3 percent peasants, and only 75 percent other strata.

a. Growing Soviet Pressure and Mengistu's Response

No real attempt was made toward converting COPWE into a party until the end of 1981. By this time, Ethiopia's dependence on the Soviet Union for military aid had increased as the result of numerous and costly military campaigns in Eritrea. The Soviets, anxious to play a more influential role than military supplier in Ethiopia, began to pressure Mengistu, suggesting that future arms deliveries would be linked to party formation. Although Mengistu was badly in need of Soviet military aid with over half of the Ethiopian budget devoted to defense, he did little to transform COPWE into the vanguard party envisaged by Moscow. Instead, he began to construct a party in which leadership roles would be reserved for soldiers and bureaucrats by shadowing the state bureaucracy with that of COPWE.

By the beginning of 1982, the rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism had pervaded Ethiopian society. Although plans were proceeding to establish the vanguard party, it was clear from the new policies and institutions being introduced that the party would not be a broadly based one with a leadership composed of representatives from all progressive and oppressed groups in society. This was best seen in the attempts of PMAC to repress dissident groups militarily instead of trying to accommodate them politically. In addition, some Western observers remained dubious about Mengistu's commitment to Marxism-Leninism, interpreting his movement toward a party more as a commitment to nationalism and the supremacy of his military dictatorship than to an ideology.

In early 1983, PMAC faced the failure of the massive Red Star Campaign begun in February 1982 in Eritrea in which Ethiopian forces made a concerted attempt to gain control of the remaining guerrilla-held territory. The resulting substantial military losses increased Ethiopia's dependence on Soviet military aid, thereby exposing PMAC to continuing Soviet pressure for party formation. During the Second Congress of COPWE in January 1983, Mengistu announced the inauguration of the vanguard party to be called the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) in September 1984, the tenth anniversary of the revolution. About 1,000 COPWE members began to form party organizations in plants, factories, state farms, offices, peasant associations, army units, and educational institutions.

Yet during this same period in early 1983, Mengistu continued to resist the Soviets. By the time the Second Congress convened, when COPWE had expanded to 6,500 cells in 14 regions and their subregions, its leadership had become almost interchangeable with PMAC's leadership. PMAC Chairman Mengistu became the Chairman of COPWE; the 7 members of COPWE's Executive Committee were all members of PMAC; 79 of the 123 full and candidate members of COPWE's Central Committee were members of the armed forces or police; all 10 members of PMAC's Standing Committee and all of the estimated 32 members of PMAC's Central Committee were on COPWE's Central Committee; and all 14 of COPWE's provincial committees were led by PMAC members. Following the Congress, 6 leading COPWE Central Committee members of the pro-Soviet faction were purged and 34 other members were dismissed; in the end, the membership of the Central Committee decreased from 93 to 91 full members and from 30 to 26 alternates. Mengistu also ordered the release from prison of 716 "reactionary" political prisoners, most former dignitaries in the Haile Selassie regime.

b. Movement Toward a Party

In the months following the Second Congress, there was a burst of activity bringing COPWE closer to party status. In January 1983, a cooperation agreement was signed between COPWE and the Bulgarian Communist Party; in May, COPWE representatives signed a cooperation agreement with the Communist Party of Vietnam, Ethiopia and Hungary signed a friendship and cooperation agreement, and a COPWE delegation visited East Germany and Bulgaria; and in July, a 30-member COPWE delegation left for Moscow to study both ideology necessary for organizing the party and Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) activities. Another major step was the creation in May 1983 of the Institute for the Study of Nationalities which was charged with analyzing the constitution and planning autonomous administrative structures for the nationalities along Marxist-Leninist lines, taking into account the relationship between those structures and the central government.

A significant step toward the creation of the vanguard party occurred in April 1983. A government shuffle was announced which consisted of a reorientation of power among senior PMAC members. PMAC Secretary-General Fikre Selassie Wogderess, considered a Soviet hardliner, was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, placing him in the number two position in the hierarchy. Furthermore, Shimelis Adougna, the pro-Western head of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, was replaced by Dawit Wolde Giorgis, a COPWE representative in Eritrea. Shimelis' removal came as a surprise to many at a time when Ethiopia was trying to attract Western aid for its drought victims.

c. Increasing Military Needs

In the first months of 1984, several situations were impacting heavily on Ethiopia's military position. A series of successful EPLF offensives had occurred in Eritrea, Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) insurgents had undertaken a forceful drive to the south of Eritrea, the newly emerged Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM), with the help of the TPLF, had gained control of large areas of the country's central Wollo and Gondar Provinces, and Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) insurgents had reappeared in the Ogaden. It was undoubtedly due to massive Soviet military supplies that Mengistu had managed to keep the country together in the past. Now faced with all of these insurgencies, especially that in Eritrea, Mengistu was convinced that only extensive new Soviet assistance could prevent widespread chaos and the opportunity for the Eritrean insurgents to regain control of large areas of the province.

Another disturbing situation was developing in Addis Ababa where opposition to PMAC seemed to be on the upswing. In January, a large number of residents took to the streets following the distribution of leaflets calling for "Death to Mengistu." The government acknowledged the arrest of more than 400 people following the incident. Soon afterward, four American diplomats were expelled from the country, accused of conspiring against the regime. In addition, apparently still anxious to demonstrate his independence to the Soviets, Mengistu expelled two Soviet diplomats with the same accusation of conspiracy against the regime.

The Soviets chose to overlook these gestures of defiance, inviting Mengistu to Moscow in March 1984 for talks with the new Soviet Premier, Konstantin

Chernenko, only 1 month after Mengistu's attendance at the funeral of deceased leader Yuri Andropov. Shortly before the visit, the Soviet Union had delivered to Ethiopia 6 MiG-25 fighter planes to be piloted by Soviets until the completion of training of 20 Ethiopian pilots in the Soviet Union. The visit was a great success for both countries. Despite Mengistu's gestures of defiance, the Soviets recognized the future party in the form Mengistu had attempted to give it. The implication was that the Soviets had finally recognized Mengistu's individual power and had accepted the role of the military in the leadership of the country.

d. Steps Toward Party Consolidation

On 17 May 1984, a seminar was held in which regional COPWE representatives and organizational affairs officials, heads of political sections of sector and force commanders, and provincial representatives participated under a directive by Mengistu. The purpose of the seminar was to make urgent preparations toward party formation through founding meetings to be held at various levels. The resulting meetings began on 4 June and continued through 2 August and were carried out in production and distribution organizations, offices, the army, among the peasants, and in all COPWE basis organizations. The participants in the meetings assessed COPWE ideological and organizational work and elected executive bodies and their representation to the WPE. Representatives to the WPE formation congress were also chosen. The COPWE groups holding formation meetings became WPE groups automatically.

4. THE WORKERS' PARTY OF ETHIOPIA

The Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) was formally established on 10 September 1984 during a 5-day national congress held in the "Great Hall of the People," newly constructed for the congress at a cost of \$45 million. Mengistu opened the congress on 6 September with a 6-hour speech presented to 1,742 delegates and to observers from 75 foreign delegations, most from Communist countries. He announced a \$30 billion 10-year development plan including increased food production by state farms and collectives. He also made it clear that no concessions would be made to any of the insurgent groups fighting against the government.

The new party will probably remain relatively small with a membership of 30,000 to 50,000 in the first stage. Most of its 13,000 to 14,000 full-time officials have received intensive ideological and organizational training in the Soviet Union or East Germany.

a. Party Structure

Despite the new party's supposed representation of the proletariat, workers and peasants in the congress were greatly outnumbered by military and government officials. Only 19 percent of all the delegates were workers and only 12 percent were peasants. Although 72 percent of the delegates came from peasant or working families, 1,200 were professionals, including 60 lawyers, 186 teachers, and 40 engineers. Seventy-five percent of the delegates had received some political training, 927 of them overseas, and 555 in Ethiopia. Only six percent of the delegates were female.

A major step in the transition from COPWE to the WPE was taken with the election of the top ruling bodies of the WPE, the Politburo and the Central Committee. (See Appendix C.) However, there are few changes in party personnel. The entire seven-man COPWE Executive Committee remains intact in the WPE Politburo and includes six of Mengistu's closest military colleagues. In a major concession to the Soviet Union which has encouraged a shift from military to civilian rule, the 136-member Central Committee chose four civilians for positions in the Politburo. No civilians have ever held such high posts in either PMAC or COPWE. However, only two of the new civilian members, Alemu Abebe and Shimelis Mazengia, are Marxist-Leninist ideologues. The remaining two, Hailu Yimenu and Amanuel Amde Michael both hold pragmatic and moderate political viewpoints.

The six alternate, nonvoting members of the Politburo are high-ranking PMAC and/or COPWE members including two Marxist-Leninist ideologues, Teka Tulu and Shewandagne Belete. Two others, Tesfaye Dinka and Kassa Gebre, are known for their moderate views, while Tesfaye Wolde Selassie and Fassika Sikelie have always been politically neutral.

An Executive Committee was also formed whose membership is identical to that of the former COPWE Executive Committee and the present WPE Politburo, a circumstance which observers believe is the result of Mengistu's reluctance to give complete power to the WPE. The WPE Central Committee consists of 136 full members and 64 alternates. With the exception of 8 individuals who were former members of MEISON or other regional organizations, all of COPWE's 99 full Central Committee members were transferred directly to the new Committee, retaining their original ranking orders. Although a number of civilians were appointed to the Central Committee, the military element remains powerful. Among the 29 officers in the full Committee and 16 officers serving as alternates, 22 hold the rank of general or higher. Another 45 Central Committee members are former officers or other military personnel who no longer use their rank; 36 of them served in senior positions in PMAC.

b. Party Indoctrination

Under the COPWE's guidance, the Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association (REYA) was set up to facilitate the active participation of youth in the revolutionary process. By the time of the WPE national congress in September 1984, REYA membership had exceeded three million young people. The activities of REYA, including the organization of cultural, literary and arts festivals, and propaganda activities in Addis Ababa University, are similar to those of the Young Communist League (Komsomol) in the Soviet Union.

Secondary and university students are required to take courses in Marxist-Leninist theory. In 1980, the Yekatit '66 (February 1974) Political School was established to educate party cadres in Marxism-Leninism. The function of the school is to provide the WPE with trained Marxist-Leninist intellectuals.

c. Soviet and Ethiopian Party Structural Similarities

The WPE ruling structure is similar to that of the Soviet CPSU structure. The CPSU consists basically of a Central Committee and a Politburo. The Central Committee is divided into executive and administrative apparatus whose members are responsible for making general party decisions. It consists of about

319 members and 151 candidates; Central Committee administrative officials are not necessarily members of the Central Committee. The Politburo consists of 12 full members and 6 candidate members, in comparison to the 11 full and 6 alternate members of the WPE Politburo. The members of the Politburo are responsible for the daily functions of the CPSU. Other smaller CPSU bodies exist, including a Secretariat, 23 departments, three schools, and a Party Control Committee. The Central Committee and Politburo of the WPE will function in a similar fashion, the major difference being the smaller number of members in each body due to the smaller population of Ethiopia.

Apart from the CPSU, two other major government bodies exist in the Soviet Union--the Supreme Soviet, which is the formal legislative body, and the Council of Ministers, the Executive Branch. A major difference exists here between the ruling structures of the two countries in that the government body of Ethiopia, PMAC, is supposedly being eliminated. Presumably the Soviets perceive, within the Marxist-Leninist model, that Ethiopia is in an early stage of Socialist development wherein a government body is not yet appropriate.

d. Effects on Daily Life

Data are lacking on the effects of COPWE and the WPE on Ethiopia's population, but there appears to be some negative impact. Many people, particularly the majority peasant population, are strongly influenced by religion and are therefore suspicious of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Also, the major problems of the economy and of the nationalities remain, the most immediate problem being the drought which is affecting 5.2 million people. The huge amounts spent on the founding of the party and celebrations for the tenth anniversary of the revolution antagonized some segments of the population. There have been a number of basic changes in the organization of society, however, which have affected large segments of the population. Peasant and urban associations have been established and maintain control in both the countryside and the cities. In Addis Ababa and other major cities, almost every city dweller is a member of one of the 284 kebeles and the All Ethiopian Peasants' Association includes 5.5 million members in about 20,000 local associations. The membership of REYA includes one-third of the country's young people, and the Revolutionary Ethiopian Women's Association claims 5.2 million members in about 21,000 local chapters throughout the country. In addition, the militia is active at both local and national levels. In general, an extensive system of controls with substantial state planning has been implemented.

5. OUTLOOK

Despite the WPE's formation, there are several factors which seem to limit extensive Soviet influence in Ethiopia. Ethiopia needs desperately to give priority to economic development, an area in which the Soviets have traditionally been unable to participate to any significant extent. While it is true that the Soviet Union is Ethiopia's only supplier of oil and has just signed an economic cooperation agreement, it cannot compete with Western countries in providing aid and trade. Mengistu made it quite clear during his announcement of the new 10-year plan that 70 percent of it would require external funding, implying the need for infusions of aid and investment from the West.

Also, Ethiopia's present economic crisis has not been solved within the Soviet model. The state farms have proven to be ineffective and it is becoming increasingly obvious that private enterprise, coupled with an incentive program,

is more flexible and capable of producing a variety of export products. Thus, Mengistu's plan of increasing agricultural production by state farms and collectives will almost certainly result in a decrease in the country's food production and the government will be under increasing pressure to decentralize.

Ethiopia behaves like a Soviet bloc nation in many ways--it participated in the boycott of the July 1984 Olympics, it is trying to become a member of Comecon, the Soviet bloc's economic community, and it has voted consistently with the Soviet Union in the United Nations. But other signs contradict the actual role of the WPE as a Soviet vanguard party and its eventual transition of power from the military to the civilian sector. Since the rise of a personal dictatorship under Mengistu, the militarization of the government has proceeded at a rapid pace. Many PMAC members and other military officers, appointed to ministerial positions and key COPWE positions, are now in key WPE positions. Moderates as well as Marxist-Leninist ideologues have been elected to key WPE positions, and Mengistu has established full control over the government and the new party. It appears likely that the WPE will become a narrowly based dictatorship of military and urban elites, the political tool of the military regime.

Mengistu's resistance to the establishment of a party over the years and the present economic crisis are two factors which lend credence to the notion that the WPE may not meet Soviet expectations. As long as Mengistu remains in power, it is unlikely that the Soviets will achieve the kind of control over a party which they desire. Mengistu has proven his ability to rise to the top under adverse conditions and to maintain his dominance over all others in the ruling structure. As long as the Eritrean insurgency and problems in the Ogaden continue, the Soviets will maintain a large military presence in the country.

Although there is very limited information on the response to the party at the grassroots level, it is logical to surmise that the emerging elite structure of the party is not attractive to the general Ethiopian population. The rigid bureaucratic apparatus into which the Mengistu regime has incorporated party structures could hardly be welcomed by the many insurgent groups fighting for independence or regional autonomy. Nor could the party be attractive to the populations of many of the country's regions who are suffering from the devastating effects of the drought which have not been relieved by Marxist-Leninist agricultural policies.

It is possible that the Soviets could increase their influence in Ethiopia if they would be more willing to provide significant funding for development programs. Soviet economic guidelines have failed to vitalize Ethiopia's economy and will probably be discarded gradually in favor of Western development schemes. Therefore, as long as Ethiopia remains dependent on Western aid, WPE policies will remain relatively moderate. In addition, the pro-Western faction within the WPE will apparently remain solidly entrenched in the party. Thus prospects for the evolution of a genuine Soviet-sponsored Marxist-Leninist vanguard party in Ethiopia appear to be slim.

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Appendix A

COPWE Departments

CCM: Central Committee Member
CCAM: Central Committee Alternate Member
SCM: PMAC Standing Committee Member
ECM: Executive Committee Member

1. Ideological Affairs Department

Head Shewangdagn Belete, CCM
Second Deputy Head Worku Ferede, CCM
Propaganda & Agitation
Section Head Girme Neway, CCM

2. Economic and Social Affairs Department

Acting Head Fasika Sidelil, CCM
Deputy Social Affairs Roberto Jigano, CCM

3. Administration, Justice and Defence Affairs Department

Head Fisseha Desta, Assistant General, SCM
ECM and CCM
Secretary General Brigadier General Mulatu Negash, CCM

4. Mass Organizations Affairs Department

Head Legesse Asfaw, SCM, ECM and CCM
Second Deputy Head Agdul-Hafiz Yousuf, CCM
Women's Affairs Head Terwork Wakayo, CCM
Youth Wondimu Tobi, CCM
Member Yidenekey Mitiku

5. Discipline and Control Department

Head Teka Tulu, SCM and CCM
Deputy Asrat Wolde, CCM
Supervision Section Head Wondayen Mihretu, CCAM

6. Finance and Property Administration Department

Head Woubishet Dessie, SCM and CCM
Deputy Negash Dubale, CCM

7. Nationalities Department

Head Alemu Abebe, CCM

8. Secretariate

Head

Imbi-Bel Ayele, CCM

Second Deputy

Bizuayehu Alemayehu, CCAM

9. Newspaper - Serto Ader

Editor

Shimalis Mazengia, CCM

First Deputy Editor-in-Chief

Tesfaye Tedesse, CCM

Appendix B

COPWE Mass Organizations

1. All Ethiopian Trade Union (AETU)
Chairman Tedesse Tamrat, CCM
2. All Ethiopian Peasants' Association (AEPA)
Chairman Abdella Sonessa, CCM
3. Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association (REYA)
Chairman Hailu Tujuba
4. Revolutionary Ethiopia Women's Association
Chairman Abezash Wolde-Michael, CCM
5. Revolutionary Ethiopia Teachers Association
Chairman Hailu Gebre-Tsadike
6. Revolutionry Ethiopia Writers Association
Executive Secretary Assefa Gebre-Mariam Tesema

Appendix C

Workers' Party of Ethiopia Structures

1. Politburo (11 members in order of precedence)

Mengistu Haile Mariam	Secretary General
Fikre Selassie Wogderess	Secretary General, PMAC Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers
Fisseha Desta	Assistant Secretary General, PMAC
Lieutenant General Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan	Minister of Defense
Berhanu Bayih	Minister of Labor and Social Affairs
Addis Tedla	Vice-Chairman, National Economic Development Council
Legesse Asfaw	Head, Organizational Department of COPWE
Hailu Yimenu	Minister of Industry
Amanuel Amde Michael	Minister of Justice
Alemu Abebe	WPE Control Commission Head
Shimelis Mazengia	Editor-in-Chief, <u>Serto Ader</u>

Alternate Politburo (6 members)

Teka Tulu	Head, Audit Commission
Fassika Sidelil	Head, COPWE Economic and Social Committee
Shewandagne Belete	Minister of Finance
Tesfaye Dinka	Minister of National and Public Security
Tesfaye Wolde Selassie	Minister of Construction
Kassa Gebre	

2. The Executive Committee and Alternate Executive Committees consist of the same members as the Politburo and Alternate Politburo.

3. Central Committee (136 full members and 64 alternate members)

Military full members (17 generals--numbers in brackets are their ranking orders):

Lt. Gen. Tesfaye Gebre Kidan	Minister of Defense (3)
B. Gen. Seyoum Makonnen	Head, National Service
Maj. Gen. Haile Giorghis Habte Mariam	Chief of Staff (46)
B. Gen. Asrat Biru	Former Northern Commander (47)
B. Gen. Mesfin Gebrekal	Chief of Operations, Ministry of Defense (53)
B. Gen. Kefelegne Yigse	Commander of Ground Forces (53)
B. Gen. Fanta Belai	Commander of Airforce (55)
B. Gen. Mulatu Negash	Secretary General, National Security Council (56)
B. Gen. Kumlachew Dejene	Military Commissioner, Eritrea (64)
B. Gen. Abera Abebe	In Eritrea (65)
Maj. Gen. Merid Negussie	Administrator and Army Commander, Eritrea (87)
B. Gen. Getachew Shibeshi	Commander, Palace Security (90)
B. Gen. Abebe Gebreyes	Commander, Central Sector (93)
B. Gen. Demissie Bulto	Commander, Eastern Sector (94)
B. Gen. Abebe Wolde-Mariam	Vice-Minister of Defense (103)
B. Gen. Worku Zewde	Commander, National Police (104)
B. Gen. Hailu Gebre Michael	Chief of Staff, Ground Forces (105)

Military Alternate Members (5 generals)

B. Gen. Amha Desta	Deputy Commander, Air Force (alternate 2)
B. Gen. Wobehu Tsegaye	In Eritrea (alternate 18)
B. Gen. Ragazza Jimma	In Eritrea (alternate 19)
B. Gen. Zewde Gebreyes	Commander, Southern Sector (alternate 24)
B. Gen. Yirgalem Tekle Haimanot	On Eastern Front (alternate 38)

4. Commissions (name of Secretary following each Commission)

Commission of Justice, Administration and Defense (Fisseha Desta)

Commission of Organization (Legesse Asfaw)

Commission of Ideology (Shimelis Mazengia)

Commission of Economic Affairs (Fassika Sedelil)

Commission of Nationalities (Shewandagne Belete)

Commission of General Services and Finance (Woubshet Dessie)

Commission of Foreign Affairs (Ashagre Yigletu)

Commission of Central Office and Secretariat (Embibel Ayele)

Commission of Auditing (Teka Tulu)

Commission of Control (Alemu Abebe)