

*THE PROCESS OF PROVIDING
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE:
A DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE*

THESIS

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AFIT/GIM/LAL/95S-5

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
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THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Logistics
and Acquisition Management of the Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Logistics Management

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September 1995

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Rhonda M. Smith

Barbara J. Stansfield

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Abstract

This research effort was a qualitative study on the current process of how the DOD provides humanitarian assistance. Currently the process is not well defined and is situation dependent. Historical documents and current guidelines, policies, and regulations were researched for information on what types of humanitarian assistance the DOD provides, how the process is initiated, and who is involved in the process. Agencies outside of the military, both civilian and government, were researched to determine the extent of coordination necessary for the military to provide humanitarian assistance. A model was compiled to portray the current process and given to key personnel identified in the research as subject matter experts. Subsequently, their opinion was used to determine the validity of the model and gather additional points of contact for future research. Once the process and key players were defined, additional research can be conducted to further determine the effectiveness of using the DOD to provide humanitarian aid.

***THE PROCESS OF PROVIDING
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I. Introduction

Chapter Overview

This chapter introduces the concept of the United States (US) military's mission of providing humanitarian assistance to countries around the world. Humanitarian assistance is defined as:

Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, or hunger, privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. (ALSAC, 1994:1-1)

This mission is structured in part to demonstrate our commitment to global peace as well as providing valuable military training. Humanitarian assistance in the past was usually conducted as an ad-hoc mission; however, the emphasis for the future is to use humanitarian assistance as a means to project our forward presence. This peaceful effort of influencing global economies and inducing political stability follows the basic moral ethic of our country's foundation in providing a helping hand (Clinton, 1994). Chapter One will pose the research questions of how do we provide assistance to countries in need; what is the process; who are the key players in the process; and what is the military's role in providing humanitarian assistance (HA). Additionally, Chapter One will

briefly describe the methodology used in conducting the research, assumptions made during the study, scope of research and an overview of the research effort.

With the end of the Cold War, the need to maintain a large defense force has decreased. As a result, the President has re-assessed the future of the US military and how it can effectively project a forward presence. A key element initially identified in the 1992 National Defense Strategy and reiterated in the 1994 National Defense Strategy was to use the military for humanitarian relief missions (Clinton 1994 and Powell 1992).

As stated by General Colin Powell in 1992,

Increasingly, US forces will be called upon to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at home and abroad. As one of the few nations in the world with the means to rapidly and effectively respond to disaster, many nations depend on us for assistance. Not only must our forces be prepared to provide humanitarian aid, but as seen recently in Northern Iraq, in some cases they must be prepared to engage in conflict in order to assist and protect those in need. (Powell, 1992:3)

Problem

For the first time in military history, the humanitarian relief mission is clearly stated in the National Military Strategy and by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Providing humanitarian relief is a complex and dynamic mission for the military because of the extensive coordination and interaction between the US government, civilian relief agencies, and the international community. Although it has been done in the past, it was usually as a secondary mission and not part of the strategic plan (Sutton:1992). Recent deployments to areas such as Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia have demonstrated that the US military is involved in numerous humanitarian relief efforts. According to the current Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, these types of operations will be supported by using military troops to provide a rapid response (Shalikashvili, 1994).

“Since 1993 the Department of Defense has provided humanitarian assistance or disaster relief to 106 countries” (Barela, 1994:24). Despite its history of providing

humanitarian relief, the military has not developed specific guidelines or regulations that clearly define how humanitarian relief missions are to be conducted. In addition, many governmental agencies and relief organizations respond to the same disasters targeted for military involvement. This uncoordinated effort may cause friction and mistrust on all sides due to misunderstanding of each other's missions and organizational structures (Burton, 1994:2). Two of the problems the military faces when providing humanitarian assistance are lack of direction and complex relationships with civilian agencies.

In answer to this problem specific guidelines should be developed in order to promote the smooth operations of humanitarian assistance within the Department of Defense (DOD). According to Burton, the key to effectively providing assistance is to develop a means or process that coordinates relief efforts between the various agencies responding to the same disaster. In addition, further gains can be made through dismantling the negative bias many relief agencies have about military involvement. This research project will explore these ideas.

Research and Investigative Questions

This thesis will address the following research questions: How is the humanitarian relief process initiated and what steps are taken in using the military for the humanitarian relief operations? To answer the research question, this study will determine answers to the following investigative questions:

1. Who initiates the process for humanitarian relief missions?
2. Who approves or decides whether the military will be used to provide humanitarian relief?
3. How does the military involvement begin and end?
4. Once the process is initiated, what government agencies are involved in or interface with the military in conducting humanitarian relief missions?

5. In what types of humanitarian missions does the United States get involved?

The intent of these questions is to initially define the current process of the U.S. military's involvement in humanitarian missions and to help develop recommendations for improving the process of providing humanitarian assistance.

Objectives

The objective of this thesis is to define the existing process for providing humanitarian assistance. The process will be described from a Department of Defense (DOD) perspective involving interfaces with other government and nongovernment agencies. It will determine the actions required to plan, coordinate, and execute humanitarian operations between the military and other relief organizations.

Methodology

The research for this project was conducted as an exploratory, qualitative study. The qualitative method was chosen because the "research being conducted will not produce findings arrived at by means of statistical procedures or quantification" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990:17). When designing the method for researching the military's involvement in humanitarian assistance operations, we determined that gaining a familiarity for this subject was the first plausible step (Schmitt and Klimoski, 1991:122). Follow on research can be used to possibly quantify how efficiently or effectively the military is providing humanitarian assistance. However, the process needed to be initially explored and described as a basis for further study. In conducting the research we used two approaches; first we reviewed historical information on DOD's role in humanitarian missions to determine the types of missions the military gets involved in, who has the authority to commit the military in providing humanitarian assistance, and what constitutes a successful mission. Secondly, we interviewed subject matter experts for information on how the process is initiated, who the key players are, and who determines when to deploy

the military and subsequently when to redeploy the military. The data was categorized to determine meaningful patterns and relationships and then validated through interviews with key personnel.

Scope

The thesis concentrated on the military's role in providing foreign disaster relief, a segment under the humanitarian assistance umbrella. This area of interest was chosen because of personal interest and possible involvement as military officers in the medical and logistics arenas. The military has three levels of planning, coordinating, and executing its operations: strategic, operational, and tactical. For the purposes of this research, DOD's role in providing humanitarian assistance will be defined in the context of these three levels. The various government and civilian agencies which interact at each level will be defined. Additionally, organizations which interface directly with the military will be identified and discussed. The primary focus, however, is DOD's involvement in humanitarian operations.

Limitations

The processes and context of the interviews only applies to DOD's roles and missions in humanitarian assistance operations. The organizational structure and paradigms of the Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)/Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs)/International Organizations (IOs) do not necessarily parallel the military. Therefore, it is important to realize the process defined in this thesis applies to the military and cannot be generalized for organizations outside of the military.

Humanitarian assistance missions are a separate entity from peace keeping operations. Although they may be conducted jointly or simultaneously, they are two distinct missions. The study of these two types of operations would be too vast to cover

in one research paper; therefore, the research is limited to humanitarian assistance missions.

Assumptions

After reviewing after action reports and interviewing key personnel, it was assumed the data attained were valid indicators of what actually happened in the past. Also, it was assumed the military will continue to be involved in humanitarian missions and therefore a need exists for specific regulations and guidelines to define this type of mission.

Management Implications

This research is important because the U.S. military's doctrine is being expanded to include military operations other than war (MOOTW). Because of this change, there is a need for formalized guidelines on how to provide humanitarian assistance in an efficient and effective manner. The management implication of this research is to explain the military's role in HA and generate discussion among the players involved in the process of how to improve humanitarian operations. Coordination meetings should take place at each level of planning - strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic initiatives should cover long range plans and involve personnel who are at the policy making level within the appropriate organizations. Likewise, the same types of meetings should be done at the next two levels of planning based on the results of the strategic conferences. The goal would be to disseminate information and guidelines on how to best coordinate and execute humanitarian aid, given that most humanitarian missions involve military, civilian, government, and nongovernment organizations.

Structure

Chapter One provides an introduction to the research and covers the reason for exploring the military's role in providing humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, Chapter One briefly describes the type of methodology used in conducting the research, a justification for the methodology, the scope, assumptions, and management implications of the research.

Chapter Two discusses the literature relevant to military humanitarian assistance operations. Initially the various humanitarian programs are discussed as authorized by Title 10 in the United States Code (USC) or specific Congressional mandates. Chapter Two also shows how humanitarian aid ties into our national security policy. The majority of Chapter Two covers the strategic, operational, and tactical elements of planning, coordinating, and executing humanitarian assistance operations.

Chapter Three describes the methodology used in conducting the research. According to several sources (Cooper and Emory; Schmitt and Klimoski; Gay and Diehl), when the purpose is to gain familiarity and insight into a specific topic, it is appropriate to conduct an exploratory study. Considering the recently expanded role of using the military for humanitarian assistance operations, the available information is currently limited to after action reports and a few joint publications (most of which are still in draft form). Therefore, it was plausible to use a qualitative method to initially describe and define the military's process of providing humanitarian assistance. Further research in this area may become quantifiable as the draft publications are finalized and military responses become more structured. Quantifiable data can then be tracked and captured providing a baseline for future missions.

Chapter Four presents the results of the research. Information was carefully examined and analyzed by answering the investigative questions. A model was subsequently compiled and used as a baseline to further define the humanitarian assistance

process. Through the use of interviews with subject matter experts who were identified during the historical research process, the model was validated. The results of the historical research as well as the information gathered via the interviews is presented through answering each investigative question. The objectives are then validated by comparing the information provided in the interviews with existing written documentation on humanitarian assistance.

Chapter Five summarizes the findings obtained in Chapter Four and draws conclusions based on the findings. Management implications are presented to further explore areas of interest or provide possible suggestions for improving the humanitarian assistance process. Additionally, future research studies are suggested, to include analyzing the benefit of using the military for humanitarian assistance operations and what is the cost of providing that assistance.

II. Literature Review

Chapter Overview

On 6 April 1991, Brigadier General Richard W. Potter, Jr., Commander, Special Operations Command, Europe received a telephone call indicating he was about to become very involved in a humanitarian relief mission. In response to the brutal treatment the Kurds were receiving from the Iraqi military, hundreds of refugees had fled to the southern border of Turkey. International concern dictated some sort of response be taken to help the Kurdish refugees existing in a harsh environment.

By 0600 that same day, General Potter reported to the operations section of the US European Command (EUCOM) to be briefed by the J-3 operations officer, Rear Admiral Leighton W. Smith. Smith informed Potter that President Bush had announced the previous evening that American assistance to the Kurds would begin on Sunday. "We are not going to let the President be a liar," declared the Admiral (Rudd, 1993:115). The immediate plan was to airdrop supplies to the Kurds in the mountains. "Three MC-130 aircraft flew to Turkey on the first day of the operation. Two were loaded with relief supplies, one carried additional aircrews to sustain operations from Incirlik, Turkey. By 1100 hours on Sunday morning the first two aircraft dropped relief supplies to the Kurds, keeping the President's promise" (Rudd, 1993:115).

The above example illustrates the need for the military to be prepared at a moments notice to respond to humanitarian assistance operations. This literature review defines humanitarian assistance, identifies the various programs conducted under the humanitarian assistance umbrella, and demonstrates how humanitarian assistance supports our national military strategy. This chapter will discuss the types of humanitarian assistance operations conducted by US military forces and what factors the military

considers in executing humanitarian missions. Additionally, Chapter Two segments the military's role in providing humanitarian assistance at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. Within each level, key players and interagency contacts are discussed as well as typical factors considered in planning, coordinating, and executing humanitarian operations.

Humanitarian Assistance Defined

Humanitarian assistance is defined as "programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger or deprivation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in damage to or loss of property" (ALSAC, 1994:1-1). Examples of humanitarian assistance include famine relief, disaster assistance after a hurricane or other natural phenomenon, or providing emergency food and shelter in areas of conflict such as Northern Iraq.

Military Humanitarian Assistance Programs

The US military is involved in numerous humanitarian assistance programs around the world. Currently the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs, Patricia L. Irvin, oversees six humanitarian programs. The first program is the DOD Excess Property Program (DOD EPP) authorized under sections 2547 and 2551 of Title 10, US Code (USC). Section 2547 authorizes the Department of Defense (DOD) to transfer excess non-lethal property to the Department of State for donation to foreign recipients. Section 2551 authorizes funding for transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide. The major types of excess property provided under the humanitarian assistance program include clothing, institutional furniture, medical equipment and supplies, vehicles and other transportation assets, and construction equipment and tools. This property is offered "as is" with no warranties or

guarantees, spare parts, or other post duration support (Irvin, 1994:32-33). The Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) is the primary source for DOD excess items. Medical commands list their excess items and supplies as available for humanitarian assistance after all attempts have been made to cross-level within the DOD. The DOD Excess Property Program (EPP) is based on supply rather than a demand system (USSOUTHCOM, 1993).

The second program is commonly referred to as the Denton Program after Senator Jeremiah Denton. This program is authorized under Section 402 of Title 10, USC. The DOD is authorized to provide no-cost transportation for privately donated humanitarian cargo to foreign countries on a space available basis. It is the responsibility of the donor to ensure that supplies are suitable for transport. Supplies transported may be distributed by an agency of the US Government, a foreign government, a private non-profit relief organization, or an international organization. They may not be distributed directly or indirectly to any individual, group or organization engaged in a military or paramilitary organization (USSOUTHCOM:1993). The program began in 1985. To date, more than 5 million pounds of humanitarian cargo have been transported to more than 25 countries (Irvin, 1994:32). Typical supplies transported include medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, clothing, educational materials, vehicles, etc.

The third program, and the focus of this thesis, is the foreign disaster relief program. It is funded by Congress to cover unanticipated costs incurred by the DOD when responding to natural or man-made disasters. Examples of disasters include hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, oil spills, famine and civil conflicts. Legislation for the program allows DOD resources to be used to assist in disaster relief operations approved by the President (the process will be defined in a later section of this chapter) (Irvin, 1994 and Title 10). "Disaster relief programs are not designed to have a long term economic impact to the stricken country. The program is designed to provide for the immediate

relief of human suffering resulting from a disaster, natural or man-made" (US SOUTHCOM, 1993:4-55). A military commander at the scene may initiate emergency relief operations without prior approval from the US Ambassador if the situation is desperate. A commander using this authority must immediately report the actions taken to the US Ambassador and the Commander in Chief (CINC). The military responds by constructing basic sanitation facilities, providing food and medical care, providing shelter, and assisting in rebuilding public facilities. Disaster relief funds have covered costs associated with DOD responses to man-made and natural disasters in Bosnia, Somalia, Nepal, Honduras, Mozambique, Tajikistan, and several countries in the Pacific and the Caribbean (Irvin, 1994:34).

The fourth program is the humanitarian and civic assistance program, authorized under Section 401, Title 10, USC. This authorizes regional unified commands to conduct State Department approved humanitarian and civic assistance activities in conjunction with authorized military operations. Operations include medical and veterinary care in rural areas, construction of basic sanitation facilities, minor construction and repair of public facilities, and rudimentary construction of surface transportation systems (Irvin, 1994:35). Projects developed and planned within the unified or specified commands should be discussed and coordinated with the Ambassador and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) mission director before being submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for consideration. Once the coordination is complete at the local level, projects are cleared by the Office of Humanitarian Assistance and Refugee Affairs. The final approval after clearing DOD, is through the Political-Military Bureau in the State Department and the USAID Bureau for Program and Policy coordination. By law, the State Department has to approve humanitarian and civic assistance programs; USAID approval is needed to effectively coordinate assistance and avoid duplication (USSOUTHCOM, 1993).

The fifth program is the humanitarian demining program. There are over 100 million unexploded landmines implanted around the world which kill or maim 150 people each week. In FY 1994, Congress appropriated \$10 million for the DOD to use in conjunction with the State Department to assist countries affected by this problem. DOD's role is to assist countries in developing ways to educate the populace in avoiding landmines and to train personnel in locating and destroying them. The goal is to assist countries recovering from conflict to restore their economies, integrate returning refugees, resume farming, and achieve a sense of stability (Irvin, 1994:35).

The sixth and final program is assistance provided to the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (NIS) - Operation Provide Hope. DOD's role is to provide transportation for privately donated and excess DOD non-lethal property to the NIS. To date, DOD has assisted 12 former Soviet republics by conducting 250 missions transporting supplies and equipment. Excess property provided to these areas has included hospitals, MREs (Meals Ready to Eat), bulk food, and medical supplies.

The myriad of humanitarian assistance programs the military is involved in requires it to be able to respond quickly and efficiently with transportation, security, logistics, and planning. By using the military as a show of good will and visible strength, the security of our nation is enhanced via a peaceful and constructive avenue.

Humanitarian Assistance and Our National Military Strategy

Based on information from the Center for Low Intensity Conflict, humanitarian assistance missions fall under Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Examples of MOOTW range from domestic support to combat operations and include such operations as Joint Task Force (JTF) Andrew, Operation Desert Shield, Operation Urgent Fury, and Operation Provide Comfort. MOOTW contains five categories of operations: support to insurgency and counterinsurgency operations; combating terrorism, peace

operations, contingency operations other than war, and DOD support to counterdrug operations. "Humanitarian assistance employs military assets in support of non-combat objectives as part of MOOTW" (ALSAC, 1994:1-11). Humanitarian assistance missions involving the military are conducted in support of diplomatic/political agendas and as such result in the military not being the lead agent. It is therefore necessary for the military to cooperate and coordinate with other agencies involved in the area of operations.

Civilian agencies involved in humanitarian assistance include Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO), Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) and International Organizations (IO). NGOs are predominantly European national or international, non-profit citizens' voluntary organizations. They focus on education, technical projects, relief, refugee and development programs. PVOs are private, US-based, nonprofit organizations involved in humanitarian efforts including, relief, development, refugee assistance, environmental projects, and public policy. IOs are organizations with global influence such as the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

As stated before, humanitarian assistance operations are currently being used as a means of projecting our forward presence in a non-threatening yet tangible way.

Responding to disasters and continually sending non-lethal, excess property to fledgling democracies supports the President's goal in expanding our global influence.

American leadership in the world has never been more important. If we exert our leadership abroad, we can make America safer and more prosperous - by deterring aggression, by fostering the peaceful resolution of dangerous conflicts, by opening foreign markets, by helping democratic regimes and by tackling global problems. Without our active leadership and engagement abroad, threats will fester and our opportunities will narrow. (Clinton, 1994: 1)

Within the last year, President Clinton has formulated a new peacekeeping policy and proposed a revision in the Foreign Assistance Act. Such initiatives include the military as a critical player in delivering assistance world wide.

Providing assistance within the six programs under DOD's Office of Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs requires constant evaluation of regional situations and matching assistance with national security strategy. Our national security strategy has three main focuses: enhance our security; promote prosperity at home; and promote democracy. When evaluating the situations abroad, the Office of Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs "coordinates carefully with the Department of State and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in order to ensure that it is providing assistance to areas where help is most needed and, importantly, that its humanitarian programs support foreign policy objectives of the United States" (Irvin, 1994:1).

Humanitarian assistance supports the third strategy of the President (promoting democracy) by demonstrating our commitment to stable governments and peaceful regions. The third strategic goal of promoting democracy states: "A framework of democratic enlargement that increases our security by protecting, consolidating and enlarging the community of free market democracies. Our efforts focus on preserving the democratic process in key emerging democratic states including Russia, Ukraine and other new states of the former Soviet Union." (Clinton, 1994:5). Using the military to provide humanitarian assistance is a tangible, visible show of strength and willingness to help. The military is very useful by virtue of its capability to rapidly deploy to austere environments and quickly begin relief operations. Providing emergency medical treatment, potable water, and shelter for significant numbers of refugees is one example of how the military is used in humanitarian missions. This capability is recognized as critical in responding to natural and man-made disasters. Visible support for countries who are developing democratic policies shows that the US is committed to their process and to their people.

The overall goal of the national security policy is to stress preventative diplomacy through supporting democracy, economic assistance, overseas military presence, military - to military contacts and involvement in multilateral negotiations. Such activities will help resolve problems, reduce tensions, and defuse conflicts before they become crises.

“Efforts to promote democracy and human rights are complemented by our humanitarian assistance programs which are designed to alleviate human suffering and to pave the way for progress towards establishing democratic regimes with a commitment to respect for human rights and appropriate strategies for economic development” (Clinton, 1994:20).

Principles of Humanitarian Assistance Operations

The main contribution the US military brings to humanitarian assistance missions is its ability to deploy a self-contained force with diverse capabilities (ALSAC, 1994 and Shalikashvili, 1994). One of the most crucial capabilities the military provides is its command, control, and communication element (Taw and Hoffman, 1994). These capabilities facilitate interagency coordination in providing humanitarian assistance.

Military objectives in humanitarian missions are to provide short-term relief and security to refugees. On-the- ground forces typically must coordinate with civilian agencies, who may have been there longer and are focused on a long term resolution. Therefore, military commanders tasked to provide humanitarian assistance must evaluate the following principles: the objective, unity of effort, perseverance, restraint, legitimacy, and other considerations to ensure appropriate aid is rendered. Each of these principles will be briefly discussed in the following paragraphs to illustrate the complexity of executing humanitarian assistance missions.

Objective - Every military action should have a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. Unlike combat scenarios where the military objective can be key terrain or delaying the enemy, humanitarian objectives are not so easily defined. Complex

issues involving a number of key players makes it difficult to clearly specify the objective of the mission. A key goal is to establish an end point where the military has achieved its objective and is handing the mission over to the civilian agencies (ALSAC, 1994 and Rudd, 1993).

Unity of Effort - Humanitarian assistance involves many civilian, government, and military agencies. In this atmosphere, military commanders do not have autonomy in deciding how to best provide humanitarian assistance. Political/diplomatic aims are not always obvious to the military forces, therefore it is necessary for the commander to carefully evaluate and support the efforts of other agencies involved in the mission (FM 100-20:1990:1-5).

Perseverance - Although the primary purpose for using military forces in humanitarian missions is to provide short-term relief, it is often difficult to set a specific time line. Quick solutions do not always work in humanitarian environments; commitment and sensitivity to long term goals are necessary to accomplish the mission successfully. "Perseverance is the patient, resolute, persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives for as long as necessary to achieve them" (FM 100-20:1990:1-6). Consequently, military units should be prepared to remain in the area of operations for as long as necessary to achieve the desired results.

Restraint - Military commanders will face austere environments during the conduct of operations. Friendly elements of the civilian populace within the area of operations will not always be easily identified. Rules of engagement must be briefed to every military member prior to deploying to a disaster site. Military forces will need to show restraint when dealing with the civilian population. One error in judgment can have disastrous effects in achieving political and diplomatic goals. (For more information on Rules of Engagement see Appendix C.) (ALSAC, 1994).

Legitimacy - This is defined as "the willing acceptance of a group or agency to make and enforce decisions" (FM 100-20:1990:1-6). The humanitarian purpose of a US military presence in a foreign country may not be accepted as legitimate. Therefore, military commanders must remain neutral in their actions when providing assistance to the local population. They must understand international and domestic laws, exercise their authority accordingly, and provide equitable treatment and assistance (ALSAC, 1994 and FM 100-20, 1990).

Other considerations - cultural respect for the people receiving assistance and for the international and national civilian agencies providing assistance is important. Military forces must be aware of the sanctity of religious structures and appropriateness of behavior. They must also be cognizant of refugees' religious beliefs and why refugees avoid certain foods. International differences will add to the intricacies of the situation, which mandates that our forces involved in humanitarian operations be aware of cultural differences.

Coordination Levels

Military operations are planned, coordinated, and executed at three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical (ALSAC, 1994). Strategic planning takes a global, all encompassing view of how the military can be used to achieve a specific, long range result. Operational planning takes the strategic objectives and applies them to a shorter time line. In addition, operational objectives more narrowly define the strategic goals. Tactical planning reduces the operational objectives to missions that need to be accomplished within the next few hours to the next few days. Planning, coordinating, and executing humanitarian assistance missions patterns the same flow of typical military operations. At the strategic level, broad policies and long range plans are determined. The operational level refines the plans and determines when those plan will be carried out.

At the tactical level, the plans are executed by units formed at the operational level (ALSAC, 1994). The following sections will explain the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of planning and interagency coordination involved for humanitarian assistance missions, as well as describing what tasks need to be executed.

Strategic

At the strategic level, the President, as the commander-in-chief and the Secretary of Defense make up the National Command Authority (NCA). This is the top US authority in planning and coordinating military operations. "The chain of command for military operations runs directly from the president to the secretary and from the secretary to the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the forces in the field" (Hartmann and Wendzel: 1994:155). The NCA is supported in its decision making process by the National Security Council (NSC), which is comprised of the President, Vice-President, Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The NSC considers national security issues requiring Presidential decisions by evaluating the political, economic, and military implications of critical situations. In addition to the NSC, the Administrator for USAID is the President's Special Coordinator (SC) for International Disaster Assistance. The SC functions through interagency working groups to provide recommendations on how to best respond to international disasters. (ALSAC, 1994).

The DOS or the ambassador in country is responsible for determining if a disaster requires a humanitarian response. Usually a request will be forwarded from the affected country through the US ambassador to the DOS. Decisions are made from information provided by US country teams as well as from the ambassador in country. If the SC or the NSC does not convene an interagency working group (IWG) to evaluate the necessary response, the DOS may lead an IWG to determine what is required.

Figure 2.1 shows how the DOS is organized into functional and regional bureaus. One of the key participating bureaus is the regional bureau of the affected country. Other functional bureaus will become involved as well when coordinating the appropriate response to a natural or man-made disaster.




Figure 2.1 Department of State Organizational Chart

A second key player in the planning process is the Department of Defense (DOD). Within the DOD, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy has the overall responsibility

for developing military policy for international humanitarian assistance operations. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs executes the policy (See Figure 2.2). The DOD sends representatives to the IWGs to facilitate coordination on appropriate responses for disaster relief operations (ALSAC, 1994 and Meek, 1994).




Figure 2.2 Department of Defense Organization

The primary Joint Staff level proponent for Humanitarian Assistance Policy is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, known as the J-5. Additionally, the J-4 (logistics) and the J-3 (operations) oversee the logistical and operational support for humanitarian assistance missions carried out by the Services. Figure A.1 in Appendix A depicts the organizational structure of the joint staff. The CINCs, OSD, and the DOS interact in coordinating humanitarian assistance operations

The Joint Staff designates which CINC will actually conduct the humanitarian assistance mission and which CINC will support the mission. Once the designation is complete, coordination at the staff level intensifies.

A key player in the humanitarian assistance mission is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This agency is not directly under the control of the Department State although it coordinates activities at cabinet and country team level. Their focus is executed in three phases: relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. For the context of this research, the relief phase will be discussed because of its impact on military operations in humanitarian operations. Within USAID there is a specific bureau for overseeing humanitarian assistance operations. The bureau coordinates its efforts through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). OFDA coordinates and plans humanitarian missions at the operational level which will be discussed in the next section.

Additional cabinet level offices may get involved in IWGs at the request of the NCA or the DOS. Depending on the type and nature of humanitarian assistance, Departments of Agriculture and Transportation, Office of Management and Budget, and the US Information Agency (USIA) may be asked to augment the IWG. For example, the Coast Guard, as an agent for the Department of Transportation, can assist in search and rescue missions, port safety and security, marine environmental response, maritime refugee processing, and law enforcement on navigable waters. This serves as an illustration of the possible agencies that can get involved in humanitarian aid just within the US government.

Each humanitarian assistance mission is unique and requires a specifically constructed response. In every humanitarian mission there are three essential elements which must be balanced: political, military, and humanitarian. These elements formulate the response triad in planning and executing a humanitarian assistance mission at every level - strategic, operational, and tactical (ALSAC, 1994 and CAC, 1993).

Many difficulties are encountered when planning at the strategic and operational levels because of the multitude of diverse and complex agencies involved. Not only must the Special Coordinator (SC) work together with the US agencies involved; the SC must also gather information from international agencies participating in the relief effort. "It is important to note that strategic plans and goals of these organizations may not always be completely compatible with military objectives" (ALSAC, 1994:2-8). Effective assistance in response to natural or man-made disasters requires strong central coordination and leadership. Therefore, it is necessary that the SC establish solid working relationships with the NGOs/PVOs/IOs involved in the area of operations.

The SC is the major interagency coordinator for the US government. The principal staff back up for executing coordination efforts is the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).

"In accordance with Section 493 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the President has designated the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (USAID) as Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance.

As Special Coordinator, the Administrator will be responsible for promoting maximum effectiveness and coordination in response to foreign disasters by United States agencies and between the United States and other donors. These responsibilities include the formulation and updating of contingency plans for providing disaster relief.

The President has directed all executive departments and agencies to treat the Special Coordinator as the focal point for interagency deliberations on international disaster assistance for natural and man-made disasters. Since it is the responsibility of the Special Coordinator to consider those executive branch actions that have significant implication for US responses to international disasters, the department and agency heads shall ensure that all such actions under consideration relating to international disasters come to the attention of the Special Coordinator in a timely manner."

Extract from White House Letter
Dated September 15, 1993

After the NCA determines that the US should respond to an emergency, the Special Coordinator may form an IWG to recommend appropriate actions to be taken. The IWG synthesizes the information received from all the cabinet level representatives, to include the US ambassador to the UN. The ambassador or chief of mission will usually gather the input by consulting with the country team (Wallace, 1995).

The country team, which is an executive committee of embassy personnel, falls under the control of the US ambassador in country. It is comprised of the principal representatives of the government departments and agencies present within the country. Examples of typical members of the team are personnel from Department of State (DOS), DOD, United States Information Agency (USIA), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The team coordinates many intelligence gathering activities with the CINC's staff to ensure continuity of effort. (FM 100-20:1990:A-10) Ultimately, however, it is the ambassador, as chief of the mission, who directs and controls the country team.

The first step the Interagency Working Group (IWG) takes is to immediately develop an information collection plan and tasks all sources to implement the plan. The unified commander is one of the most important information sources available because the unified staff has usually been monitoring crisis situations within the area of concern. The CINC will modify the collection plan to support the requirement created by the complex emergency. This information is usually communicated through the country team but also follows channels through the CJCS to the DOD representative on the IWG. Another potential source is the political advisor assigned to the CINC who can link directly with the DOS representative on the IWG. See Figure A.2 Appendix A for the interagency coordination process at the strategic level (ALSAC, 1994 and Wallace, 1995).

Interagency Planning

At the same time the collection plan is designed, the IWG begins to develop a comprehensive strategy and plan of operations. In developing an all-encompassing strategic plan of operations, the SC must include all elements that may be involved in the crisis. For example, the DOS should consider the involvement of USAID, United Nation (UN) organizations, and NGO/PVOs, and IOs that may already be operating in the country. Various organizations may establish a crisis task force or crisis action team to manage the situation. The SC must insure the integrity of this comprehensive process. In addition, the unified commander will have to consider how to integrate ongoing in-country programs under Title 10 authorities with that of the emerging humanitarian mission (Title 10, USC, 1990).

The difficulties in integrating strategic, operational, and tactical level planning with the diverse mixture of other organizations involved can be minimized through an active interface role of the SC. The humanitarian aid process is enhanced by the SC who facilitates coordination efforts between the military and those agencies whose organizational structures are not as formally defined as the military. Planning operational interfaces throughout the life-cycle of the humanitarian emergency is a critical task for the SC (ALSAC, 1994).

Although civilian relief agencies do not mirror the organizational structure of the military, they do have a chain of command. Planning follows the concepts contained in each of their charters and often takes place on all levels. Civilian and government relief organizations also tend to tailor their support to the crisis. As a result, their network is more *ad hoc* than the one found in a traditional military organization. It is clear the relationships established between the military units involved and the civilian organizations (foreign and domestic) that are also involved require constant nurturing (ALSAC, 1994).

When the military is called upon to respond to a disaster, the commander needs to keep in mind the NGOs/PVOs may have been in the area long before the military arrived and will remain after the military leaves. Tactical commanders will know that civilian agencies are in the area because of intelligence reports from higher command and from OFDA. Interactions must be coordinated with the NGOs/PVOs via the country teams, particularly the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) representatives (ALSAC, 1994, OFDA and CAC, 1993). In addition, each NGO or PVO operates separately and their capabilities, characteristics, and resources are very diverse. These types of organizations provide humanitarian assistance at the grassroots level, with the military providing security and logistical assistance to remote and unsecured areas (ALSAC 1994).

Having looked at the strategic level coordination and identified the key players at that level, the next step is to cover the organizations which interact at the operational level. The following section will describe the connectivity between the military, other US government agencies, and NGOs/PVOs and IOs.

Operational Level

This section will describe the types of organizations involved in planning and responding to a humanitarian mission at the operational level. It will provide information necessary to understand how policy guidance leads to mission statements, implied tasks, and plans of action for both military and civilian agencies. Strategic elements which the CINC considers to organize his joint task force (JTF) will illustrate how the planning process continues from the strategic level to the operational level.

The military's operational-level organization is the unified command, which is responsible for a specific region known as the theater of operations. The commander-in-chief (CINC) for that region must decide what the operational objectives will be in

conducting a humanitarian assistance mission. "He takes into consideration what conditions must be produced to achieve the strategic goal; what sequence of events will most likely result in the desired conditions; and how should the resources be applied to produce the sequence of events" (FM 100-20:1990:1-7). The CINC's role is to provide authoritative direction, initiate action, sequence events, apply resources to conduct the military humanitarian assistance operation and sustain support as long as necessary.

One of the key tasks for the CINC is developing a clear military mission statement for the operation. Using the strategic mission statement as a guideline, the CINC aims for an understandable and achievable end state for the humanitarian assistance mission. Interagency coordination through the use of liaisons from USAID/OFDA assist in developing the shape of the mission.

Some key considerations in developing the mission statement include:

- Higher strategic direction
- Desired end state
- Security of the operation
- Military assistance to USAID/OFDA and NGO/PVO/IOs
- Use of Civil Affairs forces

It is important that the military commander develop a clear and achievable statement so that appropriate taskings can take place for all military units involved in the mission (ALSAC, 1994:3-2).

For example, in Operation Restore Hope, the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) mission statement was:

When directed by the NCA, USCINCCENT will conduct joint or combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major airports and seaports, key installations, and food distribution points; to provide open and free passage of relief supplies; to provide security for convoys and relief organization operations; and to assist UN NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices. (ALSAC, 1994:3-2)

This statement indicates the mission will require using a variety of units in providing humanitarian assistance. It also gives a clear concise idea of what they are supposed to accomplish.

Another consideration in developing the mission statement and concept of operations is to decide on a desired end state or set of conditions, which, when met, means the mission has been accomplished. The end state should have been decided at the strategic level with consensus from all parties involved at the IWG. However, this is not always the case, so the CINC will establish a desired end state based on guidance from the NCA and information from the IWG.

The importance of developing an end state is emphasized when the phenomenon of mission creep starts to occur. Mission creep happens when military forces are subjected to numerous requests outside the scope of the mission. Requests can come from numerous avenues such as the civilian relief agencies in the area, the host nation government, or from the refugees. Without a clear, concise point of reference, the commander on site may become involved in operations beyond the original intent of his mission. In trying to assist the local populace as effectively as possible the commander must remain detached and focused on the mission statement and the desired end state (ALSAC, 1994 and CAC, 1993).

Supporting Humanitarian Assistance

The Unified CINC of the affected region is responsible for developing the military response to HA operations. In addition to the Title 10 responsibilities, the CINC may create a JTF to specifically address the HA mission. Prior to deploying military units to the site, the CINC will gather information by sending a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) to the operational area. The CINC may also establish a humanitarian

assistance coordination center (HACC) at headquarters to be the central point of contact in developing, planning, and executing the humanitarian assistance mission.

The HAST is responsible for assessing the disaster area in order to develop an appropriate response to the situation. Normally the HAST is deployed by the CINC as a team comprised of personnel from staff sections appropriate to the mission. If possible, the HAST will coordinate its efforts with the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to determine working relationships and responsibilities. The assessment includes, but is not limited to:

- Determine the extent of the food and water supply, loss of life, injury, illness, number of displaced persons, disruption of the government, presence of medical representatives status of communications, facilities, destruction of property and infrastructure.
- Formulate recommendations on HA mission and desired capabilities
- Establish liaison and coordinate assessment with host nation agencies, supported commanders or their representatives, US diplomatic personnel, and other relief agencies.
- Arrange for the reception of US personnel, supplies, and equipment in concert with the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). (ALSAC, 1994 3-4)

Logistical support will be determined by the magnitude of the operation and type of relief requested by the host country. The Logistics Operation Center (LOC) is the point of contact for implementing a rapid and flexible logistic response for the CINC. This includes informing vital logistics agencies of the humanitarian mission, locating and releasing required supplies, moving supplies to departure airfields and seaports of embarkation, and delivering supplies to the required area. Movement of initial relief supplies and equipment will, in most cases, be accomplished by airlift resources. The types of supplies and their arrival times are coordinated with other US agencies and foreign relief agencies involved in the effort. The LOC is also responsible for planning and coordinating force deployment and sustainment operations (Meek, 1994).

Interagency planning and coordinating can be accomplished through the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC). The CINC establishes the HACC to centralize coordination efforts among the military and other organizations involved in the humanitarian mission. Staffing for the HACC should include a USAID and an OFDA advisor/liaison who serves as the HACC director, a NGO/PVO advisor, a civil affairs (CA) officer, a legal advisor, Public Affairs (PA) Officer, and other augmentation deemed necessary by the CINC. The HACC would provide the link between the CINC, USAID and OFDA, NGO/PVOs and other agencies that might participate.

An example of a unified command structure at the operational level with appropriate sections unique to HA can be seen in Figure A.3 Appendix A.

To ensure effective and efficient coordination of military and civil aspects of HA, interagency cooperation, coordination, and connectivity are essential for success. Establishing solid frameworks at the operational level will better enable key organizations to orchestrate the total HA effort within the theater. Essential personnel from the following organizations can assist in establishing the framework:

- Host nation
- Country team
- Unified commander (CINC)
- UN agencies and multinational forces
- Joint Task Force (JTF)
- US Government agencies (USAID and OFDA)
- NGO/PVO/IOs

“USAID/OFDA administers the President’s authority to coordinate the provision of assistance in response to disasters as declared by the Ambassador within the country or higher State Department authority” (ALSAC, 1994:3-6). This authority allows OFDA to expedite interventions at the operational and tactical levels through the use of

NGO/PVOs, and other sources of relief capacity. USAID/OFDA has the following responsibilities:

- Organize and coordinate the total US Government disaster relief and response
- Respond to mission requests for disaster assistance
- Initiate necessary procurement of supplies, services and transportation
- Coordinate assistance efforts with operational-level NGO/PVOs

The authority to provide foreign disaster relief comes from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which allows us to:

- Preserve life and minimize suffering by providing sufficient warning of natural events which cause disasters
- Preserve life and minimize suffering by responding to natural and man-made disasters
- Foster self-sufficiency among disaster-prone nations by helping them achieve some measure of preparedness
- Alleviate suffering by providing rapid, appropriate response to requests for aid.
- Enhance recovery through rehabilitation programs

OFDA is allowed to coordinate directly with the DOD for using defense equipment and personnel in providing relief to the affected nation. They also can arrange with DOD to transport equipment and troops as well. DOD Directive 5100.46 establishes the relationship between DOD and USAID/OFDA, with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs) as the primary point of contact. When USAID/OFDA requests specific services from DOD (typically airlift), USAID/OFDA pays for those services/commodities (OFDA).

The CINC should also provide a liaison with OFDA to correlate military and civilian assistance efforts. USAID/OFDA provides an excellent means for operational coordination between the military and other agencies involved in providing humanitarian assistance. Other operational links established between OFDA and NGO/PVOs from countries other than the US include the International Committee of the Red Cross; the

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies; the United Nations; the Department of Humanitarian Affairs; the United Nations Children's Fund; and United Nations World Food Program. Outside government agencies responding to disasters coordinate with OFDA through donor country coordination meetings to solve operational or political problems. Figure A.4 Appendix A shows how the operational level connectivity may look.

Military and Civilian Considerations

US military forces will be faced with coordinating relief efforts through an array of civilian agencies. The focus of their concerns will vary from looking at the problem at the local level to trying to develop a consensus at the international level. This section focuses on essential interactions which take place at the operational level that facilitates an integrated relief effort.

The senior US diplomat in country is responsible for the overall coordination of US foreign HA (DOS, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 1995). OFDA assists the Embassy/USAID in coordinating and conducting operational assessments, which focus on varying degrees of aid. The results of their assessments range from providing funds to making provisions for relief supplies. Also, depending on the situation, USAID/OFDA may request logistics support from DOD (OFDA Field Operations Guide, 1995). If the Secretary of Defense, through the CJCS, supports the USAID/OFDA request, the CINC can provide military assistance.

Relationships with non-military agencies should be based on an appreciation of how they conduct their missions. Although their organizational structure does not mirror that of the military, they have established lines of communication and standardization of support. It is important to note that not all NGO/PVOs, and IOs appreciate military involvement in HA operations. Past experiences with other military forces have affected

the opinion and consequently the charters of some relief organizations which do not allow them to collaborate with armed forces (ALSAC, 1994).

Fostering a spirit of cooperation between military and civilian activities is imperative for a successful operation. When conducting joint operations with civilian organizations, clear roles and responsibilities must be outlined. Cooperation can be gained and maintained if agencies have an understanding of each other's mission and communication lines are kept open. Military commanders may find it beneficial to employ third parties for liaison and coordination with those NGO/PVOs that are reluctant to establish direct contact. OFDA representatives have proven invaluable in facilitating coordination links between the NGOs/PVOs/IOs and the military at the operational level (ALSAC, 1994).

Having discussed the strategic and operational levels of humanitarian assistance and the interagency coordination required within those levels, it is time to turn to the final level of military operations. The following section will discuss the activities involved in planning, coordinating, and executing humanitarian assistance at the tactical level. This is the point of operations where the actual mission is conducted.

Tactical Level

Depending on the size and nature of humanitarian assistance operations, the CINC may designate a Joint Task Force (JTF) to conduct the military's operation. A JTF is just one option available to the CINC, for the purposes of this research, however, it will be used as a baseline to describe the types of activities involved in preparing for and executing a humanitarian assistance mission. This section provides an overview of a typical JTF headquarters staff and addresses CINC level considerations in organizing the JTF in selecting the types of forces needed to conduct humanitarian assistance.

The CINC will develop the operational HA mission statement and concept of operations based upon the direction of the NCA. Inputs including requests from USAID/OFDA, situational factors (crisis caused by man, weather, volcanic or seismic activity) and the time military forces will enter the disaster area, will affect the mission statement. The CINC will develop a list of necessary capabilities based upon analysis of the factors mentioned above. The CINC will then task the components of the unified command to identify forces that have the specific qualities required to do the mission. The components will establish a force list (personnel, equipment, and supplies) and determine the appropriate movement requirements necessary to deploy the identified forces. After the CINC approves the components force lists, the JTF headquarters is established and approved forces assigned to it.

JTFs are suited to perform humanitarian missions because of their adaptive nature in command and force structure. A JTF has unique capabilities of Service components and the ability to quickly deploy personnel and equipment to execute any number of diverse missions. The JTF may be a two-tiered command, simplifying chain of command relationships between the CINC and the JTF. A two-tiered command structure minimizes confusion and logistics problems that often surface during joint operations. The CINC determines the command relationships for the JTF, which may include a sub-unified commander or a Service component who in turn establishes a JTF based on CINC guidance.

JTF organizations resemble traditional military organizations with a commander, command element, and forces required to execute the mission. The primary purpose of the JTF headquarters is command, control, and administration of the JTF. During humanitarian operations, the JTF headquarters must provide the basis for a unified effort, centralized direction and decentralized execution. Unique aspects of the HA mission compel the JTF headquarters to be especially flexible and responsive. The command

element must be cognizant of the capabilities and limitations of the components of the JTF. Additional functional areas may be added to the JTF staff as necessary. Examples include the staff judge advocate, health services, civil affairs, nuclear, biological, and chemical; meteorology and oceanography (METOC); and communications. See Figure A.5 Appendix A for a typical HQ staff chart.

The nature of humanitarian assistance may require a JTF to be tailored so that combat support and combat service support forces (civil affairs, engineers, medical, logistics) have an equal or greater role in the mission than other units assigned. JTF organization and composition specific to humanitarian missions are addressed in terms of special staff sections, consolidated functions, and areas of operations. Figure A.6 in Appendix A presents a possible template for a JTF organization for humanitarian operations.

Conducting HA missions or any military mission requires detailed planning for several consecutive phases of the operation. These phases are predeployment; deployment; employment; and redeployment of personnel, equipment, and supplies. The following sections will discuss these phases and the criteria used to plan and execute each phase.

Formal planning begins when the CINC receives a warning order from the CJCS. Preliminary planning might begin before official notification arrives because of intelligence reports gathered from the field. Normally, the CINC's J2/J3 (Intelligence and Operations staff) will have a lead on warning signals (such as starvation patterns, seismic or volcanic activities, civil war, or weather trends). These warning signs indicate risk areas within the CINC's area of responsibility. Contingency plans for the affected region may already exist to support humanitarian type operations.

The CINC's staff will evaluate whether the humanitarian operation is a supporting operation or the main operation. The CINC's intent and what is seen as the end state are

the foundation of the mission. In many situations, the CINC will have contingency plans or predesignated JTFs to conduct humanitarian missions. However, the CINC might use a designated JTF organized for a specific relief mission. JTF organization will follow established SOPs and joint doctrine which can be found in Joint Publication 5-00.2 *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, September 1991.

It is critical during predeployment planning that the JTF organization and staff be tailored to meet the requirements of the humanitarian mission. Planning will determine whether the military units will operate under neutral humanitarian authorities and from what type of location (neutral or possible hostile). Clarity of command, control, and communications (C³) relationships between the JTF, State Department, USAID/OFDA, UN, ICRC, host nation, and NGO/PVOs will reduce organizational conflicts and duplicative relief efforts (Burton, 1994).

The eventual transition of humanitarian operations must be an integral part of predeployment planning. Transition activities must begin as soon as the JTF arrives in theater. The transition plan should be part of the operations order (OPORDER) to ensure it is understood and agreed to by all.

The success of humanitarian missions to reduce suffering and save lives hinges on the timeliness of responding units. Predeployment plans should account for streamlined deployment procedures that are critical in disaster scenarios where time is crucial. Plans should also provide for rapid deployment joint readiness exercises so that coordination and interagency relationships can be tested and refined.

Another consideration is the possibility of coalition forces being involved in the mission. The JTF may form the core of the force, but augmented by coalition units. For the purposes of this research, JTF and Coalition Task Force (CTF) will be used synonymously.

A pivotal question for the JTF is what role the military will play in providing relief efforts. Will the JTF provide the actual relief (food, water, logistics, medical, transport relief supplies) and/or provide security for the UN, ICRC and NGO/PVOs? Once assigned the mission, the CINC organizes the appropriate JTF or a single component command to accomplish the mission.

As in all military operations, a JTF requires a clear mission statement. To achieve this the commander of the JTF (CJTF) may have to develop and submit its own mission criteria up the chain of command. For example, the mission statement for Operation Provide Comfort (northern Iraq) included:

- Provide medical care
- Provide clothing and shelter
- Move into the refugee camps
- Provide assistance for the aerial supply effort
- Organize the refugee camps
- Build a distribution system
- Provide a transportation and/or supervise the distribution of food and water
- Improve sanitation
- Provide site/convoy security

During the planning process, appropriate capabilities and requirements will be determined which in turn drives the JTF's composition. The JTF's composition depends on the mission, initial estimates of the situation, and guidance from higher headquarters. As in all operations, major mission areas like force security, sustainment, command and control (C²), and HA requirements compete for limited time and assets. Planners should consider the possibility of augmenting humanitarian assistance JTFs with expertise not typically found in most commands (ALSAC, 1994).

The CJTF should realize that the JTF will encounter the tactical equivalent of NGO/PVO/IOs in the area of operations. These organizations are in the area prior to the arrival of military forces and will remain while the military accomplishes its mission. Furthermore, civilian organizations typically stay in place once the force departs. These

organizations are staffed with competent and knowledgeable people who are fully cognizant of the political and cultural traditions of the area. Coordination and cooperation with these organizations can be paramount to the success of the humanitarian assistance operation (ALSAC, 1994).

After evaluating the pre-deployment criteria and initializing deployment procedures, the JTF begins the next phase of the operation in moving units to the area of operations. Deployment of the JTF is based on the severity of the situation, political considerations, and mobility assets. Requirements and decisions made during planning affect deployment.

The JTF should be structured to deploy in force packages. Rapid response, austere conditions, and lack of infrastructure often place unique demands on the JTF. Initial phases of deployment require only the critical command, control, communications, security and logistics capability. Follow-on forces deploy as capabilities expand to support the forces and conduct the humanitarian mission.

Deployment planning and execution considerations for humanitarian missions are fundamentally the same as in the any military operation. Close coordination between the staff sections of the JTF is critical. Planners must ask:

- Are command and control assets more crucial than immediate provisions of humanitarian supplies?
- Do the units being airlifted match the equipment being sent?
- What are the NGO/PVO requirements for transportation and has the military committed to transporting their supplies?
- Have preventive medicine units been scheduled for early deployment?
- Will media coverage of the initial deployment focus on the JTF's first actions which alleviate the conditions requiring humanitarian assistance? (ALSAC, 1994)

It is apparent that a number of considerations and coordination activities must take place prior to and during deployment to make sure the right mix of assets are available at the appropriate place and time. Coordination during the deployment phase is based on

guidance developed during the planning phase and conditions as they change regarding the situation. The CJTF must continue to keep the lines of communication open with higher headquarters (CINC), Service components of the CINC, subordinate commands, supporting commands, and NGO/PVO/IOs, UN and OFDA/DART (OFDA).

In moving the personnel and equipment, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) utilizes its components - the Air Mobility Command, Military Traffic Management Command, and Military Sealift Command. USTRANSCOM provides movement schedules for sequenced requirements established by the CJTF. Subordinate commands need to be updated on changes to the deployment schedule or changes in the mission. Changes in the mission, such as humanitarian assistance to peace enforcement, may require a shift in force deployment. Also, due to the fluid nature of disaster situations, NGO/PVO/IOs, and UN agencies may require JTF support during deployment not already identified during predeployment planning (ALSAC 1994).

Liaison

Liaison teams or personnel (military and civilian) assigned up and down the chain of command ensure the JTF can identify concerns and issues. These teams are critical during the deployment phase. Liaison teams in the mission area are critical to keeping the JTF informed of changing conditions and events. They assist the JTF in making decisions as to how the humanitarian assistance operation is progressing and whether a shift of emphasis needs to be made to avoid further human suffering. This can be done by the HAST if assigned to support or augment the JTF.

Operational success is always influenced by a commander's knowledge and use of his forces. As representatives of their parent command to CJTF, Liaison Officers (LNOs) frequently provide the critical link to effectively coordinate and execute JTF operations. Liaison personnel should be exchanged between major contributors to the force. Their

functions include the identification of political and legal constraints, transportation capabilities, logistic requirements, and other factors affecting the employment of coalition units (FM 100-20, 1990).

Employment

CJTF responsibilities during employment include force and resource monitoring, planning for current and future operations, execution, and reporting. The employment of a JTF for humanitarian missions has some unique considerations:

- What is the JTF's actual role in the humanitarian mission?
- Does the JTF provide support to the UN/ICRC/NGO/PVOs?
- Does the JTF conduct the humanitarian assistance and then transition functions to the UN, ICRC, NGO/PVOs?
- What is the relationship with OFDA/DART?
- Is the humanitarian mission part of a larger operation?
- What are the force objectives?
- How will objectives of the mission be evaluated to determine success (quantitative or nonquantitative)?
- What is the personal code of conduct for the humanitarian assistance operation?

Humanitarian assistance is something most military forces have not normally trained to accomplish (Sutton, 1994). Security concerns, global visibility, political considerations, acceptance, logistics, health factors, and unknown length of mission can affect the force and the mission. Integration of coalition forces involved impacts on how the JTF will assign missions and organize the area.

The mission of the JTF, although consistent in its overall direction to relieve suffering and minimize losses, may undergo major evolution in its specific taskings during the early stages of the operation. This can be a positive development in that each new estimate of the situation will lead to a necessary refinement or modification of the mission and tasks. Continuing on-scene estimates of the situation and importance of rapidly adjusting the mission and tasks is appropriate. It is imperative that lines of communication

remain open between the civilian agencies, OFDA, and military forces reducing the possibility of duplicating efforts yet ensuring the mission is getting accomplished.

Military coordination with the UN, NGO/PVO/IOs, OFDA/DART, and their missions are critical during the execution of the mission. In some cases, 50 or more NGO/PVOs may be working in the area of responsibility (AOR). These NGO/PVOs may be coordinating their efforts but in some cases they may be operating independently of one another. Military concerns may not be compatible with the concerns of the NGO/PVOs (security, mission priorities, support requirements, expectations).

Early in the operation it is important to establish a dialogue with the OFDA/DART, NGO/PVOs and IOs to determine capabilities and limitations and to facilitate future cooperation. This dialogue can be accomplished by defining a clear mission statement, involving the OFDA/DART, NGO/PVOs in mission planning, disseminating the view that OFDA/DART, NGO/PVOs are allies and partners, and defining military capabilities (ALSAC, 1994).

Employment considerations and factors affecting the outcome of the humanitarian mission depend on decisions made during planning and deployment. These factors include type and amount of equipment necessary to be on the ground first; response capabilities in case the mission or location changes; transition of key staff positions depending on the emphasis or phase of the operation; establishment of continuity files within each staff section; preventive medicine strategies should take precedence over therapeutic medicine in the initial stages of a humanitarian mission; security considerations and rules of engagement for deployed forces; legal and fiscal authority to conduct civil action projects; and many other concerns (ALSAC, 1994).

In organizing the area of operations, it is helpful to designate Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS). These are geographic boundaries which consider ethnic or tribal boundaries, political affiliation, relief agency operations, political acceptance of certain

coalition countries, and contiguous sectors with forces assigned (components assigned multiple sectors are connected).

Security is the CJTF's responsibility. Security for the NGO/PVOs must be considered and should be addressed in either the Rules of Engagement (ROE) or the mission statement or both. For more on ROE, see Appendix C. Depending on the environment, there may or may not be an urgent need for security forces. The ROE should contain guidance regarding whom JTF forces are supposed to protect. Hostile crowds, starving people, armed resistance, or bandits require appropriate responses. It may be necessary to first establish the environment for humanitarian operations to commence (peace enforcement). This requirement can adversely affect the speed and effectiveness of providing assistance to the area (ALSAC, 1994).

Security of the JTF is a primary concern. Other security concerns include:

- Ports and airfield
- NGO/PVOs requests
- US government activities (OFDA/DART)
- Humanitarian recipients
- Host nation agencies
- Humanitarian supplies, convoys, and main supply routes
- Humanitarian distribution centers.

Convoy security for humanitarian assistance follows the same set of tactics for any military convoy operation. If the JTF is tasked to provide convoy security or security for the NGO/PVOs, then it should plan such with all forces and agencies involved. The organization of the area of operations or humanitarian relief sectors can cause problems for convoy operations. All cross boundary travel and security responsibilities for convoy operations must be coordinated. This can be accomplished through a movement control center established to coordinate all transportation (ALSAC, 1994).

In an unfriendly environment the JTF may have the added responsibility of weapons confiscation. Specific plans and procedures must be developed and disseminated

to all forces. In addition, the ROE should address the use of force during weapons confiscation operations. Special consideration must be given to the security forces employed by the PVO/NGOs (FM 100-20, 1990).

Intelligence operations are particularly important because of the political awareness inherent in humanitarian operations. The commander must continuously and clearly identify information requirements to provide the resources necessary to conduct intelligence operations. Even more so than other types of military operations, successful humanitarian operations are very dependent upon timely and accurate information. As in other MOOTW, intelligence in humanitarian assistance missions must deal with all aspects of the area of operations and the personnel/organizations found therein. In this environment, military intelligence requirements will include such subjects as political, ethnic, religious, and economic factors.

The primary intelligence effort should be to assess the agenda of every faction and determine how this may affect friendly operations. Open sources are employed to determine patterns or methods of operation, factional associated geography, and agendas which can be associated to specific factions. The resulting analysis is employed to avoid obvious hostilities; prepare for the non-obvious hostilities (ambushes and deliberate attacks on the humanitarian assistance force); and employ appropriate force in order to accomplish the mission (ALSAC, 1994).

The result of an increased focus on intelligence during humanitarian assistance operations will be more informed military personnel with a greater awareness of the situation. This will enhance the ability of US forces to make informed judgments about which areas to avoid, where to take extra precautions, etc. based upon their specific mission and the overall humanitarian mission. They will also be able to better identify important elements of information which need to be reported through the chain of command to the tactical headquarters.

Another employment consideration is the type of medical operations expected to be conducted in the disaster area. Medical considerations for the JTF in a humanitarian assistance environment are significant. The two areas to consider are medical care for the JTF and coalition forces and medical care for the local populace. In general, JTF medical assets support the JTF personnel while host nation facilities, NGO/PVOs, UN, and ICRC health organizations support themselves and the civilian population. In most cases the area of operations will be austere and environmentally hostile. This can cause the JTF to encounter numerous medical and sanitation problems. Good medical estimates and preventative medicine planned for early in the operation can pay significant dividends. These include immunizations for all personnel and prevention of insect-borne disease and prevention of fly, water, and food-borne illnesses (ALSAC, 1994).

The JTF should consider fully using their preventive medicine assets. Intensive epidemiological monitoring coupled with sophisticated diagnostic capabilities can help prevent development of epidemics among deployed forces.

Title 10, US Code, prohibits use of military medical assets for treatment of civilians except when specially authorized by the appropriate authority. This can cause some problems for the JTF regarding the perception the US cannot and will not assist the area with medical care. The highly visible nature of US containment areas will naturally lead civilians to seek medical treatment from these facilities. Because this is an issue above the level of the JTF commander, it is necessary for the JTF to plan early in the operation how they will deal with civilian medical requests.

The JTF should attempt to coordinate with NGO/PVOs, UN, and ICRC medical facilities immediately upon planning the operation. Some type of central point or organization for coordinating medical requirements should be created. However, the differing policies and positions of individual NGO/PVO/IOs; military capabilities and policies; host nation requirements can create friction. A medical coordination agency

formed at the HOC or CMOC can provide viable solutions for medical requirements. Identification of this need and cooperation will increase efficiency and reduce redundancy.

Coordination with host nation and a wide variety of relief organizations lies at the core of humanitarian assistance operations. Mission success depends on the US military turnover of humanitarian responsibilities, including security, to the host nation or relief organization. Close coordination will improve this process. The commander of the JTF can use the HAST, the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) and the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) to assist in the coordination effort.

In order to coordinate military operations with the requirements of the host nation or NGO/PVO/IOs, a HOC can be created at the request of the CJTF. The HOC, if created, is usually collocated with the appropriate headquarters, such as the UN, conducting the operation. The HOC functions include identifying and prioritizing humanitarian assistance needs to the JTF and identifying logistics requirements for the NGO/PVO/IOs. The HOC is not as much a location or cell as it is a policy making and governing body. In the military sense, the HOC does not command and control but attempts to build a consensus for team-building and unity of effort. The HOC should consist of decision makers from the military forces command (JTF), UN agencies, DOS (USAID/OFDA/DART), regional NGO/PVOs representatives, ICRC, and host nation authorities. The HOC coordinates activities and does not necessarily control (ALSAC, 1994).

The HOC will normally have a UN director, and deputy directors from the JTF and OFDA/DART. Within the HOC, the policy making body is the Standing Liaison Committee which is comprised of UN, JTF, OFDA/DART, NGO/PVOs representatives. HOC core groups and committees meet to discuss and resolve issues related to topics such as medical, agriculture, water, health, and education.

As mentioned above, the HOC is a broad guidance or policy making body. At the tactical level the CJTF can form a CMOC as the action team to carry out the guidance and decisions of the HOC. The CMOC is a group of service members that serve as the military's presence at the HOC, as well as the military liaison to the community or relief agencies. Normally, the CMOC director is also the HOC's military deputy director.

The CMOC performs the liaison and coordination between the military support capabilities and the needs of the humanitarian assistance organizations. The CMOC in coordination with OFDA/DART receives, validates, and coordinates requests from NGO/PVO/IOs.

The CMOC supports NGO/PVO/IOs by responding to validated logistical and security support requirements. During CMOC meetings (usually daily) the CMOC identifies requests to support the NGO/PVO/IOs. Validated requests go to the JTF operations cell and then to the component/coalition force LNO for action. The following is a list of humanitarian assistance tasks the CMOC could accomplish:

- Validate the support requests in the absence of the OFDA/DART representative.
- Coordinate the military requests for military support with various military components and NGO/PVOs.
- Convene and host ad hoc mission planning groups involving complicated military support, numerous military units, and numerous NGO/PVOs.
- Promulgate and explain JTF policies to NGO/PVOs.
- Provide information on JTF operations and general security operations.
- Serve as a focal point for weapons policies.
- Administrative and issue NGO/PVOs Identification cards.
- Coordinate medical requirements.
- Chair port/rail/airfield committee meetings for space and access related issues.

Normally, NGO/PVOs requests will come to the CMOC for action. Based on lessons learned in previous humanitarian missions, the flow for requests goes from the NGO/PVOs through DART to the CMOC and on to the JTF/Joint Operations Center (JOC). Individual units or coalition forces are tasked to conduct the mission. Once it is

complete, they report back to the operations center with an after action report. The JOC closes the mission and sends a completed report to the CMOC who in turn forwards the information to the NGO/PVO who requested the support (ALSAC, 1994).

The termination of the humanitarian mission is very difficult to ascertain. Redeployment decisions are based on political and military considerations. The JTF provides assessments for the military, and the DOS representative provides the political considerations. The CINC uses this information to recommend redeployment plans to the JCS and NCA.

Simultaneous to the JTF deployment, redeployment planning should begin. Redeployment considerations will depend on whether the JTF has accomplished all or some of its objectives. Redeployment of the JTF forces begins as soon as objectives are accomplished or the need for military forces diminishes. Forces not needed to accomplish certain objectives should be redeployed as soon as possible. For extended operations a rotation policy should be established (ALSAC, 1994).

Those humanitarian assistance functions conducted by the JTF should be transferred to host nation NGO/PVOs, UN, and/or ICRC as soon as possible. As this is accomplished, forces are freed to redeploy. As the operation progresses, political and military guidance will identify functions and units which will need to remain in order to accomplish objectives not achieved. The requirement for the JTF to continue supporting humanitarian operations must be identified earlier on. This identification affects how the JTF will plan for redeployment.

Conclusion

Chapter Two has covered the background information found in the research process on humanitarian assistance missions. It covered the programs authorized under Title 10, USC for the DOD to conduct humanitarian assistance missions, how

humanitarian assistance supports our national security policy, and the planning considerations involved at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of military operations.

The following chapter will discuss the methodology used in conducting the research. Since this was an exploratory study, several qualitative tools were used to obtain and evaluate information.

III. Methodology

Chapter Overview

This chapter introduces the methodology used to conduct this study. First, it explains the qualitative research design. Second, it describes and justifies the specific methods used to answer the investigative questions initially discussed in Chapter 1. Finally, this chapter describes the population of interest and the research instruments.

Within the DOD there is only one specific guideline (ALSAC) that governs how to conduct humanitarian missions. In the past, operations were conducted as ad hoc missions. However, the current National Defense Strategy states the military will conduct humanitarian relief operations as a means of projecting our forward presence. Increasing involvement in the humanitarian role has forced the military to reevaluate how things were done in the past and develop new strategies for the future. This thesis will be conducted as an exploratory qualitative research project describing the current process of providing humanitarian relief. This process will be structured along the three levels of military operations: strategic, operational, and tactical. After the current process is charted, interagency coordination processes will be discussed as well as the type of missions the United States supports.

Qualitative Research Design

While there are many ways to conduct research, the nature of the research conducted in this thesis paralleled the ideas and rationale expressed by authors who promote the qualitative methodology design. Qualitative research is defined as “any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990:17). In conducting this thesis, it was determined there was a need to first know the ‘nature’ of and the ‘what’ of

humanitarian assistance. According to Cooper and Emory, “qualitative refers to the meaning, the definition or analogy or model or metaphor characterizing something, while quantitative assumes the meaning and refers to a measure of it” (Cooper and Emory, 1995:118).

Schmitt and Klimoski are more specific on the use of qualitative research. They suggest that the qualitative approach is effective for gaining “familiarity or insights” or for “description” (Schmitt and Klimoski, 1991:122). Humanitarian assistance is a new area of interest for the DOD, so it is necessary to determine what is and is not known about the process. The category “to gain familiarity or insights” introduced by Schmitt and Klimoski supports the need to gain more information and knowledge about a topic before a more formal investigation is done. “The researcher may seek to gain a better understanding of a phenomenon. This may be in an entirely new area of interest. Or it could reflect a desire to increase the level...of existing knowledge” (Schmitt and Klimoski, 1991:122). Under the description category, “the goal is to accurately portray the characteristics of a particular individual, situation, or group” (Schmitt and Klimoski, 1991:122). The goal of this research project is to accurately portray how the relief process is initiated and what steps are taken in using the military for humanitarian relief operations.

A more formal or quantitative research design would not have been appropriate in this instance because of the need to first determine what is involved in military humanitarian assistance operations. Formal research design can be categorized in terms of quantitative data collection, producing an effect on a variable, describing a causal relationship among variables, conducting a statistical study or measuring how a stimulus affects a particular subject. In each of these instances, a hypothesis has been proposed and a means of measuring the effects of a phenomenon has been determined (Cooper and

Emory, 1995). Quantitative research is the follow on step to exploratory research, which will be part of the proposed topics of research in Chapter Five.

To effectively study the role of various agencies in the initiation of the humanitarian assistance process and to determine how the military becomes involved in the process, it was necessary to examine the subject using a combination of two perspectives. First, because there is no clear definition on how to conduct humanitarian assistance, an exploration of the humanitarian assistance process was conducted. Second, a historical approach was needed to determine what has been done in the past with humanitarian assistance missions to identify critical tasks or operations necessary to conduct humanitarian missions.

Investigative Questions

To answer the research problem, this study will address the following investigative questions:

1. Who initiates the process for humanitarian relief missions?
2. Who approves or decides the military will be used to provide humanitarian relief?
3. How does the military involvement begin and end?
4. Once the process is initiated, what government agencies are involved in or interface with the military in conducting humanitarian relief missions?
5. In what types of humanitarian missions does the United States get involved ?

Research Design

These questions will be answered after reading, evaluating available information and interviewing key personnel. Conclusions are drawn as to how this process works. For this thesis and for question one, the objective is to flowchart the current process the military uses to conduct humanitarian assistance. After mapping the current process, interviews will be structured to capture the knowledge base of individuals currently

serving in key positions. "Interviews have been characterized as conversations with a purpose. As a technique for qualitative research, they are used to gain insights regarding how individuals attend to, perceive, or otherwise deal with some phenomenon of interest" (Schmitt and Klimoski, 1991: 139). These positions will be identified through organizational charts and military regulations which specify who is responsible for humanitarian missions. In conjunction with interviewing key personnel, continuous searches for regulations, operations manuals, news reports, and government studies will be done.

Examples of previous humanitarian missions will be used to determine how the process was initiated in each situation and also which agencies played a role in that mission. For the purpose of this thesis, Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti will be missions that are focused on.

Compiling the information found on the subject of humanitarian assistance, Questions two through five will be answered in Chapter Four. Once the process is mapped for the initiation, the flowchart will be used again to determine the interface of the agencies. The literature review also defines and describes the different types of humanitarian relief missions, the approving authority for military use and the beginning and the end of military involvement. Each of these points of information will be validated by the results of the research in Chapter Four.

Conclusions will be drawn via the procedure of sampling. Within qualitative research, sampling can be conducted a number of ways. According to Strauss and Corbin, sampling for the purpose of validating theories or relationships between categories is completed when the researcher has reached a saturation point. Saturation is defined as:

- (1) no new or relevant data seem to emerge regarding a category;
- (2) the category development is dense, insofar as all of the paradigm elements are

accounted for, along with variation and process; (3) the relationships between categories are well established and validated. (Strauss and Corbin, 1990:73)

The sample will consist of DOD organizations involved in planning, training, and conducting humanitarian assistance operations. When data indicate that no new relevant information is apparent and the same concepts are repeatedly discussed, then the saturation point has been reached. At that juncture, the sample size will be considered large enough to provide relevant and reliable information for the thesis.

Exploratory and Historical Studies

Because humanitarian missions are new and the process used to conduct them are vague, an exploration of the topic was necessary in order to learn something about the process. "Exploratory studies tend toward loose structures with the objective of discovering future research tasks" (Cooper and Emory, 1995:115). The first step is to read and evaluate as much information as possible on how the current process is performed. "The first step in an exploratory study is a search of the secondary literature" (Cooper and Emory, 1995:119).

Because the military involvement in humanitarian operations is relatively recent, the available information is limited. With this in mind, there are several approaches to finding information that are adaptable for exploratory investigations. The two this study focuses on are "in-depth-interviewing (usually conversational rather than structured), and document analysis (to evaluate historical or contemporary confidential or public records, reports, government documents, and opinions)" (Cooper and Emory, 1995:119). Using these two methods, examples of previous humanitarian missions will be used as the basis of determining how military humanitarian missions were accomplished.

The focus was on several investigative questions that were pertinent in exploring this research area. By studying historical documents, answers to the questions became available. "Historical research involves studying, understanding, and explaining past

events. The purpose of historical research is to arrive at conclusions concerning causes, effects, or trends of past occurrences that may help to explain present events and anticipate future events” (Gay and Diehl, 1992:13). Using a combination of historical and exploratory approaches to research, the research effort would be able to cover this topic to the extent that other hypotheses will be developed and studied more in-depth.

Data Analysis

Periodicals, regulations, after-action reports, government documents and news media coverage about humanitarian assistance operations were gathered, read, and categorized. Each point of interest was categorized as to the type of mission, the level of operation - whether it was at the strategic, operational, or tactical level, and how involved the military was in the operation. If reports provided useful information concerning the involvement of the military, interagency contacts, or how the military was initially contacted and directed to conduct humanitarian assistance operations then the source was considered useful. The data were coded according to strategic, operational, or tactical level operations. Peripheral information about how civilian agencies might come into contact with the military was used to make further inquiries or locate subject matter experts for the second part of our analysis.

After the secondary data were collected, the next step was to formulate a proposed model of the process. The model charted the humanitarian assistance process from a DOD perspective using the strategic, operational, and tactical flow of operations. Personnel identified during the secondary data collection process, were contacted to discuss and gain their opinion on the proposed humanitarian assistance model.

Validation and Verification

Based upon the responses gained from the subject matter experts noted above, the proposed model was validated. Validation was considered complete when responses from the interview process (Appendix D) were compared to the information gathered during the historical research phase and resulted in the same ideas and concepts being expressed. At that juncture, the saturation point had been reached. In addition, answers to the interview questions were used to verify the content of the proposed model and subsequent investigative questions. Furthermore, secondary data provided supplementary validation to the model.

Population of Interest

The population of interest for the historical portion of this project included all humanitarian operations performed by the US military. Although all operations were studied, research efforts concentrated on Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. These three operations were chosen because there was relevant and current data with which to assess the roles of key participants and the characteristics which determine whether or not the mission was a success.

Research Instruments

The research instruments included interviews, regulations, operations manuals, newspaper articles, and government studies. The interviews were structured around general topics pertaining to humanitarian assistance operations. This allowed the interviewee the flexibility to explore other pertinent areas not previously considered. Interviews were conducted by telephone with individuals involved in humanitarian

operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Written sources were collected based on their relevance to the military and humanitarian missions.

Summary

This chapter introduced the methodology used in this study. First, the qualitative research method was discussed to gain a better understanding of this approach to research. Second, the investigative questions from were discussed and the methods used to answer these questions were described. Additionally, the data analysis and validation processes were discussed. Finally, the population of interest and the research instruments were reviewed.

Chapter Four will present the results of the research. Each investigative question will be listed and the results attained through the research will be given. The emphasis is on the proposed model of flowcharting the humanitarian assistance process (Appendix A-7) which shows how the humanitarian relief process is initiated. The model also depicts at what level the military becomes more involved in the process. The results of the research will be discussed in depth in the next chapter.

IV. Results

Chapter Overview

This chapter contains the results of the research. In order to answer the research question "How is the humanitarian relief process initiated and what steps are taken in using the military for humanitarian relief operations?" a model was developed which flow charts the entire process. Figure 4.1 portrays the model derived from the research. In addition to the flow chart, answers from the investigative questions were used to further define HA operations. The results will be structured according to strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations. First, the information found through historical study will be discussed. Consequently, information gathered from personal interviews with humanitarian assistance experts currently serving in key positions will be presented. Personal interview responses refer specifically to the proposed model (Appendix A7); the questions which were asked can be found in Appendix D.

Results

Question One. *Who initiates the process for humanitarian relief operations?*

The intent of this question was to determine if one specific person or agency starts the humanitarian assistance process or if the request can come from a number of different avenues. The research found that the process can be initiated a variety ways depending on the severity of the disaster, the military situation at the time, and the level of effort required to respond to the disaster.

Findings

At the strategic level, disaster relief requests come from the US ambassador in country (ALSAC, 1994 and Meek, 1994).

At the operational level, the CINC generates requests to the Department of State based on intelligence reports (ALSAC, 1994).

At the tactical level, on the ground commanders submit requests via the chain of command based on catastrophic conditions requiring immediate response (ALSAC, 1994, Irvin, 1994, USSOUTHCOM, 1993).

In general, the majority of requests for disaster relief are filtered through the ambassador in country based upon the host nation government asking for assistance. Additionally, the ambassador will receive input from the country team to better evaluate if immediate assistance should be provided. The ambassador has the authority to provide immediate assistance and initiate steps which could lead to increased US involvement if the situation dictates (ALSAC, 1994).

Who approves or decides the military will be used to provide humanitarian relief?

The National Command Authority (NCA), comprised of the President and the Secretary of Defense, have constitutional authority to direct armed forces to execute military action. The NCA can deploy military units to assist or provide relief in humanitarian situations when circumstances threaten US political or military interests or if the humanitarian situation by itself is deemed sufficient to warrant military intervention (ALSAC, 1994, Hartmann and Wendzel, 1994).

Findings

This only pertains to the strategic level and it is the National Command Authority (ALSAC, 1994).

Deployment of troops comes from the NCA (Ingalsbe, 1995).

DOS is responsible for requesting foreign disaster relief from the DOD (Barone, 1995).

The President through the NSC, tasks the DOD (Wallace, 1995).

The research shows that there is disagreement on who has the ultimate authority in directing military forces for humanitarian assistance operations. The majority of the responses indicate that the President is involved at the strategic level and is a pivotal player in the process.

Question Three. *How does the military involvement begin and end?*

This question was intended to break down the process into specific steps to clearly demonstrate how the military becomes involved in humanitarian assistance missions and ultimately how is it pulled out of humanitarian operations. Research shows that the military is initially involved in humanitarian relief missions as soon as the NCA is contacted, by virtue of the Secretary of Defense being a part of the NCA. At the other end of the spectrum, it was found that terminating military involvement is not as obvious.

Findings

At the strategic level, the CJCS recommends the military deployment and redeployment schedule to the President, who ultimately decides when military involvement will begin and end (Rudd, 1993 and ALSAC, 1994).

UN Security Council Resolution 940 enabled US military intervention for humanitarian assistance in Haiti (CALL, December 1994).

US military involvement begins when the CJCS gives the direction for military involvement (CALL, December 1994).

In the operational context, the CINC can decide to deploy forces to relieve life threatening circumstances if the situation dictates it (ALSAC, 1994 and USSOUTHCOM, 1993).

If tactical units are deployed as part of a training mission and a disaster occurs, the ground force commander can provide disaster assistance immediately (ALSAC, 1994 and USSOUTHCOM, 1993).

Research shows that military involvement is dependent upon the situation and the current physical location of military forces. If no military forces are located in the disaster area, the NCA through the CJCS directs military involvement. If military forces are in the general vicinity training for other missions, the CINC can direct them deploy to the disaster site and provide humanitarian relief immediately. At the tactical level, if forces are currently located where a disaster occurs, the tactical commander can initiate humanitarian relief operations notifying the CINC after the fact.

Terminating military humanitarian or disaster relief operations is not as apparent. The research found that determining an end state by which to gauge when the operation is over is difficult to do. Although relief operation objectives may be discussed at the strategic and operational levels, the tactical commander and his military forces are the best sources of information from which to judge if an end state has been reached. Therefore, military humanitarian relief operations can end when the tactical commander forwards a recommendation through the chain of command to the NCA that mission objectives have been accomplished. The NCA in concert with the CJCS will then determine if the military should be redeployed or if humanitarian operations should continue.

Question Four. *Once the process is initiated, what government agencies are involved in or interface with the military in conducting humanitarian relief missions?*

Upon investigating this question, research found that there are a myriad of government, domestic and international agencies the military must coordinate with in providing humanitarian relief operations. Coordination efforts are structured along two avenues. One is the coordination between US government agencies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in deciding how the military will be used. The second, following the decision to utilize military forces, is which relief actions need to be coordinated between military units and civilian organizations providing assistance.

Strategic level coordination is conducted between the Department of State, USAID, the Secretary of Defense, and the CJCS (ALSAC, 1994 and OFDA, Version 2).

Operational interfaces are conducted between the CINC, OFDA, UN coalition forces, and host nation agencies such as their Ministry of Health (ALSAC, 1994).

Tactical level coordination is conducted between the tactical commander's staff and the DART liaison (ALSAC, 1994).

The tactical commander may also establish a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), which is comprised of members from every agency involved in the relief effort (ALSAC, 1994 and Wallace, 1995).

Research shows that interagency coordination takes place on two playing fields at each level of operation. The first playing field is the coordination that takes place within the US government and the second playing field is the coordination that takes place between the US, civilian relief agencies (foreign and domestic), and the host nation. Coordination levels and primary agencies are identified in the model in Appendix A-7.

Question Five. *What types of humanitarian missions does the United States get involved in?*

Initially it was thought that the military is only used for disaster relief missions, however, research found that the military is involved in six programs. Each program is either specifically authorized under Title 10 of the US Code or is congressionally mandated.

Findings

Currently the United States military is conducting humanitarian assistance through six different programs: the DOD excess property program; the Denton program; foreign disaster relief; humanitarian and civic assistance program; humanitarian demining program;

and the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union program (ALSAC, 1994, Irvin, 1994, and USSOUTHCOM, 1993).

The research did not indicate any additional programs being developed in providing humanitarian assistance via the military. Initiatives are being discussed within the DOD Office for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs on how to reduce costs and continue to provide humanitarian aid around the world within the context of the current six programs.

Other Findings

During the course of the research, several other findings were identified which did not specifically answer any investigative questions, but were helpful in clarifying the military's role in humanitarian assistance operations. These findings were:

- MOOTW, peace operations, and humanitarian assistance missions are different operations; however, they tend to be grouped together (ALSAC, 1994 and JWC, 1994).
- Humanitarian assistance missions were perceived as "ad hoc"; however now they are becoming more formulated (OSD for Humanitarian Affairs, 1995).
- Humanitarian assistance is not a shot in the dark. There is constant communication between the embassies and the Department of State (Bureau of Political and Military Affairs, 1995).
- It appears that standard operating procedures for HA operations are not available at the strategic and operational levels (GAO, 1994)

Validation and Verification

Historical research was used to determine the existing process of how humanitarian assistance operations are initiated and when does the military become involved in humanitarian missions. Once the historical documents were researched, a

model was compiled which depicted the overall process of disaster relief operations; Figure 4.1 depicts this process. Subject matter experts identified during the historical research phase of the project were interviewed for their opinion of the proposed model. Respondents' data were used to verify the proposed model and validate the research results from the historical information.

Summary

This chapter presented the results of the research by structuring the information per each question according to strategic, operational, and tactical applications. The proposed model of how the current humanitarian assistance process is initiated and subsequently executed via the military was presented. Key personnel within the agencies involved in coordinating and executing HA operations were asked to validate the model. Information gathered from the interviews and the historical research were consolidated to answer each investigative question. Additional findings were discussed as they pertained to the overall question of how is the humanitarian relief process initiated.

The following chapter will present the conclusions and management implications of the research. Each investigative question will be presented followed by an assessment of what conclusions can be drawn from the research and what management implications should be considered in the process. Chapter Five will conclude with suggestions for future research and a summary of its contents.




Figure 4.1 Humanitarian Assistance Flow Chart

Proposed flow chart for humanitarian assistance operations

Strategic level

1. Disaster occurs or CINC evaluates the region and determines there is a need for assistance. US ambassador is informed or asked by affected nation for assistance.
2. Request for assistance sent to the President of the United States, who informs the National Security Council and directs US Agency for International Development (USAID) to collect information and give recommendations.
3. USAID chief is the President's Special Coordinator who forms Interagency Working Groups from the key players represented in the National Security Council, from cabinet level members, and from country teams to collect information on the situation and suggest courses of action.
4. Special Coordinator makes recommendations to the President.
5. President decides to send military forces to relieve further loss of life or property.
6. The Department of Defense through the Joint Chief of Staff is tasked to provide assistance.

Operational level

7. CINC of affected region officially designated and begins planning and evaluating the situation.
8. Coordination and liaison contacts are made between the CINC and OFDA. In addition, contact is made with the UN if any coalition forces are going to respond to the disaster as well.
9. CINC gathers information from the HAST, LOC, HACC and decides appropriate course of action to respond to the situation.

Tactical level

10. CINC forms a Joint Task Force to provide humanitarian assistance.
11. JTF begins assessment and force structure planning.
12. JTF staff coordinates responsibilities and relief efforts with the NGO/PVO/IOs.
13. Military units deploy to the disaster site and begin relief operations.

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Chapter Overview

An assessment of the data gathered from interviews along with the information obtained during the historical review led to a number of conclusions about the process of providing humanitarian assistance. This chapter summarizes the assessment of the information and presents conclusions for each of the investigative questions. In addition, conclusions and management implications are discussed in response to the overall research question. Other findings which did not specifically answer a particular investigative question but were pertinent to the subject of humanitarian assistance are discussed as well. In closing, recommendations are provided for future research into the humanitarian assistance process.

Researching the military's involvement in humanitarian assistance is important because as the Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs said "The US military today must be prepared not only to respond to traditional missions, but also to respond selectively to diverse regional and other challenges, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief." (Irvin, 1994: 29).

Problem Statement

Despite its history of providing humanitarian relief, the DOD has not developed specific regulations that clearly define how humanitarian relief missions are to be conducted. There is one published guideline to date (ALSAC), with two additional joint publications being currently developed. The focus of this thesis was to perform a qualitative research project to ascertain the current process. The following research questions were used to determine the current process and how it is implemented: How is the humanitarian relief process initiated; and what steps are taken in using the military for

the humanitarian relief operations? To answer the research question, this study examined the following investigative questions:

1. Who initiates the process for humanitarian relief missions?
2. Who approves or decides whether the military will be used to provide humanitarian relief?
3. How does the military involvement begin and end?
4. Once the process is initiated, what government agencies are involved in or interface with the military in conducting humanitarian relief missions?
5. In what types of humanitarian missions does the United States get involved?

The intent of these questions was to initially define the current process of the US military's involvement in humanitarian missions and to develop a model to flow chart the current process. The flow chart was presented to subject matter experts for their input on whether the model accurately portrayed the humanitarian assistance process. Based on information gathered from the historical study and the information collected from the interviews, recommendations for improving the process of providing humanitarian assistance will be discussed in the following chapter.

Methodology

A qualitative approach was taken for this thesis because the intent was to define and model the current process used by the military in providing humanitarian assistance. According to Cooper and Emory, "Quality is the essential character or nature of something; quantity is the amount." (Cooper and Emory, 1995) Because of the nature of the research effort, quantifying or measuring humanitarian assistance efforts was not an option without first describing how it was done. Additional quantitative studies can follow, once the process has been mapped and validated.

The initial step in conducting the research was to gather historical data pertaining to humanitarian assistance operations. Past information was used to develop and define the current process of humanitarian operations. Once the process was defined, a model was developed which depicted the humanitarian assistance process at each level of operations - strategic, operational, and tactical. The model was then validated by subject matter experts, who had been identified during the historical research phase. At the time data from the interviewees matched the data gathered during the historical research and no new concepts or ideas were being discussed, the saturation point was reached. Findings based on the data collected were discussed, leading to conclusions that were drawn from the research.

Conclusions and Results

Who initiates the process for humanitarian relief operations?

Humanitarian relief missions can be initiated in many ways. For disaster relief, the request usually comes from the US ambassador in country. The Ambassador is asked by the government affected by the disaster if the US can provide humanitarian aid. The Ambassador contacts the president of the US and relays the request.

Sometimes requests will come through military channels via the CINC. The CINC's staff continually monitors the situation within their appointed region and will know if a natural disaster or man-made disaster has occurred. If military forces are already on the ground conducting training exercises, they can provide immediate assistance if the situation is desperate enough.

Additionally, the staff within the Department of State, is aligned into functional and regional bureaus. The regional offices continually monitor the political, economic, and social status of their areas of responsibility, thus being able to identify hot spots which may require humanitarian aid (Hartmann and Wendzel, 1994). Areas that appear to be in

trouble will be identified to the Secretary of State, who will inform the President. The DOS and USAID evaluate situations and events that are happening globally and prepare analysis of each situation. One of the aspects of this analysis is to match the national security policy with the proposed aid.

Humanitarian assistance takes many forms, so the request for HA is not always as structured as the Ambassador requesting assistance from the NCA. From the US Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs International Security and Peacekeeping Operations, "Request for assistance can come from multiple sources (UNHCR, WFP, ICRC, etc.)" (Ingalsbe, 1995). Per the Civil Affairs Staff Officer, Center for Low Intensity Conflict, "Each embassy or USAID mission should have a Mission Disaster Response Officer (MDRO) responsible for disaster planning and management and maintaining the Mission Disaster Response Plan (MDRP)" (Wallace, 1995).

Although there are a number of different ways HA is requested, the most common approach is through the US Ambassador of the country in need. No matter how the request is made, the US invests significant amounts of time, effort, and resources as a result of granting assistance.

Conclusions for Question One. It appears that most humanitarian relief missions are initiated via the US Ambassador in country. Although many agencies channel information to the ambassador, the ambassador is the determining factor in deciding to request assistance from the US. However, it is important to note that for the context of this thesis, the humanitarian assistance process being described refers to disaster relief operations versus the other five programs under DOD

Management Implications for Question One.

It is apparent that requests can come from a variety of avenues which makes the process complicated and dynamic. Advance notice of military involvement for disaster

relief would enhance the effectiveness of aid rendered. The sharing of information is critical between the DOS, DOD, and USAID. Therefore, the rapid dispersion of information is crucial at the strategic level. Decisions made at that level critically effect the subsequent decisions made at the operational and tactical levels.

Who approves or decides the military will be used to provide humanitarian relief?

Based upon information provided by the cabinet and other staff members, the President will decide if the military should be used to provide humanitarian relief. The NSC will make recommendations as to how the military would best be utilized in a humanitarian mission. The President and the Secretary of Defense have the legal power as the National Command Authority (NCA) to direct armed forces for overseas deployment (ALSAC, 1994; Hartmann and Wendzel, 1994; & Irvin, 1994).

Depending on the organization, there is a different perception as to how the DOD becomes involved in HA. Deployment of troops comes from the NCA, however, provisions of expendables and transportation support does not need to go through the President (Ingalsbe, 1995). Providing these types of support comes from using the legislative authorities already in place. The action officer, International Logistics and Engineering Division, J4, Joint Staff, states that the Department of State is responsible for requesting foreign disaster relief from the DOD (Barone, 1995). However, another respondent noted that the President, through the NSC, is how the DOD is tasked (Wallace, 1995). He continues

The NSC is the principal forum that considers and discusses courses of action regarding these matters and makes subsequent recommendations to the President. The NSC have the constitutional authority to direct the Armed Forces of the United States to conduct HA. This direction is given through the Chairman, Joint Chief's of Staff. (Wallace, 1995)

The perceived decisions may be varied, but the results are the same: the military is tasked to take part in humanitarian missions.

Conclusions for Question Two.

The varying responses from the field indicate that there is still confusion on how the military is tasked to provide humanitarian assistance. Regardless of this confusion, constitutional authority for directing movement of troops rests with the NCA. The President and the Secretary of Defense decide if the military will be used in humanitarian missions. The lack of written guidelines, SOPs, or regulations is indicated by the absence of consensus from the respondents.

Management Implications for Question Two.

Formal, written guidance is necessary to reduce confusing or conflicting procedures. The lead agency in coordinating international humanitarian assistance as specified by Presidential directives is USAID, consequently the director should develop the guidelines necessary to strategically plan humanitarian assistance missions. Letters of agreement and interagency coordination memorandums should be written based on input from all key players, such as the DOS and DOD. Strategic procedures should then be used at the operational and tactical levels to develop SOPs, regulations, and guidelines facilitating military humanitarian assistance operations. The goal is to educate those involved in humanitarian assistance what the military's capabilities are. It is also necessary to know who has the authority to direct the military forces into action.

How does the military involvement begin and end?

Once the President makes the decision to use military units for humanitarian aid, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), in coordination with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the CINC of that particular region to provide humanitarian assistance. At the strategic level the objectives of the mission may not be clearly delineated, therefore the exact end state will not be apparent. After the CINC has had time to evaluate the situation and develop his or her operational objectives, the end state may become more visible. Once the military forces are on the ground and have had time to further evaluate the

situation, the tactical commander will send recommendations and intelligence reports up the chain of command indicating a more definite end state. The CJCS and the SecDef will brief the President on the latest information which will be used in conjunction with other cabinet input as to when the military should redeploy.

Military involvement begins when the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff gives the direction (Wallace, 1995). Defining the end of military involvement (end state) is not as concrete and can be hazy depending on how well the objectives are understood and can be expressed. Declaring end state is difficult even when the objectives are clear, but it is even more difficult when preparing for operations other than war.

Conclusions for Question Three

Because the analysis required for HA is dynamic, it must be continuous to assist in defining what needs to be achieved and what conditions need to be met in order to reach end state. Although there appears to be some confusion as to when the military becomes involved, constitutional authority rests with the President as the Commander-in-Chief. Military involvement begins when the President decides it is appropriate to use the military for humanitarian aid. The end state, however, is not so clearly defined. On the ground forces and their commander have to carefully evaluate whether their mission has been accomplished. Intelligence reports are sent up the chain of command to the CINC and forwarded to the NCA, who collectively with the CJCS's recommendations decide that the end state has been reached.

Management Implications for Question Three.

Decisions on beginning military involvement are made at the strategic level, however, end state decisions can be influenced by the situation at the tactical level. Military personnel have to be flexible when undertaking humanitarian missions. The political sensitivity and world attention on their actions make it particularly important that nothing goes wrong and appropriate aid is being given to the targeted population. Using

military forces in a non-combatant role to secure our national interests focuses the effort on a different playing field. Clearly defined objectives such as key terrain or specified targets for destruction are not apparent in a humanitarian environment. Military personnel will have to be trained to operate in a MOOTW atmosphere rather than the traditional combatant scenario. Such training will enable them to better evaluate the situation on the ground when providing humanitarian assistance and gather meaningful intelligence data as to whether the mission has reached an end state or not.

Once the process is initiated, what government agencies are involved in or interface with the military in conducting humanitarian relief missions?

At the strategic level it is the Department of State and the US Agency for International Development who interface with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the operational level it is the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, which falls under USAID. The operational level of coordination is with the CINC who has been given the order to provide relief. Within the tactical level, the commander will coordinate with members of OFDA, UN coalition forces, if present, and civilian agencies (NGOs/PVOs/IOs). Coordination is facilitated through the use of the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) which is not a command and control element, but an interagency coordination team. The HOC can be an informal group or a very formal body of representatives from each agency providing assistance. Throughout every level of coordination, the host nation is involved in coordinating the necessary assistance.

See Figure 4.1 for the organizations involved in HA. Three of the four responses (See Appendix D to review the responses in whole) determined this to be a valid model with a few changes needed. If the model is valid, the organizations in that model must also be valid. One respondent agreed the model was valid, but commented that the IWG is ad hoc in nature, so it cannot be set in concrete as to how it is formed (Ingalsbe, 1995).

Another interviewee also agreed the model was valid; however, the respondent believes the title should be changed to reflect that foreign disaster relief is being described and not the broader scope of HA. Humanitarian assistance involves a variety of programs including disaster relief (Barone, 1995).

Although two other respondents disagreed as to the validity of the model, they both forwarded similar information from the draft Joint Pub 3-07, 24 April 1995 (Wallace, 1995 and Lukasavich, 1995). One respondent agreed with the validity with the exception of the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) which may or may not be formed during operations (Wallace, 1995). See Appendix D for the organizational charts determined to be valid at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels (excerpted from draft Joint Pub 3-07).

Conclusions for Question Four

Depending on the severity of the situation and political climate of the affected country, the responding agencies could include a host of national and international assistance as well as the military. In addition, the US could respond unilaterally or as a coalition effort with many different nations sending in military forces. The amount and type of effort will be situation dependent, calling for flexibility and careful planning.

Management Implications for Question Four

It is very important to know who is providing assistance in disaster relief operations. It is also critical to know the extent of assistance being provided in order to avoid duplication of effort. Overcoming organizational mistrust or lack of understanding among NGOs/PVOs/IOs and the military is necessary to coordinate effective relief efforts. One way of doing this is through constant coordination via liaison teams. Civilian relief agencies do not have organizational structures equivalent to the military, but they do have a chain of authority which can be used to coordinate education efforts. The military should be informed at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels on relief agencies

capabilities, responsibilities, and expectations. Additionally, the civilian relief organizations should receive information from the military on how their operations are conducted at the various planning levels. Open lines of communication can facilitate the process and avoid a myriad of problems prior to deploying any military member to a foreign country.

In what types of humanitarian missions does the United States get involved?

Currently there are six programs conducted under the Department of Defense for humanitarian assistance. They are the DOD excess property program; the Denton program; foreign disaster relief; humanitarian and civic assistance program; humanitarian demining program; and the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union program. The excess property program is an on-going effort where the DOD offers its excess, non-lethal property to foreign countries. Examples of property include medical supplies and equipment, construction materials, tools, furniture, and vehicles. The second program provides no-cost transportation of privately donated humanitarian cargo on military aircraft as long as there is space available. The third program utilizes military forces to provide disaster relief to foreign countries. In recent history, the military has been deployed to Somalia, Haiti, and Northern Iraq to provide humanitarian aid. The fourth program is the humanitarian and civic assistance program. The CINCs suggests various civic assistance projects to the Department of State and the host nation to train his forces as well as provide aid to foreign countries. Projects include building schools, roads, and providing basic medical and veterinary care. The sixth program is a combination of all the others specifically targeted for republics in the former Soviet Union. To date, more than 12 republics have received aid through 250 mission providing bulk food, medical equipment, and construction materials.

Conclusions for Question Five.

The current programs established under the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs are well defined. However, the benefit in using military units to provide assistance such as disaster relief is questionable. Millions of defense dollars are spent in equipment, time, and personnel in providing assistance around the world without concrete analyses conducted to demonstrate the benefit of such programs.

Management Implications for Questions Five

Studies should be done to evaluate the cost of each program, how much training is received from providing humanitarian aid, and if diplomatic relations are strengthened through these programs. Perhaps it would be more beneficial to use other means to respond to a disaster rather than using the military. Additionally, there is a concern that if the military is being used for humanitarian missions, our defense forces be stretched too thin to respond to a military threat. Other considerations are the number of military personnel deaths or injuries that occur while conducting humanitarian missions. Policy makers and cabinet level staff should develop criteria by which to measure the success or failure in using the military for humanitarian operations.

How is the humanitarian relief process initiated and what steps are taken in using the military for humanitarian relief operations?

The research drawn from investigative questions provided the information necessary to develop a model of the humanitarian assistance process (Appendix A.7). As previously discussed the process is usually initiated by the US ambassador in the affected country. The request for assistance is approved by the President after it has been evaluated and recommendations from the NSC have been given. USAID Director, as the President's Special Coordinator for international aid, may form an IWG to facilitate

coordination efforts. Once the President decides to use military units for disaster relief operations, orders are issued via the CJCS to the appropriate CINC.

At this point the operation has moved from the strategic level to the operational level. Mission statements become more refined and objectives are more clearly stated. The CINC's staff coordinates with USAID's operational level office which is OFDA. If any UN forces are tasked to respond to the disaster, coordination with their commander is initiated as well. The CINC gathers more information about the disaster via country teams, sending a HAST to the site, and from OFDA. Appropriate courses of action are determined and the CINC designates units to deploy to the area.

Once the CINC forms a JTF or a single service command to handle the operation, planning, coordinating, and executing the mission shifts from the operational level to the tactical level. The tactical commander begins assessing the information gathered at the strategic and operational levels to further define mission objectives and plan appropriate means of responding to the disaster. Liaison contacts are made with NGOs/PVOs and IOs to further facilitate relief efforts and discuss responsibilities and expectations. Based on previous assessments and information, military units which are best capable of providing relief are deployed to the site to execute the mission.

Conclusions for the Research Question

The above information is a very broad, simplified explanation of how the humanitarian assistance process for disaster relief is initiated and how the military fits into the process. The amount of coordination and intensity of planning such missions is much more complicated, however, now that the process has been defined, additional research can further study the effectiveness of using the military for humanitarian missions.

Humanitarian assistance is an all encompassing topic with disaster relief being a subset. The research found that when discussing humanitarian assistance with personnel working in that area, questions must reflect if it is humanitarian assistance being discussed

versus the more narrowly scoped topic of disaster relief. For the purpose of this research project, once the distinction was made clear, the emphasis was placed on disaster relief. Therefore, the proposed model of the humanitarian assistance process does not include all six programs under OSD Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs, but pertains to disaster relief specifically.

Management Implications for the Research Question

There are many factors which need to be considered when deciding to use the military in humanitarian operations. Objectives of the mission must be decided upon early in the planning process to focus coordination efforts in providing useful assistance. Information on the type of disaster and location play a critical part in deciding what type of response is needed. Organizations involved in the relief process also need to understand each other's capabilities and limitations. Command, control, and communication are key in organizing military forces deployed to the area as well as coordinating efforts with civilian relief agencies. Assuming the military will continue to perform humanitarian missions including disaster relief, it is imperative future training efforts shift to focus on MOOTW scenarios.

Other findings

Initially, the perception was that humanitarian assistance missions were "ad hoc" in nature and that the military's involvement was reactionary versus planned. However, the research found that this perception was not true. The existence of the six programs identified earlier under the OSD for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs indicates that military involvement in humanitarian operations is not "ad hoc", but planned and coordinated. Furthermore, humanitarian operations are different than peace operations, but are a subset of military operations other than war (MOOTW). Distinguishing between the different operations is difficult, especially when they often occur simultaneously. One last finding was that humanitarian assistance is not a "shot in the dark". Interagency

coordination and situation monitoring is a continual process between the DOS, DOD, and the embassies. When providing humanitarian aid, OSD for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs matches the assistance given with security policies to ensure the military is being used in support of the President's security objectives.

Conclusions for Other Findings

Determining that humanitarian missions are not as "ad hoc" as originally thought is significant. DOD can use historical data to generate realistic budget requests to provide useful assistance. In addition, training for humanitarian missions can be done based on lessons learned and from what is planned for the future. Disasters will continue to plague the world, but the military can be better prepared in responding to them if it uses information from the past to prepare for the future.

Management Implications for Other Findings

Although there will still be an element of uncertainty in responding to disasters, the military can become more prepared to respond to catastrophic situations. With the post Cold War era doctrine expanding from protecting Western Europe from Soviet invasion to MOOTW, training and doctrine within the military also needs to shift. Most disaster relief environments and other humanitarian aid situations involve complicated problems, including lack of government control within the host nation, numerous international relief agencies on site, cultural differences among the refugees, etc. Tactical commanders for US military forces will have to be better prepared to keep control of the situation while providing humanitarian assistance. It will be necessary to shift the training focus for some US military units from traditional combat roles to a more fluid environment of humanitarian assistance.

Future Research

The complexity and scope of humanitarian assistance impacts many fields, organizations, and people. While this research project focused on the role of the Department of Defense in providing humanitarian assistance, two opportunities for further research seem particularly evident.

First, a study should be accomplished which determines the price of US military involvement in humanitarian missions. Will using the military for humanitarian missions detract military combat readiness? The study should determine if US peacetime commitments will leave enough military units intact to respond to robust combat operations.

As US involvement in humanitarian missions continues to expand, less time can be spent on proper training for mission readiness. The military might slip back into a hollow force status if the Department of Defense does not or cannot focus on readiness. Although the full extent of the effects humanitarian missions have on readiness is not quantifiable, the US runs the risk of seeing them appear in future contingency operations.

The research should explore whether or not it would be beneficial for the government to establish a separate organization that would control all humanitarian operations, leaving the military to focus on readiness. This study should include who would run the organization and also where the supplies would come from in order to support this organization. Through this study, a better approach may be found for handling humanitarian missions.

Second, a study of the training process for humanitarian missions is necessary in order to determine if the military could be more prepared for these types of operations. Effective operations start with trained people who are knowledgeable of humanitarian missions.

Training on realistic scenarios will allow military organizations to build an understanding of how information is collected and disseminated. Understanding of the requirements of regional offices, logistical support and expectations by other organizations would eliminate confusion during humanitarian operations. The training accomplished would also allow military organizations to test current procedures and capabilities as well as provide for needed adjustments.

Since agencies working with the military on humanitarian missions have their own regulations and support networks, familiarity through training allows the establishment of support mechanisms which are not redundant

The study could determine the types of training that would be most beneficial to the military. Perhaps different training packages could be put together for the different types of humanitarian missions. The research could determine what the necessary parts to these packages would be.

Summary

Chapter Five presented the conclusions for each investigative question as well as a management implications. The DOD is currently involved in six humanitarian assistance programs with disaster assistance being one of them. This research effort set out to determine the current process of using the military in responding to disaster situations, either man-made or natural. Once the process was modeled by way of a flow chart, it was presented to a number of subject matter experts to determine the validity of the model. Many respondents agreed that the model was valid, however, the answers to the investigative questions varied. Lack of consensus on how the process is initiated and who has authority to involve military forces in humanitarian operations is indicative that the process is still not well defined.

Strategically, the US has to determine if the military is the appropriate means of providing humanitarian assistance. Can the defense budget handle the expense of providing aid or should other agencies be used for humanitarian operations? While it is convenient to use the military for a rapid response because of its capability to deploy a self-contained force quickly, is it always necessary to do that? Also, will using the military as a rescue agency stretch its resources too thin to make it ineffective in case of a real military threat? Measurement tools and analyses of these and other questions are necessary in order to better evaluate the appropriateness of using military forces for humanitarian operations.

Appendix A. Flow Charts




Figure A.1 Joint Staff for Humanitarian Assistance
(ALSAC, 1994:2-5)




Figure A.2 Strategic Level Interagency Coordination Process
(ALSAC, 1994:2-10)




Figure A.3 Unified Command Structure
(ALSAC, 1994:3-5)





Figure A.4 Operational Level Connectivity
(ALSAC, 1994:3-7)



Note: 1/Special Advisor to CJTF

Figure A.5 Typical HQ JTF Staff Organization
(ALSAC, 1994:3-12)




Figure A.6 Possible JTF Organization for Humanitarian Operations
(ALSAC, 1994:4-2)

Appendix B. Acronyms

AOR	Area of Responsibility
C ²	Command and Control
C ³	Command, Control, and Communication
CA	Civil Affairs
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander in Chief
CJCS	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
CTF	Coalition Task Force
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DOD EPP	Department of Defense Excess Property Program
DRMS	Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service
EUCOM	European Command
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HACC	Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center
HAST	Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Center
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross

IO	International Organizations
IWG	Interagency Working Group
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JTF	Joint Task Force
LNO	Liaison Officer
LOC	Logistics Operation Center
METOC	Meteorology and Oceanography
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MRE	Meals Ready to Eat
NCA	National Command Authority
NGO	Nongovernment Organization
NIS	Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union
NSC	National Security Council
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPORDER	Operations Order
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	Public Affairs
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SC	President's Special Coordinator
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United States Code
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command

USIA

United States Information Agency

USTRANSCOM

United States Transportation Command

Appendix C. Rules of Engagement

CRM 93-120/October 1993

**Rules of Engagement (ROE) for
Humanitarian Intervention and
Low-Intensity Conflict:
Lessons from Restore Hope**

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Summary

As part of CNA's reconstruction of Operation Restore Hope, this paper examines the rules of engagement (ROE) for U.S. Marine Corps and Army ground forces during the operation and discusses eight issues surrounding their writing, implementation, and effects. The paper concludes with a discussion of the overall lessons learned from the experience.

Why study ROE?

ROE were an important aspect of the success of Operation Restore Hope, but they were not an often-discussed issue during the operation. After all, the overall mission was a success and few major problems could be associated with ROE.

But it may be important to study the Restore Hope ROE experience for two reasons. First, during the operations there were several high visibility incidents that were widely reported in the press, such as when a Marine shot a Somali who stole his sunglasses. Second, and more importantly, the Somalia operation highlighted several new and unusual ROE issues, many of which concerned ROE for humanitarian interventions (which may have both security and relief aspects) and other low-intensity conflicts. Because the Marine Corps is likely to face many similar operations in the future, examining how UNITAF (as the U.S. led coalition was called) handled these issues--or in some cases did not--may be instructive.

The Restore Hope ROE

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) developed a rather straightforward ROE for Restore Hope. The ROE authorized the use of deadly force in response to a hostile act. It authorized a graduated response to lesser

threats and hostile intent. Soldiers were supposed to use the least amount of force necessary, use force proportionate to the threat faced, and use it only as a last resort. When faced with a potentially dangerous situation in which deadly force was *not* appropriate, soldiers were to issue verbal warnings and show force. The command later added cayenne pepper spray as another means of nondeadly force to be used after others failed.

The command defined armed individuals within the military's area of control as "threats." Defining them as threats meant that soldiers could challenge them and use all force necessary to disarm them.

Lessons learned

The analysis of ROE in this operation lead to overall ROE lessons learned in three areas. First, to ensure that ROE for humanitarian and similar low-intensity conflict missions maintain a proper balance between being too restrictive and too permissive, the ROE should be reasonable, simple, and similar to the standing peacetime ROE.

Second, dissemination is very important. It might be helpful for a commander of a joint task force to:

- Ensure that the troops realize that in their area of responsibility, ROE take precedence over all other rules governing the use of deadly force, such as guard rules.
- Explain why any disciplinary actions are taken against soldiers accused of excessive use of force (i.e., why those accused acted inappropriately). Other soldiers should not feel that they will be prosecuted for defending themselves appropriately.
- Ensure that troops know whether or not they can use deadly force to protect weapons or other equipment.
- Ensure that troops know that cayenne pepper spray is not a substitute for deadly force (i.e., even if they have the spray, they are still allowed to use deadly force to protect themselves if necessary) .

- Differentiate between ROE and weapons confiscation policy so troops do not confuse the two.
- Disseminate ROE to coalition forces to prevent confusion and coordinate policies on the use of deadly force.

The third lesson concerns the importance of early planning. Early consideration of ROE allows the commander n

- Print unclassified ROE cards for troops before the operation.
- Consider methods of using proportionate force.
- Obtain approval for the use of cayenne pepper spray before an operation starts.
- Decide whether deadly force can be used to protect weapons.

The experiences with ROE in Restore Hope also shed light on other issues. The restraint shown by soldiers may disprove concerns that "trained killers" are not able to handle delicate peace-keeping missions. Also, the soldiers were able to handle the ROE with little extra training. Finally, the similarity between the ROE for Restore Hope and those for police forces indicates that it may be helpful to study how police organizations train their officers.

Operation Restore Hope might be a precedent, but it will probably not be a textbook case for how ROE operate. There are at least three potential lessons that should *no* be taken away from the Restore Hope ROE experience. The first is that the experience will be repeated: Next time there may be different problems. The second is that because ROE problems were minor in Somalia, they will be minor in other operations: With more threats, there may be more problems. The third is that in future operations coalition forces will readily agree to U.S. ROE: This may not be the case in future operations.

Background

Situation in Somalia

After the 1991 fall of Somalia's leader Siad Barre, the country split into various factions, most along clan lines.¹ Fighting between these groups led to a ravaging of the country's capital (and much of southern Somalia), the further breakup of the country, banditry, and starvation. Continued violence prevented humanitarian relief agencies from providing enough assistance to the Somali people. The United Nations (UN) deployed a force to the region to monitor a cease fire between rival factions. But the factions were uncooperative, and the UN force was too small (and limited by mandate) to enforce a peace.

As starvation became more wide-spread, the UN authorized a U.S.-led military intervention in December 1992. CENTCOM established Joint Task Force Somalia to perform Operation Restore Hope.² The objectives of Restore Hope were to provide a secure environment to ensure the delivery of relief supplies.

Two aspects of the threat environment faced by U.S. soldiers in Somalia seem relevant here. First, Somali factions, and most of the population, were well-armed. Guns were an ever-present aspect of Somali life and carrying them in the open became very common. Soldiers had difficulty distinguishing between a Somali with a gun that might

1. For information on the situation in Somalia before Operation Restore Hope, see Rakiya Omaar, "Somalia: At War with Itself," *Current Hipster*, October 1991, pp. 23234, Samuel M. Makinda, *Security in the Horn of Africa*, Adelphi Paper 269 (Summer 1992), and United States Army, Intelligence and Threat Assessment Center, ATC-RM-065-93, *Restore Hope Soldiers Handbook*, December 1992, pp. 6-7, Unclassified.

2. For information on the event leading up to the decision to intervene, see Don Oberdorfer, "The Path to Intervention: A Massive Tragedy We Could Do Something About," *Washington Post*, December 6, 1992, p. A1.

threaten them and one carrying a gun merely to protect his belongings (or person) .

Second, the lack of school, massive unemployment, and poverty lead youthful Somali males to form roving gangs, and to turn to banditry and thievery. As one officer on the UNITAF staff noted:

Improvised roadblocks and co-conspirators would slow the approaching vehicles while groups of children in swarms of up to three hundred would descend upon the convoy grabbing everything not bolted or tied down. At busy intersections, young thieves would approach and rip the glasses off the faces of the passengers.³

Thus, soldiers faced a complex security environment in which to decide whether--and when--to use force.

ROE definition and sources

The purpose of ROE are to influence the use of force. For soldiers, they are the framework that guides them in the use of force; for decision-makers, they are a tool to control the use of force. Joint doctrine defines ROE as:

Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.⁴

ROE are based on several considerations.⁵ Military factors affecting ROE include allowing maximum freedom of action and the greatest chance for mission success. Political factors include domestic ones (e.g., the reactions of Americans to what they see on television and read in the papers), diplomatic ones (e.g., the reaction of the UN and

3. Col. F. Lorenz, USMC, *The Use of Non-Lethal Force During Operation Restore Hope*, Unpublished Paper, Aug 1993, Unclassified.

4. Joint Pub 12, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Unclassified, p. 317, 1 Dec 1989.

5. Captain J. Ashley Roach, JACG, USN, Rules of Engagement," *Naval War College Review*, pp. 47-49, Jan-Feb 1983.

read in the papers), diplomatic ones (e.g., the reaction of the UN and U.S. allies), and local political ones (e.g., the reaction of the local populace). Legal factors affecting the use of force include international law and the law of war. Finally, ROE are one means for civilian leaders to exercise control over the military.

ROE--when to use force

The key question ROE are supposed to answer is--when force can be used? In theory, this question is easy to answer. For U.S. forces, the answer centers on three distinct concepts: hostile act, hostile intent, and hostile force.

In peacetime and wartime, a soldier can use force when faced with a hostile act or hostile intent. The CINC defines both hostile act and hostile intent depending on the unique circumstances of the operating area or the mission.

The use of deadly force against a hostile act is straightforward: if being attacked, soldiers can use deadly force to protect themselves.

The use of force against hostile intent--which is called anticipatory self-defense--is more complex. A soldier does not have to be fired upon before he can use force. Instead, he is allowed to use force when he expects he will be attacked. But several conditions are attached to anticipatory self-defense. The threat of attack must be imminent, and the use of force must be immediate,⁶ proportionate,⁷ and necessary.

6. The rule that the use of force must be immediate means that a soldier can only use the force necessary to defend himself; this does not include launching a counterattack well after the initial attack is over. This summary of requirements is derived from several sources, including RAND Note N-2963-CC, Bradd C. Hayes, *Naval Rules of Engagement: Management Tools for Crises*, Jul 1989, Unclassified, and Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*, Unclassified, pp. 12 to 13, 1987.

7. Within the concept that force must be proportionate one might also include that it must *not* be indiscriminate. That is, the force used to repel an attack must be targeted at the attacker, and should not unnecessarily endanger the lives of non-combatants.

Under wartime ROE, a command may define a *force* as hostile. If so, soldiers are allowed to use deadly force against it regardless of whether or not the force is engaging in a hostile act or showing hostile intent. Although these phrases were not used at the time, in the Second World War Japanese and German soldiers were defined as hostile forces; thus, American soldiers could fire upon them whenever possible.

The Restore Hope ROE

CENTCOM and I MEF developed a rather straightforward ROE for Restore Hope based on CENTCOM's standing Peacetime ROE.⁸ The Restore Hope ROE considered the use of force when faced with a hostile act and hostile intent,⁹ and defined armed individuals as "threats."

Hostile act and hostile intent

The ROE authorized soldiers to use force against a hostile act and hostile intent: "You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or threats of attack."¹⁰ The ROE also allowed the use of *deadly* force against a hostile attack: "Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop a hostile act."

8. The exact Restore Hope ROE remains classified. See *CJTF Somalia OPLAN*, Tab A to Appendix 8 to Annex C, Rules of Engagement (General), pp. CA-1 to CA-2, Secret, 6 December 1992. This section of the paper draws on unclassified versions of the ROE (such as the ROE card given to all U.S. soldiers in Somalia) and unclassified portions of the ROE contained in the OPLAN. For the peacetime ROE, see U.S. Central Command R525-11, *Military Operations Peacetime Rules of Engagement*, 25 October 1989, Secret. It is sometimes useful to distinguish between (1) the high-level ROE the Joint Staff gives a CJTF and (2) more specific operating rules based on the ROE that the CJTF F gives to the forces assigned to him. With a few minor exceptions, however, JTF Somalia disseminated few extra operating rules. Forces, therefore, relied on the actual high-level ROE for guidance. This paper focuses on these ROE.

9. For examples of how soldiers were to tell if they faced hostile intent, see TF Mountain OPLAN 93-2 (Operation Restore Hope), Annex N, *Rules of Engagement*, pp. 1-2, Secret/NOFORN.

10. *JTF for Somalia Relief Operation Ground Forces Rules of Engagement*, Card, 2 December 1993, Unclassified.

The ROE, however, did call for as restrained a response as possible:

When U.S. forces are *attacked* [emphasis added] by unarmed hostile elements, mobs and/or rioters, U.S. forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportionate to the threat.¹¹

The ROE said that the same rules apply to when U.S. forces are *threatened* by hostile elements. It also said that soldiers should use a graduated response to such threats, including issuing verbal warnings and showing forces.¹² But if Somalis threatened the lives of U.S. forces, soldiers could use deadly force to protect themselves.

Threats

But what if soldiers confronted armed individuals that were not attacking or threatening soldiers? The ROE considered the Somalis "threats" in that case.

Within those areas under the control of U.S. forces, armed individuals may be considered a threat to U.S. forces and the relief effort whether or not the individual demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to disarm and demilitarize groups or individuals in those areas under their control.¹³

So soldiers could challenge and use force to disarm Somalis. If during such a challenge the Somali displayed any hostile intent or committed a hostile act, soldiers could use deadly force against them. One can think of a "threat," then, as a *potentially* hostile force (i.e., between friendly and hostile).

Restore Hope may in fact be the first time a command defined threats in this manner in the ROE. Unfortunately, defining threats and

11. *JTF for Somalia Relief Operation (round Forces Rules of Engagement)*. The ROE thus included several important notions, including the requirement to use force that is proportionate and the minimum necessary. See Lorenz, *The Use of Non-lethal Force During Operation Restore Hope*.

12. *CJTF Somalia OPIAN*

13. CJTF Somalia OPIAN.

saying they could be challenged--but not necessarily that they *should* be--caused soldiers to confuse ROE with weapons confiscation policy (discussed below).

Until the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved the use of cayenne pepper spray, few effective nondeadly means of force were available. If soldiers faced threats that were too minor to make deadly force appropriate, they simply had few viable options.

What's special about the ROE?

There are several interesting things about the Restore Hope ROE. First, they were similar to the standing CENTCOM peacetime ROE, except for the definition of armed individuals as threats.

Second, the ROE did not designate any force as hostile, testifying to the unclear nature of the threat and the humanitarian nature of the mission.

Third, the ROE for ground forces did not change throughout the operation. The command viewed the ROE as broad enough to account for changes in the mission and allow for the self-defense of soldiers.

Eight Restore Hope ROE issues

What is a Restore Hope ROE issue? Narrowly defined, ROE issues might only center on the writing and following of the ROE. This paper takes a broader view. Any issue that deals with the use of force is an ROE issue. After all, the use of force is what ROE are supposed to affect.

ROE for humanitarian operations

How do you tailor ROE for humanitarian operations, or for that matter, other low-intensity conflict situations?¹⁴ When CENTCOM and I MEF were developing the Restore Hope ROE, there was a tension between competing objectives: a tension that exists whenever any command develops the ROE. On the one hand, they wanted the ROE to be *permissive enough* to ensure operational effectiveness; on the other hand, they wanted them to be *restrictive enough* to prevent negative incidents.

If the ROE were *too restrictive*, they would not allow soldiers to protect themselves, deter warlords and bandits, and demonstrate the U.S. determination to ensure the delivery of relief supplies. If the ROE were *too permissive*, however, UNITAF could lose local, domestic, and international support for the operation. (UNITAF found it necessary to demonstrate the humanitarian nature of the mission, and a large number of high-visibility incidents of soldiers confronting or killing

14. Some thought has been given to ROE for low-intensity conflict. On this topic, see Any-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, *"Strawman" Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Enforcement, Peacemaking, Peace-keeping, Humanitarian Assistance, Joint/Combined/Interagency Operations*, pp. II-9 to II-10, Unclassified, 21 December 1992. Although this document did not influence the Restore Hope ROE because CJTF Somalia received this document after CENTCOM and I MEF wrote the ROE and deployed to Somalia, it provides some valuable concepts for future operations.

Somalis could have caused public relations problems at home.) Also, although permissive ROE might err on the side of allowing an individual soldier to protect himself, the local population could have turned on UNITAF had they perceived UNITAF soldiers as an enemy and become convinced that UNITAF's intentions were not humanitarian. Ensuring the proper balance thus required taking prudent risks.

It was for these reasons that the ROE strictly limited the use of riot control agents (RCA) such as tear gas. Tear gas was seen as indiscriminate and persistent (it remains in streets and is kicked up by dust for weeks in warm climates). The health situation in Somalia was bad enough anyway: Seeing U.S. soldiers gassing Somalis on television clearly would have sent the wrong signal about the humanitarian nature of the operation. Therefore, although UNITAF was allowed to use tear gas, the limits placed on the procedures for using it were so great as to make its use highly unlikely.¹⁵

Lessons learned

It is possible to properly balance the tensions between competing ROE objectives. One way to do this in such circumstances is to develop ROE similar to the standing peacetime ROE with only a few changes.

Dissemination of the ROE

There were at least three dissemination issues in Somalia. First, the JTF disseminated ROE in many ways: in OPLANs, on unclassified cards given to soldiers,¹⁶ in briefings, and through the use of training aids such as scenarios.¹⁷ The cards were probably the most effective.

15. The Secretary of Defense delegated the use of riot control agents to the CJTF. Subordinate commands had to request approval to the CJTF for use by "detailing the factual basis and intelligence assessment for the request," as well as by "specifying specific locations and anticipated duration of threat. " See Staff Judge Advocate, *Operation Restore Hope After Action Report/Lessons Learned*, Tab J, "Riot Control Agents: Request Procedures," Mar 1993, Unclassified.

16. *JTF for Somalia Relief Operations Ground Fore Rules of Engagement*.

17. These consisted of 13 "situations" with solutions and applicable ROE. See *JTF Rules of Engagement Practical Exercise Vignettes*, December 1993. Unclassified.

They were clear, concise, and unclassified--ensuring maximum understanding and dissemination.

Second, there were several high-visibility Article 32 cases in February and March 1993, in which soldiers were accused of the inappropriate use of deadly force.¹⁸ The command did not issue any clarifications about the cases, so soldiers naturally assumed the worst and in some cases were hesitant to use deadly force when they had every right to. Military commands are restricted in the information they can release on such issues by Judge Advocate General regulations, legal ethics, and concern that a commander may influence the decision in a pending case.

Third, units asked for tailored explanations and ROE clarifications, but the JTF did not issue them. The JTF Staff Judge Advocate wrote a convoy commander's ROE briefing,¹⁹ a case of tailored ROE explanations, but it was not disseminated. Also, the command did not issue clarifications on the use of deadly force to protect weapons (discussed below).

There was a difference in opinion on tailored explanations and clarifications: the Army and staff lawyers usually favored clarifications; the Marines including those on the JTF staff--felt that it was better to let the soldiers rely on their good judgment and not confuse them with more rules.

18. Article 32 hearings are held to decide whether a court martial is appropriate. On 2 February, Sgt. Harry Conde shot a Somali who stole his sunglasses. He was later convicted of aggravated assault. On 4 February 1993, Sgt. Walter Andrew Johnson shot a Somali running toward his vehicle whom he thought was carrying a hand grenade. He did not face a court martial. See Keith B. Richburg, "Two Marines Face Charges in Somalia," *The Washington Post*, 4 March 1993, p. 14, and Keith B. Richburg, "Marine Convicted in Somalia for 'Sunglasses' Shooting," *The Washington Post*, 7 April 1993, p. 20.

19. See (CJTF SJA, *CTF Somalia Operation Restore Hope Convoy Commander's Briefing*, Draft, Unclassified, 18 Dec 1992.

Lessons learned

The following lessons learned concern ROE dissemination:

- Emphasize dissemination especially the use of unclassified cards for the troops. Such cards should be printed before deployment.
- Ensure that any incidents of possible inappropriate use of deadly force are clarified to minimize misinterpretation, perhaps by educating the press covering the case.
- Consider carefully tailored explanations of ROE, especially when a Marine JTF has control over Army units that may expect such explanations.

ROE precedence

The issue of ROE precedence relates to dissemination. ROE take precedence over all other regulations concerning the use of force in that area of operation (AOR). ROE are the definitive word on the use of force:

One potential problem in Somalia was that soldiers sometimes confused ROE with other rules governing the use of force. For example, the Marine Corps guard rules allow for the use of deadly force in six circumstances, including to apprehend and/or prevent the escape of an individual, and to protect weapons or other property.²⁰ The ROE were also sometimes confused with regulations in Army manuals.

The crux of the problem was that no one spelled out --either on the unclassified cards given to soldiers or in the actual ROE--the fact that ROE took precedence over other rules. When drafting ROE it is important to be clear about the relationship between ROE and other rules governing the use of force, such as military regulations or law enforcement rules. Because the relationship between ROE and other

20. NAVMC 2691A, *U.S. Mann Corps Interior Guard Manual*, pp. 21-13 to 21-15, Unclassified.

rules was not clearly spelled out, there was some confusion surrounding it.

Lessons learned

When drafting the ROE, the command must ensure that the relationship between ROE and other rules is consistent and well thought-out, and that soldiers know that the ROE take precedence over all other rules governing the use of force. The latter can be done easily by stating so on the unclassified cards distributed to the soldiers.

Proportionate force

One of the largest ROE problems in Somalia concerned the use of proportionate force against low-level threats.

The ROE called for an incremental graduated response. But effective methods of defense short of deadly force were mostly non-existent. Somalis learned quickly that despite verbal warnings and shows of force, American soldiers would not shoot at children throwing rocks or swarming vehicles to steal things off of them. There were few means to counter such threats. The results were injuries to soldiers (some bad ones from thrown rocks), frustration, and inappropriate actions. Sometimes the soldiers responded. Soldiers fed-up with the situation would occasionally throw rocks back at the children. One soldier even developed a home-made cattle prod in case Somali children got too close to his truck.

Soldiers eventually discovered more appropriate remedies to the problem. Passive solutions included taking alternate driving routes, not driving during rush hour, and putting barbed wire around trucks to prevent Somalis from jumping up onto them. Active solutions included carrying tent pegs, batons, and sticks to beat off Somalis. Later, the ICS approved the use of cayenne pepper spray.

Lessons learned

Before an operation the command should give some thought to developing appropriate means to avoid low-level threats and deal with them proportionately. For example, batons might be made available

to those riding in trucks. Because soldiers will develop their own means as they discover what works and what doesn't, the command should explain what means are appropriate.

Cayenne pepper spray

Cayenne pepper spray was one means to help troops use proportionate force against low-level threats. As discussed above, troops were often faced with a choice between using nondeadly means of force (many of which were eventually ineffective) and using deadly force (which was often not appropriate). The use of cayenne pepper spray helped avoid this dilemma. In fact, it turned out to be an effective means of appropriately dealing with low-level threats. Merely waving an aerosol can in the air was said to ward off Somalis. It was a very effective deterrent because soldiers used it, and Somalis learned they would. Soldiers used it only when lesser measures of nondeadly force failed, however, and after visual and verbal warnings.²¹ Its approval did not change the ROE; it was merely another use of nondeadly force.

But there were three problems with the use of cayenne pepper spray. First, soldiers did not use it extensively because the command did not request approval for its use early, and was hesitant to widely disseminate it. Many officers first thought that they would not need the spray and felt it was politically sensitive and could have been misused. Therefore, the command requested approval to CENTCOM, who forwarded the request to JCS. The two staffs also had to develop procedures for its use.²² When it was finally approved, the command was cautious about disseminating it.

Second, the command had to give some briefings on use of the spray, which took time.

21. CJTF Somalia, 240733Z Feb 93, *UNITAF Somalia--Commander's Policy*

Guidance # 5 (Use of Cayenne Pepper Incapacitating Spray),
Unclassified.

22. USCINCCENT, 031800Z Feb 93, *USCENTCOM Review of Proposed Commander's Policy Guidance # 4 (Use of Cayenne Pepper Incapacitating Spray)*, Unclassified.

Third, some soldiers were hesitant to use deadly force, even when appropriate, due to the Article 32 cases; they were made more hesitant because cayenne pepper spray could be used as a *substitute* for deadly force. In one instance, a Somali attacked a soldier with a knife. Instead of shooting the Somali, the soldier used the spray. Although the spray worked and the Marine escaped unharmed, the Somali had tried to stab her four times before he was subdued with the spray. In this case, deadly force was clearly called for, but the Marines saw cayenne pepper spray as a *substitute* for deadly force instead of as a *complement*.

Lessons learned

The following lessons learned concern cayenne pepper spray:

- Obtain approval for the use of cayenne pepper spray before an operation, and disseminate this information during the operation if required.
- Hold briefings on its use before deployment.
- Ensure that soldiers are clear that the option to use the spray does not prohibit the use of deadly force.

Protection of weapons

One significant point of disagreement in Somalia was whether the ROE allowed the use of deadly force to protect weapons. For example, at one point the Army Component Commander put a statement in its Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) stating that troops should use deadly force to protect weapons:

ROE Clarification: Soldiers must protect themselves from harm as well as from theft of weapons and NVGs [night vision goggles]. Use of deadly force is authorized to prevent theft of weapons or NVGs.²³

23. ARFOR, *TF Mountain FRAGO 11 (Marka Operation) to OPORD 93-2 (Operation Restore Hope)*, Secret (The section on protection of weapons was declassified by the ARFOR Staff Judge Advocate).

This was not the last word on the use of deadly force. The JTF, not one of its components, had authority for a final decision. The JTF decided that deadly force could be used to protect weapons, but the decision was not disseminated

This situation raised three difficult issues. First, the decisions did not distinguish between two cases. In one, a Somali might steal a weapon and threaten a soldier with it on the spot. In such a case, deadly force could clearly be used under "hostile intent." But what if a Somali stole a gun that the soldier knew was not loaded, or stole a gun and was running away with it slung over his back? Could a soldier who was not immediately threatened shoot the Somali because that gun might one day be used against another soldier?

Second, what equipment was worth protecting? In a country like Somalia where there were so many guns, was it worth using deadly force to stop someone stealing a pistol? Or was it more important to stop a Somali stealing a dozen night vision goggles?

Third, if it was acceptable for a soldier to use deadly force to protect a weapon, why not disseminate that interpretation so every soldier knows the use of force in that case is appropriate? And why not make it mandatory under certain circumstances?

The Somali experience does not shed light on whether it is proper to use deadly force to protect weapons. As it turned out, there were no cases of soldiers using deadly force to protect weapons, so in Restore Hope this issue did not matter. But in future operations with a greater threat, this issue may be important to resolve ahead of time to prevent the confusion that existed in Somalia.

Lessons learned

Before an operation, the command should make a conscious decision about the use of deadly force to protect weapons, put it in the ROE, and disseminate it. Such a decision should clarify what weapons or equipment soldiers are to protect with deadly force, and under what circumstances.

ROE and weapons confiscation policy

There was confusion between weapons confiscation policy and ROE.²⁴ Weapons confiscation policy changed throughout the operation--ROE did not.

Weapons confiscation policy was designed to reduce the capability of factions and bandits to conduct attacks, and therefore to lower the general level of violence in the country. This policy dictated when a soldier *should* challenge and disarm a Somali. The command promulgated changes in weapons confiscation rules in Commander's Policy Guidances. According to the first Policy Guidance, soldiers could confiscate weapons after an encounter with Somalis, if weapons were left unattended, or within the guidelines of the ROE.²⁵ The third Policy Guidance called for the confiscation of almost any visible weapon.²⁶

The confusion between ROE and weapons confiscation policy had its roots in the part of the ROE that defined armed individuals as threats and stated that they could be challenged. This portion of the ROE did not say whether such individuals *should* be challenged, however. That decision was left to the Policy Guidances. In this case, the ROE was permissive, but not directive. The Policy Guidances were directive.

Lessons learned

It is important to coordinate ROE and weapons confiscation policy, and to distinguish between the two. ROE in other operations do not define anything as a threat and state what is permissive (but not directive). But these ROE sometimes issue different guidances during the

24. For information on weapons confiscation policy, see Col. F. Lorenz, USMC, *Weapons Confiscation Policy During Operation Restore Hope*, Unpublished Paper, August 1993, Unclassified.

25. CJTF Somalia, 240400Z Dec 92, *United Task Force Somalia--Commander's Policy Guidance #1 (Weapons Collection Procedures)*, Unclassified. CJTF Somalia disseminated these rules on simplified, unclassified sheets of paper. See *United Task Force Somalia Mogadishu Weapons Confiscation Rules*, Unclassified, 31 Dec 1992.

26. CJTF Somalia, 081200Z Jan 93, *UTF Somalia--Commander's Policy Guidance #3 (Weapons Confiscation and*

Disposition), Unclassified. The second Commander's Policy Guidance dealt with other topics.

operation as to what and who can be challenged. In future operations, if a disarmament policy changes, the command may want to issue different guidance during the operation, and not define threats in this manner in the ROE.

ROE in multinational operations

The last issue centers on ROE in multinational operations. UNITAF wanted to release U.S. ROE to coalition forces to coordinate ROE issues with them. CENTCOM developed a classified but releasable version that was given to the coalition forces.²⁷ UNITAF strongly urged the foreign commanders to adopt it. It appeared they did adopt it, probably for the following reasons:

- U.S. and coalition forces had similar concepts of the desirable strategy and the threats faced by their forces.
- Coalition commanders believed that a more restrictive ROE did not make sense because they partially attributed the failure of the first UN mission in Somalia to overly restrictive ROE.²⁸
- A more permissive ROE did not make sense due to the humanitarian nature of the mission.
- Coalition forces faced few national political constraints due to the relatively few casualties during the mission.
- Most militaries from smaller countries do not place as much emphasis--or thought--on ROE as the United States does, and are therefore willing to defer to the United States on this

27. U.S. Central Command, *Proposed Coalition Military Operations Peacetime Rules of Engagement (ROE)*, Secret.

28. It was not necessarily true that the failure of the previous UN force in Somalia was due to its restrictive ROE. The UN ROE was not restrictive. The problem was that the UN did not have enough forces to use the leeway granted in the ROE without fear of retribution. Nevertheless, most of the coalition officers--and the U.S. ones for that matter--still believed that the ROE was the

problem. On the UN ROE, see United Nations Security Council Resolution 751 (1992), paragraphs 26-29, Unclassified.

Lessons learned

If U.S. forces want to coordinate ROE with coalition forces, the United States must develop ROE that it can release to coalition forces.

Conclusions

This examination of Operation Restore Hope leads to several overall ROE lessons learned and sheds light on some other issues. But it is important to be wary of potentially misleading conclusions.

Overall ROE lessons learned

Overall lessons learned from the experience with ROE in Operation Restore Hope fall into three categories:

- ROE for humanitarian operations and similar low-intensity conflict missions should be reasonable, simple, and similar to the standing peacetime ROE.
- Dissemination of information is crucial in many areas--from the actual ROE (to U.S. and coalition forces) to rules on protection of weapons.
- It is important to consider ROE early when planning an operation to allow time for a variety of preparations, including printing unclassified ROE cards and gaining permission to use cayenne pepper spray.

Other issues

The Restore Hope experience does not simply offer lessons for military commanders in a crisis; it also sheds light on several other issues that are of increasing importance.

Peace-keeping

Although peace-keeping operations encompass much more than ROE, ROE issues are an important aspect of these missions and ROE lessons may apply to other aspects of these missions. First, some commentators have claimed that it is inappropriate to send regularly

trained soldiers (i.e., those trained to kill) into a situation where they will have to make split-second decisions on when to fire.²⁹ Instead, they maintain that the United States should send soldiers trained specifically for peace-keeping. But there were very few incidents of inappropriate actions by soldiers in Restore Hope. Although the operation does not prove that regularly trained soldiers are the most appropriate forces to send, it offers convincing evidence that sending them is not inappropriate. It showed that well-trained soldiers can make such split-second decisions using good judgment.

Second, the training required for peace-keeping missions may not be that intensive. Some contend that the training required for peacekeeping is significant, and that it will detract from combat training. With regard to ROE, the soldiers received little training, but it appeared to be enough.

Third, some contend that specific troops should be trained and earmarked for UN peace-keeping operations. Looking closely at Restore Hope gives one pause to come to such a conclusion. The forces used in the initial part of the operation were chosen because they were in the region already and had certain other skills.³⁰ It is uncertain whether forces specially trained for peace-keeping will be in the right place at the right time. Also, so many forces were used in Restore Hope--over 25,000--that the number the military would have to train for peace-keeping operations is very large.

Fourth, the Restore Hope ROE were fairly similar to law enforcement rules governing the use of force. The military may want to study how police develop and train using these rules.

29. Those with this view point to the Conde case. See, for example, Jim Hogland, "Prepared for Non-Combat," *The Washington Post*, 15 April 1993, p. 29.

30. The Special Purpose MAGTF was deployed in the region and possessed forcible-entry capabilities.

Recruitment

Much of the success of the ROE in Restore Hope was due *to* soldiers making split-second decisions. These soldiers were smart, well trained, and had an excellent knowledge of the ROE--many reciting them by heart, as well as understanding them fully. Clearly the emphasis on high-quality enlisted recruitment over the last decade contributed to the ability of these soldiers to handle the often-ambiguous situations in Somalia. As military budgets decrease, the military would be well-advised to consider such benefits of a quality force.

Potentially misleading lessons

Operation Restore Hope might be a precedent, but it will probably not be a textbook case for how ROE operate. There are several potentially misleading lessons that should not be taken away from the Restore Hope ROE experience.

The three overall lessons may be misleading because the Restore Hope ROE experience will probably not be repeated exactly. There may be new problems and some of the ones discussed in this paper may not be relevant. There was no negative impact of the strict controls on riot control agents (RCA), for example, because UNITAF did not confront many large threatening crowds. Potentially threatening Somalis were usually close and small in number, so they could be dealt with by the use of cayenne pepper spray or sticks. In other cases (such as rock throwers), Somalis were distant and/or vanished so quickly that RCA would have been ineffective and/or indiscriminate. If the threat were large crowds rioting or shielding gunmen, the military would have had to reconsider RCA regulations and standard operating procedures.

Moreover, although ROE problems were minor in Somalia, they may not be in other operations. They were minor in Somalia because the potential costs of soldiers overreacting (i.e., shooting when they should not) were small because there was little chance of the conflict escalating. The potential costs of soldiers underreacting (i.e., not shooting when they should) were also limited because there were relatively few threats to soldiers. ROE problems in Somalia were also small because, except for a few specific operations, multinational operations were coordinated, not combined. That is, the troops acted in different sectors so differences in "national" ROE were not as large a problem as might have been if operations were closer.

Finally, in future operations coalition forces may not agree so readily to U.S. ROE. The reasons that they did in Somalia may simply not be present in the future. There may be no clear lessons learned from a previous UN operation in the country. And coalition forces may have different concepts of strategy and threat, as well as large national political constraints imposed if there are significant casualties.

Appendix D. Interview Questions and Responses

July 25, 1995

Dear Sir or Ma'am:

Thank you for taking the time to help us validate the humanitarian assistance process for our thesis. With your consent, we will reference you as a source of information for the input you provide us. If you do not wish to have your name used, we will integrate the information and not be specific on the source. As per our conversation, we will call you at _____ on _____ to discuss the questions. If you prefer, you could fax or e-mail us the response to the questions in lieu of a phone call. Our fax # is (513)476-7988 or DSN 986-7988. Our e-mail addresses: bstansfi@afit.af.mil or rmsmith@afit.af.mil. If you choose to fax or e-mail the response to the questions, we would be grateful if you could respond by 1 August 1995. Any response to these questions is appreciated.

If you have any questions or comments, please feel free to call us at either (513)427-4618 or (513)879-5434. Thank you very much for your time.

Sincerely,

Barbara J. Stansfield, Maj, USA

Rhonda M. Smith, Capt, USAF

Questions for Chapter 4

Demographic information

1. Name
2. Position or Duty title
3. Number of years in that position
4. Location/telephone number/email address

Validating Questions

1. After viewing the attached chart on the proposed model for humanitarian assistance - do you agree that this is a valid model?
2. If this is not a valid model, what would you change to make it a valid model?
3. Are there any missing agencies which you think are key in the humanitarian process that we should add? At which level (strategic, operational, or tactical) should the agency or agencies be added?
4. Who has command and control of the country teams that initially evaluate disaster sites? Do they report to the ambassador in country?
5. Who is responsible at the CINC level to coordinate civil assistance programs and link them to disaster assistance missions?
6. Does the President of the United States task Department of Defense for humanitarian missions or does the Department of State?
7. Can you recommend anyone else who is knowledgeable in humanitarian operations that we could talk to?

Questions for Chapter 4

Demographic information

1. Name Steve Ingalsbe, Commander, USN
2. Position or Duty title Humanitarian Assistance Action Officer
3. Number of years in that position 4 yrs
4. Location/telephone number/email address Deputy State, PM/ISP (202) 647-4111

Validating Questions

1. After viewing the attached chart on the proposed model for humanitarian assistance - do you agree that this is a valid model? Yes, but request for assist come from multiple sources (UNCHR, WFP, ICRC, ETC.) Can't set in concrete the IWG which is formed-ad hoc in nature, although proposed PRD-50 sets guidance.
2. If this is not a valid model, what would you change to make it a valid model?
3. Are there any missing agencies which you think are key in the humanitarian process that we should add? At which level (strategic, operational, or tactical) should the agency or agencies be added?
4. Who has command and control of the country teams that initially evaluate disaster sites? Do they report to the ambassador in country?
5. Who is responsible at the CINC level to coordinate civil assistance programs and link them to disaster assistance missions?
6. Does the President of the United States task Department of Defense for humanitarian missions or does the Department of State? Depends on what level. Deployment of troops comes from NCA. Provision of expendables and transportation comes from using legislative authorities in place.
7. Can you recommend anyone else who is knowledgeable in humanitarian operations that we could talk to?

Liz Lukasavich from USAID (202) 647-7435. The RAND Corp. also has Jennifer Taw doing a study using case studies on interagency processes during HA. I don't know the number, but you can probably get it through the DESOPS for the Army.

Proposed flow chart for humanitarian assistance operations

Strategic level

1. Disaster occurs or CINC evaluates the region and determines there is a need for assistance. US ambassador is informed or asked by affected nation for assistance.
2. Request for assistance sent to the President of the United States, who informs the National Security Council and directs US Agency for International Development (USAID) to collect information and give recommendations. *Request can go to SecS from Amb.*
ADMINISTRATOR *→ depends - could be DoS*
3. USAID chief is the President's Special Coordinator who forms Interagency Working Groups from the key players represented in the National Security Council, from cabinet level members, and from country teams to collect information on the situation and suggest courses of action. *IWG'S ARE GENERALLY*
4. Special Coordinator makes recommendations to the President. *DDHOC - USAID might convene, but sometimes chaired*
5. President decides to send military forces to relieve further loss of life or property. *by SECSTATE or NSC*
6. The Department of Defense through the Joint Chief of Staff is tasked to provide assistance.

Operational level

7. CINC of affected region officially designated and begins planning and evaluating the situation.
8. Coordination and liaison contacts are made between the CINC and OFDA. In addition, contact is made with the UN if any coalition forces are going to respond to the disaster as well.
9. CINC gathers information from the HAST, LOC, HACC and decides appropriate course of action to respond to the situation.

POSSIBLY SENDS AN ASSESSMENT TEAM - preferably interagency

Tactical level

10. CINC forms a Joint Task Force to provide humanitarian assistance.
11. JTF begins assessment and force structure planning.
12. JTF staff coordinates responsibilities and relief efforts with the NGO/PVO/IOs.
13. Military units deploy to the disaster site and begin relief operations.

Capt Smith-

I couldn't get through calling you so I am going to quickly type you out a short response. My CAPT didn't get a chance to look at it (she does Bosnia issues so she is pretty busy as you could imagine) so I will have to give you my comments. I am not qualified to answer all but I will do what I can.

Demographic Information

1. Joanna Barone
2. Action Officer, International Logistics and Engineering Division, J4, Joint Staff
3. 1 year
4. Pentagon, rm 2D836, (703)614-2631, DSN 224-2631

Validating Questions

1. I agree that it is a valid model. However I feel that the title should be changed. What you are describing is a model for Foreign Disaster Relief and not humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian Assistance includes a whole variety of programs that includes Foreign Disaster Relief but also assistance that does not require a presidential declaration. We often give away excess non-lethal property, conduct training engineering and medical missions, and transport material that is all considered humanitarian assistance.

6. Department of State is responsible for requesting foreign disaster relief from DoD.

7. Richard Ragan from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs (HRA) is the FDR guru. His phone number is (703)614-0022.

I am sorry that I couldn't give you more. It is obvious that you have done a great deal of research and put alot of time into this model. Actually it was very informative for me. It is very confusing at times just to learn the flow throughout the Joint Staff and OSD let alone all the other places it must go.

If you feel that you need more please let me know. Otherwise, good luck with your thesis, I am sure that we would all like to see the final product for our own references.

Sincerely-

Joanna Barone
Joanna Barone

To: Capt. Rhonda Smith

From: LTC Stephen Wallace

Subject: Reference Request for Information (HA) Fax dated 07/25/95.

1. Information provided is based upon consensus of joint working groups and research used to develop JP 3-07.6 (currently in draft).

2. The following information is provided below:

Demographic information

Name. LTC Stephen O. Wallace

Position or duty title. Civil Affairs Staff Officer, Center for Low Intensity Conflict

Number of years in that position. 2

Location. Langley AFB VA, DSN 574-2630

Question #1&2

I believe the model is valid with the exception of perhaps the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) that may or may not be formed during operations. I am also faxing copies of what we believe to be valid at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Question # 3.

Refer to charts referenced in question 1&2 above.

Question # 4

Each embassy or USAID mission should have a Mission Disaster Response Officer (MDRO) responsible for disaster planning and management, and maintaining the Mission Disaster Response Plan (MDRP). The MDRO, a member of the Country Team, serves as the focal point for USG agencies responding to a disaster. In some cases, the Ambassador serves in this capacity. The CINC maintains command and control of teams of initial response teams, however, the Ambassador is the President's primary representative within the country and all activities will be coordinated with the Ambassador.

Question #5.

J-3 & J-5 (Policy)

Question #6

The President of the United States through the NSC. The NSC is the principal forum that considers and discusses courses of action regarding these matters and makes subsequent recommendations to the President. The NSC have the constitutional authority to direct the Armed Forces of the United States to conduct HA. This direction is given through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Question #7

LTC (P) Jim Powers
USAJFKSWCS, DOTD, CA
DSN. 239-1654
COMM. (910) 432-1654

COL Joe Stager
USSOCOM J-5
SOJ5-0 (Policy)
MacDill AFB, FL 33621
DSN. 542-1547
COMM. (919) 968-3257

3 Hope that the information is helpful. Good luck on your paper.

Regards,
LTC Wallace




Figure II-4. Coordination at the Strategic Level.

- 1
- 2
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- 4
- 5
- 6 3. Operational Level. Military and civilian agencies at the operational level develop
- 7 NCA policy and guidance into mission statements, implied tasks, and plans of action.
- 8 The CINC, supported by a joint staff, has the critical task of developing the HA military
- 9 mission statement. This mission statement should be clear, and identify results that are
- 10 achievable in a short duration operation. The CINC normally coordinates the mission




Figure II-5 Coordination at the Operational Level.

within the crisis action team, the following organizations may be designated to accomplish specific responsibilities.

- (a) Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC). The supported CINC may establish a HACC to assist with interagency coordination and

(c) Joint Information Bureau (JIB). The JIB is the focal point for the interface between the military and the media. The JIB serves to provide the news media with timely and accurate information on command issues.

(d) Joint Movement Center (JMC). The JMC coordinates the employment of all means of transportation supporting the CJTF's concept of the operation. The JMC serves as the primary interface with the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) to monitor and effect changes to the deployment of forces and material.

(4) Coordination at the tactical level is illustrated in Figure III-2.

3. Humanitarian Operations Center. The HOC coordinates the overall relief strategy, identifies logistics requirements for NGOs, PVOs, UN, and IOs; and identifies, prioritizes, and submits requests for military support to the JTF through the CMOC. *The HOC is primarily an interagency policymaking and coordinating body that does not exercise command and control but seeks to achieve unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign HA operation.* Close JTF coordination with the affected country, UN, and other key members of the humanitarian relief community forms the core of foreign HA operations. Effective coordination is the key to successful turnover of foreign HA responsibilities to the affected country or UN, NGOs, PVOs, and IOs. During large scale foreign HA operations, a HOC may be established to accomplish this coordination. The country affected by a disaster and in need of HA will normally have a ministry designated as the senior point of coordination for all HA activities. Ministries involved could include the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defense, or an emergency

1 management office within a ministry. These ministries will establish the priority needs
2 for their country and solicit assistance bilaterally or through the UN for international
3 assistance from donor countries and relief organizations. In a failed state situation
4 such as Somalia or Rwanda, the UN has the responsibility to establish overall
5 coordination of the HA effort. The more representation of the various relief agencies
6 and donor countries at the HOC, the more coordinated the HA efforts will be. The HOC
7 should consist of representatives from the affected country, the US Embassy or
8 Consulate, JTF (most likely from the CMOC), OFDA, UN, NGOs, PVOs, IOs, and other
9 major players in the operation. The structure of a HOC can be formal or informal.
10 HOCs may have political significance and authority when directed by the affected
11 country, or may be less formal if established by the UN. The HOC is normally
12 collocated with the appropriate lead or UN headquarters conducting the operation.

13

14 a. Although the functions of the HOC and CMOC are similar, there is a significant
15 difference. The CMOC is established by and works for the CJTF. The HOC is
16 normally established under the direction of the government of the affected country or
17 the UN, or possibly OFDA during a US unilateral operation. HOCs, especially those
18 established by the UN, are horizontally structured organizations with no command or
19 control authority, where all members are ultimately responsible to their own
20 organizations or countries.

21

22 b. HOCs may establish working groups and committees based on the HA situation.
23 These groups and committees discuss and resolve issues including relief material
24 prioritization, medical, sanitation, health, etc.

25

c. The UN may establish a structure called the On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) as a support organization to a HOC. The OSOCC assists in gathering, evaluating, collating and disseminating HOC information. The OSOCC may also provide facilitation services for HOC meetings.





Figure III-2. Coordination at the Tactical Level



Agency for International Development
Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)

DATE: 8/3/95

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING
THIS COVER SHEET: 5

PLEASE DELIVER THIS FAX TO

THIS FAX IS FROM

Name: CPT. RHONDA SMITH

Office: AFIT / WPAEB

Telephone:

Fax: (513) 476-7988

Name: Liz Lukasavich

Office: OFDA

Telephone: (202) 647-7435

Fax: (202) 647-5269

NOTE:

CPT. SMITH: The organigram you asked us to review is not representative of the humanitarian assistance process. I've attached several pages from the draft JTP for Foreign HA Ops, 3-07.6. LTC. Steve Wallace is the writing team leader for this joint pub based at the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley Air Force Base, Langley, Va. He can be reached at (804) 764-2630. His fax # is (804) 764-4595.

FOR COORDINATION PURPOSES ONLY

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24 April 1995




Figure II-4. Interagency Coordination at the Strategic Level.

- 1
- 2
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- 4
- 5 3. Operational Level. Military and civilian agencies at the operational level develop
- 6 NCA policy and guidance into mission statements, implied tasks, and plans of action.
- 7 The CINC, supported by a joint staff, has the critical task of developing the HA military
- 8 mission statement. This mission statement should be clear, and identify results that are
- 9 achievable in a short duration operation. The CINC normally coordinates the mission
- 10 statement with the IWG. Key considerations in developing the mission statement
- 11 include the military role in assisting NGOs, PVOs, and IOs, as well as security practices
- 12 and policies. Interagency cooperation, coordination, and connectivity at the operational
- 13 level will better enable key organizations to orchestrate the total HA effort. Key

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- 1 organizations or elements may include the HN government, DOS country team, CINC,
2 foreign military forces, NGOs, PVOs, IOs, and USG agencies, particularly OFDA.

3

- 4 a. Roles and Responsibilities. At the operational level the following entities may
5 impact on the execution of the HA mission, as depicted in Figure II-5.

6

7




Figure II-5. Operational Level Connectivity.

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


Figure III-2. Example of a Joint Level CMOC.

(6) Other Organizations. Efficient coordination and management of special functions conserves JTF resources by reducing duplication of effort. Examples of organizations that may be established to accomplish these special functions during HA operations include the following:[add a short description of each]

(a) Joint Forces Communications Center (JFCC).

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


Figure III-3. JTF Coordination Requirements.

3. Special Operations Forces (SOF). SOF assets assigned to the JTF during HA operations will most likely include CA, psychological operations (PSYOP), and other SOF. The CJTF can organize SOF assets into several different organizations, the JPOTF, JSOTF, and JCMOTF. [explain briefly these three organizations] There are several reasons why SOF are well suited to HA operations. They are adaptable and can operate effectively in austere environments typical of HA efforts. They can deploy rapidly, have excellent communications equipment, and are proficient in working with indigenous ethnic groups. Perhaps the most important capability found within SOF is the ability to work with civilian populations.

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Wallace, Lt Col Stephen O. Civil Affairs Staff Officer, Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley AFB VA. Personal Correspondence. 25 July 1995.

Smith Vita

Captain Rhonda M. Smith is from Pierre, South Dakota. She graduated from Augustana College in 1988 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Business Administration. After receiving her commission into the United States Air Force through the Officers Training School in 1989, Captain Smith was assigned to the 379 Bombardment Wing at Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan.

In 1990, she completed both the Supply Officers Training Course and the Fuels Officer Training Course. Upon completion of the courses, she returned to Wurtsmith where she served as Base Fuels Officer.

In 1992, she was assigned to Kadena AB, Japan, where she served two years as the 18 Supply Squadron Material Storage and Distribution Flight Commander. After completing her tour in Japan, Capt Smith entered the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson AFB in May 1994 and graduated with a Masters degree in Logistics Management in September 1995. Her follow-on assignment was to Charleston AFB, South Carolina.

Permanent Address: 822 Rice Avenue
Gregory, SD 57533

Stansfield Vita

Major Barbara Stansfield is originally from Pennsylvania, but grew up in Northern Ohio. She was commissioned in the Army in 1983 through the ROTC program at Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green , Ohio. After receiving a Bachelor of Science Degree in Environmental Health, Major Stansfield attended her Officer Basic Course in San Antonio, Texas.

Her first military assignment was as medical platoon leader, 4th Medical Battalion, Ft. Carson Colorado. After being promoted to Captain in May 1987, Major Stansfield's next assignment was as Division Medical Supply Officer, 704th Support Battalion, Ft. Carson, Colorado.

In January 1988 Major Stansfield attended the Army Medical Department Officer Advance Course and was subsequently assigned as Company Commander, 47th Combat Support Hospital, Ft. Lewis, Washington.

In June 1990 Major Stansfield was assigned to Logistics Division, Tripler Army Medical Center, Hawaii where she was responsible for coordinating medical equipment purchases for the hospital.

In September, 1995, Major Stansfield received her Master of Science Degree in Acquisition-Logistics Management from the Air Force Institute of Technology and was assigned to the United States Army Medical Materiel Command, Europe.

Permanent Address: 50 Parsons Street
Norwalk, OH 44857

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE PROCESS OF PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: A DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Rhonda M. Smith, Captain, USAF Barbara J. Stansfield, Major, USA				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Air Force Institute of Technology, WPAFB OH 45433-7765			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER AFIT/GIM/LAL/95S-5	
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12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This research effort was a qualitative study on the current process of how the DOD provides humanitarian assistance. Currently the process is not well defined and is situation dependent. Historical documents and current guidelines, policies, and regulations were researched for information on what types of humanitarian assistance the DOD provides, how the process is initiated, and who is involved in the process. Agencies outside of the military, both civilian and government were researched to determine the extent of coordination necessary for the military to provide humanitarian assistance. A model was compiled to portray the current process and given to key personnel identified in the research as subject matter experts. Subsequently, their opinion was used to determine the validity of the model and gather additional points of contact for future research. Once the process and key players were defined, additional research can be started to further determine the effectiveness of using the DOD to provide humanitarian aid.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Humanitarian Assistance, Low Intensity Conflict, Military Operations Other Than War, Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Aid, Humanitarian Missions, Disaster Relief.			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 152	
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