


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IN THE LINE OF FIRE - PEACEKEEPING IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS by
MAJ Jeffery S. Bess, USA, 65 pages.


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The monograph first examines the historical background of the area since the 1967 War. Based on this examination and on lessons learned from previous UN and other multinational peacekeeping operations, the monograph addresses national composition of the force, command of the peacekeeping force, and force structure. Next, based on the military and political aspects of the region, the monograph addresses the future peacekeeping force commander's concerns with military credibility, freedom of movement, and force protection.

The study concludes with a summary evaluation of the necessary size and type of force for future peacekeeping in the Golan Heights. Based on the assumption and an analysis of the political and military considerations, future peacekeeping operations in the Golan Heights would require a MFO type force under the command and control of the United States. Due to the essential requirement for force protection due to the potential of preemption by either Israel or Syria and of terrorist attacks, a heavy brigade would be the most effective force in maintaining the peace while protecting the force.

IN THE LINE OF FIRE - PEACEKEEPING IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

A Monograph
By
Major Jeffery S. Bess
Infantry



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School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
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I. INTRODUCTION

"The possibility of an accommodation - a limited Israeli withdrawal in exchange for peacekeeping arrangements and political concessions - is now at least visible over a distant horizon."¹

The Golan Heights has been an obstacle to peace between Israel and Syria ever since Israel seized the territory in the 1967 war. Israel and Syria also engaged in battle over the Golan Heights during the 1973 war. Israel contends that it will give up the Golan Heights after Syria guarantees peace with Israel. Syria contends that it will guarantee peace after Israel gives up the Golan Heights.

The diplomatic maneuvering between the two nations has been constant. Recent negotiations have increased the possibility of an agreement between these two nations. In order to be acceptable to both sides, such an agreement would almost certainly necessitate the establishment of a peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights.

Peace in the Middle East is in the national interest of the United States.² The United States has

been an ally of Israel and has guaranteed Israel's security. Israel sees American participation as crucial to any peacekeeping operation involving itself. Syria does not have the same view, but understands the value of the United States being a contributor to a peacekeeping force in the Middle East peace process.

In its current National Security Strategy the U.S. has stated that it is willing to participate in peacekeeping operations.³ This willingness, combined with the high probability that a peacekeeping force will be established in the Golan Heights, dictates that there be an analysis of the considerations involved in conducting peacekeeping operations in the Golan Heights. Some of the factors involved in such operations are the type of operation, command and control, and force structure. These factors have a major impact on credibility, freedom of movement, and force protection. The operational level commander, who is the peacekeeping force commander, needs to be aware of these concerns so as to ensure success in maintaining the peace and supporting the diplomatic efforts of the United States.

The main assumption of this monograph is that Israel and Syria have reached an agreement concerning the Golan Heights and that the United States is going to commit forces to a peacekeeping operation. Based on this assumption, a study of the considerations involved in maintaining a peacekeeping force between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights is essential. The past relationship between Israel and Syria and current doctrine for peacekeeping operations will provide the information necessary to study all aspects of command, force structure, and force protection.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

"The Golan Heights became an issue only after its occupation by Israel in 1967 and its reoccupation in 1973..."⁴

A. 1967 War

The Arab-Israeli conflict has dominated the politics of the Middle East since Israel became a state in 1948. Between 1948 and 1967, military and diplomatic confrontations between the Arabs and Israelis were commonplace. These confrontations and increased Arab-Israeli tension during the early part of 1967 set the stage for the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

The crisis intensified in May 1967 when the Egyptian government inexplicably requested that all UN forces be withdrawn from the Sinai and Gaza.⁵ The UN initially declined this request; nevertheless by 18 May 1967 the Egyptian military had forced the UN troops out of their positions. That night, the Secretary-General ordered the withdrawal of the UN troops.⁶

Another major cause of the 1967 War was a disagreement over Israeli rights of passage through the Tiran Straits. President Nasser of Egypt declared on

28 May 1967 that the Tiran Straits were Egyptian territorial waters and that Egypt would exercise sovereign rights over these straits.⁷ As a result, Egypt denied Israel rights of passage; thereby creating serious economic problems in Israel. Simultaneously, Arab nations began to concentrate military forces on their borders; Israel viewed this concentration of forces as a major threat.

"A threat to Israel's shipping and access to the East was one thing: the direct and deadly threat of an Arab military build-up along her borders was another."⁸

Israel believed that the Arab nations were threatening its very existence and consequently it decided to take preemptive action. The Israelis believed that Egypt posed the greatest threat to Israeli security. Egypt had most of its armed forces in the Sinai while Syria occupied the Golan Heights area with five infantry brigades, two armored brigades, and two mechanized brigades.⁹

"The plan was to maintain a defensive posture on the Syrian and Jordan fronts, thus enabling the greater part of Israel's army to be free for the battle royal in the Sinai arena."¹⁰

Israel executed its plan of preemption by attacking on 5 June 1967 into the Sinai and the West Bank (Maps 1 and 2). The attack began with devastating air strikes followed by a major ground offensive. On 6 June 1967, Syria initiated hostilities by bombarding Israeli settlements and positions from the Golan Heights (Map 3). Due to the advantageous position of the Syrian forces in the heights, the Israelis could not observe where the firing was coming from except by air.¹¹ As a result, Israel attacked and seized the Golan Heights.

The 1967 War was a major victory for Israel. At the end of six days of hostilities, Israel was in possession of the following large areas of enemy territory: The Sinai Peninsula (which included the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and western shores of the Tiran Straits), the West Bank, the city of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Moreover, Israel was in a position to occupy the Suez Canal, Amman, and Damascus but chose not to continue hostilities.¹² As a small country with vulnerable borders these new territories provided Israel with a buffer zone to strengthen its security. Israel was in a very

advantageous position and the Arab countries were scrambling to replace their losses and reestablish their military credibility within the Middle East.

B. 1973 War

Between the 1967 and 1973 wars, the situation remained tense. Arab nations were rebuilding their armed forces; they took particular care to acquire better air defense assets. For many Arab leaders, internal political pressures created the need to salvage their national honor by regaining the territories lost in the 1967 War. Israel, as a result of its overwhelming victory, had become complacent.¹³

Still bitter after their 1967 defeat, Arab forces attacked Israel on 6 October 1973. This time, the Arab forces were able to achieve surprise. Israel had minimal manning on fortifications and a low state of alert due to the fact that it was Yom Kippur.¹⁴

Egypt attacked with two armies; one north of Great Bitter Lake and one south of it. Syria attacked with three mechanized divisions followed by two armored divisions, two tank brigades, and one mechanized

brigade.¹⁵ At first, these large scale offensives were successful. Israeli pilots did not initially have the success they had achieved during the 1967 War because of improved Arab air defenses. The Israeli Air Force, through interdiction, delayed Arab forces as the Israeli Army moved into position.

Israel had lost some of the territory it was relying on as a buffer zone. The Egyptians had crossed the Suez Canal and more importantly the Syrians were again in possession of the Golan Heights which raised fears of Syrian bombardment from the Golan Heights into Israel.¹⁶ Simply to stop the Arab offensive and prevent any further loss of terrain was unacceptable to the Israelis:

"Acceptance of any form of [the] status quo was never considered by the Israeli command. Israel might be able to tolerate the Egyptian presence on the edge of the Sinai, but the Syrians had to be dislodged from the strategic Golan Heights."¹⁷

Israeli forces stopped the enemy advance and on 10 October counterattacked in the Golan Heights. The counterattack was extremely successful and within days the Israelis reached within 35 kilometers of Damascus. In the Sinai, Israel counterattacked across the Suez

Canal on 15 October and cut off the Egyptian Third Army.¹⁸ At the end of 1973 War, Israel had regained the Golan Heights and there was a virtual stalemate in the Sinai.

C. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

The UNDOF was established after the 1973 War as a result of the continual conflict and the lack of a peace treaty between Israel and Syria. One key aspect of the UNDOF is the buffer zone that is in place today between the Israeli and Syrian forces. It is .5 to 8 kilometers wide and has three limitation zones of 10, 20, and 25 kilometers. In the 10 kilometer zone, each country is limited to two brigades of no more than 6000 men, 75 tanks, and 36 pieces of short-range artillery. In the 20 kilometer zone, each country can maintain 162 artillery pieces not exceeding 20 kilometers in range and 450 tanks. No surface to air missiles are allowed within 25 kilometers of the buffer zone.¹⁹

In order to accomplish its assigned tasks, UNDOF forces (two infantry battalions and observers) maintain various observation posts and a quick reaction force. The tasks include monitoring the buffer zone to confirm

the absence of all non-UN military forces and inspecting the zones of limitation.²⁰

Even though UNDOF has been a success to date, it has had major difficulties in carrying out its mission. The observation posts are equipped only with large binoculars and there is no radar or night vision equipment. As a result, good visibility is required to carry out observation and 24 hour surveillance is not possible. The quick reaction forces lack deterrent capability because they are not equipped to deal with a significant threat from the Syrian or Israeli forces.²¹

Another major problem for UNDOF forces is the lack of freedom of maneuver. The UN has reported that both Israel and Syria have at times denied full freedom of movement for UN forces carrying out their duties.²² This lack of freedom prevents UNDOF from verifying that military forces and equipment have not been introduced into the limitation zones.

III. NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

*"...peace-keepers are only as strong as their weakest link, since it is against weak spots that violent acts are always directed."*²³

Maintaining an effective peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights after Israel has given up this area will be a difficult mission. There are many options available for building this force. Deciding the question of whether or not to have a unilateral or multilateral operation will be critical in determining the composition of the peacekeeping force. An additional question will be whether the force should be under the auspices of the UN or of a MFO type force such as the one in the Sinai.

The United States is the world's only remaining superpower and consequently possesses enormous political leverage. The military capability of the U.S. to act unilaterally is not questioned by anyone in the world community. Since the U.S. has not conducted many peacekeeping operations in the past, it is possible that other nations would view unilateral U.S. intervention as a strong statement for peace in the Middle East. However, unilateral action would also

cause many nations to question the neutrality of the U.S.

The issue of neutrality is one of the most important characteristics of peacekeeping operations. Neutrality is a hallmark of peacekeepers and therefore they must conduct operations in a manner fair to both sides.²⁴ Other nations will always view a global power that conducts a peacekeeping operation with suspicion.

"Put differently, a global power cannot, for the most part, be regarded as neutral and impartial in a given conflict, and for a peacekeeping operation to be successful some degree of impartiality is essential."²⁵

The ability of the U.S. to be a neutral peacekeeper is debatable due to its past support of Israel. The U.S. has always been a strong ally of Israel and is a guarantor of Israeli security. In Israel, the U.S. is considered a friend regardless of which political party is in power.²⁶ This strong relationship will raise concerns in Arab nations concerning U.S. neutrality. However, the U.S. does not consider questions of neutrality and of consent of the belligerents as insurmountable obstacles to a

successful peacekeeping operation.²⁷ On the contrary, the U.S. feels that these obstacles can be overcome.

The USS Liberty incident during the 1967 War provides an excellent example of the problems of maintaining neutrality in a tense situation:

"On June 8, in an attack lasting three hours, using bombs, napalm, machine guns and rockets, Israel devastated the U.S. vessel, flying an oversized American flag, leaving 34 dead and 171 wounded. The next day Israel invaded Syria and in two days achieved its goal of occupying the Golan Heights."²⁸

Israel was concerned that this ship could monitor its communications and pass intelligence to its enemies. This concern for the security of their communications led Israel to attack the vessel. In the end, Israel convinced the United States that the bombing was due to an error in identification.²⁹ However, this incident clearly shows the inherent dangers of operating in the region.

Since its foundation in 1945, the UN has conducted many peacekeeping operations around the world. Even though the UN has had some successes such as UNDOF, there are difficulties in conducting multilateral operations. For example, UN forces have been in Cyprus

since 1964; and while this peacekeeping force has been able, for the most part, to prevent violence, no long-term solution has emerged to the Greek-Turkish clash over Cyprus.³⁰ Analyses of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia and of the United Nations Operation in Somalia have shown weaknesses in the lack of detailed planning, fragmentation of the planning process, limits on UN information gathering, and a lack of contingency planning.³¹ Within the Middle East, the UN has conducted a number of operations to include the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), UNEF II, and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). As a result of the UNIFIL operation, the U.S. has expressed doubts about the command structure of UN peacekeeping forces; a major point of contention for the U.S. is that the UN did not name an overall commander.³² The United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) has also had mixed results.

"As long as the parties adhered to the cease-fire agreements, the presence of military observers lessened the tension and maintained the peace, but UNTSO could not prevent or stop the war of attrition which broke out in the Suez Canal zone in the spring of 1969. When the real war started again in October 1973, UNTSO's observation posts were overrun by attacking Egyptian and Syrian troops."³³

Logistics is another difficult problem that the UN has had in conducting peacekeeping operations. The UN logistics system has been criticized for lacking a procurement agency, an integrated logistics system that can be rapidly established, and a logistics staff that can be deployed quickly.³⁴ The U.S. has the greatest logistical capability in the world. Unless the U.S. provides logistical support such as strategic lift, the UN will have great difficulty in supporting peacekeeping operations.

Non-UN peacekeeping operations have also had mixed results. For example, MNF II in Lebanon in 1982-1984 was not successful in ending the Lebanese Civil War. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) operation in the Sinai has also encountered difficulties. Therefore, a non-UN peacekeeping force would not solve all the problems of a UN force; in particular, many nations would not view a MFO in the Golan Heights as an impartial a force unless it was under UN control. However, due to the difficulties of conducting UN operations and the political context of the region a MFO in the Golan Heights would be more effective than a UN sponsored operation.

Adequate political support for a peacekeeping operation is essential.³⁵ A UN operation would be subject to political maneuvering within the Security Council. Israel distrusts the UN because they believe the UN is too politicized. One of the reasons that the MFO in the Sinai has been successful is that "it fit into the political and security needs of the key parties involved."³⁶

For Israel, any peacekeeping operation involving the security of Israel must include the United States.

"That the MFO was established by an American initiative and that it includes American military units appears to be helpful in keeping the Israeli/Egyptian peace treaty intact because such a force has *much* more credibility in Israel's eyes than a United Nations force would have, given the *deep* suspicion with which Israel views the United Nations."³⁷

Conversely, "Syria would prefer a U.N. to an autonomous multinational force dominated by the United States"³⁸; principally due to the past support of Israel by the U.S.

To ensure neutrality in its peacekeeping operations, the UN has usually established multinational forces using third parties. "In some cases, the selection of units for a peacekeeping force

is determined more by political than by performance considerations."³⁹ Given Israeli suspicion of the UN due to the failure of UN peacekeeping forces such as UNEF I and UNIFIL to protect their security, it is most unlikely that Israel would accept such a UN force.

A unilateral force would almost eliminate command, control, and logistical issues but would not have nearly as much political credibility as a multinational force. Arab nations in the Middle East would not support a unilateral operation and thus the U.S. would be in a politically risky situation at best. Without providing an impartial presence through a multinational effort, the U.S. would become very susceptible to terrorists acts. The media would exponentially magnify the impact of such terroristic actions by giving enormous publicity to these actions and thereby leading many in the U.S. to urge that the force be withdrawn.

The most effective type of operation for the Golan Heights would be a MFO type operation involving the United States. A unilateral operation by the U.S. or any other nation would not have the political backing

necessary. A UN operation might provide a greater degree of impartiality; however:

"...impartiality and the use of force solely for self defense are prerequisites, but more is expected. The quality of the communications, command, and control system may constitute a primary operational imperative, as well as discipline, professionalism, and inferred respect by the disputants for the peacekeepers' combat capability and physical fitness."⁴⁰

Most individual nations foster these factors in their professional armies. A UN peacekeeping force would lack these characteristics.⁴¹ A MFO type operation with U.S. participation is necessary for any chance of a successful peacekeeping operation in the Golan Heights. The U.S., as the only superpower and in possession of the strongest armed forces, would have the inferred respect of the disputants.

IV. COMMAND OF THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE

"However, under no circumstance will the President ever relinquish his command authority over U.S. Forces."⁴²

At the heart of any peacekeeping operation is the question of command and control. There is a marked difference between the U.S. and the UN concerning command philosophies. The resolution of this difference is critical for establishing a peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights.

The Secretary-General of the UN has made his views very clear concerning command of peacekeeping forces. Boutros Boutros-Ghali has stated that one of the conditions for success in peacekeeping operations is effective UN command at the UN Headquarters and in the field. He further states that peacekeeping forces authorized by the Security Council should be under the command of the Secretary-General.⁴³ Others in the world community support this view. For example, Gustav Hagglund, a Finnish general who is very familiar with peacekeeping operations, believes that a peacekeeping force's home government should not have any authority over operational matters and that these matters should

be under the direction of the Secretary-General.⁴⁴

This sort of tight command and control over peacekeeping forces by the Secretary-General is obviously in contradiction with the U.S. view of command and control.

The latest U.S. Army doctrine for peacekeeping operations clearly addresses the issue of command.

"The chain of command, from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field, remains inviolate."⁴⁵

The National Security Strategy and U.S. Army doctrine make it clear that no one other than a U.S. officer will command U.S. forces.

In the area of operational control, there are varying opinions. One opinion is that by giving up operational control the U.S. is weakening its command authority. Another opinion is that the President retains command authority over deployed forces because the U.S. has veto power in the Security Council; and therefore the U.S. could participate in a peacekeeping operation led by another nation.⁴⁶

However, simply having veto authority in the Security Council is not sufficient to protect the broad range of U.S. interests in the Middle East. Additionally, there currently is no central command capability at UN headquarters which would enable it to maintain strong control in the field.⁴⁷ Not only does the U.S. have the strongest logistics capability in the world, it also has one of the best military command and control structures. Israel has stated that any peacekeeping operation involving the security of Israel must have strong U.S. participation. Consequently, a peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights must be under the command and control of the U.S.

The commander of a peacekeeping force has just as many diplomatic concerns as military concerns. One of the most important qualifications for such a commander is political awareness.⁴⁸ Specifically, it is critical to be aware both of the political situation between the belligerents and of the politics of the forces that make up the peacekeeping force.

One major problem that the force commander can expect is that contributing nations will insist that

their forces adhere to their national policies rather than to the mandate of the peacekeeping force.⁴⁹

"The problem for the force commander is to preventing national scruples from impinging on the collective ethos of the force."⁵⁰

A commander must understand each nation's political motivation for contributing to the peacekeeping operation and thus employ the forces in such a way as to prevent the sort of political tension between contingents that could jeopardize the overall peacekeeping operation.

The use of force is the most critical decision any commander has to make. In peacekeeping operations, the problem is magnified. Understanding the political makeup of your force, as discussed in the previous paragraph, will allow to the commander to determine under what conditions each of the units of the force will engage in combat actions. The U.S. recognizes that each national contingent commander has the right to decide whether to commit his forces to combat.⁵¹ The U.S. reserves this right just as many other nations do. The use of force could lead to a breakdown in the political framework of the peacekeeping force and could thereby jeopardize the entire operation:

"The need to employ force may begin a cycle of increasing violence; therefore, commanders must be judicious in employing forceful measures and must understand the relationship between force and the desired end state."⁵²

A MFO operation in the Golan Heights under the command of the U.S. will require particular political astuteness on the part of the force commander. The geography of the area and the combatants involved are very different from other peacekeeping operations. These factors, combined with the importance of force protection, will determine what type of force is necessary to maintain the peace in the Golan Heights.

V. SIZE AND TYPE OF FORCE

"Let's say something does go wrong. What's the real role then of the American Forces? And if you're talking about a battalion of light infantry, I mean it's nice to have them there as a marker. But does that then imply that we provide massive reinforcement? Or does that then imply that if the Syrian tanks roll by, we wave?'..."⁵³

Regardless of how peacekeeping is defined, either by the UN or the U.S., the mission for the force commander is to keep the peace.

"The peacekeepers have as a primary mission, after all, the facilitation of a peace process by keeping the former combatants apart."⁵⁴

In order to keep the peace, he must have a force structure that can guarantee the security of the combatants as well as provide for force protection. Not only does political agreement have to exist for the peacekeeping mission, but there also has to be a credible force in terms of military strength that can deter the combatants from conducting combat actions against each other; and the political leadership must convince the combatants of its willingness to use force to maintain the peace.

"Initially, the peacekeeping force concerns itself only with the active, armed parties in conflict. The force deals with these parties by putting themselves in between them and, by

their presence alone, trying to prevent combat activity between the two."⁵⁵

In the Sinai, the MFO has the appropriate force structure based on all aspects of the operation such as terrain and the potential for combat between the combatants. To this day, the MFO has maintained the peace. However, the Golan Heights is quite different from the Sinai and a peacekeeping operation after Israel has given up the terrain dictates a stronger peacekeeping force.

The Golan Heights is not a very large area. It is approximately 70 kilometers long (north-south) and anywhere from 5 to 25 kilometers wide (east-west) with a total area of approximately 1300 square kilometers. It is bounded on the east by Syria, on the west by Israel, on the north by Lebanon and on the south by Jordan and Lake Tiberias. The position of the Golan Heights gives it great strategic importance in the area; specifically, the Golan Heights provide strategic depth, direct line-of-sight into south Lebanon, and force an attacker to fight uphill.⁵⁶

The terrain of the Golan Heights greatly complicates peacekeeping operations. First, there is not a great deal of terrain for maneuver.

"Once the force is positioned, the key operational objective is to maintain freedom of movement while remaining noncoercive and impartial."⁵⁷

Not only does the force commander need freedom of maneuver to conduct inspections of buffer zones and maintain the peace, he needs this freedom of movement to maneuver for force protection. Second, if a U.S. force had to withdraw out of the heights quickly to avoid confrontation, there are virtually no routes out of the Golan Heights that the force could safely use. Consequently, a peacekeeping force must have the capability to stay in the Golan Heights and defend itself if necessary.

The Israeli Defense Force (Appendix 1) is one of the world's strongest. Active ground forces consist of 3 armored divisions and 5 mechanized brigades and a reserve force of 9 armored divisions and 10 infantry brigades. The potential strength of ground forces after mobilization is approximately 700,000 soldiers. The Israeli Air Force is the largest and most capable

in the Middle East. It consists of 16 fighter and 4 fighter/attack squadrons, 14 reconnaissance squadrons and 4 attack helicopter squadrons. The Israeli Navy possesses 3 submarines, 31 fast attack vessels, 11 amphibious vehicles, and 31 patrol craft.⁵⁸

The collapse of the Soviet Union left Syria without a major provider for its military needs.

"Indeed, by virtually every measure, Syria is a declining threat, crippled by its loss of superpower sponsorship and enjoying few attractive options."⁵⁹

However, Syria still maintains a sizable force (Appendix 1). The ground forces consist of 5 armored divisions and 3 mechanized divisions. The potential strength after mobilization is approximately 350,000 soldiers. The Syrian Air Force consists of 9 fighter/ground and 17 interceptor squadrons. The Syrian Navy consists of 3 submarines, 2 frigates, 10 mine warfare ships, 3 amphibious ships and 24 patrol craft.⁶⁰ Additionally, Syria currently has 35,000 soldiers in Lebanon.⁶¹

The occupation of the Golan Heights by a peacekeeping force prevents either Israel or Syria from

relying on the region as a buffer zone. This creates the possibility of preemption, especially by Israel.

"States surrounded by openly hostile neighbours are strongly tempted to strike first and eliminate one of them, rather than wait until they choose their time to attack concentrically with superior forces. Such preemption is certainly the path of conventional wisdom, although there may be strong political reasons against it."⁶²

Israel conducted preemptive operations in the 1967 War and in 1981 against an Iraqi nuclear facility. This shows that Israel military is offensive in nature and relies on preemption. After Israel withdraws from the Golan Heights, it is possible that it will return to a reliance on preemption.⁶³ Syria, on the other hand, is not surrounded by hostile neighbors and could move a large number of forces into the Golan Heights with ease.

"The Syrians could move two or three divisions unhindered into the Golan overnight from their staging area around Damascus, even if Syria accepted an additional 40-km. demilitarized zone extending beyond the heights."⁶⁴

In sum, both Israel and Syria have the military capability to conduct preemptive operations. Early warning of such an act by either side will not provide the force commander adequate time to withdraw his

forces due to the relatively small size of the region. The Sinai MFO has the advantage of being in a sizable region that allows the commander flexibility in responding to hostile acts. In the Golan Heights the combatants military strength, the small size of the region, and the possibility of preemption mean that the commander of a peacekeeping force there will require a much larger force than the one in the Sinai in order to accomplish any mandate.

Peacekeeping forces are generally armed with their organic small arms, but a peacekeeping force may deploy with other weapons systems if the threat requires it.⁶⁵ In order to deter violence by physical presence in the Golan Heights, a strong force is needed due to the strength of the combatants and the potential for preemptive action. The force commander may be directed to employ the force either as an effective military barrier between the combatants or as a tripwire force.⁶⁶ The latter option implies that if offensive action is undertaken by either side, the peacekeeping force would be withdrawn or reinforced. As discussed earlier, the terrain dictates that even early warning would not provide the force commander with enough time

to request support. Therefore, a strong shield is necessary in the Golan Heights.

The appropriate force to conduct a peacekeeping operation in the Golan Heights is a heavy brigade.⁶⁷ This force would have the capability to defend itself and the flexibility to react to any local violations of the buffer zone and would thereby have the military credibility necessary to conduct the operation. By maintaining a stronger force, the political leadership would also be sending a message that the peacekeeping force is not going to remain passive when a situation develops that demands enforcement of the mandate.

"There is an important difference between the show of strength and the use of force. There are certainly other ways of displaying strength besides the actual use of force. One of these is a clear display of the capacity and authority to use force. This could be achieved by upgrading both the mandate and the equipment and armament of peace-keeping forces."⁶⁸

A heavy brigade provides this credibility and accomplishes the task of deterring violence by a presence alone.

"The best weapons in peace-keeping are long-range, direct-fire weapons, such as guns, armoured cars, heavy machine-guns and missiles, with pin-point accuracy to be sure to miss the target."⁶⁹

Additionally, the peacekeeping force needs strong combat support and combat service support assets. Artillery, information gathering capability, and air power are necessary in maintaining the peace. The force commander will also need a strong logistics capability not only to provide support for the force, but to evacuate the Golan Heights if directed by higher authorities.

Both the Israelis and the Syrians have long range artillery. Artillery bombardment by each side has been a major problem in the past. Any offensive action by either side will include the use of artillery fires. A U.S. artillery capability for counterbattery fire would alleviate many concerns on both sides. If the combatants know that their artillery is at risk if employed, this could help prevent an outbreak of hostilities.

UNDOF currently uses large binoculars for observation. This has been a persistent problem for many peacekeeping missions.

"It has been pointed out, correctly, that a peace-keeping force should have access to better observation equipment than the parties

in conflict in order to be able to act as an intermediary and a referee."⁷⁰

A heavy force with organic equipment provides this capability on a 24 hour basis. Improved observation, coupled with a strengthened intelligence capability⁷¹, is necessary to provide the force commander enough early warning to react to a situation. As stated earlier, since the area is very small relative to the Sinai, every minute will count.

As is the case with many military operations, this would truly be a joint operation. Both combatants have very capable Air Forces; particularly the Israeli Defense Forces. The presence of air power would be necessary to deter either side's using air power to preempt. Close air support would also be critical if the peacekeeping force were required to protect itself. The USAF or a carrier battle group in the Mediterranean Sea could provide this air support.

The capability of the U.S. to conduct joint operations would greatly add to the logistics capability of the force.

"Experience has shown, however, that in a serious and large-scale conflict the small military observer groups were much too weak

and an armed military force properly organised and with logistic support elements was needed."⁷²

Air and naval assets would be necessary in maintaining a logistics flow to the peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights. These assets would also be critical in the event of evacuation. If the host nation withdraws its consent to the mandate or if war breaks out, the peacekeeping force may possibly be required to evacuate. Evacuation plans should include ground, sea, and air routes.⁷³

However, the terrain and lines of communication do not allow for an easy withdrawal. By withdrawing to the west, the force would have to move through Israel. To the north is Lebanon which is not a secure location for American forces considering past events and the presence of 35,000 Syrian soldiers. To the south is Jordan which is currently not on the best terms with the United States due to its political activities during Operation Desert Storm. The best option for the force commander would be to stay and conduct defensive operations. If required to withdraw rapidly, air and naval assets will be essential to accomplish the evacuation.

The goal in peacekeeping operations is to maintain a force strong enough to deter any violence that puts the peacekeeping force in the position of having to withdraw or to engage in combat actions for self defense. Being able to stay out of combat actions assists the force commander in maintaining neutrality and thus enhances his ability to protect his force.⁷⁴

Force protection will be the greatest concern for the force commander in the Golan Heights. The peacekeeping force will always be at risk from hostile acts from the combatants. However, there is also a serious threat from terrorists and other groups with a political agenda.

"An important aspect of training for a peacekeeping mission is to understand that the peacekeeping force is a potential target of foreign intelligence and hostile indigenous terrorist activities."⁷⁵

It is also widely known that terrorist acts against soldiers from the U.S. military are not necessarily intended to kill a U.S. soldier, but to make a political statement.

"Soldiers from the great powers are potential targets for kidnapers who see hostages as a means to influencing great-power policy in matters unrelated to peace-keeping."⁷⁶

The Middle East has many terrorist groups operating in the area. Hezbollah, which operates out of south Lebanon, is one of the most prominent. A peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights would be within range of Hezbollah and many other groups. States hostile to the U.S., including Iran, have influence over these terrorist groups.⁷⁷ The force commander will need the assets to protect the peacekeeping force from terrorist attack as well as from attacks by the combatants. A strong force with an enhanced information gathering capability will provide the necessary force protection to accomplish any mandate.

VI. CONCLUSION

*"...one could argue that operational art is especially critical to a peacekeeping operation since the strategic and tactical levels are so closely linked."*⁷⁸

The mission for any future peacekeeping operation in the Golan Heights will be to maintain the status quo so that diplomatic efforts can build a lasting peace that does not require a peacekeeping force.

*"Military force can act as a precondition for enduring peace (short-term objective); it cannot create such a peace (long-term objective)."*⁷⁹

There has to be political agreement among the parties for any peacekeeping operation; Israel will withdraw from the Golan Heights only in return for a peace treaty with Syria. Additionally, the peacekeeping force must be credible in terms of military strength to deter the combatants from hostile acts. A MFO type mission under the auspices of the United States is the best option for peacekeeping in the Golan Heights.

Maintaining impartiality during the lifetime of the force is essential. Of the three variables that determine the nature of a peacekeeping operation (level of consent, level of force, and degree of

impartiality), the level of force is the only one over which the force commander can exert dominant influence.⁸⁰ Belligerents will give their consent based on how credible the peacekeeping force is in maintaining the individual belligerents' security. The goal is not to maintain strict neutrality, but rather to be cognizant of the political desires of each belligerent. If both sides are satisfied with the peacekeeping force, the belligerents will accept the peacekeeping force. If one belligerent feels that their security and political concerns are not being addressed, the belligerent will view the peacekeeping force as not being impartial.

Israel and Syria have made their position known as to the composition of any future peacekeeping force. They possess strong military forces that, as past behavior has shown, can conduct preemptive offensive operations. The size of the area does not allow the peacekeeping force commander sufficient early warning of offensive operations to get reinforcements nor does it allow for rapid evacuation. Consequently, he needs a force that is strong enough to deter the combatants and that is also capable of self defense. The

challenge for the operational commander will be to maintain the peace for an extended period of time so that a lasting peace can develop.⁸¹

The key concerns for the force commander will be force protection, freedom of maneuver, and maintaining credibility; of these three concerns the most important is force protection. A heavy brigade with a strong logistics and information gathering capabilities will establish the credible deterrence needed and will also have the capability for self defense. Armored vehicles will provide protection during any hostile acts and information gathering ability will provide early warning of preemptive actions and of potential terrorist acts.

The heavy brigade will give the commander the level of force necessary to maneuver within the area and to exert a dominant influence. It will also provide the belligerents with a sense of security against hostile acts initiated by other belligerents. The maneuverability of the mechanized force will allow not only for the conduct of the peacekeeping tasks in the mandate, but it will also provide the capability

for rapid reaction to local outbreaks of violence, self defense, and evacuation if ordered by higher authorities.


Peacekeeping in the Golan Heights will be conducted in the line of fire. The peacekeeping force will be in the middle of strong armored forces and terrorist groups on terrain that does not allow for sufficient early warning or rapid evacuation. The force commander will have to establish a credible presence, deter the combatants, and maintain freedom of movement. All this must be accomplished while at the same time protecting the force. Even if the commander accomplishes all the required peacekeeping tasks, the mission will be endangered if there are casualties.

"If U.S. forces on the Golan were to suffer casualties--from terrorism, for example--there would be U.S. public pressure to end the Golan mission..."⁸²

Being in the line of fire during a peacekeeping operation is indeed ironic. Future peacekeeping operations in the Golan Heights will be a tremendous challenge to all soldiers and leaders. The commander, as expected, will have the toughest job.


Map 1. Sinai Peninsula. Central Intelligence Agency map. Current MFO buffer zones also depicted.

MAP 1 - International Boundary and the Lines of the Zones




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Map 2. Israel and border states. Central Intelligence Agency map.



Map 3. Golan Heights and border states. From Central Intelligence Agency. Current UNDOF buffer zone also depicted.

Golan Heights



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Appendix 1: Israeli And Syrian Military Organization
And Equipment

All information in this annex is from the United States Naval Institute Military Database published by United Communications Group, Rockville, MD, 18 April 1994.

Israeli Army - Organization:

The active Ground Forces of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) are organized into 2 corps with the following units:

- 3 armored divisions, each with
 - 2 armored brigades
 - 1 artillery brigade
- 4 mechanized infantry brigades
- 1 mechanized/paratroop brigade
- 3 regional infantry divisions
- 1 surface-to-surface missile battalion
- 3 artillery battalions

Reserve forces include:

- 9 armored divisions, with
 - 3 armored brigades
 - 1 mechanized infantry brigade
 - 1 artillery brigade
- 10 regional infantry brigades
- 4 artillery brigades

Israeli Army - Major Equipment:

Ground Combat Vehicles

Tanks

- 600 Merkava I/II main battle tank
- 1,300 M60A1/A3 main battle tank (US)
- 1,080 A41 Centurion medium (Great Britain)
- 561 M48A5 Patton medium (US)
- 140 T-54/55 medium (USSR)
- 115 T-62 medium (USSR)

Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles

- 100 RBY Mk 1
- 200 Shoet Mk 2/3

100 BRDM-2 (USSR)

Armored Personnel Carriers

80 Nagmashot (Great Britain A41 Centurion)

5,900 M113 (US)

few BTR-50P (USSR)

4,400 M2/3 half-track (US M3)

few OT-62 (Czechoslovakia)

Air Defense Vehicles

50 ZSU-23-4 Shilka (USSR)

30 M163 Vulcan (US)

several M48 Chaparral (US)

Artillery

Guns

140 175-mm M107 self-propelled (US)

85 130-mm M-46 towed field gun (USSR)

250 106-mm M40 anti-tank recoilless rifles
(US)

several 40-mm L70 towed air defense (Sweden)

several 23-mm ZU-23-2 (USSR)

Howitzers

36 203-mm M110 self-propelled (US)

300 155-mm Soltam M-68/M-71

155-mm Model 839P/845P self-propelled

155-mm L-33 self-propelled

155-mm M-50 self-propelled (France Model
50)

155-mm M109A1/A2 (US)

100 122-mm D-30 towed (USSR)

70 105-mm M101 towed (US)

Mortars

Approximately 1,200 of the following types:

160-mm Soltam M-66 towed

160-mm Soltam self-propelled (M-66)

120-mm Soltam towed

81-mm Soltam towed

Multiple Rocket Launchers

290-mm MAR-290

240-mm BM-24 (USSR)

160-mm LAR-160

122-mm BM-21 (USSR)

Missiles

Anti-tank

MAPATS
BGM-71 TOW (US)
M47 Dragon (US)
Milan (France)

Surface-to-surface

MGM-52C Lance (US)
Jericho I/II

Israeli Air Force - Organization:

16 fighter squadrons
4 fighter/attack squadrons
14 reconnaissance squadrons
1 electronic warfare squadron
1 transport wing
1 liaison squadron
4 attack helicopter squadrons
1 search and rescue helicopter squadron
2 helicopter transport squadron
15 air defense battalions

Israeli Air Force - Major Equipment:

Fighter/Attack

35 F-15A/B/C Eagle
11 F-15C/D Eagle
113 F-4E Phantom
125 Kfir C2/C7 (Israel)
63 F-16A Fighting Falcon
51 F-16C Fighting Falcon
40 A-4J Skyhawk
70 A-4N Skyhawk

Electronic/Reconnaissance

15 RF-4E Phantom
6 RC-12D King Air (C-12 Huron)
3 RU-21A King Air
4 E-2C Hawkeye
6 Boeing 707 electronic countermeasures

Maritime Patrol

7 IAI1124N Sea Scan (Israel)
4 BN2 Islander (Great Britain)

Transport

4 IAI201 Arava (Israel)
10 Boeing 707 tanker
22 C-130E/H Hercules
18 C-47 Dakota
2 KC-130H Hercules tanker (C-130)

Liaison

2 Westwind 1123 (Israel Sea Scan)
1 BN2 Islander (Great Britain Defender)
5 Do 27 (West Germany)
11 Do 28 (West Germany Skyservant)
18 U206C Cessna 206 (U-26)
2 F180 Cessna 180/182
12 A65/80/B80 Queen Air

Training

2 F-15A Eagle
8 F-16B Fighting Falcon
24 F-16D Fighting Falcon
15 F-4E Phantom
20 TA-4H/J Skyhawk
10 Kfir TC-2 (Israel)
80 CM170 Tzugit (France Magister)
20 PA-18 Super Cub

Helicopters

12 AH-64 Apache attack
45 AH-1G/Q/S Cobra anti-tank
4 OH-58D Kiowa cargo
36 MD500 Defender anti-tank (O-6 Cayuse)
44 Bell 206 JetRanger transport (OH-58 Kiowa)
32 Bell 205 transport (UH-1H Huey)
25 Bell 212 transport (UH-1N Huey)
32 CH-53A/D Sea Stallion heavy lift
2 AS 365 Dauphin (France)
17 UH-1D medium transport (UH-1H Huey)

Missiles

Air-to-air

AIM-9/9L Sidewinder
AIM-7E/F/M Sparrow III
Shafir (Israel)
Python III (Israel)

Air-to-surface

AGM-65 Maverick
AGM-45 Shrike
AGM-62A Walleye
AGM-12 Bullpup
AGM-78 Standard
AGM-114 Hellfire
Gabriel III (Israel)
Luz (Israel)

AIR DEFENSE FORCE

MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile
MIM-23B Hawk/Improved Hawk surface-to-air
missile
FIM-43 Redeye surface-to-air missile
M48 Chaparral air defense vehicle
M163 Vulcan air defense vehicle
20-mm TCM-20 twin towed gun

Israel Navy - Organization and Equipment:

Submarines

3 GAL class (Type 206 design)

Fast attack

2 ALIYA-class missile craft (Saar 4.5 design)
2 ROMAT-class missile craft (Saar 4.5 design)
8 RESHEF-class missile craft (Saar 4 design)
6 MIVTACH-class missile craft (Saar 2 design)
4 SAAR-class missile craft (Saar 3 design)
1 DVORA-class missile craft
5 SUPER DVORA-class gun craft
3 SHIMRIT-class missile hydrofoils
(US FLAGSTAFF 2 design)

Amphibious

4 ex-US LCM-6-class mechanized landing craft
3 ASHDOD-class tank landing craft
3 KISHON-class tank landing craft
1 BAT SHEVA-class amphibious transport

Patrol

31 DABUR class
approx 25 YATUSH class (US PBR Type)

Syrian Army Organization:

The Syrian Army consists of 2 corps, with:

- 5 armored divisions, each with
 - 2 armored brigades
 - 1 mechanized infantry brigade
 - 1 artillery regiment
 - 1 air defense regiment
 - 1 engineer battalion
 - 1 armored cavalry company
 - 1 chemical company
- 3 mechanized divisions, each with
 - 2 armored brigades
 - 2 mechanized brigades
 - 1 artillery brigade
- 2 independent mechanized infantry brigades
- 2 independent artillery brigades
- 1 special forces division, with
 - 5 paratroop/commando brigades
- 7 independent special forces regiments
- 2 coastal defense brigades
- 3 surface-to-surface missile battalions
- 9 surface-to-air missile battalions

Within each mechanized division, 1 armored brigade and 1 mechanized brigade are kept at cadre status, to be mobilized in the event of conflict.

Syrian Army - Equipment:

Ground Combat Vehicles

Tanks

- 2,100 T-54/T-55
- 1,000 T-62
- 950 T-72
- # T-34 (may be used as static air defense)

Armored Field Vehicles

Reconnaissance

- 500 BRDM-2
- 2,300 BMP-1

Personnel Carriers

1,450 including the following types

BTR-40
BTR-50
BTR-60
BTR-152
OT-64 (Czechoslovakia)

Air Defense

ZSU-23-4 Shilka
ZSU-57-2

Artillery

Guns

2,800 including the following types

180-mm S-23
152-mm ISU-152 self-propelled
130-mm M-46
122-mm A-19 corps gun
122-mm ISU-122
122-mm 2SI self-propelled
100-mm T-12 anti-tank

Air Defense Guns

1,000 including the following types

100-mm KS-19
85-mm KS-12
57-mm S-60
37-mm M1939
23-mm ZU-23-2 towed

Howitzers

152-mm D-1 towed
152-mm D-20 towed
152-mm 2S3 self-propelled
152-mm ML-20
122-mm M-30 towed
122-mm D-30 towed

Multiple Rocket Launchers

240-mm BM-24
220-mm BM-27
122-mm BM-21

Mortars

240-mm M-240
160-mm M-160
120-mm M1943
82-mm M1937

Missiles

Anti-Tank

AT-3 Sagger
AT-4 Spigot
Milan (France)

Surface-to-Air

SA-7 Grail
SA-9 Gaskin
SA-13 Gopher

Surface-to-Surface

FROG-7
SS-21 Scarab
SS-1C Scud-B
SS-1D Scud-C
SSC-1B Sepal (SSC-2B Samlet)
SSC-3 coastal (SSC-4)

Syrian Air Force - Organization:

9 fighter/ground attack squadrons
17 interceptor squadrons
1 reconnaissance squadron
2 transport squadrons
1 training group
2 helicopter groups

Syrian Air Force - Equipment:

Fighter/Ground Attack

40 MiG-29 Fulcrum
30 MiG-25 Foxbat
90 MiG-23MF Flogger
65 MiG-23BM Flogger
225 MiG-21PF Fishbed
Su-7/Su-17 Fitter
22 Su-24 Fencer
60 Su-22BL Fitter

Electronic/Reconnaissance/Observation

8 MiG-25R Foxbat

Transport

2 Il-76T Candid
6 Il-14 Crate
4 Il-18 Coot
4 An-26 Curl
2 An-24 Coke
2 Yak-40 Codling
2 Falcon 20 (France)

Utility/Communications

2 PA-31 Navajo survey (US)

Trainers

20 MiG-15UTI Midget
2 MiG-25U Foxbat
20 MiG-21U Mongol
60 MiG-17F Fresco
25 MiG-25UTI Midget
40 L39 Albatross (Czechoslovakia)
60 L29 Delfin (Czechoslovakia)
48 Flamingo (Spain)

Helicopters

36 Mi-24 Hind gunship
Mi-17 Hip H transport
100 Mi-8 Hip transport
10 Mi-6 Hook transport
20 Mi-4 Hound liaison
55 SA342 Gazelle gunship (France)

Missiles

Air-to-Air

AA-2 Atoll
AA-6 Acrid
AA-7 Apex
AA-8 Aphid

Air-to-Surface

AT-2 Swatter anti-tank
AS-12 Hot (France)

Syrian Navy - Organization and Equipment:

Submarines

3 ex-Soviet Romeo class

Frigates

2 ex-Soviet Petya class

Mine Warfare

1 ex-Soviet Natya-class patrol
1 YARMOUK minesweeper (ex-Soviet T-43 class)
1 ex-Soviet Sonya-class minesweeper
2 ex-Soviet Vanya-class minesweeper
5 ex-Soviet Yevgenya-class minesweeper

Amphibious Forces

3 Ex-Soviet Polnocny B class

Patrol Craft

6 ex-Soviet Osa I class fast attack
8 ex-Soviet Osa II class fast attack
9 ex-Soviet Zhuk class
1 ex-Soviet Poluchat I class

Missiles

SS-N-2 a/b Styx surface-to-surface missiles.

NAVAL AVIATION

12 Mi-14 Haze A anti-submarine helicopters
5 Ka-25 Hormone anti-submarine helicopters
Ka-28 Helix anti-submarine

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32. Nathan A. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Sinai and Lebanon, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University Papers in International Affairs, Number 3 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 32.
33. Ensio Siilasvuo, "United Nations Peace-keeping in the Middle East: Lessons and Prospects," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 4 December 1981, 3.
34. United States General Accounting Office, U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions, 35.
35. Houghton, Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East, 84-88. This is one of four elements that Houghton believes is essential for multinational peacekeeping. He states that the four essential elements of a multinational peacekeeping operation are cooperation of local parties, political support, an unambiguous and restricted mandate, and freedom of movement.
36. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Sinai and Lebanon, 14, 70.
37. Evans, World Affairs, Spring 1993, 146.
38. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Sinai and Lebanon, 95.
39. Houghton, Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East, 37.

40. Wolf D. Kutter, "Operational Guidelines for US Peacekeeping Commanders" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 1 April 1986), 16.
41. John F. Hillen, III, "The Limitations of a UN 'Army'," The Christian Science Monitor, 23 July 1992, 18.
42. United States President, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 13.
43. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace (United Nations: New York, 1992), 26, 29.
44. Hagglund, Survival, May/June 1990, 237.
45. United States Department of the Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 30 December 1994), 24.
46. Strobe Talbott, "Peacekeeping Loves Company," Time, 18 May 1992, 54.
47. United States General Accounting Office, U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions, 49.
48. Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface, 208. Mackinlay states that political awareness was rated unanimously as an important qualification for the peacekeeping force commander. Additionally, negotiating experience and ability were also considered important qualifications for the commander in his role as an intermediary.
49. United States Department of the Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 23.
50. Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface, 190.
51. United States General Accounting Office, U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions, 51.

52. United States Department of the Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 13.

53. "Gingrich Wants Embassy in Jerusalem," Reuter, 15 January 1995. This is a quote by Representative Newt Gingrich who is currently the Speaker of the House of Representatives. There is currently a debate within Congress over the US role in peacekeeping operations. Another point of debate is the command and control of US forces conducting a UN operation.

54. Snow, "Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order", 23.

55. James C. Wise, "How to Not Fight: Putting Together a US Army Force for a UN Peacekeeping Operation," Military Review, December 1977, 23.

56. John Foss, Al Gray, John S. Pustay, Bernard Schriever, Carl Trost, Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Douglas J. Feith, Frank J. Gaffney, Richard Perle, Eugene V. Rostow, and Henry S. Owen. "U.S. Forces on the Golan Heights? A Special Report." Center for Security Policy in Commentary, December 1994, 75. This report concludes that the United States should not participate in a peacekeeping operation in the Golan Heights. Even though this monograph is based on the assumption that the United States will participate in the operation, there is still excellent information that is useful in analyzing the situation and the consequences of participating in the operation. For example, the strategic importance of the Golan Heights to Israel also applies to Syria. Additionally, the report is not written with a totally impartial view. It emphasizes the findings from an Israeli perspective. For example, the report addresses countering the possibility of Syrian aggression but very little attention is paid to countering Israeli preemption. This is totally understandable considering that Israel is an ally and the United States has guaranteed Israel's security.

57. Wise, Military Review, December 1977, 24.

58. United States Naval Military Institute Database (Rockville, MD: United Communications Group, 18 April 1994), Israeli Army, Israeli Air Force, and Israeli Navy.

59. A.J. Bacevich, "Fear of Heights," National Review, 31 December 1994, 53.

60. United States Naval Military Institute Database (Rockville, MD: United Communications Group, 18 April 1994), Syrian Army, Syrian Air Force, and Syrian Navy.

61. David Makovsky and Evelyn Gordon, "Syria willing to 'phase in' peace," The Jerusalem Post, 1 August 1994, 1.

62. Howard, Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967, 29.

63. Foss, Commentary, December 1994, 81.

64. Ibid., 76.

65. United States Department of the Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 5.

66. Foss, Commentary, December 1994, 79; Colleen Siegel, "U.S. Defence Chief to see Golan from a Height," Reuter, 9 January 1995. Foss and the other authors discuss the use of military forces as a barrier and as a tripwire. Siegel, in her article, addresses the Israeli Foreign Minister's view on using U.S. forces as a tripwire. Siegel stated, "But Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres indicated a U.S. tripwire presence was an option to ensure that Israel and Syria would never again do battle on the heights where they fought in 1967 and 1973."

67. There is definitely wide disparity over the appropriate force structure for a Golan Heights peacekeeping operation. Bacevich, in his National Review article on page 68, states: "The force required for such a mission would be small and lightly equipped--not substantially larger than the two-battalion United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) already present on the Golan, which for two decades has done yeoman work supervising the ceasefire." Wise, in his Military Review article on page 25, states that there are three criteria in determining the force structure for a peacekeeping operation. They are: 1) "The force must be large enough to defend itself and establish a visible presence, but not so large as to be tempted to impose its will on either party in the conflict," 2)

"It must be large enough to have the flexibility to concentrate forces in response to a local threat," and 3) "Within the force, no one national element can appear to be dominant over the rest." Foss and the other author's state on page 83 of their report in Commentary that "...if there is to be an American contingent on the Golan Heights, it should be a functioning unit, specifically an armored brigade--roughly 5,000 troops and their heavy equipment." They further conclude that due to training and rotational requirements that this would entail an entire division being tasked to perform the operation. They further argue that since the Army is decreasing in size that the loss of this division for deployment to other possible contingencies is too costly. Bacevich envisions a light force that could not adequately defend itself against an armored attack by either combatant. Applying Wise's guidelines to a future Golan Heights mission calls for a heavier force, but one that could not impose their will on the combatants. In a peacekeeping operation, your will is to keep the peace and therefore you need the capability to impose your will judiciously. Foss and the other authors come the closest to my finding for a peacekeeping force structure in the Golan Heights.

68. Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the 'sheriff's posse'," Survival, May/June 1990, 202.

69. Hagglund, Survival, May/June 1990, 239. The use of heavy forces that Hagglund implies during peacekeeping operations is also addressed in the Army's new FM 100-23, Peace Operations. On page 5, FM 100-23 states: "However, forces may deploy with other weapons systems, based on the threat." In FM 100-5, Operations, it states: "The peacekeeping force deters violent acts by its physical presence at violence prone areas." You must have a heavy force to deter violence by large armored and mechanized forces that the Syrian and Israeli military possess. This is the heart of the force credibility issue.

70. Hagglund, Survival, May/June 1990, 235.

71. Urquhart, Survival, May/June 1990, 204.

72. Siillasvuo, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 4 December 1981, 3.

73. United States Department of the Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 37.
74. Ibid., 36.
75. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.3, JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations (Washington D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 November 1991 {Final Draft}), VI-3.
76. Hagglund, Survival, May/June 1990, 237.
77. Foss, Commentary, December 1994, 83.
78. Kelley, "Peacekeeping; The Operational Concerns," 27.
79. Snow, "Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order," 21.
80. United States Department of the Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 13.
81. Kelley, "Peacekeeping; The Operational Concerns," 25.
82. Foss, Commentary, December 1994, 86.

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