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OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT:


OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS
FOR
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.


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Abstract of:
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT:
OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS FOR
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In early February 1991 Operation Desert Storm had reached its dramatic conclusion. The United States military had displayed its incredible power and effectiveness as the world's sole remaining super power and stood ready to lead the world into the future of President Bush's "New World Order."

On 5 April before the dust of the homecoming parades had settled, U. S. and world attention again was sharply focused on a new and different developing human tragedy in post war Iraq. Instead of familiar footage of successful military operations, the public was now faced with the images of a half million terrorized and starving Kurdish refugees clinging to the sides of mountains in the remote northern regions of the Iraq-Turkish border.

This operation serves as a classic case in the validation of the six "Principles for Operations Other than War", although it was conducted two years prior to publishing of the fundamentals in current doctrine. The peacemaking success of "Operation Provide Comfort" established the standard in political and public perception for the projection and use of coalition military power for the purpose of saving lives.

The current world situation suggests that coalition and peacemaking operations will continue to be the most prevalent challenge facing the future employment of military forces. The experiences of Operation Provide Comfort have validated the need for continued study and development of joint doctrine for coalition and peacemaking operations.

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INTRODUCTION

In early February 1991, Operation Desert Storm had reached its dramatic conclusion. The United States military had displayed its incredible power and effectiveness as the world's sole remaining super power and stood ready to lead the world into the future of President Bush's "New World Order."

On 5 April, before the dust of the homecoming parades had settled, U. S. and world attention again was sharply focused on a new and different developing human tragedy in post war Iraq. Instead of familiar footage of successful military operations, the public was now faced with the images of a half million terrorized and starving Kurdish refugees clinging to the sides of mountains in the remote northern regions of the Iraq-Turkish border.

This massive human tragedy was viewed as the direct result of United States policy and post war actions in the region. The American people, in near unanimous opinion, demanded that the United States now redirect its unmatched military power and capability in whatever manner necessary to resolve this new world crisis.

Military leaders were faced for the first time with how "The New World Order" was to affect all future planning of military operations in support of the humanitarian operations. The peacemaking success of "Operation Provide Comfort" established the standard in political and public perception for the projection and use of coalition military power for the purpose of saving lives. The operation helped consolidate the doctrinal concepts in the development of fundamental principles for Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Operation Provide Comfort also displayed the combination and integration required for the fundamentals of OOTW at the strategic and

operational level, while simultaneously keeping sight of the fact that the basic principles of war will often drive the tactical level of the operation.

This paper will address the decision making process in the establishment of Joint Task Force Provide Comfort (JTFPC) and the transition to a Combined Task Force in response to increased tasking and mission requirements. The paper will analyze the successful organization and execution of the operation using the six fundamental principles for Peace Operations and Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and will conclude with an examination of the experiences and lessons of the operation in consideration for future Combined Task Force operations in support of peacemaking objectives.

BACKGROUND

In early March 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, Kurdish resistance forces started a revolt in the northern regions of Iraq. They were reinforced in their idea of a separate Kurdish state by President Bush's call for the people of Iraq to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein to step down. A bloodied but not broken Saddam Hussein quickly responded and unleashed the still powerful remnants of the Republican Guard in a rapid response to this new internal threat. Supported by tanks and helicopters the Republican Guard operated with devastating effectiveness and quickly defeated the weaker and lightly armed Kurdish factions. Within three weeks the Kurdish resistance was brutally crushed and a half million refugees had headed north into the freezing 8,000 ft. mountains of the Iraqi-Turkish border. The Iraqi army pressed their advance in direct pursuit to destroy all elements of resistance and once and for all eliminate the long standing Kurdish problem. Turkish forces, in their attempt to contain the

situation, stopped the refugees in the mountain passes along the 206-mile expanse of the Iraqi-Turkish border. The Turks, however, proved powerless to turn back the tide of refugees and to have them return home. The Kurdish memories of the Iraqi Army's nerve gas attacks and wholesale slaughter just three years earlier, in 1988, removed any possibility for a quick resolution to the problem.¹ The Kurds continued to flee, crowding into eight major concentration areas and over thirty smaller sites, literally clinging to the near vertical barren mountain faces of the Turkish border. Extremely harsh weather conditions in high altitudes, combined with the effects of no food, water, or shelter, was resulting in the deaths of a thousand refugees a day. The Turkish government and private relief agencies conducted relief operations but were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problem and remoteness of the location. Worldwide media attention focused on the tragedy, and public opinion demanded that immediate unified action be taken to limit the suffering and stop the dying. The U. N. Security Council took action and passed Resolution 688 on 5 April 1991 and directed that Iraq allow immediate access to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq.² The stage was set; the American people now watched for the same efficiency that had ended the Gulf War in just 100 hours weeks before to now solve this tragic situation in the same short order.

MISSION PARAMETERS AND ESTABLISHING THE TASK FORCE

On 5 April, the same day as the U.N. resolution, President Bush directed the use of military forces to provide humanitarian assistance to the Kurds. He ordered that "a major new

effort be undertaken to help the Iraqi refugees," specifically directing the immediate airlift of food and relief supplies.

The National Command Authority, having been given broad but clear guidance, passed the mission to Commander In Chief, U.S. European Command (EUCOM). EUCOM immediately established Joint Task Force Provide Comfort (JTFPC) and selected Major General James Jamerson, USAF, as the commander. The initial idea for the operation was for primarily Air Force units to conduct the air drop of relief supplies directly to the refugees. The Air Force efforts were to be supported by smaller detachments of Special Operations Forces providing Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) and forward air control. The JTF immediately deployed to Incirlik Air Base Turkey on 6 April and commenced air drop operations within 24 hours on 7 April.³

The elation over the quick reaction and the hopes for a short operation were crushed in the first two days. It had become apparent that the mission and requirements for the joint task force would have to be significantly expanded. Political and public opinion, initially calmed by rapid and impressive U.S. military response, reached an uproar when CNN depicted the waste and futility of attempting to air drop pallets of food into dense concentrations of refugees clustered in the rugged mountain terrain. The media depicted nearly 80% of the relief supplies crashing down the sides of cliffs and mountains miles from the objective area. Even worse was footage of pallets of supplies actually landing and crushing the people the U.S. forces were attempting to help. It was evident the mission would have to be significantly expanded and would require additional ground and coalition support.⁴

On 9 April CINCEUR directed U.S. Army Europe as the lead agency for the operation and directed the establishment of Combined Task Force- Operation Provide Comfort (CTF-PC).

The Army was given direction for the coordination of all efforts in support of the expanded mission requirements. On 16 April Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili, was assigned command of CTF-PC and established his headquarters in Incirlik, Turkey.

On 17 April Lieutenant General Shalikashvili listed his mission, objectives, and tasks as follows:

PROVIDE COMFORT MISSION

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort conducts multinational humanitarian operations to provide immediate relief to displaced Iraqi civilians until international relief agencies and private voluntary organizations can assume overall supervision.

PROVIDE COMFORT OBJECTIVES

- Immediate: Stop the dying and suffering; stabilize the population
- Midterm: Resettle population at temporary sites; establish sustainable secure environment.
- Long-term: Return population to their homes.

PROVIDE COMFORT TASKS

1. Provide immediate relief/stabilize population.
2. Build distribution system/infrastructure.
3. Construct transit centers.
4. Transfer displaced civilians to transit centers.
5. Transition operation to International Relief Organizations and Private Voluntary Organizations.
6. Provide continuous security for operations.
7. Facilitate ultimate objective to return displaced civilians to their homes.

Lieutenant General Shalikashvili established two separate and forward deployed task forces to attack the different geographic and tactical mission requirements of the expanded operation. "Task Force A" was located in Silopi, Turkey 450 miles inland from Incirlik and just five miles north of the Iraqi border. "Task Force A" was under the command of Brigadier General Potter, USA, and retained the original mission of coordinating relief efforts for the Kurds.

"Task Force B" was located in Zakhu, Iraq directly across the border from Silopi, Turkey. "Task Force B" under Major General Garner had the expanded mission requirements of pushing back the Iraqi Army and establishing safe areas throughout the northern region of Iraq. The TF-B mission included the responsibility to free the towns and villages of northern Iraq from the influence of the Iraqi Army and to facilitate safe passage for the Kurds out of the mountain refugee camps and back to their homes.⁵

Lieutenant General Shalikashvili's concept of operations was to: deliver relief supplies by air and land; to develop small village units near distribution sites so displaced Kurds could help themselves; to stabilize the situation and build an infrastructure; to move displaced civilians to new camps; to convert the effort to UN/multinational organizational control; to return the Kurds to their homes; and ultimately to remove U. S. forces and those of other nations from the area.⁶

The mission directed the coordinated use of coalition forces to guarantee the security of the camps as well as the establishment of a large security area in the northern regions of Iraq. This created extremely tense situations as the ROE were now expanded to include strictly enforcing the no fly zones with a combat air patrol over Iraq, as well as engaging in combat operations against Iraqi ground forces if required.⁷

Operation Provide Comfort was unique at the time, but in fact it has been a typical model of similar circumstances for many crisis action situations since the end of the Cold War and Desert Storm. The "distinctive" characteristics of Provide Comfort in 1991 were stated by Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, USA as follows:

Operation Provide Comfort was distinctive, incorporating an unforeseen situation and mission, a heavily multinational force composition and effort, and a deep involvement of civilian and international agencies critical to mission accomplishment. It also involved sensitive negotiations with Iraqi authorities and a variety of Kurdish leaders, daily media coverage with corresponding high visibility and political impact, and nearly hour-by-hour reporting by the task force commander directly to - and receipt of

direction and guidance from - the Commander-in Chief, Europe, General John Gavin, USA- who was in turn the single channel to and from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Command Authority.⁸

There have been numerous other operations in the four years following Provide Comfort. Many have shared to a large degree these "distinctive" characteristics experienced by General Shalikashvili in 1991.

ANALYSIS

Warfighting doctrine has long been based on the well-established nine principles of war that have withstood the test of time and experience. The 1993 U. S. Army FM 100-5 established the six guiding principles for operations other than war. Although these six principles for operations other than war had not been published at the time of the operation they provide a standard and a baseline for the operational analysis of Operation Provide Comfort.

OBJECTIVE: *Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.*

Just as in war, the establishment of a clearly defined attainable objective, with a precise understanding of what constitutes success, is critical in peacemaking operations. This was one of the notable areas of success for Operation Provide Comfort. The President's guidance, supported by U.N. resolution 688, international relief organizations, European partners, and world wide support of the humanitarian operation, proved a strong, clear, and legitimate mandate for the operation. EUCOM translated the national policy statement into a concise mission statement, supported by a list of objectives and required tasks. The objectives outlined a time-phased planned approach, prioritized tasks and allowed assigned units to maintain focus on long term goals. The

end state was defined and established termination criteria for the transfer of the operation to the United Nations and private organizations. This end state was achieved in mid September when coalition forces withdrew from Iraq and turned control of the operation over to the U.N., terminating Operations Provide Comfort I and II.

UNITY OF EFFORT: *Seek unity of effort toward every objective.*

The principle of unity of command as applied in war, means all forces operate under a single commander with the authority to direct those forces in support of a common objective. This valid principle, however, is considerably different in peacemaking operations such as Provide Comfort. The multinational and interagency mix of forces prevented General Shalikashvili from achieving unity of command and made the attainment of unity of effort paramount. Unity of effort (coordination through cooperation and common interests) was an essential element in the absence of unity of command throughout Operation Provide Comfort I and II.

General Shalikashvili's organizing principle was to give his key subordinates the disparate service and national elements for a given function, then to hold them responsible for pulling that function together. Each national contingent had come with its own commander and established liaison with General Shalikashvili's staff in Incirlik and in turn with his subordinates. General Shalikashvili simply told each national commander that he expected to exercise "tactical control" (TACON, a well-understood NATO term) over all forces in theater. TACON fulfilled two major objectives: (1) It enabled the CTF commander to execute the mission with no loss of effectiveness, and (2) it provided individual coalition partners ultimate authoritative control over their own forces. Legalistic prescriptions and interpretations of command relationships simply did not come

into play; mission accomplishment was the overriding concern. The mixed national and service forces operated much like a single service force rather than a coalition of the four services and thirteen coalition nations.⁹

The concept of unity of effort worked very well in the initial stages of the operation. During this initial period the urgency of the situation kept all coalition members clearly focused on the mission of saving lives. As the operation continued into the third phase, and to this day, diverging long term national interests have considerably weakened the unity of effort that marked the beginning two phases of the operation.

Another key factor in the fundamental element of unity of effort during Provide Comfort I was the coordination achieved in orchestrating the fifty diverse international private volunteer (PVO) and nongovernmental (NGO) relief organizations. These organizations provided exceptional additional capabilities that significantly enhanced the total effectiveness of the operation. To maximize and coordinate the efforts of the fifty diverse agencies, General Shalikashvili established a forward deployed Military Coordination Center (MCC) in Zakhu, Iraq. The MCC had direct access to the CTF commander, but more importantly provided on scene face to face communications between coalition forces, PVO's, NGO's, and the Iraqi military forces. This center prevented inadvertent conflict between forces and deconflicted hazardous operations. The MCC served as the link for military support of the NGO's when required and reduced the impact of misunderstandings between all parties. The MCC proved to be the key agency for ensuring that unity of effort was achieved across all private and political lines of communication and directly tied to the overall mission objectives.¹⁰

SECURITY: *Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.*

During Operation Provide Comfort the security situation was always of extraordinary concern to the forces involved. There were a number of activities that could have brought significant harm to the multinational forces and relief agencies and easily jeopardized mission accomplishment. At the start of the operation, the main threat was the Iraqi Army. Many of the refugee camps were inside Iraq and there was concern about the immediate post war reaction to the U.S. Special Forces conducting patrols and organizing drop sites.¹¹

There was also a constant terrorist threat that was a concern during the entire operation. The terrorist organizations of DEFSOL and the PKK operated throughout the country of Turkey. Strict security and operating procedures were established and maintained at all locations to preclude the repeat of another Lebanon situation. The most pervasive threat was the countless number of mines and boobytraps that littered the entire operating area and presented a constant but silent and hidden threat to all personnel.¹²

A significant part of the solution to the Iraqi military threat was resolved with the establishment of the restrictive no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel. With the coalition security forces clearing the security zones on the ground, and the skies clear of Iraqi aircraft, coalition forces maintained freedom of action and the Kurds began to feel secure enough to return to their homes.

The security from the terrorist groups was significantly enhanced by the perceived legitimacy and impartiality of the operation. This was achieved by a combination of the UN resolution, overwhelming world opinion, and the mutual respect displayed by the forces conducting the operation. The entire multinational/multiagency effort was conducted with the sole

purpose of saving lives and limiting human suffering. All fundamental elements of security were recognized, implemented, and guarded to achieve situational dominance and complete freedom of action throughout Operation Provide Comfort.

The single major obstacle in the area of security concerns was in the failure to establish universal "Rules of Engagement" (ROE) for all forces involved. Each national contingent operated with their own ROE as directed by their national governments. This area of dispute, despite tremendous international efforts, was one area that General Shalikashvili was never able to completely reconcile. The CTF was then forced to reorient the coalition forces geographically as well as functionally. By shifting forces geographically, appropriate combat functions were then matched with other complementary forces with common ROE guidelines. Fortunately due to the low levels of conflict and the ability to geographically separate forces with major differences in ROE this did not cause significant problems in the operation. ¹³

RESTRAINT: *Apply appropriate military capability prudently.*

While the presence of overwhelming force was readily apparent throughout the operation, there was very disciplined application in its use. The threat of the use of force was significantly enhanced by the successful completion of the Gulf War just one month prior to Operation Provide Comfort. There was no question in any mind that the "means" and the "will" were both readily at hand and could be brought immediately to bear if required.

The principle of restraint was most directly applied by General Shalikashvili's establishment of the MCC in northern Iraq. As mentioned earlier the MCC served to deconflict problems between Iraqi and coalition forces through mediation and negotiation. By briefing and establishing

coordination before major movements of troops or refugees, problems were reconciled well in advance at the staff level instead of on the battlefield.

PERSEVERANCE: *Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.*

Operation Provide Comfort, like most peace operations, has proven to be a long and protracted problem. The underlying causes of the Kurdish confrontation have been in existence for thousands of years. As is evidenced by current Turkish offensive actions in the region, it is unlikely that the Kurdish problem will be resolved for some time to come.

Operation Provide Comfort was divided into three separate operations. Provide Comfort I, the U.S. lead relief operation, ended with the withdrawal of forces from Iraq 15 July 1991. The second operation, Provide Comfort II, was the U.S. transition period to the U.N., which ended three months later in September 1991. The third stage is the UN led operation Provide Comfort III, which continues to this day. A sizable and significant U.S. contingent still remains in Incirlik, Turkey providing air support in the continued enforcement of the Iraqi no-fly zone.

The initial actions in Provide Comfort I and II required the types of decisive and immediate actions that were well suited to the use of military operations. There was no question as to the perseverance of the United States at the time. The United States had clearly displayed its commitment to and the importance of its long term interests for stability in the region. Operation Provide Comfort significantly benefited from this already established military presence and the established logistical lines of communication in the region.

As the situation stabilized in the Fall of 1991, the gradual transition to the U.N., with continued visible U.S. support, continued to demonstrate the principle of perseverance. The

fundamental of perseverance has however, been appropriately balanced by the sensitivity of long term U.S. strategic aims in the region, as well as the limitations of our operational capabilities and restraints.

LEGITIMACY: *Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.*

The legitimacy of the operation was directly tied to U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 combined with the involvement of international relief organizations and world wide public opinion. The legitimacy for the United States as the lead element in the operation was linked to and supported by post war actions, capabilities, and responsibilities. President Bush moved quickly to assure the Iraqi government that the U.S. understood the Kurdish revolt was over and a closed and unrelated matter. The President clearly established that the U.S. did not have any long term designs in Iraq and the only objective was to stop the dying and suffering. His statement of national policy was to simply settle the matter of the refugees and to depart the area, as is evidenced in his statement of 11 April:

Our long term objective remains the same - for Iraqi Kurds and indeed, for all Iraqi refugees, wherever they are to return home and to live in peace, free from repression, free to live their lives. We intend to turn over the administration of and security for these sites as soon as possible to the U.N.¹⁴

General Shalikhshvili's MCC was the critical agency responsible for establishing the links between the sponsoring states and the international organizations that were crucial to the success of the operation. The initial series of operations however were not conducted by the U.S. without partiality between the Kurds and the Iraqi Army. In the first few months Operation Provide Comfort was much farther up the "peacemaking spectrum" toward "peace enforcement" operations rather than "peacekeeping." In time the operation gradually moved down the peacemaking spectrum as the situation with the refugees improved.¹⁵ Public affairs, particularly

the international media, greatly assisted in the maintaining of the legitimacy of the operation. The daily coverage of the success and the impartiality of the operation continued to keep international perception strongly favorable. In this instance the "CNN factor" significantly enhanced the military operation, by constantly keeping the legitimacy of the operation in the public eye.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Operation Provide Comfort demanded extreme versatility in the execution of a rapidly developing crisis situation. The diverse mixture of 13 separate coalition forces combined with the presence of 50 international relief organizations under constant and instantaneous media coverage placed unprecedented demands upon the CTF commander and his staff. The success of this operation, as measured by the six fundamental principles for Operations Other Than War, serves as a model for future coalition and peacemaking operations.

The major factor in the success of the operation was by far the application of the concept of unity of effort. General Shalikashvili's organization of his staff with the maximum utilization of liaison officers was key in supporting this fundamental in the planning stages. The plan was superbly executed by using functional area assignments of coalition forces and through the use of tactical control in their employment. In this way he quickly brought the maximum amount of operational power to bear in the fastest possible manner. This method of employment optimized the unique capabilities of each unit, while maintaining the already effectively established national administrative and supply functions in the Gulf theater.

The utilization of nongovernmental relief organizations was quickly and effectively integrated into the total mission by the establishment of a single source and forward deployed Military Coordination Center. This agency proved instrumental in matching the expertise of the

relief agencies with the transportation, communication, and security support of the military force. The MCC additionally served to reinforce restraint throughout the operation by deconflicting disputes between opposing factions well before they reached crisis levels.

The experiences of Provide Comfort have reinforced past lessons in the difficulty of the execution and termination phases of both coalition and peace making operations. The need to clearly identify the desired end state in the planning stages will continue to be crucial to the successful execution of any operation. Additionally, appropriate attention must be given to the divergent national interests throughout all phases of any Coalition operation. Varying national interests will continue to have significant impacts on inter-operability and unity of effort of all coalition operations. The effect of divergent national interests is important at both the operational and tactical levels with respect to the security of the force and in the establishment of the ROE.

Operation Provide Comfort continues to demonstrate significant difficulties in the termination phase of peacemaking operations. Divergent national interests will also be the driving considerations in establishing the desired end state in order to end or transfer the operation to outside agencies. The requirement for the precise linkage between the political ends as balanced by the restricted latitude of military ends, ways, and means will always present a heightened interest in the conduct of peacemaking operations.¹⁶

The current world situation suggests that coalition and peacemaking operations will continue to be the most prevalent challenge facing the future employment of military forces. The experiences of Operation Provide Comfort have validated the need for continued study and development of joint doctrine for coalition and peacemaking operations.

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APPENDIX I

MILITARY SUPPORT TO PEACEMAKING ACTIVITIES




Figure 1. Spectrum of Military Activities

Source: John W. McDonald, "Military Operations To Restore Order And Maintain Peace" Landpower Essay Series, March 1993, p. 4.





Figure 2: "Area of Operations"

Source: J. L. Jones, "Operation Provide Comfort: Humanitarian and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1991, p.98.

PROVIDE COMFORT ORGANIZATION



APPENDIX II
Figure 3:

APPENDIX III

FIGURE 4:

CHRONOLOGY

5 April 91	Alert/Order to Deploy
6 April	Forces Commence Deployment
7 April	First Air Drops - 27 tons
9 April	Mission Expanded to Sustain Entire Refugee Population for Thirty Days
12 April	Site Survey of First Humanitarian Service Support Base
14 April	Construction Began
13 April	First Humanitarian Detachment Established
16 April	Mission Further Expanded to Provide Temporary Resettlement
17 April	First Recon of Temporary Resettlement Areas
18 April	Commander, JTF Met with Iraq Military Near Zakhu
20 April	Construction Commenced on First Temporary Community
21 April	Commenced Construction at Zakhu
22 April	Military Coordination Center (MCC) Established for Deconfliction
23 April	Recon of Amadiyah
27 April	Significant Shift from Airdrop to Ground Delivery
28 April	Way Stations Established
2 May	Security Expansion Eastward of Zakhu to Al Amadiyah
4 May	First Fatality - Accidental Discharge of Weapons
5 May	Security Expansion Eastward of Amadiyah to Suri
11 May	Task Force Alpha Begins Movement of Refugees to Zakhu, Second Temporary Resettlement Camp Opened
13 May	First Temporary Resettlement Camp Turned Over to United Nations Control
14 May	Third Temporary Resettlement Camp Opened
15 May	First Fixed Wing Flight into Sirsenk Airfield
20 May	Joint Survey of Dihok
22 May	Agreement on Dihok
25 May	Enter Dihok
29 May	Deployment of all Coalition Forces Complete
6 June	Last Border Camp Closed
7 June	All Relief Operations Transferred to Unhcr
8 June	Task Force Alpha Deactivated
8 June	Phased Redeployment Begins
12 June	Civil Affairs Command Deactivated
14 June	Begin Follow-on Force Planning
15 June	Support Troops Depart Dihok
22 June	US Redeployment Placed on Hold
19 Sep	Redeployment Ordered for BTF

Source: John M. Shalikashvili, "Statement," U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Aspects of Anti-Chaos Aid to the Soviet Union, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991), pp. 20-22.

APPENDIX IV

FIGURE 5:

RELIEF AGENCIES

Action NORD-SVD	Italian Red Cross
Adventist Develop and Relief Agency	Japan Sotoshu Relief Cte
American Friends Service CTE	Maltese Hilfa Dienst
American Red Cross	Medical Volunteers International
American Refugee CTE	Mideast Council of Churches
AMHURT	Operation Mercy
CARE	OXFAM
Catholic Relief Service	Red Cross and Red Crescent
Christian Outreach	Samaritans Pulse
CONCERN	Save the Children
Danish Church Aid	Swedish National Rescue Board
Doctors Without Borders	Swedish Rescue Service
Doctors of the World	Swiss Charity Team
Equilibre	Swiss Mission
German Bergewacht	Swiss Project of Emergency Help
German Red Cross	Tear Fund/United Kingdom
Global Partners	Turkish Red Crescent
Helo Mission	United Nations
Hulp Aan Kuterdan	UNICEF
International Action Against Hunger	World Council of Churches
International CTE of the Red Cross	World Food Program
International Medical Corps	World Relief International
International Refugee Year Trust	World Vision Relief and Development
International Rescue CTE	World Vision, Australia
Irish Concern	

Source: John M. Shalikashvili, "Statement," U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Aspects of Anti-Chaos Aid to the Soviet Union, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991), p. 14.

APPENDIX V

FIGURE 6:

PROVIDE COMFORT

U. S. MILITARY PARTICIPATION

USA	6,119
USAF	3,588
USMC	1,875
USN	735
TOTAL	12,316

COALITION PARTNERS PARTICIPATION

AUSTRALIANS	75
BELGIANS	150
CANADIANS	120
FRENCH	2,141
GERMANS	221
ITALIANS	1,183
LUXEMBOURG	43
NETHERLANDS	1,020
PORTUGAL	19
SPANISH	602
TURKEY	1,160
UNITED KINGDOM	4,192
TOTAL	10,926

Source: John M. Shalikashvili, "Statement," U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Aspects of Anti-Chaos Aid to the Soviet Union, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991), pp. 12.

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