

**PERSONAL  
EXPERIENCE  
MONOGRAPH**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.


**PANAMA  
DECEMBER 1988 TO MAY 1991**

**BY**

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL ERNEST A . HINOJOSA III  
United States Army**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:**

Approved for public release.  
Distribution is unlimited.



**USAWC CLASS OF 1992**



**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050**

**19950703 043**

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE MONOGRAPH

PANAMA  
DECEMBER 1988 TO MAY 1991

by

Lieutenant Colonel Ernest A. Hinojosa III  
United States Army

PROJECT ADVISER:  
Dr. Doug Johnson

TERM 2

ADVANCED COURSE

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public  
release. Distribution is unlimited.

28 MAY 1992

BOX142

SEMINAR 13

The views expressed in this paper are those of  
the author and do not necessarily reflect the  
views of the Department of Defense or any of  
its agencies. This document may not  
be released for open publication until it  
has been cleared by the appropriate military  
service or government agency.

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

INTRODUCTION

I arrived in Panama on December 1, 1988 to assume command of the 193d Support Battalion (193d Spt Bn). The 193d Spt Bn was a multifunctional, separate support battalion comprised of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, a Supply and Transportation Company, a Direct Support Maintenance Company, a Transportation (Medium Boat) Company, an Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Company, an Ammunition Ordnance Detachment, and an automated Materiel Management Center (MMC). Peacetime responsibilities included providing a full range of direct support maintenance, supply, services, transportation, and waterborne logistical support to a Joint Task Force in Panama, comparable to a divisional size unit. The Battalion also provided support to selected forces operating simultaneously at dispersed locations throughout Central and South America. It also supported the Jungle Operations Training Center with watercraft and land transportation.

During the period of May 1989 through December 1989, as tensions increased and additional forces were deployed to and/or rotated through Panama, the span of Battalion responsibilities increased with each additional unit arrival. Upon execution of Operation Just Cause, the Battalion was supporting the equivalent of a two division force with very little augmentation.

The details of the Battalion's every accomplishment during Operation Just Cause is not the intended purpose of this paper.

Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

Simply stated, the Battalion's performance was truly magnificent, not only in the opinion of this clearly biased, former commander, but as expressed by the Brigade and COSCOM Cdrs, XVIII Abn Corps G-4, USARSO CG, and DCSLOG of the Army. In an effort to document the accomplishments of the Battalion in other than annals within the unit and USARSO, I have enclosed at Annex A, extracts from the Battalion After Action Report. The Executive Summaries for the Battalion and individual units are provided, as well as selected pertinent attachments to each summary.

This monograph first presents an overview of what was not merely an isolated incident, often referred to as an invasion, but a much more complex series of events, worthy of considerable study by political, economic and military planners and strategists. It then presents a personal account of an incident and related circumstances which pertain to issues that are continuously and presently being debated within the Department of the Army, as well as the Department of Defense. The stories related here are intended to provide additional basis for argument and understanding of the issues of women in combat and the media/military interface.

## OVERVIEW-CRISIS IN PANAMA

### INTRODUCTION

On the morning of 20 December 1989, the U.S. and the World awoke to the news of Operation Just Cause. For most, Operation Just Cause came as a complete surprise. To many it was a spontaneous action directly and solely perpetuated by the unfortunate killing of Lieutenant Paz, U.S. Navy, on 16 December 1989 by PDF soldiers. The truth of the matter is a crisis in Panama had existed for some time. The crisis spans a period from June 1987 to the present. Furthermore, the implications of low intensity conflict go far beyond the application of a singular peacetime contingency operation - Just Cause. The Panama crisis is a classic contemporary study of employing virtually all of the types of peacetime contingency operations in one real life crisis.

### BACKGROUND

In June of 1987, General Manuel Antonio Noriega and close confidant - but subordinate - Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera had a parting of ways. The split was so divisive that Colonel Herrera publicly accused General Noriega of supporting drug traffickers, creating conditions which led to General Noriega's indictment and, most recently, his conviction. Reaction in Panama was vocal, physical and chaotic. It was manifested in frequent street demonstrations and national strikes which frequently led to riotous situations. General Noriega initially tried to deal with the situation with repression, nationalistic hype and anti-American rhetoric. He ultimately turned to oppression.

Law and order was deteriorating.

In the spring of 1988 President Reagan reinforced US troops in Panama with a Marine Security Force. In May of 1989, President Bush further reinforced US troops in Panama with a Mechanized Battalion from the 5th ID and a Light Infantry Brigade from 7th ID. This deployment followed the nullified democratic elections and subsequent mugging of duly elected candidates and their supporters in the streets of Panama City. Deployed US troops were to assist assigned forces in protecting US citizens and property and to assert US treaty rights. Throughout the summer and fall the US conducted exercises to assert its treaty rights, but also to irritate the Noriega regime, keep them guessing and to practice elements of various plans. On 3 October 1989, a military coup to "remove" General Noriega from power was attempted. The coup failed and tensions within the population as well as between the governments of Panama and the United States were further strained. November 1989 was marked by heightened security at US installations in Panama due to bomb threats believed to be from Colombian drug cartels. Virtually no assistance was rendered by the Noriega regime to assist US antiterrorism efforts. Throughout this period General Noriega not only continued his nationalistic hype and anti-American rhetoric but, spurred by his successful and highly publicized resistance to Washington pressures, gloatingly intensified it. On 15 December 1989, Noriega successfully manipulated the Legislature into naming him Head of State, and subsequently delivered his most inflammatory

anti-American speech to date. In this speech he described relations between the United States and Panama as a state of war. Given the volatile nature of the country at the time, it was predictable that a deliberate act or unlikely incident would eventually result in armed confrontation if diplomatic initiatives did not quickly defuze tensions. To many's surprise that deliberate act or unlikely incident came a little over 24 hours later. It may never be known whether the killing of LT Paz and the malicious and sexual attacks on another military member and his wife were deliberate or not, but they with the events of the day before were sufficient to prompt President Bush to take decisive military action. On Sunday 17 December 1989, the President directed execution of Operation Just Cause. H-hour was to be 0100 hrs, 20 December 1989.

Due to concerns of leaks in government quarters as well as live news reports from deployment bases in the US, H-hour of Operation Just Cause was moved up officially by 15 minutes. In actuality, H-hour was a little sooner than that. The element of surprise was not completely compromised, but full surprise was certainly lost. The surgical nature of the operation and the efficiency and professionalism of the forces involved quickly negated any gains the PDF may have acquired from advanced knowledge of the operation. For all intended purposes, all stated military objectives were accomplished within 96 hours and all national security objectives were accomplished by 3 January 1990 when General Noriega turned himself over to U.S. authorities.

## DISCUSSION

The deployments of May 1988 and May 1989 were intended to illustrate the U.S. resolve to use force, if necessary, to ensure the safety and security of U.S. personnel and property. Despite this influx of nearly 2 additional brigades of combat forces, Noriega did not blink. Subsequent demonstrations in the form of Sand Flea and Purple Storm exercises had little effect as well on Noriega's inflammatory, anti-American actions and words. FM 100-20 says that the political will to employ actual force - should a demonstration fail - is vital to the success of these operations. The opinion of many regional analysts is that Noriega did not believe that the "whimpish" U.S. President would order any such military action. This view was almost certainly locked in concrete on 3 October 1989 when the U.S. failed to militarily support the Panamanian military coup attempt. This, after President Bush had actively encouraged Panamanians to take such action and, some believe, implied he would come to the aid of such an undertaking.

After the nullified elections and barbarous attacks on the candidate elects and their followers, President Bush directed the return to the U.S. of all U.S. "dependents" who could not be housed on U.S. controlled installations - Operation Blade Jewel. From 10 May 89 to 30 June 89, chaos existed in the military communities of Panama. Not officially termed a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation, it had all the ingredients of one under non-hostile conditions. Understandably there was considerable concern for the U.S. citizenry in Panama, but the



decision to execute caused considerable problems for individuals, families and military organizations. Problems like movement without household goods and POVs on less than a weeks notice; movement without the sponsor - where in some cases the spouse had never been in the United States and knew no one as well; and the dramatic affect 30,60 and 90 day curtailments in tour lengths had on the unit readiness of some organizations. The latter was magnified by the fact that replacements would arrive as originally programmed. This severely debilitated several of the more technical units.

The after affects of Blade Jewel are lingering to this day. Lives of individuals and families are now shattered or hanging on by threads as a result of their experience in Panama in May-June 1989. Unit organizations recovered, but morale and cohesion continued to suffer due to numerous changes in tour lengths and status as an accompanied or unaccompanied tour.

For the better part of two years, a sometimes subtle, sometimes overt form of state sponsored terrorism existed in Panama. As the Noriega regime became more oppressive, its focus oriented towards Panamanians as well as U.S. citizenry. Numerous documented and undocumented incidents of arrests or detentions for obscure reasons were experienced often with verbal and/or physical abuse. Sometimes the activities were not only more overt, but extremely bold. Noteworthy is the day the PDF officials commandeered, by gun point, school buses with U.S. dependents on board. A tense stand off in a large parking lot of a "police" station resulted. While negotiations

went on for several hours, the school children sat scared and extremely uncomfortable in the buses. It's hard to say whether or not the threat of violence or the sweltering heat of the day was the most difficult element for them to endure. Fortunately, negotiations prevailed in this case. This incident clearly demonstrated that the Noriega regime was not adverse to using any means to attain their desired end.

When Colombian Cartels threatened to retaliate for U.S. anti-drug successes against them by bombing U.S. facilities in Panama, the Noriega Regime sat idly by. No assistance in the form of increased security and screenings at ports of entry, nor surveillance and intelligence acquisition from their agents throughout the country was performed or offered. This may be further evidence of General Noriega's increasing confidence of superiority in dealing with the U.S.

It is well known that Just Cause was a military operation conducted against the military regime and infrastructure of Panama. But given the definitions of strike, raid and peacemaking operations in FM 100-20, which peacetime contingency operation would appropriately describe the unilateral action taken by the U.S.?

Applying the elements of each as described in FM 100-20 would appear to rule out a clear alignment to any one of the three. The operation was more of a blend of all three types with a heavy emphasis on the peacemaking operation. This opinion is based on the discretion with which the force was applied; the restrictive rules of engagement that were

established; the political considerations that not only influenced the size and composition of forces employed, but the rapidity of their redeployment as well. It was also true that the regional sensitivities and local law and customs influenced the decisions of the U.S. command authorities prior to, during and after the operation. Regardless of how we ultimately categorize the operation, our categorization is within a context of our own design, not one of universal or even general acceptance. We must be sensitive to the assessments and opinions of others with different perspectives as we judge the past and plan for the future.

Operation Just Cause was successful for several reasons. First, the U.S. employed an overwhelming force to insure reduced casualties on both sides and bring hostilities to a quick end. Second, elements of the plan were practiced frequently in Panama and in CONUS during the preceding six months. Third, the existence of a logistics infrastructure in the area of operation allowed for immediate support, minimized CONUS based resupply, freed up strategic airlift and shortened lines of operation. Fourth, the force structure and the concept of the operation allowed the materiel support requirements to be met by the available CSS assets in country, although not without some risk. Classes I, III, V and water were the priorities of supply during the combat period. The 193d Support Battalion was able to meet the demands of a two division equivalent force by focusing 90 percent of its attention on these classes of supply until the situation in Panama had been brought quickly under control. If

hostilities had been prolonged any longer than two weeks, support would have been an Achilles heel. It is important to note that the support lessons of Operation Just Cause are particularly applicable to planning efforts of future force projection scenarios.

Security Assistance to the Panamanian government had virtually ceased with the U.S. legal indictments of General Noriega. U.S. initiatives were directed to other countries in the region. Just Cause redirected our interests. Even before the complete cessation of hostilities, the U.S. started a full court press with security assistance for Panama. Engineering and construction, medical assistance and law enforcement training were at the forefront of our effort. The engineering and construction and medical assistance continues today.

A little over a year ago, Costa Rica and Panama suffered a sizable earthquake. The damage and devastation were severe and taxing to both governments, but possibly more so to the new and still floundering Panamanian government. Forces assigned to Panama were crucial to the relief effort and invaluable to the Panamanian government agencies responsible for the overall planning and execution.

#### CONCLUSION

The mere mention of Panama to someone could generate a number of different responses. Some would respond with thoughts of the engineering achievement of the Panama Canal. Others would conjure up thoughts of warm weather, sunny beaches and "Panama" hats. Still others would immediately respond with some

characterization of General Noriega and/or the successful military operation Just Cause. Very few would think in terms of a country in crisis; a crisis which strained U.S. and Panamanian relations to beyond diplomatic repair; a crisis which led to the armed hostilities of Operation Just Cause, the deposing of a tyrant and dictator, the restoration of hope for a new democratic way of life for a deserving people, and the potential for a peaceful and harmonious coexistence in the region; and a crisis which offered a fertile training arena for peacetime contingency and other LIC operations.

In a world where the most likely threat to peace is regional conflicts mired in confrontations short of war, it behoves us to give adequate attention and proper study to our overall experience in Panama. It is reasonable to believe that this experience may hold the key to even more successful political, economic or military applications as we endeavor to meet the challenges of a new world order and a changing global environment.

With Desert Shield and Desert Storm following literally on the heels of Operation Just Cause, much of the immediate benefit and all of the potential benefit of our experience has not only been overshadowed, but virtually forgotten. The lessons of Desert Storm are not discounted, their study and incorporation into doctrinal applications is important, but so are the lessons spanning the entire period of crisis in Panama.

The senior service colleges are the ideal focal points for

such concentrated study, discussion, analysis and bi-product development. I know first hand that this year at the Army War College, the Army did not optimize its opportunity. It was evident through research earlier in the year that the Class of 1991 spent very little time devoted to the aftermath of Panama. In all likelihood, and understandably so, their focus was quite likely rivetted to the Desert.

Now is the time, as the justifiable excitement over our successes in the Desert subsides, to commit to a serious and comprehensive study of our Panamanian crisis experience. We must renew this focus while the memories are still fresh. Not to do so would give reason to question the Army's commitment to a lessons learned program.

## WOMEN IN COMBAT

One of the earliest stories to come out of Operation Just Cause was the dramatized performance of CPT Linda L. Bray, Cdr of the Military Police Company that captured a PDF barracks and military dog kennel in the vicinity of Panama City. As the first female commander of a combat mission, publicity was prolific and unceasing. Every bit of news media was trying to out do one another in covering the story. The story eventually became overdramatized and fell subject to a lack of continued interest except to those who, loaded with this valuable, real life example, renewed with a vengeance their fight for the placement of women in direct combat roles.

It was not unexpected that any good news person would jump on any indication of an incident which would provide a contrasting perspective or better yet, a contradicting argument. Such an incident was fed to the media, specifically CBS. The source was an experienced and somewhat senior member of one of the supported combat units. The incident reported was the alleged refusal, under orders, of two of my female drivers to drive combat forces into an area where hostilities were fully expected. The incident had occurred on the morning of the 20th of December and yet it wasn't until the early part of January that CBS was prompted by the source to aggressively pursue the story to set the record of females in combat straight. Apparently, the intense, positive publicity being communicated to the general public with regard to women in combat was too much for some to bear.

Regardless of motive behind the divulgence of the story, what was significant to me was the inordinate amount of time that I was forced to spend on a not insignificant matter, but certainly not an issue of such urgency to warrant top priority during a very critical support period in the operation. I had been apprised of the incident shortly after its occurrence, but based on initial information, from a variety of sources, did not then, nor now believe it was necessary to divert attention from the immediate, formidable tasks at hand. In due course, sufficient time would be available and utilized to investigate the alleged incident appropriately, rationally, and completely. Yet, for the better part of the next two to three weeks, much of my time was spent handling inquiries through command channels, PAO channels and on occasion direct into my Headquarters from a variety of official and unofficial parties. Of even greater significance to me was the eye opening experience of a first hand encounter with the news media on a "national level" story. My experience left me with considerable skepticism about accuracy and fairness in our national media. My experience, unfortunately, gives argument to a military position of exercising caution when dealing with the media.

#### THE MEDIA IN MY BACKYARD

My media dilemma began when, one afternoon early in January, I received a call from the USARSO PAO. They had received a call from CBS requesting access to the support unit in the operation. CBS had received reports that the magnitude of the logistics of the operation and the performance of the units



involved was an untold story which they wished to capture. The words of the PAO representative were music to my ears. The soldiers of the Battalion had performed and continued to perform magnificently during the operation, accomplishing much more than should have been expected of them. As my elation and eagerness grew, the PAO representative tempered my enthusiasm with the caveat that the inquirer had casually referred to an incident involving female drivers and asked if she, the PAO representative, was aware of any such incident. She informed him she was not, and that she would attempt to set up an interview or two for his interest in support operations.

As our conversation continued she asked about his female driver question. I related the information I had been given shortly after the incident. Two of the female drivers assigned to support combat forces, since the early stages of alert on the 16th of December, had driven through the initial assault on 20 December encountering hostile fire then and on subsequent missions through the night. On the morning of the 20th the two drivers had been rounded up along with several other vehicles and drivers and taken to Albrook Air Station to support a follow on mission in Panama City. While awaiting instructions to move out, one of the female drivers asked a CPT from the unit being supported if the mission was into Panama City and if there would be any firing. Upon hearing an affirmative answer she for the first time expressed a reluctance to go. The second female driver overhearing the conversation expressed a similar

reluctance. The CPT's response was to reportedly shake his head and walk away. The two drivers repeated their reluctance to a SSG in the supported unit who passed the problem over to a nearby LT. The LT spoke briefly to both drivers about their fears, but left shortly thereafter. The drivers ultimately talked to a Specialist from the supported unit who, as best as it could be determined, was the senior soldier present. He attempted to reassure them, but eventually made a command decision and relieved them of their driver duties, replaced them with members of his unit, and provided transportation to the drivers back to their unit.

Hearing the story, she cautioned me that the CBS correspondent might have a hidden agenda. She quickly followed up by saying that if I were to commit to the interview, she would be in attendance to offer assistance, if needed. With the desire to get due recognition for the yeoman effort extended by the personnel of the Battalion, I agreed to the interview.

The following morning the PAO representative and CBS correspondent showed up at my office. The introductions were cordial and the first few minutes focused on the role and missions of the Battalion and my appraisal of its performance. Within minutes he was asking about specific missions, specifically truck missions in support of combat forces. He was then interested in the number of females I had assigned to the Battalion and what duties did they perform? At that moment, the PAO representative and I both knew that her caution the day before had been well perceived and conveyed.

Obviously, the interview was now focused to a specific incident which, as he asked his questions, it was obvious he was more interested in then support operations. Furthermore, it was apparent that he had received considerable input, biased as it appeared to be, before soliciting the PAO for the interview. The interview lasted roughly 35 to 40 minutes. Despite his access to me on false pretenses I was quite candid and forthright with him. I had very little detail to give him as a complete investigation had not been completed. He was informed that an inquiry was ongoing to determine the facts and once conclusive, they would determine the basis for disciplinary action, if any. The reasoning for delaying the inquiry was provided. He was assured that the investigation would be pursued in the best interests of the individuals in question, as well as the government. His general line of questioning was designed, in my opinion, to get me to cast aspersion on the capabilities and motivations of the female soldier. He wanted to know if there were differences in quality of work and overall production? Were female soldiers more suitable for certain jobs then others? Did the alleged incident indicate reasonable concerns about the emotional or mental ability of females to endure combat? My responses did nothing to support his now, not so "hidden" agenda.

I conveyed to him my sincere belief that the soldiers in the Battalion, male and female, had performed their duties fully, responsibly and admirably. I related examples of performances that I witnessed personally and others which had been related to

me by leaders from within and from outside the Battalion. He clearly was not buying my assessment. I was asked if I would be willing to be interviewed on tape. I responded that I personally had no objection, but a request through the PAO would have to be cleared by the Command first. This was immediately confirmed by the PAO rep in attendance. It was at this point that the interview ended as cordially as it started.

Immediately the next morning, the CBS correspondent was on the phone in his hotel room calling direct into my Headquarters. I took the first call and reminded him of the requirement to pass his request through the PAO. He expressed a desire to be able to handle this without their involvement, but I impressed upon him that I was obligated to abide by and would comply with the established procedures. Several other direct attempts were made, but my staff appropriately referred his, and now other requests, to the PAO. By the day after the interview in my office, the JAG had advised against any taped interview until at least the results of the investigating officers inquiry were known. When it became clearly apparent that they would not be able to get a taped interview forthrightly, and that other media agencies were working feverishly for "the story", CBS went ahead and broadcast their "exclusive" news story.

The CBS report of approximately two minutes aired several nights after the interview. It was skewed by information provided by the original source and others willing to corroborate opinion rather than fact. Furthermore it was sensationalized by an inaccurate lead in by Dan Rather in which

he dramatically announces that "CBS News had learned that charges may be filed against two female soldiers who refused combat orders." [1] CBS reporter Bob McNamara then reports that military sources (read original source) report that "the first review of the incident says flatly that female drivers during combat is a no go." He adds further that "an officer of a [combat] unit involved said if my boys had done it, they'd already be in jail." He quickly adds that to the time of this report there had been no known cases of male soldiers refusing combat orders. A segment of an interview with General Thurman was included in which the General expresses praise for the performance of woman soldiers before and during the operation. I'm not sure if this was a sincere attempt at fairness, truth, and balance in their reporting, but I opine it was not. With the grossly inaccurate reporting in the lead in and beginning of the report, the damage was irreversible for the moment. The piece concluded with a paraphrased quotation of my response to the interviewer's persistent questions regarding this incident pointing to evidence of a gender gap. It was the only reference made of information conveyed in our 40 minute interview. "But a soldier issue is what one commander calls the case of the women who wouldn't drive to combat, not a male/female issue", was an accurate paraphrase of my response and of my true position relative to the issue.

Once the CBS report aired Pandora's Box was opened. The

[1]Note: The CBS report on Women in Combat aired on or about the 19th of January 1990. References to the story were extracted from a taped copy of the report contained in my personal video tape library.

command, the Battalion and the PAO were besieged with inquiries. An inordinate amount of time and valuable resources were dedicated to responding to the numerous Congressional and DOD inquiries as well as the media requests. In the meantime an informal AR 15-6 investigation officer continued to delve into the facts of the incident.

#### INVESTIGATION RESULTS

The investigating officer was a Major from the USARSO JAG office. His investigation comprised four days of interviews with key participants and witnesses to the events of 20 December, as well as incidents which had occurred during the months leading up to Operation Just Cause. Leaders from both the supporting and supported units were queried as well. Several key individuals were interviewed more than once in a full attempt to clarify conflicting input.

In his report of inquiry, the investigating officer outlined several critical facts. First, the two drivers were identified to provide transportation to combatants from Albrook Air Field to the Commandancia. Second, they were informed hostile fire was probable. Both soldiers expressed reluctance to go, fearing their safety. The OIC attempted to abate their fears, but was unsuccessful and unwittingly left soon after. The two soldiers continued to express apprehension. Third, the soldiers finally talked to a Specialist, who it was confirmed was the senior soldier present. He too attempted to reassure them, and though he thought they might be persuaded to go, their dependability in his estimation was tenuous. Unable to locate his platoon leader

for advice and assistance, and acting on his own initiative, he found two soldiers from his unit and replaced the two drivers.

The investigating officers conclusions were: (1) that neither driver had committed an offense punishable under the UCMJ, (2) that no NCO, officer, or member of the chain of command participated in the decision to replace the soldiers, and (3) the Specialist's actions were reasonable under the circumstances.

#### OTHER FACTORS CONSIDERED

To some this was a cut and dry case. To many it was representative of what they had believed and/or said for some time with respect to women in combat. What appears on the surface is not always indicative of what lies underneath.

As a result of Blade Jewell, my assigned driver strength had suffered considerably. By the end of the summer, I was barely able to man 60 percent of the task vehicle fleet. Commencing with the beginning of the new fiscal year, and I dare say because of the failed coup attempt of 3 October, I began to see a steady flow of vehicle operators coming in from AIT. The two drivers in question had six months or less in the unit and not much more in the Army. Not only were their driving skills in the early stages of development, but so were their soldiers skills.

Discriminatory practices, with respect to gender, had been evident in incidents prior to the execution of Operation Just Cause. Several incidents of female drivers being replaced by leadership in units being supported had occurred as well as

incidents where harassment had been indicated, but unable to be conclusively substantiated. Each of these incidents, that had been reported through the chain of command, were addressed by the respective senior leadership of the supported and supporting organizations. The facts in each case were never clearly sufficient to warrant any serious disciplinary action, but did result in an articulated heightened emphasis to ensure non-discriminatory practices, specifically gender related, by supported combat units.

The articulated party line was drivers were drivers and there would be no segregation of drivers to support combat forces and a mixture of male/female for general support. Yet, the combat arms mindset was that women do not belong in combat nor do they directly support the soldier on the FLOT. This perspective was blatantly and openly expressed to female drivers in the execution of their duties throughout the build up period prior to Operation Just Cause, and during its execution. The occurrences became more frequent as tensions between Noriega and the U.S. increased and the possibility of hostilities more likely.

The senior leaders of combat organizations were as guilty of this mindset as the macho private in the first squad of the first platoon of any combat company. Yes, when presented with a specific incident they took steps to return discipline and good order, but not because of their strong belief in the policies of the Army to employ women in certain roles, but because it could be potentially harmful to one's career as well as embarrassing.



Their commitment waned as the memory of the last incident faded over time.

#### ACTIONS TAKEN

After considering the facts and conclusions of the investigating officer and after reading the statements of the individuals interviewed, I decided that disciplinary action under the UCMJ was not warranted and no charges were preferred. The chain of command continued to assist both soldiers, as well as other soldiers, in their efforts to overcome traumatizations they had experienced because of their involvement in operations before and during Operation Just Cause. The results of the inquiry and actions taken were explained to the soldiers of the Battalion, and officers and NCOs received professional development classes relating to the failure of leadership in this case.

#### OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

An important lesson to be learned from this incident is the absolute necessity for leaders to become immediately immersed in troop leading incidents. They must know enough to recognize them, and must understand that there may be a multitude of ways of dealing with a specific, and often times unique, situation.

The media is a necessary element of our environment and a potentially strong ally. Caution in dealing with them is appropriate at all times, but not carried to the excess of creating the adversarial relationship we so often witness. In this regard, the PAO is generally your best teammate. Commanders and leaders at all levels should seek the assistance

and support of their command's respective expertise as early as possible, regardless of the subject being controversial or not. The PAO is there to serve the command, not just the commander.

Media training, such as offered here at the Army War College, should be expanded within the institution, as well as in some applicable way in other professional development courses for both officers and NCOs. The media/military interface will intensify as improving technologies afford the media opportunity to continue its dynamic and rapidly changing methods of covering world events. We must remember that less than 50 years ago news from the front took days, maybe weeks, to get to those waiting at home. Today it is in our living rooms, quite often while it is happening. The media, in the bat of an eye, has moved from the backyard into the house. Equally important is the constantly increasing number of uninvited house guests. It is essential to prepare junior and intermediate leaders as well as our senior leaders to handle this growingly important element of their profession. There will not always be a PAO representative at their side; not to protect them, but to support them.

Combatant command leaders are more often ill-prepared to deal with the nuances of leadership required of organizations with the assigned personnel of both sexes. It is my observation that it is generally those who do not work with female soldiers on a daily basis, whether because of branch affiliation or by choice, that tend to retain ancient cultural beliefs and stereotypical mindsets which are counter-productive to discipline and good order, and efficiencies and esprit in

organizations. In 22 years of service, I have witnessed female subordinates, peers and superiors perform professionally, competently and admirably. Leaders observed have held positions as varied and highly responsible as their male counterparts. Soldiers I have led, to include stevedores, truck drivers, mechanics and ammo handlers, have performed their jobs on par with their male counterparts.

The success that the CSS units have had in this area is a direct result of the senior NCOs and officers in our current force developing and maturing in an environment of generally peaceful coexistence with our female subordinates, peers and superiors. The male leaders and soldiers in combat service support organizations have been overhauling hard-line chauvinistic thought processes and adapting to the change in a perceived gender gap for several decades. It is not an overnight process, nor achieved by simple directive or order. Cultural changes never are. But they are never to occur if commitment is not genuine in the senior leadership, both officer and NCO alike. This is seriously lacking in the combat arms community and some parts of the combat support.

Training in the accession, basic, advanced and staff college courses of instruction is necessary to have any impact on real change in the long run. Continued, genuine emphasis by senior leadership is absolutely necessary to minimize the disruption and threat to discipline and good order in the current and near term environment. We need not look further than our sister service the Navy for a motivational example. Furthermore, if we

continue any lockstep, parochial or biased ways and/or fail to take positive steps toward real change, we will find ourselves once again adhering to policy changes and methods of implementation provided to us by Congressional mandate.

#### SUMMARY

This experience, as well as some other experiences during my tour in Panama, were not always desirable, but in the long run have been impetus for reflection on both my personal and professional life, changed the way I perceive certain issues and resulted in positive changes in the way I handle certain responsibilities. I would not like to relive my Panamanian experience, but I am not regretful of the experience. Most importantly, I am extremely proud to have been associated with the soldiers, female and male, of the 193d Support Battalion whose monumental and magnificent performance during Operation Just Cause was pivotal to the operation's success.

ANNEX A

EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES

FROM THE

193d SUPPORT BATTALION

OPERATION JUST CAUSE AFTER ACTION REPORT

BN



**OPERATION  
JUST CAUSE**

**193RD SUPPORT BATTALION**

**AFTER ACTION REPORT**





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 193D SUPPORT BATTALION  
FORT CLAYTON, PANAMA

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF  
SOSU-SUB

8 January 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 41st Area Support Group, Corozal, Panama

SUBJECT: Executive Summary for Operation Just Cause

1. Early morning, 20 December 1989, the 193rd Support Battalion, as part of in-place Army Forces (ARFOR), began supporting the 23,000+ forces of Operation Just Cause in the Republic of Panama. From CSS soldiers driving infantry in 2-1/2 Ton trucks under fire, to detailed bus drivers receiving sniper fire while supporting the U.S. press corps, to LCM-8 crews performing combat patrols and rendering suppressive fires for landing troops, to fuel handlers refueling helicopters while receiving covering fire from attack helicopters, to CSS headquarters locations under sporadic mortar fire - our Battalion personnel were there.

2. Alpha Company (S&T), 193rd Support Battalion established LUZON FIELD, FORT CLAYTON, on the Pacific side as the staging area for aerial resupply of water and fuel blivets early on. Recognizing the growing magnitude of distribution requirements (by air and truck) it was decided to transform the operation into a full blown distribution point. We immediately took action to secure an initial 3,000 cases of MRE'S, filled all available fuel and water blivets, and established areas for CL V and CL IV. From that point forward, LUZON FIELD became the supply hub of a Unit Distribution System for helicopter and truck transportation for the Operation. Alpha had distributed the following (approximate) amounts from LUZON:

By 28 December 89  
(APPROX 85% BY CH47  
- 275 STONS)

By 3 January 1990  
(APPROX 90% REMAINDER BY TRUCK  
- 90 STONS):

CL I	<u>68.2</u> STONS	<u>77.3</u> STONS
CL II	<u>4.0</u>	<u>4.8</u>
CL III	<u>61.0</u>	<u>141.0</u>
CL IV	<u>11.3</u>	<u>13.3</u>
CL V	<u>142.6</u>	NO CHANGE
CL VI	<u>7.5</u>	NO CHANGE
CL VIII	<u>.9</u>	NO CHANGE
CL IX	<u>1.0</u>	NO CHANGE
WATER	<u>25.0</u>	<u>33.3</u>

TOTAL: 321.5 STONS

421.7 STONS

3. In addition, Alpha Company (S&T) was busy transporting approximately 250 infantry soldiers to their offensive kick-off positions (many of the trucks stayed with the infantry for days - some drivers returning fire along side the infantry). Alpha also operated two large-scale hot refuel points, pumping approximately 110,000 gallons in the first eight days. A Company then provided a mini-FAST (CL I, III, V, and water) to Rio Hato (2



SOSU-SU

8 January 1990

SUBJECT: Executive Summary for Operation Just Cause

Bde/7ID), and jumped their FSSP forward to David. Finally, the company established a substantial Ammunition Transfer Point at Fort Clayton and a GRREG point at Albrook Air Force Station.

4. Meanwhile, the 193rd Support Battalion's 1097th Transportation Company (Medium Boat) was conducting combat and combat service support missions on the Atlantic side and in the Canal itself. By 31 December, it had transported 2,442 passengers (plus 848 EPW's), and 738 STONS of cargo.

5. B Company played a large role in security operations at Fort Clayton, Corozal, and at the Refugee Center. As time progressed, Bravo Company (DS maintenance) began the enormous task of recovery of both U.S. and enemy battle damaged vehicles. Echo Company (AVIM), was not only involved in keeping the U.S. Army helicopters flying, but assessed and made operational several enemy captured helicopters. The 565th Ordnance Detachment (Ammunition), operated the only in-country ammunition supply points, issuing over 450 STONS of CL V by the time U.S. forces began mopping up. The 565th also began the chore of receiving truckloads of captured ammunition (this mission still ongoing). At the same time, the HHC was busy orchestrating operations, intelligence (processed 75 SALUTE Reports), and materiel management through its Logistics Operations Center.

6. At H-hour, the Battalion was at 69% authorized strength required to support the equivalent of a two division force. Over the course of time, the Battalion received the assistance of various augmentation elements. The I Co, 159th Aviation Regiment, 8th Ordnance Company, 513 Maintenance Company, HHC 7th DISCOM, 364th S&S Company, 612th, 403rd, 406th, 546th, and 126th Transportation Companies, and from the Army National Guard, HHC, 419th Combat Aviation Group, all provided assistance to the Battalion. In total an additional 88 soldiers were thrust into the CSS effort. Their assistance was invaluable, their role equally important and their performance equivalent to that of the Battalion.

7. The Battalion received some equipment augmentation: 2 ea 6,000 LB Forklifts (A CO) from DOM, 41st ASG, and 4 ea 5T Cargo trucks (A CO) from 142nd Medical Battalion

8. The Battalion began winding-down combat service operations and began picking up redeployment support in the form of maintenance contact teams and defuel/refuel services at Tocumen/Torrijos Airports and Howard Air Force Base, 7 - 26 January.



ERNEST A. HINOJOSA III

Enclosures

1. Bn Staff Journal Extract LTC, TC
2. Mission-Taskings Summary Commanding
3. Maps of Areas of Operation

BATTALION STAFF JOURNAL EXTRACT

20 DECEMBER

0030 HOT REFUEL POINTS (VENADO AND EMPIRE RANGE) 100% OPERATIONAL

0030 PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION FOR 5/87TH INF BN TO ATTACK POSITIONS (12  
2-1/2T'S) 8 TRUCKS ROLL. 4 IN RESERVE.

0030 4 LCM'S IN DS OF TF ATLANTIC (7ID).

0136 HOT REFUEL POINT EMPIRE REPORTS ENEMY MORTAR POSITION NEUTRALIZED BY AHI  
SUPPRESSIVE FIRE NEARBY

0220 41ST NET JAMMED. SWITCHED TO AJ FREQ.

0246 RECEIVED ORDER: ACTIVATE ATP

0400 INCOMING - 3 ROUNDS (NEAR DAS3 VAN, TECH SUPPLY WHSE, AND A CO MOTOR  
POOL

0435 LAUNCHED S&P'S TO BEGIN TRANS FOR ATP

0620 CW3 LAMBERT REPORTS UNID'D INTRUDERS AT ASP GATE: HIS TROOPS ENGAGE  
WITH SMALL ARMS AND THEY RUN.

0950 MCC RELAYS ONLY SECURE ROUTE IS FROM CLAYTON TO COROZAL TO ALBROOK.

1100 193RD NOTIFIED TO PICK-UP 12 AUGMENTATION 77F'S AT HAFB

1218 GRREG SITE ESTABLISHED. A/193RD.

1617 1097 TRANSPORTS C CO 82ND FROM STURGIS TO GAMBOA. TROOPS OVERRUN PDF  
PRISON CAMP, GAMBOA. VESSEL 08 TAKES SMALL ARMS FIRE. NO INJURIES.  
BOAT RETURNS TO STURGIS, PICKS UP AMMO AND RUCKS AND DELIVERS TO GAMBOA.

1700 A/193RD SPT ESTABLISHES LUZON FIELD AS SLING-LOAD SITE. RECEIVED  
MISSION TO SLING 3 WATER AND 3 FUEL BLIVOTS TO 82ND AT TOCUMEN.

2105 REQUESTED HELO TRANS FROM ASP\*1 TO ASP\*2 FOR 5 STONS FOR 2300.

2300 HELO MSN UNDERWAY

21 DEC

0151 SOC CALLS FOR EMERG ISSUE AMMO TO 2/7ID.

0225 INCOMING MORTAR ROUNDS NEAR ATP AND CURUNDU ELEMENTARY SCHOOL.

BATTALION STAFF JOURNAL EXTRACT (contd)

1130 SOC REQUESTS IMMEDIATE RESUPPLY OF AMMO TO 2/509 PINNED DOWN NEAR MARRIOT HOTEL.

1900 RECEIVED HEADS-UP MISSION TO ESTABLISH HOT REFUEL AT RIO HATO.

2330 FIRST LOGPACS BEGIN HELO INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LOADING LUZON FIELD.

22 DEC

1320 1097TH REPORTS TRUCK LOAD OF CAPTURED ARMS AND AMMO AT DOCK 45.

23 DEC

0350 RECEIVED EXECUTION ORDER 90-2A. ESTABLISH FAST AT RIO HATO.

0450 CH47 CARGO HOOK INOP ON LUZON. ATTEMPT TO LOAD INTERNAL W/500 GL WATER BLIVET - WINCH BREAKS - NO GO ON RESUPPLY TO 2/7ID.

0826 ATC EMPIRE SITE ORDERED TO BREAK DOWN. PASSED TO A/193RD TO CEASE OPS NLT 1700 AND DISPLACE BACK TO CLAYTON.

1900 23 DEC-0400 24 DEC : 193RD SPT MINI FAST DEPLOYS BY C130'S TO RIO HATO.

24 DEC

1830 193RD BDE STATES RIGGERS WERE CHOPPED TO A/193RD SPT, BUT WERE DIVERTED BY COSCOM.

25 DEC

0100 FIRST A/193RD SPT CONVOY TO RIO HATO: 1 5K, 1 HEMMT FUELER, 1 M1008, 1 HEMMT WKR, TWO MP ESCORTS AND OA37 (DRAGONFLY) AIR COVER, CONVOY CDR: 1LT WELCH.

1130 RECEIVED MISSION ANOTHER CONVOY TO RIO HATO TO RESUPPLY FUEL. MP ESCORT AND AIR COVER BEING COORDINATED.

1955 A/193D SPT CONVOY DEPARTS RIO HATO: 2 5K TANKERS, 2 HEMMTS, 1 5T S&P W/FSSP, THREE MP ESCORTS. CONVOY CDR: 1LT WELCH.

26 DEC

1140 CONVOY DEPARTS FOR TOCUMEN - 82ND AIRBORNE LOGPACS.

1700 RECEIVED WORD THAT ONLY 5,000 GL WERE PUMPED FROM LAST NIGHT'S CONVOY TO RIO HATO. THE REST RETURNED (10,000 GL).

2206 NOTIFIED THAT FSSP AT DAVID WOULD BE RESUPPLIED VIA WET BIRD C-130.

BATTALION STAFF JOURNAL EXTRACT (contd)

27 DEC

- 0030 LT WELCH DISPLACED FSSP FROM RIO HATO TO DAVID. REQUESTS ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT ASAP.
- 0400 NOTIFIED TO PROVIDE 3 2-1/2 T TRUCKS TO HANGAR 3.
- 0910 NOTIFIED BY MCC THAT MSR'S TO TOCUMEN, RIO HATO, AND FT DAVIS WERE OPEN, BUT TO DAVIS REQUIRED ARMED ESCORT.
- 1814 RECEIVED WORD THAT DAVID FSSP REQUIRES MORE EQUIPMENT.

28 DEC

- 0400 DISPATCHED EQUIPMENT FOR DAVID FSSP TO HAFB (2 463L PALLETS).
- 1900 ASP#1 CALLS: 7 TRUCK LOADS OF AMMO AND ARMS FROM RIO HATO DROVE UP. 14 MORE ENROUTE. NEEDS 250 PALLETS.

29 DEC

- 1230 ASP#1 NEEDS 250 MORE PALLETS FOR CAPTURED AMMO
- 1800 RIO HATO MINI-FAST REDEPLOYS BACK TO FT CLAYTON
- 2330 LT WELCH BROUGHT JET A1 FUEL SAMPLE BACK FORM DAVID. NOT SUITABLE FOR AIRCRAFT.

30 DEC

- 0800 RETURNED DRIVERS TO LTC FOXWORTH, 142ND MED. RETAINING TRUCKS UNTIL 3 JAN.

1 JAN 90

- 1525 POL AUGMENTEES DEPART FOR DAVID TO REINFORCE LT WELCH'S TEAM.

3 JAN 90

- 1200 FINAL CLOSURE OF ATP AT TROPIC TEST CENTER AREA.

5 JAN 90

- 1200 ATP CLOSES.

7 JAN

- 1410 COL JOHNSON DIRECTS CLOSURE OF DAVID POL OPERATIONS.

MISSION-TASKINGS SUMMARY

A. EQUIPMENT & PERSONNEL

200100 DEC PROVIDE 2 SQUADS FOR SECURITY OF COROZAL (B CO)

200218 DEC PROVIDE 2 - 44 PAX BUS DRIVERS (HHC)

200921 DEC PROVIDE WATER TRAILERS FOR EPW CAMP (A, B, HHC)

200940 DEC 2 - 5KW GENS TO EMPIRE RANGE EPW CAMP (B CO)

202300 DEC PROVIDE 5 KW GEN W/OPERATOR FOR ALBROOK EPW CAMP (B CO)

211259 DEC SET UP SHOWER POINT, EPW CAMP EMPIRE (A CO)

212000 DEC ASSESS AND REPAIR 12 PDF AIRCRAFT TECUMEN (E CO)

212106 DEC PROVIDE WELDER & EQUIP TO COMMANDANCIA (OPENS SAFE) (B CO)

211615 DEC PROVIDE 8 GUARDS FOR REFUGEE CAMP (B CO)

231153 DEC PROVIDE SERVICE AND RECOVERY (B CO)

231155 DEC PROVIDE MKT'S AND 2 COOKS TO SPT REFUGEE CAMP (HHC/B CO)

240300 DEC TEMPORARY RETAIL REFUEL POINT FOR 71D (A CO)

240830 DEC WRECKER HAUL CARS COMMANDANCIA (B CO)

240845 DEC REPAIR DAS-3 VAN COROZAL (B CO)

241015 DEC MECHANIC TO REPAIR PUMP AT RODMAN (B CO)

30ASAP DEC 1 EA 30 KW GENERATOR FOR 470TH MI BN

30ASAP DEC B COMPANY TO PROVIDE 1 CONTACT TEAM TO REPAIR 30 KW GENERATOR

300700 DEC 1- WRECKER TO GO TO FT AMADOR TO LIFT OH-58 HELICOPTER

310900 DEC 1 - WRECKER TO SUPPORT FOR 5T COMM VAN (B CO).

311300 DEC 1 - WRECKER TO RECOVER FREE A 10K FORKLIFT MIREED IN THE MUD (B CO).

31ASAP DEC 1 - GENERATOR MECHANIC WITH TOOL BOX IN SUPPORT OF HHC, 193D SPT.

011800 JAN 1 - 7 1/2 T CRANE W/OPERATOR TO UPLOAD EQUIPMENT FOR 528TH SPT BN.

01ASAP JAN 1 - BANDING KIT (COMPLETE WITH BANDAGE AND CLIPS) FOR 7TH ID.

011500 JAN 1 - WRECKER SUPPORT TO MOVE PDF UNSERVICEABLE BUS, 193D INF BDE.

MISSION-TASKINGS SUMMARY (contd)

01ASAP JAN 1 - FUEL TANKER TO TOP OFF VEHICLES ON THE ATLANTIC, 7TH ID.

010930 JAN 1 - FORKLIFT TO MOVE 1,000LB BARRIERS, 193D INF BDE.

021600 JAN 1 - 5K GENERATOR IN SUPPORT OF COSCOM.

021300 JAN 1 - 5K GENERATOR MECHANIC IN SUPPORT OC COSCOM.

020600 JAN 1 - 40 PAX BUS DRIVER IN SUPPORT OF DSPO.

020900 JAN 1 - WRECKER TO RECOVER A V300, 2/504TH.

020900 JAN 1 - WRECKER TO RECOVER PDF VEHICLES, 1/508.

020900 JAN 1 - WRECKER TO RECOVER DOWN ST WRECKER, 1097TH.

021300 JAN 1 - 7 1/2T CRANE IN SUPPORT OF 193D INF BDE TO MOVE BARRIERS.

021330 JAN 1 - 6K R/T FORKLIFT MECHANIC AT ASP1, RODMAN.

021330 JAN 1 - WRECKER TO RECOVER DOWN VEHICLE AT PANAMA VIEJO, 41ST SOC.

021600 JAN 1 - 5K GENERATOR WITH OPERATOR TO PROVIDE LIGHTING AT COMMAND-  
ANCIA.

231400 DEC 1 - FORKLIFT MOVE BARRIERS LEGISLATIVE PALACE, PANAMA CITY

030800 JAN 1 - SMALL ARMS CONTACT TEAM IN SPT OF WEAPON PROC CENTER,  
ALBROOK.

031600 JAN 1 - CONTACT TEAM TO REPLACE GENERATOR BRACKET BOLTS IN SPT OF  
1/508 INF.

040700 JAN 1 - WPN CONTACT TEAM TO REMOVE BREECH BLOCK ON ZU24.

040800 JAN 1 - 6K FORKLIFT TO SPT SERRO TIGRE.

041130 JAN 1 - WRECKER TO MOVE (11) V-100 PDF VEHICLES, SUPPORTED ELEMENT  
DOM.

041500 JAN 1 - 7.5 CRANE TO LIFT CAPTURED ADA GUNS, SUPPORTED ELEMENT  
COSCOM.

041600 JAN 1 - 500 GALLON WATER BLIVET AND 1 - 500 GALLON MOGAS BLIVET IN  
SPT OF 2D BDE, 7TH ID.

041700 JAN 1 - CONTACT TEAM TO REPAIR FORKLIFTS, SUPPORTED ELEMENT COSCOM.

04ASAP JAN 1 - WRECKER TO TRANSPORT PDF BUS, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 193D INF  
BDE.

MISSION-TASKINGS SUMMARY (contd)

050700 JAN 1 - 7.5 CRANE, SUPPORTED ELEMENT DSPO.

050700 JAN 1 - WRECKER TO LIFT ARTY PIECES, SUPPORTED ELEMENT COSCOM.

051000 JAN 1 - WRECKER TO REMOVE (2) 2 1/2T TRKS, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 193D INF.

060630 JAN 1 - WRECKER SUPPORT TO ASSIST IN RECOVERY MSN, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 1ST COSCOM.

061600 JAN 1 - CONTACT TEAM AND FUEL/DEFUEL VEHICLES AT TOCUMEN, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 82ND AIRBORNE (A CO).

070700 JAN 1 - MAINTENANCE CONTACT TEAM TO HAFB, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 82ND AIRBORNE.

070700 JAN 1 - DEFUEL/REFUEL TEAM AT HAFB, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 82ND AIRBORNE.

071500 JAN 1 - CONTACT TEAM FOR A 4K FORKLIFT, SUPPORTED ELEMENT ADAAG.

07ASAP JAN 1 - WRECKER TO RECOVER (1) 2 1/2T, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 193D INF.

080800 JAN 1 - 6K FORKLIFT, SUPPORTED ELEMENT TTC.

080800 JAN 1 - 7.5 CRANE, SUPPORTED ELEMENT DENTAC.

080800 JAN 1 - WATER TRAILER, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 7TH ID.

080830 JAN 1 - FORKLIFT MECHANIC AT HAFB, SUPPORTED ELEMENT ADAC.

080845 JAN 1 - 7.5 CRANE, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 154TH SIGNAL.

081700 JAN 1 - AIR COND MECHANIC, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 127TH SIG BN.

081900 JAN 1 - 7.5 CRANE, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 519 MP.

MISSION-TASKINGS SUMMARY (CONTD)

B. TRANSPORTATION MISSIONS

STATIC:

- 6 2-1/2T TRUCKS TF ATLANTIC (RELEASED 7 JAN 90)
- 6 2-1/2T TRUCKS 5/87 IN (RELEASED 3 JAN 90)
- 2 S&P W/5T TRAC RATION RUN - EPW CAMP AND ATLANTIC-SIDE (ONGOING)
- 2 LCM-8 MED BOATS DS TO TF ATLANTIC (FT SHERMAN-COLON PATROLLING/TRANSPORT-RELEASED 4 JAN)
- 2 LCM-8 MED BOATS DS TO TF ATLANTIC (STURGIS-COMBAT TROOP LANDINGS/TRANSPORT-RELEASED 4 JAN) 1 S&P W/5T GEN CGO DISTRIBUTION POINT LUZON (RELEASED 1 JAN)
- 1 S&P W/5T CL V ASP--ATP OPS (RELEASED UPON CLOSURE OF ATP - 5 JAN)

NON-STATIC:

- 201408 DEC PROVIDE 1 S&P W/5T TO HAUL 30 PORTO POTTIES TO REFUGEE CAMP
- 221251 DEC BOB TAIL TO MOVE REEFER VANS
- 220446 DEC S&P W/5T TO HAUL CL IV TO EPW CAMP EMPIRE RANGE
- 221320 DEC S&P W/5T TO HAUL DUNNAGE TO EMPIRE EPW CAMP
- 230800 DEC 2 - EA LCM-8 DOCK 45-STURGIS-MANDINGO 7 ID CGO
- 231245 DEC S&P W/5T HAUL GEN SUPPLIES TO EPW CAMP
- 231530 DEC 5T BOBTAIL MOVE REEFER VAN
- 231700 DEC 2 - 2-1/2 T CGO TRANS RATIONS TO REFUGEE CAMP
- 240600 DEC 3 - S&P'S W/5T'S AND 2 2-1/2T'S CONVOY TO TOCUMEN FOR RETROGRADE
- 240900 DEC LCM-8 SPT TO FT ESPINAR COMMISSARY (MANDINGO PICK-UP)
- 241945 DEC 1 - 2-1/2T TRUCK TO RECOVER ENEMY WEAPONS SYSTEMS
- 250957 DEC 2 - 1/2T CGO TO HAUL MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO 7ID
- 251000 DEC 2 - 5T W/S&P'S HAUL CAPTURED WEAPONS AND AMMO
- 251300 DEC 1 - 5T TRAC TO HAUL 82 ABD CATTLE CAR
- 251545 DEC 3 - 2-1/2T TRUCKS IN SUPPORT OF 193RD INF BDE
- 260001 DEC 2 - 5T W/S&P'S HAUL 6 463L PALLETS
- 260600 DEC 2 - 5T W/S&P'S BOXED IN SUPPORT OF 82 ABD RESUPPLY TOCUMEN



MISSION-TASKINGS SUMMARY (contd)

260900 DEC 2 - LCM-8'S MANDINGO PICK-UP SUPPLIES

261030 DEC 1 - 5T CGO TO HAUL MED SUPPLIES, CAPTURED WEAPONS AND AMMO TO ALBROOK FROM RIO HATO

261100 DEC 4 - 2-1/2T TRUCKS HAUL 82 ABD PAX FROM HAFB TO PAITILLA AIRFIELD

261300 DEC 2 1/2T TRUCK HAULS CL IV

262230 DEC 1 - 2-1/2T HAUL LOGPACS

270700 DEC 3 - 2-1/2T CGO IN SUPPORT OF CLASSIFIED MISSION

270800 DEC 1 - 5T W/S&P MORE LOGPAC SUPPLIES

271000 DEC 1 - 5T W/S&P CL I ALBROOK TO LA CHORRERA (IN SUPPORT OF MARFOR AND OPCON'D 7ID FORCES)

280445 DEC 1 - 5T W/S&P TO HAUL 2 - 463L PALLETS

280600 DEC 2 - 5T S&P TO DELIVER LOGPACS TO HAFB

280800 DEC 1 - 5T CGO TRANSPORT ADACG EQUIPMENT FROM HAFB TO RODMAN

281730 DEC LCM-8 TO MOVE 13T TRACTOR W/REEFER VAN

290730 DEC 2 - 5T W/S&P'S HAUL CAPTURED WEAPONS AND AMMO FROM TORRIJOS TO ALBROOK

301530 DEC 2 - 5T W/ S&P'S TO PICK-UP WOODEN PALLETS FOR THE ASP

301700 DEC 1 - 5T W/S&P TO PICK UP CARGO FROM BLDG 22 COROZAL AND TAKE TO HAFB

301200 DEC 1 - HEMMET TO DELIVER 2,000 GALS JP-5 TO TOCUMEN FOR 82ND ABVN

300700 DEC 1 - M35 TO GO TO COROZAL BLDG 721 TO PICK UP 10 EA FUEL BLIVETS

311200 DEC 1 - 5T W/S&P TO GO TO TORRIJOS AIRPORT K.L.M. WAREHOUSE FOR MEDICAL SUPPLIES

311300 DEC 1 - 5K TANKER DELIVERED 20,000 GAL JP-5 TO 7TH ID/1097TH

310800 DEC 3 - BOXED S&P'S TO GO TO TORRIJOS AIRFIELD THEN TO ASP 1, RODMAN TO TRANSPORT CAPTURED EMENY WEAPONS AND AMMO.

311800 DEC 1 - 2 1/2 T TO TRANSPORT AMMO/WEAPONS/MAGAZINES ASP 1/ RODMAN/ALBROOK.

MISSION-TASKINGS SUMMARY (contd)

310930 DEC 1 - 5T AND 1 - 2 1/2 T TO HELP CLOSE DOWN AND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT FROM ATP TO ASP 1.

310900 DEC 1 - 5T WITH FLATBED TO TRANSPORT WEAPONS AND AMMO TO ASP 1.

310730 DEC 1 - 2 1/2 T TO GO DOWNTOWN TO PICK-UP DOCUMENTS FROM PDF HQ.

310700 DEC 2 - 5T CARGO TO MOVE EPW'S IN SUPPORT OF 7TH ID.

311300 DEC 1 - LCM AT MANDINGO POINT TO PICK UP COL JOHNSON AND PARTY, THEN TRANSPORT TO 1097TH.

010900 JAN 2 - S&P BOXED W/TARP TO TRANSPORT 300 PCS OF DUNAGE FOR COSCOM G-4.

010900 JAN 1 - TRACTOR W/TRAILER TO PICK UP ALL WOODEN PALLETS IN SUPPORT OF 565TH ORD DET.

020900 JAN 1 - S&P BOX WITH SHOTGUN AND TARP IN SUPPORT OF 565TH ORD DET.

021000 JAN 1 - 5T W/FLATBED TO DELIVER MRE'S IN SUPPORT OF JSOTF.

030800 JAN 1 - 5T TRAC W/BOX TRAILER AND 1 - 5T CGO IN SPT OF ASP1.

03ASAP JAN 1 - S&P TO TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT FROM ATP TO ASP.

031000 JAN 2 - S&P'S TO MOVE MISC CGO IN SPT OF MCC.

030700 JAN 1 - 5T TRAC W/BOX TRAILER AND 1 - 2 1/2T TRK TO HAUL AMMO FOR ATP.

030630 JAN 1 - LCM TO RETRIEVE PDF BOAT IN SPT OF COSCOM.

041800 JAN 1 - BOBTAIL TRACTOR TO SHUTTLE MSC VAN IN SPT OF 1/508 INF.

041045 JAN 1 - S&P 5T TO TRANSPORT FORKLIFT, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 7TH ID.

040800 JAN 2 - S&P'S W/SIDEBOARDS TO TRANSPORT WPNS AND AMMO, SUPPORTED ELEMENT MCC.

040545 JAN 1 - 5K FUEL TANKER TO RIO HATO, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 7TH ID.

040800 JAN 1 - 5T CGO FOR CLASS IV.

041400 JAN 1 - 2 1/2T TO DELIVER 2300 MLS (64 MOD) DINNERS.

051300 JAN 1 - 5T S&P TO TRANSPORT LETHEM BATTERIES, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 330TH TRANS COMPANY.

050545 JAN 1 - 5000 GALLONS JP5 TO RIO HATO, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 7TH ID.

MISSION-TASKINGS SUMMARY (contd)

050630 JAN 1 - LCM TO RECOVER (2) 65' BOATS, SUPPORTED ELEMENT DSPO.

050730 JAN 1 - S&P TO HAUL 200/400 ROLLS OF CONCERTINA, SUPPORTED ELEMENT MCC.

060730 JAN 2 - TRACTORS W/TOW BARS, SUPPORTED ELEMENT COSCOM.

061100 JAN 2 - TRACTORS W/TRAILERS TO TRANSPORT FORKLIFT TO RIO HATO, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 7TH SF GROUP.

061400 JAN 1 - 5,000 GAL JP5 , SUPPORTED ELEMENT 7TH ID.

061400 JAN 1 - LCM SUPPORT FROM DOC 45 TO STIRGIS LANDING, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 7TH ID.

06ASAP JAN 1 - 5T S&P TO TRANSPORT PALLETS FROM HAFB TO COROZAL, SUPPORTED ELEMENT MCC.

070800 JAN 1 - 2 1/2T TO MOVE WEAPON CRATES, SUPPORTED ELEMENT COSCOM.

070930 JAN 1 - LCM TO SHUTTLE 4 TRACTOR TRAILERS, SUPPORTED ELEMENT JOTC.


071600 JAN 1 - M818 TRACTOR W/DRIVER, SUPPORTED ELEMENT MCC.

080700 JAN 2 - S&P'S, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 214 MED DET.


082200 JAN 2 - S&P'S TO HAUL PALLETS, SUPPORTED ELEMENT 7TH ID.

LIST OF MAPS


- MAP 1. AREA OF CSS OPERATIONS (PANAMA)
- MAP 2. LUZON FIELD DISTRIBUTION OPERATIONS
- MAP 3. PACIFIC SIDE OPERATIONS
- MAP 4. ATLANTIC SIDE OPERATIONS
- MAP 5. SITE "ALPHA" (RANGE 16A) EMPIRE RANGE
- MAP 6. SITE "BRAVO" (VENADO DROP ZONE)
- MAP 7. "MINI-FAST" RIO HATO  
FSSP HOT REFUEL DAVID
- MAP 8. LAYOUT OF LOGISTICS OPERATIONS CENTER (LOC)




193RD SUPPORT BATTALION - AREA OF CSS OPERATIONS  
 OPERATION "JUST CAUSE" DEC 89




LUZON FIELD DISTRIBUTION OPERATIONS, A/193RD SPT BN



PACIFIC SIDE OPERATIONS








SITE "ALPHA" (RANGE 16A)  
 EMPIRE RANGE  
 A/193RD SPT BN HOT REFUEL




ATC




VENADO  
DZ



SITE "BRAVO" (VENADO DROP ZONE)  
POL SECTION OF 1/228 OPCON TO A/193RD SPT BN




193RD SPT BN  
 "MINI-FAST"  
 RIO HATO



193RD SPT BN  
 FSSP HOT REFUEL (RESUPPLIED BY WET WING C130)

DAVID



APPROXIMATE LAYOUT OF THE 193RD SUPPORT BATTALION  
 LOGISTICS OPERATION CENTER (LOC), BLDG 202, FORT CLAYTON, PANAMA

HHC



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 193D SUPPORT BATTALION  
FORT CLAYTON, PANAMA

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

SOGA-SUH

18 Jan 90

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 193d Support Battalion, Fort Clayton,  
Panama.

PURPOSE: To provide a summary of the role the Headquarters and Headquarters Company played in support of operation "Just Cause" in the Republic of Panama, from 20 Dec 89 to 7 Jan 90.

1. At approximately 0020 hrs, 20 Dec 89. Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) was notified of a short rest exercise. Upon notification of short rest we immediately implemented OPSEC, started issuing weapons and ammunition (contingency stock) and stringing out concertina wire. By 0105 hrs the Battalion Headquarters (Bldg 202) was secured. American Flags and glint tape were distributed to every soldier to distinguish them from the soldiers of the Panamanian Defense Forces. In the early morning hours three mortar rounds impacted in the vicinity of Luzon Field with one mortar round hitting about 15 yards behind the DAS 3 van.


2. The Staff Sections orchestrated the Battalion operations. The Materiel Management Center ran the Logistics Operations Center while the Data Center continued to process requisitions. The Supply Section supported two units, HHC and the 565th Ordnance Detachment. Our Maintenance Section also continued to provide support to the 36th Explosives Ordnance Detachment.

3. The Dining Facility served, from 22 Dec thru 28 Dec, 2 hot meals per day averaging 1300 meals a day (permitted close to 600 meals per day). On 28 Dec we started feeding three meals per day averaging approximately 678 per meal. We also provided two cooks and one mobile kitchen trailer (MKT) to the Refugee Camp at Balboa High School where they provided 54,500 hot T-Rations and over 100,000 Meals Ready to Eat (MRE's) to the Refugees (mission is still on going).

CONCLUSION: The Soldiers of Headquarters and Headquarters Company were READY and they performed their missions SUPERBLY!!!!

Enclosures

1. CQ Log Extract
2. Mission Summaries
3. Headcount (Dining Facility)
4. Headcount (Refugee Camp)

  
JAIME LUGO  
CPT, QM  
Commanding

A  
CO

19 JANUARY 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander 193d Spt Bn, ATTN: S 2/3.

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this After Action Review is to provide with Problems, Discussions and Recommendations during the 'Just Cause' operations, 20-28 December 1989.

2. Narrative Summary:

a. Prior to the outburst of hostilities, A Co 193rd had two (2) Hot Refuel Points (VENADO and Empire Range) which were critical to this operation.

Early morning, 20 Dec 89, A Co established at Luzon Field as the staging area for aerial resupply of water and fuel. Later this operation was transformed into a distribution point for all classes of supply.

The unit was tasked to activate an Ammo Transfer Point at Albrook.

23 December unit was given the mission to deploy toward a Mini FAST and Hot Refuel Point at Rio Hato.

Continued to deploy forward with a Hot Refuel Point at David.

b. Services Provided

(1) 5 tons shipped from Luzon Field

C1 I	68.2	Stons
C1 II	4.0	Stons
C1 III	61.0	Stons
C1 IV	11.3	Stons
C1 V	142.6	Stons
C1 VI	7.5	Stons
C1 VIII	.9	Stons
C1 IX	1.0	Stons
Water	25.0	Stons
TOTAL	321.5	STONS (Approx 85% CH47 - 275 5 tons)

(2) Transportation - Drove over an average of 400 miles per truck  
Transported two (2) Battalion of troops  
over 5,000 enemy weapons.  
approx 68.2 5 tons C1 1

(3) Provided 3 shower units-POW camp, Ft. Sherman, Curundu

(4) Provided Graves Registration collection point-processes 70

remains.



3. General Conclusions/Recommendations: The unit performed it wartime mission extremely well. Shortage of 77F and 88M personnel were felt. Units that provided augmentees the first couple of days improved our capabilities to perform. We encountered several problems with additional missions; sling load operations, Hot refuel points and GRREG operations.

- Recommend more sling load training and equipment
- Recommend Hot Refuel missions be performed by supporting units.  
i.e. 1/228th Avn.
- Recommend GRREG team be assigned or be available in USARSO.

4. Extracts to Daily Journal and Unit taskings can be found in Chapter 1, Enclosures 1 and 2 to Battalion After Action Review.



ADRIAN A. ALBINO  
CPT, QM  
Commanding

B  
CO

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
B COMPANY, 193D SUPPORT BATTALION  
FORT CLAYTON, PANAMA

SOSU-SUT

17 January 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, 193D SUPPORT BATTALION

SUBJECT: After Action Report (AAR), Just Cause

1. PURPOSE: To describe the operations of B Company, 193d Support Battalion, during Operation 'Just Cause' in the Republic of Panama during the period of 20 December 1989 to 7 January 1990.

2. NARRATIVE SUMMARY: After receiving notification of a Short Rest readiness exercise on the evening of the 19th, OPSEC became an immediate concern. Personnel were kept inside as much as possible. Glint tape and American flag shoulder patches were distributed but were not put on. The arms room prepared to issue weapons and began to break down the contingency ammunition stockage and load it into magazines. Phone lines were kept open, but personnel answering the phones would only state that the requested individual was not immediately available and would call back as soon as possible. The primary means of communication between company sections and battalion was by landline.

3. The first sounds of the attacks on the DENI station and Commandancia reached the company while personnel were still drawing weapons. Local security was established and concertina wire was emplaced around the company area. Triple strand concertina was erected within the DS maintenance facility to act as an EPW holding area.

4. Shortly after going to a full alert status, a tasking was received to provide a contact team to work on commercial TMP vehicles at Corozal. SGT Howard led a four man team, but was able to accomplish very little due to the fact that many of the vehicles were missing major components.

5. 2LT Gibson led a 30 man team to Empire Range site 16A to provide security for A Company's aircraft refueling operations. 2LT Johnston led an 18 man security detail to 41st ASG at Corozal. The departure of both of these elements was delayed due to soldiers wandering off to fill canteens, look for other soldiers, etc. Word was received from S-3 via landline to hold the Corozal element in place. When S-3 did give the order to move, it was not immediately passed on.

6. At approximately 0400 on the 20th, several mortar rounds landed in the vicinity of Luzon Field. They would be followed by several more at approximately 0730. Damage consisted of one window knocked out by concussion at Tech Supply and a scratched finger, possibly caused by shrapnel, suffered by SPC Paiz, who was providing security at the maintenance shop.

7. The maintenance workload was relatively light for the first several days of the operation. This was probably due to the good maintenance posture of 193d Brigade forces (Task Force Bayonet), and their understandable lack of PMCS while involved in active combat operations.

a. Two exceptions were communications electronics and service and recovery. Units deploying from CONUS seem to have brought a large quantity of unserviceable radio equipment with them. Radios also constituted the majority of TF Bayonet job ordered equipment, but daily contact with various elements of TF Bayonet did not turn up any evidence of diminished operational capability due to lack of radios.

b. Recovery teams were busy from the 20th on, due to the emphasis placed on moving both serviceable and unserviceable PDF equipment before it could fall back into the hands of its former owners or DigBat members. Several missions required recovery teams to enter areas that were still subject to intermittent sniper and mortar fire. Recovery crew morale remained high, but fatigue and stress was very evident by 23 December.

8. The Class IX mission was hindered by the lack of repair parts coming in from CONUS during the first several days of the operation. Batteries were sometimes in short supply, due to a lack of electrolyte at the maintenance facility. The majority of battery requests again seem to have come from units deploying from CONUS.

9. The amount of incoming jobs had increased by 1 January 1990. Fortunately, the personnel involved in duties at Corozal, the Balboa refugee camp, and Site 16A had been released back to the company by this time. The availability of these personnel allowed B Company to maintain a relatively steady production rate. The increased flow of repair parts from CONUS and the return of the civilian work force to Bldg 701 at Corozal have further assisted in maintenance and Class IX support efforts.

10. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS: For the most part, B Company performed well during Operation "Just Cause". Despite complaints about security missions for other units, the required personnel were present when needed to provide support. The practice of "loaning" equipment to other units, especially those from out of theater, may also prove to be questionable, due to the difficulty in tracking and recovering equipment assets.

11. ENCLOSURES: encl 1 DA Form 1594 and Significant  
Mission Extracts
- encl 2 DS Maintenance Mission Statistics
- encl 3 Armament Mission Totals



IAN P. ERICKSON  
CPT, OD  
Commanding

ENCL 2 DS MAINTENANCE MISSION STATISTICS

BEGINNING BALANCE 20 DEC 1989:	158
JOBS RECEIVED 20 DEC THRU 7 JAN:	349
JOBS COMPLETED 20 DEC THRU 7 JAN:	238
JOB STATUS AS OF 8 JAN 1990:	

a. Jobs Evac'd	95
b. Deferred	4
c. Jobs OH	111
d. Await Inspection	25
e. Await Shop	17
f. In Shop	2
g. Await Parts	38
h. Other	9
i. Final Inspection	10
j. Await Pickup	10

ENCL 3    ARMAMENT MISSION STATISTICS

1. Armament section was tasked to provide inspectors to perform technical inspections of captured small arms. Several additional missions were given to section personnel once they had arrived on site.

2. Mission statistics for the period through 7 Jan 90 are as follows:

M16/Taiwanese Type 65 Inspected:	318
75mm Chicom Recoilless Rifles Disassembled:	19
ZPU 23-4 Soviet AA Guns Disassembled:	28
90mm Cockerill Cannon Breechblocks Removed from V-300 Armored Cars:	6

3. Although armament personnel are not trained to work on the majority of the listed equipment, they were able to accomplish the mission in a superb manner. All personnel questioned agreed that it was an excellent training opportunity and that the chance to work on foreign equipment increased their knowledge of weapon systems over that of their peers.

E  
CO



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
E Company 228th Aviation, 193rd Support Bn  
APO Miami 34006

SOAR-ECO

January 18, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 193rd Support Battalion

SUBJECT: After Action Report for "Just Cause"

1. Enclosed is the After Action Report for Operation "Just Cause" in the Republic of Panama. The report covers the period of 20 DEC 89 to 7 JAN 90.
2. By 20 DEC 0100 the unit was on line to support the aviation missions of operation "Just Cause". Also coordination was completed to support any battle damage aircraft repair support the customer units would require. The mission tempo picked up that morning after aircraft returned from the missions and remained extremely high for the next two days.
3. Personnel working at the flight line were signed in and sent to the flight line without being issued their weapons. The initial mission was to accomplish the immediate maintenance requirements for the support of the first phase of the operation. By 0400 all personnel were rotated out of the shops, as the mission allowed, to acquire their weapons, ammunition, and gas masks. Required security points were manned by the 1/228th, and my Headquarters and Service platoon personnel. Personnel not required during the night were bedded down in the duty sections. (Shift endurance information is in Encl II, TAB B)
4. At about 0300 hours we were tasked to locate as many Chemical Lites as we could and deliver them to the FARP at Venado. By about 0400 a team, armed with extra ammunition, had been dispatched and returned from Venado.
5. The unit did not have enough ammunition for sustained defensive operations. Coordination was made through the 193rd TOC to be issued ammunition from the ASP. A team was dispatched to pickup ammunition from the ASP. The team received 10 cases of ball and 4 cases of tracer. Tracers were required due to our greatest threat being night attacks.
6. The Lockheed work force had 35 of 55 personnel stuck downtown. The directive for them to remain did not leave sufficient time to keep the day shift at Howard AFB.

SOAR-ECO

SUBJECT: After Action Report for "Just Cause"

On 20 DEC 89 efforts were initiated to contact all personnel not available for work. On 22 DEC Lockheed began to conduct operations to assist personnel in relocating to areas where they could begin reporting for work. The efforts were successful and by 24 DEC 89 98% of the work force was available for work. (Additional information is in Encl II, TAB C)

7. The workload remained high except for the DSU receiving section. The DSU had only received two push pallets so far in the operation. By 21 DEC the blue routes appeared to be safe enough for the DSU to travel, so we dispatched a truck to Corozaal to pick up what supplies were there.

8. I received a warning order to be prepared to dispatch a team to Tocumen to evaluate PDF rotary wing aircraft. Supposedly there were 12 UH-1H aircraft on the ramp. The mission was tasked, initially to evaluate the aircraft. It turned out to be 12 aircraft of the following type: 6 UH-1D, 2 UH-1H, 2 UH-1N, 1 Civilian Jet Ranger, and 1 PUMA. Another UH-1N turned up that was being flown by our forces. Later, additional taskings were given for further evaluation, repairs, and other maintenance requirements. (See Encl II, TAB A for further information)

9. I was visited by COL ZIERDT, the COSCOM Commander. I saw him after he had been to the maintenance shop. He was concerned with shop performance, shop statistics, the unit's lack of officer and Senior NCOs, and their cumulative effect on the first two days of the operation.

10. The unit was visited by LTG ROSS, DCSLOG of the Army. A briefing was given to him at the DSU. The briefing covered shop operations during the operation. He was mostly interested in the shop's performance, personnel and equipment shortages, and what he could do to help.


11. The 1/228th was visited by MG BRADY, the PAO of the Army. I was on hand because of anticipated questions he would have on E Company operations. He was mostly interested in the missions flown with night vision goggles, and MEDEVAC missions. He won the Medal of Honor flying a DUSTOFF mission in Vietnam.

12. The unit performed outstandingly. In 19 days we completed 575 work orders, 2.3 months of work (a normal month's completions average is 250). This was accomplished while under a tremendous workload, tired, locked in, poor sleeping conditions, etc.

SOAR-ECO

SUBJECT: After Action Report for "Just Cause"

13. POC this headquarters is CPT Kent, AV 284-3418.



CAMDEN J. KENT JR.  
CPT, AV  
Commanding

TAB A

JOURNAL OF EVENTS

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
20 DEC/0100	UNIT WAS RECALLED AND ON LINE TO SUPPORT AVIATION MISSION
20 DEC/0200	RECEIVED REQUIREMENT TO SUBMIT HOURLY RED 1 REPORTS
20 DEC/0400	ROTATION OF ALL PERSONNEL FROM, MISSION SUPPORT, IN HANGER #4 FOR PICK UP OF WEAPONS, AMMO, AND GAS MASK COMPLETED
20 DEC/0300	TASK FROM S-3 TO DELIVER CHEMICAL LITES TO VENADO
20 DEC/0600	BATTLE DAMAGED ACFT BEGAN TO ARRIVE
20 DEC/1720	SENT TEAM TO ASP TO PICK UP MORE AMMUNITION
21 DEC/1400	1ST TRIP BY DSU TO PICKUP PARTS AT COROZAL
22 DEC/0930	VISIT BY COL ZIERDT, COSCOM COMMANDER
22 DEC/1400	RECEIVED WARNING ORDER TO EVALUATE PDF AIRCRAFT AT TOCUMEN
22 DEC/2200	RECEIVED AUGMENTATION FROM I COMPANY, 159TH AVIATION REGT, 189TH MAINT BN, 46TH SPT GROUP, 1ST COSCOM, FT BRAGG. 21 PERSONNEL.
23 DEC/1800	90% LOCKHEED WORK FORCE AVAILABLE FOR WORK
23 DEC/1100	TEAM LEFT FOR TOCUMEN TO EVAL PDF UH-1D ACFT
24 DEC/1400	TEAM LEFT FOR TOCUMEN TO EVAL PDF UH-1N ACFT
24 DEC/1800	98% LOCKHEED WORK FORCE AVAILABLE FOR WORK
26 DEC/1800	100% LOCKHEED WORK FORCE AVAILABLE FOR WORK
26 DEC/1000	REPAIR UH-1D/H/N PDF ACFT AT TOCUMEN

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
27 DEC/0730	TEAM LEFT TO CONTINUE SERVICING ACFT AT TOCUMEN AND STANDBY MISSION
27 DEC/1300	11 ADDITIONAL LOCKHEED PERSONNEL ARRIVE
28 DEC/1800	GIVEN MISSION TO SERVICE UH-1N MODEL PDF ACFT IN HANGER #4
29 DEC/0915	VISITED BY MG ROSS, DCSLOG OF THE ARMY
4 JAN/1300	6 ADDITIONAL LOCKHEED PERSONNEL ARRIVE
5 JAN/1300	2 ADDITIONAL LOCKHEED PERSONNEL ARRIVE
6 JAN/1000	VISITED BY MG BRADY, THE PAO OF THE ARMY
7 JAN/0700	TEAM LEFT TO RECOVER UH-1N AT DAVID

TAB B

DAILY WORK SUMMARY  
OPERATION "JUST CAUSE"

<u>DAY</u>	<u>REC</u>	<u>COM</u>	<u>O2'S</u>	<u>BATTLE DAMAGE AND PHASES</u>
20	32	22	19	2 BLADES, 1 WINDSHIELD, 1 OIL COOLER
21	30	24	17	GENERAL SHEET METAL
22	13	36	10	1 MAIN ROTOR BLADE
23	59	35	21	GENERAL SHEET METAL
24	34	19	18	
25	35	36	29	FUEL TANKS 2 UH-60s
26	30	52	8	
27	57	44	29	GENERAL SHEET METAL, 1 BLADE, HYDRAULICS
28	25	25	21	GENERAL SHEET METAL, AH-1 + PHASE ASSIST
29	39	19	30	OH-58C, UH-1H, AH-1E, & CH-47C
30	38	41	22	GENERAL SHEET METAL, BLADE, WINDSHIELD
31	30	37	23	
1	36	31	16	UH-60A PHASE
2	26	29	18	GENERAL AND DEPOT SHEETMETAL
3	36	35	21	UH-60A PHASE
4	44	30	19	UH-60A PHASE ASSIST, CH-47C PHASE
5	51	18	16	
6	19	25	11	UH-1H PHASE
7	<u>7</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>5</u>	
<u>641 575 353</u>				<u>TOTALS</u>

SECTION/PLATOON IN DAYS	COMPLETED WORK ORDERS			TURN AROUND		
	<u>02</u>	<u>05</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>02</u>	<u>05</u>	<u>12</u>
ELECTRIC	28	6	12	3	15	35
ENGINE	8	0	20	4	0	0
AVIONICS	132	16	85	9	27	9
BATTERY	33	7	24	3	3	2
HYDRAULICS	11	10	8	1	1	39
LOCKHEED (LSSI)	71	5	21	4	11	51
SHEET METAL	11	3	2	2	29	57
WELDING	7	3	2	1	6	1
POWERTRAIN	21	1	5	3	14	8
MAINTENANCE	30	2	0	3	1	0
QUALITY CONTROL	1	1	1	1	10	1
SUB TOTAL:	<u>353</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>168</u>	AVERAGE: 3	11	18
<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>575</u>					

1097  
TRANS  
CO

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
1097th Transportation Company (Medium Boat)  
APO Fort Davis, Panama 34005

SOSU-SUV

09 January 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 193d Support Battalion, Fort Clayton,  
Panama 34004

SUBJECT: Operation Just Cause - After Action Review

PART ONE - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE:

a. The purpose of this After Action Review is to summarize the 1097th Transportation Company (Medium Boat) role in Operation Just Cause. This summary will incorporate equipment and personnel utilization, transportation taskings, supplies consumed to sustain the unit during performance of mission, and unit performance during the operation.

2. NARRATIVE SUMMARY:

a. This report spans from 20 December 1989 to 7 January 1990. The unit used organic assets to support missions in Atlantic waters, Pacific waters, and within the Panama Canal waterway. Two vessels were under operational control to Task Force Atlantic (TFA) at Fort Sherman, two vessels were under operational control to TFA at Gamboa, five vessels were operational on Gatun Lake, one vessel was on the marine railway at Dock 45, and five vessels were operational at Rodman Naval Station (Encls 1 & 2).

b. Severe restrictions placed on the wheeled vehicle main supply route connecting the Pacific and Atlantic communities necessitated heavy use of air and waterway transportation modes. Thus, during all phases of Operation Just Cause, the vessels of the 1097th provided a major logistical link between the Atlantic and Pacific communities via the Panama Canal. 1097th vessels transported soldiers, supplies, equipment, enemy prisoners of war (EPW), local national detainees, captured weapons, and captured ammunition (Encl 3).

c. Excluding isolated cases, 1097th vessels transported all enemy prisoners of war and local national detainees from the collection points on the Atlantic side to the main collection point on the Pacific side.



SOSU-SUV

SUBJECT: Operation Just Cause - After Action Review

d. The 1097th was directly involved in two vessel beach assaults at Gamboa, one vessel assault in Limon Bay, and supported Navy Seal sniper teams in Colon Harbor.

e. Task Force Atlantic used the 1097th vessels as a main sources of support and resupply. This included insertion and extraction of soldiers and equipment at Gamboa during combat assaults and transportation of class I, III, and V resupply for military operations. Simultaneously, the 1097th teamed with the Navy Special Boat Unit and Navy Seal teams for combat assaults in Limon Bay and Colon Harbor and further establish security in these areas (Encl 4).

f. In addition to military operations support, the 1097th transported supplies for the U S family member populous and Panama Canal employees.

g. On hand personnel strength was 67% of the unit authorized strength. Vessel use was 80% of assigned vessels. The unit accomplished 111 transportation missions. Supply consumption consisted of 101 cases of MRE'S, 10,799 gallons of JP5, 660 gallons of lube oil, and \$2935.57 dollars of class IX parts. There were 200 rounds of 5.56mm and 1,200 rounds of .50 caliber expended (Encl 5).

### 3. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS:

a. The 1097th Transportation Company (Medium Boat) performed well in an ever changing combat environment. The soldiers accomplished all assigned missions in a timely and professional manner.

b. The performance of joint operations between the 1097th, the Navy Special Boat Unit, and the Navy Seals were smooth and well executed.

### 4. RECOMMENDATIONS:


a. Recommend better dissemination of information regarding procedures for requesting vessel support at all levels under all situations (TAB A).

b. Recommend the contingency war plan incorporate delegation of authority for the commander of the 1097th to commit vessels under circumstances that would otherwise hinder wartime efforts (TAB A).

SOSU-SUV

SUBJECT: Operation Just Cause - After Action Review

c. Recommend upgrade of the 1097th Authorized Level of Organization (ALO). More specifically, request higher prioritization of personnel fill (TAB B).



PHILLIP D. SENECHAL  
CPT, TC  
Commanding

5 Encls

1. Staff Journal Extracts
2. Vessel Logbook Extracts
3. Vessel Usage
4. Map of Patrol Areas
5. Class IX Expenditures

565  
ORD  
DPT

Headquarters, 565th Ordnance Detachment  
Ammunition Supply Point Number 1

SOSU-AMMO

19 January 1990

SUBJECT: Executive Summary

1. PURPOSE: To identify and highlight specific areas in the ammunition arena that worked very well or were major problems areas. The intent of the report is not to point fingers but to identify problem areas and possible solutions, to these problems.

2. NARRATIVE SUMMARY

a. The 565th Ordnance Detachment was notified of the impending invasion at approximately 2200hrs. All phones except the secure line were removed. Soldiers were issued their basic load of small arms ammunition at 2300 hrs. UBL of AT-4's and fragmentation grenade were prepositioned in the Commander's office. Hasty fighting positions were selected and soldiers assigned to each post.

b. The main concern was the avenue of approach from gate 8 off of Thatcher Highway (Encl 1). The perimeter road that parallels Thatcher Highway was closed due to sporadic small arms fire throughout the early morning of 20 December 1989. Since the majority of the issues during that time were small arms ammunition from magazine E5, issue teams had to travel through the center of the ASP, an additional 1.5 miles over bad road, to reach E5. Issue team were increased in size to provide security during all issues. This reduced the number of issues that could be supported at one time. 5 personnel were engaged in a short fire fight at E5 at approximately 0630 hrs 20 December 1989, 36 round were fired. The only damage done to the area was one of the perimeter lights was shot out.

c. The 565th Ordnance Detachment issued over 390 tons of ammunition during the first 5 days of the war and a total of 565 tons were issued from 19 through 29 December 1989 from both ASP#1 at Rodman and ASP#2 at Fort Espinar. Enclosure 2 contains all the detailed information on the unit issues, ATP issues, and ATP resupply. A 10 men augmentation team from 8th Ordnance Company arrived at 1800 hrs 20 December 89, and personnel were immediately intergrated into the 565th Ordnance Detachment operations. Issues continued around the clock. Due to the shortage of personnel, 2 personnel were flown to ASP#2. The soldiers were only getting one or two hours of sleep every 24 hours.

d. On the 24 December 89, I was notified that the 565th Ordnance Detachment(ASP#1) would pick up the mission of receiving segregating, palletizing, and storing all captured weapons and munitions. Over 10 tons of residue and materials were moved out of building 13028 in preparation for this mission. The first load of weapons (253 AK47's), Tiawan M16's, 3 RPG7 launchers and 7.62 G-3 rifles were received at 0200 hrs 25 December 89. The first two truck loads of ammunition arrived at 0500 hours. Processing of this ammunition was delayed util 0900 hrs for safety reasons. All personnel were exhausted and falling asleep while driving

SOSU-AMMO

19 January 1990

SUBJECT: Executive Summary

vehicles and forklifts. Handling of loose foreign munitions would have been too dangerous at this point.

e. On 27 December 1989, I received an additional 7 personnel from 8th Ordnance Company and 1 person was assigned to the 565th Ordnance Detachment. A nightshift of six personnel was established at this time allowing a regular sleep schedule to be set up. Processing of the captured munitions continued 24 hours a day from 25 December 1989 until 4 Jan 90. Night operations were terminated at this point due to the volume of unserviceable munitions lining the roads and the lack of lights in the area.

f. The mission to handle captured weapons was shifted to Albrook and the weapons received on 25 December 1989 were shipped to Allbrook on 27 December 1989. However, weapons and equipment continued to be a major problem. We found weapons mixed in with loose small arms ammunition, on the same vehicles as the captured munitions and in boxes marked batteries. Weapons were turned over to the MPs or shipped back to Allbrook on 193d Spt Bn vehicles. Tab K contains a listing of the number of vehicles processed and the quantity and tonnage of captured U.S. Ammunition.

g. Accountability of the captured foreign and commercial munitions is impossible at this time. Boxes thought to contain ammunition my in fact contain weapons. The entire processing of captured munitions was extremely hazardous and is discussed at length in the AAR.

h. The processing and retrograde of the captured ammunition will continue for at least 60 days. Start of the operation has been delayed due to the lack of packing material.

i. The only unit that turned in ammunition to the ASP instead of redploying with it was the Rangers. They made an amnesty turnin of 5 to 6 tons of ammunition. Turn in of US munitions is covered in Tab I.

SUBJECT: Executive Summary

## 3. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

a. The main reasons that the 565th Ordnance Detachment was able to accomplish its mission were innovation, initiative, and motivated soldiers. Ammunition management above the ASP level was virtually non-existent. Channels of communication were poor. The 565th Ordnance Detachment received taskings from everywhere, most of which bypassed the 193d Support Battalion Logistics Operations Center.

b. Transportation was a major problem throughout Operation Just Cause. The Combat Configured Loads (CCLs) worked well overall. Some overstockage did occur at the Ammunition Transfer Point.

c. Augmentation from the 8th Ordnance Company was an excellent idea; it raised the 565th to its full required authorization of 30 personnel, the mix of personnel very similar to the recommended MTOE change in Part IV. Major problems with the current MTOE as well as personnel and equipment shortages hampered operations.

d. The SAAS-4 system does not work well under wartime conditions.

e. Processing of the captured ammunition was a nightmare. It is a miracle that no one was injured or killed. Lack of outside lighting or portable floodlight sets made night operations extremely hazardous.

f. Some of the same mistakes made during Grenada were made again during Operation Just Cause. The ammunition community needs to learn from its mistakes and implement procedures to ensure that they gain knowledge from mistakes and implement procedures that will prevent the same problems from occurring during the next war.

TAB K

TOPIC: CAPTURED AMMUNITION AND WEAPONS

PROBLEM/OBSERVATION

The quantity of ammunition stored throughout Panama was Two to Three times the amount thought to be there. No one was prepared to handle or move the enormous quantities that were there. The majority of the munitions received by the 565th Ordnance Detachment was extremely hazardous to handle. In addition the trucks carrying the munitions also had weapons and equipment mixed in, which had to be separated.

DISCUSSION:

The 565th Ordnance Detachment, augmented by soldiers from the 8th Ordnance Company, began to receive captured munitions on 25 December 1989. From 25th through 27th December 1989 the majority of the munition turned in was loose and open boxes, with about 2600 loaded magazines also turned in during this period. Then starting on the 28 December 89, the 4/6th Inf Bn, along with 5th ID Island began trucking ammunition from Flamingo Island. 4/6th Inf Bn should be commended for their efforts. 90% of the munitions captured was segregated by type and stacked on wooden pallets. The time taken by them to properly prepare ammunition for shipment, allowed the Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) to quickly off-load the 5ton and 2 1/2 ton trucks they were using, band the the ammunitions, and store it properly. The ammunition received from Rio Hato, while not on pallets, was atleast stacked neatly and sorted by type. Unloading was labor intensive but timely, simple and safe. The 82nd Airborne shipments of captured munitions out of Tocumen were all nightmares. I believe it is a miracle that one of my soldiers was not killed or injured sorting through the garbage on their vehicles. Loose Fragmentation grenades of all types, RPG's of all types with rounds, detonating cord, and blasting caps scattered through out the loads. From top to bottom. From looking at the trucks, it appeared munitions were literally thrown on the vehicles along with weapons and equipment. The took hours just to off load just one 2 1/2 ton or 5 ton truck, and the 565th had already received trucks from Tocumen. The drivers from the 4/7th Maintenance Group, and 193d Support Battalion did not seem to care about anything, to exclude how their vehicle was loaded nor did they bother to help unload their vehicles unlike the other drivers. In fact you had to go find them when it came time to have their trucks moved. The ammunition from Divid was mixed, about half the trucks were neatly loaded, the other half were a nightmare. These trucks, unlike the 82nd Airborne come with a labor force of about 20 panamanians who stacked the munitions on pallets. By 29 December 89 the 565th Ordnance Detachment had received 20,000 loaded magazines. I discussed this problem with COSCOM and a 15 man, panamanian labor force was provided from 31 December 89 to 6 January 1990. Approximately 25 to 30 thousand magazines were unloaded by this work force. Over 100 tons of loose smallarms ammunition will be destroyed over the next 2 months. Ammunition received from the feild was segregated by type, the most hazard set aside for

TAB K (contd)

destruction and the rest banded and set aside for temporary storage. This ammunition can not be properly packaged for retrograde to CONUS for the following reasons:

1. The sheer volume (700 plus tons) overwhelmed the work force.
2. The unsafe conditions of a large portion of the munition resulted in a concentration of effect to set the ammunition safe first.
3. The lack of materials, wooden ammunition pallets, 1 1/4" banding 3 ply 44cu' boxes, prevent the repacking of ammunition for retrograde of CONUS.

**CONCLUSION:**

The 565th Ordnance Detachment received over 700 tons of captured munitions under the worst conditions possible over a 9 day period and manage to segregate, classify, and temporarily store the munition without a single injury. I handled the captured munitions in Grenada and faced the exact same problems I faced here in Panama. I don't think we learned anything from that operation. Packing material is a necessity.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

The movement of captured ammunition to ASP#1 was done too quickly. If two days had been taken to assess what was actually out there and what materials were needed then the whole operation could have been done safer, quicker, and with less manpower. If all of the munitions would have been placed on pallets by the type then the offload of trucks could have been faster and not taken so long. Plus, the loose ammunition could have been loaded in boxes, provided by the ASP, instead of just thrown on vehicles this would have been much safer for everyone. AMCCOM should maintain a preposition package of pallets, banding, paint, tape, seals, and banding equipment that will be automatically sent to Ordnance Unit that's tasked with this job in the next war or conflict.



THE BELOW LISTED NUMBERS REFLECT THE NUMBER OF TRUCKS RECIEVED FROM THE LOCATION LISTED. THESE TRUCKS WERE LOADED WITH CAPTURED MUNITIONS.

	HUMMV	2 1/2 TON	5 TON	S&P
ALBROOK	0	20	0	5
PANAMA CITY	0	30	4	0
FLAMENCO	0	10	20	5
RIO HATO	0	10	45	6
DAVID	0	5	1	13
TOCUMEN	0	11	15	5
SIERRA TIGRE	0	5	0	4
MP/193D INF	34	5	0	0
-----				
TOTAL	34	96	85	38



SUBJECT: After Action Report-Operation JUST CAUSE

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this after action review is to summarize activities, events, problems, and recommendations encountered by the 193rd Spt Bn Materiel Management Center in support of Operation JUST CAUSE.

2. NARRATIVE SUMMARY: During Operation JUST CAUSE, the 193rd Spt Bn Materiel Management Center provided continuous 24 HR Direct Support (DS) supply and maintenance management to one hundred and twenty-five (multiservice) customer units participating in combat, combat support, and combat service support operations within the Republic of Panama.

The Class I,II,III (P),IV section (three personnel) provided subsistence support thru the issuance of 28,734 cs of MREs, 7500 bxs of Sundry Packs, and the provision of 3,000 T Rations meals per day in support of the Command POW and REFUGEE CAMPS. Additionally, while maintaining the only on hand stockage of POUCH, HUMAN REMAINS in-country, filled all requests received; it also processed several class II, III (P), & IV off-line requisitions, and provided air resupply (LOG PACKS) technical assistance to supply and transportation personnel ferrying 321.5 STONS.


The Class III (BULK) section (one manager) accounted for the issue and receipt at SEVEN refueling sites of a total of 976,918 gls of JP5 and 30,474 gls of MOGAS UNLEADED MEDIUM (MUM). It provided daily POL accountability updates within the Command's Logistic Status Report and monitored POL equipment asset serviceability and unserviceability.

The Class V section (two personnel) provided ammunition management support by keeping day to day track of all ammunition receipts, issues, and on hand balances for an Ammunition Transfer Point (ATP) and two Ammunition Storage Points (ASP); maintaining visibility over the issue of 442.56 stons; and providing timely, 100 % demand satisfaction without incident. Additionally, it was responsible for monitoring the accountability of massive retrograde operations of captured ammunition (approx 700 STONS).

The Class VII/PBO section ( three personnel) submitted 81 requisitions (1607 items) in support of combat operations and provided assistance to the 5TH ID in generating replacement requisitions for battle losses; additionally, it processed 102 MRA-1 requests. It also provided two personnel to inventory all confiscated OPFOR equipment captured by the 193rd INF BDE (LT).

The Materiel section (Class IX/Maintenance Mgt--six personnel) managed over 7,799 repair parts requisitions, of which 3304 were filled, while the remaining were passed to the higher source of supply. Additionally, it called in 291 off-line requests to eleven different AMC major supporting commands and to the Defense Logistic Agency and coordinated direct ALOC shipment pick up from HOW AB during the initial 72 hours of combat operations; all in support of USCINCSO's Army, Air Force, and US Marines component units. It also orchestrated the successful completion of 133 vehicle recovery missions; coordinated deployment of contact teams to provide forward maintenance support; and intensively managed the daily production backlog of two Maintenance DSU's (B Co, E Co (AVIM), 193rd SPT BN), while providing technical assistance to the 5th ID and 7th ID DS Maintenance elements.

3. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS/ RECOMMENDATIONS: The MMC, though inadequately staffed, to support a Corps-size element, accomplished its primary mission--SUPPORT THE CUSTOMER. Additionally, it provided the majority of personnel for the headquarters security force, QRF, and exercised supervision over the entire security element. Although, customer support was maintained without major interruptions, augmentation personnel to fill vacant positions would have enhanced our capabilities and maintained continuity and high morale in the performance of any mission assigned. Moreover, requisitions passed by this MMC should have gone expeditiously to the National Inventory Control Point (NICP) without the necessity of a Manager Review process at the 93rd TAMMC (SAILS) level (unless the items were on hand to fill them) ; implementation of this procedure will prevent unnecessary delay and increase in requisition processing time.

  
MIGUEL A. GALINDO  
CPT, OM  
CHIEF, 193RD SPT BN MMC