


**PERSONAL
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MONOGRAPH**

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**OPERATION DESERT SHIELD-DESERT STORM
FIRST INFANTRY DIVISION, FT. RILEY, KANSAS**



BY

COLONEL WALTER M. CRAIG, JR.
United States Army

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PERSONAL EXPERIENCE MONOGRAPH

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD-DESERT STORM

FIRST INFANTRY DIVISION, FT. RILEY, KANSAS

PREPARED FOR LTC. DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II

BY

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OPERATION DESERT SHIELD-- A GARRISON PERSPECTIVE

We all know the results of the 2 August, 1991, invasion of Kuwait. As events unfolded, it became clear that some form of U.S. military involvement would be required. Many commanders began immediate planning foreseeing the likely deployment of their units and questions immediately surfaced around the impacts of missions defend or attack.

The implied mission of defend appeared to be the initial planning factor. As the commitment of U.S. forces began, a rotation concept was discussed. Most thought a one year rotation would be the likely outcome.

In November, the decision was reached to mass sufficient power in the Gulf to allow sufficient flexibility to support an offensive option. Consequently, additional forces were identified and the implementation process began.

The First Infantry Division was officially alerted on or about 8 November, 1990. I served as a battalion commander within the division. Sadly, I ruptured a lower disc while in the field on 17 October. I had the disc removed on 2 November. Normal recovery for

such surgery is nine months to one year. A few days after the surgery, I was informed that I would be replaced after twenty-five months in command as I was non-deployable. The commanding general decided to make me the headquarters commandant since I knew the post and the base support structure plus I was an experienced commander. The Headquarters Command grew into a thirteen company organization of close to two thousand soldiers. It was a mix of active and reserve component units organized to support the post and the deployment.

The goal of this paper is to recall some of the unusual events of this period in the hope that some of the observations will be of value to future planners and commanders.

The division was alerted formally on 8 November, 1990. Until that time, the word was "business as usual". In my opinion, this was a mistake. Commanders could have been planning, training, and focusing much earlier if as little as a warning order had been given. Funds could have been spent for critical items related to desert operations. However, we remained in the NTC train-up mode up till the last minute. This was not the fault of the division chain of command; they had little guidance either. Once the word was out, hasty decisions were made. Valuable time was lost by holding off till 8 November to begin serious preparation for deployment.

Early on, it was decided to reassign all soldiers pending UCMJ action to the Headquarters Command. The concept was fine, the execution was not. Some soldiers, after hearing of the alert notification chose to go AWOL. During their absence, they were

reassigned to the command. After their parent unit deployed, the soldier would be rounded up or would reappear. The problem was that under the UCMJ, these soldiers could NOT be charged with missing movement because they were not members of the deploying unit when it departed. All that could be done was to bring a simple AWOL charge via Article 15 or via courts martial. This was a bitter lesson to learn.

Under mobilization circumstances, the UCMJ system simply was unable to respond in a timely, efficient manner to the need of the commander. For example, I inherited all chapter cases in the division with a few exceptions. An involuntary separation board was appointed, notification sent to those concerned, and the two week notification clock began. Meanwhile, some notified soldiers would go AWOL and miss the board. They would return after the board disbanded and the whole process would have to be repeated again. If the soldier went AWOL again to frustrate the system, the only option left to the commander was to cut a deal with the soldier by offering a better chapter option with a general or honorable discharge or to prefer courts martial charges and try for pre-trial confinement. In some cases, under these conditions, a chapter 10 could be arranged, depending on the case.

Several cases brought to trial could not be efficiently pursued because of the difficulty and expense of bringing witnesses back from SWA. Some cases died because of the lack of available witnesses. This frustrated the system. It also created the impression that some soldiers were getting over while honorable

soldiers were in harms way.

One of the most emotional issues is how to handle the consequences of mass casualties. There were two schools of thought on this matter. One was to encourage all military families to remain on post or in their present communities. The other was to encourage families to go home to their relatives. The former option was taken at Ft. Riley. An efficient family support system and center was set up and manned. A post wide support effort was put into motion. I was required to train 340 casualty notifiers and to have fourteen trained burial teams ready. Prior to the breaching operation, the garrison commander told me to expect 20% casualties in the breaching force. Shortly thereafter, we received a 40% casualty estimate from our counterparts in SWA. Faced with these potential numbers, the garrison staff became concerned about the effects of so much stress and loss concentrated on a small post. Further, animosity would develop between those families of deployed soldiers versus nondeployed especially in the face of significant casualties. Some of this tension was experienced by children. For example, my own two daughters were told that I was a coward because I was still on post and not in the desert. My children became embarrassed and confused. Some wives became angry and hostile towards spouses of non-deployed personnel. At least in my case, my wife and I felt guilty about being there with me non-deployable. There was indeed a sense of shame associated with my status. My wife endured some caustic comments early on and basically withdrew for post activities after twenty-five months of supportive effort

on behalf of the unit and the post. Tensions were high and emotions got the best of people in some cases.

In my view, it would be better to encourage families to return to a home setting because, in the event of a loss, they would probably relocate there anyway. Their roots and true emotional support are at home. This is a particularly difficult issue especially from a policy standpoint. There is no easy solution to this complex problem. But in the final analysis, I believe returning to home, relatives, community and family is a better source of support than remaining on the military post. Depending on the situation and duration and casualties of a conflict, the post can become a synergistic factory of dread as the casualties mount. Fear, gloom and doom would begin to feed on itself.

The Army simply is not equipped or set up for efficient mass casualty processing. We would have performed the mission but it would have been an awkward struggle. Further, the average notifier may not even have a good handle on his own affairs and is not knowledgeable or trained in estate management and is not an adequate resource to a family with a loss of their provider. A checklist of benefits or a cookbook arrangement greatly simplified to address uncomplicated basic benefits should be prepared for survivor assistance personnel. However, more complicated issues are clearly out of the scope of the average notifier. Things are just too complicated.

The division was issued several hundred HMMVs, and five ton trucks just prior to deployment. This last minuet issue added

significantly to the workload. All vehicles and tracks had to be desert painted. In my signal battalion, 132 trucks had to be adapted to carry signal shelters, painted and prepared for shipment. The old fleet of CUCVs were turned in. This was accomplished in under three days working around the clock. Over 600 pieces of rolling stock was painted in this one battalion. Bradleys and M-1A1s were also issued in the eleventh hour. We were grateful for the new, capable equipment. However, I strongly believe it could have been shipped sooner and prepared, even as a contingency, rather than pull off the fielding as we did. The plate was already full. This additional workload on commanders and troops was not necessary. Further, one might rightly ask why a deployable mech infantry division did not have the newest, or even adequate equipment in the first place.

Modernization seems to be accomplished in a hit or miss fashion. The 4th Infantry Division (M) had no M-1s and no Bradleys as I understand it. However, the division did have the new division command and control system, MSE. The 1st Infantry Division (M) had the M-1s and the Bradleys, but it did not have the modern MSE C2 system. 1st ID (M) was selected for deployment because it had the newer weapons systems. One might ask why Divisions aren't modernized as a force package instead of a mix. The result was that the 1st Division deployed with a less capable C2 system and it had to interface this system with the modern MSE within the VII Corps upon deployment in country. This unfamiliar C2 arrangement placed the division at risk due to frail command and control

communications. We certainly did not train in peace as we had to operate in war. The mixed C2 problem was prevalent throughout the theater.

There is insufficient depth to critical equipment assemblages per the TO&Es to increase the assurance of sufficient equipment on hand to counter loss due to combat or attrition through extended operations in a harsh environment. Signal vans such as computer switchboards, generators and other critical components to the C2 system come to mind. Parts availability is a critical issue. Units should be allowed to build up significant combat stockages rather than depend on the logistics system to be able to identify, locate and ship to a user in a moving, rapidly changing theater. Many needed items were shipped from Ft. Riley and were never received by the addressee units because the system was unable to maintain visibility in theater logistics bases. Too many maintenance actions were completed by scrounging and trading than through the proper system. Go to War stockages should be maintained by deployable units. A type of Air Force style war reserve or " RISK " kit may be of use. Under this concept, a certain amount of critical components, parts or subassemblies are retained bases on known need, to provide a ready and assured source of critical spares. Shortly after the 2 August invasion, I directed my DS maintenance shop to begin ordering numerous spares for the commo vans because I suspected that piece-part and circuit card and signal cable level parts would be difficult if not impossible to get. In essence, I created a battalion RISK kit for my signal vans and systems. These

parts sustained the battalion during the war. Very little was obtained through the system.

Rumors became rampant as time went on. No official word was given to the community until the official alert notice was received. Perhaps it would have been better for the soldiers and the community to have been told that there was a high likelihood of deployment and that the division was planning accordingly. Most people would have accepted this information and trusted the chain of command from the perception that the command was passing on all that it knew at the time. However, by maintaining the business as usual posture, soldiers and their families began to suspect they were not getting the full story. In this instance, it would have been better to overstate the case than to understate it.

The command group decided to put a robust family support structure in place so that commanders in the desert did not have to be directly involved with family support issues at home. In short, the intent was to allow commanders to focus on their combat mission, knowing there was a capable support structure dealing with problems back home. This support concept was an excellent idea and it worked. The administrative load was removed from commanders and placed on the post. Each battalion had two or three personnel who remained at home station. These were mainly nondeployables for medical reasons. A family support military chain of command ran from the battalion-brigade level to a military officer family support coordinator who reported to the garrison commander. A parallel arrangement of key wives was created to handle family

issues. If a problem was not resolved by the spouse chain of concern, it was routed to the green suit chain for resolution. The family support coordinator had direct access to the chiefs of all supporting agencies and facilities on the post. Any issue unresolved by the support coordinator was taken care of by the garrison commander.

Along with the above arrangement, a council of colonels was formed. This group, headed by the garrison commander, ran the post, supported the deployment and redeployment to include the mobilization, reception, deployment and redeployment of reserve component units. This arrangement worked extremely well. The lesson here is that there is absolutely no reason to import a general officer to run things. The people who knew the post best ran it. Smooth community interface and support was achieved through the garrison commander. Good law enforcement and security was achieved via the post PMO.

The AG was central in the RC mobilization effort and the interfacing of RC AG processing units to mobilize the guard and reserve units stationed at Ft. Riley for support and deployment. The division G-1/AG became saturated having to deploy a portion of the shop to the desert while leaving a part to deal with mobilization and redeployment issues.

Senior wives are critical to the operation under deployment-high stress conditions. Key leader personality takes the fore. As in any event dealing with a number of individuals, some rise to the occasion and others cause more than their share of problems. Many

of the wives that contributed the most were spouses of very junior soldiers. The key is to find the willingness to share, work and support and to not focus on sponsor rank as an indicator of support potential. The modern two income family with a working wife makes a support system very difficult to put into place ahead of time. Many spouses are simply not interested in any significant involvement. Further, many spouses are not aware of basic information related to their husband's profession to be of any real help to others. Basic issues such as survivor benefits, SGLI, finance records, powers of attorney and related implications are completely over the heads of many wives. Many soldiers deliberately keep their wives ignorant of entitlements and other key items of essential information. Much needs to be done to facilitate spouse education as to basic benefits and procedures in the event of sponsor deployment.

A significant number of spouses do not speak English and show no real desire to learn. This presents a real problem in dealing with support issues to include legal and benefits. Further, women who do not speak the language well are not going to come forward as active supporters unless it is in a group of common language spouses. As the non-english speaking and the non-supportive spouses are strapped out of the pool of people who might help in support groups, you end up with a small handful of dedicated persons who will give all to make the system work. As the economy continues to get more difficult, and the working spouse becomes the norm, the ability to create and man robust post support functions from

military spouses will continue to become more difficult. A key cadre of civilian government employees is essential to form the core of any support network. The DPCA becomes important quickly when a transition from peace to potential or actual war takes place because family support and community activities center around this activity. Periodic reviews of family support plans should be conducted as a normal part of the readiness of the post to support a deployment.

The DEH is critical in a post deployment situation. Adequate budgets must be in place to support emergency projects related to deployment. This includes everything from emergency lighting at rail heads to money for fencing at the deployment storage parking lot. Troop housing becomes critical fast with much overflow to local area motels. Single parent or geographic bachelors become a problem as spaces are taken through mobilization.

Too many reserve component soldiers showed up non-deployable. At first, under current guidance, we were holding them as non-deployable for over ninety days pending resolution of their status. Later, we were returning them within thirty if they showed no likelihood of deployability. Some were pregnant upon arrival. This could have been avoided with proper processing at their parent unit location.

Too many RC soldiers had no dental panographs. This created a significant bow-wave in processing these soldiers. Medical processing for RC soldiers virtually brought active medical support to a standstill. Procedures need to be changed. All medical

processing for RC soldiers should be required to be completed and kept current at their parent unit at home location. The system is too cumbersome otherwise. Reserve component soldiers need up to date POM packets maintained at home station with only by exception actions required at the deployment post.

The Railway Security Service or, RSS, is neither secure or a service. Much of the equipment railed to the port in Texas was vandalized. Soldiers put everything they had into getting their gear ready only to find vehicle windows broken out in large numbers. An aggressive, serious security effort could prevent or significantly reduce such damage. ITOs and contract officers should get serious with the rail carriers. As a DOD policy issue, security of military equipment is wholly unsatisfactory while in transit to ports of embarkation.

Again UCMJ was frustrating. The Army was under mobilization, but verdicts, process and rules, especially pretrial rules and limitations, were in effect. Punishments did not fit the crimes under the serious conditions of a country mobilizing for war. Punishment, if given at all, fit the peacetime expectations. A case in point is that of Sergeant Prunner. He deserted, went AWOL and was convicted by a General Court Martial. He was sentenced to four months confinement after a long, expensive trial. The average soldier was in the desert for six months. There is no sense of equity under such a system wherein a deserter serves less time away from family than an honorable soldier doing his duty. Serious penalties must apply under deployment conditions because the

possibility of loss of control and discipline is very real if sufficient soldiers see the penalty of not going less than the danger or discomfort of going.

SIDPERS does not work well in dynamic environments. The system is too cumbersome to keep up with rapid change. Further, automatic provisions can create problems. For example, if a losing unit does not "depart" a soldier properly, and the gaining unit does not properly "arrive" the soldier, the pay center views the soldier as AWOL. Now his pay is effected and the process spins out of control. We experienced soldiers who had properly deployed being carried AWOL. We also experienced soldiers who did not appear on any unit roles and were truly not accounted for. At the start of the deployment, we were unsure of the status of about 600 soldiers. Within twenty-four hours we were able to get this number down to ninety-seven. A day later, we were down to seventeen. Some of these were later found to be in jails around the country, in hospitals, or hiding out in Junction City. Some deploying units had not assigned their non-deploying soldiers to garrison control, or had turned them over physically but did not complete the SIDPERS actions through their PACs to transfer the soldier on paper. Seventeen out of 13,000 is not too bad. But it is still too many.

Single parents presented problems. Most, in fact, the vast majority of single parents deployed. However, many did not. Care plans were not adequate or were "created" to meet a requirement. A deployment was not expected. The plan was put together to fill a unit requirement. Perhaps many were created with no intention to

actually implement. I personally reviewed many that were so shallow as to cause doubt as to how carefully commanders were reviewing these plans. Some were fraudulent. Some soldiers contacted the care giver asking them to withdraw support for the purpose of rendering the single parent nondeployable. The Army has a tough policy issue in this case. Many honorable, professional soldiers are single parents. However, too many ride the system and work it to their own benefit. Strict separation actions need to take place if an adequate, verified plan cannot be put into effect after a reasonable amount of time, usually thirty days after notification to render a verified plan. It should also be pointed out that good soldiers often have care plans fall apart through no fault of their own. The demography of the Army has presented difficult challenges to readiness especially when single parents are concerned.

Related to the above issue is pregnant soldiers. Around a third of my female soldiers were unmarried and pregnant. They became nondeployable. Worse, they blocked a position and they could not be replaced as a TO&E personnel shortfall. This becomes acute in critical skills such as computer switchboard operators or electronic maintenance technicians. Lastly, when rumors of deployment start turning real, I strongly suspect some women became pregnant strictly to avoid deployment. Again, a complex and challenging policy issue may be at hand. I personally do not believe that women should serve at echelons below corps. In some cases, unit replacements to fill a command may work when unexpected losses take place due to nondeployables. However, in single

function, specialized units, the loss of a handful of critical, highly trained and talented soldiers can have a significant effect on the mission capability of a unit. Perhaps there should be a percentage female limitation cap in certain units at the division and corps level.

Commanders need to be firm and yet fair with questionable soldiers. Many of the soldiers assigned as nondeployable because of pending UCMJ or administrative separation action should have been separated much earlier or they should have been deployed with their unit to SWA. Many left behind as unworthy were in the grade of E-4. Many chapter case stay-behinds were not barred from reenlistment, had few, if any counselling statements and seemed to be viewed as " duds " and not worth the trouble of taking along. Some serious discipline cases clearly should have been aggressively pursued in the normal course of business well before the alert notification. Further, some commanders refused to give some very young soldiers a chance to prove themselves. Most of these were alcohol rooted problem soldiers. They may have performed well in a drug free, alcohol free theater. In some cases, I deployed soldiers at their request to SWA. I know of none who were returned as unsuited to duty there. I directed deployment of several soldiers with particularly weak cases. Some were carried nondeployable only because of " bad debts or lots of bills ". Some clearly tried to use excessive debt as a way to avoid deployment. Too many commanders bought into this ploy. Many of these substandard soldiers claimed they could not afford to take care of their

children under the strain of a deployment. However, care of their children did not prevent them from running up a \$ 23,000 car note in the case of one soldier.

Female soldiers with new-born babies presented a problem. The six week recovery period may not be enough for a new military mother. This emotional mine field is made worse in the case of dual family member cases with a new baby just delivered and both parents deploying. This may be another difficult policy issue. It may be unfair to expect both parents to deploy to a war zone and place their children at risk should both parents be killed or incapacitated in war. Perhaps a policy of only one military member being deployable is a more equitable approach. However, under a volunteer concept, the issue becomes cloudy between what is morally correct and what is contractually agreed upon. In this case, perhaps early outs with streamlined rules and procedures is in order. However, the taxpayer is not providing a babysitting service or a part time job to the military. Again, a difficult issue to resolve both from a moral and functional point of view.

A them versus us attitude was just under the surface between those family members with loved ones deployed and those whose sponsors remained behind. Very active, in tune leadership is the only recourse to handling this problem. Firm, up front command guidance throughout the command is necessary to make clear that no such attitudes will be tolerated. Like a fire near a gasoline tank, any adversarial attitudes or actions must be stopped cold by the leadership at both the garrison and the deployed locations. There

are limits to what can be done, especially among civilians and dependents. The issue becomes one of the overall attitude that is the expected norm of behavior. Peer groups can become effective in this case especially among waiting families.

Too many soldiers keep their wives in the dark and totally ignorant as to benefits, pay matters or resources available to them on the post. The Army needs some way to force sponsors to keep their spouses informed. Many wives simply do not have a clue as to what is going on. Many spouses do not know how to get help. Some are openly hostile to the military and will resist contact from the sponsor unit. Several are so inept, no amount of direct help will be of any lasting benefit. However, the vast majority of young spouses, if given a minimum of assistance, will do fine. Their primary need is for a sense of emotional and physical security and a feeling of being involved fairly. In other words, if all are in this together, then some level of acceptance is achieved.

Inspector General programs and inspections need to be revamped. They need to quit micro managing equipment nuts and bolts and start closely reviewing personnel readiness deployability criteria. Are files, POM packets and associated legal documents adequate and correct? Are care plans validated? Is the post and associated RC units properly organized to support a deployment? Commanders do a good job on day to day training and readiness. The areas that seem to be prone to shortchanging are the personnel related issues. IG inspections should take on a deployability readiness focus. Equipment standards should become one of safe,

mission capable criteria rather than the excessive and often unrealistic standards applied today. An example of unrealistic standards would be 10-20 criteria applied to a M-54 series five ton truck made in 1968. Perhaps the real issue is what is such a piece of equipment doing in an active army division in the first place? This is, after all, a genuine readiness issue.

Soldiers may have been confused on what constituted legal war trophies. Some returning soldiers expressed confusion over what was legal to bring home. Some brought bayonets, while others were told they could not return with that item. There are probably several other examples.

OER/NCOERs were a mess. The system was not able to smoothly sort out time lines, due dates and other matters when the division was deployed and the OER infrastructure and reporting channel was fragmented between CONUS and theater. A deployed Personnel Service Company was trying to interface with its nondeployed portion at Ft. Riley in order to conduct business. Even with daily courier, the lack of communications, and the need to submit reports to PERSCOM caused problems. Once the division is deployed to a theater, all ties to CONUS should stop, and all support matters should be handled in theater. Further, OER/NCOERs prepared during the deployment often required signatures of deployed personnel prior to submission to PERSCOM channels. This was often impossible to accomplish in a timely manner or did not happen at all. Some efficiency reports were late or lost.

I do not know if a theater PERSCOM was established in SWA, I doubt

it. However, it seems proper that such an EAC organization be established as a central point to CONUS PERSCOM rather than separate commands, using various routes, attempting to forward reports to Washing D.C. from a war zone.

Open hostility developed over frustrations with mail. Mail service was totally unsatisfactory. Families were given mixed directions. The routing of mail was unclear. It appears that some parts of the country processed the mail with more dedication and care than did others. Families became hostile and extremely frustrated over the mail situation more than from any other factor. Post authorities lost more credibility from the poor mail service than from any other issue. Fear of casualties was accepted by families. But frustration with the mail brought out deep seated anger which bled off onto other areas. The Army must plan and resource for mail logistics if it is to have credibility with families in this key morale area. The mail to " any soldier " totally flooded the system. Transport appears to have been lacking to include the personnel required to sort, package and transport mail. Family members could get no straight answers they were willing to accept in regard to mail.

Access to desert satellite telephones was a fine morale enhancing tool early on in the initial stages of the deployment. However, once the units departed the ports, and the telephones followed, far too much sensitive and conflicting information was given to wives. The wives then networked the information. Often, the spouses had the real, current situation before the post

authorities. The reason is that post authorities would only provide information and status received through official channels whereas the wives would hear from their husbands in real time over the phone. The end result was that the post authorities, particularly at post wide family support meetings, gave the appearance of withholding information from family members. This strained credibility and relations even when the situation was carefully explained. Families simply could not understand how a Private could get the word through to his wife over some desert phone while the Army, with all its resources could not provide up-to-date information. Too much information, both accurate and inaccurate was getting back to spouses from the desert.

The intent of the desert phone service was to boost morale. However, it soon became a massive potential security problem. It was not uncommon for soldiers to report accurate unit locations to family members so they could place them on the map and follow their progress. In some cases, general options and plans were discussed. Far too much information was being given away. A competent enemy could have taken advantage of this situation. Such communications needs to be severely limited in future operations.

Posts with the majority of their forces deploying need a reserve component military police company brought on board to provide additional security. Ft. Riley reaped great dividends from our reserve component MP company. Family members wrote letters to the editor thanking the MPs for their work and for being there. A true sense of safety and security prevailed at Ft. Riley during the

deployment. Further, having the extra MP company on board diluted unreasonable arguments posed by scared wives. Some wanted the post sealed off and completely closed off from the world. Others wanted entire roads and sections of the post closed. Early on, we were able to demonstrate the safety of the post and these fears subsided.

Walking dog patrols were worth their weight in gold. This visible symbol of neighborhood security was openly appreciated by families. Post housing and the families at Ft. Riley were indeed well secured.

The hub of the post support effort was the family support center. A well run and properly resourced facility is essential. Moreover, aggressive advertisement is vital in order to reach spouses, particularly those residing off post. Radio station spots were used, direct mailings and family support networking groups were used to good effect. Outlying community support groups were tied in to the central family support center. The garrison commander, through his ties to the various chambers of commerce played a vital role in generating support.

All essential family matters should be handled at the family support center. Legal, finance, and DEERS related problems to include CHAMPUS are key spouse areas of interest. Hours of operation need to be tailored to the level of use and the level of emotions and stress. Chaplain service is essential in the center. Streamlined personnel services such as dependent ID card service is a valuable service. The family member sees that things

are being made easier and as convenient as possible under the circumstances. A well run family support center can foster a sense of place and a foundation for collective problem sharing for the military community. DPCAs need to be adequately resourced at divisional posts to ensure a capable cadre is always on hand in the event of a deployment.

The Army needs to seek relief through the DOD and the Congress for certain unfair state laws that adversely affect deploying soldiers. For example, soldiers renting a home are not allowed forgiveness of lease termination penalties due to deployment in the state of Kansas. The Kansas state attorney general, in a recent ruling upheld the landlords right to impose early termination fees upon departing soldiers. The soldier has no protection. Further, most junior enlisted soldiers are not aware of their rights, and probably have not carefully read their lease agreements or posed the question to the landlord regarding unexpected deployment under unit orders. Clearly, this is morally wrong as a matter of fairness to expect a soldier, deploying under the orders of his government to be liable for lease termination penalties. The Army needs to take a strong stand on this issue. The situation at Ft. Riley is particularly galling because Ft. Riley is the second or third largest employer in the state. There are probably similar problems in the other several states. The Soldier and Sailors Relief Act does not appear to provide protection in this case.

Small chemical protective masks were a severe problem. They were universally in short supply. Likewise, the smallest and the

larger boot sizes were a problem. Some soldiers deployed with no protective mask. A few did not deploy because of non-availability of boots. I know of one soldier who waited, non deployable, because boots were being custom made for him. The most pressing and serious issue was the small mask.

Spare chemical protective suits were a problem. Stockage levels were in doubt and the soldiers wondered about this.

Dry battery stockage levels were totally inadequate. Every battery in the division was on order or consumed from the outset. The amount of batteries just to keep the M-8 chemical alarm operating on a twenty-four hour basis is amazing. Similar mathematics applies to oil and air filters and other common expendables.

Self service supply items appear to have been wholly inadequate or non existent in theater. Large go to war stockages need to be on hand and actually in place. A fifteen day level is not sufficient to support a deployed unit while the logistics system builds to support. Thirty days should be the absolute minimum. Unit budgets are not adequate, on a day-to-day peacetime basis, to fund proper contingency stocks.

Unit organic transport is inadequate. Conex or containerized transport storage container capability is totally lacking. A tactical container should be procured which is suitable for peacetime motor pool usage and ready for deployment should the need arise. Why should a post rent box cars or other commercial containers that they cannot deploy instead of having something they

can PLAN to take with them? I would bet that most commanders would agree that cargo hauling capability within their units was lacking, as well as tow pintle availability for the numerous towed items such as MKTs, water and cargo or generator trailers and others.

If an asset or resource is not mobile, it is not a resource but a problem. Anything procured to support must be organically mobile.

Many soldiers appeared to hate the field food they were given. T-rations and MREs need to be fixed. I wonder what rations other national services use and if our Troop Support Agency samples their products. It would be interesting to feed Ts and MREs to the folks at TSA for six months and then see how they rate them.

Some unit TO&Es do not make sense in a wartime environment. For example, the division signal battalion, spread all over the division area of operations, with many signal teams operating in isolated locations, have no assigned medics and no antitank-anti armor capability. There is no attached air defense capability for the key signal node centers. Loss of one or two of the three node centers would cripple the division C2 network. Three water trailers to cover an entire division sector is another example of inadequate planning in the TO&E. Perhaps the worst example of shortsightedness is having only one wrecker authorized in the battalion.

Lack of mobile cargo hauling and storage capability in the division is critical. For example, 1st Infantry Division (M) used 175 conexes, 13 twenty foot ISO containers and 103 forty foot ISO shelters. Cost was \$1,400,000.

Readiness groups must send out contact teams to all RC units at first notice of activation to assist in planning for mobilization, logistics and training for subsequent deployment.

Last minute fielding added to difficulty in deployment. The division successfully fielded over 8,000 pieces of new equipment within two months. Over 6,800 vehicles and related equipment was painted desert tan by soldiers and contractors.

Many temporary hires were needed to augment logistics and operations areas. Over 138 temp hires were required. The most significant problem was obtaining security clearances for these people. Many could not be obtained in a timely manner. IMAs must be pre identified to fill key post deployment related positions upon deployment notification.

Recall of soldiers attending off-post schools was a problem. Every TRADOC school Command Sergeant Major seems to have his own set of rules. Each had to be dealt with individually. TRADOC needs to standardize procedures upon alert and recall to return soldiers in a timely manner.

The transportation automated system, TC ACCIS did not properly satisfy transportation automation requirements. UNISYS printers could not produce a seven page GBL.

Too many reserve component soldiers reported needing security clearance updates or clearances in general. Ft.Riley DSEC issued over 1,500 interim clearances, plus processed over 1,251 other clearance actions for RC personnel. RC units must be better prepared.

Fifth Army, 89th ARCOM, STARC Nebraska, Kansas and Missouri must stress the readiness importance of NBC equipment maintenance and training in RC units. Many soldiers were not ready. Medical records, particularly shots, dental and panographs were sadly lacking in readiness and currentness.

Blocking, bracing and packing materials stocked by the DEH were not useable due to rot. There is no reason to hold this material a war reserve assets. Buy the material needed upon alert notification.

Abbreviated letter contracts worked well in the department of contracting to expedite critical purchases to support the deployment.

A " Who Pays " matrix needs to be developed early in the mobilization process to streamline financial difficulties. In some cases, it was unclear who would pay for what depending on type of purchase or status of unit ie.,RC vice active.

NBC logistics guidance was inaccurate for CDE sizing data. Sizing done with the training chem suit does not produce accurate data. The BDO is different in size. Also, wear of wet weather gear needs to be taken into account.

Many RC units reported significantly short of all types of CDE. Much of what they did have on hand was not properly cared for. Many units were missing a significant portion of optical inserts for their personnel.

About one third of a RC units ten day train-up was devoted to basic NBC skills training. Much of this training should have been

properly completed prior to mobilization as part of their normal yearly training requirements.

Too many critical items were fielded to the division too late. For example, over 2,000 pair of night vision goggles were issued shortly before departure. Crews were able to train in SWA prior to the ground phase. Had they not had this time, they would have been in the position to fly at night untrained. Further, if the Army was able to rush 2,000 sets of night vision systems to the division at the final hour, why weren't these devices fielded months earlier? Every USR report to FORSCOM and HQ DA contained statements regarding the chronic shortages of these and other critical items. It appears that nobody listens during normal times. USR reports need to be acted upon and commanders concerns need to be taken seriously.

Transportation logistics was significant. Soldier weight estimates for airlift need to be increased from 300 to 475 or possibly to 500 pounds each. Associated TAT and basic load need to be factored in. Over 15,180 soldiers were airlifted from Ft. Riley. 115 aircraft were used. They consisted of 14 C5, 55 C 141, 6 DC 10, 12 L1011, and 28 B-747. Short tons moved by air was 3,083.

Sea lift was as follows:

246,000 metric tons shipped by sea.

Rail utilization was: 2,129 rail cars used. Rail sidings and access needs review for lighting and adequacy. Security aspects need review also. In many cases, the loss of one track would delay the movement of heavy combat equipment from the post to the port of

embarkation. Agreements with unions should be explored as to after hours or weekend-holiday work. For example, if the one or two tracks leading out of Ft. Riley became unusable over a weekend, could rapid repair been accomplished?

There is no provision in SIDPERS to create dummy or provisional UIC codes for units created to manage deployment unique situations. The process used was to assign all non-deployables to the existing Headquarters Company, Headquarters Command and then create a derivative UIC from that. We ended up with a company with over 1,600 soldiers on its roles. Dummy " plug in " UICs need to be in the SIDPERS data base to allow for expansion under deployment conditions.

Reception teams for each brigade and separate battalion must be assigned to the ports of embarkation and debarkation. 1st Infantry Division was the last division in SWA ports and was the first division to fully deploy in the TAA. The reception teams made the difference.

Support soldiers and equipment should be the first part of the airflow. These should include necessary communications, MI and ADA personnel and equipment to support initial port operations and deployment as the main body follows.

Military sea lift command placed a single units equipment on several ships in many cases. This increased the difficulty in finding and sorting out the equipment at the SPOD. However, if there was a sea threat, it would probably be more prudent to split the load among many vessels.

Operational funds were not released until formal notification was received. This made it impossible to order and obtain many supplies, especially SSSC items. Contingency funds must be released early on to allow for proper planning and to reduce panic buying.

The directorate of contracting needs to be augmented early on at first indication of possible alert.

FORSCOM logistics guidance was confusing regarding NBC equipment. The second set of CDE was not assumed to require gloves and boots. Hence, some division soldiers deployed without a second set of these items.

RC component DS/GS units did not have or deploy with sufficient ASL to do their job in SWA.

RC units were mobilized from numerous locations without any fund cites on their orders. Payment vouchers and fund accounting cannot be established without accounting codes and fund cites.

RC unit USR reporting does not make sense. There seems to be different criteria between personnel readiness criteria and equipment on hand measures of readiness. Many units were reported C-3 while missing substantial combat systems. Some were as low as 54% EOH yet still reported combat ready.

The Army pay system is too complex and requires paperwork upon mobilization for RC personnel. The Air Force and Navy have a streamlined system that requires a fraction of the workload required in the Army system. JUMPS-RC needs to be brought in alignment with the active system so that the two can be dovetailed during mobilization and in processing to the mobilization station.

Some soldiers are lazy and do not take care of required personal affairs during peacetime operations. Some commanders are not reinforcing deployment related administrative requirements such as wills, powers of attorney and family care plans. For example, the division SJA processed 6000 requests for wills just prior to deployment along with 12,000 powers of attorney. The show rate for completed wills was just 60%. Many boarded the airplane without proper legal protection due to their own failure to act. Clearly, IGs should spend more time on personnel deployment readiness than on micro managing equipment maintenance and paperwork training records as is currently the case.

Many active as well as RC soldiers reported to Ft. Riley in non-deployable condition. Why?

RC personnel under mobilization had to be issued active duty ID cards. Another cumbersome administrative burden. Why have two different cards? Why not develop a dual purpose card?

RC units must process family members into DEERS at home station and not wait till activation. RC units do not appear to have sufficient automation to create accurate rosters or records at state headquarters. Again, a real burden on personnel to process these soldiers. Thousands of man-hours are spent on ID cards, DEERS paperwork and dental/medical records updates. All of this could and should be accomplished and kept current at home station.

ARCOMS and STARCS must do better on security clearances for their personnel.

STARCS need funds to establish regional family action centers

(FACS) at mobilization. Many RC families do not get timely, accurate information or services. Many must drive several hundred miles to process paperwork. There needs to be a better system of family support within the RC.

Sidpers Wartime, Sidpers and Sidpers RC appear to not be compatible. Sidpers RC has a different format than Sidpers AC. An AC installation can not tap into RC data bases. The result is a great duplication of data and effort. The system needs to be compatible with common baseline data fields with information exchange possible.

Force fed equipment fieldings to deploying units must be accompanied by MTO&E changes. The reason is that without an MTO&E authorization to have the equipment, you cannot routinely order parts or major component replacement parts/assemblies because the ordering unit has no justification/authorization for ordering the items. Sounds like a " Catch 22 " but that is exactly what it is. Some alternative needs to be established for this problem.

Rail dates for unit moves were classified. This made logistics planning complicated. It impacted contracting because they could not stipulate to a vendor " not later than " delivery dates.

Force fielded equipment could not be repaired in theater by RC DS/GS maintenance units because they had insufficient or non-existent ASL. AC units were in the same shape for force fielded items as well.

Simple things such as cardboard boxes for soldiers personal items storage are grossly underestimated.

Certified load planners are in critical supply. A trained and certified cadre of load planners must be on hand at all times.

Materials handling equipment is in short supply and is not adequate to move out a division from home station in a timely manner.

Storage for all soldier property needs to be centralized in one location ideally, perhaps a recognized bonded moving company warehouse such as Allied or Mayflower rather than being stored in numerous locations. In some cases, soldiers returned to different barracks and their personal belongings were in another building. Personal baggage posed a significant problem.

Vehicle bumper numbers need to be added to bar coding data for GBL and ease of item identification.

Over 3,200 spare protective masks were issued during the deployment. All TDA assets were issued. All TO&E spares were issued as well.

Many were consumed as a result of a high percentage of unready RC component masks.

Vehicle MOB TDA authorizations are not sufficient. Transportation requirements skyrocket as unit vehicle equipment is loaded yet unit transport requirements remain. The Ft. Riley MOB TDA for vehicles was 663. The TMP fleet could handle 333. Thus there was a shortfall of over 300 vehicles. In some cases, the recently turned in CUCVs could have been used for general transportation. The provisional units depended on these vehicles to conduct operations. Leased vehicles would have been required if the CUCVs

were not available.

The AUTOROS system for SSSC accounts was unable to handle mobilization demands. It could not sort out unusual, war-time demands from peacetime levels.

RC units as well as AC units, upon activation and out processing for deployment cannot support themselves for food service. DOLs and DOCs need to plan for this as part of post mobilization planning. Overall, food service support was excellent and flexible for arriving units awaiting onward movement to SWA.

Many Army CIFs use manual property books. Some are automated. They all need to be automated. Manual facilities cannot keep up with accounting while supporting the deployment of a division and its deploying RC units.

Even at the 30 day level, SSSC supplies were grossly inadequate. The Army needs to ramp up this area as a deployment contingency significantly. Female hygiene requirements totally overwhelmed the system.

TA-50 spares and authorized stockage levels in the Main Support Battalion need to be upgraded. There was not nearly enough on hand. This seemed to be a common comment from returning commanders.

The TO&E for the MSB is not adequate for mobility. The DISCOM Main Support Battalion is not mobile and cannot even begin to support a division that is highly mobile and moving great distances rapidly. The Army needs to invest in mobility. Again, if a unit is not mobile, it is a hinderance and not an asset.

Income tax, both state and federal needs to be placed on hold for deployed soldiers. The matter is too complex, and many spouses are totally unable to begin to cope with tax matters with their spouses absent. Soldiers should be allowed to file within six months after return or upon April 15 the following period, whichever comes later.

Many soldiers with bad checks deployed leaving their spouses unable to cash checks at military installations and other facilities and businesses. Some provision needs to be made for this problem. The problem becomes crucial for those wives who do not speak English and have no understanding of a checkbook or anything else related to finances.

Units do not need to re-qualify their soldiers on their weapon prior to deployment. A good battle sight zero and field firing should be all that is necessary. Ranges and ammo for soldiers who are unqualified should be run to handle these soldiers on a by exception basis.

Peacetime Army requirements such as SQT testing should stop immediately upon alert notification. All troop schools should return soldiers to their units immediately to include TRADOC schools. A common sense test could be applied: students complete if they are 75% through the course. If not, they are returned.

The above laundry list is my review of my experiences encountered in the deployment operations at Ft. Riley Kansas. The tone of the paper is to highlight some problems and give lessons learned. It should be remembered that this deployment was a stellar

performance by a great group of commanders and post civilian employees who pulled together as a dedicated team. I honestly can not think of a better division or post in the deployment performance and the reception and redeployment effort.