

**PERSONAL
EXPERIENCE
MONOGRAPH**

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**THE BATTLE COMMANDERS
DEVELOPMENT COURSE (BCDC)
A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION**



BY

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**THE BATTLE COMMANDERS DEVELOPMENT COURSE (BCDC)
A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION**

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Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for Course 455,
Personal Experience Monograph (PEM)
Term III

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CLASSIFICATION

a contracted interactive opposing force (OPFOR), the training centered on the Deliberate Decision Making Procedure (DDP) (Figure 1, Deliberate Decision Making Procedure). Commanders received a division order requiring them to defend against an attacking Soviet style motorized rifle division (Week 1) followed by a deliberate attack against remnants of a much depleted defending motorized rifle regiment (Week 2).




FIGURE 1, DELIBERATE DECISION MAKING PROCEDURE²

Commanders were encouraged (not always successfully) to conduct the planning and preparation for combat on days 1-4 with execution against an interactive OPFOR on Day 5 (Figure 2, Week 1, TCDC Schedule). The Week 2 schedule was very similar to the

Week 1 schedule but focused on brigade offensive operations (Week 2 Schedule not shown).

DAY 1	SYNCHRONIZATION AND STAFF PROCESS CLASS
	BLUE FORCE LAYDOWN
	OPFOR LAYDOWN
	INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB)
DAY 2	ROAD TO WAR
	MISSION ANALYSIS
	COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE CLASS
	COMMANDER'S PREPARE/ISSUE GUIDANCE
	COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT/ANALYSIS/COMPARISON
DAY 3	JANUS DEMONSTRATION
	COURSE OF ACTION DECISION BRIEFING
	PLAN DEVELOPMENT
	WARGAMING/SYNCHRONIZATION
DAY 4	OPORD BACKBRIEF
	REHEARSAL
	COUNTER RECONNAISSANCE BATTLE
DAY 5	DEFENSIVE BATTLE
	AFTER ACTION REVIEW (AAR)

FIGURE 2, WEEK 1, TCDC SCHEDULE

SUCCESSFUL SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE BRIGADE'S COMBAT POWER

Success at TCDC was measured by the ability of the commander to synchronize the combat power of his brigade to defeat the enemy while maintaining a favorable end-of-

mission friendly combat power ratio compared to that of the OPFOR.

Defending friendly brigades normally defeated the attacking Soviet MRD, but rarely had sufficient combat power themselves to be considered combat effective (66%). During the reconnaissance—counter-reconnaissance fight the attacking OPFOR normally obtained detailed information on the disposition of the defending brigade. The information gained during the reconnaissance-counter-reconnaissance fight enabled the OPFOR commander to confirm the location of templated friendly units. The OPFOR commander finalized his selected course of action and attacked against identified friendly weaknesses. In the offense, the attacking friendly brigade was rarely successful despite the availability of accurate intelligence information on the disposition and strength of the defending enemy force. The brigade commander inevitably failed to synchronize the brigade's combat power at critical points in the battle. In the offense, the characteristics of concentration, surprise, tempo and audacity were not followed allowing the defending OPFOR to attrite friendly units to the point where they were combat ineffective.

While knowledge of the DDP (to include the commander's estimate) was important, it did not, in itself, constitute the basis for success. Command was more than simply making decisions. Yet how were we to introduce leadership training into a two week course whose focus was on synchronizing combat power (decision making)? As a result of numerous battles and after action reviews (AARs) a number of characteristics which commanders possessed and or employed were identified which appeared to contribute to the successful synchronization of combat power. These were:

- Successful commanders understood their role in the deliberate planning procedure. They normally conducted their own personal estimate of the situation that allowed them to form the basis of their intent, guidance and vision to their staffs.³
- Successful commanders understood their role in the preparation phase of combat operations. Conversely, unsuccessful commanders all too often failed to understand their personal contribution to synchronizing their unit's combat power during this critical pre-hostilities period. With so many battlefield activities taking place prior to executing either defensive or offensive operations, the commander must identify how he can best contribute to the unit's preparation for combat and having determined that, take action accordingly. The activities of a commander during the preparation phase are directly related to the information gained as a result of conducting his personal estimate of the situation. For example, during the preparation phase, the commander must verify that his location on the battlefield will allow to him to make critical decisions and to communicate those decisions to subordinates and staff. It is during the preparation phase that the commander verifies that he can indeed see that certain point on the ground which he expects the enemy to reach, and that he has the ability to communicate the counterattack order to the reserve force commander. Successful commanders understood that they had a finite amount of time and energy available to them prior to the battle and that their visualization of the battle derived during the planning phase, dictated their activities--where, what and with who--during the preparation phase of combat operations.

- **Successful commanders understood that while they normally made few decisions during any one battle, those that they did (or did not) make were often the key to the success(or failure) of the unit's mission. For brigade commanders this was a difficult lesson to accept. By their nature commanders want to make decisions. Assessing the outcome of a battle was often considered something short of 'commanding.'**
Commanders often gave way to the temptation to indulge in an over abundance of unnecessary decision making. Decision making by a brigade commander must be balanced against the need to allow subordinate commanders maximum flexibility to execute their unit's mission within the constraints imposed by the brigade commander. Unnecessary decision making by the brigade commander often inhibited subordinate commanders from taking the initiative.
- **Successful commanders could mentally visualize the progress of the battle and assess its movement toward the desired end state.**
- **Successful commanders possessed the flexibility and capability to modify rapidly their plans to take advantage of unexpected opportunities. Such opportunities could be a suddenly exposed enemy flank, or a previously unidentified weakness in a defensive line. Successful commanders were opportunists and had the strength of will and the courage to take risk.**
- **Successful commanders were able to articulate their guidance, intent, and vision to their staffs and subordinate commanders. Successful commanders took every opportunity to coach, lead, mentor and motivate their subordinates throughout the planning, preparation and execution phase of combat operations.**

- Successful commanders were able to deal with what W. J. Wood refers to as, “exertion, frustration, uncertainty, apprehension, danger to their units, and chance,”⁴ without losing their focus on the desired end state. Successful commanders effectively dealt with these distracters as they occurred and never let them accumulate to overwhelming proportions.
- Successful commanders had personalities that showed their genuine concern for the subordinate commanders and staff members on their, albeit temporary, brigade combat team. Successful commanders would listen to advice rendered to them by subordinates, and provide their own experience, judgment and guidance to those they came in contact with. Successful commanders were approachable. Subordinates could present problems to them without fear of being castigated. One of the key reasons behind their approachability was their understanding of their role as a coach and mentor. These commanders recognized early in the training that subordinates would not want to present them with bad news if they ‘killed the messenger’ in response. They had as General J. Lawton Collins stated, ‘the human touch.’⁵ Under positive leadership, subordinates felt they could ask for help and guidance from the commander.

In summary, commanders who understood their role and their contributions to synchronizing their brigade’s combat power throughout the planning, preparation and execution phase of combat operations were usually successful --their units defeated the OPFOR with minimum friendly casualties. Conversely, units were normally unsuccessful, when commanders failed to understand that basic leadership skills and performance of

specified commander's functions are vital in synchronizing their brigade's combat power. Key to being able to synchronize the brigade's combat power was the ability of the commander to perform a commander's estimate. The products of the commander's estimate-mission analysis, course of action development and analysis and a decision by the commander drove the DDP. This finding is not unique to TCDC. LTC John D. Rosenberger, senior brigade trainer at the NTC, observed twelve combined arm brigades plan and fight about a hundred battles at the NTC. Rosenberger concludes that few brigade commanders possessed "... the skills and competencies required to effectively employ every element of combat power to achieve their intent."⁶

THE PROBLEM

The principal problem experienced at TCDC was the inability of the commander to synchronize the combat power of the brigade. Commanders and staffs rarely understood the DDP and, therefore, could not make the transition to a rapid decision making mode during the execution phase of combat operations. In many cases, even with an understanding of the DDP, commanders were ill-prepared for the demands of simulated combat against an experienced OPFOR. In retrospect, this lack of preparation was to be expected. The entry level training of those who attended the two weeks of TCDC instruction was diverse. For every individual experienced in the synchronization process, there were four who were not. In many cases, combat arms command designees had not seen troop duty for years. Years at the Pentagon or other staff positions had left them ill-

prepared for assuming their role as the synchronizer of combat power within the brigade. While it was often advantageous to have lieutenant colonel and colonel students assume the role of the brigade staff in the TCDC classroom, it was often unrealistic. This level of experience and expertise normally exceeded that which the brigade would have on his staff upon assuming command. In order to train combat, combat support, and combat service support arms, TCDC had out of necessity, taken the 'shotgun approach to providing instruction.'

Another identified shortcoming of the TCDC instruction was the lack of emphasis on leadership. Success was determined by whether a commander could synchronize the brigade's combat power and thereby, defeat the OPFOR but, the aspects of coaching, motivating and mentoring were secondary to 'winning' the battle. Integrating leadership into TCDC instruction was a noted shortfall but one that seemed beyond the scope and the ability of the course to rectify.

THE REQUIREMENT

In the summer of 1993, the Commander, TRADOC, General Frederick M. Franks, expressed his concern that the Army must do a better job in teaching its commanders how to synchronize combat operations. About this time, the term 'battle command' enjoyed a revival in the U.S. Army.⁷ Battle command appeared as a new term in the Army's lexicon. The 1993 edition of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, defines battle command as:

the art of battle decision making, leading and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions. Includes visualizing current state and future state, then formulating concepts of operations to get from one to the other at least cost. Also includes assigning missions; prioritizing and

allocating resources; selecting the critical time and place to act; and knowing how and when to make adjustments during the fight.⁸

While perceived by many to be just another new 'buzzword' the battlefield operating system function of battle command was vastly different from the old battlefield operating system of command and control. The focus had rightfully shifted to the commander and his role in motivating and directing soldiers and to his role in decision making. General Franks wanted to produce 'intuitive maneuver leaders' that could exercise leadership over subordinates, rapidly assess complex situations, visualize the battlefield and desired end states, articulate his intent to subordinates, and make timely decisions. The emphasis was on maneuver commanders, something that, despite the best efforts in TCDC, was diluted with the attendance of combat support and combat service support command designees in the course. There simply was not enough time to focus on training brigade commanders without sacrificing efforts to train the brigade staff. With this guidance, and no more, the School for Command Preparation began to develop a plan that would meet General Franks' requirements.

THE BATTLE COMMANDERS DEVELOPMENT COURSE--THE FIX

Armed with the collective experience of the TCDC instructors and with the limited guidance received from General Franks, a team of instructors began to 'flesh out' a course that would produce 'intuitive maneuver commanders.' The first action was to grab the office dictionary and find the definition of 'intuitive.' The American Heritage Dictionary defines 'intuitive' as:

1. a. The act or faculty of knowing without the use of rational processes;

immediate cognition. b. Knowledge so gained; a sense of something not evident or deducible. 2. A capacity for guessing accurately; sharp insight.⁹

After reading the dictionary definition of intuition the team considered itself in deep trouble. We could not think of one person we knew that was an 'intuitive leader.' The thought of a commander that made decisions without going through a rational thought process was contrary to everything I had ever learned about the DDP. Crystal balls were not on the list of items issued to commanders.¹⁰

Based upon the collective experiences of the TCDC instructors and the guidance provided by General Franks, Week 1 would continue to focus on the staff planning process and its role in synchronizing the brigade's combat power. Instruction on DDP would be the foundation for producing commanders that could make rapid decisions under combat conditions. Instructors recognized that during the planning phase of Week 1, additional emphasis was required on the importance and significance of conducting the commander's estimate. With the emphasis on producing 'intuitive maneuver commanders' and with the limited time available (two weeks for the entire course) the team decided that the second week of the course would be limited to maneuver battalion and brigade commanders. No longer would the battalion and brigade commanders have the luxury of a staff to assist them in the planning, preparation and execution phase of combat operations. Commanders would now be forced to go through an abbreviated planning process which at the time we called the Combat Decision Making Process (CDP). The CDP most closely resembles the 'run' portion of the decision making process where advanced application of tactical decision making is required. The CDP is driven by the commander and relies upon his experience and expertise to arrive at a timely, acceptable solution given the limited

time available.¹¹ Unrealistic? Perhaps at an initial glance, but not unrealistic when considering that, during the execution phase of combat operations, staff estimates are not always available.

The BCDC instruction sought to produce maneuver commanders who could visualize the current and future state of combat operations, then formulate concepts of operations to get from one state to another at the least cost. Instruction also required commanders to assign missions, select the critical time and place to act, and know how and when to make adjustments during the fight. Every attempt was made to replicate the intellectual and mental pressures of battle command in each lesson. Three Terminal Learning Objectives (TLOs) were identified which focused on the art and science of battle command. These TLOs were designed to assist the commanders in honing their tactical skills, knowledge, and ability to make decisions in the application of combat power on the battlefield. These were considered graduate level TLOs and were selected based upon knowledge previous gained during Week 1 of TCDC instruction. These TLOs are listed below:

- 1. Analyze and modify brigade level intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products to support tactical decision making operations.** Commanders would be provided the products of the IPB process and would have to analyze them and request additional information required to support plan development and the execution of operations once hostilities were initiated. Providing the IPB products obviated the need for including a full time S2 intelligence officer in BCDC and kept the focus on the

commander's ability to analyze information and to make demands on intelligence collection.

2. Exercise battle command to synchronize and execute brigade and battalion tactical operations. This TLO centered on leading and motivating subordinate commanders, the execution of a reconnaissance and surveillance plan, use of a decision support template (DST), identification of commanders critical information requirements (CCIR), abbreviated rehearsals and in exercising tactical judgment. This TLO would be tested primarily during the preparation and provided with division level operations orders (OPORDs), and overlays, IPB products, and previously prepared commander's estimates, and through the use of JANUS computer simulation commanders would utilize abbreviated decision making procedures in developing and executing combat operations (Figure 3, The Combat Decision Making Process). Battalion commanders received previously developed brigade OPORDs and were required to assess whether they were feasible and suitable given the current situation. If the OPORD no longer applied to the particular situation, commanders were required to go through the combat decision making process and formulate a new concept of operation, conduct a suitability, feasibility, and acceptability analysis, and then rapidly confirm his estimates and adjust the concept of operation accordingly.




FIGURE 3, THE COMBAT DECISION MAKING PROCESS¹²

The discerning reader should have identified that none of the above TLOs or supporting enabling learning objectives (ELOs) made any mention of producing intuitive leaders. As the team attempted to develop a course that would produce intuitive leaders, it soon discovered that the dictionary definition of 'intuition' did not apply to the development of intuitive commanders. What were the task, conditions, and standards that applied to the development of intuitive leaders? We certainly did not know nor did any one else whom we asked. Not knowing of any present day 'intuitive commanders,' the team began to research some of history's 'great captains' in an attempt to identify those characteristics of battle command--leadership and decision making-- that made them

'great'. The team studied (among many) Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant, Creighton Abrams, and Erwin Rommel all in an attempt to come up with some common characteristics that led to their success. These commanders appeared to possess the ability to make 'intuitive decisions'. How did they do it and how could we apply the lessons learned to developing 'intuitive commanders' in the BCDC?

COMPETENCIES OF 'HISTORY'S GREAT CAPTAINS'--DE-BUNKING THE MYTH OF INTUITION

The more the team studied history's 'great captains' the more it realized that the dictionary definition of intuition had nothing to do with their tactical or strategic success as commanders. While the team's research into the 'great captains' was limited, it identified the following battle command competencies that were common (but not absolute) to them all:

- A recognition of their role as commander and of what they had to do to contribute to the success of the battle.
- The ability to assess the battle rapidly whether by personal presence or through other means such as radio, telegraph or messenger delivered information.
- The ability by their mere personal presence on the battlefield, to inspire subordinates.
- A keen appreciation of the terrain.
- An understanding that (except for Alexander the Great) being forward did not necessarily mean they should remain in the 'beaten zone'. Alexander's place in battle

was, as with the style of heroic leaders, up front leading his soldiers into the fray.

Being forward was considered a risk they would take given the requirements to make decisions and to motivate and lead their subordinates.

- Recognition that being in good physical condition was a pre-requisite to maintaining stamina. Poor health had a negative effect on their ability to both direct the battle and lead and motivate subordinates. All possessed the required physical stamina to work long hours under tough, demanding conditions.
- Understanding the value of rest and its contribution to their ability to reflect, think, and calculate friendly and enemy situations. Most of these 'great captains' set a side time during the day for personal reflection.
- Could visualize the expected battle so that they could place themselves at the decisive point at the decisive time. It was no accident that these commanders collectively showed up just at the right time to save the day with a monumental decision, i.e. 'Commit the reserve now!'
- Could clearly verbalize their intents and decisions to their subordinates with minimum words and written documents. The ability to express their thoughts clearly and succinctly was one of their greatest attributes.
- Had the ability to impose their will on subordinates and the enemy. All had the strength of will to see them through difficult situations.
- Of those studied, most had a strong spiritual belief. In his book The Mask of Command, author John Keegan relates that after the Battle of Waterloo if the Duke of

Wellington "...told his sister-in-law a day later, 'The finger of God was on me all day-- nothing else could have saved me,' he spoke close to the virtual truth." ¹³

- Were tactically and technically competent. They understood the art and science of their profession.
- Possessed a high intellect and a strong dose of common sense.
- Most, but not all, were students of history (Grant being the exception).
- Possessed a seemingly intuitive sense that was born through repetitive combat experience, commander's estimates of the situation, and personal wargaming. What appeared to be intuition was nothing more than the knowledge gained and honed due to repetitive experience. This conclusion is supported by W. H. Agor, who relates: "intuitions are our initial impressions of people and situations based on experiences which are repressed due to conditioning."¹⁴ Lussier and Saxon state:

intuition is particularly useful in a situation where there is a crisis or emergency situation. In an environment where rapid decisions must be made, such as the military, and more factual information is not forthcoming, a highly developed intuition can be an efficient way of knowing and an important source for making decisions.¹⁵

Key to my understanding of what contributed to the success of history's 'great captains' was the discovery that, while they shared many common competencies and character traits, they were all different in some manner. They were products of their times, each with widely differing personalities, but these personalities transcended all of their other character traits. Each had mastered the balance between their weaknesses and their strengths.

BCDC-- FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY

With the TLOs identified and the results of my research on history's 'great captains,' I began to develop the BCDC. Key to producing 'intuitive leaders' would be the following:

- **Maximum use of the JANUS simulation with the ability to fight the same battle over and over again would be key to replicating the repetitive combat experience of history's 'great captains'. If the commander was not successful we would stop the simulation, make adjustments to the plan and fight the battle again. Though difficult and demanding on instructors, contracted OPFOR, and the student commanders, we would plan, prepare, and execute at least one battle per day.**
- **Brigade commanders would be required, per the ELOs to coach, teach, and mentor subordinate battalion commanders throughout the week long course. This would serve as an excellent opportunity for the brigade commanders to hone their leadership skills, something that was lacking in Week 1 of the course.**
- **Commanders would be presented with the unexpected. The situations presented on the JANUS computer simulation would require them to assess the situation rapidly and formulate new courses of action. In this manner we would also attempt to replicate the pressures and demands of combat.**
- **A small but very important portion of the course would capitalize on the lessons learned from history's 'great captains' to be followed by practical exercises utilizing the JANUS computer simulation. Commanders would unknowingly fight some of history's great battles followed by after action reviews (AARs) where students could compare their actions and decisions against those of history's 'great captains.' It would make for excellent discussion.**

DEVELOPING THE COURSE

With this as a background, the team set out to develop the daily lessons that would produce 'intuitive leaders.' A brief summary of the lessons follows:

Lesson 1, Battle Command. This two hour block of instruction consisted of an instructor led discussion that focused on the role of the commander during the planning, preparation, and execution phases of combat operations. Assigned historical readings included Alexander the Great, The Duke of Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant, Creighton Abrams, and Erwin Rommel. Selected readings on leadership included articles written by General Lawton J. Collins, Major General Aubrey S. Newman and Colonel Roger H. Nye. These publications provided the battalion and brigade commander designees the information necessary to participate in group discussions on battle command. There were three ELOs that served as discussion points during this lesson. Using examples identified in the readings, commanders were expected to discuss the following:

1. ELO: Leading and motivating soldiers.

- The importance of demonstrating moral and physical courage in the face of adversity.
- The importance for the commander to provide his subordinates his vision of the tactical operation.
- The importance for the commander to articulate orders clearly to subordinate commanders and staff.
- The importance of soldier team development.

2. ELO: Exercising Tactical Judgment.

- The factors that impact upon where the commander positions himself on the battlefield during the planning, preparation and execution of combat operations.
- A description of the commander's responsibilities and role in tactical decision making.
- The factors and considerations that drive the location of the special staff during this period (Fire Support Coordinator, Brigade Engineer, Air Liaison Officer).
- The tools (computer generated products like Terra Base) that are available to the commander to assist him in determining minimum exposure to enemy fires while at the same time afford him maximum flexibility in exercising battle command.
- The requirement to see the battlefield and to communicate with subordinate and higher commanders throughout the battle.
- The commander's personal safety and survivability versus his personal presence and ability to 'see' the battlefield.
- The importance of the 'imperative of example' during the planning, preparation and execution of combat operations.

3. ELO: Using critical information requirements (CCIR) to focus the staff on gathering information to assist him in the decision making process. The discussion included as a minimum:

- The rationale behind the commander identifying CCIR.
- The characteristics of CCIR.
- How the commander utilizes CCIR in the decision making process.

-The relationship between CCIR to priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

-The relationship of CCIR to the Decision Support Template (DST).

Lesson 1 Observations. Lesson 1 served as the introduction to the art of battle command and provided the foundation for understanding the critical role the commander plays in rapid decision making. Examples of history's 'great captains' brought to life the role of the commander during the planning, preparation, and execution phases of combat operations. In several readings command designees observed that Alexander the Great and the Duke of Wellington maintained a daily routines that not only were important to maintaining their physical and mental well-being but also served to comfort the apprehension of their subordinates. In the case of the Duke of Wellington, "...routine--method as he called it--was essential to his operational success. It was almost unvarying."¹⁶ Studying history's 'great captains' pointed out to the command designees that were times that the commander had to 'go off' and just plain reflect on what was going on. Personal time provided commanders the opportunity to reflect about the current and future state of the battle.

Another key point that received much discussion in Lesson 1 was, how did history's 'great captains' always seem to be at the right place at the right time? As the command designees learned, it was no accident that Abrams, Wellington, and Alexander seemed to be where they could contribute most to the successful outcome of a battle. Experience and knowledge (technical and tactical competence) allowed these commanders to

unconsciously move through a series of logical steps towards arriving at a decision—the essence of what General Franks referred to as ‘intuition.’

Lesson 1 stressed that once combat operations began, commanders may not have the opportunity to consult with and receive information and recommendations from their staffs. As Wu Ch’i (430-381 B.C.) stated,

A general good at commanding troops is like one sitting in a leaking boat or lying under a burning roof. For there is not time for the wise to offer counsel nor the brave to be angry. All must come to grips with the enemy.¹⁷

Commanders simply will not have the time to go through a lengthy decision-making process and will have to rely on their personal experience, judgment, and courage to exercise battle command.

Lesson 2, Combat Decision Drills w/Simulation. This two hour period of instruction presented commanders with a series of situations where they had to exercise their analytical skills to assess the situation, and then develop their intent, guidance, and concept of operation, and finally fight their plan on the JANUS computer simulation. The scenarios presented to the commanders on the JANUS simulation replicated George Custer’s battle with the Sioux at the Little Big Horn, 1876; and Dan Morgan’s fight at the Battle of Cowpens, 1781. Students were not told they were refighting these particular historic battles until the AAR. Lesson 2 reinforced the value of studying history by demonstrating that today’s commanders face many of the same battlefield dynamics as some of history’s ‘great captains’ did hundreds of years ago. Lesson 2 consisted of six ELOs whose requirements were designed into the scenarios described above:

- 1. ELO: Conduct a commander's assessment of tactical operations.** A logical visualization of the current situation as compared with the expected battle outcome and future state of both friendly and enemy forces.
- 2. ELO: Formulate commander's concept of operation.** Commander's were required to determine whether the base plan met the assessed situation. If it did not they were required to determine whether a branch to the base plan addressed the assessed situation. If the branch to the original plan did not meet the situation, commanders were required to formulate a new concept of operation that did.
- 3. ELO: Conduct a suitability analysis.** Given a situation, their commander's assessment, conclusions and their concept of operation, commanders were required to develop their intent, and use of the brigade's combat power to support their concept. Enemy COAs, CCIRs, limitations, and the amount of risk the commander was willing to accept were also required development.
- 4. ELO: Conduct a feasibility analysis.** Commanders were required to analyze whether their concept of operation met the criteria of time, space, and means.
- 5. ELO: Conduct Acceptability Analysis.** Given the information previously developed, commanders were required to compare the factors of acceptable risks against the desired outcome consistent with the higher commander's intent and concept of operation.

6. Conduct validity checks on the concept of operation selected. Commanders were required to conduct validity checks of the developed plan to include:

- confirmation of estimates.
- a personal analysis of the terrain.
- an assessment of the impact of the battlefield conditions on current operations.
- monitor battlefield preparations.
- share the results of their personal reconnaissance (done via JANUS computer simulation) with subordinate commanders and staff.
- develop alternatives to the plan.
- confirm or adjust the concept of operation.
- support the morale of the troops and subordinate leaders.

7. Execute tactical operations on the JANUS simulation. Commanders were expected to recognize how to use the JANUS simulation as a training tool to achieve synchronization.

In order to maximize the learning experience each battalion commander was provided with a situation and given approximately 30 minutes to read, comprehend the situation presented, and, with the assistance of contract personnel, enter their concept of the operation on the JANUS simulation. Battalion commanders fought their plans on the JANUS simulation against a non-inter-active enemy. The brigade commander coached and mentored the battalion commanders, offering guidance where appropriate. Depending

upon how well the battalion commanders synchronized available combat power they could stop the simulation, make appropriate changes to their initial plan, and refight the battle.

Lesson 2 Observations. Lesson 2 resulted in improvements in battle commanders combat decisions. It provided battalion commanders with situations that required them to assess the situation rapidly, apply the combat decision making process, and execute combat operations. It reinforced Lesson 1 discussions on how the commander determines where he should position himself on the battlefield in order to make key decisions that will determine the outcome of the battle. It also provided the brigade commanders with the opportunity to coach, teach, and mentor battalion commanders in the conduct of rapid decision making. Battalion commanders were able to make adjustments to their plans, then re-fight critical portions of battles. The ability to conduct repetitive warfighting was a valuable aspect of this lesson. History was brought to life in a manner that commanders understood and appreciated. The historic vignettes that served as the basis for the computer simulated battles allowed instructors, during the AAR, to compare the lessons learned by the student commanders with those of history's 'great captains.' The real value was in assessing what the commanders could have done to synchronize better their unit's combat power. Discussion also focused on the leadership aspects of battle command, the intangibles of warfighting. The leadership aspects of battle command while difficult to quantify, were vital in achieving the successful synchronization of the unit's combat power. By the end of Lesson 2, commanders were ready to integrate battalion operations with those of brigade level combat operations.

Lesson 3, Exercising Battle Command. Lesson 3 was a 32 hour brigade level practical exercise that focused on the commander's estimate and the CDP. The day before Lesson 3, brigade commanders were provided with a division operations order, map, overlay with operational graphics depicted, and IPB products. That evening, brigade commanders were required to:

- Rapidly conduct a detailed commander's estimate of the situation IAW FM 101-5. The estimate had to include the results of the commander's mission analysis, the characteristics of the area of operations (weather, terrain), the enemy situation, (disposition, composition and strength), peculiarities and weaknesses, friendly situation, assessment of relative combat power, enemy capabilities, and a friendly course of action which offered the best probability of success.
- Develop and present detailed commander's guidance to student battalion commanders. Once brigade commanders presented the above to the battalion commanders, battalion commanders were required to go through the same process. Upon completing their commander's estimates, battalion commanders back briefed brigade commanders with their results. The brigade commander could then confirm that the battalion commander understood his intent, guidance, and concept for the brigade fight.

In the majority of situations, there was never enough time to involve the staff in the deliberate decision making process. In some scenarios the staff was involved with planning movement activities, or was viewed as inexperienced and therefore requiring more than the usual amount of guidance from the commander. Instructors confided to the brigade and battalion commanders that in some cases the amount of planning and guidance

required by the commanders was beyond that normally required or expected of commanders. However, as explained, the end result would be a better prepared brigade and battalion commander. A series of fragmentary orders and spot reports were rendered to the commanders that required their analysis to determine their impact on the developed plan and situation. Commanders were required to make modifications to their plans as appropriate.

In several situations, commanders were provided erroneous information to replicate the friction of battle. Incomplete maps, missing graphics, too much information, and at times, the severing of communications between the brigade commander and battalion commanders all contributed to the 'fog of battle'. In these situations, commanders were forced to assess difficult, often confusing situations, and develop creative solutions that ultimately led to the synchronization of their unit's combat power.

Commanders were required to fight from a location they selected as a result of their estimate and information gathered as a result of simulated reconnaissance on the JANUS simulation. Brigade commanders were required to position themselves where they could receive FM radio communications from their battalion commanders and where they could best see the battlefield in order to make decisions. Battalion commanders positioned themselves where they could best direct their battalion's activities in support of brigade directed missions. Contract computer operators played the role of company commanders and positioned their forces per the battalion plan and per direction of the battalion commander. All commanders were required to designate which vehicle they were to command from to preclude unrealistic movement and visual capabilities. Throughout the

exercise numerous situations or changes in mission took place that required modification to the original plan. AARs occurred as necessary to reinforce instructional points.

Lesson 3 missions included a deliberate attack against a depleted OPFOR regiment; a follow-on attack against a hasty defense; a movement to contact that turned into a meeting engagement and, as the result of a chemical attack against an in place unit, the assumption of a hasty defense.

Lesson 3 consisted of nine ELOs:

1. **ELO: Conduct commander's estimate.** Commanders were required to produce all elements of the commander's estimate as previously described.

2. **ELO: Develop brigade commander's guidance.** Commanders were required to
 - provide battalion commanders with their vision of enemy courses of action and how they impacted upon the friendly course of action;
 - restate the brigade mission;
 - state his intent;
 - give detailed (given time constraints) concept of operation;
 - provide the deception objective (if any);
 - establish the time plan;
 - articulate key aspects of the OPORD to include specified tasks to subordinate units, priorities and how he envisioned employing intelligence, maneuver, aviation, fire support, mobility/coustermobility/survivability, air defense, and combat service

support assets. In addition, brigade commanders were expected to identify there anticipated activities and, or, location during the preparation and execution phase of the operation.

3. ELO: Lead and motivate subordinate commanders. This ELO required the

brigade commander to:

- establish a teamwork climate that engendered success;
- demonstrate moral and physical courage (replicated by his simulated location on the battlefield);
- provide the vision that focuses and anticipates future courses of events;
- analyze the subordinate battalion commander's plans to ensure compliance with the brigade's overall mission and his guidance and intent;
- lead, coach and mentor subordinate battalion commanders as they developed their commander's estimate and guidance for their company commander's and staff.

4. ELO: Conduct the commander's assessment of the current situation as

compared with the expected battle outcome and future state of both friendly and enemy forces. Commanders were required to:

- recognize the similarities and differences between the initial plan the commander developed (or received) and the current and projected combat situations;
- consider the friendly force posture, enemy probable actions, and posture and battle space.

5. ELO: Formulate Concept and conclude: Commanders were required to determine if:

- the base plan met the assessed situation;
- a branch of the base plan addressed the assessed situation;
- a new whole new plan required development to meet the assessed situation.

6. ELO: Conduct a Suitability Analysis and issue modifications to the original plan. Commanders were required to:

- make changes to the commander's intent;
- develop the concept of operation to include major elements of maneuver for critical events in the battle and the integration and synchronization of combat multipliers (fire support, aviation, deep operations etc.);
- consider enemy COAs;
- identify CCIR;
- identify limitations.
- determine risks he was willing to accept.

7. ELO: Conduct a Feasibility Analysis. Commanders had to ensure that the concept meets the criteria of time, space, and means.

8. ELO: Conduct an Acceptability Analysis. Commanders compared factors of acceptable risks against the desired outcome consistent with the higher commander's intent and concept.

9. ELO: Execute tactical operations on the JANUS computer simulation.

Brigade and battalion commanders must be subject matter experts in the tactics, techniques and procedures essential to synchronizing their unit's combat power. A checklist was developed to assist commanders with the many requirements pertaining to planning, preparing and executing combat operations.¹⁸ Checklists are not all inclusive but can assist commanders in situations where they might otherwise overlook critical aspects of battle command. The checklist is arranged in battle sequenced order--concept, plan and execute.

Conceptualize

- Did you visualize (form a mental picture) of the current and future state of friendly and enemy forces upon receipt of the mission?
- Did you see the enemy, friendly, terrain, and their relationship to each other terms of time, space and purpose?
- Based upon this visualization, did you formulate a concept of the operation?
- Did you establish key pieces of information (CCIR) to execute the concept of operation?

Enemy Plans and Preparations

- Did you know the enemy organization and equipment, doctrine, and weapon systems capabilities?
- Did you identify enemy strengths, weaknesses, and possible missions?
- Did you integrate the threat with the terrain?
- Did you develop a concept that created or exploited a weakness in the enemy plan?
- Did you envision or demand that the S2 envision, the enemy purpose within the IPB?
- Did you analyze the enemy situation provided to you by the S2?
- Did you use a situational template in COA development?
- Did you wargame/anticipate enemy actions?

Friendly Plans and Preparations

- Did you understand the mission (task and purpose)?
- Did you review the battlefield area evaluation (BAE) provided to you by the S2?
- Did you formulate your intent consistent with the higher commander's intent?
- Did you issue a clear, concise, and attainable commander's guidance to your subordinates?
- Did you formulate a concept of operation consistent with time, space, and purpose considerations?
- Did you integrate and synchronize all battle field operating systems into the plan?

- Did you effectively plan for and integrate the use of your reserves?
- Given a lack of time to conduct a formal planning session with subordinate commanders, did you plan for going forward to their locations to conduct face to face discussions on the mission?
- Did you communicate the results of your commander's estimate to include your METT-T analysis, intent, and concept of operation to subordinate battalion commanders?
- Did you use briefbacks to ensure that subordinates understood your intent and unit mission?
- Do you understand your unit's capabilities and limitations?
- Did you assign missions based on subordinate unit's suitability to accomplish the mission (combat power, experience, ability or other considerations)?
- Did you publish a timeline and enforce it based upon METT-T analysis?
- Did you establish a priority of work?
- Did you plan for all assigned and implied missions (both current and future)?
- Did you clearly articulate the unit's task and purpose for actions on the objective?
- Did you identify decisive points or areas, times and actions critical to the successful outcome of the operation?
- Are you satisfied with the detail and quality of your contingency plans?
- Did you assess the effect of tactical logistics on the mission?
- Did you consider how well the unit is managing existing resources?
- Does the plan synchronize all battlefield operating systems throughout the mission?

- Are you satisfied with the quality of the operational graphics?
- Did you develop a personal schedule to supervise critical aspects of the preparation for the mission?
- Did you ensure that the unit conducted an effective rehearsal?
- Did you provide subordinate commanders maximum time to plan and prepare for the operation?
- Did you make efficient use of available time?
- Did you focus the planning efforts of the staff in order to provide you with the necessary combat information to make critical decisions?
- Did you update subordinates as new information became available?
- Did you take appropriate action to reduce risk?

Terrain Plans and Preparations

- Did you conduct a physical reconnaissance of the ground?
- Did you analyze the terrain using the factors of OCOKA?
- Did you refine OCOKA after conducting a terrain reconnaissance?
- Did you integrate the results of the terrain analysis into the plan?
- Did you communicate your impressions of terrain analysis to subordinates?
- Did you analyze and apply the effects of the weather on enemy and friendly forces?

Enemy Execution

- Did you modify the plan based upon a new estimate of enemy situation on actual effects of terrain?
- Did you use combat information to verify or adjust the estimate of the enemy situation?
- Did you avoid enemy strengths and attack enemy weaknesses?

Friendly Execution

- Did you locate yourself at the right place to influence the outcome of the fight?
- Did you anticipate and communicate any changing enemy situations?
- Did you issue clear and concise fragmentary orders?
- Did you achieve synchronization?
- Did you react to FRAGOs?
- Did you show initiative within the next higher commander's intent?
- Did you execute contingency plans when necessary?
- Did you make timely decisions?
- Did you execute actions on the objective as planned?

Lesson 3 Observations. Incomplete information, sudden attacks by OPFOR units, and poor weather and visibility all contributed to a fast paced, four day exercise in battle command. Battalion commanders fought their forces from a JANUS computer screen with the assistance of contractor provided personnel. Brigade commanders were sequestered from the battalion commanders and were required to fight their brigades from a specific location and vehicle depicted on their own JANUS computer screen. They could not take advantage of the classroom environment and 'wander around aimlessly' on the battlefield. They could see only what they would actually see given the terrain and his position on the battlefield. They received and transmitted information from and to their battalion commanders via hard-wired communications headphones.

The scenarios were free play, interactive exercises with the OPFOR provided by experienced contract personnel. Commensurate with their mission, brigade commanders received enough combat power to accomplish assigned missions.

Many of the frustrations of combat were experienced during Lesson 3 by battalion and brigade commanders. In the heat of battle, battalion commander often failed to suppress, obscure, secure and reduce obstacles while attacking OPFOR prepared positions. Initially, brigade commanders often failed to provide the requisite commander's guidance, intent, and vision to their subordinate commanders. However, by the end of Lesson 3, a noticeable improvement was evident as commanders learned the lessons from mistakes committed in previous exercises.

Successful commanders in Lesson 3 were:

- able to recognize their role as commander and what they had to do to contribute to the success of the battle.
- able to rapidly assess the battle whether by personal presence or through other means.
- able to inspire by their personal presence on the battlefield, subordinate battalion commanders.
- able to develop a keen appreciation of the terrain.
- able to identify where they should position themselves on the battlefield in order to see and influence the battle.
- able to apportion personal time to reflect on the battle. They constantly calculated the factors which influenced friendly and enemy situations. They did not be bogged down in collecting useless information. They focused subordinate commanders to provide them the information they needed to make critical decisions.
- able to visualize the expected battle so that they could place themselves at the decisive point at the decisive time.
- able to clearly articulate their intents and decisions to subordinate battalion commanders with minimum words and written documents.
- able to impose their will on subordinates and the enemy.
- able to learn from previous exercises so that by the end of the Week 2 training they possessed a 'seemingly intuitive sense'.
- tactically and technically competent. They understood the art and science of their profession.
- of high intellect and common sense.

IMPLICATIONS ON FUTURE TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

I believe that the focus of TCDC and BCDC is just about right. Given the varied backgrounds and experience of the command designees, it is essential to begin instruction on how to synchronize a unit's combat power with deliberate decision making procedures. A commander's thorough understanding of the deliberate decision making procedure is essential in the conduct of abbreviated decision making. In a combat situation, the emphasis shifts from commander-staff interchange of ideas to a commander driven process where many of the operations are simultaneous rather than sequential.

The shift from the DDP in Week 1 to an abbreviated commander driven decision making procedure in Week 2 emphasized the role of the commander in a combat environment where hostilities are in progress. As mentioned, I believe the focus of the instruction is about right. That judgment notwithstanding, there are a number of areas that I have identified for improvement.

DDP versus CDP. Providing instruction on the DDP and the CDP is often confusing to the command designee. The Army, in its attempt to quantify what is truly different about decision making in combat conditions, unnecessarily complicated a very good system. Whether in a pre-combat status that favors the DDP or in an environment where hostilities have commenced, the emphasis must remain on the commander's ability to conduct an estimate. The commander's estimate will drive the products of mission analysis (the re-stated mission), commander's guidance, course of action development and

analysis, and a course of action comparison and decision. All of these products are essential to the conduct of the DDP and the CDP. The only real difference is the lack of time and staff input normally prevalent in combat. The more experience commanders have in the DDP, the faster they can mentally leap through the process in combat where time is critical and often lacking. As I discovered by studying history's 'great captains,' it is repetition and experience that seemingly allows the commander to think 'intuitively.' The commander that can rapidly conduct a commander's estimate will always be one step ahead of the OPFOR. Commander's guidance, intent, and vision all are direct products of the commander's estimate and are inherent to the DDP.

Technical and Tactical Competence and Decision Making. There is no substitute for technical and tactical competence. The most charismatic commander even though revered by his subordinates will never carry the battle if he is not adept at making decisions. While everyone prefers to work for the easy going, fun-loving commander, when the situation is difficult it is the technically and tactically competent commander who is best able to synchronize his unit's combat power.

Development of 'intuitive leaders.' The BCDC provides an excellent way to begin the development of 'intuitive leaders.' The JANUS computer simulation exercise is a relatively inexpensive method to train commanders in the art of battle command. The ability to conduct low cost, multiple repetitive combat scenarios, where the results of a commander's ability to synchronize his unit's combat power is readily observable through

instant replay and AAR discussion is essential. The majority of major installations in CONUS and overseas have this capability.

Intuition is not guess work. It requires skill, knowledge, and sound judgment. While commanders may have an intuitive feeling they must follow it up with solid reasoning to ensure successful decision making.

There was a great deal of pressure on brigade commanders to make the 'right decision' through out Lesson 3 exercises. Successful commanders understood that they could not get overloaded with information lest it inhibit their ability to sort through problems logically. Telling their battalion commanders that they were going off on a 'break' for a few minutes (personal time) was a lesson learned from studying history's 'great captains' in Lesson 1. Often commanders discovered that if they distanced themselves from a particularly tough problem they were better able to arrive at an original solution.

Lesson 3 confirmed that there was no substitute for experience. Repetition and extensive AARs all increased a commanders level of experience, which contributed to his development as an 'intuitive leader.' Decisions reached by intuition alone did not normally contribute to sound decisions. Follow up and lots of hard work (analysis, comparison, feasibility, and suitability of plans) were required to produce successful decisions.

The commander's role in decision making. Decision making in combat places added responsibilities on the commander. The lack of time and staff experience makes it incumbent that commanders take an active role in the planning, preparation, and execution of combat operations. During planning commanders will have accept risk when

considering the number of enemy courses of action versus possible friendly courses of action. The information gained as a product of commander's estimate will yield valuable insights that the commander must use to focus staff effort. The commander's ability to conduct a rapid estimate of the situation is critical to his being able to provide guidance, intent, and vision to his staff. The results of BCDC proves that decision making can be taught utilizing examples of history and computer simulation. We are rapidly transitioning into an age that has been described as 'third wave warfare' where information and knowledge will determine success on the battlefield.¹⁹ The battle command environment that dominated AirLand Battle doctrine is giving way to the 21st century where "the competitive advantage will derive from the quantity, quality, and use of information."²⁰ Commanders will have to think and act faster than ever before in order to synchronize their unit's combat power. Information to assist the commander in the decision making process will be abundant. The problem facing the commander in the 21st century (indeed today) is quite possibly too much information--information that is not focused to answer important questions the commander needs to make critical decisions. The Army's ability to collect and disseminate information will be greater than ever before. Yet, without focus, it is merely information. As Drucker states, "...the amount of knowledge, that is, its quantitative aspect, is not nearly as important as the productivity of knowledge, that is its qualitative impact."²¹ While Force XXI will use information "to dominate, control, and win on tomorrow's battlefields,"²² we must also train commanders to focus the collection effort and to sift through all the information to support the commander's intent and vision of the battle. Twenty-first century technology must not focus on the solution of old

problems but be harnessed to solve future problems. In the 21st century, the quality of information will be the key to our ability to synchronize combat power.

Plan for Success not Failure. In many of the exercises commanders failed to take advantage of their units' success. During the planning phase they had developed contingencies and branches to deal with unexpected problems to the original plan but rarely developed the same for successful operations. As a result, they were unable to take advantage of windows of opportunity. OPFOR units that had been forced to react to friendly activity would often regain the initiative to the disadvantage of friendly forces. Commanders must always be looking ahead. Without a plan for success, commanders surrendered the initiative to the OPFOR.

Summary

The purpose of the Battle Commanders Development Course is to provide instruction to battalion and brigade command designees in the art of battle command. As stated in FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels,

Combat demands rapid estimates of situations, sound decisions, and timely initiation of actions to accomplish those decisions. The leader who delays making a decision may cause unnecessary casualties as well as failure of the mission. Success hinges on creative, flexible leaders who can quickly adapt, anticipate opposing force reactions, then make and rapidly execute sound decisions.²³

Leading and motivating subordinates requires commanders to, "inspire their soldiers to do things against their natural will--to carry out missions for the greater good of the unit, the

Army, and the country.”²⁴ Making decisions and leading and motivating soldiers are the essence of battle command. They are also the essence of the BCDC program of instruction. If commanders understand their role in exercising battle command, they are well on their way to being able to synchronize their unit’s combat power to defeat any enemy, on any battlefield.

The ability of a commander to make timely decisions is predicated upon his mastery of the DDP, and his understanding of his role in it. This mastery of the DDP prepares the commander for situations where time is compressed and staffs are often unavailable or unable to assist the commander in making decisions. Within the DDP, it is the ability of the commander to conduct the Commander’s Estimate that provides him with the information necessary to ultimately produce his guidance to staff and subordinate commanders, and courses of action that will lead to the synchronization of his unit’s combat power. Without a METT-T analysis, the commander cannot possibly identify those critical aspects of the situation that will allow him to focus the planning efforts of his staff and subordinate commanders. With the DDP as a foundation, commanders must, in combat situations, be able to conduct abbreviated decision making. There will be little time for staff input, and those conditions which produce the ‘fog of battle’ will predominate. It is during such times that the commander’s ability to exercise battle command will be tested. Experience, judgment, courage and strength of will produce ‘intuitive commanders.’ While nothing can ever take the place of personal experience, commanders may gain helpful insights in the art of battle command by studying examples of history’s great captains to see how they exercised battle command in critical situations.

While the BCDC program is not a panacea for developing tomorrow's great captains it does provide combat arms command designees with valuable instruction in the art of battle command.

¹ Robert Debs Heinl, JR. Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations. Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1966. p.61.

² Student Text 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Process. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994, p.I-2-31.

³ It was the products of the commander's estimate-mission analysis (implied, specified and essential tasks), the situation and course of action (characteristics of the area of operations, enemy situation to include dispositions, composition, strengths and weaknesses, friendly situation, relative combat power, possible friendly courses of action, the analysis and comparison of courses and a decision on which course of action offers the best probability of success) which focused the staff's planning effort. This observation supports a similar finding by a U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) (1994) contracted study that analyzed eleven battalion size rotations at the National Training Center (NTC). In part the analysis concluded that "...the commander must ensure that the staff remains focused (by issuing his guidance and intent) and working collectively throughout the battle." Paul A. Jarret. 'LIST OF FINDINGS: ANALYSIS OF TAKE HOME PACKAGES FOR CRITICAL LEADER DEVELOPMENT FACTORS IN CTC DATA.' Submitted by Michael R. McCluskey and Jack Hiller, HumRRO, Inc., to the Army Research and Study Institute (ARI) 1994, p.16. A thorough understanding of the DDP allowed commanders to mentally leap into an abbreviated combat decision making environment when there was an absence of planning time and when the situation was by its nature vague, unclear, confusing and ambiguous (VUCA). The TCDC week one focus on the DDP while necessary, did not adequately prepare commanders for situations where time was not available for staff planning and recommendations and where the situation was often of a VUCA nature.

⁴ W. J. Wood. Leaders and Battles. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1984, pp.3-7.

⁵ General J. Lawton Collins. 'Leadership at Higher Echelons.' Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Military Review, May 1990, pp. 33-45.

⁶ John D. Rosenberger. 'The Burden Our Soldiers Bear. Observations of a Senior Trainer (OC).' Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College Directed Study, 1995, pp.12-13.

⁷ The term battle command is not new term to the Army. S.L.A. Marshall referred to it in his book, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War, back in 1947.

⁸ FM 100-5, Operations. Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1993, p. Glossary-1.

⁹ William Morris, editor. New College Edition, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, Mass, 1966. p. 688.

¹⁰ Student Text 101-5, COMMAND AND STAFF DECISION PROCESSES. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, dated January 1994 defines intuition as: 'the instinctive ability to solve problems; it is typically derived from the commander's range of experiences and reflections on similar situations during his development as a leader. Using intuition does not automatically infer rejecting logical analyses. Rather, it is the seasoned judgment that rapidly dismisses the impractical solution and moves on to the more pertinent course of action.' p. I-1-6. Unfortunately this publication was not available the summer of 1993 when development of the BCDC was initiated.

¹¹ Student Text 100-9, The Tactical Decisionmaking Process. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, July 1993.

¹² Student Text 101-5, COMMAND AND STAFF DECISION PROCESSES. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January 1994, p. I-2-31.

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- ¹³ John Keegan. The Mask of Command. New York: Penguin Books, 1987, p. 103.
- ¹⁴ James W. Lussier and Terril F. Saxon. 'Critical Factors in the Art of Battle Command.' Alexandria, Virginia: Army Research Institute, 1994, p.33.
- ¹⁵ Ibid. p. 33.
- ¹⁶ John Keegan . The Mask of Command. New York: Penguin Books, 1987, p. 138.
- ¹⁷ Robert Debs Heini, Jr. Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations. Annapolis, Maryland: . United States Naval Institute, 1966, p. 58.
- ¹⁸ 'Battle Command' (working draft). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Battle Command Battle Laboratory, 1994, pp. 28-36.
- ¹⁹ Alvin and Heidi Toffler . War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century. Boston, Mass: Little, Brown and Company, 1993, pp. 64-79.
- ²⁰ ARMY FOCUS 94 Force XXI. Washington DC: Department of the Army Publication, 1994, p. 5.
- ²¹ Peter F. Drucker . Post Capitalist Society. New York City, New York: Harper Business, 1993, p. 186.
- ²² ARMY FOCUS 94 FORCE XXI. Washington DC: Department of the Army Publication, 1994, p. 5.
- ²³ FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels. Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1987, Appendix A.
- ²⁴ FM 22-100, Military Leadership. Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1990, p.1.