


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**DIRECTED
STUDY
(WRITING
OPTION)**

**A FORCE STRUCTURE PROPOSAL
FOR THE CURRENT INTERWAR PERIOD**

BY

COLONEL PETER HOLMBERG
United States Army National Guard



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**A Force Structure Proposal
for the Current Interwar Period**

by

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A Force Structure Proposal for the Current Interwar Period

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to a given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a *paradoxical trinity* . . .

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the *people*; the second the *commander and his army*; the third the *government*.

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*¹
(emphases added)

We the *People* of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. . . .

The *Congress* shall have Power to . . . provide for the common Defence [and] . . . declare War, . . .

The *President* shall be *Commander in Chief* of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the Several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States . . .

The Constitution of the United
States²
(emphases added)

I. Introduction

Purpose and Scope. The purpose of this paper is to propose a conceptual force structure for the relatively low-threat environment that is likely to follow the Cold War by one or two decades. The present period is an opportunity for the American economy to regain its strength while America's Army retains and evolves the unsurpassed excellence that resulted in victory in the Persian Gulf War. The present period is also a crossroads for America to either strengthen or erode its army's constitutional ties. The period between world

wars lasted two decades. If this is a guide to how long we have to repair the Cold War ravages to the American economy, we are already one-quarter of the way through it. The military-political-economic conundrum the Nation now faces is how to retain military excellence and capability while re-structuring the Army to save money and to expand popular support of military affairs.

To these ends, this paper will examine the constitutional intent behind America's Army, the military-political lessons of Vietnam, and by what mechanisms American forces should be committed to combat. From this examination, the paper will suggest a new division of functions, roles, and missions for the components of America's Army that will in turn result in a conceptual force structure proposal that optimizes constitutional intent with military and economic concerns. It will be a force structure that retains the present active duty strength, increases the professional longevity of superior active duty officers and NCOs, retains a dynamic power projection capability, increases ties between the active and reserve components, improves the ties between America's Army and the American people, and stays within projected budgets. It will be an army for the current interwar period with which the American people will have a strong kinship and in which they will have justifiable pride.

II. The Constitution and America's Army

The Constitution and the National Will. The Constitution gives to Congress power to "raise and support Armies" and to "calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions."³ The *Federalist Papers* elaborate the meaning of these clauses. First, a militia is the natural defense for a free country, although a militia is neither able or willing to tend to the Nation's defenses full-time. Second, a standing army is therefore necessary as custodian of national security and to set standards for military conduct. Thus the standing army is to be responsible for initial response, militia readiness, conduct, and training. Third, Congress is to independently regulate and call forth the standing army and the federalized militia. The fourth and final point is that the standing army and the militia must together be of sufficient size to accomplish national security objectives, but must do so within available means.⁴ The Constitution also speaks to the President being "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States."⁵

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A constitutional dilemma exists today in that the Founding Fathers did not foresee America's warmaking extending beyond its shores. The modern global economic web has America's economic and political, indeed world order, dependent upon universal free and equitable access to markets.⁶ International reliance on America in the role of an honest broker has grown.⁷ As a result, the opportunity to accelerate international acceptance and adoption of democratic values and government has become a part of the national security policy.⁸ As America's vital and important interests have grown correspondingly complex, the circumstances that may commit American troops into hostilities often seem increasingly obscure to the average citizen. However, the constitutional requirements for committing the Nation to war remain unchanged. Congress, being the reflection of the National Will, is the only branch of government authorized to provide for the Nation's common defense and to declare war.⁹

Since the United States is now globally entangled, the risk of the Commander in Chief fortuitously committing the Nation to war without having first secured the support of the National Will is greater than was the case during isolationist times. However, the current relatively low-threat environment presents an opportunity to safely re-develop a mechanism for how the Nation should enter a state

of war in conformance with the intent of the Founding Fathers.

Vietnam--A Catharsis for the American Way of War. The traumatic Vietnam experience clarified the importance of satisfying constitutional requirements before committing the Nation to war. In this war, the American armed forces ravaged the enemy's army, and, judging by the "flag vote" preceding the armistice in 1973, one can easily argue that it succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of the people it sought to protect. Yet, the Nation lost the war at the regional strategic level because it did not first secure the support of the American public as required by the Constitution.¹⁰ In failing to do so, the Nation's strategic center of gravity, its National Will, was left to the four winds.

Despite the outcome of the Vietnam War, at the level of strategy that exists above the regional short-term level, that is, the level that spans the globe in space and many decades in time, America emerged the victor in the Cold War. In this struggle, America pursued policies that were reaffirmed in elections over four decades. At the Cold War level of strategy, the Vietnam War is relegated to a mere campaign status.¹¹ Yet, it was a campaign in which the Nation bared its own center of gravity, ignorant of being

bled white from unheeded wounds and thereby potentially risking the outcome of the Cold War. Thus, a seminal lesson of Vietnam is to never again expose the Nation's strategic center of gravity to such risk. Force structure can serve that end. In that vein, it is cause for reflection that the keynote speaker to the 1995 Annual Strategy Conference at the United States Army War College stated that recently "there has been a substantial, although gradual, deterioration in military-civilian relations," and that, to cure this ill, the reserves should be used to "tie the American society to the military."¹²

III. Post-Vietnam Reconstruction.

The War Powers Resolution. With the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (WPR), Congress intended to fulfill the constitutional intent with respect to presidential powers to introduce troops into hostilities.¹³ To accomplish this while also sufficiently enabling the Chief Executive to respond to crises in a timely manner, WPR allows unilateral presidential warmaking within strictly defined limits. So long as the President submits specified reports on actions taken to Congress, he may commit the Nation's forces into hostilities for up to ninety days and may order up to 200,000 reservists to active duty for an equal time period

with an option for an additional ninety days.¹⁴ Thus, Congress reasoned, the President as Commander in Chief could hold at bay armed aggression against U.S. interests while Congress determined if the National Will would support sacrifices needed to defeat the aggressor.

A New Concept for Force Structure. In the wake of the Vietnam War, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Creighton W. Abrams restructured the Army so that it could not again go to war without first mobilizing the reserve components. Force structure in a sense became a lever to force Congress to face up to its task of expressing the National Will. This generated the round-out division concept, where one brigade out of each division so designated would be from the reserve components. It caused numerous small, but key, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units to also be from the reserves. The result was that the Nation was unable to wage war on a significant scale without involving the reserves, in combat arms, CS, and CSS roles.¹⁵

The AirLand Battle Doctrine. The doctrine that grew out of the Abrams army had the four tenets of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. In order to execute the AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine, the Army developed a new family of

weapons systems: the Abrams main battle tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Apache Attack Helicopter, the Multiple Launch Rocket System, and the Tactical Artillery Computer Fire System. According to ALB doctrine, the Army would fight its enemy in simultaneous close, rear, and deep battles, overwhelming his capacity to conduct coordinated maneuver and decisively mass his forces. The ALB doctrine permeated the entire span of command within the Army and was implemented and improved through rigorous and realistic training at several maneuver training centers. Its efficiency surpassed even the most optimistic predictions in the Persian Gulf War victory over Iraq. It did, however, fall short of testing the roundout concept in combat. Nonetheless, it is the conclusion of many that the presidential activation of the reserves, that occurred in earnest with the activation of three roundout brigades in November 1990, and the subsequent congressional debate and resolution to approve the use of offensive combat power, turned the battle cry in the Nation's streets from "No blood for oil!" to "Support our troops!"

Another outcome of the AirLand Battle doctrine, as it became perfected towards the end of the Cold War, was the oft-heard sentiment that combat arms was becoming too complicated for the RC. Thus, a new roles and missions debate began to brew over how far the constitutional mandate

of the militia fighting alongside the standing army ought to be taken. However, testimony to the House Armed Services Committee by the Commander of Forces Command in the immediate wake of the Gulf War, clarified that, properly resourced, NG combat brigades would need approximately ninety days of post-mobilization training to attain deployable proficiency.¹⁶

In the post-Cold War drawdown, the strong affiliations that had developed in the Abrams Army between the Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Components (RC) have eroded. As America's Army has undergone the Bottom Up Review (BUR),¹⁷ the AC has become increasingly focused on its own quick and complete response to various regional contingencies. Ironically, the contingencies have grown in number while their relevance to the national interest has come under debate, and resources for execution have dwindled.

Meanwhile, to prove their relevance, both the National Guard (NG) and the Army Reserve (USAR) have secured agreements from all members of those CS and CSS units without which the Army cannot go to war, to volunteer for active duty at the call of the CSA. Thus, the Army is now able to partially bypass the intent of WPR.

Consequently, although a part of the Abrams plan and all of WPR remain, the intents of both have been partly

circumvented by both the AC and the RC. It is ironic that these actions, taken in isolation, were both positive in nature and had the best of intentions to improve the President's ability to respond to crises in a timely and efficient manner.

IV. Post-Cold War Constraints and Imperatives

The Threat. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a power vacuum has appeared on the world scene. This vacuum is too large for the United States to fill, nor is the National Will likely to consider it either vital or important to do so. With history as a guide, we know that no power vacuum will exist for very long; soon one or more actors will appear whose expanded interests will struggle to fill the void. One can then argue that, even though we are currently not sure of who these actors might be, we at least know the size of the void, and from that we can begin to think about worst case capabilities. Next, we can begin to look at whose intentions might evolve contrary to U.S. interests. By marrying up capabilities with intentions one gets an idea of what the future threat is most likely to be, once the power vacuum created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union is filled.

Using this line of reasoning, a worst case scenario of two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) became the planning model for force structure for the post-Cold War/current interwar period.

Based on existing hot spots, such as Iraq and North Korea, to mention just a few, further constructs can be made. At this juncture, a contingency-specific force may be tailored based on mission, enemy, terrain, time to prepare, and what troops strategic lift will make available. These specific plans may then be considered as base plans, that is, plans to be somewhat modified around a core concept, for other but similar contingencies. The final product becomes a force that will be sufficient to deal with potential threats to U.S. national interests.

The Budget Outlook. The long duration of the Cold War caused the United States to pursue a "guns and butter" course. However, since the end of World War II, there has been an overall trend towards "butter" at the expense of "guns," if defense outlays are measured as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP).¹⁸ Only through this kind of economic strategy would the National Will support the relatively high defense effort needed to counter apparent Soviet intentions. The present unprecedented four trillion dollar national debt, sustained by budget deficits that will

require extraordinary measures to eliminate, would certainly be less were it not for the relatively high defense expenditures necessary to win the Cold War. If Congress does not eliminate the deficit, interest payments on the national debt will continue to increase beyond its current one-third share of the discretionary portion of the budget it now costs.¹⁹ The present interwar period may therefore be a singular opportunity for the United States to re-establish its national power on a sound economic footing before the next significant threat to vital national interests crests the strategic horizon.

The defense budget is likely to have to bear a significant burden in balancing the federal budget. This is so because of the dynamics associated with mandatory entitlement programs, which cause the discretionary budget portion to shrink, which, in turn, accelerates pressures to transfer defense dollars to domestic programs.²⁰ This trend may be somewhat ameliorated by the 104th Congress being more defense oriented than its predecessor. A recent prediction that the current congressional make-up may indicate an enduring political shift could, if true, prolong this relatively friendly attitude towards defense spending.²¹ Regardless of congressional attitudes, however, the basic dynamics indicating a downturn in defense spending, and its implications, remain unchanged.

U.S. Strategy for the Post-Cold War Interwar Era. With the end of the Cold War, the reasons for U.S. forces being forward deployed had substantially vanished. The threat in Central Europe was such that, should a MRC erupt, sufficient warning time would allow for deployment of forces from the Continental United States (CONUS). Accordingly, the U.S. has now adopted a force projection strategy, based on forces generated through the BUR process.

The BUR force allocates ten divisions to the AC and fifteen "enhanced brigades" to the NG. All of these units are organized at maximum Authorized Level of Organization (ALO 1). The BUR also incorporates various USAR CS and CSS units at ALO 1, plus eight NG divisions at a level of organization equivalent to forty percent of TOE capability.²² The eight NG divisions are considered a "strategic hedge" without a federal role in the current interwar period, although they are a significant resource for state-run Military Support To Civil Authority (MSCA) missions.

The BUR force was in part based on the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS), which determined strategic lift requirements for the two-MRC force projection strategy. The MRS together with a BUR Update (BURU) validated strategic lift requirements with the result that many strategic lift

assets are now in place through interim measures.²³

Permanent measures have a high enough priority in the defense budget that congressional approval for funding is considered likely.²⁴

The force that the MRS BURU concept is capable of transporting varies with the amount of equipment prepositioned in theater, distance to the theater of war, and the level of sophistication of port facilities. The concept also assumes that CONUS based forces will be ready to ship when lift assets are available. Hence, the basic assumption is that activation of reserves is undertaken promptly so that post-mobilization training will be completed when lift assets become available. Another assumption is that the enhanced brigades will need no more than ninety days for post-mobilization training. With these assumptions, when the MRS concept is fully implemented in 2001, strategic lift assets will be sufficient to land approximately five and one-third divisions under a corps headquarters, in theater, seventy-five days after the decision to deploy forces is made.²⁵ With the nineteen new Large Medium Speed Roll On/Roll Off (LMSR) and eight existing Fast Roll On/Roll Off ships in the MRS, one may assume that approximately one heavy division would subsequently arrive in a theater such as Southwest Asia each thirty days. Accordingly, if eight of ten active divisions

are available for deployment and the first increment of three to five enhanced brigades is ready ninety days after the first troops ship, there appears to be sufficient forces on hand to, at the least, mount an effective operational defense in two MRCs separated by forty-five or more days.

In such a scenario, the forces to support a decision to go on the operational offensive could then be committed to the fight if the National Will, as determined by Congress, will bear necessary sacrifices. The most critical imperative is to ship enough forces for an effective operational defense in order to buy time for the political process to work. In other words, in a fast-moving MRC, *presidential warmaking powers should be defined by the forces necessary to mount an effective operational defense* in addition to the provisions of WPR, leaving the decision of committing the Nation to offensive warfare to Congress.

V. Options to Modify the BUR Force Structure

Functions, Roles, and Missions within America's Army. Before discussing feasible options for America's Army's force structure for the current interwar period, it is necessary to look at what should be its internal Functions, Roles, and Missions²⁶ (FRM) for the current interwar period. Table 1 summarizes America's Army's internal FRM as they now exist:

	Function	Role	Mission
AC	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide army forces to Unified Commanders In Chief (CINCs) 2. Provide warfighting doctrine and training standards for America's Army, and provide equipment suited for the doctrine 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organize, train, validate, and equip America's Army in accordance with doctrine and as assigned by the NCA 2. Doctrine and equipment developer for America's Army 	Execute and sustain warfighting missions assigned by the NCA and CINCs
NG	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide pre-organized units to augment the AC in time of war or national emergency 2. Provide militia forces or individual militia members to the Governor of each state 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organize, train, and resource units of a "balanced" force as assigned by the NCA 2. Organize, train, equip, and validate militia units or individual militiamen as ordered by the Governor 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mobilize to execute missions assigned by the NCA and CINCs 2. Mobilize and execute missions as ordered by the Governor
USAR	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide pre-organized and trained units to the AC 2. Provide qualified individual soldiers to the AC for immediate mobilization 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organize, train, and resource units (primarily early deploying combat service support units) as assigned by the NCA 2. Manage the IRR and IMA individual reserve systems 	Mobilize and execute missions as assigned by the NCA and CINCs

Table 1. Current FRM within America's Army^{2/}

With today's budgetary constraints and the re-discovery of constitutional intent, it is worthwhile to analyze if the current FRM is the best combination of constitutionality and pragmatism. Both the Constitution and the present budget morass dictate that significant portions of America's Army reside in the RC. The *Federalist Papers* details the clear need for a standing army along with the militia; the standing army's role should be as custodian of things military, while a militia's is the natural defense of a free country.⁴

In a modern context, the FRM of the AC could thus be translated to (1) provide initial response and augment the "militia" in fighting the Nation's wars, (2) develop doctrine and equipment, (3) train and validate the RC, and

(4) manage the military establishment and infrastructure. Similarly the NG's federal FRM would be to simply fight the Nation's wars under the command of the President and the direction of the AC and to serve the Governor for state duties.

The FRM of the USAR are more difficult. There is a clear need for all of the FRM the USAR performs, several of which are not found in the NG or the AC. For example, the USAR Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Individual Augmentee functions are of great value, as demonstrated during the Gulf War. On the other hand, there is also duplication of the NG's constitutional mandate, such as Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units in the USAR. Thirdly, although USAR may physically be in the best position to support state and local emergencies, they lack the legal mandate to do so; USAR units do not have a state chain of command to deal promptly with local disasters nor are they exempt under the Posse Comitatus Act.²⁸ Finally, the USAR performs numerous schools activities with zeal and purpose, often with scant material resources.

I therefore propose that TOE units in the USAR be re-aligned with the NG, while the USAR be tasked with all individual readiness for the RC, including all individual programs (IMA, IRR, etc.), schools (both instructors and students would be assigned to the USAR, much like for TRADOC

schools in the AC), and Selective Service. This change, requires that a seamless personnel environment is arranged between the USAR and the NG, with promotion criteria governed by the AC, so that officer and NCO careers would be balanced between educational and troop unit assignments. My recommendations for new FRM within America's Army are in Table 2.

	<u>Function</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>Mission</u>
AC	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide army forces to Unified Commanders In Chief (CINCs) 2. Provide warfighting doctrine and training standards for America's Army, and provide equipment suited for the doctrine 3. Provide trained commanders and headquarters for NG TOE units above brigade, except for "strategic hedge divisions" 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organize, train, validate, and equip America's Army in accordance with doctrine and as assigned by the NCA 2. Doctrine and equipment developer for America's Army 3. Command NG TOE units above brigade, except "strategic hedge divisions" 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Execute and sustain warfighting missions assigned by the NCA and CINCs 2. Develop doctrine and equipment 3. Command NG units above brigade as assigned by CINCs
NG	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide pre-organized units to augment the AC in time of war or national emergency 2. Provide militia forces or individual militia members to the Governor of each state 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organize, train, and resource units of a "balanced" force as assigned by the NCA 2. Organize, train, equip, and validate militia units or individual militiamen as ordered by the Governor 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mobilize to execute missions assigned by the NCA and 2. Mobilize and execute missions as ordered by the Governor
USAR	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide pre-organized and trained units to the AC 2] 1. Provide qualified individual soldiers to the AC for immediate mobilization 2. Provide conscripts for America's Army through the Selective Service System 3. Provide DMOSQ ed individual soldiers to the USAR and NG 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organize, train, and resource units (primarily early deploying combat service support units) as assigned by the NCA 2] 1. Manage the IRR and IMA individual reserve systems 3. Command the Selective Service system in its entirety and assign inductees in accordance with army needs 4. Command the RC military education system (all RC POIs) complementing TRADOC 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mobilize and [execute] support missions as assigned by the NCA and CINCs, focusing on providing individually qualified soldiers 2. Command the Selective Service system 3. Command, functionally subordinate to TRADOC, that portion of the reserve school system for which RC POIs are authorized

Table 2. Proposed FRM for America's Army (bold text signifies changes, and brackets-[text]- signifies deletions).

It is important to recognize that, although perhaps fraught with hidden difficulties, the re-alignment of FRM between the NG and the USAR, once accomplished, should appear relatively seamless to the soldiers. The proposal involves no unit moves, inactivations, or mission changes, but simply a change of peacetime chains of command and a larger pool that is available for, usually voluntary, state MSCA missions.²⁹

The First Force Structure Option--"The Efficient Force".

"The Efficient Force" is a force that gets the job done most efficiently when measured against short term goals. It is essentially affordable within existing and projected budgets. This option stays within the manpower limitations of the BUR, but will shift combat roles to the AC.

The advantages of this option are clear: it gives flexibility to the AC and the executive branch in responding quickly to potential trouble spots. It also makes the difficult tasks of synchronization of the battlefield and maneuver against guileful enemies the purview of those who have the most time and resources to master the art: the AC.

The disadvantages are lodged in the unbalanced force it creates and the likelihood that, being removed from the fight, the American public, as well as the largely RC CS and CSS structure, would adopt a "we and they" attitude vis a

vis the AC. Combat forces representing a relatively small portion of the Army could encourage a public attitude of "throw-away soldiers."

The Second Force Structure Option--"The Constitutional Force". This option would seek as literal an interpretation of the Constitution as possible. It would transfer the USAR to the NG while the function of the AC would shift somewhat to a greater role as advisors to the NG. The AC would retain its initial response role, but with lesser capability. This option would somewhat curtail specialized military technology and doctrine in favor of broad public participation, civilian skill transfer, and simpler tactics.

The advantages of this option lie entirely in broad public participation and transfer of a greater amount of military virtues--honesty, discipline, drug-free environment, racial equity, physical conditioning, team work, etc.--to society in general. This option would also contribute to a greater understanding of military affairs by society in general, and vice versa.

This option's disadvantages consist of a dilution in the AC of the same virtues it would promote for society in general. It would also entail a greater risk in war with fewer units having undergone the rigorous training that led

to the Gulf War victory, as well as fewer units being ready for deployment during the early stages of a conflict.

Another aspect of this option is that, by possibly overtaxing the abilities of a larger NG coupled with a smaller AC, the National Will may eventually cause a change in direction of American foreign policy to a more isolationist outlook. The consequences thereof are considered regressive for the United States.³⁰

The Third Force Structure Option--"The Effective Force".

The third option seeks a force structure that will yield desirable results of an enduring nature while sacrificing some near term efficiency if such is the price for long-term effectiveness. This option focuses on safeguarding American core values as well as material well-being, but accepts some risk in doing so. The "Effective Force" option modifies the BUR force slightly; it retains nine and one-third divisions and ten division headquarters in the AC and fifteen enhanced brigades in the NG. It deletes one-third of one division and its headquarters from the "strategic hedge" in the NG and aligns the two freed up NG divisional brigades with the tenth AC division headquarters. Further, five division headquarters for the enhanced brigades may now be created out of freed up AC assets.³¹ Additional assets for the

Readiness Training Brigades recently created for training and evaluating the RC would now also be available.

The advantages of the third option focus on stronger ties between America's mainstream and the soldiers who fight as well as between the components of America's Army through structured interdependency. (The USAR would play a key role in that both the AC and the NG would depend on a quick infusion capability of qualified IMAs and IRRs, and the NG would also rely heavily on the USAR NCO Education System (NCOES) generating a quality product.) The "Effective Force" would be slightly smaller and therefore less expensive than the BUR force. Even though the NG loses a division headquarters and a divisional brigade, the state mission is not jeopardized due to the absorption of USAR TOE units in the NG, provided the proposed FRM alignment goes through. Lastly, by allowing for an increase in the number of senior officer and NCO slots in additional AC divisional headquarters, the unprecedented quality of experience present in the AC would be allowed to rise to its full potential, as opposed to being "SERBed" and retired early.

The disadvantages of the "Effective Force" proposal lie in the possible need for an operational pause between the defense and offense phases of strategic power projection in response to two nearly simultaneous MRCs. The pause would be necessary, given the assumptions in the MRS BURU

scenario, to allow Congress to commit the Nation to offensive war and because of the gap created by the loss of two-thirds of an AC division. This said, it is critical that the National Command Authority (NCA) weigh the options of either mounting an operational defense in theater until offensive capability is available or conducting a forced entry once offensive capability is fully mobilized in CONUS. It is entirely conceivable that a future adversary might have concluded from the U.S. performance in the Gulf War that the only way to beat the Americans is to use theater nuclear weapons early in a conflict before offensive power has arrived in theater.

Clearly, enemy use of nuclear weapons is a threat of the most serious sort to our operational center of gravity, our armed forces. However, an *operational* threat ought not to cause us to put at risk our *strategic* center of gravity by hastily disregarding the congressional prerogative of to express the National Will. Rather, it should be viewed as a limit to American power that can be overcome if moral authority expressed through the National Will so dictates.

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions. The third option accepts an element of tactical and operational risk in order to facilitate

Congress' and the "militia's" constitutional prerogatives. In the hands of inept decisionmakers in Congress or the Executive Branch, the risk may backfire, at least in the short term. However, for the long term, one should consider that Vietnam showed the perils of committing the Army before the National Will had made itself heard. The bottom line in a democracy such as ours, therefore, appears to be that accepting and dealing with tactical and operational risk at critical junctures is necessary to allow sufficient time for the National Will to enter the arena. Tactical and operational risk taking, at those few critical junctures, allows the National Will to govern our direction and thereby protects and safeguards the Nation's Strategic center of gravity.

Recommendations. America's Army should adopt the proposed re-aligned FRM and the "Effective Force" structure option. The re-alignment of RC TOE units from the USAR to the NG allows for a reduction in NG force structure. The "Effective Force" option keeps the AC close to BUR levels while slightly re-aligning its responsibilities to encompass a greater role in training the RC, and robusts NG MSCA self-sufficiency. This option also enforces and clarifies constitutional mandates of Congress, the President, the AC, and the NG, while retaining essential mission capability and

budget imperatives. The "Effective Force" sustains the excellence of America's Army and bolsters America's core values while it allows the Nation to rebuild its economy through the current interwar period.

NOTES:

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret with Introductory Essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie and a Commentary by Bernard Brodie (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 89.

² U.S., *Constitution*, Preamble; art. I, sec. 8; art. II, sec. 2.

³ *Ibid.*, art. I, sec. 8.

⁴ Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, editors, *The Founders' Constitution*, vol. 3 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 134-145, 150-151, 154-155, and 175-177. This work contains the *Federalist Papers* by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, who congruently address and explain the reasons behind the Army and Militia clauses to the *Constitution*. Hamilton, in *Federalists No. 8, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29*, and Madison in *Federalists No. 41 and 46*, argue that, in a democracy such as the United States, a standing army is no danger to liberty so long as it and the militia are independently regulated by Congress. Hamilton makes the case that the militia alone is neither able nor willing to tend to the Nation's defenses, but needs a professional army to set standards of military conduct and to be the full-time custodian of national security. In *Federalist No. 23*, Hamilton further states, on the size and role of the defense establishment, that "The means ought to be proportional to the end; . . . [the federal government] ought to possess the means by which it [the end] is to be attained [emphases in original]" and that "the Union ought to be invested with the full power to levy troops . . . and to raise the revenues, which will be required to for the formation of an army" In *Federalist No. 29*, Hamilton defines the role and limits of the federal militia and the standing army, stating "If a well regulated militia be the most natural defense of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of national security [Congress]. If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power [by Congress] over the militia, in the body of those whose care the protection of the state is committed [the militia], ought as far as possible take away the inducement and pretext to such unfriendly institutions [as a standing army could otherwise be]." Together, these discourses yields the following main points: (1) a well regulated militia is the most natural defense of a free country, but the militia is neither willing nor able to be a full-time national security custodian; (2) a standing army is therefore necessary to be the custodian of national security and to set standards for military conduct, thus putting the army in charge of militia readiness, conduct, and training; (3) the standing army and the federalized militia must be

independently called forth and regulated by Congress; and (4) the standing army and the militia must together be of sufficient size to accomplish national security objectives, but the objectives must be aligned with available means.

⁵ Constitution, art. II, sec. 2.

⁶ A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, February 1995 (Washington, D.C.: The White House), pp. 19-22.

⁷ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 702.

⁸ A National Security Strategy, pp. 22-24.

⁹ Constitution, art I, sec. 8.

¹⁰ Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), pp. 11-19.

¹¹ Prof. Doug Campbell, Ph.D., U.S. Army War College, April 24, 1995. The relegation of the Vietnam War to campaign status in the global, half-century arena of the Cold War became a point of relevance in an Advanced Warfighting Course case study of the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive of 1972.

¹² Prof. Elliot A. Cohen, in the keynote address on April 27, 1995, to the Annual Strategy Conference held at the United States Army War College.

¹³ 50 U.S. Code 1541 Note and (a)

Constitution, art. II, sec. 2.

Kurland and Lerner, vol. 4, p. 6. This work contains *Federalist No. 74, 500*, by Alexander Hamilton and deals with presidential power under the Constitution. In this paper, Hamilton curtly makes the case for centralized national power in war, with the army, navy, and militia under the command of a single individual, the President.

¹⁴ 10 U.S. Code 673 b.

¹⁵ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. General Creighton W. Abrams, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, in a statement to the House Armed Services Committee on "The Posture of the Army," February 14, 1974, made the following observations: "We consider the total force structure, both Active and Reserve Components, in developing requirements for initial reinforcement and for mobilization. Obviously, we rely heavily on Reserve Component forces. We can make no plans to fight in a major conflict without considering their early mobilization and commitment" (p. 10), and "The strategic reserve, consisting of both Active and Reserve Component forces, must be prepared to move responsively and decisively, within the limitations of the War Powers Act [sic], to counter challenges wherever they might arise. This base in the United States is the heart of the American Army. Unless it is strong, ready, and capable of being projected, our entire strategy is endangered" (p. 12).

¹⁶ U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *The Impact of the Persian Gulf War and the Decline of the Soviet Union on How the United States Does Its Defense Business*, General Edwin C. Burba, Jr. Testifying

on the performance of the three Army National Guard brigades mobilized for the Persian Gulf War, 102d Cong., 1st sess., 1991, p. 221.

¹⁷ Gen. J.H. Binford Peay III, Maj. Gen. John R. D'Araujo Jr., and Maj. Gen. Max Baratz, "Building for the Future: The Active/Reserve Offsite Agreement," *Army*, November 1994, pp. 45-47. The BUR (first announced by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in December 1993) allotted 500,000 [later changed to 495,000] 367,000, and 208,000 soldiers to the AC, NG, and USAR, respectively, by the end of 1999. The BUR also guided functions, roles, and missions by generally allotting a mix of all forces, but with an edge to combat arms, to the AC, a "balanced" force of mainly combat arms formations with organic CS and CSS as well as non-organic CS in the NG, and mainly CS and CSS units in the USAR.

¹⁸ Murray Weidenbaum, *Small Wars, Big Defense*, (Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 11.

¹⁹ Prof. Dennis S. Ippolito, Ph.D., United States Army War College lecture, September 8, 1994.

²⁰ Ippolito, slide no. XIV.

²¹ "Rare Combination of Forces May Make History of '94: Democratic apathy and Republican strength suggest landslide may have ushered in a lasting change," *Congressional Quarterly--Weekly Report*, April 15, 1995, vol. 53, no. 15, pp. 1076-1081.

²² U.S. Army, Headquarters, Directorate of Operations, Warplans Division, telephone conversation with the author, May 8, 1995.

²³ U.S. Army, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1996, Presented to the Committees and Subcommittees of the Senate and House of Representatives*, February 1995, pp. 90-92.

U.S. Congress, Senate, *Posture Statement*. General Robert L. Rutherford, USAF, Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee of the 104th Congress, February 23, 1995, pp. 16-17.

²⁴ Mr. Jon Kaskin, OPNAV N42, lecture to the United States Army War College on April 24, 1995. Mr. Kaskin explained that, even though the Navy may not put a high priority on strategic sealift, the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps all do. The result is that in the Department of Defense consolidated budget, the Navy is "out voted," and strategic sealift remains a top priority item in DoD funding requests.

²⁵ U.S. Army, Headquarters.

²⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* (The Pentagon: February 1993), p. iv. The report defines roles, missions, and functions as follows: "Simply stated, the primary function of the Services is to provide forces organized, trained and equipped to perform a role -- to be employed by a CINC in a mission." [emphases in original]

²⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pp. III-51 to III-52.

U.S., General Accounting Office, *Report to the Honorable John W. Warner, U.S. Senate--Roles and Functions: Assessment of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Of Staff Report* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, July 1993), pp. 36-38.

Peay, D'Araujo, and Baratz, pp. 45-47.

²⁸ 18 U.S. Code 1385 prohibits using the Army or Air Force (but not the NG in a state role) to execute the law.

²⁹ Col. Peter Holmberg, *Military Support for Domestic Disaster Relief-- Is the Doctrine Supported by Ends and Means?*, United States Army War College paper (unpublished), October, 1994. The paper demonstrates that the NG has, in all instances except those of unusual magnitude, been able to respond to MSCA requests without a detraction to readiness. The NG has been able to be responsive due to the volunteer status, outside of federal readiness responsibilities, of most participants. The paper implies that the AC could be released from most MSCA responsibilities with implementation of humanitarian aid interstate compacts between states.

³⁰ A National Security Strategy, p. 33.

³¹ Lt. Col. D. Allen Youngman, *The Army National Guard and Force XXI*, United States Army War College research paper (unpublished), May 1995. Lt. Col. Youngman's paper demonstrates how five AC division headquarters for the fifteen enhanced brigades fits the Force XXI concept.