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
Post-Cold War Europe:
The Loss of Stability and the Emergence of the Extreme Right

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Submitted to the Faculty of the University Graduate School
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree
Master of Arts
in the Department of West European Studies
Indiana University
May 1995


Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to sincerely thank the members of my Thesis Committee for their guidance and support. Professor Carl Ipsen pushed me to do my best, provided invaluable assistance in explaining the often muddled workings of European politics and was instrumental in helping me to tailor my work to meet the objectives of my research. Professor Brigitte Waldorf's expertise on issues involving the plight of immigrants in Europe also helped establish the parameters for my research, as well as providing numerous suggestions and examples to help illustrate my arguments. And Professor Daniel Quilter, who being the first to hear my ideas, prompted me to continue research into this area. Without this guidance and support, the researching and writing of this thesis would have been much more difficult.

Although it is difficult to adequately express the depth of my gratitude, I would also like to thank the West European Department Staff for their help. The support and compassion of both Mary Kay Welsh and Amanda Ciccarelli helped see me through some very difficult times. I shall always be thankful!

The angry man feels pain, but the hater does not. Much may happen to make the angry man pity those who offend him, but the hater under no circumstances wishes to pity a man whom he has once hated: for the one would have the offenders suffer for what they have done; the other would have them cease to exist.

-Aristotle

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INTRODUCTION

In October 1986, after months of personal correspondence, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev met in Reykjavik, Iceland to discuss the reduction of conventional forces in Europe as well as the possibility of a nuclear-free world. Although no concrete guidelines were worked out, a marked change in the attitudes of the two great superpowers was readily apparent. In addition to Gorbachev's continued willingness to make fundamental changes in the Soviet Union, this summit showed that President Reagan was now ready to "deliver a parallel revolution in international relations" (Walker, 1993, p. 295) and abandon the arms build-up mandated by the "Reagan Doctrine."

Subsequently, the bi-polar world dominated by the two great superpowers changed quickly and dramatically. In December 1987, the U.S. and Soviet leaders met again, this time in Washington D.C.; the results of the 1987 summit were truly remarkable. Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to scrap all medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, thus turning further diplomatic discussions away from arms control and towards arms reduction. This agreement and Gorbachev's actions during the summit (shaking-hands with the crowds and making various public appearances with his wife) played upon America's love of heroes and convinced Americans that the

Soviet leader "genuinely embodied an astonishing change in the way the world had been organized for a generation" (Walker, 1993, p. 296), a conviction further strengthened by the introduction of additional Soviet freedoms under the policy of *glasnost*.

Throughout 1988, Gorbachev continued his reforms in the Soviet Union, including the recognition of non-Communist parties and the recognition of the Russian Orthodox Church. Finally, in December 1988, Gorbachev spoke before the United Nations (UN). He stated that "force or the threat of force neither can nor should be instruments of foreign policy" and announced that the "principle of excessive stockpiling of arms is giving way to the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defence" (Walker, 1993, p. 309); and his past actions made the speech both powerful and believable. Furthermore, he announced the withdrawal of 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks from Eastern Europe with further reductions to follow (Walker, 1993, p. 309).

More than any other single event, Gorbachev's 1988 speech signaled an end to over 40 years of Soviet aggression and so an end to the Cold War. As a direct result, 1989 became a year of dramatic change for Europe. Hungary opened its borders allowing thousands of East Germans to escape to the West; free elections were held in Poland; and the Berlin Wall fell. All of these changes, and those that followed in 1990 and 1991, were proof that the Cold War had indeed

ended. And these changes encouraged the belief, expressed by many European politicians and scholars, that Europe was destined to enter a period of renewed prosperity, a "European Golden Age."

This belief, however, proved to be unfounded. In fact, the majority of both Western and Eastern¹ European countries have experienced an overall increase in political instability since 1989. Not only are the countries of Eastern Europe experiencing greater than expected difficulties in converting to market economies and pluralistic political systems, but in the West "in all the five big EC [European Community] countries, an entire political class is on the defensive (or, in Italy's case, under investigation)" (The Economist; July 3, 1993, p. 7). Political instability - exemplified by scandal, corruption, stagnation and dissension, as well as extreme rightist violence - would appear to be on the rise throughout Europe.

Overall, Europe (both the East and West) hardly seems any better off now in terms of strength and/or political stability than it was before these dramatic changes took place. In fact, Europe appears to have been more politically stable during the late 1970's and early 1980's, a time when both the U.S., with the Strategic Defence

¹Throughout this paper, terms such as "Western" and "Eastern" will be used to differentiate between countries and ideas based on social and political conditions which existed prior to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Communist bloc.

Initiative (SDI), and the Soviets, with the deployment of the SS-20 medium range missile in Europe, increased the tensions of the Cold War.

At first glance, faced with the collapse of an entire political system, it is easier to understand why the East and the former Soviet Union now face a time of great political and economic instability. After all, the majority of the population within this area knew only the rigidity of Communist rule for most of the past 40 years. A lack of "political harmony" in the East at this point is not surprising. However, how can we explain the increase in political instability in the West, the apparent winner of the Cold War?

It is my belief, and this thesis will attempt to show, that the reasons for political instability in Western Europe are similar to those for Eastern Europe; that is, the demise of a political system that had been in place for more than 40 years. The policies and actions of the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War laid the foundation for modern Europe and, in a sense, provided Europe with a stable, though tense, environment in which to develop. The end of the Cold War has left a void in the European political system which has permitted the previously narrow confines of acceptable political choices to be opened up. Also, with the enemy vanquished, governments and political parties which served as important "anti-communist" forces

during the Cold War are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain support as they strive to change their focus from Cold War security to increasing economic power. While these nations have of course always pursued policies designed to increase their economic strength, for the past 40 years they did so in the constant shadow of the superpowers. As an example, the European Union (EU), which initially called for economic and political unity for all of Europe, remained strictly a Western institution. The U.S. saw the EU as a means by which Western Europe could increase its economic strength while also solidifying the anti-Soviet alliance. In turn, the Soviet Union saw the EU as a potential threat to its hold over Eastern Europe and initiated a policy to block Eastern contact with the EU. Consequently, attempts "to forge a more overall relationship [between the West and the East] fell victim to the icy political climate of the late 1970's and early 1980's" (Urwin, 1991, p. 215). Today, the "shadow of the superpowers" has disappeared and European governments are having difficulty adjusting to the quickly changing political atmosphere. These governments can no longer concentrate on external issues (those surrounding the Cold War) and so are being forced to look inward. Moreover, the European peoples are experiencing a shift in their political attitudes as a result of the breakdown in the old relationship between European politics and the Cold War as well. Perhaps most importantly, the direction of this

shift, primarily to the right, is also influenced by the Cold War.

Fear and hate are deeply ingrained psychological factors which the Cold War served to control and manipulate. With the end of the Cold War, these controls became unusable but the feelings of hate and fear surfaced. I will argue in this paper that European governments used and became dependant upon the Cold War and its psychological undertones to promote themselves and their political philosophies. Since its end, the groups of the far right, which exist in any modern pluralist political system and which employ a strategy of fear and hate to a greater degree than other political groups have been able to attract a wider following. Then seeing this shift, mainstream political parties throughout Europe have adopted many of the same controversial issues exploited by the extreme right into their own platforms in an attempt to attract voters.

The first part of this thesis (chapters 1 and 2) will lay the foundation for the theory described above. Chapter 1 will present the history of the Cold War, not simply as a compilation of facts, but as a continual series of policies and actions which brought modern Europe into being and continue to influence her today. It will not only concentrate on U.S. and Soviet actions, but will also show how European governments responded. Finally, this chapter will show how these factors, when taken together, served to

stabilize Europe.

In Chapter 2, the Cold War will be looked at from a different perspective, not only as a series of policies, but as a "war." And in this context, the psychology of war and the promotion of hate and fear -readily apparent in Soviet, U.S., and European policies and actions- will be discussed.

Part two (chapter 3) will discuss the emergence of the far-right in Europe. First, I will consider some contemporary theories designed to explain this phenomenon and why these theories fail to grasp the totality of the situation in Europe. Then I will present a theory and model which addresses both the loss of political stability which accompanied the end of the Cold War and the underlying psychological factors of war which remained after its end and influenced the general shift to the right.

The third part of this study (chapter 4) will present several models which illustrate the practical application of these theories. First, an overall picture of European instability will be presented, detailing the emergence of various rightist ideologies; then I will present two country examples, using the model detailed in chapter 3. Finally, I will present some overall conclusions, as well as discuss some areas for future study.

CHAPTER 1

History of the Cold War and the Shaping of Europe: Caught Between the Superpowers

Wars in Europe during the past 1000 years have been either "wars of ideology" or "wars of succession and the balance of power" (Walker, 1993, p. 5). The Cold War combined both of these elements and was fought primarily by the United States and the Soviet Union, with the fate of Europe caught in the middle. Ideologically, it was a battle between capitalism and Communism. It also decided the post-World War II (WWII) configuration of Germany. However, this war did not limit itself to Europe and, in fact, encompassed the world and reached into space before its end. Its battlefields included, among others, Korea, Vietnam, Cuba and Angola; as well as the classrooms of America and the factories of Western and Eastern Europe. During the course of this war, millions of people died and millions more grew-up in constant fear of nuclear attack.

For all its tensions, the Cold War had become by its end a system of political control which prevented potential catastrophe in Europe by halting the escalation of regional conflicts. Under the constant threat of nuclear attack, neither the West nor the East could afford to allow a conflict to develop into total war. Consequently, European nations were forced to pursue their own interests under the ever present shadow of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In

time, the Cold War became a European institution and was "marked by a kind of warped stability and an evolving code of acceptable behavior" (Walker, 1993, p. 1) which shaped the development of Europe.

This chapter is not intended to be a chronological history or detailed listing of the events and causes of the Cold War. Instead it will focus upon those policies which most affected the economic and political development of Europe after 1945. By approaching the Cold War in this manner, the important relationship between Cold War policies and stability can be highlighted.

The Cold War's beginning can be traced to the waning days of World War II (WWII) and can be loosely attributed to Hitler's refusal to surrender. This refusal resulted in the total destruction of Germany's political system, its economy, and its infrastructure, thus creating a void that the Allies would be forced to fill. In addition to the German question, "the Cold War, like WWII, began with a Western attempt to rescue a Poland that was beyond its reach" (Halle, 1967, p. 57). The Soviets knew that its Western Allies did not want to fight to save Poland; after all, the cooperation of the Soviets was still needed by both the U.S. and Britain; in addition, the U.S. hoped that they could convince the Soviets to send troops to the Pacific. Consequently, at the Yalta Summit in February 1945, when Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt met to decide the fate of

Germany and the post-war world, Roosevelt and Churchill disavowed any national interest in Poland, other than to call for free elections after the war.

By refusing to take a firm stance on the Polish question, the path was cleared for the Soviets to move into Eastern and Central Europe and establish dominance. By war's end, a bi-polar world had come into being. Political allegiance in Europe was "gravitating toward those whose armies were occupying one or another country. Italy and Greece, France and the Low Countries, were heading west; Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria were heading east; the alignment of Finland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and above all, Germany, seemed to be in suspense" (DePorte, 1979, p. 59).

By this time, it was obvious that the U.S. and Great Britain had a much different interpretation of the agreements reached at Yalta than the Soviets. Although Roosevelt realized following the conference that "you can't do business with Stalin" (Walker, 1993, p. 17), it was too late. He was close to death and the Soviets already controlled the East. Then, on 23 April 1945, a meeting between the new U.S. President, Harry Truman, and his Russian experts dramatically changed American relations with the Soviets. This meeting which took place just before Truman's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov resulted in a new aggressive tone and the U.S.

statement that Stalin's failure to fulfill the Yalta agreement would "seriously shake confidence in the unity of the three governments" (Walker, 1993 p. 20).² This dramatic change in U.S. attitude, away from passive acceptance of Soviet actions, was made possible by the U.S. development of a working atomic bomb, which it of course would soon use to end the war with Japan.

After the destruction of Hiroshima, relations between the U.S. and the Soviets continued to worsen and the Cold War had indeed begun. Despite the presence of nuclear weapons, the first weapons of the Cold War were primarily economic. First, in the form of the Lend-Lease program and American financial loans, both of which were made available to the countries of Western Europe but not to the Soviets, despite having received a promise of economic aid at the Yalta summit³. In addition, Stalin's other plans for recovery -reparations from Germany- was firmly blocked (in the Western zones) by both British and U.S. opposition.

Outraged by U.S. actions, Stalin, in a speech before the Supreme Soviet, stated: "the capitalist system of world economy harbors elements of general crises and armed conflicts, and hence, the development of world capitalism

²This reference to the "three governments" refers to the WWII alliance between the U.S., Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.

³Soviet actions also prevented Eastern European countries access to these programs, although aid had initially been promised.

proceeds not in the path of smooth and even progress but through crisis and the catastrophes of war" (Pravda, 10 February 1945). Several ranking U.S. officials believed this speech was an open declaration of war. Hoping for a better understanding of Stalin's view, the U.S. State Department asked for additional information. George Kennan, in charge of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, responded with the famous "Long Telegram." This telegram, with its over 5,500 words, began "USSR still believes in an antagonistic 'capitalist encirclement' with which in [the] long run there can be no permanent peaceful co-existence" (Walker, 1993, p. 39). A devout anti-Soviet, Kennan also believed that the U.S. had the ability and the obligation to confront Soviet interests. He stated that, through containment, "the West had the physical and moral resources to resist Communism and to outlast it, if it could only summon the political cohesion and will" (Walker, 1993, p.41). Churchill, though no longer Prime Minister, voiced British support for Kennan's telegram in his equally famous "Iron Curtain" speech in March 1946. Stalin followed with an interview in Pravda where he said that Churchill's speech was "a dangerous move, calculated to sow the seeds of dissension among the Allied States" (Walker, 1993, p.42) As a result of this series of volleys, the Cold war raged.

The French, in response, stated that they could not hope to survive in a bi-polar world without economic aid.

Eager to maintain a strong alliance with France, the U.S. wrote off \$2.7 billion of France's outstanding war debt and guaranteed an additional \$1.3 billion in loans. Consequently, France was "rescued in the name of anti-communist solidarity" (Walker 1993, p. 47). However, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, all firmly under the control of the Soviet Union, had their credit applications rejected by the World Bank.

Also, up to this point, the British had maintained the illusions of world power, though WWII had drained their resources and badly crippled their infrastructure. After the war, Britain continued to support its colonial holdings and to supply economic aid to many of its allies until the harsh winter of 1946/47. Britain then concluded that it could no longer support its colonies and other governments at the expense of its own people and announced that it would end economic aid to Greece and Turkey within a matter of weeks. Again, Truman and the U.S. came to the rescue. Right and Left-wing forces were involved in a civil war in Greece. Speaking before Congress, Truman stated that this was not a civil war, but a war caused by outside aggression. In fact, he convinced Congress and the American people that "international Communism was on the march and the orders came from its center, Moscow" (McWilliams and Piotrowski, 1993, p. 40). Thus, by scaring "the hell out of the American people" (McWilliams and Piotrowski, 1993, p. 40),

he persuaded Congress to approve \$400 million in direct aid. He also won approval to send troops to Europe to administer reconstruction. U.S. aid quickly turned the tide of battle in Greece, allowing a victory by the Right. It was this speech and its results which would later define the Truman Doctrine.

The sheer destruction of WWII had created desperate situations throughout Europe; however, Germany was by far the worst off. It had been utterly destroyed by Allied bombings and was now an occupied country. Truman and the U.S. Zone Commander believed that the German economy should be revived and expanded. Not only would this reduce the U.S. economic burden, but a revived Germany would prove a powerful ally against the Soviets. Although, the French feared a strong Germany and had a veto right, they agreed to German reconstruction in return for a promise of future U.S. economic support. The Soviets also had the right to veto; however, the U.S. started the rebuilding of Germany's infrastructure without their approval, thus beginning the process for the "permanent" division of Germany. Soon after these developments, the Truman doctrine was linked to the Marshall Plan, which was designed to aid the economic recovery of Europe. In a speech at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, General George Marshall stated that the purpose of this policy "should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and

social conditions in which free institutions can exist...Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us." (Walker, 1993, p. 51). With these funds, Western Europe pursued economic reconstruction underwritten by the U.S. These funds were also made available to Eastern Europe; however, their distribution would have been subject to U.S. control and to the Soviets this condition was unacceptable.

The Soviets responded by forming Cominform, the Communist Information Bureau, which, in turn, promoted a series of strikes throughout Western Europe. The U.S. quickly responded with aid in the form of food, which weakened the effects of the strikes. Predicated by this failure and the attractiveness of the Marshall Plan to many East European governments, the Soviets moved to establish their total dominance over Eastern Europe, which precluded the development of any form of Communism too different from that dictated by Moscow. The U.S. saw this as an attempt by the Soviets to raise the stakes; they responded with the decision to militarize Western Europe. A mere 10 months after the Marshall Plan was implemented, another Cold War institution, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was formed.

In light of this build-up in tensions, it seemed only a matter of time before a direct confrontation. This confrontation occurred in June 1948. On 23 June, the West

announced that the Deutschmark would be introduced into all sectors of West Berlin, the following day, the Soviets announced their blockade of the city. The U.S. responded by flying supplies into Berlin. For 11 months, daily U.S. sorties kept the city fed and warm. The U.S. also flew 60 B-29 atomic bombers into British bases. Although the Soviets eventually ended their blockade, their actions cemented the separation of Germany.

After this crisis the Cold War seemed to stabilize in Europe. From this point on, the majority of Cold War confrontations would take place outside of Europe, primarily in the developing countries of Asia and South America. In 1949, the U.S. blueprint for fighting the Cold War, NSC-68 was initiated. This document raised the defense budget from \$13.5 billion to \$50 billion. In its first real test, the 24 June invasion of South Korea, NSC-68 also received its biggest boon. American diplomacy, defence budgets and military reach exploded across the globe in the aftermath of the invasion. It was also shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War that Congress passed the increases in the defence budget called for by NSC-68.

By moving beyond the borders of Europe, the Cold War brought a new intensity, a new Germany, and a new militarization back to the heart of Europe. First, although the Korean War had an unsettling effect on international trade and world prices, it also stimulated economic activity

in Europe. During 1949 and 1950 West Germany's foreign trade doubled; it rose another 75 percent the next year. Secondly, European NATO countries increased their spending on defense from \$4.4 billion in 1949 to 8 billion by 1951, despite strains on their national economies (Walker, 1993, p. 85). Despite this new intensity, a strange type of stability was also readily apparent. Remarkably, in Korea although U.S. and Soviet pilots (the latter dressed as Chinese) had clashed (in the North), both sides managed to avoid a larger war.

In 1949, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the implementing body of the Marshall Plan, held a meeting calling for "the integration of the European economy" (Walker, 1993, p. 87). Although initially blocked by Britain, this plan laid out the formation of what is today the European Union. European unity was not a new concept. Towards the end of WWII, Resistance leaders had met in hopes of forming a single European Political Union. It was their belief that this union would keep the continent out of future wars and prevent the atrocities of the past from ever happening again. Circumstances after the war, however, prevented these ideas from being realized. Given the Cold War division of Europe, designs for European unity would have to be limited to Western and Eastern alliances, and within each of these alliances unity became both a byproduct and necessary concomitant of that same Cold War.

By the 1950's, the West Germans saw continued support of a strong U.S. alliance as the key to recovering full sovereignty. The British also strongly supported U.S. policies. However, the French, while paying lip service to American efforts, also supported the idea of creating a European superpower as a balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. After all, French industrial production was 50 percent higher in 1954 than in the last year before WWII, and with this increased economic strength came increased interest in a Europe in which France could be the dominant power. The combination and interplay of these factors would borrow from the OEEC's plan for a united Europe and eventually lead to the formation of the Common Market, which was able to prosper and flourish in the West under the American military umbrella.

For the U.S., the 1950's were a time of growing international concern. The launching of Sputnik caused the U.S. to believe that a "missile gap" existed between themselves and the Soviets. As such, the U.S. plunged into development of the Atlas and Polaris missile systems. In addition, the U.S. pressed the Europeans to "implement a forward strategy by improving their conventional defense efforts" (DePorte, 1979, p.157). Included in this strategy was the decision, in May 1955, to grant West Germany full sovereignty, NATO membership and the right to rearm. In response to what they saw as a threat from a rearmed Germany

the Soviets formed the Warsaw Pact.

The 1950's were also a difficult time for the U.S. and West European alliance. American efforts to have Europe strengthen its own defenses, as well as the U.S. failure to provide aid during the Suez crisis, called the U.S. commitment to Europe into question, and this, in turn, affected the path of European unity. Even though Germany had been granted sovereignty, Chancellor Adenauer had reluctantly to accept the French concept of Western Europe and pay whatever economic price was required to the new Common Market in order to secure a strong French alliance.

Despite these events, by this point the "states in each half of Europe were linked to their protecting or hegemonic superpower by a thickening web of security, political and economic ties" (DePorte, 1979, p. 166). However, while during the Cold War's first decade Western Europe huddled together under American protection and suspended most of its traditional jealousies for the greater imperative of survival, the combination of strategic stability and prosperity in Europe brought back some of the old continent's nationalist rivalries, especially between the French and the British. During the 1960's, Western Europe, now dominated by a strong Franco-German alliance, continued to grow and prosper distinctly apart from the British and the Americans. The U.S. in turn embarked upon a policy of arms control on the strategic front, accompanied by a

continued, aggressive pursuit of anti-Communism in the developing world.

By the late 1960's the stability of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship in Europe had become more important than the ideologies and ambitions that divided the two. The Soviet forces and the forces of the U.S. and Western Europe were described as "being more or less in balance" (Walker, 1993, p.154). The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty further established them as equal partners in a nuclear relationship which was becoming both codified and stable. Moreover, this new "*detente*" was seen by the Soviets as a way to stabilize its relations with an America chastised by its failure in Vietnam, and as a way to normalize its relations with Western Europe. At the same time, with the European front now stable, the Soviets could spread their influence further into the developing third world. For this reason, *detente* appears to have been, at least to U.S. officials, nothing more than the continuation of the Cold War in other places, and by more subtle means than the mutual proliferation of missiles. All in all, to the U.S., *detente* suggested a defeat for Western strategy. On the other hand, Europe saw *detente* as a means through which they could recover responsibility for their own affairs. Consequently, it was no surprise that in 1973, Europe "puffed out its chest" and refused to allow the U.S. to use its airfields during the Yom Kippur War. However, despite

all the posturing, *detente* preserved the institutions of the Cold War intact. NATO and Warsaw Pact forces still faced off across the Elbe, Germany was still divided and Western Europe still relied on the strength of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Much to the satisfaction of the U.S., by the end of the 1970's *detente* came to an abrupt end. The Soviets were heavily involved in the development of numerous types of nuclear warheads and, in 1977, they deployed SS-20 missiles, each carrying three warheads, to Eastern Europe. Once again Western Europe's fears were raised and their actions galvanized by the West's conservatives into a new militancy. Speaking before NATO, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt relayed his fears of losing the U.S. nuclear umbrella. His concerns, and those of others, led to the NATO plan for the deployment of 572 new U.S. missiles to Europe.

Western fears also intensified as the result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and actions in Poland (the putting down of the Solidarity movement by force). Indeed, these fears played a significant role in the elections of Thatcher, Reagan, Mitterand and Kohl, all of whom, with the possible exception of Mitterand, campaigned openly and powerfully on the theme of the Soviet threat and the need for Western rearmament. The mood in the West was reminiscent of those earlier "tremors of nuclear dread, the air-raid-warning rehearsals in schools in the 1950's or the

nuclear-shelter panic of the early 1960's" (Walker, 1993, p. 268). As Reagan pursued his own doctrine, which revived the U.S. defence industry and re-ignited the nuclear arms race, the world was once more on the brink.

Things began to change dramatically once again in 1982, when Yuri Andropov took power in the Soviet Union. At that time the Soviet Union had known almost 30 years of "continual peace," but was struggling with a weak economy which could not keep up with the U.S. in the arms race. Andropov hoped to resume *detente* with the U.S. and dreamed of a transformed relationship with an increasingly neutralist Western Europe. However, the fears of the 1970's had put conservative governments into power throughout Europe, governments which confounded his hopes and plans. Andropov died in 1984 and was followed by Konstantin Chernenko, who lasted just 14 months. However because Chernenko was ill, Gorbachev, acting General Secretary, was able to push forward a reopening of the superpower dialogue with the U.S. Perhaps sobered by coming so close to the brink of nuclear war, Reagan welcomed this dialogue, which, once initiated, would eventually lead to the Reykjavik Summit and the end of the Cold War.

The importance of Cold War policies to the governments of Europe should be readily apparent. Germany, practically destroyed by WWII, used Cold War policies to rise from the ashes of its defeat to become one of the strongest economic

powers in the world. Perhaps, the most important feature about its development during the Cold War period was the weight it attached to institutions such as NATO and the European Community. Membership in these organizations, provided Germany both the ability to rebuild and to pursue its own economic and political interests. NATO "served to integrate the Federal Republic in the western alliance as a contributing partner, and secured long term leverage to effect the reunification of Germany (Anderson and Goodman, 1993, p. 24). All told, German development after WWII mirrored Cold War policy developments. It was one of the first nations to use the Marshall plan to begin its rebuilding; it relied on NATO and the U.S. nuclear umbrella for security; it was able to rearm as the result of an increasing Soviet threat; and it took advantage of the industrial demands created by the Korean War to more than double its economic growth. These factors, and its strength and activities in the European Union, combined to create what is now modern Germany. However, German reliance on these institutions (institutions of the Cold War) came at a cost. They provided a "normative framework for policy-making" (Anderson and Goodman, 1993, p. 24) which limited, and to some degree, controlled their actions. Even today, with the Cold War over, German officials are not ready to abandon these institutions. Many do not feel adequately protected by French and British nuclear deterrents and want

the American nuclear umbrella to remain in place.

Throughout the Cold War, French actions were enigmatic. Although they often denounced the division of Europe and worked diligently for *detente*, they also benefited greatly from it. At the end of WWII France desired to play a major role in international politics; however, a weak economy and military prevented this. Consequently, France was one of the first European nations to ask for U.S. economic aid and was an active member of NATO, at least until the 1960's. However, to France, these actions amounted to nothing more than delays in meeting its political goals. Since the end of WWII France has been committed to three national imperatives, all of which have been affected by the institutions and policies of the Cold War. First, they have strived to maintain an independent voice in diplomacy which led to the formation of the Force de Frappe and the French withdrawal from NATO, though in the end this aspect of strategic independence proved no more effective than the policies pursued by Western Germany and Britain within the confines of NATO. Secondly, France desired the construction of a West European entity in which it would play a dominant role. While France played a major role in the early development of the European Union, they were soon overwhelmed by the economic and political strength of West Germany. Finally, France desired to preserve its traditional economic and political sphere of influence.

Again, hopes were frustrated as France could not continue to provide economic assistance to these areas and eventually lost many of its colonial territories. Policies in support of these imperatives often led France to pursue its own relations with the Soviet Union; however, events such as the Vietnam War and the deployment of SS-20 missiles, among others, forced them to retreat time and time again to a common Western position. The end of the Cold War has not eased things for France and has, in fact, put the French in a strange position. France was committed to the idea of a Single Market and the deepening of the European Community; however, the rapidly changing political landscape of Europe has altered many of the priorities of the West and could in fact delay this "deepening" in favor of broadening.

In addition to these two examples, other Western European countries have been affected, to varying degrees, by the Cold War and its policies. In the end, the East could not compete with the economic prowess of the West. However, the security and economic systems in place in 1989 should be distinguished for more than just their success. These systems were also "multilateral and highly institutionalized" (Keohane and Nye, 1993, p. 106). Multilateralism has been defined as "an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct" (Ruggie, Summer 1992, p. 571). In a direct sense, this is what the

European Community and NATO, the two primary institutional instruments for waging the Cold War in Western Europe (Keohane and Nye, 1993, p. 112) had accomplished. These ties also affected their relations with the rest of the world. During the 1970's and 1980's the EC was a magnet for former dictatorships on the periphery of Europe, and came to include Greece, Portugal, and Spain.

In the end, "the Cold War, with all of its rivalries, anxieties, and unquestionable dangers... produced the longest period of stability in relations among the great powers that the world has known in this century" (Gaddis, 1987, p. 245).

CHAPTER 2

The Cold War and the Psychology of War

Karl von Clausewitz defined war as "the continuation of policy by other means" (Brzezinski, Winter 1992-93, p. 31), and this definition certainly applies to the Cold War. From the beginning, the Cold War was fought between two opposing political philosophies with the fate of Europe and much of the Third World caught in the balance. Perhaps what distinguishes war from peacetime policies is that it "both requires and engenders a deep-seated sense of enmity between participants" (Rieber, 1991, p. 4). A war without enemies cannot exist, and an enemy cannot exist without hatred. Noted psychiatrist Leonard Sillman states that "a very intense emotional state is essential for the successful conduct of what is the most strenuous, dangerous and difficult of all social undertakings, namely war" (Ballard and McDowell, 1991, p. 229). While recognizing that the Cold War was indeed a war, political analysts often fail to devote adequate attention to the psychological undercurrents of this war and their effects on the populations of the U.S., the Soviet Union and Europe. These psychological factors are thought to be of little importance because the Cold War was a war fought with policies and few direct confrontations resulted in actual combat, at least on the European landmass. However, psychologists argue that

perception in war is often much more important than reality. Consequently, the psychology of war and the perceptions of both sides are of considerable importance in understanding the "how" and "why" of political decisions made during war, including the Cold War.

Keeping these considerations in mind, this chapter will look first at the psychology of war, in particular the emergence of the enemy and the role of hate. Then, this process including the enmification of both sides will be briefly traced through the history of the Cold War.

There have been numerous theories put forward to explain the existence of war. Freud believed that war was "an outlet for repressed impulses" (Fornari, 1966, p. xx). Psychologist Edward Glover made a similar observation describing "war as a manifestation of conflict between human impulses" (p. 86). For Glover, wars occurred when external problems were internalized. Finally, Psychoanalyst Franco Fornari sees war as "an unconscious security maneuver against terrifying fantasy entities which are not flesh and blood but represent an absolute danger" (p. xvi). Despite the differences in these, and other theories, there appears to be at least one common characteristic; defense against psychotic anxieties.⁴

⁴The theory on the development of war and the enemy presented in this paper is based on the writings of Franco Fornari, who incorporates the views and ideas of many psychologists into a single comprehensive theory.

According to Psychiatrist Rene Spitz, in approximately the eighth month of life infants develop a "stranger anxiety as a result of their ability to recognize that the stranger is not the mother" (Fornari, 1966, p. 161). The fact that the infant tries to avoid looking at the stranger, even though there has been no attack or threatening behavior, implies that the "other as enemy is comprehensible only in terms of externalization onto the stranger of a bad internal object" (Fornari, 1966, p. 162). In this case, the child externalized the fear surrounding his mother's absence.

For Fornari, the externalization of this bad internal object or "terrifier," onto another is the beginning of a larger process of deflecting guilt. All humans have fantasies and dreams of violence against their families and other people and things they love. According to Psychiatrist Melanie Klein, "these nightmarish fantasies are dominated by the sense that we ourselves hurt our loved ones through our own destructive attacks on them" (Rieber, 1991, p. 110). However, in order to avoid feelings of guilt for the imagined death and/or destruction of this loved object (a part of the mourning process), blame is projected onto an external enemy (Fornari, 1966, pp. xx-xix). Consequently, the "love object" died not because of our destructive fantasy but because of the actions of an enemy. Fornari uses the example of anti-Semitism to illustrate this process:

"For the Christian, the entire world of guilt is based on the fact that 'sins are the cause of Christ's death.' Every Christian, therefore, at the moment when he feels guilty, is apt to feel that his love object has died, that it has died through his fault, through his failure to observe the precepts of his church. Depressive anxieties of this sort are rather hard to endure, and anti-Semitism offers Christians a way to avoid mourning and the sense of guilt for death-loss of the love object by projecting into the Jews the cause of the death and betrayal of Christ" (p. xxv).

From this example, a clear relationship can be drawn between this process and the way in which an alien entity becomes an enemy. In primitive societies, when a tribe member died, his⁵ death was often attributed to the evil magic of another tribe. Thus, for these tribesmen the experience of mourning became "not the sorrow for the death of the loved person, but the killing of the enemy who is falsely thought to be the destroyer of the loved object" (Fornari, 1966, p. xviii). In this manner, guilt (caused by the tribesmen's own fantasies of aggression towards the dead tribesman) is avoided.

In all of the situations detailed above, the enemy is seen and feared as a force that can destroy a love object, the mother in the first case, Christ in the second and a fellow tribesman in the third. However, this phenomenon has not been limited to infants and primitive societies. It has been and remains a vital aspect of war. In fact, during

⁵Unless otherwise noted, these theories and examples apply to both men and women. Consequently, masculine pronouns and nouns, which are used for convenience and efficiency, refer to "humankind" and should be considered gender neutral.

WWII, Hitler externalized the frustrations and fears of the German people onto the Jews by blaming them for many of the problems within German society. By finding an enemy in the external world, we, as human beings, are "able to reassure ourselves both against the fear that this bad something may hurt us and against the danger of our [own] destructive attacks being directed toward what we love" (Fornari, 1966, p. xvii). As a result, psychologically, our most important security function is not to defend ourselves from an actual threat, but to find an external enemy for our internal fears.

In addition to our own internalized guilt, homicide, pillage and often rape, which become "legal" for as long as a war rages, also evoke strong feelings of guilt. But, by projecting negative images onto an apparent enemy, man is able to escape his guilt, and the guilt associated with war, by simply making the enemy appear evil and thus guilty. As an example, the rite of the Roman *fetiales* charged an enemy with guilt through a ceremony which included the breaking of a cornel-berry cane, which turned blood-red (implying evil) when broken, and the throwing of this cane into the enemy's territory (Fornari, 1966, p. 22). However, in order to create sufficiently negative perceptions of the enemy, strong emotions are required. Consequently, the process of creating enemies is dependent upon the human ability to hate. In the article cited above, Leonard Sillman states

that training for war "must stir deep emotions of hate and revulsion against the enemy" (Ballard and McDowell, 1991, p. 229). Through hate, an "intense hostility toward an object that has frustrated the release of an inner tension" (Ballard and McDowell, 1991, p. 230), man is able to present the enemy as an utterly inferior and inhuman being who deserves no sympathy or compassion. In addition, since our guilt is projected onto an inhuman adversary, "hate toward the enemy appears virtuous and assumes the semblance of love" (Fornari, 1966, p. 175).

While these theories help explain the original development of the enemy and its connection with anxiety, guilt, and hate, the psychology of the group must also be explored in order to show how these psychological processes can lead to war. Without controls, individuals would be in constant conflict with those around them; consequently, in order for a society to develop, a group mentality must be adopted and maintained. This process also begins in childhood. Agents of socialization, such as the family, television, school, etc. teach children acceptable group behavior and define their roles in society based on a common identification with a love object, such as the group itself or an idea as vague as freedom or democracy or nation. The child, who is now venturing away from the protection of his mother, sees group membership as a replacement for the declining parental relationship. In many societies, this

movement away from the mother and into the group is institutionalized. Before acceptance into the tribe, children go through initiation rites, such as circumcision (both male and female), designed to prove their courage and show their unity with the group. While in American society these rites are not often so well defined, they are evident nonetheless. As an example, high school graduation traditionally marks the entrance of young adults into the working world and, in the south, many young women still have "Debutante Balls" at which time they are accepted into society. Over time, the interactions of the individual with the group will cause the original love object of the individual, the mother, to become secondary to the preservation of the group (Fornari, 1966, p. 36).

Throughout most of human history, religion, personified as a parental figure, has served to control and direct the group or tribe. The gods and religious leaders of one's own tribe were "good" (the mother) and those of other tribes were "evil" (the stranger). Consequently, religious leaders would use perceived threats against themselves to direct the actions and attitudes of the group. After all, "defining an image of the 'enemy' on a mass scale is the psychological prerequisite for modern warfare" (Rieber, 1991, p. 4). In addition, a greater capacity to hate is a function of group dynamics (Fornari, 1966, p. 174). As in the case of opposing tribes, it is the group which defines the external

enemies for the individual. In this manner, the "logic of group action intertwines with the emotional needs of the individual under stress to produce a shared image of the enemy" (Rieber, 1991, p. 7).

As societies continued to develop, political ideologies took, to a large degree, the place of religion and now perform the same tasks of organizing and controlling these feelings. In this instance, the state has the same influence on its citizens as parents have on the development of their children. Consequently, the role of the state has been to define and preserve the group's love object through its policies. These policies (economic, political, ideological, etc) then serve as "generators of conflicts but are not specific factors of war" (Fornari, 1966, p. xxvi). They are elements which activate the transference process, but wars arise only when there is a perceived threat to the life of the love object. As such, war can be viewed as a natural outgrowth of the fear, conflict and aggression of the human condition in relation to the role of the group, and without war "society would be apt to leave men defenseless before the emergence of the Terrifier as a purely internal foe" (Fornari, 1966, p. xvi).

Using this theoretical framework, the remainder of the chapter will focus on how these psychological processes actually shaped U.S. and Soviet policies during the Cold War. It is important to keep in mind that the Cold War was

in fact a war and so subject to these processes. Each side learned and taught others to hate an "enemy" and, in the end, each side took political advantage of, relied upon and even reveled in the development of an "us versus them" mentality. This mentality came to underline and define both sides policy concerns and actions and, within these policies, was reflected the "need to have enemies in [their] lives" (Gelman; 1989, p. 62). In fact, it will later be argued that these governments became dependant upon the Cold War as they used the hatred of an enemy to promote themselves and their philosophies to their own people and the world.

At the end of WWII, the U.S. and the Soviet Union emerged as the two most powerful nations on earth, while the opposing nature of their political ideologies and plans for post-WWII Europe became readily apparent. To most Westerners, Soviet policies appeared much different, in both method and rhetoric, from their own. The idea of a world-wide armed workers' revolution was "new and ran against the American grain" (Rieber, 1991, p. 26). To most Westerners, these armed revolts were seen as a means of extending Soviet hegemony; consequently, the West found itself facing a new adversary. In the Soviet Union, capitalism and U.S. calls for free democratic elections in Eastern Europe after WWII were in turn seen as possible threats to Soviet security and Soviet Communism. Soon, both these policies and their

differences were being distorted by fear. U.S. rhetoric centered upon themes of Soviet barbarism, including the trampling and crushing of its weaker neighbors. In the Soviet Union, the U.S. was seen as "a greedy beast intent upon seizing control of the world by bankrupting it and by plundering the meager resources of the weak and the poor" (Rieber, 1991, p. 26). In turn, these and similar notions fed on misperceptions and misrepresentations of the other leading to exaggerated fears and hostile measures from propaganda to military buildups and the arms race. Fear fed upon fear.

In psychological and philosophical terms, these images satisfied needs on both sides. For the U.S., they provided the rationale for the continued expansion of the defense industry and, more importantly, for the assertion of U.S. hegemony as a world power. However, the "universalization of American policy needed the universalization of a threat" (Rieber, 1991, p. 26). Soviet propaganda, which announced the inevitability of a world dominated by Communism, provided this threat. This propaganda threatened both democracy and freedom, the revered "love-objects" of the West, and provided the enemy for future U.S. policy. Consequently, within a matter of months, a shift from the Nazi menace (the old enemy) to the Soviet threat (the new enemy) had taken place. A similar shift took place in the East. The Soviets perceived U.S. actions as the rationale

for maintaining a strong presence, in the name of security, in Eastern Europe and also for the promotion of Soviet Communism (their own "love-objects"). Ultimately the view of the other as an enemy would come to dominate the thoughts and feelings of U.S. and Soviet policy makers to the point that they were bewitched by a combination of fear and hatred. Together, these fears and responses to them caused further perceptual distortions which led to war, in this case, a Cold War.

A distinction needs to be made between the Cold War and other wars. In keeping with the psychological arguments presented above, it becomes important to consider why a more traditional war did not take place in Europe. After all, the prerequisite of a feared and hated enemy, which presented an actual threat to the love objects of the West and East respectively had been met. According to Fornari, the reason is simple: the fear of nuclear reprisals. If one side or the other had started a conflict, it could have easily escalated into a full scale nuclear war. While this would have provided the means to destroy the enemy, it also threatened the life of each side's own love-object. Consequently, since the preservation of the love-object is paramount, neither side could risk starting a conventional and/or traditional war. As such, fear and hatred of the other boiled under the surface of East-West relations resulting in a non-traditional war fought with rhetoric and

economic policies.

The Cold War went through three distinct phases of tension in Europe. Immediately following WWII until the death of Stalin in 1953, Cold War policies were based upon fear of the enemy. The second phase, from 1953 until the mid 1970's, was a time of relative stability in Europe; however, even this eerie peace was dominated by the policies of the past. Then, from the late 1970's until 1986, Cold War policies were once again based on fears and hatred of the enemy.

Soviet actions following the Yalta conference quickly dispelled American beliefs that Stalin's definition of democracy and independence for Eastern Europe matched their own; but because the U.S. still hoped for Soviet assistance in the Pacific, they allowed Soviet actions to continue unchallenged. Subsequently, the Soviet refusal (in March 1945) to allow U.S. medical personnel free access to Poland in order to treat and evacuate American prisoners of war marked a significant change in U.S. attitudes. Soon after, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Averell Harriman expressed the feelings of fear which would come to dictate U.S. policy for more than forty years in a memorandum which began:

"Unless we wish to accept the 20th century barbarian invasion of Europe, with repercussions extending further and further in the East as well, we must find ways to arrest the Soviet domineering policy...If we don't face these issues squarely now, history will record the period of the next generation as the Soviet age" (Walker, 1991, p. 17).

To Harriman, Soviet ideology was "just as vigorous and dangerous as Fascism or Nazism" (Walker, 1991, p. 18). In light of the U.S. alliance with the Soviet Union at the time, this comparison seemed misplaced; however, within it can be seen the roots of the enmification of the Soviet Union. By January of 1946, Stalin reflected similar views, and similar undercurrents of fear, when, in a speech before the Supreme Soviet, he spoke of the evils of capitalism. From this point in time, fears and feelings of hatred spiraled out of control and U.S. and Soviet relations took on the appearance of "a war between good and evil" (Walker, 1991, p. 37). For example, Kennan pictured the Soviets as inhuman when he stated Communism was a "malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue" (Walker, 1991, p. 41). This type of image was strengthened time and time again by both U.S. and Soviet policy makers.

During the Cold War's first decade, policies motivated by mounting fears quickly followed the rhetoric. The U.S. began with the Marshall Plan in 1946. The Soviets countered with the formation of Cominform, also in 1946, and the launching of strikes throughout Europe. The U.S. rushed food to Europe to lessen their effects. Then the Soviets established firm control in Eastern Europe with the coup in Czechoslovakia and, finally, the U.S. organized the militarization of Western Europe. These events and images did more of course than simply dictate U.S. and Soviet

policies. They entered the popular culture and helped shape a generation; after all, and as stated earlier, "defining an image of the 'enemy' on a mass scale is the psychological prerequisite for modern warfare" (Rieber, 1991, p. 4).

Once the U.S. and the Soviets began to "perceive one another through the prism of the Cold War in Europe, they saw that jaundiced image of the other wherever they looked" (Walker, 1991, p. 60). Hollywood made numerous movies, such as, in 1951, *I was a Communist for the FBI*, which depicted the evils of the Soviets and Communism (Walker, 1991, p. 69). Magazines and newspapers ran articles like "Could the Reds Seize Detroit" (Walker, 1991, p. 69). The Cold War even had its own series of collector cards entitled "Children's Crusade against Communism" and which promoted slogans like "Fight the Red Menace" (Walker, 1991, p. 69). In addition, Senator Joe McCarthy claimed to have lists of government officials and high-ranking military officers believed to be Communists. His actions heightened the "Red Scare." In the same vein, the FBI kept files on Hollywood actors and other, supposedly, disruptive elements tied to Communism (Walker, 1991, p. 70). Consequently, "the single most striking feature of American public life in the last four decades has been the consistent fervor with which the Russians have been identified as the enemy" (Rieber, 1991, p. 5). Without a doubt, similar ideas came to shape Soviet and European life.

As a result of all these events, two firmly opposed camps were now mobilized under two very different banners. However, this spiral of policy and action did not continue uninterrupted. Stalin's death in 1953 and the events that followed appeared to bring about a change in perceptions, at least for Europe. While the U.S. and Soviets found new battlegrounds for the Cold War including Cuba and Vietnam, European countries were jostling for position, and their actions betrayed a "revival of the culturally familiar 19th Century game of the European powers" (Walker, 1991, p. 124). However, even this game had to be played in the shadow of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear umbrella and underlying fears and feelings of hate continued to shape European policies. While it was also during this period that European and American peace movements developed and flourished, it is important to remember that they only developed when Cold War tensions in Europe lessened and Europe appeared relatively stable. Consequently, these movements were also affected by later increases in tensions.

By the late 1970's and early 1980's, fear had once again come to dominate Cold War policies. President Reagan described the Soviet Union as "the focus of evil in the modern world" (Walker, 1991, p. 268). For him, the Cold war became a "crusade against an enemy with whom there could be no quarter, and no ending short of defeat" (Walker, 1991, p. 269). This idea became the foundation of the Reagan

Doctrine and the promotion of the arms race. The Soviets, who viewed Reagan as a "missile-toting cowboy" (Rieber, 1991, p. 85), also did their part in returning fear to the forefront of the Cold War by deploying SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe. Once again a spiral of fear dominated Europe and the superpowers. This return of fear in Europe is dramatically reflected in two surveys of West German youths, one in 1978 and one in 1981. In 1978, only 9.7% of those surveyed believed that the threat of war in Europe was great; however, as a result of increasing Cold War tensions in Europe, a 1981 survey, shows this percentage was almost three times as high (27.7%) (Rieber, 1991, p. 259).

Despite these different phases, the image of the other as enemy was always evident. Even in the 1960's, during the time of *detente*, Psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner, following an extensive trip to the Soviet Union, found that the West and the East still shared common images of the other. According to Bronfenbrenner, both sides, when describing the other, stated:

1. They are the aggressors.
2. Their government exploits and deludes the people.
3. The mass of their people are not really sympathetic to the regime.
4. They cannot be trusted.
5. Their policy verges on madness.

As can be seen in these statements, both sides believed the other to be guilty of starting and continuing the Cold War. Also, by adding the concepts of dishonesty and madness, the enemy is perceived as being inferior. These feelings and

images combined to give the people something to hate.

In addition, a prominent characteristic of hatred is that it is "a primary psychological force engendered by indoctrination and frustration, which is carried along from one generation to the next, reinforced by myriad social pressures" (Ballard and McDowell; 1991, p. 231).

Consequently, although U.S. and Soviet political rhetoric initially established the other as the enemy, the resulting fear and hate were ingrained into the social consciousness of each side and became a self-promoting force. Throughout the Cold War, hate and the enmification of the other remained both motivating and permanent factors.

Now, even though the Cold War has ended, fear and hate are continuing to shape European politics. After all, as Psychologist Reuben Fine so eloquently stated, "once hatred is deeply rooted in the psyche, it is extraordinarily difficult to eradicate" and is "carried along on its own momentum" (Ballard and McDowell, 1991, p. 231).

CHAPTER 3

The End of the Cold War and the Emergence of the Extreme Right

1986 to the present has been a period of tremendous change for Europe and the world. The bipolar structure of power that had characterized world politics for more than forty years disappeared. One by one the Communist governments of Eastern Europe collapsed or were reconfigured. The Berlin Wall was dismantled opening the way to future German unification. And governments in both the West and newly autonomous East sought to develop new strategies to cope with the sharp decline in Soviet power. Many European scholars, the media, and various world leaders optimistically announced the end of the Cold War -of political hostilities between Eastern and Western Europe- and the beginning of a new European age. However, this same period also witnessed a dramatic rise in political instability: anti-semitic violence was once again on the increase; increasing numbers of foreigners became targets of direct assaults; extreme rightist groups gained political legitimacy; and, perhaps most important, people lost faith in the old political elites. Recalling the optimistic forecasts for Europe following the end of the Cold War, one has to wonder why Europe is currently suffering from such widespread political instability. And, in conjunction with

this instability, why has there been such a dramatic rise in both the activities and acceptability of extreme rightist groups in Europe?

In light of these questions, this chapter will first consider several prominent theories which seek to explain Europe's present political upheaval. Then, using the information provided in chapters 1 and 2 as foundation, an alternative theory will be presented. This theory suggests that Europe's current problems may be more deeply rooted in the mindset of European society and that economic problems are a facet, but not the fundamental cause, of a larger problem.

Political theorists such as Ronald Inglehart, Raymond Duch, Michelle Taylor and others have attempted to explain what they call "value change in industrial societies." According to their theories, originally designed to explain the substantial rise in "Green Parties" during the 1970's, when Western European societies reach a point where basic economic needs are being met, economic issues receive less attention and are assigned a lower priority. As these societies became increasingly "postmaterialist," they develop value priorities which emphasize a "more cultured society, a free personal life, and democratization of political, work, and community life, in contrast to materialist issues such as a stable economy, economic growth, fighting crime and maintaining political order"

(Minkenberg, 1992, p. 59). However, holding to nonmaterialist beliefs at one time does not ensure that a person will continue to assign economic issues a low priority; consequently, when the 1980's brought about a perceived loss of economic security as a result of the European recession and high unemployment, political instability resulted as society once again attributed increased importance to materialist values.

Other theorists, such as Michael Minkenberg and Piero Ignazi, offer a slightly different explanation. They argue that in the 1980's European societies became increasingly more neo-conservative in reaction to postmaterialism. Elements of this neo-conservative upswing included a "shift towards self-affirmation (as opposed to group solidarity)" (Ignazi, 1992, p. 4), and "the emergence of new priorities and issues not treated by the established parties [such as creationism, antipornography, and xenophobia], a disillusionment towards parties in general, and a growing lack of confidence in the political system and its institutions" (Ignazi, 1992, p. 6). Together, these elements "provoked, directly and indirectly, a higher polarization both in terms of ideological distance and in terms of ideological intensity" (Sartori, 1976, p. 126), resulting in the growth of new rightist groups.

While these theories offer viable explanations for Europe's current instability and the subsequent rise in

rightist activities, they are based on the reactions of Western European political dynamics to situations that existed before the end of the Cold War. Consequently, they fail to adequately address the fact that European political behavior has changed since 1986. For example, Inglehart's theory fails to address the prominence of anti-immigrant and/or xenophobic activities and rhetoric in Europe. Despite claims to the contrary, these factors do not derive solely from economic considerations. "Not only is the degree to which immigrant workers deprive natives of job opportunities rather questionable, it is also open to discussion whether they represent a burden or not rather a net gain for West European society" (Ber, 1993, p. 417), especially in light of Europe's declining birth rates and the significant shift in the structure of its age pyramid.⁶ In addition, Green Parties are continuing to make political gains; consequently, it is unlikely that the "postmaterialists" are returning to materialistic pursuits. Likewise, Ignazi's theory fails to address several significant issues including why these societies have experienced such a profound disaffection and disenchantment with the established political structure. These problems go beyond mere economics. After all, Europe's political

⁶Accordingly, French officials believe that between 2000 and 2039 they will have to recruit between 165,000 and 315,000 new immigrants annually to prevent a decline in the population (Ber, 1993, p. 417).

structure survived previous economic downturns, including the depression brought about by the OPEC oil crisis in 1973. And although European governments at this time began to restrict immigration, no significant rise in extreme rightist groups or violence directed against foreigners occurred. During the 1970's, the restrictions on immigrants were seen primarily as a solution to Europe's economic problems.

More importantly, neither theory offers any explanations for the developing political situation in the East. After all, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and other Eastern countries could hardly be described as postmaterialist. Up until the very end of the Cold War, actions in the East were motivated by policies designed to increase Soviet strength and position. These policies and their creators cared little about aesthetics or environmental impact. Nonetheless, these countries are now experiencing several of same phenomena affecting Western Europe. For example, extreme rightist groups have tried to seize power in several countries, including Russia, and the war in Yugoslavia is largely motivated by ethnic hatred.

Despite the limitations of these theories, they do address some basic themes which support a more comprehensive theory. For example, both theories support the idea that Europeans are dissatisfied with many of their political institutions and this dissatisfaction has, in turn, resulted

in increased political fragmentation and electoral volatility.

The theory I propose views current European instability as the break down of a dynamic and self-replicating relationship between Cold War political stability and the psychological undercurrents of war. In addition, this theory will show that as European leaders struggled with post-Cold War instability and desperately sought to find new enemies, the right was able to capitalize on these same instabilities to attract new members. More simply, a growing majority of European population is experiencing a shift in political attitudes as a result of the breakdown in the relationship which previously existed between European politics and the Cold War. In addition, the direction of this shift, to the right, is primarily determined by the psychological factors which underlay Europe's Cold War politics.

Within any society, political elements -the left, right, and center- work together and in competition to shape a basic political structure. While one side or the other may enjoy a majority⁷, the relationship between all the elements influences the way the government defines and acts upon policy issues. In turn, the continued importance

⁷While Eastern European politics were dominated by the Communists, there was still a limited degree of pluralism as some within the power structure supported non-orthodox values and ideas. Their political systems were composed of people who held more and less extreme positions.

placed on these issues by the government and society, as well as the psychological make-up of each issue, affects the political process. In Europe, as illustrated in chapter 1, the Cold War dominated the political structure for more than forty years and set well defined boundaries for the pursuit of national policies and goals. (See Figure 1.)

After the Cold War, the political balance was undermined and governmental policies pursued within this framework became unusable or irrelevant. A political vacuum has been created and society has been left with the task of finding something new to fill the void. In the interim, Europe is left with a situation of relative instability. (See Figure 2.) European governments have lost a key rallying point and, perhaps more importantly, a sense of identity. This is especially true in the East, where Soviet power dominated almost every sector of life. For more than forty years, European governments relied on the Cold War in order to force acceptance of political rhetoric which, among other things, downplayed the government's own inadequacies in the context of a strong united front against a common enemy. People saw these governments as their protectors and they accepted the rhetoric in the name of the greater good. However, now the visible threat of an enemy on the borders of Europe has disappeared. In addition, issues which dominated the political landscape just a few years ago, such as national security, NATO, the Warsaw Pact,

FIGURE 1





FIGURE 2



the Soviet and U.S. nuclear threats, etc., have faded away or been called into question. In most every case, people are beginning to look into their own backyards and question the viability of governments so closely linked to Cold War policies, a questioning revealed by Europe's "marked disenchantment with the major social and political institutions and profound distrust in their workings, the weakening and decomposition of electoral alignments and increased political fragmentation and electoral volatility" (Ber, 1993, p. 443).

A majority of today's Western European political leaders and parties, which supported Cold War policies, have been part of the political landscape for many years, in some cases in-and-out of office over several decades.⁸ In most of these countries, even the primary opposition leaders have remained the same. In the past, these opposition leaders would capitalize on a political mistake to increase their support or even seize power during the next election. However, just like their predecessors, these leaders themselves used the Cold War to their advantage, often times making few, if any, changes once they came to power. This political process was repeated over and over while the groups and ideas remained basically the same. While this political shuffling was probably more acceptable in the

⁸Although leaders changed in Eastern Europe as well, the political process was continually controlled by the Communists.

context of a feared and common enemy, people are now demanding real change and are willing to accept more extreme views. The end of the Cold War has turned people's attention toward internal (materialistic) issues such as economic and political reform, in addition to more controversial issues such as regionalism. Consequently, the current attention being given to political scandal, corruption, and stagnation throughout Europe should come as no surprise.

One of the most prominent cases of scandal, "*Tangentopoli*" (Kickback City), still rages in Italy. This scandal began in February of 1992 with the arrest of Mario Chiesa, a Socialist official and president of a hospice in Milan, on charges of bribery and corruption. Since then more than 6,000 politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen have been investigated, including two-time Prime Minister and leader of the Socialist Party (PSI) Bettino Craxi, who was convicted in absentia and is now a fugitive. Other leading political and business figures have been convicted or are currently either under investigation or on trial for receiving and soliciting payoffs and bribes (summarized from Wertman, 1994, pp. 8-14; and Evans, 1994, pp. 4-7).⁹ This

⁹Some of the more prominent names are De Lorenzo (PRI, Minister of Health), Citaristi, (DC treasurer), Arnaldo Forlani, (former DC Prime Minister), Sergio Cusani (President of Montedison), and Franco Nobili, the president of COGEFAR (Fiat) and the head of Italy's largest public corporation, with interests in banks, supermarkets, and the national airline.

scandal and its clean-up (the "clean hands" (*Mani Pulite*) investigation) have greatly impacted Italy's political scene. Although all political parties have been implicated, the investigation shows that the Christian Democrats and the Socialists, Italy's two largest ruling parties (prior to the investigation), had the largest numbers of officials involved in payoffs and kickbacks. Consequently, they have lost control of the government and indeed the parties themselves have disintegrated. The Christian Democrats went from 29.7% of the vote in the 1992 parliamentary elections (already an all time low) to a mere 11 percent in 1994 (Wertman, 1994, p. 9) and the remnants of the party have changed its name (to the Italian Popular Party). The Italian people have also shown their unwillingness to tolerate continued corruption by supporting a referendum (approved by 82% of the electorate) which calls for a majority system in future parliamentary elections. As compared to the traditional proportional representation system, it is believed that a majority system will limit the power of political parties, seen as the prime culprits in the scandal. Although scandals and investigations have long been a part of Italy's political history, it was not until the Cold War ended and people began to look inward that the cry for change was so loudly heard. For decades the Christian Democrats had attracted right-wing voters by functioning as a "bulwark against Communism" (Berselli,

1994, p. 13); however, now that this is no longer relevant, right-wing voters and parties are establishing their own separate political identity. This sentiment is also shared by Douglas Wertman, a resource analyst at the U.S.

Information Agency, who states:

"The end of the Cold War helped shake the foundations of Italy's postwar political structure. The Cold War divisions had served as a major defining characteristic of the Italian party system, and anticommunism was a key source of Christian Democratic support. Corruption and inefficiency were long tolerated by many nonleft voters because they believed them a necessary evil in protecting from communism Italy's place in the Western security and economic framework. The end of the Cold War did not necessarily mean that the left would gain power, but it did mean that the lock on power of the parties that had governed Italy was no longer secure" (Wertman, 1994, p. 9).

While Italy provides one of the best examples of scandal, it should be remembered that other European countries have not been free from instances of political corruption.

As a result of the end of the Cold War, people no longer want to hear the same rhetoric or see the same group of leaders. People are seeking change, if only for the sake of change. As such, new leaders and parties which are taking advantage of this political vacuum are quickly gaining popularity. Again considering the example of Italy, leaders of the National Alliance (AN) (formerly the MSI) have taken advantage of the erosion of support for the Christian Democrats and the Socialists to improve their own political position. Previously, the AN had been considered too "Fascist" to gain significant political representation

within the narrow confines of Italy's political structure. However, with the end of the Cold War, the First Republics "anti-Fascist prejudice had fallen" (Berselli, 1994, p. 14). This, in combination with the people's loss of confidence in the more prominent political parties as a result of *Tangentopoli*, has allowed the AN to flourish. Currently, the AN is Italy's third largest political party and was a member of Berlusconi's 1994 ruling coalition. Similarly, new political groups many with similar hard-line nationalistic goals are gaining power and support in other European countries as well.

Overall, European society has experienced a period of confusion as conventional political elements attempt to adopt new policies and as groups on the left and the right seek to take advantage of the current instability to acquire new supporters. Reaction to both scandal and political stagnation help to demonstrate that the people within Europe are anxious to hear new ideas and are willing to listen to and elect those who present them.


The disruption of the relationship between the government and any important policy issue would likely lead to a period of political disharmony as the government searches for new priorities and issues to pursue and as supporters of old policies face disillusionment and search for new concerns. In the current European situation, society appears to be moving to the right in order to fill

this void.

There are several factors which determine the direction and degree of political shift, including the ability of rightist elements to mobilize and, as addressed above, the willingness of society to accept (or tolerate) them. The failure of the left (Socialist, Communist and/or trade unions) should also be seen as a contributing factor. During the Cold War, the left, as a result of its doctrine and resources, was able to "absorb the frustration of young people without work or hope" (Hossie, 1993, p. 16A) by providing them with an alternative. Now, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the left is discredited. Jack Veugelers, a sociologist who studies rightist activities in Italy and France further suggests, "the army, the schools, and the Communist Party were the institutions that traditionally transformed immigrants into Frenchmen. Now the schools and the Communists are failing and 'what you have is a crisis of the institutions [of the left]'" (Hossie, 1993, p. 16A). While these factors played a part in increasing the attractiveness of the right, the psychological factors underlying the disrupted relationship and the societal attitudes surrounding it played the biggest role in motivating Europe's swing to the right. In this case, these factors were the promotion of hate and the enmification of the other. (See Figure 3.)

Howard Stein, a leading psychoanalyst states, "we need

FIGURE 3



the bad guys, the people who embody all the stuff that we want to get rid of -our greed, anger, avarice" (Gelman, 1989, p. 62). The Cold War provided Europe, and most of the rest of the world, with this "bad guy." Consequently hatred was built into the framework of Cold War policy from the beginning, and, as noted before, "once hatred is deeply rooted in the psyche, it is extraordinarily difficult to eradicate and it is carried along on its own momentum" (Ballard and McDowell, 1991, p. 231). As such, once the enemy had disappeared, people were left with intense feelings of animosity and hatred which lacked a target. Rightist elements, which maintain hatred as part of their fundamental make-up, have been able to mobilize resentment and redirect this hatred against a new enemy, thus increasing their power and acceptability. In some Western European countries, it is the Eastern immigrants and the Turks which have become the targets of this hatred, while in others it is the Africans (both Maghreb and sub-Saharan). Extreme rightist groups have capitalized on the differences of these non-Europeans to create the perception that Europe "is being invaded by alien traditions, culture, and religion" (Ber, 1993, p. 416). Currently, this image presents an impression that goes far beyond reality.¹⁰

European governments also contribute to this perception

¹⁰It should also be noted that many of these extreme rightist groups are once again targeting an old enemy, the Jews, in increasing numbers.

of the immigrant as enemy. The German Ministry of Defense, when discussing military threats confronting a unified Germany, stated that Germany would have to "cope with the possibility of large flows of immigrants fleeing economic deprivation in the south or instability in the east (Keohane and Nye, 1993, p. 35). German officials freely admit that this threat does not fit easily under the traditional heading of a military security issue and realize that in countering it, they will be forced to create new mechanisms of coordination with the Foreign Ministry. France is also concerned about immigrants. Government officials, while discussing fears about the future of French national identity, centered upon the affects of an "invasion of immigrants" (Keohane and Nye, 1993, p. 146). After all, psychologists have stated that "nothing promotes the cohesion of a social, ethnic or national group as surely as a common object of loathing" (Gelman, 1989, p. 62), and "'purely French' national identity today means an isolated and xenophobic France" (Keohane and Nye, 1993, p. 147). In this case, the underlying psychological factors inherited from the Cold War serve as a tool for political recruitment by the right. It is fear of the unknown which has caused Europe's current instability, and hatred of the other which is increasing the strength of the right.

Throughout European history, the end of a conflict has been followed by an attempt to establish a new system which

would prevent a new conflict from occurring, a process which entails identification of potential enemies. The end of the Cold War has been no exception. There is today an instinctive search for a new enemy "after the old has retired from the fray" (Walker, 1991, p. xi). A search which the right seems to be leading.

CHAPTER 4

The Extreme Right in Europe: Applications and Conclusions

Since the Cold War ended, extreme right parties have attracted substantially larger numbers of votes and so achieved greater political representation. The Austrian Freedom Party, which had faded from the political scene by the early-1980s, suddenly re-emerged in 1986. During general elections, it received 9% of the vote and 18 seats in parliament (Ber, 1993, p. 414.) Then, in 1990, it almost doubled its electoral support and received 33 parliamentary seats (Ber, 1993, p. 414). In France, the right-wing National Front led by Jean-Marie Le Pen won almost 14% of the vote during the 1992 national elections (Moseley, 1992, p. 2c), up from 9.6% in 1988 (Ber, 1993, p. 414). This group, whose ideology revolves around law and order, family and fatherland, tradition, religion, xenophobia, and racism, also received 12.4% of the vote during the March 1993 National Assembly elections and remains a strong player in French politics (Altermatt, 1994). During Italian elections in the spring of 1994, the AN, a neo-Fascist party made substantial gains. In 1994, this group received 13.5% of the total vote¹¹ during parliamentary elections and entered the ruling coalition, the Alliance for Freedom, comprised of

¹¹ The AN received 21.8% of the vote in Rome and the south, making it the most popular single party in the region.

other rightist leaning political groups (Berselli, 1994, p. 13). Rightist parties, many of them with extreme ideas, are also profiting from dissatisfaction with established leaders in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Even in Sweden, long considered a model of liberalism and generosity, the New Democratic Party, which relies on anti-immigration rhetoric as part of its platform, gained 25 parliamentary seats in 1991.

Chapter 3 discussed both Europe's current political instability and the rise of the extreme right, and it was argued that throughout Europe rightist political groups are using the "political void" created by the end of the Cold War to increase their memberships and power. The extreme right is filling this void by offering immigrants as an alternative "hate-object." These groups are able to mobilize resentment and protest. In addition, their ability to offer a future-oriented program that confronts Europe's post-Cold War economic, social, and cultural transformation adds to their appeal (Ber, 1994, p. 415). These parties are also finding it easier to function because the narrow confines of acceptable political choice are now being called into question because established political parties can no longer capitalize on anti-Communism as a rallying point to offset scandal and dissatisfaction.

Still to be discussed is the related rise in violence by the more extreme rightist elements. Although these

groups act outside of Europe's political spectrum, it is simply another facet of Europe's recent political shift to the right. As anticipated, when extreme rightist groups gain political "legitimacy," many of their actions also gain some degree of legitimacy. Consequently, the actions of more extreme rightist elements are also being more readily accepted. In addition, their actions, most of which are directed against foreigners, are serving as an outlet for people's fear and hatred. With the nuclear threat fading, people no longer fear the destruction of their own love-object and are free to react and/or accept the more extreme actions of others. This chapter will also present two country studies which trace political changes from the end of the Cold War to the present, and include discussion of how these developments fit into the above theoretical discussion.

Perhaps the best example of increasing violence can be found in the actions of neo-Nazi groups in Germany. While rightist attacks have been a problem in Germany for many years, it wasn't until the Cold War ended that the number of these attacks increased dramatically as shown by this yearly comparison of *Verfassungschutz* reports:

Table 1: # of Rightist Attacks

<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>
17	76	73	103	270	1483	2584	1700*

*Statistics for January through October.

Many of these attacks were directed against foreigners.¹² The first (identified) incidents directed against foreigners were reported at the end of 1990, when skinheads in the former East German state of Brandenburg attacked a discotheque and fatally wounded an Angolan (Dellen, 1993). Then, in 1991, a group of right-wing teenagers attacked the home of asylum seekers in the state of Saxony. These teenagers displayed slogans such as "Germany for the Germans" and "Foreigners out" (Dellen, 1993). In 1992 alone, over 1,800 of the total 2,584 rightist attacks were either assaults or arson attacks against either foreigners or else Jewish monuments in Germany (Dellen, 1993). Although there are two distinct aspects of current extreme rightist violence in Europe, the majority of these extreme rightist groups have long held anti-semitic beliefs¹³ and so an increase in both anti-semitic and anti-foreigner violence is not surprising. The ever increasing number of attacks against foreigners supports the idea that, after a period of confusion and instability, the extreme right has identified foreigners as the "new enemy" to complement the "old enemy" of Jews.

¹²These Verfassungschutz reports define "rightist" attacks as bombings, arsons, and/or physical assaults perpetrated by a known member or members of an identified rightist group.

¹³Most anti-semitic attacks are carried out by neo-Nazi groups which still blame European problems on the Jews. These groups exist throughout Europe and have been responsible for numerous attacks. These groups in recent years are also increasingly targeting immigrants.

Another indication that this rightist shift is not restricted to a small number of select individuals and, in fact, represents a characteristic of a large segment of European society is the apparent unwillingness on the part of people and governments to stop the anti-immigrant and/or foreigner violence. In Germany, during an attack in November 1992, an asylum seeker was assaulted by a group of teenagers while onlookers stood by and refused to help. The German government has also been accused of being "blind in its right eye and not taking rightist attacks on foreigners serious enough" (Dellen, 1993), an observation which seems to have been confirmed by the actions of Chancellor Kohl. Kohl, anxious to keep the support of many of these right-wing voters, insisted that "leftists [still] threaten German democracy just as much as rightists" (Moseley, 1993, p. 2C). Kohl's statement shows that his government, which was closely identified with the Cold War, understood that people were dissatisfied with the status quo and, in fact, showed that he may be willing to adopt a more rightist approach in order to maintain support. In response to increased international pressure, there have been some government crackdowns. Nonetheless, these attacks continue.

Although this problem appears to be most acute in Germany, it is evident in many other European countries as well, including Italy, France, Germany, and Spain (Hossie, 1993, p. 16A). In Italy, right-wing thugs, called "Nazi-

skins," have attacked foreigners, especially those with dark skin. Also, in Rome, several immigrants found sleeping in city parks have been doused with gasoline and lit on fire by, it appears, extreme rightist youths. In France, the tombstones of French Muslim soldiers were vandalized in November 1992. And in Spain, since 1990, a Dominican immigrant has been shot and killed by an unidentified man in Madrid, a Dominican home has been burned to the ground, and an Egyptian man has been thrown down an embankment and suffered two broken legs (Moseley, 1992, p. 2C). Perhaps the most alarming display of anti-immigrant violence occurred in Spain on 13 Nov 1992, when four gunmen kicked open the door of an abandoned discotheque and opened fire on four immigrant squatters, killing one (de Bertodano, 1992, p. 28). This example, and others, suggest that attacks have advanced from spontaneous to organized actions.

European governments have attributed much of this rise in violence to unemployment, resentment over growing numbers of immigrants and refugees, political stagnation, and faltering national identities. Consequently, a number of European governments, including Germany, Switzerland, and Spain have responded by further restricting immigration. Prior to the Schengen agreement, which eliminated borders, controls were also placed on border crossings in the hopes of slowing illegal immigration. The French, in particular, routinely stopped and searched "Arab-looking" drivers

(Roberts and Pascoe, 1995). However, these measures only punish the victims and ignore the void created by the end of the Cold War and the importance of hate. Instead of addressing the problems head-on, European governments are attempting to remove the "temptation." In addition, by restricting immigration, the governments are labeling immigrants as "undesirable" or "unwanted," thus supporting the idea that foreigners are indeed the enemy and inviting future attacks. Ricardo Ghinaudo, spokesman of the Latin American Committee in Spain, and many other minority group leaders, share this opinion. They argue that these policies are bringing about an increase in racism and xenophobia. Ghinaudo stated that, "racism often originates in the policies applied by governments because there are no policies to integrate immigrants and because they (immigrants) are forced to live in marginal conditions. This creates an image that contributes to their social rejection" (InterPress Service, 1993).

Individually, these examples, which describe the rise of extreme rightist parties and the accompanying rise in violence, support the idea that European politics are moving towards the right and that foreigners are finding themselves more and more frequently labeled as "enemies." Before any definitive conclusions can be drawn however, it is important to test whether this theory can be applied more specifically to individual countries. A review of a particular country's

political and social history since the end of the Cold War should either confirm or disprove the idea that Europe's shift to the right is being caused by the end of the Cold War and its underlying psychological themes. In this case, it is the hate and fear of the people, previously harnessed by Cold War policies, which define these psychological themes. Also, these emotions are causing Europeans to search for new enemies. Enemies which the political right seems to be supplying in the form of foreigners.

Several factors were taken into consideration in selecting countries to be studied. First, these countries had to be relatively free of rightist groups and/or rightist violence prior to the end of the Cold War. For example, Germany was excluded because it has a long history of neo-Nazi groups and activities. As such, it would have been difficult to distinguish the differences between groups and their activities before and after the end of the Cold War (though the increased level of activity is significant and has been described above). Secondly, the electoral system had to allow easy access to variant political parties. Again, Germany is disqualified as the electoral system prevents minority parties from gaining seats by the 5% rule (a party must receive at least 5% of the popular vote before it can gain representation). Using these criteria, Switzerland and Sweden presented likely test cases. Also, since both of these countries are "politically

neutral," neither had a direct say in the promotion of Cold War policies; however, by being a part of Europe, they were still shaped by it. Consequently, these countries display characteristics of a control group.

Switzerland

By the end of WWII, Switzerland's claims of neutrality were not well viewed by the Allies who criticized the close economic ties it had maintained with Nazi Germany. However, due to its financial might, Switzerland proved to be a key ingredient in the reconstruction of post-WWII Europe and was able to regain its international recognition and reputation. Then, as sides were being drawn in the Cold War, Switzerland's "political traditions placed her on the side of the Western powers" (Diele, 1992, p. 117). As such, for the next 40+ years, its financial dealings and political policies stressed this often unstated preference for the West.

Following WWII, Switzerland experienced a dramatic economic upsurge. As a result, thousands of foreign workers from Spain and Italy entered Switzerland looking for work. Many of these workers were originally were employed in the textile industry, but as the Swiss workers achieved a higher economic status, foreigners took an increasing share of the jobs in the construction and in the clock-making industries as well. While these workers seemed to fill a void in the

Swiss economy, by 1960 there were growing fears that the proportion of aliens was becoming too high, 10% of the resident population in 1960 as compared to 5% in 1945 (Diele, 1992, p. 119). As such, referendum initiatives were started in an attempt to reduce this number. Although many of these initiatives were defeated, the war had given rise to a "conservative ideology that made people sensitive to the ethnic, political or economic threat which the aliens supposedly represented" (Diele, 1992, p. 120). Consequently, thousands of these workers were forced to return to their homelands.

Despite these early efforts at control, the percentage of foreigners in Switzerland continued to rise until 1974, at which time foreigners accounted for 17% of the Swiss population (Diele, 1992, p. 119). While this percentage has remained fairly constant since that date, Switzerland finds itself today dealing with a new type of foreigner. The foreign workers from Southern Europe have been replaced by refugees from the former East. As it stands now Switzerland receives the highest per capita number of appeals for asylum in Europe. From 1988 to 1990, the number of those seeking asylum rose by 107% (Long, 1991). As the government attempts to deal with these numbers, they must also face the problems created by dramatic increases in illegal refugee entries.

To combat these problems the Justice Ministry proposed

housing illegal refugees in camps, speeding up the application procedure and increasing to six months (from three) the initial period during which asylum seekers are not allowed to work (Long, 1991). All of these attempts are "aimed broadly at reducing Switzerland's attraction for economic refugees" (Long, 1991) and, unlike in the past, the government is finding increasing support from political parties and from the people.

Since 1989 Switzerland has experienced an increase in the number of direct attacks on foreigners. Early in 1989, four asylum-seekers died in an arson attack on a shelter in the southeastern town of Chur (Long, 1991). Then in November of the same year, a hostel in Steinhouse was attacked and damaged by a group calling itself the "patriotic front" (McArthur, 1990, p. 8). Two weeks later, a gang of teenagers battered to death a 44 year-old Kurdish refugee on the street in Freiburg (McArthur, 1990, p. 8). This attack, which received a lot of attention in the press, was labeled the "birth of a new fascism in Switzerland" (McArthur, 1990, p. 8).

As these attacks continued, their support by Swiss political parties also appeared to be growing. The National Action Party, a leading rightist party, stated that the reason for these attacks are understandable in that, they "are the fruit of our too liberal immigration policies. They [foreigners] ought to go back to their own countries or

to ones with similar cultures. Cultural diversity only brings unhappiness" (McArthur, 1990, p. 8). Even the government, while not condoning the violence, has indicated by their statements that they too understand why these events are occurring. For example, a government spokesman stated, "while the unease among the Swiss population caused by the growing numbers of migrants is understandable, it must never be transformed into violence against innocent people" (Long, 1991).

During the 1991 general elections, the ruling coalition's (the Radical Democrats, Christian Democrats, Swiss People's Party, and the Social Democrats) share of the vote dropped from 72.3% (in 1987) to 69.7% (Lohneis, 1994; Papadopoulos, 1988; and Church, 1992). This decline might have been greater had the Swiss People's Party not adopted and used anti-foreigner rhetoric during the campaign. In addition to this apparent move to the right by the Swiss People's Party, the 1991 elections also witnessed the emergence of several extreme rightist parties (see Table 2), all of which keyed upon anti-foreigner rhetoric during their respective campaigns.

As previously indicated, Switzerland did "favor" one side during the Cold War. They fell victim to the policies of the Cold War which served to socialize the masses and provided them with a convenient enemy. When the Cold War

Table 2

Swiss Political Parties and Representation Following
Elections in 1979, 1983, 1987, and 1991

Party	1979 Seats(% of	1983 Popular Vote)	1987	1991
Radical Democrats	51 (24.1)	54 (23.4)	51 (22.9)	44 (21)
Social Democrats	51 (24.4)	47 (22.8)	41 (18.4)	41 (18.5)
Christian Democrats	44 (21.5)	42 (20.2)	42 (20)	36 (18.3)
<u>Swiss People's Party*</u>	<u>23 (11.6)</u>	<u>23 (11.6)</u>	<u>25 (11)</u>	<u>25 (11.9)</u>
Ruling Coalition Totals	169 (81.6)	166 (78.0)	159 (72.3)	146 (69.7)
Independent's Party	8 (4.2)	9 (4.0)	8 (4.2)	5 (2.8)
Old Liberals	8 (2.8)	8 (2.8)	9 (2.7)	10 (3.0)
National Action*+	3 (1.9)	5 (3.5)	-----	-----
Swiss Democrats*	-----	-----	3 (3.2)	5 (3.0)
Evangelical People's Party	3 (2.2)	3 (2.1)	3 (1.9)	3 (1.9)
Progressive Organizations	2 (1.7)	4 (2.2)	4 (3.5)	1 (1.5)
Green Parties#	2 (.8)	4 (2.2)	9 (4.8)	14 (6.2)
Communist	3 (2.1)	1 (.9)	1 (.8)	2 (.8)
Autopartei*	-----	-----	2 (2.6)	8 (5.1)
Lega dei Ticinesi*	-----	-----	-----	2 (1.4)
<u>Confederates*</u>	-----	-----	-----	<u>1 (1.0)</u>
Rightist Totals (excluding Swiss People's Party)	3 (1.9)	5 (3.5)	5 (5.8)	16 (10.5)

* Represents political parties with extreme right leanings and/or parties which supported anti-immigration platforms during elections.

+ The National Action party became the Swiss Democratic Party prior to the 1987 election.

Prior to 1991, the majority of the electoral loss suffered by the Ruling coalition was captured by the Green Party, as would have been expected according to Inglehart postmaterialism theory. However, after the end of the Cold War, the Green Party received only a 1.4% increase in popular votes, against a 4.7% increase in popular votes for the right.

(All information for this chart taken from Lohneis, 1984; Papadopoulos, 1988; and Church, 1992.)

ended, there was a disruption in Switzerland's political cycle, just as in the rest of Europe. Again, in this case, the right has worked to fill the void and has given the Swiss a new, suitable enemy: foreigners. While the presence of foreign workers and other aliens have always been a controversial issue in Switzerland, it wasn't until the disruption of this cycle that the violence against them became more common and anti-foreigner political parties gained in strength, exemplified by the fact that initiatives against foreigners are finding support within many sectors of Swiss society. As stated earlier, in the past, most initiatives against foreigners were voted down. Since 1991, the far right (excluding the Swiss People's Party) has represented almost 11% of the electorate, compared to 5.8% in 1987 and 3.5% in 1983 (Church, 1992, pp. 184-188 and Table 2); numbers which are expected to increase during Switzerland's 1995 parliamentary elections.

Sweden

More than any other European country, the rise of the extreme right initially appears most surprising in Sweden. While for its size, Sweden has one of the largest immigrant populations in Europe (12% of the population is of immigrant descent) (Inter Press Service, February, 1992), its policies towards these immigrants have always been extremely liberal and tolerant and reflected great compassion toward political

refugees from selected countries such as Poland, the former Yugoslavia, Chile, Iran, and Turkey. Consequently, extreme rightist groups have traditionally had a difficult time gaining a foothold and violence has not been tolerated. However, since the end of the Cold War, there has been an alarming increase in assaults against foreigners and, in 1991, a newly created right-wing party, the New Democracy Party, which used an anti-immigrant platform, received 6.7% of the vote and 25 parliamentary seats (Altermatt, 1994). More importantly they found themselves holding the balance of power in the ruling minority coalition.

Under closer scrutiny, the onset of anti-immigrant violence and the birth of the New Democracy Party can be explained. Despite claims of neutrality during the Cold War, "Sweden hedged its bets by preparing to receive Western military support in case the former Soviet Union had attacked it" (Reuters World Service, February 8, 1994). These preparations included communication with NATO neighbors Denmark and Norway and the building of specially-extended airport runways to let Western bombers mount raids over the Baltic Sea (Reuters World Service, February 8, 1994). Although official government policies were designed for active defense and preventing the country from being dragged into war, leaders still had to calculate the risk that the country "most probably in the course of war, would be attacked by the Soviet Union" (Reuters World Service,

February 8, 1994); consequently, it can be argued that Sweden had taken a "side" during the Cold War. It should also be remembered that, just like Switzerland, Sweden relied on Western Europe and the United States as its principal trade partners. So, again, Sweden did have a stake in the outcome of the Cold War.

Just like the rest of Europe, Sweden has also seen a rise in rightist violence. In December 1991, members of a neo-Nazi group shouted "Sieg Heil" and fought in the streets with police after not being permitted to hold a demonstration. Approximately 150 people were arrested and police seized weapons, including home-made bombs, and flagpoles with sharpened points (Reuter Library Report, December 1, 1991). On Feb 20, 1992 an unidentified gunman shot at three 9 year-old immigrant children on their way home from school, injuring one. This attack followed 11 similar attacks against Latin American, African and Mediterranean immigrants during the previous six months (Inter Press Service, February 21, 1992). In May 1994, three skinheads attacked Helena Hakansdotter, a young Swedish woman and head of the Social Democrats' youth organization in Boden. They carved a swastika on her cheek with a razor and called her a "socialist pig" (Reuters World Service, May 3, 1994). At the same time, other groups of skinheads overturned headstones at Jewish cemeteries throughout Sweden and painted them with swastikas. Finally,

in September 1994, gangs of neo-Nazi skinheads and immigrants brawled in western Sweden. Several people were injured and five neo-Nazis were arrested during 5 hours of fighting which began after about 200 skinheads left a party. (The Herald, September 26, 1994).

As noted earlier, in 1991 the New Democracy Party entered parliament for the first time. Swedes were growing wary of the country's generous immigration policy and this provided the New Democracy Party with an issue upon which to capitalize and the party found itself in the enviable position of holding the balance of power in the minority coalition. However, its success would be short-lived. In the 1994 parliamentary elections, the New Democracy Party received only 1.2% of the vote and lost all 25 seats. Although the Social Democrats returned to power with 45.6% of the vote, it should not be assumed that Sweden is returning to its liberal policies. The New Democracy Party was voted out primarily because of an internal power struggle and its inability to solve the unemployment problem. Had they proven to be better legislators, the elections might have turned out differently. Another indication that the Social Democrats are not returning to their old liberal ways is the decision to align themselves with the Liberal Party, a "clear sign that the SD Party has moved towards the center" (Haydon, 1994). Consequently, Sweden's entire political structure finds itself shifted to

the right.

Since the end of the Cold War in Europe, many European countries have experienced a dramatic rise in both the actions and perceived acceptability of extreme rightist groups. While many leading political scientists still argue that this rise is the result of declining economics, I see this problem as more deeply rooted in the mindset of modern European society. Europe is experiencing a shift in political attitudes as a result of the breakdown in the circular relationship which previously existed between conventional politics and the Cold War. In turn, the direction of this shift, to the right, is determined by the psychological factors of fear and hate which underlined Cold War policies.

While both the examples presented above provide support for this theory, several qualifying factors must be explored. First of all, in the Swiss example, it should be remembered that foreigners have never been well liked or totally accepted in Switzerland. Consequently, the model's usefulness in predicting shifts based on breakdowns in relationships where strong emotional factors come into play must be significantly isolated from past activities. As such, it requires further study. The Swedish example provides clear support for the theory.

Overall, to determine the feasibility and acceptability

of this theory, it must be applied to additional situations. While this model indicates that, within Europe, a large portion of the population did experience a shift of political attitudes to the right, it did not delve into which groups (social, economic, etc.) have moved farther right than others or which groups have attempted to maintain a central or leftist position. While theorists such as Inglehart, Minkenberg and others have made predictions in this respect, in this study it is the shift itself that is of primary importance. The dynamics of who goes how far will need to be pursued by additional studies.

Despite its limitations, this model goes beyond many of the theories previously developed to explain political shifts in Europe. While many of these theories concentrate on economics, postmaterialism, and neoconservatism, the present model explores as well the importance of the psychology of the people, the government and the Cold War together. "Hatred" and societies' need for enemies emerge as the primary reasons for the political shift to the right and for the increase in rightist activities in Europe. By implication, if the psychological rationale for similar situations and policies are understood, predictions can be made as to the direction in which groups within society will react when (political) relationships are disrupted. Consequently, this theory has implications for other parts of the world. For example, if North and South Korea move

closer, will a time of disharmony develop? Will rightist elements in this area of the world be able to attract new supporters by turning society's hatred against an alternative target, such as U.S. military personnel? Now that the PLO and Israel have begun to work for peace, rightist elements within both these forces are looking for new enemies.

Overall, in Europe, it should be remembered that as a result of the end of the Cold War, growing political malaise and social disaffection created a crisis which used the themes of immigration policy and the threat of "enemies in our midst" to allow the extreme right to break out of the fringes and into the political forefront. Today's violent right extremists operate at least partly in a political and intellectual climate which protects and/or accepts them. All in all, as the German writer and thinker Hans Magnus Enzensberger has pointed out, "there is a real and growing danger in Western and, to an even greater extent, Eastern Europe that the Cold War may be replaced by a great civil war of all against all, spreading like wildfire." (Altermatt, 1994).

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