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Parameters is a journal of ideas and issues, providing a forum for the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, military ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. It serves as a vehicle for continuing the education, and thus the professional development, of War College graduates and other military officers and civilians concerned with military affairs.

From the Editor

In This Issue . . .

Kenneth K. Steinweg examines an enduring challenge to US forces: how to reduce the number of casualties caused to friendly forces by one's own weapons. After considering earlier work on the subject, notably that of Charles R. Shrader, the author analyzes newly uncovered archival material and other fresh sources, reaching fundamentally different conclusions about the primary causes of fratricide and the degree to which fratricide has affected US forces in this century. He then offers new considerations for reducing the incidence of friendly fire casualties.

The feature, "Challenges of Ethnic Strife and Humanitarian Relief," considers those topics from several different perspectives.

William A. Stofft and Gary L. Guertner look at the definition of ethnic conflict and at historical examples that reflect the causes of ethnic conflict and the forms it can take. They then consider policy and planning issues related to military interventions in such conflicts. Their examination of the implications of intervention includes analysis of the components of "selective and discriminate" decisions about when and how to involve US forces.

Peter J. Spiro presents a broad view of the nature, variety, and reach of a set of organizations that may be linked in many readers' minds to forms of ethnic conflict and to the humanitarian relief operations that US and other forces have supported since 1990. Noting that there are some 15,000 "nongovernmental organizations" throughout the world, the author profiles the range of their activities and the influence they exert in debates on the environment, labor, human rights, and similar issues that transcend national and regional borders.

John W. Jandora profiles three different types of nongovernment actors whose objectives and methods can threaten the success of peace support or humanitarian relief operations. He describes patterns of behavior and operations that are often displayed by urban mobs, criminal gangs, and ethnic groups, illustrating how their operational characteristics reflect goals and objectives of the groups.

Andrew S. Natsios examines another set of nongovernmental organizations in his analysis of the international humanitarian relief response system. The author provides a primer on the values, interests, and operating principles of the kinds of organizations most often found in areas where human suffering—whether from natural disaster, wars, or ethnic strife—draws international

volunteer groups seeking to alleviate the consequences of those disturbances. He uses his experiences with such operations to suggest why humanitarian relief organizations and the military sometimes find themselves at odds, while trying to solve the same kinds of problems, in the midst of larger conflicts.

Karl W. Eikenberry offers a broad overview of the military power of the People's Republic of China, describing the components of that power and then exploring the likelihood that China might use it in ways that could destabilize the Pacific Region. He also examines recent Chinese thinking on the role of their military forces, particularly as guarantors of domestic tranquility, and records Chinese perceptions of the importance of the United States' presence in the region.

David W. Hogan compares the roles and effectiveness of special operations forces against Japan in World War II under two fundamentally different commanders and command structures. He contrasts the styles and objectives of MacArthur and Stilwell as they affected the missions and performance of guerrillas in the Philippines and the somewhat more conventional organizations and missions in the China-Burma-India theater.

Commentary and Reply uncovers a long-hidden aspect of the planning for the invasion of Japan ("Downfall: The Operation that Never Was," by Wayne A. Silkett, Autumn, 1994) by a retired naval officer who would have played a major part in a deception operation in support of the invasion.

Review Essays include Victor Gray's timely survey of "Strategic Reading on Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict," Donald R. Boose's " Strategic Reading on the Northwest Pacific," Paul Braim's insights on World War I historiography, "A Surge of Revisionism: Scholarship on the Great War," Charles R. Shrader's examination of "World War II Logistics," and Michael R. Boldrick's review of "Three Schools of Thought on Nuclear Proliferation."

Book Reviews include Karl Farris on Richard N. Haass's *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World*, Harold Nelson on John Keegan's *A History of Warfare*, and Lewis R. Sorley's assessment of *Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific*.

Other Business . . .

As forecast several times in past issues, we have regrettably removed some 400 recipients of the journal from the distribution list due to their retirement from active service. Each of those who were removed from our list will receive a letter with a form and instructions for subscribing to *Parameters* through the Superintendent of Documents — JJM.

Dealing Realistically
With Fratricide

KENNETH K. STEINWEG

The tragic downing of two US Army helicopters over Iraq by two US Air Force jets in April 1994 once again pushed fratricide into the national spotlight. The intense public scrutiny over the 17-percent fratricide rate in the Persian Gulf War was just subsiding when this reminder appeared. As demonstrated by this most recent incident, fratricide is a multi-service, joint problem. For those hoping the problem will go away, it will not.

Some sources suggest that the high fratricide rate of the Persian Gulf War is a new phenomenon, attributable to the lethality and technology of the weapons of modern war.[1] Others state that the Persian Gulf War rates were due to the time available for combat seasoning, "which invariably reduces the frequency of friendly fire."[2] These arguments overstate the cause and understate the issue. Fratricide is such a sensitive topic that few people have attempted to study it, and only recently is it being portrayed as an issue that might be confronted with the intention of developing solutions to reduce its awful cost. Its deep psychological and cultural aspects and the fog of war associated with fratricide have made it, until recent times, something of a pariah.

This article identifies and analyzes several controversies related to fratricide: how to define it, how to calculate it, and how to present the results. Case studies used in the analysis—from all major 20th-century conflicts—strongly suggest that fratricide rates have been *at least five times greater* than the generally accepted rate of two percent. The experience at our national training centers and the training technologies in use there support this historical evidence. Four decades of behavioral research help to explain why our fratricide rates have always been so high and why they resist efforts to reduce them. Finally, emerging weapons, frequent involvement in joint and coalition warfare, and the expected conditions of the future battlefield can only aggravate present fratricide rates. New initiatives are required to prevent any increase in the

fratricide rate and to reduce that rate from its historical norm. That conclusion has significant implications for policy, doctrine, and fratricide prevention techniques and technologies that will affect all of the military services.

Fratricide: Definition and Calculation Controversies

Any purposeful discussion of fratricide must first settle the issue of its definition. At first glance, the definition would seem obvious: the wounding of a soldier by his own troops. Examples suggest that we need a more rigorous definition, one that excludes weapon malfunctions, weapon cleaning accidents, and deliberate self and friendly wounding, all of which have been included in combat casualty data in the past. The recently adopted US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) definition narrows the conditions for inclusion under the heading of fratricide:

> Fratricide is the employment of friendly weapons and munitions with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy his equipment or facilities, which results in unforeseen and unintentional death or injury to friendly personnel.[3]

The qualification in this definition that makes it so restrictive is the portion "with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy his equipment or facilities." These words eliminate accidental weapon explosions and misfires, training accidents, and self-wounding of any kind, whether intentional or not.

An unexpected controversy, little appreciated by the lay public and difficult for all to understand, is the method of presenting fratricide information. What follows is a complex but necessary discussion of the three ways in which fratricide rates are calculated. They are not directly comparable methods. Often the methods are intermixed or used interchangeably with no clear notation of method, further complicating a problem that is inherently difficult to understand.

The first method, a ratio between two groups of friendly casualties, is the traditional formula for fratricide calculation:

$$\frac{\text{number of friendly troop casualties caused by friendly fire}}{\text{total number of friendly casualties}}$$

This is the conventional method; it is used in all historical examples to be presented here. Yet it can be misleading. If friendly soldiers are efficient at dispatching the enemy with few casualties from the enemy, fratricide as a

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percentage of total friendly casualties would be high. This reason is given as one explanation for the Persian Gulf War rate. This method of fratricide calculation is used at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana.

The definition of fratricide states that the friendly troops must be injured while trying to inflict injury on the enemy. Therefore, some sources argue, a more accurate and fair way of depicting fratricide is to reflect enemy casualties in the denominator of the equation.[4] This results in the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{number of friendly troop casualties caused by friendly fire}}{\text{total number of } enemy \text{ casualties inflicted}}$$

The advantage of using this second method is that it relates the effectiveness of inflicting enemy casualties to the mistakes of wounding a friendly soldier. When well-trained soldiers and brilliant strategy inflict huge losses on the enemy, we would see very low percentages of fratricide. A slightly modified version of this method is used at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California.

There are substantial difficulties with this method of calculation in combat operations. Obtaining enemy casualty data for the same time period as friendly fire data was collected is extremely difficult given the nature of war itself and some of our opponents since WWII: Chinese, North Koreans, North Vietnamese, Viet Cong, Iraqis. Several attempts were made to compile enemy and friendly casualties for the same battle or time period during the Korean War. One study over a 60-day period is marked by ambiguity, missing data, and assumptions, all of which contribute to estimates of casualty ratios between enemy and friendly forces that fluctuate wildly between 3:1 and 1:1.[5] A second detailed Korean War study (370 pages and covering a single battle over a period of one month of combat) gathered all available information on opposing sides. Called a "limited vertical slice of combat" and with many adjustments for missing and contradictory data, this study derived enemy to friendly casualty ratios of 2:1 to 2.5:1.[6] This source makes no reference to fratricide, in spite of extensive information on casualties, which makes any conclusion for this discussion suspect.

Just as important, if one uses this second method of calculation, not every enemy casualty should be counted. In an example related to the Persian Gulf War, if the Iraqis suffered 100,000 casualties, American fratricide rates would be a fraction of a percent. But is it accurate to count all enemy casualties in the denominator or only those who were at risk from the soldiers they faced? An Iraqi soldier 200 miles to the rear of his front line and under attack by the Air Force is not a target engaged by American ground soldiers. This enemy should not be part of the denominator in the new equation. Deciding which enemy casualties were at risk and should be included in the denominator makes this second method of calculation very difficult.

	Method 1	Method 2	Method 3
Numerator	Friendly Casualties by Friendly Fire	Friendly Casualties by Friendly Fire	Friendly Casualties by Friendly Fire
Denominator	Total Friendly Casualties	Total Enemy Casualties	No Denominator
Training Center Using Method	Joint Readiness Training Center	National Training Center	Combat Maneuver Training Center

Table 1. Methods of Fratricide Calculation

Finally, there is a third method of presenting fratricide data: raw total numbers with no denominator. Whereas the first method discussed relates fratricides to total friendly killed and wounded, and the second relates them to enemy killed and wounded, this third method uses total numbers of US soldier casualties caused by friendly fire, period. The number stands out starkly in a one-to-one ratio with human life. Air Force fratricide cases are often presented this way. The Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Hohenfels, Germany, uses this method of fratricide data presentation.

The three methods are summarized in Table 1. Careful attention must be paid to the method used to present fratricide information before trying to apply the results to policy and doctrine. It is important to understand in reading the following case studies that mixing different methods of fratricide calculation produces comparisons based on entirely different logic and emphasis.

Case Studies

The most comprehensive compilation of fratricide examples and cases was published in a landmark study by then-Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Shrader in 1982. His examination of 269 different incidents acknowledges the difficulty of developing accurate rates but concludes, "It appears that amicicide [fratricide] incidents account for something less that 2 percent of all casualties in battle."[7] He repeats this assessment a decade later: "There are sound reasons to consider two percent of total casualties as a good working order of magnitude for amicicidal casualties, but as many critics have pointed out, the true number may be much higher."[8] Citing no reference for the figure, Trevor Dupuy states in his 1990 book on attrition and battle casualties, "There are no accurate statistics for fratricide. . . . The average proportions [are] more likely no more than 2 percent of casualties incurred."[9] Against this background the Persian Gulf War fratricide data look terrible. Is this latest fratricide rate really so inconsistent with historical precedents?

Before reviewing 20th-century case studies, we should note that a number of factors make analysis difficult. First, estimates of fratricide rates from official records are hard to find. Although battlefield fratricide has been known for centuries, there was no clearly defined reporting requirement prior to publication of the 1985 edition of AR 600-10, *The Army Casualty System.*[10] The TRADOC definition discussed above was not published until 1991. The edition of AR 600-10 used during the Vietnam War resulted in friendly casualties being classified either as "Killed in Action" or "Result of Hostile Fire."[11]

Second, there is a powerful bias against officially reporting fratricide in war. It is such a sensitive topic that few people have attempted to study it, and until very recently, no one has systematically looked at the issue. The assumption that fratricide is a rare event reinforced these biases. The Persian Gulf War exposed the magnitude of the issue.

Third, the confusion of battle and the difficulty of actually knowing what happened in combat means that what little data are available probably understate the case. This is particularly so in close man-to-man fighting and close artillery support. In most official records, for example, all wounds are attributed to the enemy.

Fourth, the collection and recording of casualty data initially take place at medical facilities, usually far from the place of injury, and without benefit of questions regarding source of injury. In reality, however, casualty data collection and reporting are Adjutant General (AG) functions and so the data are usually reported as gross numbers and totals which are generally devoid of clinical or causative details except for such categories as "bullet wounds," "shrapnel," "mines," or in the case of World War I, "gas." In addition, these AG reports are usually compiled from other reports, not derived from actual patient contact. Facts and issues not collected and explored early in the casualty evacuation process can never be developed after the fact. Only in smaller unit reports or unofficial individual records will such evidence be available.

Fifth, the myriad sources where fratricide might be discovered result in comparisons of different types of data. Personal memoirs on one hand may be the best source available in one battle, while occasionally battle reports or special studies may allude to the issue and allow one to draw some conclusions. By necessity, a variety of types of data must be used when studying fratricide. Any combat example will involve only a very small percentage of casualties incurred in the war. By themselves they tell a compelling story, and some can be generalized on a much larger scale.

Last, representative battles and campaigns, rather than well-known worst-case examples, must be examined if the conclusions are to be considered representative of the persistence of fratricide. Worst-case examples are plentiful enough, only one of which will be mentioned below to demonstrate a point. The circumstances used in each of the following analyses will be explained so that the veracity of the information presented can be judged. There is nothing about

the examples discussed, with the aforementioned exception, to think they lie outside the range of ordinary battlefield occurrences.

The search for data begins with one of the first conflicts of the 20th century: the Mexican Punitive Expedition in 1916-1917 to track down Pancho Villa. This conflict was small, involving on average approximately 8300 troops, and lacking in large-scale clashes. The Army Medical Department did classify injuries by disease and method of injury.[12] Of the data on casualties published by the Surgeon General's Office, "number [of friendly troops] shot by guard" is recorded as "4/1000." The casualty rate, dead and wounded, is recorded as 41/1000, which yields a ten-percent fratricide rate (4/41) using method one (friendly troops wounded by friendly fire, divided by total friendly casualties). The resulting fratricide rate does not include artillery fire, perhaps the most frequent cause of friendly fire casualties. Because the Punitive Expedition was characterized by small skirmishes, artillery was rarely employed in support of the infantry or cavalry. The fratricide associated with this expedition begins to establish the basis for challenging old assumptions.

World War I presents tremendous problems for research into fratricide. Early casualties incurred by American forces were so numerous and came so quickly that data overwhelmed the casualty collecting system then in place.[13] The meticulous categories used in the Mexican Punitive Expedition were abandoned; thousands of gas, machine gun, and artillery casualties became mixed in with the figures on rampant diseases. More than 10,000 medical records were lost. Only the grossest of casualty types are reported. It is in this kind of chaotic environment that personally kept records may give the best insight.

The personal records of a Regimental Aid Station physician, Dr. L. D. Besecker (23d Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division), during March-June 1918, are very instructive. Each patient treated was meticulously recorded by name, identification number, description of wounds, status, evacuation data, and agent of wounding. It is here that Dr. Besecker carefully documented wounds by friendly fire. Of the 82 combat casualties identified during this period, at least eight (ten percent) were caused by friendly fire. The 2d Division had arrived in France in late 1917 and trained extensively before entering the lines in March 1918. The abrupt ending of the log in June 1918 coincides with the start of a large German offensive against the 2d Division and probably reflects the fact that the author was overwhelmed by sheer volume of patients.[14]

Following World War I, French General Alexandre Percin alleged in his book *Le Massacre de notre Infanterie* that 75,000 of France's 3.3 million casualties were due to artillery fratricide.[15] He derived a 2.2 percent fratricide rate from a medical study at the beginning of the war, which he indicated was obviously too low. "I am certainly far below the reality [artillery fratricide rate] while the incidents involving heavy artillery—Verdun clearly showed this— were far more numerous once trench warfare was established."[16] General Percin cites numerous examples with higher rates in the appendix of his book, including

one study revealing that two out of every ten shells that fell on the trenches were from friendly artillery. General Percin appears to endorse this estimate of 20 percent of all artillery casualties being from fratricide, proposed by a French general he considered "sympathetic" to the artillery. Yet many have used General Percin's earlier-cited 2.2-percent figure as a properly calculated number of artillery fratricide and one that he supported. Such is obviously not the case.

The British had similar problems with artillery fratricide that were also related to tactics: "The 'creeper' [rolling barrage] covered the ground progressively in front of and behind the objectives. All the infantry had to do was to stay close to it [the artillery barrage] even if the occasional short round sprayed them with shrapnel." [17]

Dr. Besecker, in his earlier account, did not attempt to sort out friendly from enemy artillery injuries, the common problem alluded to by General Percin. Given the fact that American troops trained extensively with the French prior to commitment to the front and initially were assigned piecemeal among French units, there is good reason to believe that American units also suffered from artillery fratricide. To the extent that the foregoing is correct, Dr. Besecker's data on fratricide represents a low estimate of the actual total.

The duration of World War II, and the extent of American involvement in it, provided many opportunities for obtaining new data on fratricide. Medical reports do in fact reveal excellent, well-documented evidence of the full scope of fratricide injuries. The examples below from this war are by-products of information collected for other reasons, but in each case they shed light on fratricide because the right questions were asked.

Captain James Hopkins was a battalion surgeon with the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), often referred to as "Merrill's Marauders." He served in campaigns on New Georgia Island and in North Burma. During periods in both of these campaigns, and because of his personal interest in the value of body armor, he meticulously recorded the mechanism and method of injuries of each individual soldier as they occurred. Lines of casualty evacuation required that the wounded and dead pass through Hopkins' aid station, where he had personal contact with the patients. Consequently his records are unusually complete and, because of his interest and medical training, unusually accurate. He interviewed patients or other soldiers from the same unit about each casualty. He published individual surveys of both campaigns in 1962. The New Georgia campaign surveyed 161 casualties and the Burma campaign 202. Hopkins' data identify friendly fire as causing between 13 and 14 percent of the casualties in both the Burma and New Georgia campaigns, when corrected for the TRADOC definition of fratricide. [18]

Another World War II example, also from the Pacific, was the product of a dedicated and well-supported study of combat casualties. A team composed of physicians, ordnance staff, and technicians carefully studied every casualty as it occurred in what is referred to as the Bougainville Study

in the Solomon Islands. Autopsies were performed on those killed. The 1788 casualties incurred by the two divisions in this campaign were catalogued from February to April 1944: 16 percent of the killed in action (KIA) and 12 percent of the wounded in action (WIA) were attributed to friendly fire.[19] Strange as it may seem, the author used the Bougainville data to compare and contrast actual lethality of US weapons on American casualties (219) versus Japanese weapons on American casualties (1569).[20] There was no discussion, and seemingly no analysis, of the high incidence of fratricide.

These carefully collected World War II studies build on the anecdotal and small data base of the earlier conflicts. Collectively they introduce the notion that the issue of fratricide, when carefully monitored, is a much larger problem than previously appreciated. Before going on to the Korean conflict, a final and vivid example from World War II makes the assertion of much higher fratricide rates even more plausible. Although it involved inexperienced troops, the example speaks for itself.

Expecting tough Japanese resistance, 35,000 US and Canadian troops invaded Kiska, an Aleutian island, in August 1943. The daylight assault was complicated by dense fog, and fighting continued through the night. By the end of the fight a day later, 28 men were dead and 50 were wounded. *There were no Japanese on the island.*[21] This catastrophic "battle" continued for 24 hours against an enemy who wasn't there. Thus 100 percent of the casualties were fratricide. The miscalculation, misidentification, and error in this assault clearly exemplify what the conditions of combat, fear, and uncertainty can do to judgment. The Kiska Island experience suggests that fratricide rates five or more times higher than the often-cited two percent are both understandable and reasonable in difficult, long-running combat operations.

The Korean War yields little data on fratricide rates in spite of voluminous records and reports of casualties. One reason for the dearth of such information can be found in the extensive use of US weapons by the North Korean army and Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). It was reported that whole units of the CCF were armed with the M1 carbine as well as the 1903 Springfield rifle;[22] the weapons came from US forces, or forces armed by the United States, as well as from Chinese arsenals. The forces of both nations also routinely used US-made machine guns and submachine guns. Type of ordnance therefore could not be used with any probability of accuracy to indicate whether friend or foe fired the wounding agent.

A dedicated Wound Ballistics Research Team was dispatched to Korea in late 1950 to do a careful survey, but they arrived just after the entry of the Chinese into the war. The team was denied country entrance and so set up a study of casualties in Japan. After stabilization of the Korean front, several members of the team did manage to survey some casualties in Korea. The report of this Wound Ballistics Research Team is devoid of any comment

on fratricide. One photo included in the report shows 12 bullets removed from US casualties, six of which are of US caliber.[23]

Early mainframe computers were put to work analyzing Korean War casualty data. Most official studies were done after the war; these studies produced 119,000 IBM punch cards on which casualty data were recorded. Because of the limited abilities of the computers, collection was confined to only 50 fields of data per casualty. Answers about causative agents were punched in as either small arms, fragments, or other general munitions categories.[24] Thus the introduction of computer-assisted documentation did not materially influence our understanding of fratricide in that war. Because the right questions were never asked, pertinent data were not recorded in the casualty treatment and evacuation process.

Where fratricide does surface in Korean War reports, the issue is not discussed in detail. A limited study on the 25th Infantry Division during 26-31 July 1950, using casualty data computer cards, could ascertain the weapon responsible for the injury in only 47 percent of the cases. Within this study, the analysis of one regiment's casualties from bullets identified three of 44 casualties (6.8 percent) as from "friendly pistol, rifle." There is no subsequent discussion of this category anywhere in the report. As it represents only one type of fratricide, from bullets, and does not deal with the historically more common cause, artillery, the overall rate is undoubtedly higher.[25]

The Vietnam War produced considerable data on combat deaths and injuries, largely because of a detailed survey conducted between 1967 and 1969, *during* the war and *in* Vietnam. Involving over 125 personnel and called *Evaluation of Wounds Data and Munitions Effectiveness in Vietnam,* the WDMET Study was a dedicated and well-supported effort that studied more than 7800 casualties during this two-year period. It was a massive undertaking, with data collected case by case as casualties occurred. Each case was thoroughly documented, to include interviews when possible, with photographs and meticulous searches for wounding agents and their identification. Intended to study weapon lethality, body armor protection, and medical treatment requirements, the WDMET Study integrated the work of many branches of the Army; ordnance, artillery, infantry, and medical personnel all played major roles.[26]

In the study's comprehensive three-volume report are casualty data on 5993 cases in one survey, with a separate survey of 500 consecutive autopsy cases. Extensive information on the causative wounding agent was carefully collected in many of the reported cases. In the autopsy series, tables summarize data by type of missile. Of the 161 autopsied fatalities due to identifiable bullets, 22 fatalities (13.7 percent) were from 5.56mm M193 (M-16 rifle) bullets.[27] Analysis of the 186 fatalities caused by fragments in this autopsy series reveal that at least 20 of the deaths (10.8 percent) were caused by US weapons. This figure assumes that all identifiable mortar and grenade wounds could be considered to have been caused by enemy weapons, which is a doubtful premise. A

tally of the weapons responsible for the 5993 casualties shows four US weapon types—M-16 rifle, M-79 grenade launcher, Claymore mine, and artillery—responsible for 11 percent of all the US casualties.[28]

As straightforward as these data may seem, they are still open to challenge. The Viet Cong captured and used some American weapons, including the M-16, therefore casting doubt on who actually fired the weapons in these cases. A companion study in WDMET done by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology carefully evaluated 56 KIAs by specific bullet type to study lethality and ballistic characteristics. Included in this group were 11 killed by M-16 rounds. Four of these are recorded as having been killed by friendly fire, four more by "circumstances unknown," two simply as "KIA," and one by "enemy sniper."[29] Although a small number of documented instances, the acknowledgment of at least four fratricides in the group, and the ambiguity surrounding many of the rest, leave open to question whether some or any of these deaths were caused by M-16s in enemy hands.

Additional evidence of high fratricide rates in Vietnam appeared recently in Charles Hawkins' careful review of his infantry battalion's 1970 tactical operations center journals. A review of four months of low- and mid-intensity combat revealed an average fratricide rate of 14 percent. No single weapon system was dominant. Fratricide occurred across the spectrum of weapons: artillery, mortars, rifles, and close air support.[30]

Operation Just Cause, conducted in Panama late in December 1989, lasted only a few days and was characterized by night operations and small infantry tactics. Evidence from Panama buttresses all the previous data and interpretations. Three of the 23 killed in action were fratricide victims. Of the 310 wounded, estimates of wounds by friendly fire vary from a minimum of 16 to the more likely total of 37. The original 16 WIA identified as friendly fire casualties were scattered about the country in several incidents. An additional 21 occurred in one incident in which troops on the ground were misidentified by an AC-130 gunship. Operation Just Cause therefore produced a fratricide rate of 13 percent among the KIAs, and between five and 12 percent of the WIAs.[31]

Table 2 summarizes the case histories reviewed. In every case the fratricide rate is many times higher than the two percent that appears repeatedly in print as the expected rate. Some surveys presented can be challenged in some respect. The World War II, Just Cause, and Persian Gulf War data are the most useful because they are the most complete. As a whole, the surveys demonstrate consistency in a fratricide rate that is many times higher than the earlier two percent estimate. Support for this much higher rate comes surprisingly from two other sources: training center data and behavioral research.

Training Center Data

Warning signs about our impending fratricide problem have been up for some time. In addition to the historical cases recounted above, the sophisti-

Conflict	Source of Data	Fratricide Rate (Method 1, TRADOC Definition)
World War I	Besecker Diary (Europe)	10% Wounded in Action
World War II	Hopkins New Georgia Burma Bougainville Study	14% Total Casualties 14% Total Casualties 12% Wounded in Action 16% Killed in Action
Korea	25th Infantry Division	7% Casualties
Vietnam	WEDMT (autopsy) WEDMT (autopsy) WEDMT Hawkins	14% Killed in Action (rifle) 11% Killed in Action (fragments) 11% Casualties 14% Casualties
Just Cause	US Department of Defense	5-12% Wounded in Action 13% Killed in Action
Desert Storm	US Department of Defense	15% Wounded in Action 24% Killed in Action

Table 2. Fratricide Rates in this Century's Conflicts.

cated monitoring technology at our three national training centers indicates the magnitude of the problem. These centers are the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) now at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany. Data on fratricide have been collected at the NTC and JRTC since 1985, and at the last center, CMTC, since it was opened in 1989. Human controllers, computers, and technological innovations that support and add realism to training, including the use of MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System) equipment, at these training centers permit the careful collection and study of fratricide data, causes, and rates.

At the desert training area at NTC, armor and mechanized units maneuver over vast expanses of flat terrain where visual line of site is often good. Direct fire weapons (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles) that allow visual identification of their target are used extensively here. As units oppose each other in mock battles, information is collected on shots fired, by whom and at whom. Special computerized equipment on each combat vehicle records the identity of the firer and the identity of the target, creating what is called matched pairs (the firer paired with the target). Since the technology differentiates between friendly and

opposing vehicles, equipment, and personnel in each recorded instance, high volumes of data have been made available for analysis. It is unlikely we can get any better at tracking weapon fires and identifying "casualties."

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and the Army Research Institute (ARI) conducted detailed studies of direct fire records collected at the NTC from 1986 to 1990.[32] NTC reports fratricide as a ratio of shots fired at friendly forces by friendly troops, divided by total shots fired, a modification of the second method of calculating fratricide (see Table 1). Fratricidal incidents there ranged from 5.6 percent of fires for defense in sector to 25.4 percent for deliberate attacks. The average fratricide rate for all types of maneuvers was 11 percent. To an offensively oriented Army, these represent huge potential losses.

These data are not directly comparable to one of the three commonly used methods of estimating fratricide discussed earlier. They can, however, readily be converted to method two, the most meaningful method of fratricide calculation: the number of friendly troops made casualty by friendly fire, divided by total enemy casualties inflicted. If 11 percent is the average accidental firing rate at friendly forces, then the other 89 percent are correctly aimed at the enemy. The ratio of fires at friendly forces to enemy forces is thus 11/89 or 12.4 percent. It must be remembered that although NTC simulates battlefield conditions in many realistic ways, it is not real battle with the additional anxiety of potential death. In addition, each unit operates for several weeks as opposed to longer periods of operations frequently encountered in combat. These battle figures also incorporate the additional advantage that units undergoing training at the NTC are fully aware that fratricide data are being collected and analyzed. A conscious, deliberate, and vigorous program to keep these losses at a minimum is part of each unit's training at the NTC.

The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) contains rolling, wooded terrain over which infantry and combat support units operate. Ground visibility is not as good as at NTC, and close combat and indirect fires (artillery, mortars) are more common than the long-range attacks by tanks and armored infantry fighting vehicles at NTC. Data from this training center show a fratricide rate of slightly more than seven percent over the last four years.[33] The JRTC uses the first method of fratricide calculation: friendly casualties caused by friendly fire, divided by total friendly casualties.

Fratricide at JRTC is frequent in spite of a rigorous training program, comparable to that at the NTC, to prevent it. The training and command emphasis includes rehearsals of operations and "battle tracking," a system whereby adjacent units frequently report the locations of all of their subordinate organizations. Indirect fires account for only 34 percent of the firing at JRTC; they contribute a stunning 75 percent to the total number of fratricide casualties. As at NTC, units are tested for only several weeks at a time.

The third Army combat training center, CMTC in Hohenfels, Germany, has had similar experiences with fratricide incidents. It reports its

fratricide experience using the third method discussed: as raw totals only, without the benefit of a denominator, making it impossible to compare CMTC fratricide rates with data from the other two centers. Recent introduction of new equipment will allow CMTC to collect and present data comparable to that of either of the other two sites in the near future.

It should be underscored that at all combat training centers fratricide prevention is heavily emphasized. Fratricide incidents are reviewed during periodic pauses in each training cycle. They are examined in excruciating detail by the entire chain of command of the unit conducting training and by the training center support organization. It is hard to imagine the issue being more heavily emphasized. Yet the rates are still high, suggesting that perhaps this fratricide prevention technique may have reached its maximum potential. While combat training center data should have been an indicator of trouble ahead, indicators derived from behavioral research were available long before the Persian Gulf War.

Behavioral Research

There are factors operating at our combat training centers and during our wars that explain the existence of high fratricide rates in spite of our present preventive measures. These factors are baseline weapon performance and degradation of skills by stressors, principally sleep deprivation.

As important as training, discipline, planning, and coordination are in the employment of weapon systems, the results produced by any weapon system are determined in large measure by the humans in the system. Their limitations, whether functioning as weapon crew members, artillery fire observers, or fire direction personnel, are well documented.[34] As an illustration, over the period 1985-1989 at the NTC, forward observers could reliably locate stationary targets only with an error of 500 meters (five football fields); only one-third of the initial rounds fired on the targets were classified as either effective or suppressive.[35] These data do not include additional errors attributable to defective munitions. This was the state of the art at that time. Accuracy of forward observers in World War II with a target at 5000 yards also was off by as much as 500 yards, with the result that sometimes artillery shelled its own troops.[36] It is not unreasonable to believe that similar conditions existed during the Korean War and conflicts prior to World War II. Many weapon systems shared the same problem as the artillery, with accuracy dependent on human judgment. It also should be noted that the recent introduction of laser range finders and laser target designators has compensated for some of these human-induced errors.

Add the effect of combat stressors and performance deteriorates quickly. For readily apparent reasons, the topic of stress was identified as a priority area of military research as early as 1917. Stress-induced decrements in performance are most likely to occur when they can be least tolerated—during critical combat situations.[37] The degradation of combat skills associated with

continuous operations is well-researched and published.[38] Sleep deprivation can begin to affect performance significantly 18 to 24 hours into continuous operations, with performance declining 25 percent for every successive day that individuals are awake.

But sleep deprivation effects are uneven. Purely manual tasks are the least affected, while skills requiring complex mental tasks are first to decline.[39] Such critical functions as command and control, fire control, awareness of orientation to friendly and enemy troops, and target designation and tracking are some of the first skills to be affected. Planning activities, so important to success and to fratricide prevention, deteriorate markedly.[40] In short, weapons can still be loaded and fired efficiently over time, but the ability to exercise good judgment and employ the weapon correctly deteriorates rapidly. Abrupt and serious failures are prone to appear. In addition, vigilance is a big problem. Research recommendations include posting sentries in pairs during severe combat stress because of the propensity for visual illusions and failure to detect targets.[41] In the words of a 1953 study: "The tempo of warfare is increasing. It is becoming more and more evident that the human organism is one of the primary limiting factors in determining the success or failure of a military operation."[42] It would appear that the pace of the modern battlefield is moving beyond the abilities of its human participants to react appropriately over extended periods of combat.

The consequences of degradation of ability quite logically apply to conditions that can cause fratricide. Combat identification failures and poor situational awareness are the two major reasons for fratricide and were the two main causes in the Persian Gulf War.[43] Situational awareness refers to land navigation errors (being in the wrong place) and insufficient coordination between units and individuals as they move about the battlefield. Unrecorded unit movements when combined with inaccurate or ill-defined target reference points can be lethal. It is precisely these skills that are degraded early by continuous operations. A participant in the ground assault of the Persian Gulf War describes the situation:

> It was round the clock battle, a blow deep in the heart of enemy territory. It was fought at a furious pace, in rainstorms and sandstorms, with killing systems of ferocious ability. It left many soldiers . . . looking for help when picking out the good guys from the bad guys.[44]

The degrading of skills did not begin when contact with the enemy began. It began with the movement to contact and the sleep deprivation that started to accumulate as early as 24 hours previously.

Even rested, alert individuals are vulnerable to serious error under stress. Air Force research and work done by others demonstrate the effects of stress on error generation. Human attention capacity is thought to be limited

in quantity and therefore allocated in proportion to the number of items needing attention and their importance. Threatening objects receive proportionally more attention than do non-threatening objects and information. This is referred to as attention gradient or divided attention. People placed in a life-threatening environment allocate attention to the most threatening aspect, be it an aircraft, a tank, or a soldier. In a complex situation with many input variables affecting the subject, contradictory evidence about what is assumed to be an enemy often gets little or no attention when the expectation is that the target is the enemy. On the modern battlefield, with its proliferation of high velocity and high volume fires, this has serious implications. Situational awareness cues will decline, so soldiers and equipment will be increasingly misidentified if the expectation is that the enemy is present.[45]

Researchers using early combat simulation models to assess the need for combat identification systems to prevent fratricide did not incorporate into their systems the large body of knowledge on the effects of stressors on human performance and judgment.[46] This unintentional oversight resulted in an unrealistic expectation of consistency in human performance; that oversight tended to lower expected, and hence projected, fratricide rates.

In summary, a major reason the fratricide rate remains so high is that imperfect human skills and judgment needed to employ weapon systems quickly degrade under multiple stressors, all made worse by the continuous operations that seem to characterize the tempo of modern war. "The stressors inherent in the combat environment . . . impose severe debilitating effects on performance."[47] Our combat training centers reflect this fact, and our most recent experience in combat confirms it.

The Desert Storm Experience

Many Americans not familiar with the issue of fratricide were appalled to learn of the high casualty rate in the Gulf War from our own weapons. Of the 613 US military battle casualties in Operation Desert Storm, 146 were killed in action, including 35 (24 percent) killed by friendly fire. Of the 467 wounded, 72 (15 percent) were by fire from friendly weapons, for an overall average of 17 percent.[48] A full 77 percent of all combat vehicles lost were destroyed by friendly fire.[49] This was in spite of comprehensive training in the desert prior to the onset of the war, extensive and repeated operational rehearsals, and the use of Fire Support Coordination Lines (FSCL), combat identification markers on vehicles, high-tech navigational systems, and extensive liaison networks to integrate different ground and air elements.[50]

The fratricide rates experienced in Desert Storm are consistent with all that has been discussed here. There is ample historical precedent and training center verification for the fratricide incidents that occurred in that operation. Behavioral research sheds light on the reasons for decrements in human ability and the limitations of training. There is no reason to believe

that fratricide rates in war would be lower than in training. In addition, unlike in prior conflicts, US forces in Southwest Asia had unique capabilities to identify losses due to fratricide. These included the use of weapon-mounted video cameras to record hits and depleted uranium rounds that unequivocally marked their targets as US hits. The short duration of the Persian Gulf War also allowed for immediate attention to be focused on battle damage evaluations. In essence, the new conditions of this war allowed for the most accurate accounting of fratricide events we have ever attempted.

So it is against this background of historically high fratricide rates, significant training fratricide rates, behavioral research, and more accurate determination of weapon results that the Persian Gulf War data should be viewed. Clearly a new course on fratricide prevention needs to be charted to prevent our next experience from mirroring the past.

Implications

The view of fratricide presented here calls for a reexamination of many issues. Here are some that seem to be among the most important.

• *Fratricide prevention must have high priority because our fratricide rates will become a serious political and ethical issue in future conflicts.* Public outrage over continued high fratricide rates—the ten to 15 percent suggested here—could make it politically impossible to prosecute a war successfully. Because the country understands the meaning of fratricide, the public may well ask, Why was this not fixed after Desert Storm? Discussions about using the wrong method of calculation or a more-palatable denominator will be irrelevant. Charles Shrader made the point that "whether the loss, permanent or temporary, of 2 percent of the nation's military in a given conflict is significant and thus demands an extraordinary application of resources to avoid is a question that must be answered at the highest policy levels."[51] With evidence to suggest that rates may be at least five times that high, we should give full attention and additional funding to fratricide prevention. We cannot repeat the Gulf War fratricide rates in a future conflict.

• *Reducing fratricide rates will provide a significant battlefield advantage for the American military.* As Colonel Shrader remarked, "The impact of amicicide [fratricide] on combat power is geometric, not linear. Each fratricide incident represents one bomb, shell, or bullet that should have fallen on the enemy to reduce his combat power rather than our own."[52] Our foes on the battlefield suffer as we do from reduction in baseline performance ability of weapon systems and the decline in human abilities related to the tempo of combat operations. Any significant improvement in fratricide rate for our forces will put our foes at an additional disadvantage. And the advantage is not only on the combat end of the equation. Every friendly tank or vehicle spared the effects of friendly fire is one less that has to be "force projected."

Current US strategy involves harnessing technology to give us an edge on the battlefield. A 50-percent reduction in fratricide rates translates to a five- to eight-percent increase in combat power. The opposite is also true: allowing the fratricide rate to rise because of emerging battlefield characteristics will significantly degrade our ability to fight and win. This is another aspect of the technological edge we can leverage.

● *Measures presently in use are not effective enough to reduce fratricide incidents.* The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) states in their 1992 newsletter *Fratricide: Reducing Self-Inflicted Losses*: "The key to solving fratricide problems is detailed planning and rehearsals to minimize predictable risks."[53] If these efforts were sufficient, incidents of fratricide would fluctuate by unit based on planning and rehearsal, not by type of engagement, as data from the NTC show. Yet even after intensive training, planning, and rehearsals before the Desert Storm ground campaign, the residual rate of fratricide remained unacceptably high. Nor are the high rates at our combat training centers the result of ignorance, indifference, or inattention to doctrine. Instead, all the data argue for an inherent, intrinsic risk associated with each type of maneuver, rather than relative rates subject to control by planning or rehearsal. While planning is certainly important to keep fratricide incidents low, it will continue to have only a limited effect on the rate. Because of the pace of modern warfare and the degradation of human performance during continuous operations, we may be approaching the minimum levels of fratricide attainable using current preventive methods.

As an interim measure, a reemphasis on the importance of sleep discipline will begin to address the steep decrements in performance and judgment associated with sleep deprivation. Initial emphasis must be on those personnel in command and control centers and key leaders from platoon level up. The heavy responsibilities of command and the continuous tempo of warfare will make this measure difficult to enforce, yet the means must be found to do so.

● *The modern battlefield is predisposed to increased fratricide rates.* Modern combat limits many fratricide prevention measures, including heightened planning and rehearsals, from being applied:

> Continuous land operations [are part of] advanced warfare. [They are] made possible by the almost complete mechanization of land combat forces and by the technology that permits effective movement at night, in poor weather, and in other low visibility conditions. . . . The reasons that armies have traditionally paused in battle—darkness, resupply, regrouping—have been overcome largely by technological advances.[54]

One of the potentially weak links on the modern battlefield is the Army's most sophisticated system, the soldier. Continuous operations at times require human participants to exercise ability and judgment at a superhuman pace, a

fact that is repeatedly overlooked by scholars and soldiers alike. Recent publications speak about fratricide as a result of direct human error, fire discipline, carelessness, and lack of coordination.[55] These statements are true but do not go far enough. These errors are natural outcomes of human behavior in the environment into which we have placed soldiers. While the AirLand Battle concept may be terribly effective against the enemy, by its very nature it is also hazardous to friendly troops.

• *Technology will permit the development and routine use of an IFF-type of system for ground warfare.* During the Gulf War, methods of acquiring targets in armored divisions were consistent at 3000 meters, with first round hits at 2500 meters, often beyond the ability of tank crews to identify the target consistently. Technologies exist in our laboratories that allow acquisition of targets at 4000 meters, with the potential of acquisition at 5000-7000 meters in several years.[56] These ranges are well beyond visual identification abilities even with visual aids. The air-to-ground Maverick missile shares this same mismatch between technology and human behavior. It must be fired as the aircraft approaches its ground target before visual identification of the target is possible. The missiles lock onto targets and do not discriminate between friend or foe.[57] The sophistication and range of modern weapons have outpaced the ability of humans in the system to identify many targets with sufficient assurance to preclude fratricide incidents. We need an improved ability to identify targets out to the maximum range of weapon and target acquisition with much lower probabilities for error than is now possible.[58] Technology will have to provide an answer to this problem for surface warfare, much as it solved the problem for air warfare.

• *Similar or identical weapon systems in the hands of friend and foe will push us inexorably toward ground IFF technology.* Many US weapons are widely sold or reproduced throughout the world. It is possible that future adversaries will possess vehicles, tanks, and weapon systems that are identical to ours. Sorting out friend or foe in night combat, combat with fluid lines, and in close air support missions will be impossible with present methods.

Even weapon systems on opposing sides that are developed independently are often distressingly similar in appearance. They look alike and have the same characteristics because of technical and engineering requirements used to enhance capabilities—a trend called convergent evolution. Military helicopters are a good example of this tendency for equipment to appear similar although developed independently, as the tragedy over Iraq demonstrated.

• *Joint doctrine will require us to revisit the issue.* Joint operations require complex coordination and command and control arrangements. Close air support historically has been plagued with difficulties in identifying friendly forces on the ground. The continued movement toward joint close air support under a single air manager will involve Navy, Air Force, and Army

aircraft traveling hundreds of miles an hour with seconds over a target to discriminate between friend and foe. These are optimal conditions for fratricide. The operations of different services will have to be integrated to an extent not yet attempted. And this article has not even mentioned the potential for fratricide in coalition or combined operations.

• *The force projection pillar of our National Military Strategy will increase factors favorable to fratricide.* Cold War doctrine used the principle of forward defense, initially employing troops already overseas, combat-ready, oriented to the terrain, and adjusted to the time zone. The new strategy of force projection can insert large numbers of troops into a hostile, unfamiliar area after considerable travel time with its concomitant lack of sleep, time zone changes, and disruption of diurnal rhythms. All these circumstances produce serious degradation of ability and judgment. The Persian Gulf War allowed weeks to train and acclimatize after the last combat units closed in theater. Fratricide will get worse under more difficult operational circumstances.

• *A future battlefield that includes a nuclear, biological, or chemical environment will increase fratricide rates.* Careful research on the effects of Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) equipment demonstrates up to a fourfold increase in fratricide rates over baseline data when wearing this equipment for long periods of time. The MOPP equipment causes tremendous problems with vision and hearing. These sensing abilities are critical for command and control and coordinated physical performance,[59] areas where we already have seen that significant degradation produces conditions conducive to fratricide.

• *An additional component needs to be added to our current plan for fratricide reduction.* This has only recently become apparent. A 1982 TRADOC study concludes, "There is no significant evidence to indicate that existing operational command and control procedures are not sufficient to control fratricide to acceptable operational levels,"[60] an assertion that we must examine closely. High fratricide rates persist in spite of preventive measures; the evidence is in our combat training centers and our recent wars. Our soldiers need help in distinguishing between friend and foe.

A technological solution has generally been effective for the Air Force. Their identification friend or foe (IFF) system, which uses transmitters that permit pilots to query an IFF system on board an approaching aircraft, has successfully dealt with closing with targets before visual identification is possible. The appropriate return signal identifies a friendly aircraft: otherwise it is considered the enemy. During the six-week Persian Gulf War air campaign, when tens of thousands of air sorties were flown, there were no incidents of air-on-air fratricide. An integrated ground system has the same potential.

Such technological solutions to address the fratricide issue have met with some hostility:

There appears to be an unwarranted faith in eliminating amicicide [fratricide] through the application of some technological remedy. . . . The solutions to the problem of friendly fire, if any, are more likely to be human rather than mechanical. Increased emphasis on training, combat conditioning, fire discipline, planning and coordination of operations, and keeping the troops informed is likely to produce more joy than all the expensive technological toys combined. [61]

This source attributes fratricide to carelessness, stress of combat, lack of training, lack of discipline and fire control, and lack of coordination.[62] Studies of human behavior make clear that of these causes, all except lack of training have been demonstrated to degrade quickly during combat and are not amenable to compensation through training. Prevention of errors in these instances requires different kinds of controls than have heretofore been available in ground combat operations.[63]

The benefit to be gained from technology is at minimum a safety check, with no upper limit on the potential for control and coordination measures. It adds another dimension of the known to all the unknowns of the battlefield. It can help to compensate for the anxiety, fear, uncertainty, and exhaustion that are the seeds of fratricide. These factors have been with us since the beginning of modern armies, and successive strategies to deal with them have brought us to where we are today. Introducing technology to counter fratricide in ground combat operations is one of the few options we have not exercised.

• *We need consistency in our terms and methods of calculating fratricide.* The fratricide calculations at JRTC (see Table 1) use the first method discussed (friendly casualties from friendly fire, divided by total friendly casualties). Those calculations are consistent with the method used in all the historical evidence presented. The fratricide data from NTC use a method easily converted to the second method of calculation, with the denominator being enemy casualties. The recently published Center for Army Lessons Learned newsletter on fratricide juxtaposes these two very different fratricide calculations, derived by different methodology because of different logic. In the same newsletter CMTC data are noted to have a "similar" experience although in reality the data are not comparable.[64]

Confusion over methodology has notable implications. That the two methods of fratricide calculation at present are somewhat similar in final result is coincidental; the methods are based on fundamentally different assumptions and relationships. Using the data from both interchangeably is confusing and will produce incorrect conclusions unless carefully explained. A common method of calculation should be used to facilitate cross analysis and understanding of training center experiences. The combat training centers should have the capability to use as the "gold standard" the second method, which reflects the efficiency of inflicting harm on the enemy (friendly casu-

alties caused by friendly fire, divided by enemy casualties). Instrumentation at the training centers could allow this kind of data to be captured and analyzed. It may be that our high-technology weaponry is very efficient in dispatching the enemy. If so, fratricide rates from this method will be low.

Unfortunately this denominator (enemy casualties) has not been available in combat operations, nor can anyone reasonably expect it to be available in future conflicts. We thus will have to settle for the historical method of presenting fratricide in war by using method one: percent of friendly casualties due to friendly fire, divided by total friendly casualties. Comparing fratricide data from war and training centers therefore will require the use of both methods; any mixing of methods needs to be carefully labeled and understood. There is one potential advantage to be gained from this recommendation. If fratricide rates are really lower by method two (which is not borne out by NTC data), comparable results from our combat training centers calculated using both methods will allow us to explain our fratricide rates in war. We ought to be able to develop the means to make the conversion from one method to the other as routine as we now calculate other aspects of combat operations.

• *We must take the known limitations of human performance into account when running computer simulations and testing equipment for the battlefield.* The body of knowledge addressing human abilities in continuous operations has been well articulated for the last 20 years. The steep decline in human abilities due to stressors like sleep deprivation has long been recognized. We need to incorporate this knowledge into simulations, whether of operations or weapon capabilities, to allow us to compensate for decline in individual abilities over time in combat. Few studies take into account this decline. The requirement to do so in support of sustained ground operations by a small Army and Marine Corps is almost self-evident.

The Future

Fortunately, a reassessment of the priority given to fratricide prevention is beginning. After the Persian Gulf War, the House Armed Services Committee requested that the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) review the technology and techniques available to reduce fratricide.[65] This excellent review concluded that the technology for avoiding fratricide of land surface targets lags behind the technology important to avoiding aircraft accidents.[66] It advocates priority funding to find better solutions. Our land systems are acquiring the same characteristics as those of aircraft—rapid movement, short closing intervals to determine friend or foe, and usually lethal first shots. The OTA report, however, does not emphasize the tremendous effect of stressors on abilities and judgment.

Defense Department guidelines have assigned the Army as the lead agency for ground-on-ground and air-on-ground combat identification sys-

tems. It appears the Army is moving along two fronts. The Army Materiel Command is pursuing two technologies to deal with combat identification and situational awareness. The Training and Doctrine Command is approaching the problem from the standpoint of leader development. These are mutually supporting strategies. As one writer notes, "Technology is a great enhancer, and it supplements what is really the glue that holds the Army together—training and discipline." [67]

The 1st Cavalry Division is scheduled to be the first unit "digitized"— in 1996—under a long-established effort to improve combat effectiveness. Digitization of the battlefield refers to the process in which voice, text, and maps are converted into computer code. By linking forces on the battlefield into a single digital network, a commander can "see" the battlefield on a screen. This enables a commander to increase concentration and synchronization of fires, improve intelligence collection, and, one hopes, reduce fratricide by increasing situational awareness and combat identification.[68] This system was not conceived as an anti-fratricide system, although it could aid in that effort. Still, it will be of no help to dismounted infantry not accompanied by vehicles. A recently announced acceleration of fielding calls for the entire XVIII Airborne Corps to be digitized by the end of the century.[69] However, sufficient funding for the entire Army is thought to be a serious problem.

A specific fratricide prevention measure under development is the millimeter-wave (MMW) device. This system, similar to the Air Force IFF system, sends out an interrogating signal that queries a target vehicle. If there is an appropriate coded response, the target is identified as friendly. This vehicle-mounted system will not, however, aid dismounted soldiers. A field test of the MMW device is expected in 1996. It will be expensive to provide each vehicle on the battlefield with such a device.

With regard to the fighting soldier, one point is certain. Soldiers who are casualties of friendly fire are no less brave or courageous. Many soldiers go into battle knowing the risks include fratricide, having met the issue at our combat training centers and observed its occurrence in training. A sort of gallows humor surrounds it. During World War II, the US Ninth Air Force was so often off target and on friendly forces that they were dubbed "The American Luftwaffe."[70] German troops in World War I resorted to calling their 49th Field Artillery Regiment the 48½ because of the unit's propensity to fire short rounds on them.[71] The soldiers of the future will continue to have fratricide as their unwelcome companion on the battlefield. We must use every possible means to reduce the rate.

Finally, what should our attitude be toward those who, under conditions of high stress and fatigue, are discovered to have inflicted friendly casualties while demonstrating no negligence? Even under the best of circumstances, if such a term can be used in regard to war, fratricide will occur. The

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evidence presented here suggests its inevitability due to mismatches between weapon capabilities and the endurance of weapon crews. With the failure of measures to prevent fratricide, should we subject these individuals—whom we have placed in a position of such certain errors—to the guilt of a mistake that is not entirely theirs? The modern battlefield's vigorous, violent, continuous combat assures fratricide. Until an adequate combat identification system is in place, there will be many such individuals in every conflict.

Conclusion

This article does not blame anyone for the past. Rather, the charge to our present and future leaders is clear: We need a solution to this problem. Had alleviating fratricide been possible during this century, the effects would have been tremendous. If a conservative US fratricide estimate of ten percent is used for 20th-century conflicts, the following fratricide casualties result: 5000 killed and 23,000 wounded in World War I; 19,000 killed and 72,000 wounded in World War II, 5400 killed and 10,300 wounded in the Korean War, and 5800 killed and 36,500 wounded in Vietnam. For more recent conflicts we have the actual counts presented earlier. The aggregate total is approximately 177,000 casualties. A 15-percent fratricide rate is equivalent to a quarter of a million casualties in the 20th century. The technology that increases the lethality of ground combat provides the means to reduce its effect on friendly troops.

• We must acknowledge the magnitude of the problem. Fratricide rates have been, conservatively, ten to 15 percent of our casualties, not two percent. The magnitude of this aspect of war's friction is a burden every 20th-century soldier has had to carry. When fratricide is explained in terms of human inability to cope with the stressors of the battlefield, instead of human error or stupidity, it will become clear that something besides training is needed. The American people will support funding the effort for solutions.

• The time has come for a technological initiative to decrease fratricide. The historical fratricide rate and combat training center data confirm the need. The battlefield trends of the future will require it, and we

must sustain the effort to find appropriate solutions for it. Reduction, if not elimination, of fratricide will increase our combat power relative to our foe, conserve our resources, and most important, protect and save human lives. Prototypes are being funded and fielded.

• An armed forces-wide common strategy in fratricide calculation, presentation, and research needs to be developed. The present system is confusing to the military and to the public. There are no Navy, Marine, joint, or DOD definitions. Fratricide is a joint issue, but only TRADOC has advanced a definition of it. We must have common definitions and calculation standards to understand one another. Achieving that in our dialogue will facilitate development of preventive measures and doctrine applicable to all services.

• Research has suggested the limitations of human ability and judgment under combat conditions. The relationship between weapon systems and human judgment requirements needs to be carefully studied. Some present-day weapon systems rely on human judgment under conditions and distances where such judgment is known to be faulty. Intervention in these areas will be required.

This article relies to a great degree on data involving the Army, but the problems articulated here are joint ones. The Persian Gulf War was a paradigm of what is to come, and the services must find solutions to fratricide together. As Colonel Shrader remarked, "It may well be that in the fog of war, friendly fire casualties are inevitable, but this solemn observation does not absolve the armed forces from doing everything in their power to eliminate the problem."[72] It is an investment of energy, time, and money we can afford to make.

NOTES

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Ethnic Conflict: The Perils of Military Intervention

WILLIAM A. STOFFT and GARY L. GUERTNER

"History is littered with the wreck of states that tried to combine diverse
ethnic or linguistic or religious groups within a single sovereignty."[1]
— Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

E thnic conflict is an elemental force in international politics and a signifi-
cant threat to regional security and stability. Ethnicity as a source of
conflict has deep historic roots. Many such conflicts have lain dormant in our
lifetimes, suppressed by the Soviet empire or overshadowed by the ideologi-
cal competition of the Cold War, whose protagonists demonstrated unwar-
ranted optimism about their ability to defuse ethnicity and ethnic conflict.
Marxists believed that ethnicity would give way to "proletarian internation-
alism." Social class and economic welfare would determine both self-identity
and loyalty to political institutions that would transcend ethnic identification
or religious affiliation.

Western democracies assumed that "nation-building" and economic
development were not only vital components in the strategy to contain
communist expansion, but that capitalism, economic prosperity, and liberal
democratic values also would create free societies with a level of political
development measured by loyalty to the state rather than to the narrower
ethnic group. Instead, the goals of assimilation and integration within the
larger context of economic and political development are being replaced by
violent ethnic corrections to artificially imposed state boundaries. The Balkan
and Transcaucasian conflicts, for example, are ancient in origin and have as
their object the territorial displacement of entire ethnic groups. Such conflicts
by their nature defy efforts at mediation from outside, since they are fed by
passions that do not yield to rational political compromise. They are, as John

Keegan describes in his most recent study of war, apolitical to a degree for which Western strategists have made little allowance.[2]

The demise of European communism and the Russian empire has unleashed this century's third wave of ethnic nationalism and conflict. The first, in the wake of the collapsing Ottoman, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian empires, came to a climax after World War I; the second followed the end of European colonialism after World War II. The third wave of ethnic-based conflict may transform international politics and confront the United States with new security challenges.[3]

The extent of the historic transformation under way since the Cold War will be determined by the interplay of many trends, some cyclical like ethnic conflict, and some historically unique. Cyclical trends include the violence that follows failed empires and states, economic scarcity, environmental degradation, epidemics, mass migrations, and even ethnic cleansing. Historically unique trends which make the post-Cold War world unpredictable include global transparency and communications, mobility, proliferation of military technology, including weapons of mass destruction, and the potential scope of environmental changes caused by unprecedented assaults from population growth, industrialization, pollution, climatic change, and the emergence of new, virulent diseases. These trends are capable of producing synergistic effects that fast-forward systemic collapse in the Third World, reducing the radius of trust and loyalty to ethnic kinsmen, tribe, clan, or religious group.

The United States and its allies are faced with intractable zones of hostility in failed, fragmenting states that resemble the anarchy of the pre-nation-state system. Failed states are inevitably altered when, as Martin van Creveld noted, warring factions wrest the legal monopoly of armed force from official hands and create an environment in which the distinctions between war and crime are lost in a rising tide of violence and anarchy.[4] Somalia, Bosnia,

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Haiti, Peru, Rwanda, Sudan, Chad, Liberia, and most recently Chechnya provide evidence to support Van Creveld's hypothesis.

These trends are not indicators of an inevitable dark age of ethnic conflict. They are, however, warnings to both our military and civilian leadership that we face an unprecedented number of conflicts ranging from high-tech forces emerging from the military-technical revolution to primitive inter-clan, urban warfare. The primary interest for the US Army is to protect our national interests when they are at risk from any of these trends.

Implications for Military Strategy

Emerging patterns of ethnic conflict are forcing Americans to reexamine long-held principles. Self-determination, for example, seemed morally clear and compelling in President Wilson's Fourteen Points designed to formalize the liberation of small states from European empires after World War I. These same principles were equally compelling when Roosevelt applied them to European colonial empires at the end of World War II.

The third wave of ethnic conflict confronts policymakers with more complex patterns, patterns that cannot be resolved by idealist policies based on self-determination. What, for example, is a reasonable unit of self-determination? Is it every ethnic group that wants a sovereign territorial state? Where does the proliferation of states end? How does "reunion" take place if the process begins to reverse itself? Are US interests better served by support for the integrity of existing states or their fragmentation? How does support for the status quo square with our political history and contemporary world view?

Thinking about these challenges begins with the *National Security Strategy*. A specific national security goal of the United States is the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. These objectives require political and economic strategies based on the recognition that not all ethnic conflict is synonymous with a desire for separatism or secession. Regional stability may be underwritten by support for civil rights movements or greater autonomy for ethnic groups within an existing state. How another sovereign state shares political and economic power within its own borders is not a problem for US military leaders until efforts to achieve peaceful integration and assimilation erupt into violence, terrorism, insurgency, or patterns of repression that threaten to destabilize an ally or a region in which the United States has a clear interest at risk.

The line between appropriate US political support for stability and peaceful resolution of ethnic-based civil conflict, on the one hand, and a military strategy to deal with ethnic-based regional instability, on the other, needs to be drawn with some degree of precision. Understanding patterns of ethnic conflict is an essential starting point for military strategy, because each case varies in its causes, potential for escalation, and probability of successful intervention. Mili-

tary strategy and operational plans must be tailored to counter an adversary's specific capabilities and centers of gravity. Such an understanding also provides good historic indicators for the intractability of any such conflict, the potential for domestic and international support for it, and the degree to which US military options could achieve desired goals at acceptable costs.

Patterns of Ethnic Conflict

The academic literature on ethnicity and ethnic conflict is extensive and controversial. This study uses Donald Horowitz's working definition of ethnicity: a narrow self-identification and basis for affiliation, loyalty, and action, but elastic enough to embrace groups differentiated by race, color, religion, language, regional origin, tribe, or nationality.[5] This section addresses those patterns of ethnic conflict that are the most threatening to regional stability:[6]

- Communal violence
- Repression of ethnic enclaves
- Irredentism and retrieval
- Separatist movements

Communal Violence

Communal violence can result from an ethnic mosaic or intermingling of groups, often through centuries of conquests, migrations, and dislocations. Ethnic groups can be distributed so haphazardly that it becomes difficult to discern a discrete territorial unit inhabited by specific nationalities or ethnic groups. Many of the groups evidencing this pattern have lived side by side with one another, usually in a segregated fashion, for dozens of generations. Nowhere is this better typified than in India, where one commonly finds a Muslim side of a village and a Hindu side of a village. Jerusalem, as well as Sarajevo, each with its respective ethnic or religious quarters, typifies this distribution pattern, as does Beirut. Each of these cities can attest that the volatile mix of ethnic groups can lead to intense violence.

These types of societies are given to periodic and virulent outbursts of conflict. Bosnia, for example, combines at least three patterns of ethnic conflict—communal violence, repression of ethnic enclaves (variously by all three parties), and irredentism or retrieval of adjacent enclaves of ethnic kinsmen. The Bosnia example is made more complex and tragic because Bosnia is bordered on two sides by independent states, Serbia and Croatia, seeking to annex large segments of its territory. As discussed below, these complex patterns, vital parts of policy development, must be understood and accounted for by strategists when deciding whether or how to apply military forces.

Repression of Ethnic Enclaves

Enclaves are most often created through the process of imperial exhaustion. The collapse of empires and the emergence of newly independent

states usually produce pockets of stranded co-ethnics in territory no longer under a former imperial power's control. Ethnic populations living within enclaves have both contemporary affiliations to, and historic claims upon, the territory which they inhabit within their host state.

Host state repression of enclaves may take the form of human rights abuses committed against stateless minorities (Azeris in Armenia, Kurds in Iraq or Turkey, and Baluchis in Pakistan, for example). More often, however, threats to large ethnic enclaves can have the potential for escalation when the enclaves have patron states on or near the borders of repressor states. Examples that have flared up—or have the potential to do so—include Hungarians in Slovakia, Russians in newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union, Armenians in Azerbaijan, and Moslems in Bosnia.

Azerbaijan provides an instructive lesson for newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union not to discriminate against their Russian minority. Armenia is attempting to claim an enclave of ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh by capturing a corridor linking it to the enclave. The reclamation of an enclave generally means the inclusion of people who are not of that ethnic or national group, creating an entirely new enclave. In such a situation, the reclaiming state may have to accede to some sort of guarantee regarding the rights of the newly created minority population, or else engage in the types of large-scale "population transfers" which occurred at various times within the Soviet Union and at the end of World War I and World War II.

More extreme solutions are at work in Bosnia, where one finds many islands of Serbs distributed in de facto enclaves as well as in the communal mosaic described above. The Bosnian Serb nationalists, in concert with the Serbian military, have sought to reclaim these enclaves throughout Bosnia, again through the establishment of what they call corridors. Implicit in the creation of these corridors is the recognition that one will have to "reclaim" individuals who are not co-ethnics, leading to the creation of new enclaves. Rather than live with this condition, the Bosnian Serbs have engaged in "ethnic cleansing," a benign term when describing expulsion from one's homeland. When they use it to describe genocide they demonstrate the banality of evil.

The use or establishment of corridors to make enclaves territorially contiguous is not without historical precedent. The so-called "Polish Corridor" that connected the Baltic Coast with Poland during the period between World War I and World War II created a German enclave in East Prussia that was forcefully reclaimed by Hitler. At Yalta, this former German enclave became part of the Soviet Union; today it is Kaliningrad, the only noncontiguous portion of Russia, separated from it by Lithuania. Ethnic enclaves have been and will continue to be sources of regional instability.

Closely related to the enclave problem, but with greater potential for conflict, are patterns where national boundaries divide ethnic groups between two sovereign states.

Irredentism and Retrieval

Irredentism, one state's attempt to claim or reincorporate contiguous territory occupied by ethnic kinsmen, often occurs after the deliberate transfer of terrain, as from losers to victors. The Pola region between Italy and the former Yugoslavia, the Alsace-Lorraine region of France, and Italy's acquisition of the Northern Tyrol are examples of deliberate transfers of terrain and populations that created irredentist movements. In Europe irredentas were often created in the aftermath of major power conflict, such as the two World Wars. Hitler, for example, used irredentist pretexts to incorporate Austria and the Sudetenland. In the Third World, irredentist claims are most often attributable to the capricious fashion in which the boundaries for colonial empires were delineated. The policies of the Russians in Kazakhstan, Somalis in Ethiopia, and Tajiks in Afghanistan are a few current examples of this enduring consequence of geopolitical maneuvering.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, a whole new array of real and potential irredentas has been spawned. The Soviet Union was loathe to launch irredentist or other ethnic-based claims for fear of riling ethnic tensions both within and outside the USSR. The same is no longer true of the new nationalist regimes created by the Soviet empire's fall. Nationalists in newly independent republics inspire their counterparts in Russia, many of whom are prepared to mobilize Russians to retake the lost empire. Ethnic-based claims reinforced by repression anywhere against the 25 million Russians living in the newly independent republics are likely, along with economic chaos, to resonate as the most effective rallying call for extremists.

Regional conflict stemming from new irredentist-retrieval patterns is not limited to the former Soviet Union. We find ourselves in a period of profound international transformation in which nationalist, including irredentist, claims will be more frequent than during the more stable bipolar period of the Cold War. As one leading expert has warned:

> Irredentism has been a by-product of transition and uncertainty in the international order. Irredentist propensities may lie dormant for years and then erupt when interstate arrangements are destabilized. The latent and overt phases of irredentism are therefore closely connected to occurrences in the international arena in general and regional politics in particular.[7]

Secessionist Movements

Separatist or secessionist movements are not always ethnic-based or motivated, but they nearly always result in or are affected by some degree of ethnic conflict. The former Soviet Union, for example, did not fragment along purely ethnic lines. Indeed, as discussed above, each of the new states in the Commonwealth of Independent States is confronted with its own internal ethnic conflicts. The last act in this great drama has yet to unfold, and ethnic conflicts

will play a prominent role in determining the former Soviet empire's continued fragmentation or forceful reunion by revanchist Russian nationalism. The rubble in the streets of Grozny is tragic evidence that the boundaries of a new Russian state cannot be consolidated without bloodshed. The challenge for American leaders is to balance our primary interest in the stability and democratization of Russia with violent repression of ethnic separatists.

Historically, most ethnic-based secessionist movements are spawned by failures in integration and assimilation. Eventually convinced that they are unable to compete in an undivided state, often in effect colonized by civil servants and administrators from other regions, and subject to uncongenial policies on language and other important symbolic issues, such groups are apt to seek independence. More often than not, they do so heedless of the economic costs. If the region is economically backward, as the Slovakian Republic (a good but atypical example of peaceful separation), the southern Sudan, the southern Philippines, the former East Pakistan, the hill country of Burma, or Chechnya, secession very likely means a loss of subsidies from the center. One reason people living in such regions nonetheless choose secession is that their political and ethnic goals outweigh the economic benefits that come with the undivided state. Another reason is that the political and economic interests of their elites lie with independence. Rather than be minority political leaders in a heterogeneous larger society, these elites may see independence as making it possible to be at the center of things. If they are junior civil servants, and if other groups have longer traditions of education and have produced many more senior civil servants, they may see independence as making it possible to jump the queue.[8]

Two specific cases of secessionist movements are worth noting because of their potential effects on regional stability and military strategy. The first is the violent but successful independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia. This secessionist victory sets a precedent that may contribute to a domino effect throughout Africa, where some degree of regional stability had been achieved by the acceptance of colonial borders, no matter how arbitrarily they may have been drawn.

The second example of ethnic-based separatism is illustrated by stateless minorities who form recognizable enclaves shared by two or more states. The Kurds in Iraq and Turkey or the Baluchis in Pakistan and Afghanistan are examples. The case of the Kurds in Iraq is especially challenging because their fate led to an ongoing mission to provide humanitarian relief and security to their enclave in northern Iraq. In Turkey, the Kurds have the potential for destabilizing not only a region, but also a US ally that plays a strategic role in both Europe and the Middle East.

Separatist movements in general demonstrate the paradox confronting US national security strategy. Political, economic, and military strategies must be carefully coordinated through the interagency process to avoid what may seem in some regions of the world to be paradoxical, if not contradictory,

US objectives. The enlargement of democracy, as the strategic objective that replaced the containment of communism, will produce both the desire for self- and group-expression and the electoral vehicles by which to promote separatist ambitions.[9] This is why the Administration has clearly stated that the national security strategy of the United States is not to embark on an idealistic, global crusade. Selectivity and discriminate military intervention are guides to both our involvement in ethnic conflicts and our parallel efforts to enlarge democracy. Moral commitments cannot multiply while military resources decline. The guiding principle is the degree of risk to a clearly identifiable US interest. We know how to say no to intervention, and we will encourage others, including the United Nations, to say no as well.[10]

Implications for the Army

The patterns of ethnic conflict described here will continue to erupt in human rights violations, terrorism, insurgency, civil conflict, territorial disputes, and open warfare. These events produce economic dislocations, refugees, and mass migrations which contribute to the domino effects through which a clan struggle can engulf an entire region.

While our ability to affect the root causes of centuries-old ethnic conflicts is marginal, few ethnic conflicts in the world pose direct threats to US security. As the last global superpower, however, the United States plays a leading role in the promotion of collective security and the protection of human rights. Moreover, there is reason to believe that domestic political pressures for US participation in multinational efforts to alleviate the consequences of ethnic conflict will grow as the result of global transparency and near real-time news coverage of violence everywhere in the world. Violence is no longer remote or abstract. When ethnic violence and human suffering are on display in our living rooms every night, they raise two questions for the Army: Under what conditions should the leadership recommend that US forces participate either unilaterally or in coalition to contain or terminate an ethnic-based conflict? What specific military requirements are needed for the wide range of operations that ethnic conflicts may require?

Under What Conditions Should Military Force Be Introduced?

Military leaders can play a vital role in the interagency decisionmaking process. This process should clearly assess US interests and objectives against the risks and costs of intervention. The risks of military intervention in ethnic-based conflicts are high. Deeply rooted, and in some cases intractable, ethnic conflicts may be driven by emotional rather than material interests. Economic and political incentives may neither satisfy nor suppress the combatants. The risk of escalation is high, especially when ethnic combatants have kinsmen or patron states in the region. Escalation may also include terrorism directed against the United States. Military objectives and centers

of gravity in such conflicts will be difficult to identify, difficult to attack, and may lie beyond imposed political constraints.[11]

This last point lies at the heart of civil-military decisionmaking. Civilian leadership identifies the broad political objectives and acceptable levels of cost and risk. Military leadership is responsible for a military strategy that can achieve political objectives. Reconciling the two requires a clear delineation of political constraints and an equally clear assessment of military objectives and centers of gravity that must be attacked to achieve both military and political objectives. If centers of gravity, the most vital military targets, lie beyond the political constraints imposed by the nation's leadership, military intervention is unlikely to succeed. Typical political constraints on military intervention in ethnic (or other) conflicts include:

- Lack of support by Congress and the American people
- Limited UN mandate
- Lack of political cohesion and compromise to hold and field a coalition force
- A perceived inability to terminate conflict quickly at reasonable costs
- No clearly definable end state
- The need to avoid military targets that might lead to escalation, unacceptable risks, and unacceptable costs
- The need to minimize collateral damage, especially noncombatant casualties
- Media coverage and global transparency

The various patterns of ethnic-based conflict described earlier can complicate the reconciliation of political constraints and effective military targeting against centers of gravity. Typical centers of gravity include:

- Military forces, generally land forces in ethnic conflicts
- Political-military leadership
- External political, economic, military support
- Popular support for ethnic combatants

While the list is neither inclusive nor necessarily applicable to all ethnic-based conflict, it does allow analysis of ethnic conflicts for patterns that could relate conflict centers of gravity to political constraints imposed on US forces during an intervention. If external political, economic, or military support is a center of gravity (Serbia's support of Bosnian Serbs, for example), then regional escalation of a conflict must be an acceptable risk. If land forces are the center of gravity, then the United States must be prepared for a level of effort, including American casualties, required to degrade or destroy those forces. If popular support for ethnic combatants is a center of gravity, then economic and other targets that are punitive to noncombatants must be acceptable.

The difficult reconciliation process between political constraints on war and centers of gravity is vital to the formulation of effective military

> *"Selectivity and discriminate military intervention are guides to both our involvement in ethnic conflicts and our parallel efforts to enlarge democracy. Moral commitments cannot multiply while military resources decline."*

strategy if military force is to be the principal means for conflict termination. Reconciliation is equally important whether in war—situations in which military force is the principle means to achieve national objectives—or in operations other than war—situations in which military power is available but subordinate to political or economic power in conflict resolution. Specific Army capabilities are required in all such situations, however, whether they are called war or operations other than war.

What Army Requirements Are Needed to Respond to Ethnic Conflicts?

This analysis emphasizes that ethnic conflicts stem from deep historical roots that ultimately require political solutions. Military force can never achieve a lasting solution in such conflicts. At best, it can temporarily contain or reduce violence and foster the political conditions and institutions that might lead to a stable environment and a willingness to work toward more enduring solutions. Even given these limited objectives, military contributions to the resolution of ethnic conflicts may require considerable forces, resources, and lives, without assurance from the parties to the conflict of the durability of the changes brought about by the loss of US lives and the expenditure of our resources.[12]

Under current domestic and international political conditions, the Army leadership can make several operational assumptions about their role in responding to ethnic conflicts. First, with the possible exception of humanitarian relief operations, US involvement will not be unilateral. A growing consensus in the post-Cold War world is that in regional conflicts, if military force is to be used, it should be applied collectively; that is, collective uses of military force can be legitimate means to just ends.[13] By contrast, unilateral interventions establish precedents that lead to more bold, potentially destabilizing behavior by other governments. Russian demands for unilateral peacekeeping in their "near-abroad" is one example. Therefore one assumption of this article is that US participation in ethnic conflicts will be virtually synonymous with participation in multilateral peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. This does not

suggest that all peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations are the result of ethnic conflict. Desert Storm provides a powerful example to the contrary.

Second, military commitments will be limited to peacekeeping and to low- and mid-intensity peace-enforcement operations. But peace-enforcement operations are likely to be dominated by land combat, requiring overwhelming military force on the ground to bring any conflict to an early end before public support erodes. Such a display of military capability, in both soldiers and firepower, provides a potent deterrent effect as well on local populations from which hostile forces might otherwise draw support.

Third, a broad range of noncombat operations will be required. It has already been demonstrated that these requirements compete for resources with the readiness requirements for the "nearly two simultaneous" major regional contingencies prescribed in the Bottom-Up Review and in the *National Military Strategy*.

The affordability of the force capable of carrying out the Bottom-Up Review scenario and the feasibility of the concept itself have been challenged in recent months. However, the operational assumptions derived from that policy remain valid until the policy is changed. Those operational assumptions give rise to several specific requirements for the Army:

- Sufficient forces to meet anticipated peace support missions while maintaining the ability to execute major regional contingencies
- Interagency coordination from planning through execution, especially with US private volunteer organizations (PVOs) and non-government organizations (NGOs) from other nations, which can be force multipliers in medical and humanitarian relief missions
- The opportunity to train with and the ability to operate in a multinational force structure
- The ability to deploy trained and ready forces on short notice
- The ability to extricate forces from protracted peacekeeping operations to meet more immediate requirements for major regional contingencies
- Robust programs to train and educate Foreign Area Officers and strategists with language skills for effective regional liaison over the long haul
- Tailored leader development and training programs to include:
  - Regional orientations
  - Root causes and patterns of ethnic conflicts
  - The nature of peacekeeping operations
  - Negotiating skills for officers and NCOs
  - Thorough understanding of Rules of Engagement

The most significant constraint on the Army in meeting the requirements of national policy is in combat service support organizations—medical,

engineers, military police, civil affairs, and psychological operations units—of which there are insufficient numbers to support peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and major regional contingencies. There are three ways in which we might correct these deficiencies: restructure the reserve component to provide additional support capabilities and access to those units in peacetime; add more specialized units to the active force; or, as the President's National Security Advisor has done, declare a clear priority: "We will never compromise military readiness to support peacekeeping. Nor would we hesitate to end our engagement in a peacekeeping operation if that were necessary to concentrate our forces against an adversary in a major conflict."[14]

Declaring priorities does not make the United States an unreliable partner in collective security. It means that peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations are, by definition, burden-sharing enterprises. The United States will honor its commitments and share the burdens of world order. It cannot, however, under current fiscal constraints, carry so large a percentage of the collective security burden that other interests are placed at risk as the result of overcommitment. Peacekeeper's fatigue is a threat to readiness if a declining US force structure is confronted by frequent or protracted deployments.[15]

Two specialized leader development requirements cited above also deserve emphasis here. One is the importance of negotiation skills. Officers and NCOs will be in close contact with combatant and noncombatant groups in situations where decentralized diplomacy and on-the-spot negotiating skills can defuse a volatile situation, possibly saving American, allied, and noncombatant lives. We cannot place the lives of those officers and NCOs at risk by failing to prepare them for the challenges of negotiating under adverse conditions with individuals from other cultures. We have to find ways to adapt our formal training of officers and NCOs to develop the skills they will need to succeed in such situations.

The other calls for thorough understanding of rules of engagement as a critical part of specialized training for ethnic conflicts. Rules of engagement have political significance that resonate far beyond the battlefield. Global transparency, the omnipresent news media, and the political nature of collective security and peacekeeping forge an unprecedented convergence of the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war in the theater of operations. A single infantry unit can bring immediate praise or condemnation from the world community. Similarly, a single explosive event with even a few casualties (as in Somalia) can cause US domestic support for a military intervention to evaporate overnight.

To Conclude

There is a point that needs to be widely understood throughout the defense community: peacekeeping operations generally and ethnic conflicts in particular are land-power dominant. They will require the best of our

traditional combat skills, and they will require our best efforts to be open-minded and innovative in an era of declining resources, ambiguous threats, and additional missions under the umbrella of operations other than war.

These requirements do not mean that ethnic conflicts and peacekeeping operations are the centerpiece of our foreign and defense policies. Our armed forces' primary mission is to fight and win wars. Nevertheless, early, collective participation to contain or dampen ethnic conflicts can protect allies, create breathing room for fledgling democracies, and contribute to regional stability. The interests of the nation and the credibility of the Army demand that we thoroughly understand the complex environments of ethnic conflict before we commit our forces.

NOTES

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1. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), p. 129.

2. John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), p. 58.

3. The most comprehensive, documented post-Cold War study of ethnic conflict is Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).

4. Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 197-207.

5. Donald L. Horowitz, "Ethnic Conflict: The Known and the Unknown," paper presented at the Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C., 23 June 1992, pp. 5-6. Horowitz is recognized as one of the nation's most prolific scholars on ethnicity and ethnic conflict. One of his most significant warnings is to avoid using ethnicity and race as synonymous. He calls this the "figment of the pigment." Groups with identical gene pools can be parties to conflicting ethnic factions. In Bosnia, for example, all factions are predominately Slavic in origin.

6. More comprehensive patterns of ethnic conflict are developed in Tomas A. Hopkins' "Resurgent Nationalism: Ethnic Group Distribution Patterns and Interstate Relations," paper presented at the International Studies Association-West meeting, Phoenix, Ariz., 5-7 November 1992.

7. Naomi Chazan, "Irredentism, Separatism, and Nationalism," in *Irredentism and International Politics*, ed. Naomi Chazan (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 143.

8. Developed in detail by Horowitz, pp. 19-20.

9. The enlargement of democracy theme was developed by Tony Lake. See Daniel Williams, "Clinton's National Security Adviser Outlines U.S. 'Strategy of Enlargement,'" *The Washington Post*, 22 September 1993, p. A16.

10. This was a prominent theme in President Clinton's speech at the UN General Assembly. "Address by the President to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," White House Press Release, 27 September 1993.

11. The authors are indebted to Colonel Bruce Clarke for the relationships between political constraints and centers of gravity. See his "Conflict Termination: A Rational Model," *Journal of Conflict and Terrorism*, 16 (1993), 25-50.

12. This theme is developed by Lieutenant Colonel William T. Johnsen, *Ethnic Conflict in Europe* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 23 December 1994).

13. Morton H. Halperin and David J. Schneffer, *Self-Determination in the New World Order* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), p. 105. See also Daniel Williams, "Clinton Peacekeeping Policy to Set Limits on Use of U.S. Troops," *The Washington Post*, 6 February 1994, p. A24.

14. Tony Lake, "The Limits of Peacekeeping," *The New York Times*, 6 February 1994, p. E17.

15. This problem was described by Secretary of the Army Togo West. See Steve Vogel, "Secretary Concerned that Frequent Deployments Will Run Troops Ragged," *Army Times*, 28 February 1994, p. 4.

New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decisionmaking Institutions

PETER J. SPIRO

It is becoming increasingly difficult to use the word "we" in the context of international affairs. Until recently, it was assumed to denote those who shared the speaker's affiliation with a particular nation-state. But in the post-Cold War context, such affiliation no longer necessarily defines the interests or even allegiances of the individual at the international level. Dramatically multiplied transnational contacts at all levels of society have not only resulted in a greater awareness of the global context, but have also created new commonalities of identity that cut across national borders and challenge governments at the level of individual loyalties.

Environmentalists, human rights activists, women, children, animal rights advocates, consumers, the disabled, gays, and indigenous peoples have all gone international, following the example set long ago by religious denominations and the labor movement. These groups have developed distinct agendas at the global level and in the form of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) they are working with increasing sophistication to further these interests in international institutions.

NGOs have emerged as prime movers on a broad range of global issues, framing agendas, mobilizing constituencies toward targeted results, and monitoring compliance as a sort of new world police force. International

regimes protecting human rights and the environment would arguably amount to nothing without initial and continuing NGO pressure, presaging a next wave of less developed but emerging norms that recognize other major nonnational interests and groupings. The corporate community is likewise asserting itself at the international level, often in counterpoint to the global public-interest community. The phenomenon even has its sub rosa parallel in the world of international criminal syndicates.

In some places, of course, nationalism has reasserted itself, often with ugly consequences. But even this resurgence has led to gains for NGOs, particularly where nationalism has weakened or destroyed state structures. Governments in many of the new countries of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, for example, have only a partial hold on their own territory, creating unprecedented opportunities for NGOs as service providers and instruments of civil society, as Lester Salamon has recently documented in *Foreign Affairs*.[1] And at the level of international institutions, the greater number of less powerful governmental representatives only makes NGO elements more significant by comparison. It is almost as if the world has arrived at a sort of neomedievalism in which the institutions and sources of authority are multifarious. Just as the leader of the Knights Templars or of the Franciscan order outranked all but the most powerful of princes, so too the secretary general of Amnesty International and the chief executive officer of Royal Dutch Shell cast far longer shadows on the international stage than do the leaders of Moldova, Namibia, or Nauru. The state may not be quite ready to wither away, but it's not what it used to be.[2]

At the same time as NGOs and the communities they represent emerge as serious international players, however, their impact is inadequately reflected in international law or in the formal structure of international institutions. In line with the doctrine of sovereignty and its conception of the state as the exclusive building block of international relations, international organizations have themselves made little room to formally acknowledge the significance of non-state communities, maintaining themselves for the most part as purely intergovernmental bodies. It may be time to reexamine this policy of exclusion. Bringing NGOs more deeply into the fold of international institutions—in the United Nations (UN), regional organizations, treaty-making bodies, international financial institutions (IFIs), and the organs of world trade—could enhance the legitimacy of those institutions, as well as promote greater responsibility among the NGOs themselves.

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New World Openings and the Rise of NGOs

It is not that NGOs are new to the world scene or to international organizations. The Catholic Church at one time overshadowed its secular rivals, and it remains to this day the most prominent non-state actor, as well as the only one widely accepted as a sovereign entity. The establishment of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society in 1838 marked the appearance of the first modern NGO. The labor movement had in place formidable international wings by the early part of this century, as did international business, and both were extended formal representation in the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

Labor and business NGOs, as well as NGOs with expertise in such fields as international law, transportation, communications, agriculture, and health, were welcome participants in League of Nations policymaking, in some contexts voting on and signing League instruments (as did the International Chamber of Commerce in several instances). At the San Francisco conference in 1945, nongovernmental representatives were instrumental in weaving a human rights theme through the UN Charter. But the extreme superpower polarization of the 1950s and 1960s effectively marginalized NGOs, at least as far as they might otherwise have constituted a significant third force.

The founding of Amnesty International in 1961 laid the cornerstone of the powerfully independent NGO community of today. Genuinely transnational and unaligned, Amnesty International was uncompromising in taking up the rights of individuals against the traditional rights of sovereigns and unafraid in confronting states with their misdeeds. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF), also established in 1961, filled a similar role in the protection of the environment, as did other groups on issues relating to refugees, population control, nonproliferation, and economic development.

At their start, groups such as Amnesty International and the WWF tended to be elite-driven, much as were many of their League precursors. They claimed moral authority or technical expertise but not broad constituencies, and their numbers were limited. A growing public awareness of international affairs (coupled with a distrust of policymaking elites, in or out of government) has transformed many NGOs into representative organizations that at least purport to act in the name of memberships as well as the global common good. These organizations are backed not only by moral authority but also by the capacity to spur large and influential segments of the public to action at the international level, through both national and international institutions. Amnesty International and the WWF now command memberships of more than 1 and 3 million individuals respectively; Greenpeace claims 4.1 million. Other groups, such as Save the Children International, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Human Rights Watch, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the Women's Environment and Development Organization (led by Bella Abzug), and the Interna-

tional Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission may have fewer formal adherents but are highly mobilized and enjoy broad, sympathetic constituencies. Membership NGOs routinely link themselves together in single-purpose coalitions such as the climate, pesticide, and rain forest action networks,[3] and often find strong allies in research institutions (the World Resources Institute is a prominent example), which also count as nongovernmental actors, especially on issues with significant technical content. The Union of International Associations recognizes some 14,500 international NGOs, of which more than 5000 have membership structures.

This explosion in nongovernmental activity reflects the dramatically heightened permeability of national borders and improvements in communications that have allowed territorially dispersed individuals to develop common agendas and objectives at the international level. Vernacular publications and the "lexicographic revolution" laid the foundations of modern nationalism by crystallizing vertical social and cultural cohesion on a territorial basis.[4] Modern communication is much less dependent on location; increased travel, the fax, and perhaps most important the Internet have created the possibility of a cohesion that is not tied to territory. If national groupings are communities in the sense that the nation is always conceived as a "deep, horizontal partnership," today's non-national affinities have at least the potential themselves to evolve into communities of similar marrow. By providing institutional homes in the same way that states have accommodated nationalism, NGOs are the inevitable beneficiaries of the emergence of the new global communities.

But NGOs have also gained from an international context more amenable to non-national ties and a shift of focus from security matters, in which national allegiances are central, to so-called global issues, in which they are not. "If there's no Cold War, what's the point of being an American?" laments John Updike's Rabbit Angstrom as he grapples with the unordered new world. The diffusion of international rivalry and diminished prospects of armed and ideological conflict (at least in the democratic world) have diluted the meaning and intensity of national identities, allowing other identities, whether based on immutable characteristics, social or economic status, or belief systems, to come to the fore. This is not to say that conflict along national lines has ceased to exist. It clearly has not, even in the democratic world, especially in economic dealings with the less open societies of Asia; and a look at the "zones of turmoil"[5] reminds one of nationalism's potential ferocity. But as a general matter there is more room for the profession of nonnational identities in a world unburdened by Cold War loyalty tests.[6]

Moreover, the nature of global issues presents greater openings for NGO influence. On traditional security matters, decisionmaking was highly centralized. States enjoyed essentially absolute authority over weapons of significant destruction. NGOs calling for disarmament may have boasted large and energized followings, and may have influenced policy through the

traditional techniques of social protest. But there were few opportunities for direct nongovernmental action insofar as NGOs had no access to the currency of power, namely, the weapons themselves.

On such issues as human rights and the environment, by contrast, NGOs have the capacity to act directly and independently. Foreign policy-making by "wise men" is no longer the norm.[7] As arms have been devalued, the relative international significance of influence over the media, of money (from not only corporations but also foundations and wealthy activists such as George Soros), of the ability to collect, marshal, and disseminate information, and of claims of representivity has grown, and NGOs hold vast collective accounts of each, clearly surpassing those of many states.

Alarms rung by Amnesty International and other watchdog groups, as amplified by the press, are significant even when they fail to win government response. When it met resistance in national capitals, for example, the international coalition of anti-apartheid groups turned to local government authorities, along with their vast procurement and pension funds, to seal off Pretoria in a campaign that rendered US federal policy almost irrelevant.[8] Rights groups are contemplating a similar strategy with respect to China, pressing companies to voluntarily adopt codes of engagement akin to the Sullivan Principles (takers so far include Reebok, Timberland, and Levi-Strauss) against the backdrop of possible direct shareholder action.[9]

On the environmental side, the Nature Conservancy (with assets of $915 million and an annual budget well over $100 million) innovated such mechanisms as debt-for-nature swaps on its own, in direct negotiations with governments of the southern tier. Before dolphin-safe tuna was mandated by law, a labeling campaign had succeeded in capturing 95 percent of the market. A business-environmentalist alliance, the Forestry Stewardship Council, is developing standards for "green lumber" that will similarly exploit environmentally conscious markets to advance sustainable tree-harvesting practices. In 1992, NGOs provided $8.3 billion in aid to developing countries, representing 13 percent of development assistance worldwide. Securing government action is no longer always necessary to the bottom line.

Channels of Institutional Influence

These two broad factors behind recent NGO growth—heightened nonnational identities and the possibility of direct action—could come together at the level of international organizations. In this sphere, woolly-headed notions of pyramidal one-world government have given way to the more realistic objective of institutionally decentralized global governance. The aim is not a superstate but rather the establishment of norm-creating multilateral regimes and, ultimately, some sort of global constitutional order. This construct already constrains state action in the context of human rights and environmental protection and is on a springboard in other areas. Much of

this regime creation is occurring in multilateral institutions, including standing UN organs and the ad hoc world conferences that have become a permanent fixture on the global stage and that themselves often result in instruments of global governance.[10] The context is one that plays to NGO strengths.

In a tradition that dates to the 1932 World Disarmament Conference, issue-oriented intergovernmental summits are now uniformly shadowed by unofficial parallel NGO forums and are preceded by preparatory committee meetings at which NGOs appear in force. With the enthusiastic encouragement of organizer Maurice Strong, more than 4000 individuals representing more than 1400 NGOs were accredited to the UN Conference on the Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992; a parallel Global Forum attracted some 25,000 other individuals from 167 countries. NGOs made a similarly substantial showing at the 1993 world conference on human rights in Vienna and the 1994 Cairo conference on population. Parallel conferences are on track for the 1995 Copenhagen summit on social development and Beijing conference on women.

NGO participation in these ad hoc standards-setting institutions has not been governed by uniform procedures. In addition to working the proverbial hallways in the same way that domestic interests lobby the Congress, NGOs have managed to insinuate themselves into decisionmaking contexts in three ways. As far back as the conference that led to the Peace of Paris, to which labor leader Samuel Gompers accompanied President Woodrow Wilson, nongovernmental leaders have been included in national delegations. This has become a routine phenomenon, with NGO representatives appearing as "public members" on national negotiating teams (mostly Western) in multilateral forums, especially in the environmental context. (More than a dozen such members were included in the US delegation at Rio, as they had been in the preparatory committee meetings leading up to it, and NGO leaders made up more than half of the US team at the Cairo conference.) This may be a welcome development so long as it promotes transparency and allows NGOs a voice they would not otherwise enjoy. There looms, however, an inevitable danger of co-option, which explains a fairly consistent refusal on the part of human rights groups to accept such invitations.

NGOs have also participated in various informally constituted working groups associated with the development of protective regimes, especially when presiding officials have been sympathetically inclined. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (recently signed by President Bill Clinton for the United States), for example, came out of a working group in which representatives of Save the Children International and other NGOs were instrumental to the drafting process. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity evolved from drafts composed by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature. Indigenous peoples enjoy substantial direct representation in the work of the Human Rights Commission

toward a declaration delineating their rights under international law. In a preparatory conference of the Economic Commission for Europe at Bergen in May 1990, delegates from five designated sectors (youth, unions, industry, science, and voluntary organizations) were afforded full participatory rights during the working phase, with NGO leaders serving as sessional vice presidents. But inclusion of NGOs in such ad hoc decisionmaking is at the whim of the chair and the sufferance of national delegations, and the NGOs must tread carefully to preserve privileges not procedurally protected.

Finally, there is the occasional phenomenon of outright delegation capture. As a lawyer in Greenpeace's conventions and treaties division notes, the organization

> has recognized the value of even just one "friendly" small state if that state's representative is . . . scientifically trained, well-informed, and co-operative, for that person not only has the automatic right of access to committees and working groups, but also, in the one-country, one-vote system, has the same formal power as any other state, however large its delegation.[11]

Microstates lacking the resources to dispatch their own emissaries have in some cases effectively ceded their representation to NGOs, as the Pacific island nation of Nauru has done with respect to the London Dumping Convention, handing its seat to two American environmentalists. Lawyers from the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development have played visibly influential roles on the delegations of several small island states. Industry groups have also been known to succeed in near-complete delegation capture; the US delegation to International Telecommunications Union meetings, for instance, has come sometimes to be known as the "delegation from Motorola." Such infiltration, while affording select NGOs direct access to decisionmaking forums, is something in the nature of a fraud on other governments. NGO influence should not hinge on which groups happen best to ingratiate themselves with nation-state representatives.

The situation is not much better at standing UN institutions than in the ad hoc bodies. The UN Charter itself, in article 71, allows the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to "make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations," and NGOs have been afforded some formal privileges in ECOSOC under a 1968 resolution that gave them a cumbersome and now anachronistic "consultative status."[12] Although ECOSOC allows more established groups, such as the International Chamber of Commerce, to sit on the floor with national delegates and to make statements in plenary sessions, in practice consultative status has amounted to little more than access passes and proverbial photocopying privileges. Nine hundred seventy-eight NGOs currently have consultative status, up from 90 in 1949.

NGOs have made important recent inroads in the increasingly significant venue of international financial institutions, mostly by lobbying

donor governments. The World Bank has had an NGO liaison committee in place since 1982, and more recently established an independent inspection panel through which NGOs will be able to seek review of Bank policy implementation. Despite liberalized information policies in the IFIs, however, they remain non-transparent and a frustrating target for direct NGO action, and they have been serious laggards in acknowledging even the relevance of the environment and other human development factors to their lending practices. Some NGOs have greeted the anniversary of Bretton Woods with the slogan "50 years is enough." The NGO community is particularly incensed by the failure of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to provide for some form of public participation in the new World Trade Organization.

The Case for Recognition

Existing avenues of access demonstrate that NGO influence will be felt, and there is a growing understanding that NGOs must be better integrated into decisionmaking processes. As a practical matter, that influence is likely to rise as NGOs mobilize constituencies with increasing effectiveness at the international level. International law should move to reflect and entrench this facet of the new global political dynamic, to the end of advancing the legitimacy of global institutions. The review of the consultative status system now under way at ECOSOC could present a suitable opportunity for expanding the mechanisms by which NGOs interact with the UN system.

The essentially governmental character of multilateral decision-making bodies will, of course, remain a fact of international relations. Governments continue to represent enduring communities—most Americans still identify themselves as such in most international contexts—and they continue to exercise primary control over international relations.

Nor is the representivity of NGOs, especially on a case-by-case basis, beyond question or above scrutiny. World conferences invariably face the problem of NGIs (nongovernmental individuals) and GONGOs (government organized NGOs), and very few of even the larger international NGOs are operationally democratic, in the sense that members elect officers or direct policy on particular issues. (Amnesty International and the Sierra Club are notable exceptions.) Arguably, it is more often money than membership that determines influence, and money more often represents the support of centralized elites, such as the major foundations, than that of the true grass roots.

But as they now stand, most international institutions are in formal terms themselves wildly undemocratic. In the General Assembly and other UN bodies, tiny San Marino (population 23,000) has the same vote as China (population 1.17 billion); the smallest ten UN members have a total population less than that of Washington, D.C. The continuing proliferation of smaller nations is only likely to compound the representational distortion of bodies such as the

General Assembly[13]—a distortion compounded by the presence of governments that do not even pretend to represent their subjects democratically.

If numbers are the benchmark of legitimacy, the NGO community easily passes the test. However imperfect the mechanisms of representation, environmentalist and human rights NGOs collectively speak for many times over the numbers represented by even medium-size states in the UN, and even narrowly defined NGOs would outrank the microstates. Memberships are attentive to an organization's general principles and in some cases its specific policies. (One need only look at the domestic example in which the American Civil Liberties Union lost thousands from its rolls as a result of its intervention on behalf of the marching Skokie Nazis.) Funding more often follows success than the other way around, and the greater part of NGO coffers is filled by member contributions.

Nor would formal recognition of nongovernmental actors be without important precedent. The ILO, the sole surviving institutional innovation of the Peace of Paris and the League of Nations era, operates under a tripartite structure in which governments, workers, and employers have votes in a 2:1:1 ratio. (The ILO is counted among the more successful international organizations; UNICEF, which also cooperates broadly with NGOs, is not by coincidence another.) This structure has been echoed at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), where representatives from business and labor make up advisory boards that are in practice heeded at the ministerial level, and the formation of a third OECD non-state board composed of environmentalist leaders is imminent. Sir Geoffrey Palmer, former Prime Minister of New Zealand, has proposed the creation of a tripartite UN Environmental Protection Council with representatives from governments, business, and environmental organizations.[14] The ILO model could be readily transplanted to other contexts in which primary non-state communities are well defined and have achieved some level of representivity.

In the context of world conferences, intergovernmental forums could allocate a number of seats—at the table—for each of these communities ("major groups," in the language of Rio's *Agenda 21*). That number, although small, should be large enough to allow for reflection of the diversity among the NGOs and their constituencies. Liberally accredited by a secretariat office, the NGOs would then be left to decide on the composition of this representation. Although not seamlessly democratic, the exercise would likely result in the selection of legitimate and effective institutional leadership for NGO efforts in decisionmaking forums.[15]

However visionary this may sound, it is not far from recent practice. Negotiation between NGOs and governmental delegations is already occurring outside of formal procedures. There have been significant successes in channeling NGO input at world conferences, of which the 1993 conference on human rights is perhaps the best example. A liaison committee was set up

to oversee contacts between 841 accredited NGOs (many from the South and without previous experience) and the governmental forum, and agreed to a method of proportional representation within the committee by subgroup, according to geography and such other characteristics as gender, age, and disability. Those subgroups were then able to elect representatives to the committee. (Similarly, before the Rio conference a steering group of US NGO representatives selected NGO leaders to be included in the US delegation, and major corporations have established the World Industry Council for the Environment to develop "policy partnerships" with governments on the issue.) Through the committee, NGOs exerted a significant influence on the final declaration out of Vienna, especially in its unprecedented emphasis on women's rights issues and its call for the creation of a UN High Commission for Human Rights and an international criminal court.

That NGOs were not included in the drafting sessions at Vienna (in the face of excited opposition from China and the Group of 77) probably did not much change the result, nor is more formal NGO inclusion at other such gatherings likely to mark any dramatic shift in the balance of powers. As lawmaking organs, both the world conferences and the standing multilateral institutions work more through negotiation and near-consensus than through legislative-type voting procedures. The further addition of, say, five or even ten percent to the number of participants (on top of the numerous new national representatives of recent years) would not disrupt the decisionmaking process.

At the same time, such reform would pose important institutional benefits. As noted in the terms of reference for the Commission on Global Governance,

> a crucial factor in the effectiveness of organisations is their perceived legitimacy, [which] is linked to participation and transparency in their decision-making processes and to the representative nature of bodies that exercise authority.[16]

To the extent individuals count themselves a part of non-state communities, formal participation in intergovernmental forums by the representatives of such communities would create an additional (and arguably more direct and responsive) uplink from the citizenry in a context where parliamentary-type representation remains impractical. Improved procedural equity would make international institutions less threatening. Some mechanism for formal NGO participation in the new World Trade Organization would, for instance, likely defuse grassroots opposition from environmental and human rights activists; the rallying cry of "GATTzilla" may otherwise continue to resonate.

Institutionalizing the NGO role in global decisionmaking would also strengthen the transnational ties that NGOs embody. This, too, would help stabilize government-to-government relationships, as genuine societal interdependence diminishes the possibilities for unbuffered national conflict and points

toward the potential of a democratic peace. International recognition of NGOs would afford them some measure of protection from persecution by national governments. And entrenching the presence of the NGOs in international organizations would contribute to greater transparency because states would be less able to revert to their interests qua states in backroom deal-making.

Finally, NGOs would themselves become more open and accountable were they formally brought into the fold. The consequences of misbehavior would be magnified, in rather the way that college sports teams are suspended for improper recruiting activities or that scientific research teams are subjected to rigorous peer review. In one recent incident, the Natural Resources Defense Council purported to represent a small Amazonian tribe in negotiations with a US oil company on its exploration plans in the Ecuadoran rain forest without the tribe's permission and to its subsequent dismay.[17] As a condition for participation in any UN body, NGOs might be required to subscribe to a code of conduct defining their basic mechanisms of accountability. This may imply some loss of independence, but that is the inevitable implication of power responsibly exercised.

Of course, some governments are themselves hardly enamored of enhanced NGO participation. In the ECOSOC review of consultative status, China and Group of 77 delegations are mobilizing to block the expansion of NGO participation, just as they have drawn the line on fuller NGO participation at Vienna and other forums. These governments have a history of tangling with human rights NGOs, and they predictably interpose the doctrine of sovereignty by way of defense for their restrictive positions.

In the near term, those who oppose a significantly enhanced institutional role for non-state actors may prevail. Even as Western governments (the United States included) trumpet the virtues of NGO participation, they too have sovereign interests to protect and are not likely to press the issue. This could be short-sighted. On the one hand, the world may be witnessing a repeat of the 1920s, when internationalist hopes far outpaced reality, ending not in the triumph of universalism but rather in the depths of global division and conflict. On the other, it is possible that the world, or at least a good part of it, is entering a postnational era in which states share the allegiance of their subjects with nongovernmental entities. If so, fictitious forms cannot preserve an order now past, and international organizations that refuse to adapt to the new reality may do so at their institutional peril.

NOTES

1. Lester M. Salamon, "The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (July/August 1994), pp. 109-122. As Samuel P. Huntington noted more than 20 years ago, transnational organizations cannot thrive without physical access. Huntington, "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," *World Politics* 25 (April 1973), pp. 333-368.

2. On the increasingly undeniable devolution of state authority, see Pierre Hassner, "Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism: Ethnicity and World Order," *Survival* 35 (Summer 1993), pp. 49-65; and Ronnie D.

Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society," *Millennium* 21, no. 3 (1992), pp. 389-420.

3. On the phenomenon of NGO networks, see David Ronfeldt and Cathryn L. Thorup, "North America in the Era of Citizen Networks: State, Society, and Security," RAND/Ford Foundation Report (Santa Monica, Calif., August 1993).

4. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991). See also Lipschutz. "Reconstructing World Politics," p. 391.

5. Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1993).

6. Miroslav Nincic notes: "As a general rule, the less benign the perceived character of global society, and the more international existence is deemed an anarchic struggle for power among nations, the less tolerant is the perceiver of domestic pluralism and popular participation in the conduct of foreign relations." Nincic, *Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political Realism* (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 6.

7. Michael Clough, "Grass-Roots Policymaking: Say Good-Bye to the 'Wise Men,'" *Foreign Affairs* 73 (January/February 1994), pp. 2-7. As Jeane Kirkpatrick has observed, "international relations can no longer be the preserve of the exclusive elite . . . the democratization of international relations has taken place to an extent that is dramatic." Quoted in Barbara Crossette, "A Warrior, a Mother, a Scholar, a Mystery," *New York Times*, August 17, 1994, p. C-7.

8. Peter J. Spiro, "Taking Foreign Policy Away from the Feds," *The Washington Quarterly* 11 (Winter 1988), pp. 191-203. For a case study of the impact of NGOs in advancing human rights, see Kathryn Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America," *International Organization* 47 (Summer 1993), pp. 411-442.

9. For a detailed description of possible corporate undertakings in the context of trade with China, see Diane F. Orentlicher and Timothy Gelatt, "Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in China," *Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business* 14 (Fall 1993), pp. 66-129. Activists have also recently won the withdrawal of two major US oil companies from Burma.

10. A case in point is international approaches to the environment. Although its declaration of principles was transparently aspirational, the 1972 Stockholm world conference on the human environment is generally recognized as a turning point in international environmental protection efforts that moved the environment permanently above the international policy horizon. From it emerged a standing institution (the UN Environment Programme); weak but more focused "framework" treaties followed, which in turn are being filled out by specific regulatory regimes. The 1985 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer itself included no obligations, but the 1987 Montreal protocols and subsequent amendments set a full phaseout of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other ozone-depleting substances by 1996. The regime covers 132 signatories with a total population of 4.7 billion people. Between 1987 and 1991, global CFC consumption was in fact reduced by half. A similar filling-out process is likely to occur with the biodiversity and climate change conventions signed at Rio. On the process by which so-called "soft law" regimes become progressively harder, see Peter M. Haas, "Evolving International Law: Changing Practices of National Sovereignty," in Nazli Choucri, ed., *Global Accord: Environmental Challenges and International Responses* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 401-430.

11. Kevin Stairs and Peter Taylor, "NGOs and Legal Protection of the Oceans," in Andrew Hurrel and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., *The International Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests, and Institutions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 130.

12. See Economic and Social Council Resolution 1296 (XLIV) (1968).

13. By one estimate, the number of states could rise from the current 200 to over 500 in the wake of increasingly successful national separatist movements. See Bob Davis, "Growth of Trade Binds Nations, but It Also Can Spur Separatism," *Wall Street Journal*, June 20, 1994, p. A-1.

14. Geoffrey Palmer, "New Ways to Make International Environmental Law," *American Journal of International Law* 86 (April 1992), pp. 259-283.

15. See "The UN System and NGOs: New Relationships for a New Era," Report of the Twenty-Fifth United Nations Issues Conference, sponsored by the Stanley Foundation, Arden House, Harriman, N.Y., February 18-20), 1994, pp. 25-26.

16. Commission on Global Governance, undated pamphlet, p. 8. The commission, which has been funded by governments and foundations, includes Ingvar Carlsson Oscar Arias, and Jacques Delors, and is scheduled to issue a comprehensive report of its findings in late 1994.

17. See Joe Kane, "Letter from the Amazon: With Spears from All Sides," *New Yorker*, September 27, 1993, pp. 54-79.

Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War

JOHN W. JANDORA

It is generally accepted that since 1989, there are seemingly more crises of wider variance with which the United States must contend. The military implication is that "to deal with such a wide range of possibilities, our armed forces must be capable of accomplishing a wide range of missions."[1] Beyond that, American forces will have to adapt to some unusual mission activities and will consequently have to cope with some unusual threat situations.

During the Cold War, the ability of our primary adversary to raise, equip, sustain, and employ military forces was fairly well defined and well understood. The US defense establishment had few doubts regarding Soviet procedures for developing combat systems and mobilizing, deploying, and sustaining forces. It likewise had few doubts regarding Soviet procedures for supplying and otherwise supporting allies and surrogates—whether regime forces or insurgents. During the Gulf War, the Soviet model was applied to the Iraqi army wrongly and sometimes subconsciously. In the end, the false analogy did not matter. Coalition forces destroyed the Iraqi army in Kuwait through superior firepower, logistics, and technology. That victory was made easier than analysts had forecast by easy identification of Iraqi units and supply depots and the enemy's static defensive scheme.

Other conflict situations—Lebanon in 1983 and more recently Somalia—presented different circumstances to planners. Threat forces were difficult to identify, and the battle area was not delimited by defensive works. One might be tempted to apply paradigms of insurgency to explain the outcomes of our involvement in those situations, but long-held views on insurgency must also be reconsidered. In the former pattern of international confrontation, there were usually two sides to every conflict, the regime in power and the insurgents. One side would have the support of the United

States or others in the Western bloc, while the other side would have the support of the USSR or its allies. Such conflicts would be generated, enlarged, reduced, or extinguished largely in accordance with the policies and capabilities of the two superpowers. These post-World War II constraints have been removed. The nature of civil war has changed along with the demise of the bipolar world order.

Multidimensional factional conflict has now become a prevalent pattern of civil war. The Lebanon crisis, which was the precursor of this trend, is perhaps the paramount example. However, the pattern also fits Bosnia, Somalia, Afghanistan, and other countries. In these situations, one has to deal with numerous armed groups which align and realign in ever-changing alliances. While there are ways to distinguish the competing sides, simple dichotomy no longer suffices as a formula.

The characterization of the struggle in Lebanon as a religious conflict between Christians and Muslims, for example, merely obscured the real underlying antagonisms. In actuality, the Christians never presented a united front, so there was no "Christian cause." Within the dominant Maronite Christian sect, the Gemayel-led faction was often ruthless in dealing with its traditional rivals, the Chamoun and Franjiyah factions. As for the Greek Orthodox Christians, they adhered to an age-old distrust of the Maronites in general and so sought security in alliances with Muslim groups. The Druze, a heretical Islamic sect, manifested a similar lack of unity, at least until the Lebanese forces invaded their strongholds in the Shouf region. The Arslan loyalists did not cooperate with the Jumblat-led Popular Socialist Party (PSP), and their cooperation could not be expected, based on Lebanese history. Those two families headed factions which had been rivals for centuries. Similar traditional rivalries also divided the Shiite Muslims.[2]

The complexity of Lebanese factionalism was matched by the complexity of foreign involvement, a situation that evolved largely because neither the Western bloc nor the Soviet bloc had vital strategic interests at stake. A rather large number of countries—each with its own regional interests, in competition with the others—actively supported one or another of the factions. In addition to the United States and USSR, France, Syria, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and Saudi Arabia were involved in the Lebanese conflict.

America's military intervention in Lebanon in 1982-83 was limited in scope and duration. Had it been otherwise, we might have developed

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doctrine appropriate to such conflicts. Instead, those planning Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) found it necessary to include "nontraditional categories" of information in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process, just as they had to devise new concepts of battlefield operating systems.[3] Beyond that experience, we should be able to minimize improvisation in assessing each nontraditional threat situation, as common features become evident. Those concerns, essential for intelligence analysis, are no less important for mission planning at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. As indicators of threat strengths and weaknesses, they help to identify and define a non-state actor's center of gravity.[4] Knowledge of nontraditional threat factors may well determine the success or failure of an operation.

Operations Other Than War

Mission profiles for US military forces will probably involve unilateral or multinational efforts to:
- buttress friendly regimes
- thwart criminal organizations or "criminal" regimes
- relieve the adverse effects of natural or economic disasters
- restore or maintain peace in an area or country
- protect Americans or allied personnel

The American defense establishment has coined the term operations other than war (OOTW) to identify this new mission set. In fact those mission activities are not new; what is different about them is their frequency and the many forms they have taken. Since the concept of OOTW has yet to be clearly defined, it may be useful here to consider a comprehensive list of relevant activities. They include: nation-building, security assistance, counterinsurgency or insurgency support, punitive strikes or raids, preemptive strikes, sanction or embargo enforcement, counter-terrorism, support to law enforcement (counter-drug, counter-smuggling, counter-piracy, counter-poaching), disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, noncombatant evacuation, combat search and rescue, and personnel recovery.[5]

It is difficult to generalize about such varying mission activities. Some are inherently of short duration, while others can continue—and have—for years. They span a wide range of operational environments. Some will occur under wholly peaceful circumstances. Others will start that way but evolve into armed confrontation. Yet others will take place under hostile conditions from the start. Obviously, only those which involve potential or actual force on force situations have threat implications. It is the threat perspective, though, which offers some basis for distinguishing among the various forms of operations other than war. Unlike conventional wars, many such operations pose situations in which the rules of engagement are either ambiguous or highly restrictive. Potential threat forces are another variable. They can include regime forces, insurgent or factional forces, terrorists,

Mission Activities	Potential Threat Forces				
	Regime Forces	Insurgent or Factional Forces	Terrorists	Criminal Organization	Armed Populace
Short Term					
Punitive Raid or Strike	X	X			X
Preemptive Strike	X	X			X
Counterterrorism					
Permissive		X	X		
Non-permissive	X		X		X
Disaster Relief				X	
Noncombatant Evacuation, Combat Search & Rescue, Personnel Recovery					
Permissive		X			
Non-permissive	X	X			X
Long Term					
Nation-building		X	X	X	
Security Assistance		X	X	X	
Counterinsurgency		X			X
Insurgency Support	X				
Sanction/Embargo Enforcement	X			X	X
Support to Law Enforcement		X	X	X	X
Humanitarian Relief			X	X	
Peacekeeping		X			X
Peace Enforcement	X	X			X

Table 1. Mission/Threat Correlation.

various kinds of criminal organizations, and armed groups among the populace at large. The correlation between missions and threat forces is shown in Table 1.[6]

Certain types of threats are much better understood than others. There are proven methods for assessing the capability of potentially hostile regimes to react to US military force, and many handbooks and case studies describe the organization and operations of insurgents, terrorists, and, to a lesser degree, drug traffickers. The material provides frameworks for assessing the capabilities of these potential threats. In contrast, there has been no comparable analysis of the power base of factional "armies," large criminal organizations, and armed groups among the populace. The following discourse suggests a framework for such analysis.

Three Difficult Threats

Consideration of factional "armies," large criminal organizations, and armed groups among a populace presents a subset of threat environments in which it is relatively difficult to identify the enemy. Notwithstanding the prob-

lem of identifying the opponent, we are still dealing with organizations, albeit at varying levels of sophistication. This commonality supports a consistent analytical method and a single set of relevant factors: motives, objectives, cohesion, leadership, tactics, armament, sustainability, and force generation. These concepts should be self-evident as to meaning, except for the last two. The term *sustainability* applies to operational logistics, the ability to support and sustain current operations or activities. The term *force generation* applies to change in capability over time. The concept is similar to force development but different in that it excludes the sophisticated functions of research, development, testing, and evaluation of new systems, force structuring, and doctrinal revision. It is convenient to begin at the low end of the organizational spectrum, with the armed populace, and continue with more enduring threats—large criminal organizations and factional forces.[7]

Armed Populace

Civilians will be driven to violence generally by one of three conditions: breakdown of social controls (the police and security functions of the state); economic deprivation; or threats to traditional values, either internally induced or externally generated.[8] Examples of the third case include a serious scandal involving the ruler of a country or foreign pressure for his abdication or resignation. With the possible exception of the third case, the presence of US forces will not be the proximate cause of such conditions. However, American troops obviously could become targets of violence when deployed to prevent or suppress civil disorder. An understanding of the motives of mob action would help to assess persistence of the threat.

The foregoing motives generally define typical objectives of the "hostile crowd": to seize or defend government offices or other important sites or terrain; to seize produce, other goods, or wealth; or to exact revenge or restore honor or status. In the course of pursuing these objectives, an enraged mob may deliberately or accidentally inflict casualties and damage. The threat to a downed pilot consequent to a punitive strike, for example, would be more serious in cases where the local people seek to avenge their loss or restore their honor.

Despite appearances, planners should not assume that militant mobs are random groupings. They likely have cohesion before they mobilize for action. Their solidarity derives from residence, ethnicity, occupation, economic status, society (e.g., brotherhood) membership, or some other factor. Ethnicity and societal membership are obviously the stronger bonds of the ones cited. Nonetheless, the inhabitants of a city quarter, despite being of diverse ethnic origin, might have common resentment toward a regime which failed to provide relief in the wake of a disaster. Unrelated groups of unemployed or underemployed persons, students, or factory workers might have common resentment toward their government for other reasons. Analysis of

the basis of cohesion would help identify the threat force as well as gauge its potential size and disposition.

To the extent that militant mobs are not random groupings, they likely have a ready-made leadership structure. Ethnic group members are responsive to their clan elders, who themselves conform to a traditional pecking order. Factory crews follow their foremen, who in turn follow the shop chief. Students rally behind their class or union leaders, who follow their school student president or student union president. Gang members obey their acknowledged leaders. It is important to note, however, that ethnic groups and fraternal societies, especially secret ones, usually have implicit, automatic rules of succession to leadership, while other groups do not.

Tactics would vary according to the composition of the militant mob and the prevailing sense of morality. If the group includes renegade soldiers, mutineers, deserters, gang members, or "popular defense force" members, it might be capable of teamwork. It is usually unlikely that any hostile mob would close with peacekeeping forces unless it had overwhelming numeric superiority at the point of contact or sought to carry out a ruse. A typical ploy would be to engage the peacekeepers only to lure them into an ambush. Otherwise, the militants are likely to maintain a stand-off distance by either exploiting urban terrain or using women and children as human shields.

Militant mobs can be expected to have limited capacity without access to weapons and ammunition. These will be more or less plentiful depending upon local customs of keeping arms, governmental practice of arming civilians, and the vulnerability of armories. In some countries the populace is allowed to keep arms and to carry them, especially in the hinterland. In other countries, the regime co-opts certain groups, such as students and laborers, into its civil defense and security scheme. Similarly, local elites may employ armed gang members for personal protection or local security. Such customs and practices bring about greater familiarity with weapons and possibly greater lethality in times of violence. Even when access to weapons is more restricted, the presence of military veterans among a mob could result in the capture of an armory and somewhat effective use of its contents. Some crew-served weapons could be brought into action. It is unlikely, though, that mobs and even popular defense forces would be able to employ tanks, surface-to-air missiles, or artillery, let alone high-technology systems. Such groups also would have difficulty sustaining their fight.

Unlike standing forces and militias, the armed populace depends almost exclusively on a static support base: the fighters must go home to provision. This condition can be a vulnerability if the conflict is protracted or changes locale. Conversely, it complicates the targeting efforts of the peacekeepers when the hostile force merges back into the larger society. Without mobile logistics, militant group action lacks sustainability; once it acquires that capability, a mob transitions to a militia.

Force generation is a complex factor with many elements: mobilization of manpower, materiel supply, financing, training, intelligence, technology transfer, and advice and assistance. It has limited relevance with regard to an armed populace because of the transient nature of mob action. However, the aspect of linkage, as it pertains to mobilization, does deserve consideration. A disturbance in one town or area becomes a national problem when related groups rise up in support. The relevant ties are those among student associations, labor unions, craft guilds, youth gangs, kin groups, and chapters of fraternal societies. If constituents of such groups rise up successively, they can force peacekeepers to confront an expanding problem. Linkage in itself, however, probably will not affect the long-term sustainment of an uprising, unless that uprising coalesces with an insurgency, mutiny, or other such movement.

Criminal Organizations

While the common motive of large criminal organizations is monetary gain, there can be differences in objective. Pirates and poachers focus on seizing goods; smugglers and narcotraffickers focus on delivering goods. Because of potential resistance or interdiction, all such groups must be capable of forceful action. They develop organizations that can bring decisive force to critical points. Such outlaw groups generally do have common bonds beyond the profit motive. Their cohesion is probably comparable to that of work crews which perform hazardous jobs. Moreover, when organizers rely on kinsmen for their manpower, they gain an added element of cohesion.

Where kin groups are involved in large-scale crime, they would probably be led by traditional elites. However, criminal leadership is usually determined by survival of the fittest—or, more accurately, the cleverest. There is no role here for longevity or regulated promotions. There are unwritten codes of loyalty, and infractions are summarily and severely punished. As a consequence of this brutal system, leaders may be more effective in reacting to challenges. Moreover, the top leadership may be immune to arrest, due to personal status, influence, or connections with the right people.

The tactics of criminal groups are relevant here only as they confront law enforcement or peace enforcement units. When caught at a disadvantage, criminals probably would take evasive action, following set procedure. Their concern would be to protect their goods and their conveyances, not to hold position. Criminal organizations would most likely employ offensive tactics when they are actively targeting law enforcement units. They probably would rely on deception and ambush to achieve their kills. Some criminal organizations have ties to insurgent or factional forces, which offer protection of routes, hide sites, and safe havens.

The business of crime rings is not warfare, but illegal movement or removal of goods. They arm themselves accordingly, using mostly small arms

and limited amounts of heavier ordnance, such as mines, machine guns, hand-held SAMs, and light antitank weapons. Given ties between different organizations, a criminal group will have little difficulty acquiring such armament; payment for services could take the form of an arms transfer. In cases where a criminal organization needs extra firepower, it can usually buy the services of mercenaries, terrorists, or factional or insurgent forces. The additional threat capabilities represented by such hirelings would have to be added to those of the criminal group itself.

The nature of illegal activities and the profits they represent also could ensure logistic sufficiency for criminal organizations. These groups steal, rent, or purchase the conveyances and the communications, electronics, avionics equipment, and repair parts needed for operations. As weapons are transferred between collaborating groups, so too are supplies and equipment.

Many of the factors that account for criminal organizations being serious, immediate threats also account for their becoming larger threats over time. If necessary, a criminal organization can increase its workforce through recruitment, purchase of services, agreement on mutual interest, bribery, or intimidation. Moreover, it can enter into long- or short-term alliances with— or otherwise co-opt—terrorists, youth gangs, insurgents, or factional forces. Networks in place for the illegal movement of goods provide criminal organizations with the means to sustain operations against counter-crime programs.

Financing for arms and supplies is directly related to market demand for the criminal group's product or service. While an effective law enforcement campaign could cause the cost of supply to escalate beyond an acceptable price limit, each situation will vary according to commodity, locality, and other circumstances. It could become easier to intercept payoffs than to curtail market demand, but criminal organizations have developed ingenious methods to launder money, divert payments into foreign bank accounts or real estate, or otherwise conceal money transfers.

As would a legitimate business, a crime ring will invest in training as necessary to sustain operations. Large criminal organizations usually can procure the instructional expertise needed to improve camouflage, deception, security of employees and goods (in shipment or storage), detection of law enforcement activity, and targeting of law enforcement officers. In some cases the effectiveness of training may be adversely affected by a need for secrecy. When failure to perform could result in death, the incentive to learn will likely be high.

Because intelligence information is necessary for survival, criminal organizations likely will develop networks of informers. They may be able to gain accomplices within governmental and law enforcement agencies through bribes or blackmail. They may be able to retain agents among the population at large through payoff or intimidation. Relevant information can be reported, via normal commercial means, through business offices which serve as fronts

for the organization. Beyond that, criminal groups have been known to procure and use sophisticated communications intercept systems.

Successful criminal groups will have the wherewithal to obtain technologically advanced arms and equipment. Besides communications intercept gear, they might procure sophisticated munitions, surveillance systems, and communications equipment, along with operator training. When attempting to improve their organization, procedures, or tradecraft, such groups could seek assistance from similar groups outside their area or from allied terrorists or insurgents.

Factional Forces

Factional forces, the last category of potential threat forces examined here, may be less familiar to the general public than either an armed populace or a criminal organization largely because the old Cold War dichotomy of regime forces versus insurgents does not apply in factional conflicts. Rather, we need to envision the multidimensional conflicts of Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Bosnia—the struggle of ethnic-based militias, which align themselves in changing patterns of alliance and opposition. While the characteristics of these forces will become apparent from the discussion, it is useful to define this force type by what it excludes. The concept of *factional forces* does not include the standing formations which have been and continue to be sustained by the regime in control of the capital. These are *regime forces*. Nor does it include classic insurgent forces, which are motivated by an ideology and are often supported by a foreign power which espouses or exploits the same ideology.

Describing armed forces as ethnic-based then raises questions as to what constitutes ethnicity. For this study it essentially amounts to common kinship—not religion or culture, although those two factors could also affect the self-identity of the group concerned. Apart from fiction, total homogeneity is unlikely. The core kin group can and will assimilate unrelated people—either long-time clients or newly admitted ones who may be displaced, dispossessed, or otherwise in need of group security.

The motives for a kin group of whatever size to take up arms and organize militarily are the same as those that affect an armed populace: breakdown of social controls, economic deprivation, or threat to traditional values. The corresponding objectives, however, are somewhat broader in scope. In the first case, the objective is to protect the kin group, its homeland, resources, and interests, by either defensive or offensive action. In the second case, it is to gain by forceful means a rightful or fair share in the allocation of goods and services. The objective in the final case is to defend or restore the traditional value system.

The basis of cohesion is of course a given; it is the bond of blood, whether real or fictional, and a sense of common destiny. Leadership often

conforms to a traditional pecking order. However, it may be that the leaders in peacetime are not the leaders in war. In this respect, an obvious change in the visibility and prominence of certain persons may be an indicator that hostilities are imminent. Moreover, the "war experience" may create conditions that allow individuals to rise in status through military prowess.

Tactics likely will derive from the traditional ethnic practice of war, unless the factional forces include significant numbers of veteran soldiers. Even then, military leaders are likely to apply economy of force considerations and resort to stratagems either to optimize advantages or to offset disadvantages. As a consequence, operations probably will involve stand-off attacks, blockades, hit-and-run actions, delaying actions, feints, raids, ambushes, and hostage-taking. Although not well understood in the modern West, hostage-taking in other parts of the world traditionally serves to intimidate adversaries or to influence negotiations between warring parties. Since it implies at least a temporary cessation of hostilities, negotiating can be a means of loss avoidance or, conversely, force preservation. The holding of hostages can be an important precondition for attaining that purpose.

The source of arms for factional forces varies according to the circumstances of the military buildup. Troops who quit the regime armed forces may bring individual and crew-served weapons with them. Otherwise, factional forces may gain weapons through cross-border trafficking, facilitated by a kindred clan, a commercial group, or a friendly foreign government. The accumulation of arms by the faction may start well before the resort to hostilities. One authority has observed, concerning countries with high instability, that "international arms smuggling usually begins two to five years in advance" of civil war.[9]

Factional armies have at least a rudimentary commissariat system, which allows them to displace and operate at a distance from their base for extended periods of time. Supplies may be carried by humans or animals over concealed routes, offering few opportunities for targeting. Cannibalization of damaged equipment will increase staying power over the near term.

As with criminal organizations, various factors allow for force generation over the longer term. A factional army, after mobilizing the manpower of a kinship group, can enlist support from other sources. One technique would be to appeal to a kindred people, evoking either traditional alliances with their code of mutual obligation or historic symbolism with its aura of sacred national cause. An example of the latter would be the mystique of the Battle of Kosovo, which recalls the steadfastness of the Serb nation in the face of extreme adversity. Another technique for gaining manpower would be to intimidate weaker ethnic groups. To the extent that such potential reinforcements are ready and able to move quickly, a factional army can expand its military strength relatively rapidly.

In the event of prolonged hostilities, a factional army may be able to gain considerable amounts of arms, equipment, and supplies by seizing them from opposing forces in the aftermath of battles, raids, or capitulations. Its logistic burden will be easier, though, if it comes into control of depots or factories that are equipped, or can be retooled, for military production. At a minimum, it will probably improvise, such as in producing explosives from fertilizer. If a factional army has large logistic requirements, it probably will have to retain control of a seaport, airfield, or overland route, depending on the geography involved. Faced with interdiction efforts, it could arrange to have arms and supplies floated ashore in bladders, dropped by parachute, or moved over back roads. In any case, it is likely that resupply operations will rely heavily on camouflage and deception. Foreign contacts will be critical. The faction will have to establish supply networks involving any number of links and conduits. Typical suppliers may include foreign governments and their agencies, commercial middlemen, smugglers, black marketeers, and front organizations (of otherwise legitimate businesses).

To finance its operations, the faction's leadership likely will rely on various complementary means of acquiring money, including donation, taxation, seizure, extortion, and sales of products or services. Likely donors would be friendly foreign governments and wealthy kinsmen living at home or abroad. Within its area of control, the faction could impose a variety of taxes. Aside from the more obvious head tax or market tax, the faction might levy transit fees or an employment tax, for example. Transit fees, similar to customs duties, are imposed on private commerce at ports of entry or at roadblocks. An employment tax, a percentage of wages, is paid by laborers in return for a guarantee of employment or continuation of employment. Apart from friendly sources, the financing effort may be directed at current or former adversaries as well. The latter may be subjected to extortion or to seizure of bank holdings and payrolls, especially when their defenses have lapsed. Regarding sales, the faction may use middlemen and front organizations where it cannot act as a vendor itself. It is quite possible that a peace enforcement contingent could end up procuring, via contractors, the products or services of a hostile faction.

Training within factional forces probably will not conform to any rigorous, formal program due to a lack of ammunition, time, facilities, or other resources. It is possible that over time factional forces could establish a structured training process, but at least initially, training will be improvised. Most requirements for training probably will be created by the acquisition of new weapons through capture, purchase, or outside support. Instructors can be provided from within or outside the factional army. An initial poor showing on the part of factional forces may be rectified over time through training, and the occurrence of such training may be difficult to detect, especially if it is low-profile activity.

The ability to collect and use intelligence also will contribute to the long-term sustainability of the factional army by reducing risk in operational decisionmaking. The faction will not likely possess technologically advanced collection systems, although it may receive sophisticated intelligence support from friendly powers. In most cases, factional forces will rely on an age-old means of intelligence—a network of informers. In many countries the infrastructure for such a network is provided by secret societies or brotherhoods, whose well-established, secure links can be used to pass instructions and receive reports. Otherwise, noncombatant supporters and allies of the faction may have jobs (e.g., driver, expediter, cleaner) that allow them to obtain information of military significance. Such information can be relayed via agents, messengers, or phone lines, depending on local conditions, thus avoiding electronic transmission and reducing the chance of detection.

Given outside contacts and financing, factional forces probably would be able to obtain technologically advanced weapons, although cost could prevent their acquiring them in large quantities. In exceptional cases, the faction might have sufficient industrial skills to reverse-engineer and produce local versions of foreign-developed systems, probably in limited quantities. Whatever the means of acquisition, the objective most likely would be to obtain only a sufficient number to achieve psychological effects or temporary, local superiority. In most cases, the acquisition of such weapons can be considered a given. The more critical question is effective employment. If supply is limited, the opportunity for testing and practice likewise will be limited. However, such drawbacks may be offset through military advice and assistance from outside sources.

The sources for such support are varied. One source is friendly or otherwise supportive foreign governments, which could help in one of two ways. They may send trainers and technicians, on long- or short-term assignments, to the faction's area of operations, or they may allow the faction to recruit within their borders. Another source of operational and technical expertise is mercenary manpower, which might join the factional forces for monetary, religious, or ideological reasons. Depending on their proficiency, such augmentees could significantly upgrade the capabilities of a factional army.

In Conclusion

This examination of nontraditional threat types is not intended to expound on the various factors of analysis, which would require a small book. Its intent is to bridge a gap in threat awareness. Military planning and intelligence analysis must move beyond the Cold War mind-set and its preoccupation with standing, conventional forces. The framework presented above is intended to prompt further study, reflection, and exposition.

From an operational perspective, the parameters used to examine the three kinds of forces suggest a significant departure from routine order-of-battle factors of analysis. Moreover, much of the relevant information, because of its nature, probably will not be available from military intelligence sources. Planners will have to rely on other US governmental agencies and perhaps on foreign governmental and nongovernmental agencies for the information they seek. In many cases, protocols and procedures for information exchange will have to be established, if the threat parameters described here are accepted as valid.

This framework for analysis requires action in other areas as well. Units preparing for operations other than war should initially be made aware of the expanded intelligence requirements, and over the long term these requirements should be included in doctrinal publications. Units and schools training for such contingencies should be made aware of the full range of relevant threat types, and all types should be included, on a selective basis, in exercise scenarios and threat models. Senior military leaders should sensitize their staffs and subordinate commanders to nontraditional threat parameters, because these are in many instances indicators of an adversary's center of gravity.[10] Successful targeting of that source of the adversary's power may depend on political and economic as well as military means.

NOTES

1. Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, 71 (Winter 1992-93), 36.

2. Among the numerous books on modern Lebanon, two provide excellent insights on factionalism within each of the main confessional groups. These are Helena Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985) and B. J. Odeh, *Lebanon: Dynamics of Crisis* (London: Zed Books, 1985).

3. See S. L. Arnold and David T. Stahl, "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War," *Parameters*, 23 (Winter 1993-94), 7-8.

4. As defined in FM 100-5 (p. 6-7), center of gravity is "that characteristic, capability, or location from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." For commentaries on the application of this concept, see Steven Metz and Frederick M. Downey, "Centers of Gravity and Strategic Planning," *Military Review*, 68 (April 1988), 22-33; and William W. Mendel and Lamar Tooke, "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity," *Military Review*, 73 (June 1993), 2-11.

5. Note that this list differs from the list of mission activities in FM 100-5 since the latter includes some missions which do not involve a hostile situation and excludes others, particularly support to law enforcement, which do.

6. Note that where multiple threat force types are indicated for a mission activity, they may or may not all be present at the same time or place. The chart merely shows the range of possibilities.

7. The following discussion is based on observations of hostilities in various parts of the world over a six-year period. Specific cases and sources are for the most part omitted due to security classification.

8. This paradigm may seem rather simplistic. However, it needs to be so. One is easily overwhelmed by the hundreds of works on *conflict*, which espouse quantitative, behavioralist, and other approaches. The real concern here is the generation of destructive power among "civilians," not the rationalization of its existence.

9. Lyman A. Shaffer, "Illegal Arms Traffic," in *New Dimensions in Transnational Crime*, ed. Donald E. J. McNamara and Philip John Sted (New York: John Jay Press, 1982), p. 115.

10. For a similar suggestion, see William A. Stofft and Gary L. Guertner, *Ethnic Conflict: Implications for the Army of the Future*, Strategic Studies Institute Report (Carlisle: US Army War College, 1994), pp. 12-13. Without discussing indicators, the authors argue for "matching patterns of ethnic conflicts with centers of gravity" that allow for political constraints.

The International Humanitarian Response System

ANDREW S. NATSIOS

The chaos spreading through many countries in the developing world has drawn together an unusual, sometimes incompatible, assortment of organizations to respond to these multiplying crises. Each year from 1978 to 1985 saw an average of five complex humanitarian emergencies, the term used in the disaster discipline for these crises; by contrast, there were 17 in 1992 and 20 in 1993.[1] The increase in these emergencies appears to be one of the few clear patterns in the new world order.

Were Harry Truman and George Marshall designing the Marshall Plan today, they would face a complex, sometimes bewildering international structure for implementing their strategy for rebuilding Europe. They might even think twice about whether or not to undertake the effort. Virtually the entire international response system is a post-World War II phenomenon; part of it was in its infancy, but most of it was not even conceived at the time of the Marshall Plan. To those of us who work in the relief discipline it seems a small miracle that the existing system works as well as it does, given the conflicting mandates of the responding organizations, the enormous complexity of the problems they address, and the organizational incongruities that have emerged in the years since the US helped Europe recover from World War II.

This article examines the existing humanitarian response system—made up of private voluntary organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and United Nations agencies—through which the international community responds to these emergencies. The article assesses the cultures and operational habits of this triad of organizations and the manner in which they

interact with each other. It then describes a civilian US government agency, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), in the Agency for International Development, which coordinates US responses to foreign disasters. Throughout, there are examples of how the US military fits into this complex system.

Private Voluntary Organizations

What we in the United States call a private voluntary organization (PVO) is known in Europe and the rest of the world as a non-governmental organization (NGO). As used in this essay, the term PVO describes private, non-profit organizations which specialize in humanitarian relief and development work in the Third World and increasingly in former communist countries. American PVOs employ hundreds of thousands of people in developing countries, have private revenue of $4 billion and receive $1.5 billion from USAID, and communicate with the public through newsletters and magazines whose aggregate circulation is in the millions.[2]

Most PVOs, private by charter, accept grants of federal money from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in order to carry out their work. For a PVO to remain eligible to receive such grants or food aid, it must by law raise at least 20 percent of its total income from private sources. While the proportion of a PVO's income from the US government, whether in the form of cash grants or food aid, varies according to its corporate strategy, some PVOs bump up against this 20 percent limit. A few PVOs accept no USAID money in order to maintain their distance from the US government, whose policies they may find objectionable.

This PVO suspicion of US government influence extends to work with the military. When President Bush ordered the US military to Kurdistan in June 1991, several PVOs, particularly European, refused to work cooperatively with them. Kurdistan became a seminal experience for American PVOs in their relationship with US forces, as it showed them they could work together productively in a humanitarian emergency, something that even organizations not opposed to US government policies or to close association with the US military had doubted.

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To paraphrase Chester Barnard, the US military and American PVOs are unalike in every important way.[3] Indeed, it's difficult to imagine two more dissimilar cultures. The former is highly disciplined, hierarchical, politically and culturally conservative, tough, with a mission to defeat the enemy. By and large, American PVOs are independent, resistant to authority, politically and culturally liberal (with the exception of some Christian PVOs), sensitive and understanding, with a mission to save lives. Because military missions tend to be explicit and tangible, the military sometimes misses the mark on humanitarian mission statements where objectives can be implicit and intangible.

Profile of a Culture

Any PVO reflects certain ideologies and organizational missions, to some degree based on the organization's private donor base and institutional history. Many are firmly on the ideological left; others are more centrist; still others are on the right. PVO comfort levels in dealing with the US military decline as one moves from right to left on that spectrum. PVOs tend to recruit former Peace Corps workers, religiously committed activists in the faith-based PVOs, and young people with graduate degrees in development economics and public health. Most recruits get the bulk of their operational training on the job; there are few equivalents to military doctrine or field manuals to describe how a particular activity or program is to be executed. Where PVO doctrine does exist it comes out of generally shared experiences and responses, is seldom written down, and is not always followed uniformly. Field experience in the culture of PVOs is comparable to combat experience in the military, a badge of honor, accorded the highest respect.

Conversely, nearly all PVOs share a devotion to the concept of sustainable development in any country or region in which they operate. They share an aversion to the quick fixes which they believe military operations tend to emphasize. Their own painful experience through four decades in the field teaches that real development is a slow, difficult process. One political value all PVOs share is a robust internationalism; there are no isolationists among these organizations.

The term private voluntary organization covers an array of organizations which help define PVO culture in all its color and complexity. PVOs may be divided into those which exclusively undertake advocacy work, attempting to influence public policy, and those which are primarily operational, managing projects in the field. Most large PVOs do both because they have realized that thoughtless or pernicious behavior, whether government policy, donor attitudes, or developing country demands, can quickly undo generally well-conceived and implemented community development work.

Advocacy and operational groups both have their weaknesses. PVOs which only advocate tend to have a limited understanding of field realities in the developing world. They tend to be governed by ideological preconcep-

tions rather than pragmatic appraisal of what works. PVOs that only operate in the field can go just so far in criticizing public policy before their workers and programs are threatened by government officials intolerant of those who examine and criticize government policies or behavior.

Some PVOs specialize by sector, such as health, education, or economic development. A few do only relief work, others only development. Some do both, particularly the larger PVOs such as Care, Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision, the three largest in the United States. Over the past decade a body of scholarship has developed which suggests that well-conceived relief work should be designed with developmental components and that good development work should include disaster prevention and mitigation measures to reduce the need for relief in disaster-prone areas. Agricultural development programs in drought-prone areas, for example, should include drought-resistant crop varieties and water conservation measures.[4]

Although most PVOs of US origin employ indigenous staff to manage their programs, some remain Western in their leadership, culture, and standards. In most developing countries there is an array of indigenously organized and managed PVOs which do relief and development work, sometimes forming partnerships with Western PVOs to meet common objectives. While many of these indigenous groups run fine programs, some are suspect in their operational capacity, professionalism, and accountability. Their reputation, good or ill, usually precedes them.

The comfortable assumption that Western PVOs can be trusted and indigenous PVOs cannot is both unfair and simplistic. Such an assumption, all too easy to make during planning, can endanger a mission if it is used to support operational decisions. In Somalia, the United Nations, and before it the United States, gave short shrift to Somali PVOs and leadership, with unfortunate consequences. When the battle was joined with General Aideed, Somali PVOs could have rallied support for the international presence in the country. Instead, the UN received little help from the more responsible elements of Somali society that were represented by local PVOs.

The fundraising imperative, which provides insight into their sometimes curious behavior, operates to some degree in all PVOs. PVOs must communicate with the American people either through electronic media or direct mail solicitation to raise funds. Research has shown that income increases significantly when purchased advertisements are combined with coverage of the PVO's work on national television and radio news programs. The more dramatic and heart-wrenching the scenes and reports of disaster in the developing world, the more income PVOs can expect from their solicitations.

One of the comparative standards against which PVOs are judged by the American news media is their overhead rate compared to the money they actually spend on programs in the field: the former should be as low and the latter as high as practicable. Obviously, their constituents would expect to see

some public recognition of the role they played as donors in media reports of the success of "their" PVO.

In spite of their non-profit nature, PVOs need to compete—perhaps less so than private businesses, but compete they must. The quality of their field programs affects their capacity to gather government grant funding, and their public visibility affects their private contributions.

All this is to say that the interest of PVOs in telling their stories to the news media is not so much a case of large ego (though that is sometimes there too), as it is of survival. When US government personnel take public credit for a response to a complex emergency, they ought to know that PVO teeth are grinding: an organization's financial health can be affected by military or other government public affairs announcements. Conversely, a carefully tailored series of such announcements, emphasizing the teamwork involved in success, would go a long way to reassuring many PVOs and their members that young Americans, in and out of uniform, were together helping to alleviate suffering.

PVOs have chains of command just as the military does, though not as disciplined or explicit, and these chains of command inevitably contribute to tensions between PVO field staff and central staff in headquarters. When observers find differing policy or operational concepts within the same PVO, it is often because each level in the hierarchy responds to a different agenda and is under a different set of pressures. Headquarters must respond to donor concerns, budget limitations, and the worldwide institutional consequences of a given policy. The field staff focuses on the human need in a particular program in the villages, where they struggle daily to overcome operational difficulties and chaotic working conditions to alleviate suffering or save lives.

PVOs will likely be there on the ground anywhere in the world where a humanitarian crisis exists when US or other military forces arrive and will generally be there when military forces depart. Kurdistan is the only recent exception to this rule. Hence military action can create animosity that will eventually affect the PVOs. The latter, with little or no security in conflicts, can be perceived at worst as Western, at best as foreigners from the same tribe or clan that produced the military. The World Vision headquarters in Baidoa, Somalia, was bombed in February 1994 by a Somali militia leader annoyed with UN peacekeepers over an issue unrelated to World Vision policies or operations. To make matters worse, when the staff injured in the bombing needed UN peacekeeper help to get to a medical facility, it was late and hesitant.

PVOs rely for their security on two aspects of their culture, not on guards, which they seldom employ, or on weapons, which they virtually never carry themselves. One is the importance of the work they do for the community. Even after Somalis as a group had turned violently against the UN presence in Somalia, they continued to request expansion of foreign PVO programs in their country. Second, while many PVOs find it difficult to remain neutral in conflicts which are inherently political—how could anyone remain apolitical in the

Cambodian or Rwandan genocides?—their perceived nonpartisanship is essential to their security in such conflicts. Don't bother us, they say, we don't take sides. So when military forces, whether under the flag of the UN or the US, are perceived to be supporting one side over the other in a conflict, PVOs are at risk.[5]

International Committee of the Red Cross

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), founded in 1863, is by far the oldest humanitarian relief organization. Specializing in conflicts, it is also the largest such organization, with 6300 employees worldwide and a budget of $608 million in 1993.[6] It is the only one with a mandate under international law (except perhaps the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees[7]), a fact which its managers, called delegates, frequently cite. Of all humanitarian institutions it is the most doctrinally developed, with an elaborate system of rules for functioning in conflicts, which work well most of the time, and which its delegates can recite in their sleep.

One generally knows what to expect programmatically in an ICRC program wherever it is to be found, a claim that few PVOs or UN agencies can make. It is the most focused, using its authority under the Geneva Convention in conflicts where other relief agencies have difficulty gaining access to the vulnerable. It does no development work, a strength in that its mission is clearly focused, and a weakness in that it does not address root causes of an emergency. Its focus is on family reunification, carrying messages between family members separated by a conflict, protection of prisoners of war and civilians, and providing humanitarian relief for those most severely affected. It is the most expensive, given the high cost of living of its largely Swiss staff and the cost of the high standards it sets. It is the only organization primarily funded through annual contributions from donor governments and national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which relieves it of the requirement to solicit funds from the public (although it does some modest fundraising among the Swiss public). The US government for many years has been far and away its largest donor.

Some would argue that the ICRC's impressive performance in chaos is less a function of its age, budget, size, and doctrine than the fact that it is run by the Swiss, whose culture values highly both discipline and order. Little is left to chance or human discretion in ICRC operations. Conflicts by their nature are the embodiment of chaos; consequently, any organization that can impose a modest degree of order in a conflict has an immediate operational advantage.

The ICRC is the relief organization with the most in common with the military; it is also the one least likely to have much to do with the military. This apparent paradox can be traced to its operating doctrine, which calls for absolute political neutrality in all conflicts. ICRC doctrine places a premium on voluntary adherence to international law by contestants: the very presence of peacemaking forces with an aggressive mandate means the spirit of ICRC persuasion has been replaced by armed force, even if those forces operate under the UN banner. Only

on direct order from ICRC headquarters will delegates even converse with any military force, let alone work with them operationally.

The ICRC will not work in a conflict unless both sides agree in writing to complete transparency in standard operating procedures. This means in practice that all sides to the conflict will get prior notice of each relief flight and each convoy, including travel routes, cargo descriptions, and times of departure and arrival. In Somalia it also meant getting clan elder approval for each region in which the ICRC operated. Indeed, until Somalia the ICRC never employed armed guards or drove in convoys protected by military forces. In fact, it was doctrinal heresy for the ICRC to use force to protect its operations and to work closely with the military in that country. The change was more a function of the chaos in the countryside than deliberate change to ICRC doctrine.

The Red Cross symbol appears on every vehicle, building, and piece of equipment the ICRC employs, not so much for its public relations value (though it does not hurt), but because in conflicts this symbol has become associated with the neutrality provided for in the Geneva Conventions. This characteristic led at one point to an extended debate with US representatives over whether the US flag or the Red Cross would appear on US Air Force planes delivering ICRC relief food—donated by the US government and the European Community—to famine-ravaged Somali cities during Operation Restore Hope.

The ICRC has until the last several years been entirely staffed by Swiss nationals. It has served in some respects as their version of the US Peace Corps, an outlet for the altruistic and adventurous instincts of Swiss youth, but one open to older people as well. However, the pathological levels of violence encountered at various times in the new world order have dramatically increased the fatality rate of ICRC delegates, as well as the psychological problems of staff traumatized by the atrocities they sometimes witness. The Liberian civil war reached such maniacal and psychotic proportions that the ICRC withdrew and several delegates required psychiatric hospitalization. These conditions have caused fewer young Swiss to volunteer, leading the ICRC to recruit some staff from outside Switzerland. It is an indication of the chaos spreading through the world that for the first time in its 150-year history the ICRC has been forced to hire non-Swiss staff.

While the ICRC is part of the International Red Cross movement, it has a tenuous, in the past sometimes acrimonious, relationship with the Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the "United Nations" of the Red Cross national offices. The ICRC, the Federation, and the UN agencies described below are international organizations; they are not PVOs.

The United Nations

It has become fashionable recently in the disaster relief community to blame the UN for most failed responses to complex humanitarian emergencies. Some of this blame is properly directed, but much is not. The UN is being

held accountable for work it was not until recently staffed to do. It is also being held responsible for some work it will never be able to perform, given two different realities: the nature of the institution, and the fact that the great powers and more than a few developing countries do not want it to be involved in certain kinds of activities.

The UN is not one institution, centrally managed, in a hierarchical organizational structure. The UN General Assembly and Security Council resemble the US Congress, with the Secretary General representing the Speaker of the House, rather than a chief executive. The Secretary General presides, he does not rule.

Four nearly autonomous UN agencies provide most of the operational support and services required to respond to a complex humanitarian relief requirement. They also are voluntary agencies in that countries are not assessed fees for their operation, but instead contribute what they wish. The four line agencies are: the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). In addition, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA), part of the Secretary General's staff, conducts the negotiations needed to bring humanitarian support through conflict lines and provides a modicum of coordination, to the extent that any of the four UN agencies wish to be coordinated. It is one of the great ironies of the UN system that its least important and badly run work is supported by assessments, while its better work is funded voluntarily through these agencies.[8]

The four line agencies, resembling feudal baronies, only nominally report to the Secretary General. They are in fact quite independent of the Secretary General and of each other, obtaining their resources and political support from donor countries whose representatives sit on their independent governing boards. They do not report to the General Assembly in any managerially significant way, nor do they get policy guidance from it. In Somalia the field directors of these agencies reported to their headquarters, not to the director of UN humanitarian operations located in Somalia. Three of the four agencies are led by politically well-connected Americans, the fourth by a Japanese. All assiduously cultivate their bases of political support in their home countries. While the Secretary General has a hand in appointing the leaders of each of the Big Four, few have ever been removed by the Secretary. Nor does he control their budgets, staffing, or policy.[9]

These four UN agencies had little operational capacity five years ago, but instead provided money to the governments of developing countries to do their work for them through indigenous government ministries. UNHCR's refugee camps in many countries were managed through the ministries of the host government or under grant agreement with PVOs. It is only with the advent of the new world order, and the rise of the complex emergency as a painful fact of

international life, that they have hired staff with operational skills and experience. Even now the quality is uneven, the depth limited.

These UN agencies have used four models for coordinating humanitarian relief operations, with varying degrees of success. In the first model, the Secretary General assigns leadership in a particular disaster to one of the four line agencies. In Bosnia it has been UNHCR, in the southern African drought it was the WFP, and in Sudan and Kurdistan it has been UNICEF. The second model, successfully employed in Angola, vests leadership with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

The third model, used in Somalia, had no lead agency. Instead, the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, created a new, hybrid entity, not tied to any of the UN agencies, in which the military, political, and humanitarian section heads reported to a powerful UN czar, the Secretary General's personal representative, who reported directly to the Secretary General. The Somalia experience suggests that this last model, however much preferred by the Secretary General, is unmanageable. Neither the Secretary General nor his staff was capable—temperamentally, intellectually, or organizationally—of centrally supporting extended field operations in Somalia. The procurement, personnel, contracting, and budgeting systems of the line UN agencies, however weak, are greatly superior to those of the Secretariat at UN headquarters in New York.

The fourth model was the norm before the advent of the new world order. Seldom followed now except in smaller natural disasters, it called for the country director of the UN Development Program to act as the chief UN officer in any country affected by a major disaster. UNDP's lack of experience or interest in complex emergencies has made this traditional model unappealing if not dysfunctional.

All of the models reflect the vagaries of UN personnel policy, which mixes skilled and dedicated career international bureaucrats with languid and incompetent relatives of petty dictators whose votes in the General Assembly or on governing boards are important to the agency bureaucrats. The size of this latter group is debatable; my experience is that it is large enough to be a costly and visible nuisance, but certainly not representative of the average operational UN staff in the specialized agencies. There is no functional personnel system; there are no career ladders; and promotions based on merit alone are not the norm. The newer, operationally competent employees are too often contractors with limited career opportunities. The personnel system still reflects the much less rigorous demands of an earlier era, when the great powers did not want a robust UN system. It is arguable whether this situation has much changed since 1989.

Because of the institutional weaknesses of the position of the Secretary General and the feudal structure of the UN system, activities ranging from routine coordination to development of comprehensive and integrated

strategy in humanitarian emergencies are difficult to plan and carry out. In late 1990, led by the Nordic bloc and supported by the United States, donor countries proposed and the General Assembly approved reforms which created the previously mentioned Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), which is managed by one of 17 Under Secretaries General. Expectations of what DHA can do in complex emergencies are thwarted by its limited statutory authority and the Byzantine bureaucratic politics of the UN system.

Developing countries were quite unenthusiastic about the reforms that created DHA and strengthened the UN's operational capacity in complex emergencies: some of their governments were causing the problems that the reforms were meant to address. Third World elites and intellectuals suspected that the DHA reforms would advance the case for humanitarian interventionism, which some of them perceived to be a form of Western neocolonialism in the robes of Mother Teresa. The changes promised to unleash meddling, do-gooder PVOs and donor aid agencies whose roots are sometimes found in the colonial affairs offices of contributing countries. National sovereignty in nation-states with weak national identities, some of which govern using police-state tactics, is a central issue for policy development. Indeed, the issue of sovereignty threatens the very foundations of states. In order to secure approval of the DHA reforms, the reformers diluted the language of the resolution.

Given its real mandate, DHA has done reasonably well, particularly as it has matured organizationally. It has created a centralized system for identifying and evaluating needs and donor appeals for funding; both, however, remain highly inflated and unprioritized. DHA conducted diplomatic negotiations between combatants in conflicts to ensure the protection of relief efforts, managed coordination with PVOs and the big four UN agencies (though all four continue to resist this coordination), and provided start-up funding for fast onset emergencies out of a $50 million emergency revolving account. The fund is now out of money despite the generous donor funding that created it. The work done by DHA reflects modest incremental improvements to the old system, not breakthroughs in innovative organization or management.

The UN will always be held hostage to some degree by the governments it serves. In its assessments of impending famines, for example, crop estimates are heavily influenced by local ministries of agriculture, which means the estimates are sometimes politicized and frequently suspect. The agricultural production figures used to judge food aid requirements for the southern African drought were based on such estimates, most of which turned out to be significantly overstated. The net effect of the distortion was a significant overcommitment of food aid in Mozambique. In 1990 the Bashir government in Sudan refused to acknowledge a massive drought during its critical early months. When the government finally did report drought conditions, under intense international pressure, it overestimated food requirements, which the UN promptly publicized.

Even with the UN's institutional weaknesses, however, the international community needs the UN when responding to a humanitarian crisis. No sovereign state alone has the UN's legal and moral sanction to intervene, its coordinating authority, its peacekeeping troops (however constrained by their home governments), its diplomatic good offices, and its financial and staff resources.

Donor Government Aid Agencies

The final component of this complex system is represented by donor government aid agencies. In the United States, that function is fulfilled by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in the Agency for International Development. OFDA is charged under the Foreign Assistance Act with coordinating all US government assistance in foreign disasters. It operates under a unique but jealously guarded provision of law—the so-called "notwithstanding" provision—which allows it to act quickly in a disaster situation, free of the many procedural, administrative, and bureaucratic requirements of the federal government. Because it is exempt from prohibitions on US government assistance to certain countries, OFDA can provide life-saving relief assistance to people suffering the effects of natural or manmade disasters anywhere that the State Department has declared a disaster. OFDA, with expenditures of $189 million a year and a modest staff of 25 regular and 25 contract employees, has a simple, focused mission: save lives and reduce human suffering through relief and rehabilitation interventions.[10] It is not authorized to do development or reconstruction work.

OFDA projects itself into disasters either indirectly, through grants to PVOs, the ICRC, or UN agencies, or by direct operational intervention through its Disaster Assistance Response Teams. These teams have the authority to spend money in the field on the spot, and their daily situation reports to USAID and State Department leadership can shape US policy. With their satellite telephone capacity, these teams can order additional staff, equipment, and logistical capacity from the OFDA office in Washington. Early in the Kurdish emergency, for example, the only reports that Secretary of State Jim Baker and Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger received on what was actually happening in the field were situation reports from the OFDA.

Because of their technical expertise in relief, rapid contracting capacity, and long experience in emergencies and in grants to other actors, OFDA officers have influence which, even if unofficial, extends throughout the response system. It is perhaps the only element of the humanitarian relief system that can call meetings, get quarreling groups to work together, and draft strategic plans that other organizations will take seriously. Frequently when the UN is either not present in the field or its contracting mechanisms are too slow, OFDA will fill in the gaps, handing operations over to the UN later. The European Community two years ago created an office modeled after OFDA, which they

call ECHO, the European Community Humanitarian Office, that attempts to provide them with a similar operational capacity in emergencies.

Implications

The relief response institutions—PVOs, ICRC, and the UN—in conjunction with OFDA and ECHO, make up the system used by the international community to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies. The complicating subtlety in all this is that many of the institutional players really don't like or trust one another. The PVOs quarrel quietly among themselves, publicly with the UN. The UN does not often deal with the ICRC, which keeps to itself and protects its prerogatives. Much of this distrust is understandable—it results from ambiguous or overlapping organizational mandates; the stresses of working in combat where relief workers regularly get killed, wounded, or kidnapped; competition for scarce private or donor government resources; the lack of experience in dealing with each other; and turf issues over geographic and sectoral focus.

The good news is that coordination and cooperation are improving rather than declining as the humanitarian relief system matures. Necessity encourages it and painful experience requires it. In spite of its feudal character, the system does function, though it is better when competent and skillful leaders emerge to manage the response in the field. Experience over the past few years suggests, not surprisingly, that the quality of this leadership can profoundly affect the competence with which the relief response is managed and whether it ultimately succeeds or fails. Jim Grant, director of UNICEF, provided inspired leadership in the early years of Operation Lifeline Sudan, as has Mrs. Ogata, High Commissioner for Refugees in Bosnia. As in most organizations, leadership does make a difference.

How well this humanitarian response system works with military forces in peacekeeping operations, whether or not the forces operate under the UN banner, will be determined by the quality of military and civilian leadership and its familiarity with the humanitarian response structure. The only part of the military force structure prepared by doctrine, training, experience, and personnel recruitment policy to deal with these organizations is the civil affairs branch of the Army. Unfortunately, commanders and military planners often include a civil affairs function in a humanitarian relief operation as an afterthought, if at all. Both PVO and UN managers have repeatedly commented how well they could work with US forces if they could deal with civil affairs officers instead of combat commanders.

The greatest strength of the civil affairs organization is also its greatest weakness: except for a small, overextended, active-duty battalion at Ft. Bragg, all civil affairs assets are in the Army's reserve components. The strength derives from the recruitment of professionals in the civilian world, who generally are not found in the active force; these specialists can relate

readily to civilian humanitarian agencies. The weakness lies in their reserve status and in the low opinion—whether deserved or not—that some individuals in the active force sometimes have of the reserves. Interservice rivalry in Somalia aggravated the friction between the active and reserve forces, which tended to weaken the US relief effort.

The way in which civil affairs units were employed in the Gulf War and Somalia was counterproductive in the former instance and nearly catastrophic in the latter. In Rwanda, the US humanitarian assistance effort included a robust civil affairs component. This element was initially provided by the US Army Peacekeeping Institute but was substantially augmented by active and reserve component civil affairs personnel as the US effort matured. The requirement for civil affairs units in all humanitarian operations is becoming more apparent, so much so that commanders could be judged negligent if they fail to integrate them into their operational plans. In a complex humanitarian emergency a civil affairs unit is a powerful force multiplier; in a Chapter VI or VII peacekeeping operation, a civil affairs company could be worth an infantry battalion.

Perhaps the most consistently difficult lesson for US military forces to learn is that unlike their role in combat, they are not in charge of managing the response to a complex humanitarian emergency. US forces in EUCOM, apparently unfamiliar with the relief discipline, attempted to write an operations plan for Kurdistan that, if followed, might find the Kurds still in camps in the Turkish mountains. Once commanders were directed to let field staff from the US Agency for International Development take the lead with the ICRC and PVOs (the UN had not yet arrived), the situation improved.

The unfortunate reality is that usually no one is in charge in a complex humanitarian emergency, a situation which is unlikely to change at any point in the foreseeable future. The notion that if any institution is in charge it should be the United Nations is by no means universally acknowledged among relief responders. Furthermore, it will be challenged as well by UN agencies that don't want their rivals in the system to be in charge if they can't be. UN performance has not matched its mandate; until it does, the UN cannot assume an undisputed leadership position. In such a vacuum the military, trained to deal with chaos, can be perceived to be usurping the prerogatives of other agencies. Training and practice can overcome such misperceptions.

The two most important capabilities the military brings to any emergency response remain logistics and security: they are tasks that relief organizations can never match but increasingly need in complex emergencies. When the military focuses on what it does best it serves well; when it is required to do nation-building and development, complex disciplines about which it knows relatively little, it can do more harm than good.

The response structure includes the other humanitarian actors described in this article with which the military must learn to live and work. The ambiguous

situation in which the US military now finds itself requires a doctrine of cooperative engagement with humanitarian agencies in which the military contributes three key proficiencies: security, logistics, and limited, temporary assistance when humanitarian organizations are unable to cope with a life-threatening emergency event. The military should not attempt to replace or dominate humanitarian organizations, nor should it be directed to undertake nation-building activities. Projects such as port and road reconstruction, which the military sometimes undertakes as part of its own transportation requirement, should be of short duration and sustainable without its ongoing attention.

A reasonable person might conclude that there will be more, rather than fewer, humanitarian relief operations in the years ahead. The planner's paradox is that no single source of support in such operations—PVOs, Red Cross, UN, or national assistance offices—is organized, trained, or equipped to perform all of the functions inherent in relieving human suffering in those crises. With military forces in the asset pool, many more capabilities become available to overcome suffering.

Success in such operations will be determined by the degree to which all of the players can step outside of their individual cultures and value systems, surrender some of their autonomy, and seek the best, rather than the worst, in those with whom they must solve the problems they will confront in a humanitarian emergency. Planning, training, exercises, application of operational lessons learned—all can contribute to improved understanding and eventually improved execution of relief responses where millions of lives are at risk.

NOTES

1. Study done by Faye Henderson of the LAI/OFDA staff (3 August 1992) for the author, who was then serving as assistant administrator FHA/USAID, Bureau of Food and Humanitarian Assistance.

2. See USAID 1994 annual report entitled "Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs," Bureau for Humanitarian Response, pp. 70-97.

3. Chester Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968).

4. See *Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disasters* (Boulder, Colo., and Paris: Westview and UNESCO Presses, 1989).

5. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies has written a set of NGO guidelines for doing disaster relief entitled "Code of Conduct" (1994) which addresses some of these issues.

6. See the ICRC 1993 Annual Report, pp. 273, 277.

7. Under the UN Charter, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees has a legal mandate to provide support and protection to refugees.

8. The UNHCR has responsibility for refugees (and by practice, more recently, for internally displaced people). The World Food Program provides food for people affected by droughts and civil wars and UNHCR-managed refugee camps. UNICEF specializes in medical, educational, and job training support for women and children. And the UN Development Program has responsibility for development assistance, usually through country governments. While a half dozen other UN agencies claim an operational role, they are more modest players.

9. The UN Security Council last year approved a little-noticed but managerially significant reform of the governance of UN specialized agencies. Under the reforms, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN will have budget and policy review authority over all specialized agencies, the first time such authority and oversight has been vested in a membership body of the UN.

10. See OFDA Annual Report for FY 1993, p. 57.

Does China Threaten Asia-Pacific Regional Stability?

KARL W. EIKENBERRY

Nowhere has the collapse of Soviet power had greater consequences for security issues than in the Asia-Pacific region.[1] The Cold War witnessed two very different US-led approaches to countering the USSR. In Europe, America was able to forge an enduring collective alliance among nations that shared a commitment to Western liberal political values and open trade regimes. In Asia, however, the potential partners of the United States were divided by historical animosities, dissimilar developmental strategies, incompatible security interests, and fundamentally different philosophies of governing. Consequently, the United States implemented its policy of containment in the western Pacific through a series of bilateral and limited multilateral security treaties and pacts.[2] Thus, even with an abrupt end to the Cold War, we find NATO, although under stress, still cohesive. In East Asia, on the other hand, the implosion of the Soviet Union removed the stimulus that linked the defense concerns of the key players and dampened traditional rivalries.

It should surprise no one that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is at the center of the post-Cold War security calculations of all East Asia regional actors. China, which has the largest population of any nation, dominates the Asian landmass with an area slightly greater than that of the United States.[3] Chinese family-oriented Confucian culture, which places high premiums on education and hard work, provides a strong foundation upon which PRC modernization efforts are rapidly proceeding.[4] China's growing economy, by some calculations, is now surpassed in size only by that of the United States and Japan.[5] Additionally, the PRC maintains more soldiers under arms than any other nation.[6] At the same time, considerable caution attends most analysts' estimates of the PRC's long-term stability due to the scope of the Chinese people's political disaffection, as well as doubts about the ability of the Communist Party leadership to maintain unity after the passing of Deng Xiaoping.

This conjunction of uncertainty and vast potential power has led to widely varying evaluations of the role the PRC is apt to play in the security of East Asia. A Republic of Korea National Defense College faculty member calls China's defense buildup a "disturbing factor" to Asia-Pacific security.[7] A Russian journalist notes that although his country enjoys neighborly ties with the PRC, "It should not be forgotten that [Chinese] local museums and historical maps show a good part of the Russian land as having been taken from China by force."[8] The *Hindustan Times* warns that Sino-military developments are "causing worries," while a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official expresses concern that the rising budget of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) could trigger "a vicious circle in which Asian countries would strangle themselves in a contest of military might."[9] In contrast, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir counsels the countries of the region to not be unduly worried by Chinese defense spending, and PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian has decried the "China threat theory" as "ridiculous tales of the Arabian nights."[10] This broad range of views poses a difficult question: Is China a threat to the peace of the Asia-Pacific region through the first decade of the next century?

An understanding of the Chinese expression for "threat" (*weixie*) helps inform this study. The word consists of two characters: *wei* is defined as "strength" or "power"; *xie* implies "to force" or "to coerce."[11] The root meanings remind us that the concept of "a threat" entails an awareness of both capabilities and intentions.

This examination of the PRC's likely effect on the stability of East Asia begins with a discussion of China's capabilities, primarily focusing on its sources of military power. This is followed with a much more problematic inquiry into Beijing's intentions. Synthesis of the two dimensions of *weixie* suggests some inferences about the nature of the "China threat" to Asia-Pacific stability and leads to implications for the foreign policy and military strategy of the United States.

Capabilities

In the field of world politics, power is generally considered to be the capacity of a nation to control the behavior of other states in accordance with

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its own ends.[12] International relations theorist Kenneth Waltz suggests that "an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him."[13] Such formulations make it clear that national capabilities or power resources are usually meaningful only when measured in relative terms. As political scientist Robert Jervis observes: "Knowing how much leverage one state has over another tells statesmen and analysts very little unless they also know how much leverage the other state has."[14]

When appraising the role of power, it is analytically useful to specify scope and domain. The former refers to the effects that matter, and the latter to those who can be affected.[15] To illustrate, the statement that the PRC has a great deal of capability tells us little. However, the assertion that China is able to employ its naval and air forces to gain control of the Spratly Islands (a specification of scope) in a conflict with Vietnam (a specification of domain), implies much. This inquiry will therefore examine the absolute capabilities (the scope) and relative power (the domain) of PRC military strength.

Absolute Power

Operationalizing the concept of military power is, of course, a troublesome task. The Chinese define *potential* military power as being determined by a state's political system, level of economic development, military strength, territory, population, and scope of natural resources.[16] Western thinking is generally consistent with that view, since Clausewitz's idea of the "people's share in the great affairs of state" is roughly analogous to the Chinese notion of the role of the political system.[17] This section concentrates on three generally robust indicators of military power: defense expenditures, force structure, and national wealth.

• *Defense Expenditures.* The PLA's official budget has increased about 140 percent over the past six years, from around $2.5 billion (US) in 1988 to $6 billion in 1994.[18] This sharp rise in military expenditures is often cited by East Asian officials and security specialists as evidence of the threat China presents, or will soon pose, to regional stability.[19] The numbers are misleading for two reasons.

First, the selection of 1988 as a baseline year for PLA budget trend analysis heavily biases the outcome. In 1979, the cost of the brief but intense Sino-Vietnamese War drove PRC defense spending up to $2.6 billion, a sum not surpassed until 1989 as PLA modernization was subordinated to other economic priorities by Beijing's leaders throughout the 1980s.[20] Thus, it is equally valid to say either Chinese military expenditures rose 135 percent between 1979 and 1994, or 140 percent since 1988. Moreover, the rather modest size of the 1979 starting point figure must be kept in mind. A linear rise in spending between 1979 and 1994 would equate to only about $230 million per annum.

Second, official PLA budget figures are nominal and not discounted for the effects of inflation. Consequently, increases in military spending are overstated in real terms. PRC yearly inflation averaged around 5.1 percent during the 1980s and accelerated significantly in the 1990s.[21] By mid-1994, the urban consumer price index was rising at an annual rate of 23 percent.[22] While over the past ten years price increases due to inflation have outstripped the growth of military expenditures (reportedly 130 percent to 116 percent), undoubtedly reflecting some creative statistical interpretation, the fact remains that nominal budget trends do exaggerate the extent of the buildup of the Chinese armed forces.[23] The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), for instance, using real prices, estimates PRC defense spending to have risen only some 13 percent between 1985 and 1992.[24] Thus, it seems clear that any meaningful discussion of the recent expansion of PLA budget appropriations must be tempered with explicit recognition of baseline and inflation factors.

It can be argued that PRC official defense budgets, like those of the former Soviet Union, grossly understate actual outlays and are inaccurate gauges of spending levels. Chinese military allocations as reported to the outside world do not include the costs of research and development, modernization of defense industry plants and equipment, and various personnel compensation plans.[25] Nor is PLA revenue from its numerous commercial enterprises counted.[26] Conceivably, actual expenditure figures (by Western standards) could be as much as double those announced by Beijing.[27]

Nevertheless, there is good reason to speculate that one of the important reasons official outlays have been increased in recent years is to offset shrinking non-budget revenues.[28] Most notable has been the precipitous decline in Chinese arms sales, from some $4.7 billion in 1987 to $100 million in 1992.[29]

Three other points help to keep Chinese military expenditures in perspective. First, even if the IISS's estimate of 1992 PRC defense spending is doubled, per capita outlays would still be (in 1985 US dollars) less than $40, contrasted, in that same year, with $136 for Japan, $268 for Russia, and $964 for the United States.[30] Second, given the problem of inflation, as well as the Communist Party leadership's anxiety about PLA loyalty, a sizable portion of military budget increases since the Tiananmen incident in 1989 has probably been earmarked for improvements in soldier pay and quality of life.[31] Finally, with the relatively backward state of the PRC's defense industries, there simply would not be many high-tech, force multiplier items for the PLA to procure domestically even if funds were made available.[32]

• *Force Structure.* Since its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic of China has made extraordinary progress in developing a credible defense posture. Despite the constraints of poverty, a large population, intermittent domestic political upheavals, and periodic international isolation, Beijing's leaders over the past 45 years have generally found the PLA capable

of responding to internal and external threats and, when necessary, advancing limited foreign policy objectives by means of force.

China possesses the world's third largest nuclear weapons arsenal, including 80-plus intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and 20-plus intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).[33] Additionally, China's air force operates about 180 aircraft capable of delivering nuclear bombs, and China's navy has one nuclear-armed submarine (SSBN) with 12 ballistic missiles.[34] Considerable resources continue to be committed to the strategic forces. By the end of the century, China might be deploying accurate, mobile, solid-fuel ICBMs, perhaps with capabilities on par with the Russian SS-25.[35] China also is expected to field ICBMs with MIRV warheads within the next 15 years.[36]

The PLA's conventional capabilities are also impressive, somewhat enhanced by recent efforts to improve mobility and acquire force projection weapons and equipment. The 2.3-million-member ground forces have 12 motorized infantry or armored divisions, the navy commands a 6000-man marine brigade, and the air force has an organic airborne corps of three divisions.[37] The air force has improved its aerial combat potential with the 1992 purchase of a squadron of 24 Su-27 fighters from Russia; moreover, some observers speculate that China may procure additional Su-27s and possibly other sophisticated attack and command and control platforms in the near future.[38] Aircraft range and loiter times also have been extended with the acquisition of midair refueling capabilities from Iran.[39] Finally, the navy continues a steady transition from coastal defense to a blue-water force. It has developed surface warfare, logistic, and communications systems to the point that it can effectively provide muscle to back Beijing's South China Sea territorial claims against regional contenders.[40] And while the much-rumored purchase of an aircraft carrier from Russia or Ukraine has not materialized, the fact that some East Asian security experts have seriously considered it a possibility indicates the progress Chinese naval forces have made over the past decade.[41]

As with the case of PRC defense expenditures, however, assessments about the quality of the PLA force structure need to be placed in an appropriate context. Neither China's strategic nor its conventional capabilities should be considered daunting.

Where the strategic capabilities of the United States and Russia include a fully integrated triad of nuclear forces (bombers, sea-based missiles, and land-based missiles), the PRC, with one SSBN and a fleet of antiquated bombers, possesses only one functional strategic arm.[42] The vast disparity in size between the Chinese missile arsenals and those of the United States and Russia effectively limits Beijing to a second-strike, countervalue doctrine through the foreseeable future.[43] One PRC security expert has said that given such realities, the PLA's approach to developing its nuclear forces is "high in quality, few in number."[44] Thus, although Beijing's strategic arsenal is

growing in size and versatility, it is extremely modest by superpower stand-
ards, and it will remain so at least through the first decade of the next century.

Turning to the PLA's conventional forces, it is evident that they can
capably operate along or within their nation's borders. But whether or not
they pose a threat leads to the issue of power projection, and therein lies a
major weakness of China's military.

First, while recent PLA inquiries abroad about the purchase of
advanced weaponry and military technology have generated much publicity,
actual procurements and their effects on overall combat effectiveness have
been minor. For instance, compare the one-squadron-size force of 24 Su-27s
acquired from Russia with the 23 F-15 squadrons (approximately 24 aircraft
per squadron) fielded by the US Air Force.[45] Additionally, the Chinese do not
yet have an AWACS; their ability to effectively command and control an
Su-27 squadron is thus problematic. Simply stated, the numbers are small,
and the combat power is diminished by the inability of China's air force, as
yet, to achieve the important multiplier effects that accompany sophisticated
supporting C^3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence), train-
ing, and logistic systems. Moreover, in contemporary warfare, it is often the
synergistic effect from the simultaneous employment of a broad range of
complex weapon systems that proves decisive in battle.[46] The Su-27 repre-
sents the only highly capable system in the Chinese air force inventory; full
exploitation of synergism remains a somewhat distant goal.

A second constraint on the PLA's capacity for force projection is the
PRC's weak indigenous technological and industrial base. Chinese military
R&D, production technologies, and weapon systems generally lag 10 to 20
years behind the West and Japan.[47] Today's armaments have become so
complicated and entail the integration of so many intricate subsystems that
China faces enormous challenges in its efforts to reach the cutting edge. The
air force's difficulties in designing and producing the Jian-8 II Finback fighter
illustrate the magnitude of the tasks ahead. Begun in 1964, the J-8 program
has led to the production of over 3000 aircraft, with a fourth generation
Finback currently under development and projected to be fielded by the end
of the decade.[48] Yet the authoritative PRC journal *Modern Weaponry* notes
that the "engine and onboard equipment have not advanced [and the] devel-
opment of the model and major components is uncoordinated."[49] It rates the
current model's firepower and control systems as 15 years behind "foreign
levels."[50] Such is the nature of the design, test, and validation problems that
the PLA confronts as it labors to supply its ground, naval, and air forces with
world-class equipment.

Yet a third obstacle to Chinese endeavors to build a power projection
capability is the technological and operational demands that are linked to the
ongoing revolution in military affairs. As the major global actors begin to

fully exploit the opportunities of the information age, the PLA finds itself significantly disadvantaged.[51]

China's military officer corps, disconcerted by the results of the Gulf War, seems acutely aware of the problem.[52] PLA National Defense University researchers emphasize that warfare has evolved from a historical stage during which quantity dominated quality, to one in which the reverse is true.[53] They candidly state that PRC weaponry is inferior to that of the developed countries, that its technology lags even further behind, and that the quality of the PLA's personnel is yet a more serious handicap.[54] The newspaper of the armed forces, *People's Liberation Army Daily*, reported that participants at a military forum in 1993 concluded that whereas the PLA has traditionally looked at tactics from a "strategic angle," it must now do so from a "technological angle"; to downplay the role of science would be to "try to catch a sparrow with blindfolds" (a Chinese proverb meaning to engage in self-deception).[55] Whether the PRC can eventually close the technology gap is not in question; the point remains, however, that the process will be a protracted one.

• *National Wealth.* The military power a society can generate is dependent not only upon the size of its economy, but on the proportion of wealth that it can allocate to defense expenditures. The former is measured by a nation's GNP, whereas the latter is largely a function of GNP per capita.

Attempts to derive widely agreed-upon estimates of the size of the Chinese economy and per capita wealth inevitably founder upon problems related to currency conversion, purchasing power parity, and statistical data accuracy. Assessments have differed by as much as a factor of ten.[56] Many economists believe the official figures of PRC aggregate and per capita GNP are somewhat or even grossly understated.[57] Pending further reforms in price structures, currency exchange mechanisms, and trade policies, the problem of calculating China's wealth will remain formidable. Nevertheless, certain key economic statistics less subject to dispute do indicate impressive gains over the past 15 years. For example, the PRC's economy grew at an average annual rate of 9.4 percent during the 1980s and continues to expand rapidly; China's gross domestic savings stood at a remarkable 39 percent of GDP in 1991; its international trade has more than quadrupled over the past 15 years; and Beijing's international reserves in late 1993 stood at $22 billion.[58] Moreover, the return of Hong Kong to PRC sovereignty in 1997, along with deepening trade ties with Taiwan, would seem to further enhance China's financial prospects.[59] Barring severe political turmoil (a possibility that cannot be dismissed lightly), it is clear the armed forces will be able to modernize at an accelerating pace as a key beneficiary of the PRC's burgeoning economy.

Formidable impediments to development, however, cannot be wished away. The population will grow another 350 million by 2025, increasing demand for jobs, housing, education, and social welfare spending.[60] The shocks of rapid urbanization, market reforms, inflation, and a loosening of political control have

led to unemployment and underemployment, corruption, and periodic worker and peasant discontent.[61] The people, despite steady improvements in their standard of living, remain poor, and the government, chary of political unrest and eager to appease, may be inclined to favor consumption-oriented fiscal policies. The energy import bill has escalated sharply in the past few years and will continue to rise, at least in the near term.[62] While the potential of the PRC's human capital is enormous, currently less than two percent of China's adults have graduated from universities.[63] Finally, the sector of the national economy that has proven most resistant to market reforms and efficiency is precisely the defense industry groups.[64] So, while it can be said that if China remains on its current economic growth trajectory, it will be a global superpower by the middle of the next century, conjectures about outcomes in international affairs five decades hence should be heavily discounted. For the next 10 to 15 years, the PRC will remain hard-pressed to translate economic gains into significant payoffs for its military.

Relative Power

As mentioned earlier, national power is meaningful only when discussed in terms of both scope and domain. We now turn to the latter, to judge PRC regional force projection capabilities on a comparative or relative basis.

Two questions are central to understanding this issue: First, is there a post-Cold War East Asian "power vacuum" whose existence might prompt Beijing's use of force? Second, are any of the particular regional actors especially vulnerable to a PRC military threat?

• *Is there a power vacuum in East Asia?* The United States played a pivotal role in Asia-Pacific security from the end of World War II until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Regional alliances and treaties were primarily oriented toward Washington or Moscow, with Beijing serving as something of a wildcard. Has the precipitous decline in Russian power since 1991, and concurrently the significant reduction in the size of the American armed forces, led to an unraveling of the complex East Asian security ties that had so effectively checked local historical rivalries?

The idea of an Asian-Pacific power vacuum in the 1990s, of course, evokes images of the region between World Wars I and II, when the erosion of European colonial hegemony stimulated a *realpolitik* response from Tokyo.[65] The absence of strong or domestically legitimated states throughout the region increased uncertainty, lowered the costs of war, and contributed greatly to the eventual clash between Japan and the United States. Obviously, such conditions do not obtain in the Asia-Pacific region of our times. East Asia is, for the most part, composed of mutually recognized sovereign states. It is economically vibrant, with growth rates measurably higher than the global average; by the middle of the next century it is expected to account for 50 percent of world GNP.[66] Moreover, politically the states of East Asia are

relatively stable. Although US and Russian military deployments throughout the area have decreased during the 1990s, the effect has been to make more explicit the fundamental strength, not weakness, of the region.

Additionally, America's role as the "honest broker" or balancer of security interests in the Asia-Pacific region did not necessarily end with the Cold War. To assert that it did assumes US power is rapidly waning in East Asia and American military forces are hastily being withdrawn. Yet America's aggregate economic strength remains formidable; the collapse of the Soviet Union did nothing to change this fact. It is also true that the United States has continued to reduce the size of its armed forces in the region. But since American forces committed to the Asia-Pacific theater during the Cold War were preoccupied with the Soviet Union, the demise of the USSR has appreciably increased *comparative* US regional armed strength despite reductions in American defense expenditures.[67]

PRC military officers and security experts themselves stress this point in making their own appraisals of the correlation of forces in East Asia. For instance, Guo Zhenyuan, of the influential China Centre for International Studies, writes:

> The United States is the winner in its confrontation with the Soviet Union and is the only superpower in the world today. Though its strength has been considerably eroded by decades of confrontation with the Soviet Union, it still enjoys superiority in the Asia-Pacific region and throughout the world. By readjusting its security strategy, the United States will be able to cut back somewhat while still maintaining its dominant position and leading role in the security structure of the region.[68]

Additionally, the Gulf War demonstrated to PLA commanders that the United States retains a formidable strategic deployment capability that will offset, to a degree, reductions in forward-deployed forces.[69] Finally, Chinese military thinkers openly acknowledge America's continuing influence in the area, especially Northeast Asia, pointing out that "the United States will continue in the future to be an important factor in the maintenance of [Asia-Pacific] regional stability."[70]

• *Are the regional actors vulnerable?* While the overall distribution of military capabilities in the East Asia region can hardly be defined as a power vacuum, are there any particularly lucrative targets in the region against which the PRC might employ force in the years immediately ahead? Setting aside for now the issue of Taiwan, the possibility appears remote. The matter is one of where potential engagements would be fought. China's geographic expanse, large population, and substantial agricultural and industrial bases combine to make it virtually invincible against a conventional foe bent on occupying the country. The picture is quite different, however, for the PRC's use of force beyond its borders. Quite simply, the PLA's punch

dissipates exponentially as the distance from the homeland increases; correspondingly, the relative strength of the potential target states grows. Even during the 1979 one-month limited war against Vietnam fought along China's southeast border, PRC armed forces suffered some 26,000 casualties pushing toward objectives only 15 kilometers beyond the Sino-Vietnamese frontier; C^3I and logistic problems proved to be severe.[71]

The PLA, of course, is much more capable today than it was in the late-1970s; on the other hand, so are its neighbors, at least within the confines of their own territories and littorals. For example, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force has 158 F-15J and F-15DJ fighter aircraft.[72] Even the smaller powers, drawing upon the wealth accumulated from sustained economic growth, are generally able to purchase arms that serve as effective conventional deterrents. Malaysia, for instance, recently decided to purchase 18 Russian MiG-29 and eight US McDonnell Douglas F/A-18D Hornet fighters, both world-class aircraft, placing the Chinese air force's acquisition of 24 Su-27s in better perspective.[73] Vietnam, the one Asian nation against which the PRC was not reluctant to apply military pressure over the past 15 years, was mostly distinguished during that time by its degree of international isolation (Moscow was an increasingly unenthusiastic sponsor after 1979). However, with Hanoi's ongoing integration into the East Asian political and economic system, Beijing will likely be required to adjust its means-ends calculations when weighing the use of force against its southern neighbor in the future.

Certainly, if the Asia-Pacific region were thrown into political chaos (some plausible scenarios, discussed later, could lead to such an outcome), the prospect of China committing forces beyond its borders would increase. As the national stakes rise in value, the price of war becomes less of an impediment to action. Yet absent such developments, it appears that the somewhat limited scope and domain of PRC military power, at least over the near term, will militate against Beijing's inclination to use its armed forces as a tool of compellence in its relations with its regional neighbors.

Intentions

A state's military power does not, in itself, constitute a threat to another nation. As noted earlier, it is power *and* intentions that matter. Canadians do not feel endangered by US military strength, whereas Pakistanis remain vitally concerned with the posture of India's armed forces. The problem, of course, lies in ascertaining what another state's intentions are.

Chinese strategic intention can be evaluated in two ways: by reviewing PRC military doctrine, and by speculating on the degree to which China considers maintenance of the international, and especially regional, status quo over the next 10 to 15 years to be in its interests. Both cases assume the state as a rational unitary actor.

Chinese Military Doctrine

Military doctrine is defined as "authoritative fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions."[74] A set of approved, shared ideas about the conduct of warfare that guides the preparation of armed forces for future wars,[75] military doctrine enables the researcher to surmise how a state envisions employing force in the future. Doctrine is generally correlated with the concept of intentions.

The sources of military doctrine evolve from a complex array of geographic, societal, economic, political, and technological factors.[76] The core unifying element, however, is a state's interpretation of the constraints and opportunities that obtain from its position in the international system.[77] For example, in the case of the PRC, the PLA doctrine from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s of "luring the enemy in deep" and "people's war under modern conditions" reflected a realistic appraisal by Chinese military strategists of the vast disparity between the national power of their country and that of the Soviet Union.[78]

Two aspects of contemporary Sino-military doctrine are particularly helpful in analyzing Beijing's intentions regarding the use of military force in the Asia-Pacific region: the internal defense missions of the PLA, and the wide variety of external defense contingencies that Chinese strategists must address.

Internal Defense. The People's Liberation Army periodically has played a crucial role in maintaining China's domestic stability, and ultimately Chinese Communist Party control, at critical junctures in the PRC's relatively brief history. In the late-1940s and 1950s, the PLA secured both China's northwest (Xinjiang) and southwest (Tibet), and has periodically since then been called upon to counter local uprisings in those territories. During the late-1960s, PLA intervention at the height of the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution checked the PRC's slide toward self-destruction.[79] More recently, the CCP leadership's grip on power seemed to hang in the balance until the massive intervention of the Chinese army during the June 1989 Tiananmen incident.

PRC military writings explicitly emphasize the armed forces' responsibility for maintaining domestic order. A typical article from the PLA General Political Department Mass Work Section notes that the basic functions of the army are (in the order listed): "1. safeguarding the country's stability; 2. defending state sovereignty and security; and 3. offering a fine, stable environment for the country's reform and construction."[80] General Liu Huaqing, Central Military Commission Vice Chairman, has underscored (as have all of the PLA's senior leaders) that the Chinese military must be ready to protect the "unity and security of the motherland."[81] The establishment of the 1.2-million-man paramilitary People's Armed Police in the mid-1980s had been intended, in part, to free the PLA to concentrate on external defense missions.[82] The events of June 1989 eliminated most of the progress that had been made to this end.

China's leaders remain committed to market reform and liberalization; they have discarded any other course of action as consigning their country to backwardness and ultimately undermining their claim to rule. They also are aware of the centrifugal forces and trends toward regionalization that will attend such policies. The PLA is viewed, in the final analysis, as the guarantor of domestic stability, and much of its energy is accordingly directed inward.

• *External Defense.* The PRC's land boundaries extend over 22,100 kilometers. The climates and terrains across this expanse include tropical rain forests, deserts, glacial barriers, mountain ranges, coniferous forests, and steppes. China's neighbors include three powers with whom it has fought in the past 25 years (Russia, India, and Vietnam); the increasingly unstable North Korea; and a host of countries beset with civil strife that has implications for ethnic minorities living within the PRC (Afghanistan, Burma, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). Additionally, the PLA must consider the possibility of instability in Hong Kong after its return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, and that of an armed clash with Taiwan. The United States, by contrast, has land boundaries about one-half that length (slightly over 12,200 km), and enjoys exceptionally good relations with its only two neighbors, Canada and Mexico.[83]

The point of this comparison is to highlight the extent of China's security dilemma. That the United States has a tremendous amount of power is evident. It should also be clear that having secure borders increases the proportion of power that the United States can project outside of North America. Current PLA military doctrine reflects the reality that the Chinese armed forces' immediate concerns are located near the PRC's frontiers, not in distant regions.

The PLA is emphasizing the creation of highly mobile, elite units, capable of bringing Chinese military power to bear swiftly at potential flash points along its vast borders, which do encompass much of the Asia-Pacific region. After the Gulf War demonstrated the enormous conventional firepower of armed forces equipped with high-technology weaponry and support systems, the *People's Liberation Army Daily* announced that "today's strategy is to first defeat the enemy troops without a war, or [alternatively] to defeat the enemy troops by fighting small battles."[84] The Central Military Commission's "principles for strengthening the PLA" emphasize:

> Recent local wars, especially the Gulf War, show that the defeated side was backward in modernization and weak in fighting capacity, although there were other reasons for this failure. . . . We must quicken our pace of modernization in order to keep up with the times and must not slow down.[85]

Consistent with these guidelines, large-scale training exercises have been conducted regularly in recent years in which mechanized, airborne, and marine units

moved rapidly by transport aircraft, helicopters, rail, ship, and vehicles to hypothetical trouble spots, including the South China Sea region.[86]

One must remember, however, the constraints imposed by limited resources and expansive security obligations. General Liu Huaqing has said that the PLA doctrine of "active defense" does not call for the procurement of long-range weapons and the capability of performing global operations, but instead depends on the ability to keep China's territories "free of infringement."[87] Accordingly, PRC military leaders still feel compelled to rely on a large standing army, contending:

> The main threat to the security of our country is limited warfare. However, our country is vast and has varied topography, long coastal and land boundaries, underdeveloped communications, and a low level of modernization of the army. It is necessary and appropriate to maintain three million troops at this time.[88]

Thus, in the main, the doctrinal literature and training regimens of the PLA's conventional forces simply do not seem to support assertions that China is intent on fundamentally contesting the regional security order in the near-term.

In addition, as the only openly declared Asian nuclear power, the PRC has generally displayed a commitment to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, claiming adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime, and signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992 and the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993.[89] While it has ignored the extended voluntary nuclear testing moratorium being observed by the United States, Russia, Britain, and France, the PRC is participating in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations in Geneva and has not openly opposed moves to achieve a total ban on nuclear testing by 1996.[90] China also pledges no first use of nuclear weapons, and argues that all nuclear powers should renounce first use against non-nuclear states.[91] By and large, then, Beijing is not obstructing initiatives related to the control of weapons of mass destruction. China definitely seeks to improve its strategic strike capabilities; however, its pace of force development is tempered not only by the resource limitations noted earlier, but by the PRC's awareness that should it be perceived as opposed to all efforts to limit the size of its nuclear inventories, an uncontrolled regional nuclear arms spiral would likely result.

Is the PRC Dissatisfied With the Status Quo?

A second approach to judging Chinese intentions is to ask whether or not the PRC is dissatisfied with the international and regional status quo.

In his work on change in world politics, Robert Gilpin postulates that an international system is stable if no state believes it is profitable to attempt to change the system, and that a state will attempt to change the system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs.[92] By such criteria, is China prepared to upset the security equilibrium in East Asia?

PRC leaders insist, not surprisingly, that "China will not constitute any potential or real threat. Rather it will always be a positive force for peace, stability, and development in the Asia-Pacific region. China's foreign policy of peace is one that can stand the test of time."[93] Yet the record is not reassuring; it indicates that Beijing clearly has a regional territorial agenda. As Sinologist Samuel Kim points out, China is an irredentist state with more territorial disputes than any other power in the world.[94] It has unresolved land claims against India, Russia, Tajikistan, North Korea, and Vietnam, and it has extensive maritime claims based on the continental shelf principle that involve Japan, the Koreas, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei.[95] The extreme negotiating position staked out in the territorial sea law passed by the Chinese National People's Congress in 1992 is especially disconcerting.[96]

Beijing has not been hesitant to use the PLA beyond its borders in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. John Garver, an expert on PRC security matters, cites 15 instances of China's international use of force since 1949.[97] More worrisome for the future, Beijing has not renounced the possibility of using arms against Taiwan, officially declaring:

> Peaceful reunification is a set policy of the Chinese government. However, any sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Chinese government is closely following the course of events [that is, efforts to establish two Chinas] and will never condone any maneuver for "Taiwan independence."[98]

On the other hand, it cannot be argued in any convincing fashion that China is a revolutionary or reformist power. Its era of radical international activism of the 1960s and early 1970s coincided with a period when it was weak and playing only a marginal role on the world stage. The pursuit of ideological goals in the conduct of foreign policy is a luxury afforded only to those with little power (and little to lose) or with very great power (and much to expend).[99] China today is neither at the periphery nor the core; it is a middle-ranking state very much constrained by the distribution of power within the Asia-Pacific region. While on an upward growth path, it is still far from the point at which it might seek to rewrite the rules, in the fashion of, say, Germany or Japan in the 1930s.

Alternatively, it still appears that the PRC cannot be categorized as a profoundly disaffected nation. The PRC's rapid integration into the international trade and financial orders over the past 15 years has been remarkable for a state that pursued the goal of autarky for the first 30 years of its existence. It is a member of the World Bank Group and the Asian Development Bank, and it has applied for full GATT membership. China's exports and imports as a percentage of GNP grew from about ten percent in 1978 to around 30 percent in the 1990s.[100] Foreign direct investment climbed from a negligible level in 1980 to over $4.3 billion in 1991.[101]

In the short run, at least, the pursuit of power and wealth do conflict, and the amassing and exercising of military resources entail costs that can undercut economic efficiency.[102] At present, given the favorable conditions presented by the international economic order, it is still very much in China's self-interest to work within a system from which it has profited so greatly.

The influence of international institutions, norms, and ideas on future PRC behavior regarding security issues should not be discounted. China certainly is less inclined to project its military power unilaterally than if the international system was simply a Hobbesian jungle.[103] The PRC has but a 45-year history in the community of nations, and its full participation in global and regional political, economic, and security regimes is a relatively recent phenomenon. Its behavior has increasingly reflected a respect for and commitment to world societal practices and standards. This is not to argue that somewhat fuzzy terms such as "international norms" constrain nations from employing the means necessary to defend their vital interests. For that matter, so-called global values are often best understood by examining the underlying distribution of state capabilities that give rise to and support these concepts; power and interest do count greatly.[104] Nevertheless, the employment of force that runs counter to world norms often entails significant reputational costs (witness the efforts of even a superpower, the United States, to lower such costs by building an international coalition in the 1990-91 Gulf War with Iraq). It is likely, therefore, that given its still limited resources, the PRC will be inclined to work strategically within world systems to settle less serious regional problems, rather than sacrifice its investment in future credibility for immediate but small payoffs.

Inferences About the Threat and Implications for US Policy

There are plausible conjunctions of events that could find at least parts of Asia engaged in the next 10 to 15 years in arms-racing, or even in the throes of war. Uncertainty, random events, imperfect information, and mis-calculations all play important roles in international affairs and undermine the most sophisticated of forecasts. In 1979, none of those commenting on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan concluded that within 15 years the Iron Curtain would fall, the USSR disintegrate, and the Moscow-based communist challenge to the West disappear. So the question of China as a threat to Asian Pacific stability remains difficult to answer.

What are the scenarios in which Beijing might be at, or near, the epicenter of instability or conflict in East Asia? Externally, three possibilities are most worrisome: a declaration of independence by Taiwan, or PRC preemption of such a possibility; war on the Korean Peninsula arising from either Pyongyang's aggression or internal collapse; and accelerated Japanese defense spending and the acquisition of nuclear forces, giving rise, in turn, to a regional arms race and alliance diplomacy.

The prospects of domestic instability cannot be ignored. There have been no cases to date of communist regimes gracefully handing power over to more democratic successors. Moreover, the CCP leadership's predisposition to see Western subterfuge behind domestic demands for political reform (the latest foreign plot being to inflict upon China the evil of "peaceful evolution") bodes ill for PRC external policies in the midst of severe civil unrest.[105]

At the same time, this study emphasizes that there are important constraints and opportunities that China cannot ignore as it advances through the first decade of the 21st century. They are derived from the structure of the international system and East Asia regional subsystem, the imperatives of economic growth, and the limitations on the pace at which the PRC can accumulate relative military power. Collectively, they pose a set of incentives and disincentives that will strongly influence Chinese calculations about the utility of force.

China is a rising power with enormous growth potential. It has a capable but technologically backward military, some years away from being able to roam far from home. Benefits from participation in the world's liberal trading order are substantial, and Beijing finds the benefits of the status quo outweighing the costs. Hence, whether in terms of capabilities or of likely intentions, the PRC cannot be regarded as a serious threat in the mid-term to Asia-Pacific stability.

If such a conclusion is correct, what are the implications for US foreign policy and military strategy? The question is a timely one since the post-Cold War era marks the first time in the history of Sino-American relations that the United States has dealt with China for its own sake, and not simply in the context of crises with other major powers (such as with Japan from the 1920s through World War II, and thereafter with the Soviet Union).[106] Building upon the preceding analysis, three recommendations seem appropriate.

First, the United States should maintain a strong military presence in Asia. The reassurance that a credible American regional presence provides to the potential mutual antagonists of Northeast Asia, as well as the many actors concerned about the security of the sea lanes of South and Southeast Asia, is crucial to the continued stability of the region. Were a severe crisis to unfold unexpectedly in East Asia and if US military power were found lacking for reasons of capability or will, an arms spiral analogous to that which consumed the European powers in the years leading to World War I could be set in motion. As a PLA security specialist, Senior Colonel Pan Zhenqiang, notes:

> During the Cold War years, taking an explicit commitment to a broad engagement in the affairs of the region, [the United States] became an indispensable factor in the security pattern of the Asia-Pacific area. To provide extended deterrence to its allies and to maintain the US military presence is part of this security structure.[107]

The current security structure does provide the modicum of certainty needed to promote continued regional growth and stability. America must not mistakenly apply the "overextended global cop" metaphor to its current commitment of military forces in an Asia-Pacific region so vital to US strategic and economic interests.

Second, the United States should increase the scope of its ties with China and promote PRC interdependence in the international economic system. The evidence seems so overwhelming that modernity begets political liberalization that such a policy is hard to assail on strategic grounds. On the other hand, as Senior Colonel Pan points out:

> If Beijing fails in its formidable efforts to reorganize its economic as well as political structures and its modernization programs fall apart, there is a possibility that it will shrink back into a sealed society again; or worse, like what happened in the former Soviet Union, the country falls into a painful process of split, with perhaps millions upon millions of refugees and immigrants flocking to neighboring countries. The impact could really be catastrophic.[108]

Plainly, the United States can ill afford to see Beijing's transition from a command to a market economy fail.

Further, as part of Washington's policy of engagement with Beijing, Sino-American security ties should be both increased and regularized. There are important shared strategic concerns that should not be obscured by the important contradictions between the two nations. For example, Chen Qimao of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies comments: "China would not like to see ultranationalism and religious fundamentalism prevail in regions after the Cold War. In this respect, it shares a common interest with many countries, possibly including the United States."[109] More specifically, within the East Asia region, Washington and Beijing agree on the threat posed by nuclear proliferation, the desirability of ending Cambodia's civil strife, and the importance of upholding the international principles that underpin the liberal trading order.

At the same time, it is very much in America's own long-term security interests to maintain access to the PLA. An enduring aspect of Chinese strategic culture is the emphasis placed on the maxim of Sun Tzu that "all warfare is based upon deception."[110] The PLA, by the standards of most armies in the 1990s, remains enshrouded in secrecy. As the PRC becomes more powerful, the United States will require a precise understanding of Chinese military capabilities and intentions. Routine bilateral dialogue and exchanges will increase PLA transparency.

The third policy recommendation is that the United States work with China and the other major actors in East Asia to establish subregional, or issue-specific, forums for consultation and coordination on security issues. For example, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States all hope to reduce

tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and an informal mechanism could usefully be established for the exchange of information and opinions. However, at present the interests of the actors composing the broader region are simply too diverse to make profitable an Asia-Pacific-wide dialogue based upon a European model. For that matter, there is no evident reason that what is understood to be the Asia-Pacific region should be embraced by an overarching security condominium. Chinese leaders, however, do remain receptive to more modest or restricted proposals, and the United States should take advantage of the favorable existing environment and exert the leadership necessary to create appropriate institutions.[111]

China's leaders envision that the PLA will become one of the most powerful armies in the world by the mid-21st century. If the PRC continues to grow at its present rate and the country remains unified, this expectation will be realized. Yet in international affairs the future is highly problematic. In the time frame that does matter in security issues relating to potential challengers, perhaps 15 years into the future, the PRC is unlikely to disrupt the equilibrium in East Asia. US policy nevertheless ought to be consistent with the assumptions upon which such an analysis is based: the United States should continue to be actively engaged in regional security issues. To do so is both to promote Asia-Pacific stability and to hedge against the unforeseen.

NOTES

1. The terms "Asia-Pacific" and "East Asian" regions are used interchangeably throughout this paper. Unless otherwise noted, both terms will refer to China, its contiguous areas, the island states of East and Southeast Asia, and the surrounding oceans and seas. As a global and more specifically a Pacific power, the United States is also assumed to be a member of the region.

2. Among the most important US security relationships in Asia during the Cold War were the 1951 tripartite security treaty with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) and bilateral treaties with Japan and the Philippines; the 1953 bilateral treaty with the Republic of Korea; the 1954 bilateral treaty with the Republic of China (abrogated in 1979 with the establishment of diplomatic ties between Washington and Beijing); and the creation in 1954 of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) consisting of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, France, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. See Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb, *American National Security: Policy and Process* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 33-34, 356-83.

3. China's land area is 9.33 million square km, while that of the United States is 9.17 million square km. From US Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook* (Washington: GPO, 1992), pp. 71, 358.

4. The "economic miracles" of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, as well as the extraordinary performances of overseas Chinese around the world, are all excellent indicators of the enormous potential of China's population of some 1.2 billion.

5. Asra Q. Nomani and Robert S. Greenberger, "China's Economy World's No. 3, IMF Calculates," *The Wall Street Journal*, 21 May 1993, p. A-6.

6. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1993-1994* (London: Brassey's, 1993), p. 152.

7. Hwang Pong-mu, *Wolgan Chungang* (July 1993), pp. 518-29, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report-East Asia* (hereafter FBIS-EAS), 29 September 1993, p. 33.

8. Vladimir Skosyrev, "China Increases Defense Expenditure," *Izvestiya*, 20 March 1993, p. 33; FBIS, *Daily Report-Central Eurasia*, 30 March 1993, pp. 26-27.

9. M. K. Dhar, *The Hindustan Times*, 10 March 1993, p. 12; FBIS *Daily Report-Near East and South Asia*, 18 March 1993, p. 46; and Tokyo Kyodo, 17 March 1993, FBIS-EAS, p. 3. The term PLA refers to all of

the armed forces of China: the ground forces, the navy (PLAN), the air force (PLAAF), and the strategic rocket forces or Second Artillery.

10. Kuala Lumpur Voice of Malaysia, 21 August 1993, FBIS-EAS, 24 August 1994, p. 54; and Li Wei, Beijing Zhongguo Xinwenshe, FBIS, *Daily Report-China* (hereafter FBIS-CHI), 22 October 1993, p. 23.

11. Beijing Waiguoyu Xueyuan Yingyuxi, *Hanying Cidian* (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1982), pp. 713, 763.

12. A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 30.

13. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), p. 192.

14. Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," *World Politics*, 40 (April 1988), 334.

15. David A. Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics," in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 16-17, 25.

16. *Cihai: Junshi Fence* (Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Chubanshe, 1980), p. 3.

17. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 585-94. Two excellent studies of the interrelationship between economic development and military potential include Robert S. Gilpin's *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990); and Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987). For the influence of geography on military power see Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1939).

18. Sandra Deger, "World Military Expenditure," *SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), p. 387; and Lincoln Kaye, "Pre-Emptive Cringe," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereafter *FEER*), 24 March 1994, pp. 48, 50. All monetary figures are shown in US dollars, derived from the May 1994 exchange rate of $1 (US) being equal to 8.6664 renminbi, China's unit of currency.

19. See, for example, Jim Mann and David Holley, "China Builds Military; Neighbors, US Uneasy," *Los Angeles Times*, 13 September 1992, pp. A-1, A-26; Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Builds Its Military Muscle, Making Some Neighbors Nervous," *The New York Times*, 11 January 1993, pp. A-1, A-11; and William Branigin, "As China Builds Arsenal and Bases, Asia Fears a 'Rogue in the Region,'" *The Washington Post*, 31 March 1993, pp. A-21, A-27.

20. Paul Humes Folta, *From Swords to Plowshares?: Defense Industry Reform in the PRC* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 19-20, 216-19.

21. The World Bank, *World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), p.262.

22. "Prices and Trends," *FEER*, 19 May 1994, p. 60.

23. Lieutenant General Lu Lin, Deputy Director of the PLA General Logistics Department, quoted in Beijing Zhongguo Xinwenshe, 20 March 1993, FBIS-CHI, 23 March 1993, p. 68.

24. IISS, p. 226. Defense expenditure (in 1985 $US) is listed at $19.8 billion in 1985, and $22.4 billion in 1992. These figures are estimates of *actual* defense expenditures and are consequently much larger than those stated in the official PRC budgets. Additionally, IISS figures reflect the old official exchange rate of approximately 5.75 renminbi (Rmb) per US dollar, recently readjusted to 8.7 Rmb per dollar.

25. Deger, pp. 387-88; and CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Chinese Economy in 1991 and 1992: Pressure to Revisit Reforms Mounts* (Washington: CIA, 1992), p. 12.

26. One report indicated the PLA may back or actually control up to 20,000 companies. See Tai Ming Cheung, "Serve the People," *FEER*, 14 October 1993, pp. 64-66.

27. Deger, p. 387; and CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, p. 12.

28. CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, p. 12.

29. Nayan Chanda, "Drifting Apart," *FEER*, 26 August 1993, p. 10.

30. IISS, pp. 224, 226.

31. Paul H. B. Godwin, "Force and Diplomacy: Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," in *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), p. 178.

32. Economist Dwight Perkins convincingly makes this point. Incurring high production opportunity costs to field obsolete weapon systems is an approach that China abandoned when it launched its modernization drive in the late 1970s. See Dwight Perkins, "The Economic Background and Implications for China," in *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective*, ed. Herbert J. Ellison (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1982), p. 110.

33. Dunbar Lockwood and Jon Brook Wolfsthal, "Nuclear Weapon Developments and Proliferation," *SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), p. 239. IRBMs include the CSS-2 and -6 (ranges 2800 km and 1800 km), while the ICBM force consists of the CSS-3 and -4 (ranges 4750 km and 13,000 km).

34. Ibid., p. 239; and IISS, p. 244. The SLBMs are classified CSS-N-3 and have ranges of between 2200 and 3000 km.

35. Jim Mann, "China Upgrading Nuclear Arms, Experts Say," *Los Angeles Times*, 9 November 1993, p. H-2; and Lockwood and Wolfsthal, p. 239. The SS-25 has a range of 10,500 km, CEP of 200 m, and a throw-weight of 10,000 kg (see IISS, p. 241).

36. Mann, p. H-2; Lockwood and Wolfsthal, p. 239.

37. IISS, pp. 152, 155.

38. Patrick Tyler, "Russia and China Sign a Military Agreement," *The New York Times*, 10 November 1993, p. A-15; and Lincoln Kaye, "Courtship Dance," *FEER*, 26 May 1994, p. 24. For a thorough account of Sino-Russian military ties, see Bin Yu, "Sino-Russian Military Relations: Implications for Asian-Pacific Security," *Asian Survey*, 33 (March 1993), 302-16.

39. Godwin, "Force and Diplomacy: Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," p. 181.

40. See John W. Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests," *The China Quarterly*, No. 132 (December 1992), 999-1028, for an excellent account of the Chinese navy's progress in developing a power projection capability that can extend to the South China Sea area. The PLA's recent expansion of a landing strip on Woody Island in the Paracels has further boosted the scope of air cover available to PLA naval and marine forces operating in the area. See Tai Ming Cheung and Nayan Chanda, "Exercising Caution," *FEER*, 2 September 1993, p. 20.

41. Yu, p. 302; and Godwin, p. 179.

42. The two Chinese air force bombers with nuclear delivery capabilities, the H-5 and H-6, are adaptations of two Soviet bombers, the Il-28 Beagle and Tu-16 Badger, first flown by the Russians in 1947 and 1954 respectively. See Harlan W. Jencks, *From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), p. 288.

43. To illustrate, the United States currently has some 6000 strategic nuclear warheads in its arsenal. Under START II, the number will be reduced to 2228. China, on the other hand, has some 280 strategic warheads, 170 of which would have to be launched from highly vulnerable air- and sea-based platforms. See IISS, p. 235; and Lockwood and Wolfsthal, p. 239.

44. Song Jiuguang, *START and China's Policy on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament in the 1990's* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1991), p. 14.

45. IISS, *The Military Balance 1993-1994* (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp. 25-26.

46. The US Army key doctrinal manual, for instance, notes: "Arms and services *complement* each other by posing a dilemma for the enemy. As he [the enemy] evades the effects of one weapon, arm, or service, he exposes himself to attack by another." US Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington: GPO, 1987), p. 25.

47. Richard A. Bitzinger, *Chinese Arms Production and Sales to the Third World* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1991), pp. 20-29.

48. Zhong Yongqian, "Brief Look at China's Fighter Aircraft Development Level," *Xiandai Bingqi*, October 1993, pp. 2-4, *Joint Publications Research Service, China Report*, 31 January 1994, pp. 20-21; and Richard J. Latham and Kenneth W. Allen, "Defense Reform in China: The PLA Air Force," *Problems in Communism*, 40 (May-June 1991), 46.

49. Zhong, p. 21.

50. Ibid.

51. For a discussion of the impact of information technology on military affairs, see General Gordon R. Sullivan and Colonel James M. Dubik, "War in the Information Age," *Military Review*, 74 (April 1994), 46-62.

52. Jiang Zemin, Communist Chinese Party Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, summing up the US-led coalition's impressive application of high technology in the 1991 campaign against Iraq, reportedly said, "To fall behind [technologically] means to get thrashed." See Mann and Holley, p. A-26.

53. Zhou Tao and Ren Yanjun, "Rally Under the Banner of Modernization," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 22 August 1993, p. 1, FBIS-CHI, 1 September 1993, p. 25.

54. Ibid., p. 25.

55. Yang Wei, et al., "Military Forum Column-Sponsored Pen Meeting on Tactical Studies," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 28 May 1993, pp. 22-26, FBIS-CHI, 2 July 1993, p. 24.

56. See CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Chinese Economy in 1990 and 1991: Uncertain Recovery* (Washington: CIA, 1991) for a discussion of PRC GNP calculation problems. Three methods commonly used are exchange rate conversion, physical indicators, and purchasing power parity. All have significant disadvantages.

57. In 1991, China's official GDP was estimated to be $370 billion (US) and per capita GNP about $370 (US). See The World Bank, p. 238, 242. Given the continued rapid PRC economic growth since that time, per capita GNP by mid-1994 is around $450 (US).

58. The World Bank, pp. 240, 254; "Prices and Trends," *FEER*, 19 May 1994, p. 60; and Samuel S. Kim, "China and the Third World in the Changing World Order," in *China and the World: Chinese Relations in the Post-Cold War Era*, pp. 156-57.

59. For a series of essays on the prospects for Mainland-Taiwan-Hong Kong (the so-called "Greater China") cooperative development, see "The Emergence of Greater China," *Chinese Economic Studies* (Winter 1993-1994).

60. The World Bank, p. 288.

61. Barber B. Conable, Jr., et al., *United States and China Relations at a Crossroads* (Washington: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1993), pp. 20-27.

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80. PLA General Political Department Mass Work Section, "Do Good Jobs of Supporting the Government and Cherishing the People in the New Situation of Reform, Opening Up," *Qiushi*, 1 August 1992, pp. 2-5, FBIS-CHI, 4 September 1992, p. 36.

81. Liu Huaqing, "Unswervingly Advance Along the Road Building a Modern Army With Chinese Characteristics," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 6 August 1993, pp. 1-2, FBIS-CHI, 18 August 1993, p. 17.

82. IISS, p. 155. Peoples Armed Police missions include, among others, border and internal security, anti-terrorism, and fire-fighting. Author's discussion with General Wang Guozhong, Director of the Logistics Department, People's Armed Police, in Beijing, 18 September 1987.

83. CIA, *The World Factbook 1992*, pp. 71, 358.

84. "Turn to Science, Technology for Troop Quality," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 27 September 1991, p. 3, FBIS-CHI, 11 October 1991, p. 27.

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86. See, for example, Chen Hui and Zhang Zhongshun, Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 27 August 1993, FBIS-CHI, 30 August 1993, p. 40; Sun Maoqing, Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 6 January 1993, FBIS-CHI, 11 January 1993, p. 23; and Tai Ming Cheung and Nayan Chanda, p. 20.

87. Liu Huaqing, p. 19.

88. Ibid., p. 20.

89. IISS, pp. 249-51; and Ragnild Fern, "Annex A. Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements," *SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), p. 768. PRC adherence to MTCR had been brought into question by alleged Chinese sales of M11 missiles and missile technology to Pakistan. See Nayan Chanda, "Red Rockets' Glare," *FEER,* 9 September 1993, pp. 10-11.

90. "China Airs Stand on Nuclear Testing," *Beijing Review*, 18-24 October 1993, p. 4; Shen Dingli, "Toward a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: A Chinese Perspective," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 50 (March/April 1994), 51-54; "Bomb Test in China Upsets US," *San Jose Mercury News*, 11 June 1994, P. A-10; and "Regional Briefing," *FEER*, 23 June 1994, p. 13. PRC officials emphasize that while the United States has conducted some 1050 nuclear tests, Russia (the former Soviet Union) 700, and France 200, China has tested only 39 times since it exploded its first nuclear device in 1964. As such, they say that the PRC must continue limited testing for reasons of safety and reliability (see Shen, pp. 51-2).

91. "China Airs Stand on Nuclear Testing," p. 4.

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93. "China Never Seeks Hegemony" (address by Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting, 23 July 1993), *Beijing Review*, 2-8 August 1993, p. 11.

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96. Robert G. Sutter, *East Asia: Disputed Islands and Offshore Claims. Issues for US Policy* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1992), pp. CRS-6, CRS-7.

97. John W. Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, p. 251.

98. Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Beijing, August 1993, *Beijing Review*, 6-12 September 1993, pp. VI-VII.

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103. The concept of a world society that promotes norms, principles, and ideas that are important determinants of state behavior has been articulated by Hedley Bull in *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1977). The importance of ideas in ensuring compliance to rules in the absence of enforcement mechanisms is also argued effectively by Douglass C. North in *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), pp. 33-68.

104. See Susan Strange, "*Cave! Hic Dragones:* A Critique of Regime Analysis," in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell Univ. Press: 1983), pp. 337-54; and Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," *World Politics*, 43 (April 1991), 337-66.

105. See Kenneth Lieberthal, "Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy," in *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s*, ed. Harry Harding (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 43-70; and James D. Seymour, "Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations," in *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War*, pp. 202-25.

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107. Pan Zhenqiang, "Future Security Needs of the Asian-Pacific Area and Their Implication for the U.S. Defense Policy," paper presented at the 1993 United States National Defense University and United States Pacific Command Pacific Symposium, Honolulu, Hawaii, 4 March 1993, p. 16.

108. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

109. Chen Qimao, "New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey*, 33 (March 1993), 248.

110. Sun Zi (Sun Tzu), *Sun Zi Bingfa Qianshuo*, ed. and trans. (into modern Chinese) Wu Rusong (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1985), pp. 29-40.

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MacArthur, Stilwell, and Special Operations in the War against Japan

DAVID W. HOGAN, JR.

To begin a study of American theater-level organization and conduct of special operations in the war with Japan, one can consider two images. First, picture native stevedores at a port in the occupied Philippines unloading, under cover of darkness, crates of cigarettes, matches, chewing gum, candy bars, sewing kits, and pencils from a huge cargo submarine, each item bearing the inscription "I shall return" over a facsimile of the signature of General Douglas MacArthur. Then imagine Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell at lunch with members of his personal staff in the dining room of the Imperial Hotel in New Delhi, India when, at an adjacent table, an officer of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) stands up and opens his bush jacket. Five pigeons, freed from confinement, rush into the air and disappear through an open window in the ceiling. The general leaps from his chair, but, after a momentary glare at the perpetrator, resumes his seat and his meal without further ado.[1]

The two vignettes say much about MacArthur, Stilwell, and their respective approaches to special operations in the Southwest Pacific and China-Burma-India theaters. MacArthur appears in his role, both bestowed and self-manufactured, as symbol of resistance, spiritual leader, and redeemer of the Philippine nation in its hour of need. Stilwell comes across as the hard-boiled pragmatist who could tolerate a band of free-spirited eccentrics as long as they produced results. In the context of an Army which had given little prewar thought to what we today call special operations, each commander had to make his own way in a largely unfamiliar field with little if any guidance from doctrine on the place of special operations in theater organization and strategy. Considering the contributions which special operations made in the two theaters, they did quite well.

The Aristocrat and the Doughboy

The suave, charismatic MacArthur seemed uniquely qualified to direct special operations in the Southwest Pacific theater (SWPA). Imaginative, widely read, with a quick, flexible intellect, he sensed the importance of spiritual and moral, as opposed to material, factors in warfare, and he knew from history and his father's own experiences in the Philippines how effective a force of guerrillas could be. Even for an American Army officer, his extensive experience and close ties with the Philippines were unusual. He had lived much of his life in the islands, adopting them as his home, and he had long been involved in the task of creating a national identity for the Philippines, notably through his service as field marshal of the fledgling Philippine army in the years before the war. He had a keen sense for Filipino politics and had established close friendships with Filipino leaders, particularly Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon, the godfather of MacArthur's son and contributor of a $500,000 nest egg to his former field marshal's bank account. These considerable ties of emotion and self interest were sealed by MacArthur's genuine and deep sense of obligation to those he had left behind on Bataan and Corregidor and his near obsessive need to remove the blot of those defeats from his record.[2]

In most respects, Stilwell was about as different from MacArthur as can be imagined. In contrast with MacArthur's aloofness, urbane grace, and aristocratic paternalism, Vinegar Joe prided himself on his candor, lack of polish or pretension, and identification with the common soldier. Having served extensively in China during the interwar years, he knew the country and could speak Chinese fluently, but his tendency to let people know what he thought of them ill-suited him for a post with such strong diplomatic overtones. Yet, the abrasive exterior concealed a keen intelligence, a willingness to innovate, and, like MacArthur, an unusually great sensitivity to Asiatic cultures. His acid was balanced by a human kindness and an ironic sense of humor which could tolerate the mavericks often found in the special operations community. Like MacArthur, Stilwell had a score to settle. For a man who had despised the Japanese since a visit to Japan in the 1920s, defeat in the Burma campaign of early 1942 must have been a bitter pill to swallow.

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He was, therefore, inclined to be open-minded toward anyone who could help him avenge that defeat and regain Burma.[3]

From the time he assumed command of US Army forces in the Far East in July 1941, MacArthur displayed both an interest in special operations and a desire to keep independent practitioners out of his theater. Early in his tenure, he maneuvered to cut Philippine High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre out of war preparations, and he would manage to limit the Department of the Interior's role in Philippine affairs for the rest of the war. Similarly, he and his staff blocked all attempts by William J. Donovan's OSS to gain a foothold in the theater until the closing days of the conflict. Brigadier General Charles A. Willoughby, SWPA's vain and domineering intelligence chief, later claimed that MacArthur, in the midst of a shooting war, could not afford to wait for the new OSS to establish itself in the theater, but the explanation does not ring entirely true. MacArthur and his staff were apparently suspicious of semi-autonomous agencies with a separate chain of command back to Washington, and they also believed themselves to be quite capable of handling special operations in the Philippines without any help from the OSS.[4]

MacArthur's expertise in special operations was belied by his initial performance. Before the outbreak of the war, he had given some thought to guerrilla warfare by Filipino reservists and had taken steps to organize an underground intelligence service among Filipino officials and American residents of the islands, but these plans amounted to very little. MacArthur overestimated both the time available before the Japanese attack and the ability of his force to halt the enemy on the beaches, and he did not want to dampen Filipino morale by premature preparations for guerrilla warfare. When the Japanese broke through his beach defenses, forcing a withdrawal into Bataan, MacArthur improvised as best he could, organizing an intelligence net based in Manila, sending officers behind Japanese lines to organize resistance, and accelerating preparations for guerrilla operations in Mindanao and the other southern islands. Evacuated to Australia, he hoped to direct guerrilla warfare from his theater headquarters there. Unfortunately for his plans, the War Department designated Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright as the commander of all American troops in the Philippines, and, when Wainwright surrendered in May 1942, he ordered all units under his command to follow suit, uprooting most of the seeds sown by MacArthur. Not until late 1942 did a largely spontaneous guerrilla movement finally contact MacArthur in Australia.[5]

Whereas MacArthur was interested in special operations from the beginning, Stilwell had to be sold on such activities. An orthodox soldier and admirer of infantry, he initially dismissed guerrilla warfare and sabotage as "illegal action" and wanted to concentrate on building a powerful Chinese army. Nevertheless, the potential for special operations in his China-Burma-India theater (CBI) drew the kind of entrepreneurs that MacArthur had kept

out of the Philippines. When Commander Milton S. Miles arrived in May 1942 with vague orders from the Navy Department to undertake operations which would do maximum possible damage to the enemy, Stilwell, eager to hit back at the Japanese in some way, gave him free and exclusive control over special operations in CBI. Two months later, Major Carl Eifler, an old acquaintance from Stilwell's interwar service on the Mexican border,[6] appeared in Chung-king at the head of an OSS mission that Stilwell had initially rejected. The CBI commander sent him to Burma, as much to keep him clear of Miles in China as for any other reason. Over time, Stilwell's estimation of special operations rose, partly due to his close relationship with Eifler and partly out of fascination with the Kachin natives among whom Eifler's OSS Detachment 101 worked, but mostly because of the valuable intelligence which Eifler's men were providing by early 1943.[7]

Command and Control

Both Stilwell and MacArthur dealt directly with their special operations chiefs but at different levels of involvement. While MacArthur left many details of Philippine affairs in the hands of his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, he insisted on personally interviewing escaped prisoners and returning agents from the islands and otherwise kept in close touch with developments through Colonel Courtney A. Whitney, whom Sutherland brought into the theater in May 1943 to take charge of the Philippine Regional Section. A former lawyer and acquaintance of MacArthur in prewar Manila, Whitney has acquired a reputation as a sycophant who, according to Paul Rogers, "simply mirrored what he thought was the true MacArthur." Attempting to pacify an aggrieved guerrilla leader, Whitney wrote:

> In my own case when recommendations I have made have been partially or wholly disapproved, despite my conviction that I was right in the first instance, I have always sought to find the soundness in his [MacArthur's] decision and I have never failed to do so. This results in a wholehearted acceptance of adverse decisions and much happier resulting service. I think that once you realize that it is General MacArthur and he alone who defines all Philippine policies and makes the decisions upon questions emanating from the Islands you too will find the way to see in his decisions, however contrary to your views, constructive soundness. By that I do not mean that we are a bunch of "yes" men around the General in these matters—to the contrary we are as independent as a bunch of "hogs on ice." But ours is the pick and shovel work in the orientation of policy for his consideration—his the final word.[8]

Whitney was apparently responsible for the decision to create, in SWPA propaganda, a cult around MacArthur and his pledge to return, a campaign which, however effective in some quarters, led some guerrillas to adopt the

derisive motto, "We Remained!" Still, the Colonel did possess a keen, if rather conservative and paternalistic, sense for Philippine issues, and, more important, he enjoyed the ear of his commander.[9]

The emergence of Whitney's Philippine Regional Section (PRS) ignited a turf battle within MacArthur's theater headquarters. Before Whitney arrived, special operations in SWPA, including the work of the PRS, came under the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB), an inter-Allied agency which operated under the coordination of Willoughby's intelligence section (G-2). As the activities of the PRS in establishing Filipino agent nets and supporting guerrillas expanded during the spring of 1943, however, the section achieved a semi-independent status, under which Whitney reported directly to Mac-Arthur and Sutherland, although he continued to coordinate his activities through G-2 and relied heavily on the AIB for support. The PRS's status irritated Willoughby, who, in late February 1944, recommended that Philippine activities be split among the staff sections. As Allied forces neared the islands in late May, Sutherland acted, assigning intelligence tasks to G-2, supply to G-4, and direction of guerrillas to the G-3 Operations subsection; but instead of assigning Whitney to G-2 as Willoughby had hoped, he detailed the bulk of the PRS and its chief to G-3 Operations. Despite petty sniping from G-2 over such matters as PRS's waste of maps and poor standards for dispatches, Whitney's stature with MacArthur continued to grow, to the point that by war's end he had become MacArthur's chief confidant.[10]

Compared to MacArthur, Stilwell took a more detached approach to special operations, working directly with Miles and Eifler when necessary but giving them an almost entirely free hand. In theory, the intelligence section of Stilwell's rear headquarters echelon in New Delhi supervised Detachment 101's operations, but in practice Eifler often dealt directly with Stilwell. Eifler would be waiting at the airstrip when Stilwell's plane, dubbed "Uncle Joe's Chariot," made one of its periodic stops in Detachment 101's area. More often than not, Stilwell would notice the burly colonel, call out, "Buffalo Bill! Come on over!" and then introduce Eifler to senior officers as the "Army's number one thug." Eifler would take the opportunity to report, answer questions, and make requests. On at least one occasion, Stilwell intervened to provide Eifler with an advance when his OSS superiors in Washington were not forthcoming with needed funds. Once the 1944 campaign in North Burma began, Detachment 101 came directly under Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC), Stilwell's tactical headquarters, and its activities were controlled by Stilwell in person.[11]

Detachment 101 was fortunate to have direct access to Stilwell, for the special operations chain of command in the CBI theater was a nightmare. At the Navy Department's insistence, Miles had a separate chain of command back to Washington, although Stilwell supposedly had complete authority over Miles where "necessary." To avoid jurisdictional clashes with Miles,

Donovan agreed to designate him as the OSS Strategic Services Officer (SSO) for the theater, but the arrangement did not work well. Miles was determined to remain independent of OSS, which, in turn, increasingly saw him as a tool of the Chinese and an obstacle to their plans for an espionage net in China free of foreign control. At first, Stilwell got along well with Miles and backed those activities which he thought might prove productive, but he came to regard Miles as a loose cannon when the latter attempted to expand his sphere by sending liaison officers to the 14th Air Force and Lord Louis Mountbatten's new Southeast Asia Command. After a visit to the theater in late 1943, Donovan removed Miles as OSS's theater chief, relieved an exhausted Eifler, and extensively reorganized OSS in the theater. Colonel John Coughlin became the new SSO, reporting directly to Stilwell and possessing supervisory authority over Detachment 101, now under Colonel W. R. Peers.[12]

Even if special operations agencies could straighten out the chain of command within the theaters, they still faced difficulties in securing cooperation from the more conventional services, which could be counted on to view their unorthodox enterprises with skepticism. Since those agencies were not self-sufficient, they had to rely at least partly on the services for support when the services themselves were struggling with inadequate resources. Fortunately, the services soon understood the benefits that special operations could provide to them. In Burma, Eifler pointed out to the commander of the Air Transport Command the value of operatives who could help downed pilots escape from the forbidding North Burma jungle, and the general arranged for Eifler's command to parachute agents into the region. Tenth Air Force later expressed its gratitude for the target acquisition and other intelligence provided by the detachment by giving an L-5 liaison plane to Peers. In SWPA, the Seventh Fleet was hesitant to divert submarines from other missions to run supplies into the occupied Philippines, but Whitney's PRS offered coast-watcher stations and naval intelligence in return for supply missions and radios. Those missions were arranged by Lieutenant Commander Charles "Chick" Parsons, chief of the PRS's support effort, and Captain A. H. McCollum, Director of Naval Intelligence for the US Seventh Fleet, and they were carried out by Seventh Fleet's "Spy Squadron" of submarines.[13]

Informal working relationships and salesmanship could ease many problems of cooperation between special operations agencies and the services, but they could not always overcome differences among allies separated by politics and culture. In SWPA, the AIB had originally been created in July 1942 to bring under one roof several mainly-Australian organizations involved in intelligence collection, sabotage, and propaganda. An Australian "controller" provided loose coordination under the overall direction of Mac-Arthur's headquarters. Unfortunately, national, philosophical, and personal differences within the AIB caused it to pull in different directions, resulting in its reorganization in early 1943 along the lines of Australian, Dutch, and

American spheres of interest, rather than function. From the viewpoint of MacArthur's headquarters, AIB's "intermittent mania for complete independence" and tendency to go off on "semi-political" tangents from the main focus of the theater, the drive to the Philippines, provided a constant irritant. MacArthur's grant of semi-independent status to the PRS, like his designation of Sixth Army as Alamo Force, probably represented a tactic to remove Philippine affairs, in which he possessed both a national and personal interest, from any control by the Australian-dominated AIB.[14]

In CBI, Stilwell had to work not only with the Chinese, but also with the British, sovereign in India and prewar rulers of Burma. Miles may have been correct in his insistence that it was impossible to conduct special operations in China without going through the Chinese government, but that did not make dealing with the byzantine, corrupt Chinese bureaucracy any easier. As for the British bureaucracy in India, it had its own misgivings about special operations and vigorously opposed the establishment of an independent American intelligence net in India. With regard to OSS operations in Burma, it expressed much more tolerance, but OSS Detachment 101's relations with its British allies were often turbulent, particularly when Special Operations Executive/India infringed on what Eifler considered his turf. Into this picture came Lord Mountbatten's new Southeast Asia Command, an Allied headquarters established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in late 1943 to infuse new vigor into the war in Burma. For the 1944 offensive into Burma, the Allies envisioned an expanded role for Major General Orde C. Wingate's long-range penetration groups, which would include a new American contingent code-named Galahad. The prospect of the only American combat unit in the theater serving under a British general was enough to arouse every Anglophobic instinct in Stilwell, and when Wingate stated that he could not use Galahad before April 1944, Stilwell prevailed on Mountbatten to transfer Galahad to his control.[15]

Roles and Missions

Along with complications of command and control, MacArthur and Stilwell faced the problem of defining new concepts in a field that had received little attention in the prewar Army. Within SWPA there existed several differing views on the proper role and capabilities of guerrillas. In March 1943, MacArthur, in accord with Quezon's wishes, directed the guerrillas to "lie low" and focus on organization and intelligence. The order seemed sensible at the time and undoubtedly spared many Filipinos from reprisals, but it created problems for guerrilla commanders who found it hard to remain idle in the face of popular demand for action against a brutal occupation. When Whitney arrived in May 1943, he pushed for more aggressive exploitation of the guerrilla potential by forming a battle detachment in every area and arming every guerrilla by the time of liberation. More often

than not, his views prevailed, due to MacArthur's emotional commitment to the guerrillas, and the PRS expanded its supply effort into the islands. By the eve of the invasion of Leyte in October 1944, however, SWPA and Sixth Army still took care to list combat intelligence as the primary mission for guerrillas and warned against their use in attacks on fixed positions. Significantly, the guerrillas on Leyte would come under Sixth Army's intelligence section during the invasion.[16]

Within the CBI theater, considerable debate existed over the proper role of long-range penetration groups. The Army guide to these units, taken almost entirely from Wingate's report, stated that they consisted of separate, self-contained columns which, supplied by air and directed by radio from a group headquarters, would operate independently for as long as three months deep in enemy territory. The main point of dispute seems to have been whether these columns would operate more or less independently against Japanese communications or in closer coordination with units in contact with the principal Japanese forces. The orthodox Stilwell took the latter point of view, envisioning Galahad as a kind of strategic cavalry conducting envelopments around the Japanese flank while his Chinese divisions advanced on the enemy front. Whatever his view of Galahad's eventual mission, however, he seems to have viewed this "tough-looking lot" first and foremost as a model, the American combat unit he had long been seeking to show the Chinese how to fight. It is interesting in this regard that the commanders of Galahad, while they noted differences in training and organization between their unit and other American formations, seem to have viewed themselves more as conventional infantrymen than as a special force.[17]

During the initial stages of the drive down the Hukawng Valley in February and March 1944, Stilwell took precautions against misuse of Galahad. For the command of Galahad, he chose Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill, an old intimate and former theater G-3 who had already been involved in planning the campaign. Throughout the campaign, Stilwell stayed in close touch with Merrill, often planning operations with him. In late February, following his concept of long-range penetration groups, Stilwell sent Galahad on a march around the Japanese right flank to cut the enemy's line of retreat at Walawbum while the Chinese attacked in front. At the same time, he ordered Merrill to avoid unnecessary heavy combat. Galahad carried out its mission, but the glacial pace of the Chinese advance left Merrill's 3000 lightly armed troops exposed to a riposte by the Japanese 18th Division, forcing the Americans to evacuate their roadblocks. After the battle, Stilwell told Merrill that he would never again leave one of his few American combat units in such an exposed position. For the next envelopment to Shaduzup and Inkangahtawng, Merrill arranged for two Chinese regiments to follow and take over the roadblocks, leaving Galahad free to use its light, mobile battalions to best advantage.[18]

Much as Stilwell and Merrill would have liked to spare Galahad from prolonged line duty, circumstances and coalition politics intervened. When a Japanese force threatened to outflank Galahad's own envelopment toward Inkangahtawng, Stilwell's staff, in his absence, ordered Merrill to establish a blocking position. At Nhpum Ga, Merrill's 2d Battalion stopped the Japanese but at a heavy cost in dead and wounded. Although Galahad desperately needed rest and reorganization, Stilwell was eager to capture the key airstrip at Myitkyina before the monsoon season. Believing that Galahad was his only reliable unit, Stilwell ordered Merrill to strike for the airfield. Revived by promises of a long rest upon completion of the mission and reinforced by Chinese troops and Kachins, Galahad drove over the rugged Kumon range and captured the airstrip in a surprise attack on 17 May. At that point, Galahad could reasonably have expected relief, but Stilwell could not afford to rest his Americans while other nationalities who were equally exhausted continued to fight. Nor could Stilwell get reinforcements from other sectors of the Allied front. Thus, Galahad stayed in line, desperately throwing ill-trained fillers into the ranks to replace veterans evacuated with wounds and disease, with disastrous results for unit morale. Only a fraction of the unit remained by the fall of Myitkyina on 3 August 1944.[19]

Contributions to Victory

Galahad's tragic fate obscured a generally good record for special operations in the CBI theater. True, special operations in China, Indochina, and Thailand did not really get under way until the last months of the war. In Burma, however, the effort that Stilwell authorized in 1942 paid off handsomely. OSS Detachment 101 provided much essential information, including, by Peers' estimate, up to 90 percent of Northern Combat Area Command's intelligence in the 1944 offensive. Its Kachin confederates also guided and screened columns, helped downed fliers to escape, and provided a potent guerrilla army. Galahad's sacrifice made possible the capture of Myitkyina, greatly easing the aerial transport of supplies over the Hump and making it possible for the Ledo Road from India to link up with the North Burma road system on its way to a final junction with the old Burma Road. If Stilwell thought about it at the time of his relief in October 1944, he could have taken considerable pride in CBI's performance of special operations during his tenure.[20]

After a rocky start, the investment of MacArthur and his staff in the Filipino guerrillas likewise paid off to a large degree. Although often plagued by internal rivalries and, despite SWPA's efforts, lack of resources, the guerrillas still performed valuable services in guiding American units, harassing Japanese movements, assisting downed pilots, guarding captured areas, and eliminating bypassed enemy detachments, thereby releasing American troops for other duties. Guerrilla reports, though often exaggerated and unreliable, still represented the single most important source of intelligence

for American forces. Volckmann's North Luzon guerrillas actually approached Whitney's dream of a guerrilla army. As for the Filipinos themselves, the guerrilla experience left several troubling issues to resolve after the war, but it also provided a people with a badly needed sense of national pride on the eve of full independence in 1946.[21]

MacArthur and Stilwell were different men who took different approaches to special operations in their respective theaters. MacArthur's was based on a romantic vision, drawn from history and legend, of a people's war against brutal oppressors. The SWPA commander turned to special operations early, developed an extensive support organization, and closely supervised its work. Stilwell's approach was more cautious and pragmatic, judging special operations entrepreneurs by their results. Although he permitted direct access and made sure that the special operators obtained their share of resources, he generally adopted a hands-off tack, giving each entrepreneur a mission and letting him carry it out without much interference. Yet, for all their differences, the two commanders shared some basic traits. Both, by the late spring of 1942, were driven men, eager to avenge recent defeats and ready to adopt almost any means to achieve victory over a despised enemy. Thus, while both were basically orthodox soldiers who relied on the big battalions, both were ready to turn to special operations to aid conventional forces. Because of their support, special operations forces were able to make significant contributions to victory in the war against Japan.

NOTES

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1. John Keats, *They Fought Alone* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963), pp. 324-25; Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History* (New York: Knopf, 1956), pp. 133-34; Richard Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1979), p. 117; US Army Military History Institute (USAMHI), Senior Officers Debriefing Report: Conversations Between Lieutenant General William R. Peers and Lieutenant Colonel Jim Breen, Lieutenant Colonel Charlie Moore (Carlisle, Pa.: USAMHI, 1977), I: 3-4.

2. D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 3 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), I: 557-59, 571-75, II: 90-91, 153-54, 509; Stanley L. Falk, "Douglas MacArthur and the War Against Japan," in William M. Leary, ed., *We Shall Return!: MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan* (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1988), pp. 1-2; Carol M. Petillo, *Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1981), pp. xvi-xvii, 63, 134, 191, 207-10, 215-19, 243; Paul P. Rogers, *The Good Years: MacArthur and Sutherland* (New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 61, 80-82, 218, 239-41.

3. Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), pp. xi-xiii, 4, 87, 125-30, 170-71, 198-99, 300-01, 392; Peers interview, I: 4, II: 24; George A. McGee, Jr., *The History of the 2d Battalion, Merrill's Marauders: Northern Burma Campaign of 1944* (Braunfels, Tex.: George A. McGee, Jr., 1987), pp. 63, 207. See also Theodore H. White, ed., *The Stilwell Papers* (New York: William Sloane, 1948).

4. R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1972), pp. 250-51; Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, *MacArthur, 1941-1951* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1954), p. 144; Rogers, *The Good Years*, pp. 79-82, 247; Kermit Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2 vols. (New York: Walker, 1976), II: 359, 365; Petillo, *The Philippine Years*, pp. 233-34; Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 95-96; Kermit Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2 vols. (New York: Walker, 1976), II: 358;

Larry S. Schmidt, "American Involvement in the Filipino Resistance Movement on Mindanao," master's thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1982, p. 195; James, *The Years of MacArthur*, II: 510-11.

5. David W. Hogan, Jr., *US Arms Special Operations in World War II* (Washington: US Army Center of Military History [CMH], 1992), pp. 65-68; James, *The Years of MacArthur*, I: 583, 594, 609, 616, II: 26, 91, 105, 141-42, 145, 149; Rogers, *The Good Years*, pp. 213-15; Louis Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, US Army in World War II (Washington: GPO, 1953), pp. 502-03; US Army, GHQ, US Army Forces, Pacific, Military Intelligence Section, "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation," 2 vols., CMH, I: 1-6, 12-13; "Guerrilla Activities in the Philippines, CNO, Dept Navy, 14 Sept 44," pp. 1, 14, HRC Geog S. Philippines 370.64 Guerrilla Activities, CMH Archives; David J. Steinberg, *Philippine Collaboration in World War II* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1967), p. 21; Willoughby and Chamberlain, *MacArthur, 1941-1951*, pp. 46-47, 54, 57-60; Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History* (New York: Knopf, 1956), pp. 39, 44-48, 55-58; Jonathan M. Wainwright, *General Wainwright's Story*, ed. Robert Considine (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1946), pp. 120, 130-33, 136, 140-41; Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), pp. 141, 145-46, 202-04.

6. Eifler, a 250-pound mountain of a man who "seldom spoke more softly than a loud roar" would soon become a legend. Lieutenant General William R. "Ray" Peers, who succeeded Eifler as head of OSS Detachment 101, recalled that when he met Eifler, his new boss "took a stiletto type dagger and drove it a good two to three inches into the top of his desk. He looked pleased." See Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 69, 79. When questioned by the author about some of the stories in circulation, Eifler responded, "Well, there's the legend of Carl Eifler and there's the real Carl Eifler," but he readily admitted that Peers' story was true.

7. Hogan, *Special Operations in World War II*, pp. 98, 101, 105-06; Smith, *OSS*, p. 243-45; Thomas N. Moon and Carl F. Eifler, *The Deadliest Colonel* (New York: Vantage Press, 1975), pp. 9, 36-40, 53, 58-61, 329-32; Milton E. Miles, *A Different Kind of War*, ed. Hawthorne Daniel (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 76-90; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 67, 69, 90, 109, 177, 309-11; William R. Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," *Military Review*, 28 (June 1948), 11-13; Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, II: 360-61, 369-70, 374, 376; Eifler to Donovan, 24 November 1942, OSS History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 49, RG 226, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C.; "OSSSU Detachment 101: A Brief History of the Detachment for NCAC Records," March 1945, OSS History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 51, RG 226, NARA.

8. Whitney to Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, 12 May 1944, Whitney, Courtney—Semi-Official Letters, April 1943-August 1944, Folder 1, Box 9, Courtney A. Whitney Papers, Douglas MacArthur Library, Norfolk, Va.

9. Courtney A. Whitney biography, Folder 1, Box 1, Whitney Papers; "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines," p. 31; Paul P. Rogers, *MacArthur and Sutherland: The Bitter Years* (New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 124, 164, 290; James, *Years of MacArthur*, II: 509-10, 598; 27 October 1944 entry, Royce Wendover diary, USAMHI; Edwin P. Ramsey and Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey's War* (New York: Knightsbridge, 1990), pp. 226, 317; Colonel Macario Peralta to MacArthur, 11 March 1944, Folder 3, Box 1, Whitney Papers; Whitney to Sutherland, 1 June, 9 July, 15 July 1943, in Folder 12, Guerrilla Movement in the Philippines, Correspondence, 1943, Box 3, Whitney Papers; Keats, *They Fought Alone*, pp. 341, 347; Travis Ingham, *Rendezvous by Submarine: The Story of Charles Parsons and the Guerrilla Soldiers in the Philippines* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1945), pp. 141-42. See also Russell W. Volckmann, *We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines* (New York: Norton, 1954).

10. The repeated changes in high-level supervision of special operations in the Philippines contributed to wasteful duplication as PRS installed its own American-dominated intelligence nets, leaving the old Filipino-dominated G-2/AIB nets to atrophy; see "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines," I: 23, 27, 30; Jesus A. Villamor, *They Never Surrendered: A True Story of Resistance in World War II* (Quezon City, Philippines: Vera-Reyes, 1982), pp. 219, 243. See also "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines," I: 7-11, 29-34, 58; General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, "Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, GHQ, SWPA," 3 vols., CMH Library, I: 1, 4-8, 58; Rogers, *The Good Years*, p. 247; Whitney to Chief, G-3 Operations Division, GHQ, SWPA, 16 June 1944, Willoughby to G-3, 14 June 1944 and 25 May 1944, Folder 7, Memorandums to and from G-3, 1944-1945, Box 4, Whitney Papers; Willoughby to Sutherland, 20 May 1944, Folder 7 Whitney, Courtney—Personal Correspondence, 1940-1944, Box 8, Whitney Papers; G-2 to G-3, 25 May 1944, Folder 10, Philippine Regional Section Reactivation, Box 5, Whitney Papers; Whitney to Controller, AIB, 29 May 1943, Folder l, Operations 1943, Box 63, Whitney Papers; James, *Years of MacArthur*, II: 510.

11. Historical Section, China-Burma-India Theater, "History of the China-Burma-India Theater, 21 May 1942 to 25 October 1944," unpublished manuscript, vol. 2, pt. 2, CMH Archives, Section AG, p. 3, Section JICA, p. 2, Section PW, pp. 2, 5-6; Eifler to Donovan, 24 November 1942; Moon and Eifler, *The Deadliest Colonel*, pp. 63, 68-69, 108; Peers interview, I: 3-4, 14, 17, II: 24, 26.

12. Moon and Eifler, *The Deadliest Colonel*, pp. 111, 169, 173; Stilwell to Marshall, 21 February 1943, Stilwell Radios-Personal File, File I, Items 142-209, Stilwell to Marshall, 6 March 1943, Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items 210-327, File I, 2 June 1944 correspondence in Items 2501-2298, Marshall to Stilwell, 21 June 1944, Stilwell to Marshall, 19 July 1944, Sultan to Hearn, 14 August 1944, and Marshall to Stilwell, 14

August 1944, in Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items 2649-2822, File VII, Box 4, in US Army China-Burma-India Theater of Operations, Commanding General: Miscellaneous Notes and Correspondence, Personal Message File, "Oklahoma File," Diary of Operations, RG 493, Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.; Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, II: 360-64; Eifler to Donovan, 24 November 1942. Miles continued in the theater in his capacity as commander of Naval Group China.

13. Eifler to Donovan, 24 November 1942; William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America's Most Successful Guerrilla Force* (Boston: Little Brown, 1963), pp. 65-67, 107, 109-10, 114, 122-24, 129, 148, 219; Peers interview, I: 1; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 147-48, 281, 327; Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, II: 371, 381, 387; "Allied Intelligence Activities in the Philippines," I: 19; Ingham, *Rendezvous by Submarine*, pp. 135-36; Whitney, *MacArthur*, pp. 132-33.

14. "Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau," I: i-ii, 5, 7-9, 13, 18-19, 33-36, 92, 115-16.

15. Hogan, *US Arms Special Operations in World War II*, pp. 103, 112-14; Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, US Army in World War II (Washington: GPO, 1955), p. 35; Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, II: 372; Eifler to Donovan, 24 November 1942; Moon and Eifler, *The Deadliest Colonel*, pp. 71, 162, 167, 179; Pape to Stilwell, Ferris, 18 June 1943, Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items 501-591, File II, Box 1, Pape to Stilwell and Ferris, 27 July and 28 July 1943, Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items 591-701, File II, Box 2, Marshall to Stilwell, 1 September 1943, and Stilwell to Marshall, 3 September 1943, Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items 702-812, File II, Box 2, and Ferris to Stilwell, 21 October 1943, Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items 1001-1101, File IV, Ferris to Stilwell, 5 November 1943, Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items 1102-1183, File IV, Stilwell to Marshall, 11 November 1943, Marshall to Stilwell, 14 November 1943, Ferris to Hearn, 27 November 1943, in Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items 1184-1299, File IV, in Commanding General: Miscellaneous Notes and Correspondence, Personal Message File, "Oklahoma File," Diary of Operations, RG 493, WNRC; "History of the China-Burma-India Theater," unpublished manuscript, I: 132, II: GA-2, 7; McGee, *History of the 2d Battalion*, pp. 25-26.

16. "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines," I: 7, 15, 19, 31-34; Ingham, *Rendezvous by Submarine*, pp. 135, 141; Rogers, *The Bitter Years*, p. 122; Annex 11 to FO 25, Control of Filipino Forces, 6th Army, 6 October 1944, in "Report of the Leyte Operation, 20 October 1944—25 December 1944," Box 1478, Philippine Archives, Liberation/Postwar: Liberation of the Philippines, RG 407, NARA; memorandum for G-3 Planning, 29 September 1944, Folder 7, Memorandums to and from G-3, 1944-1945, Box 4, Whitney Papers; Schmidt, "American Involvement," pp. 108-09, 189-91, 202; Robert Ross Smith, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency," unpublished manuscript (1963), pp. 43-44, CMH Library; Marking and Yay Panlillo to Colonel James W. Atwell, Chief of Staff, I Corps, 15 September 1943, HRC Geog S. Philippines 370.64—Guerrillas—Markings, CMH Archives; Fertig to MacArthur, 18 June 1944, GHQ, Fertig to MacArthur, Vol. 10, Box 607, SWPA, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Guerrilla Resistance, RG 338, WNRC; Whitney, *MacArthur*, pp. 91, 133; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 202, 339; Volckmann, *We Remained*, pp. 120-21.

17. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 36, 131, 149; Riley Sunderland, comments relating to Scott R. McMichael, "Common Man, Uncommon Leadership: Colonel Charles N. Hunter with Galahad in Burma," *Parameters* (Summer 1986), pp. 5-7, 12, in Scott R. McMichael Papers, USAMHI; McGee, *History of the 2d Battalion*, pp. 11, 45, 67; White, *The Stilwell Papers*, pp. 219, 280; Marshall to Stilwell, 4 October 1943, Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items 1001-1101, File IV, and Merrill to Stilwell, 6 November 1943, Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items 1184-1299, File IV, in US Army CBI, Commanding General: Miscellaneous Notes and Correspondence, Personal Message File, "Oklahoma File," Diary of Operations, RG 493, WNRC; Peers interview, I: 5-7; Military Intelligence Division, War Department, *Merrill's Marauders (February—May 1944)*, American Forces in Action (Washington: War Department, 1945), p. 16; David W. Hogan, Jr., *Raiders or Elite Infantry?: The Changing Role of the US Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 63-64; Charles N. Hunter, *GALAHAD* (San Antonio, Tex.: Naylor, 1963), pp. 146, 172.

18. "History of the CBI Theater," I: 158, II: GA-13, 30, 50; *Stilwell Papers*, p. 280; McGee, *History of the 2d Battalion*, pp. 25, 39, 50, 63, 66-67, 71, 88; Hogan, *US Army Special Operations in World War II*, pp. 114-17; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 149-58, 175-80; Peers interview, I: 7; Hogan, *Raiders or Elite Infantry?*, p. 65.

19. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 181-82, 188-91, 201-02, 211, 221-37; Hunter, *GALAHAD*, pp. 136, 176; Hogan, *US Army Special Operations in World War II*, pp. 117-19; Hogan, *Raiders or Elite Infantry?*, pp. 65-68; Sunderland comments, pp. 7-11; *Stilwell Papers*, pp. 295-301, 304; "History of the CBI Theater," I: 160, II: GA-55, 83-84; McGee, *History of the 2d Battalion*, pp. 3, 104, 108, 115, 119, 133, 136, 139, 154, 161, 166, 187, 193, 199, 205, 214-15; Hunter, *GALAHAD*, pp. 168-69. See also Boatner's letters to Stilwell in HRC Geog U. Burma 370.2—Myitkyina, CMH Archives.

20. Hogan, *US Army Special Operations in World War II*, pp. 119, 122, 127-28; Hogan, *Raiders or Elite Infantry?*, pp. 67-68; Peers interview, I: 5.

21. Hogan, *US Army Special Operations in World War II*, pp. 68, 70, 85-90; James, *Years of MacArthur*, II: 688; Steinberg, *Philippine Collaboration in World War II*, pp. 2-3, 167.

Commentary & Reply

DECEPTION PLAN FOR OPERATION OLYMPIC

To the Editor:

Relative to Wayne Silkett's article "Downfall: The Invasion that Never Was" (*Parameters*, Autumn 1994), I may be the only surviving naval officer to have direct knowledge of a deception plan related to Operation Olympic, the proposed assault on the Japanese island of Kyushu. Operation Olympic is covered to a considerable degree in the National Archives, but without any clear reference to a deception plan that was formulated in late May and early June 1945. The purpose of the plan was to make the Japanese believe the Olympic assault was taking place earlier than actually scheduled.

During the assault on Okinawa, the Japanese did not resist the landing phase on Sunday, 1 April 1945, but on Friday and Saturday, 6 and 7 April, the fleet endured more than 600 kamikaze attacks which produced many casualties. These attacks continued daily and often at night throughout April, May, and early June.

Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, the senior naval officer in the area, witnessed from his flagship, USS *Eldorado*, the kamikaze attacks and the staggering naval losses they caused. The ferocity of the attacks convinced him that had the enemy launched such attacks on our shipping during the first day or two of our Okinawa assault, in conjunction with a massive counterattack by Japanese defenders, we might have been prevented from putting ashore the great force of troops and supplies that we did. He came to believe that the enemy also recognized this probability and would thus be prepared to vigorously oppose the landing on Kyushu with thousands of suicide planes, boats, and baka bombs (piloted engineless gliders launched from mother planes).

Admiral Turner concluded in late May or early June 1945 that if our assault forces were opposed by such measures from the outset, we could be defeated on the beaches. His intelligence sources indicated that the Japanese expected Operation Olympic in the fall of 1945 and had begun building a fleet of suicide planes, perhaps as many as 5000, which were secreted throughout the southern islands.

Admiral Turner's plan to counter the Japanese preparations was ingenious. We would form a fleet of 400 ships, sufficient to carry 500,000 men, with their equipment and supplies, protected by the usual screen. However, no troops would be carried, no equipment would be aboard. The screening carriers would carry only fighter planes.

This phantom fleet, large enough to be credible, would go through all the routines associated with an assault: recorded radio traffic would fill the airwaves; boats, with no troops aboard, would be put in the water; a line of departure would be formed; and waves of boats would approach the control vessels marking the line of departure. Shore bombardment would follow, and the enemy, believing this to be the main assault, would be induced to unleash thousands of suicide defenders.

The risk to the US Navy was the potential loss of many of the 400 ships involved, along with their operating crews. But the reward, if the plan succeeded,

was elimination of the kamikaze force in Kyushu and the increased likelihood of success for Operation Olympic some two weeks later.

I learned of my involvement in this plan in June 1945. At the time, I was commanding officer of a submarine chaser attached to 5th Fleet. For a small ship, we had many interesting assignments, apparently to the satisfaction of Captain B. B. Adell, USN, commander of the control group for Admiral Turner. Captain Adell summoned me in early June 1945 and under sworn secrecy told me that I was to return to Pearl Harbor, take a new command, and return to Okinawa to command the central control ship for the deception operation then being planned. Owing to the Japanese surrender in August 1945, I never made it back to Okinawa and returned to civilian life shortly thereafter.

Forty years went by before I disclosed to anyone the plans for the Olympic deception. George McMillan, a well-known author, had been commissioned by Random House to write a book to be titled "The Invasion of Japan," describing the planned two-part assault. During one of many interviews with McMillan, I described the deception plan, which he had never heard of. Unfortunately, McMillan died before finishing and publishing his work.

I subsequently sought—unsuccessfully—to verify my recollection in official records at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, the National Archives, and the Naval Historical Center at the Washington Navy Yard. Finally, I corresponded with Dr. Dean C. Allard, the senior naval historian, who eventually confirmed that the deception had in fact been planned at the highest levels and would in all likelihood have been implemented had the war continued.

One thing seems certain: had the kamikaze force attacked our phantom fleet, few of the planes would have remained available to oppose Olympic two weeks later.

Lewis M. Walker, Commander USNR Ret.
Greenville, S.C.

The Author Replies:

Like so much of the material I uncovered pertaining to Operation Downfall, Commander Walker's recollection was fascinating and very informative. During my research I did not come across any mention of this elaborate deception plan, only the US Navy's grave concern for the kamikaze threat.

Perhaps Downfall's having never gotten out of the planning stage accounts for the lack of attention provided to this greatest-of-all-invasions-that-never-took-place. While I hardly consider my research exhaustive, I uncovered only one significant treatment of the planning, other than some of the actual documents—an unpublished but very helpful master's thesis, and a hint in "Book World" of *The Washington Post* that a book on Downfall is scheduled for publication.

Nevertheless, as Commander Walker's material underscores, students of strategy will not miss the vital importance of deceiving an enemy nor the irony of an operation that would have employed almost as many vessels then as exist in the entire US naval inventory today.

Lieutenant Colonel Wayne A. Silkett, USA Ret.

Review Essays

Strategic Reading on Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict

VICTOR GRAY

The concept of nation, a *Volk* or *ethnie*, is an ancient one, but the idea of the nation-state is relatively new, dating from the rise of modern England and France. Nationalism as a force in international relations dates only from the late 18th century, reaching a peak in Europe in the 1918-1939 period. Frozen thereafter by World War II and the Cold War, it seemed to have disappeared as an issue in Europe. In some ways, however, the emergence of assertive nationalism in Africa and Asia during the postwar breakup of colonialism was but a precursor of what was to come in Europe during the breakup of the Soviet empire.

Ethnic conflicts in post-colonial Africa and Asia have been particularly troublesome in areas where colonialist-drawn pencil lines often boxed competing nations within the borders of one artificial state. Such multinational states also exist in Europe and, as we have seen in Belfast and Sarajevo, the internal struggle for advantage can lead to bloody conflicts in their supposedly "civilized" climes. There are, too, problems that can arise from nations that encompass several states. The Kurds, the Mayans, and the "Arab Nation" in an age of Islamic fundamentalism are but a few examples of the potential for conflict inherent in such diasporas. Nor should one forget the 25 million Russians now living outside Russia in the Baltics, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.

During the next decade, however, it is the often destructive micro-nationalism of Europe and Africa that will cause the most difficulty for strategists looking for ways to put some order into this new world. It will test the limits of self-determination and sovereignty, and challenge the international system to devise universal norms and effective means for protecting human rights, cultural autonomy, and life itself within often cramped political quarters. The problem for strategists is especially acute in two areas: around the rim of the former Soviet Union where ancient hatreds have returned with a vengeance, as the artificial internationalism of communism has crumbled; and in Africa, where the end of the Cold War has led to a diminution of superpower interest in and ability to control ethnic strife. The fighting and genocide that have resulted have scrambled security thinking. They have placed a premium on rapid reaction forces, new ground rules for intervention, and clearer thinking about exit strategies.

Coping with such issues will demand greater understanding of what is distinctive about each ethnic conflict and of the characteristics that all such conflicts share in common. The search for such understanding will require moving beyond the pop writing on nationalism and ethnic conflict and familiarizing oneself with three strands of the more serious but still very readable literature on the subject. The first

deals with basic conceptual issues such as the nature of nationalism, sovereignty, and secession. The second, the core of the strategist's interest, deals with the "hows" and "whys" of getting in and out of ethnic conflicts and devising methods for managing and resolving such conflicts. Delving into this latter segment of the literature, steeped as it must be in case studies, will lead one nicely into the third branch that looks at regional peculiarities. Here, however, one has to be careful not to overreach, for it is impossible to become an expert on all regions. It would be best to concentrate on one or two, where language abilities or past or prospective assignments could lead to a real specialization.

Whatever the specialization chosen, it remains best to begin with the general concepts that must be grasped. *State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies: The Breakup of Multinational States* (1991) edited by Boston University's Uri Ra'anan and others is an excellent place to begin an investigation of the difference between "state" and "nation" and of why some contemporary multinational states succeed while others fail. Ra'anan's opening essay on "states larger than nations" (e.g., the Soviet Union, Canada) and "nations larger than states" (e.g., Germany, China) provides a conceptual and historical introduction that points the reader in the direction of some answers to that "why" as well as some "hows" of avoiding future conflict. One of the more hopeful "hows"— conflict reduction through cultural autonomy—is explored theoretically by Theodore Hanf of Austria's Renner Institute and by others who examine the historical evidence offered by such "successes" as Catalonia in Spain and Scotland and Wales in the United Kingdom.

Writing from a part of the United Kingdom not noted for its success in this regard, Professor Stephen Ryan of the University of Ulster turns his attention in *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations* (1990) to examples far removed from Ireland of forced assimilations, forced expulsions, and genocide in an attempt to come up with a useful model for ethnic conflict resolution. This very much "how"-oriented book, crammed with dozens of recent case studies, could serve as a manual for effective peacekeeping. Especially useful are his discussions of the conflict "management" versus "resolution" debate, wherein he notes the management role of the Cold War superpowers in keeping a lid on the worst ethnic violence, and the shifting of that role to the United Nations. He rightfully puts considerable stock in further thickening the global human rights regime as a means of protecting minorities and preventing genocide.

Conflict management is the theme of another useful work, *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts* (1993), edited by John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary. Speaking of case studies, two collections worthy of note for those seeking deeper understanding of the ethnic roots of current conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and around the southern rim of the former Soviet Union are: *Ethnicity and Conflict in a Post-Communist World: The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China* (1992) edited by Kumar Rupesinghe, Peter King, and Olga Vorkunova of Oslo's International Peace Research Institute; and *The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict* (1993) by Hugh Poulton of London's Minority Rights Group. The latter contains a moving foreword by Milovan Djilas, who did battle with Stalin to save a united Yugoslavia and with Tito to bring about a democratic one. The former book, which contains a rare treatment of China in its section on "brewing ethnic conflicts," brings to mind that there are two predictions for China's future, one being superpower status, the other implosion.

Ethnic Conflict and International Security (1993) edited by *Survival's* Michael E. Brown starts to examine the issues raised by nationalism in the aftermath of the Cold War. It contains a dozen essays, all by acknowledged experts in the field of strategy, that were originally published in the Spring and Summer 1993 issues of *Survival.* The following sampling should convey the level of expertise and pragmatic bent of the essays: "Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism: Ethnicity and World Order" by Pierre Hassner of the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI); "Ethnic Conflict and Refugees" by Kathleen Newland, a consultant to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; "International Mediation of Ethnic Conflicts" by recent NSC staffer Jennone Walker; and "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts" by Mats Berdal of London's International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Robert Cooper, the United Kingdom's second-ranking diplomat in Bonn. "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism" by the London School of Economics' Professor Anthony D. Smith is also worth reading for those interested in the causes of the explosive spread of ethnic conflict. It is a distillation of the thinking of a leading theorist in the field.

Nations in Turmoil: Conflict and Cooperation in Eastern Europe (1993) by Janusz Bugajski of Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) looks at the roots of ethnic animosity in a particular area, providing the reader with the sort of in-depth historical background necessary to understand conflicts such as that in Bosnia. It is, however, thoroughly up-to-date in its proscriptions for the future, putting great stock in the European integration process as a means of providing an organic rationale for cooperation among diverse ethnic groups. In his *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Threats to European Security* (1994), Stephen Iwan Griffiths, writing for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) also looks at the response of European security institutions to ethnic conflict in the same area, particularly in the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The latter two countries—both split up by ethnic differences—are among those discussed in *The New Political Geography of Eastern Europe* (1993) edited by two social geographers, John O'Loughlin of the University of Colorado and Herman van der Wusten of the University of Amsterdam. It provides an excellent geopolitical overview of the area with an emphasis on the potential problems arising from ethnic differences, for example, in Romania and the former Soviet Union. Probably the best books on the former Soviet Union, however, are *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (1993), edited by Stanford's Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, and *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval* (1994) by Professors Karen Dawisha of Maryland and Bruce Parrott of Johns Hopkins' Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. While thoroughly examining the ethnic and cultural sources of conflict in the area, both provide a wealth of current data and are as up-to-date as tomorrow's newspapers on the fighting in Russia's "Near Abroad," a region worthy of particular attention by Western strategists.

Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict (1991) edited by K. M. de Silva, Director of Sri Lanka's International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES), and the Australian National University's R. J. May also focuses on a particular area—South and Southeast Asia—but offers a useful exploration by McGill University's Ralph R. Premdas of the causes and consequences of outside intervention in such conflicts. More recent and more useful to a soldier or diplomat seeking to inform his or her own decisionmaking with regard to future such interventions is *Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict* (1993) edited by de Silva and his ICES colleague S. W. R. de A. Samarsinghe. It examines the

specifics of peace negotiations in conflicts ranging from Cyprus to Sudan, including, not surprisingly, the Indo-Sri Lankan peace accord, and concludes with a future-oriented "lessons learned" essay by McGill University's John M. Richardson and American University's Jianxin Wang. This is must reading for those interested in exit strategies.

Kamal S. Shehadi revisits the issue of the breakup of multinational states in his *Ethnic Self-Determination and the Break-Up of States* (1993), but devotes most of his effort to discussing how the international community can best intervene to ensure rational borders or to prop up "failed states" that lack the internal attributes of sovereignty. The changing nature of sovereignty and other conceptual issues such as controlling the right of secession also feature prominently Judith Toland's *Ethnicity and the State* (1993) and in the Summer 1992 special issue of *The Fletcher Forum* devoted to ethnic conflict. Conceptual essays, such as journalist Jim Anderson's "New World Order and State Sovereignty: Implications for UN-Sponsored Intervention" and "Testing the Moral Limits of Self-Determination: Northern Ireland and Croatia" by Gerard F. Powers of the US Bishops Conference, are the most thought-provoking of the *Forum* pieces, but its numerous case studies are also worth reading.

Maryland's Professor Ted Robert Gurr has been involved in the production of three instant classics on ethnic conflict that contain a similar mix of case studies and strategizing. The first, coedited by Professors Jack A. Goldstone and Farokh Moshiri, is *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century*. It not only examines ten revolutions of the last 20 years ranging from Vietnam and Nicaragua to South Africa and the PLO *Intifada*, but also introduces readers to a survey of revolutionary theory, including Goldstone's analytical framework for the future. The second, the outgrowth of a project by the same name that has tracked 233 politically active communal groups around the world, is Gurr's *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (1993). It attempts to explain why disadvantaged groups mobilize, and it evaluates strategies that have successfully reduced ethnic conflict. The third, coauthored by Gurr and Barbara Harff, an associate professor of political science at the US Naval Academy, is *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (1994). It provides an outstanding overview of ongoing ethnic conflicts and a very useful glossary and bibliography that make it must reading for someone seeking an introduction to the field. Its final chapter on responding to international crises of this sort is worthwhile reading even for the experienced strategist.

Gurr also features prominently in *The Internationalization of Communal Strife* (1992) edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. In their introductory essays, Gurr and I. William Zartman of Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) provide a global and theoretical framework within which to consider the book's several case studies. One of their main conclusions is that internationalization of communal conflict is commonplace in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East but almost totally absent in Latin America. In her essay on Peru, Cynthia McClintock of George Washington University attempts to explain why Latin America is different, citing as reasons the paucity of interstate warfare, the unifying role of religion, and the effects of large-scale intermarriage that has "eroded the primordial loyalties" of indigenous peoples. While hers is one of the more informative pieces in the book, she might want to reconsider the last conclusion in light of the recent flare-up in Chiapas of the centuries-old resistance of the Maya across the Mexican-Guatemalan border. To the extent that it destabilizes either country, it is a conflict that must be of concern to the United States.

The strategist, experienced or otherwise, should also take a look at two new books from the Council on Foreign Relations: *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (1993) edited by Lori Fisler Damrosch and *Nation Against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty* (1993) by Gidon Gottlieb. The first draws on the experience of six crises—Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, Liberia, Cambodia, and the former Yugoslavia—to examine, within the context of developing international law, options for intervention that range from economic sanctions to the use of force. In the second book, Gottlieb, an authority on international law and diplomacy, argues forcefully that granting statehood to every people seeking self-determination would dangerously fragment the international community into mini-states, the size and viability of which would mock the concept of sovereignty. Instead, echoing the Austrian political scientist Karl Renner, he advocates a "states-plus-nations" route that respects the cultural aspirations of minority groups without jeopardizing the territorial integrity of existing states. But what of those unfortunate people spread over several states, none of which they can call their own? This unique problem is examined in a thorough and provocative essay on "Ethno-National Diasporas and Security" (*Survival*, Spring 1994) by Professor Gabriel Sheffer of Jerusalem's Hebrew University. He explores, in particular, the dangers of terrorism by the dispossessed and the more conventional security problems caused by linkages between disadvantaged minorities and ethnic cousins possessing states and modern weapons.

Finally, returning full circle to basics, strategists and casual readers alike might spend a little time ruminating about new issues of identity that get to the question: "Who are the 'we' in 'We, the people'?" A trio of recent books on Europe provide superb starting points from which to approach that question. *European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy* (1993) edited, very appropriately, by the University of Barcelona's Soledad Garcia, discusses the pressures on the identity and sovereignty of European states. Those pressures come from above (the emerging supra-sovereignty of the European Union); from below (regionalism such as that generated by the Catalonia of which Barcelona is the proud capital); and laterally (the Eastern Europeans and North Africans knocking at the door). The regional component of this pressure-cooker is explored, again appropriately, by a Scotswoman, Sharon Macdonald of Keele University, and nine colleagues who examine, in *Inside European Identities: Ethnography in Western Europe* (1993), what it means to be Welsh, Basque, and other subordinate nationalities in the nation-states of modern Western Europe. Putting it all together in a strategic concept is *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (1993) edited by Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre. This is a provocative, seminal work, in which Waever and Buzan define the concept of "societal security"—which concept, they argue, must be folded in to more conventional notions of security in Europe.

Having dipped into at least *some* of this literature, those soldiers and diplomats charged with considering which ethnic conflicts warrant intervention by the United States or the world community and under what conditions to end such intervention will be better equipped to do that job.

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Review Essay

Strategic Reading on the Northwest Pacific

DONALD W. BOOSE, JR.

The Northwest Pacific (Korea, Japan, and the Russian Far East) witnessed many changes in 1994. The long post-World War II era may finally be coming to an end, although the legacy of that war, the major transforming event of the 20th century, is still potent. A number of recent books shed light on the war's effects and the postwar transformation of the region.

Hostilities began in Asia in 1937, but for Americans the war started in 1941 with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Gordon W. Prange spent his life studying that attack, conducting extensive interviews with Japanese participants and collecting an immense Pearl Harbor archive. Since Prange's death, his colleagues, Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, have published a series of books based on Prange's research and his extensive files. Their latest publication, *The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans*, is a collection of Japanese documents written as events were happening as well as "memory documents" produced shortly after the war. The book contains interesting material, including letters by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who conceived the attack and commanded the Japanese Combined Fleet until his death in 1943, but there are no startling revelations. Indeed, the main thrust of all the "Prange Enterprises" books—supported by exhaustive documentation—is that there was no conspiracy and no cover-up. Japanese success was the result of thorough planning, hard training, good luck, and unfortunate, but understandable, American errors.

Readers already familiar with the war will find much of interest in *From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima: The Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, 1941-1945*, edited by Saki Dockrill. This is a fine collection of essays on prewar diplomacy, operations in the China and Southeast Asian theaters, the wartime role of Thailand, and German-Japanese relations. The "American" theaters of the Central and Southwest Pacific are covered by Ronald Spector's discussion of the development of American Pacific strategy and Edward J. Drea's examination of US Army code-breaking efforts. Saki Dockrill and Lawrence Freedman address American use of the atomic bombs, a topic of current interest in light of an ongoing controversy over the National Air and Space Museum's portrayal of the Enola Gay (the B-29 bomber from which the Hiroshima atomic bomb was released) and continuing claims by some historians that the bombs were intended more to influence the Soviet Union than to effect the surrender of Japan. Dockrill and Freedman argue that the bombs were part of a successful "strategy of shock." The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki proved that Japan faced catastrophe and persuaded those Japanese leaders already considering surrender to take action over the opposition of hard-liners. This expedited the "notoriously complicated and time-consuming" Japanese decisionmaking process and brought the terrible and tragic war to an end.

In *The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb*, a meticulous study of American and Japanese planning, John Ray Skates also makes a convincing case that while American leaders recognized the bomb's effect on postwar Soviet thinking, they saw it primarily as a "psychological weapon aimed at Japan's military leaders." The atomic bomb decision was made as the war in the Pacific reached an extraordinary intensity of violence. Bombing, naval blockade, and invasion (with possible tactical use of poison gas) were all part of an escalating strategy—influenced by the tenacious Japanese defense of Iwo Jima, Luzon, and Okinawa—to force the Japanese surrender. American military leaders expected that Japanese civilians, as well as soldiers, would fight with suicidal ferocity, but Skates points out that civilian morale and support for the war were in reality not as strong as the Americans believed and the Japanese leadership wished.

This is one of the issues explored by John W. Dower in *Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays*. A historian with extensive knowledge of Japan, Dower has three main themes: that Japan's postwar social, political, and economic structure are rooted in wartime decisions and events; that Japanese society, usually viewed as homogeneous, is in fact marked by internal turmoil, tension, and diversity; and that US-Japan relations are a "tangled history of mutual hatred and respect, conflict and cooperation." His discussion of the stereotypes with which Japanese and Americans tend to portray each other is of particular interest, but the whole book is essential reading for anyone trying to understand modern Japan.

The underlying theme of *A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World*, edited by William J. Williams, is that the Korean War was both a part of the post-World War II transition and a transforming event in its own right. John Edward Wiltz's overview of the history of US-Korean relations is comprehensive and includes assessments of the most contentious claims of recent revisionist historians. His extensive footnotes covering most of the available English-language sources on the subject are a good starting point for further study. Other essays cover the war's effect on racial integration in the US military, differing approaches to the role of reserve forces, and the ways in which the war contributed to the post-World War II transformation of Korea, Japan, China, and the international order. All are of high quality and worth careful reading. Richard P. Hallion's discussion of naval air operations is relevant to current deliberations on joint doctrine. Jon Halliday relates his interviews with Russian fighter pilots who dueled with United Nations Command (mostly American) fliers over North Korea and Manchuria. His report of Russian aerial victory claims has since prompted a lively debate, demonstrating the uneasy relationship between fighter pilots and historians who uncharitably compare the pilots' claims against the other side's recorded losses and speculate on the inevitable discrepancy.

In the early 1970s, the late Donald Stone MacDonald was directed by the State Department to assemble a secret "interpretive summary" of documents bearing on US policy toward Korea during the formative period from 1945 to 1965. Declassified in 1989, it is now available as *U.S.-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance: The Twenty-Year Record*. It is a fascinating, but tantalizing, book. While some documents are quoted in their entirety, most are summarized or paraphrased, and many of the footnotes are still classified, leaving enough loose ends to fuel continued debate over US intentions and actions. Among the issues covered are the role of US officials in nudging President Syngman Rhee toward giving up the Republic of Korea

(ROK) presidency in 1960 and US actions at the time of the 1961 military coup (US officials publicly expressed support for the government, but refused to intervene on either side).

MacDonald's book ends with the ROK poised for an economic transformation and with the seeds of political reform just beginning to sprout. South Korea is a far different country today, but the transformation is not yet complete. President Kim Young Sam began 1994 strongly, continuing his efforts to reform politics, reduce corruption, and purge political generals. But he has been criticized for indecisiveness on the North Korean nuclear issue and for political expediency. The 21 October 1994 collapse of a commuter bridge in Seoul brought charges of government ineptitude, intensifying this criticism.

South Korea nonetheless is immeasurably stronger and more influential than its isolated and economically weak northern rival, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), where the most dramatic event of 1994 was the sudden death of President Kim Il Sung and the transfer of power to his son, Kim Jong Il. Korea watchers have long considered these events to be a necessary precondition to political and economic change in North Korea. To date, no new trends are discernible, but there has been movement on the thorny nuclear issue. On 17 October 1994 the United States and the DPRK signed an accord intended to freeze the North Korean nuclear program and begin trade and diplomatic relations between the two states. Critics claim the agreement props up a faltering North Korean regime, delays full inspections of suspected DPRK plutonium waste sites, and sets a bad precedent for dealing with other would-be nuclear weapon states. Supporters insist that the DPRK has agreed to restrictions far more stringent than those required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and note that North Korea will have to comply with each phase of the agreement to keep the benefits flowing. Given the dearth of acceptable alternatives and the value of keeping North Korea engaged in dialogue, most observers seem at least cautiously optimistic. A positive indication would be the reinstitution of talks between the two Koreas. That had not happened by January 1995, although the ROK government had announced the lifting of some restrictions on commerce with the North. The initial reaction of North Korea was to reject the ROK move, but that may be preliminary posturing. The shooting down of a US Army helicopter in December 1994 also complicated, at least temporarily, the development of US policy toward the DPRK.

Someone seeking background on these issues could profitably turn to *Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War,* edited by Young Whan Khil, a useful compendium of essays on Korean politics, economics, reunification negotiations, international relations, and the North Korean nuclear issue. This is a handy, well-documented reference book.

Contributors to Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato's *U.S.-Japan Partnership in Conflict Management: The Case of Korea* focus on the crucial US-Japan-Korea triangular relationship. Overall, the essays support the notion that the United States plays a positive and stabilizing role, not least because a Japan allied to the United States is perceived as less threatening by Korea and other regional nations, while the US-Korean relationship is reassuring to Japan.

Japan underwent its own political turmoil during the past year. In June 1994, after the fall of a second short-lived multiparty government, Tomiichi Murayama, chairman of the leftist Japan Social Democratic Party (JSDP), became Prime Minister.

He heads an unlikely coalition of the JSDP with its bitter rival, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the liberal reformist *Sakigake* party. In spite of its failure to win an important by-election in September, the ramshackle alliance was judged at year's end more stable and effective than anyone expected at its inception.

Soon after his accession, Prime Minister Murayama renounced his party's traditional opposition to the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the Japan Self Defense Forces, and nuclear power generation. Two months later the JSDP followed up by adopting, over the opposition of the old Marxist stalwarts who used to form the heart of the party, a document consistent with Murayama's new positions. In September the Japanese cabinet decided to seek a permanent seat for Japan on the UN Security Council and authorized Japan's third UN peacekeeping deployment: the dispatch of nearly 500 Japanese soldiers to assist Rwandan refugees.

US-Japan trade negotiations deadlocked at the beginning of the year, but in July the two countries agreed on a framework for talks and in October announced a limited trade agreement, once again forestalling a US-Japan trade war. In spite of continuing trade imbalances, particularly in the automotive sector, the bilateral relationship was much improved at year's end.

Edward J. Lincoln provides a well-informed and thought-provoking examination of these two issues—Japan's economic prowess and its role in the world—in *Japan's New Global Role*. He argues that significant changes of the 1980s, "macroeconomic shifts, financial deregulation, yen appreciation, rising labor costs brought on by long-term demographic changes, and technological success," have "combined to thrust Japan into the world in new ways." These trends will continue throughout the next decade. Japan will continue to seek, and others will expect, more active participation in global issues, but Japanese insularity and foreign suspicions, aggravated by real and perceived trade and investment inequalities, inhibit Japan's efforts to assume a larger international role. Lincoln makes specific policy suggestions for both Japan and the United States. He sees little risk of a "re-militarized" Japan, but because any Japanese military activity outside its borders raises fears among regional neighbors and because Japan has historically lacked institutional means for controlling its military, he warns against increased UN-sponsored Japanese peacekeeping operations. Instead, Lincoln suggests, Japan can play a more productive and reassuring role through greatly expanded participation in international diplomatic, humanitarian, and environmental activities.

Japan already plays an important role in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the largest and most important regional venue. With US encouragement, this organization has been moving toward trade liberalization, and on 15 November leaders of the 18 APEC nations announced agreement to end all trade restrictions by 2020. This measure could stimulate worldwide trade liberalization, although many tough issues remain.

C. Fred Bergsten, chairman of the APEC Eminent Persons Group which recommended the free trade measure adopted at the summit, was a presenter at the 1994 National Defense University (NDU) Pacific Strategy Symposium, the papers of which have been edited by Michael D. Bellows and published as *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities*. Bergsten's paper on "Strategic Architecture for the Pacific" highlights the economic dimension and stresses the value of interdependence.

Among the other participants at the NDU symposium were two Russian scholars. Although Russia is a Pacific nation with important interests in the region, it

is not yet a member of APEC, a reflection of its current economic weakness and lack of influence. Russian military forces in the Far East, including ballistic missile submarines deployed in the Sea of Okhotsk bastion, are potentially formidable and of continuing concern to the Japanese. But for now, post-communist Russia, distracted by internal political and economic turmoil, is focused more on Europe and Central Asia than on its Far Eastern provinces and neighbors. In October 1994, a huge multinational development project (and potential ecological disaster) planned for the Russia-DPRK border area at the mouth of the Tumen River was put on hold for lack of investor support. Russia's commercial and economic relations with South Korea are clouded by Russian difficulties in servicing the multibillion-dollar loan extended by the ROK in 1990 when the two countries assumed full-scale diplomatic relations.

Russian cooperation with and potential investment from Japan are impeded by unresolved territorial claims over the southern Kurile Islands. This "Northern Territories" issue is also the principal obstacle to the negotiation of a peace treaty between Russia and Japan, who have never officially ended World War II. Both Russian and Japanese presenters at the NDU conference noted the proximity, if not confrontation, between Russian forces guarding the Sea of Okhotsk bastion and Japanese forces. The Russian scholars argued that to avoid a return to Cold War-style tensions in the Northwest Pacific, the United States and Japan should maintain dialogue, avoid unilateral actions, and include Russia in any future multilateral security forums.

US government officials representing the State and Defense Departments and the US Pacific Command provided a summary of the Clinton Administration's approach to Asia and the Pacific. They noted the continuing importance of the region to the United States and pledged that the United States would stay engaged as part of a "New Pacific Community," maintain its current force levels, and seek the enlargement of free trade, economic growth, and democracy. These policy statements were formalized in July 1994 when the White House published *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.* This strategy is built on long-standing US approaches to the region and reflects essential continuity in US policy. During the course of 1994, the United States took a high-profile stance on trade and human rights issues, but the effects were counterproductive. By midyear, US officials had reassessed and reoriented their approach and, while retaining the basic "engagement and enlargement" strategy, took a less confrontational line. A new factor in 1995 will be the influence of the Republican congressional majority. In the past, Republicans have generally favored free trade and Pacific engagement, but there are advocates in both major parties for protectionism and reduction of overseas commitments. As in the case of the US-Japan trade agreement and the North Korean nuclear accord, it will take time to assess the effect of domestic political changes on US Asia-Pacific policies. Change is inevitable, but the nation's enduring economic, security, and ideological interests should work to assure substantial continuity in those policies.

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Review Essay

A Surge of Revisionism: Scholarship on The Great War

PAUL F. BRAIM

Although the 50th anniversary of great events in World War II is upon us, bringing a plethora of writings on that conflict, a scholarly reexamination of World War I proceeds apace. A quick look at reviews and lists of new books reveals as many on the First World War as on the Second. Advertisements for tours of European battlefields of the Great War appear to be at least as numerous as those for visits to battlefields of "The Great Crusade" in the same areas in World War II. It also seems that the battlefields of World War I, at least in Europe, are better memorialized than those of its successor. Two associations, The Great War Society and The Western Front Association, both collegia of persons interested in the First World War, are increasing in membership and hold frequent conferences of scholars and antiquarians.

The high interest in World War I may well be the result of the passage of time having obliterated the uglier memories of that war, while memories of the horrors of World War II, such as of the Holocaust, yet remain strong. Scholars, however, generally recognize World War I as having defined "War in the Machine Age." It could be said that the 20th century began at Sarajevo in 1914; some believe our century will end in war growing out of the same locale.

The word "Revisionism" often connotes the writings of those iconoclasts of the period between World Wars I and II who discovered great conspiracies to wage war for personal power or profit. The Revisionists celebrated herein are not reformers; rather, they are scholars who have subjected earlier verities about World War I to broader and more rigorous research—and who have found many previous conclusions to be less valid than commonly held. They display considerable understanding, even empathy, with the leaders on both sides—beleaguered as those leaders were by immense challenges.

Revisionist historiography over the last decade rather well refutes the old charge that Allied and German military leaders were blundering fools or butchers, who considered no strategy other than attrition in their attempts to prevail in the Great War. However, recent campaign analyses and biographies do show the senior commanders to have been bound by a conservatism born of chronological age and military heritage, which limited their appreciation of the potential of the weapons of the Machine Age. These leaders, on both sides of the fighting, were men whose experience was in an animal-powered era. They slowly came to appreciate the combat effectiveness of the tank and the airplane, but they continued until war's end to seek to employ, in a decisive role, their favorite weapons platform: the horse.

A recent defining study of the forward edge of fighting in the Great War has come through the scholarship of Hubert C. Johnson, whose *Breakthrough! Tactics, Technology, and the Search for Victory on the Western Front in World War I* describes and analyzes a broad array of diverse innovations in tactics in World War I. Johnson avers that Allied and German commanders, their staffs, and their military schools, gradually developed tactics and procedures to return maneuver to warfare on the Western Front. Bringing to light a number of obscure staff studies and offensive plans, he shows that both sides attempted, over the long period of siege warfare, to improve coordination of artillery, tanks, and aircraft with infantry attacks. The Germans did not emphasize the employment of tanks but did develop effective antitank operations. The Germans also developed "stormtroop tactics" for engaging and bypassing defensive positions, although, as Johnson shows, Allied forces employed similar, if less effective, procedures for penetrating strong defenses. Limitations in communications, and embedded parochiality, prevented these early combined-arms operations from achieving a complete rupture of the extensive defenses on the Western Front.

From his notes, it is obvious that Dr. Johnson has followed his own admonition that there remains no substitute for researching the major (national) archives. He buttresses his extensive research with conclusions based also upon an uncommon degree of common sense. Johnson acknowledges indebtedness to Bruce Gudmundsson's earlier work, *Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918*. Gudmundsson concludes that stormtroop tactics enabled the Germans to break through Allied defenses, but slow reinforcement of their gains, by foot and animal, prevented decisive exploitation of the gaps they created. By 1918, the Germans could not reinforce their depleted armies, in quantity or quality of human replacements, to meet the increasing power the Allies gained through American participation in the war. Gudmundsson also challenges the opinion held by many veterans of World Wars I and II (including this reviewer) that the Germans were, essentially, better soldiers than their enemies. He asserts that the key to German battlefield superiority in war lay in decentralization of command, which allowed even their junior leaders to make independent combat decisions.

A predecessor to Gudmundsson's work, Timothy Lupfer's *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine during the First World War*, also examines and confirms innovative German organizational and tactical changes which led to battlefield effectiveness. In a similar vein, Tim Travers, in his book *Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918*, describes the conservative bent of British generaldom and the struggles of radical British thinkers to develop tactics to maximize new weaponry. In a related text, *Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War*, Martin Samuels compares German and British tactics, giving the British more credit for innovativeness than does Travers.

Most of the Revisionist scholars are less sympathetic and more critical of American leadership than were previous authors of largely paeanic texts. The First World War began the United States' overseas commitments on behalf of imperiled humanity. Our national distemper over the political results that followed the Armistice did not include condemnation of our military leaders. It was an age of heroes, as the current era certainly is not. Most American military histories and biographies were rather hagiolatrous until recently. Now that nearly all of the doughboys of the Great War have passed in final review, it is time for dispassionate, critical histories of US participation in that war—and these are appearing on publishers' lists, reexamining and reevaluating that struggle.

A capstone to the Revisionist scholarship on the American experience in the Great War is the recent publication of *The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918* by David F. Trask. In this slim volume about the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) on the Western Front in World War I, Trask rationalizes cogently the American experience. A former Chief Historian of the US Army Center of Military History, Dr. Trask has spent much of his professional life researching World War I. In this book he presents his grand synthesis of Revisionist scholarship. His thesis: The AEF was ill prepared for this test of battle, and its leadership was inadequate to the demands of modern war.

The entry of the United States into World War I offset the German advantage, but only to the extent that the resources of the United States could be quickly applied to the Allied cause. The Allies wanted food, munitions, US naval forces, and US manpower to reinforce their depleted armies. Allied military leaders disparaged the small US Army, considering it to be a "constabulary," its leaders inexperienced and untrained in modern war. The Allied judgments about the American Army were essentially correct. However, US President Woodrow Wilson's goal was a grand league for international cooperation to prevent future war. Wilson came to realize that he could hope to achieve his scheme only if an American army fought as a national force and gained a significant victory. This was the tasking given to General John J. Pershing, the Commander-in-Chief of the AEF when committed to battle in France.

Trask limits his inquiry to what he calls "grand tactics," the application of strategy in the theater of war, and views the AEF participation at that level through the statements of the highest US, Allied, and German political and military leaders. Quoting Allied and enemy commanders concerning the poor performance of the Americans, Trask faults General Pershing for most of the failures of the AEF. He indicts Pershing primarily for insisting on creating a separate US theater—defying the expressed opinions of many senior observers that the AEF, under the pressures of imminent combat, was totally unprepared for organizing a modern theater of war.

Pershing's training dictum, to prepare the AEF primarily to fight "open warfare" is also cited by Trask as inappropriate to the impacted nature of the battlefield. Further, Pershing's resistance to temporary amalgamation of elements of the AEF within Allied armies at the height of the German offensive of 1918 (even after President Wilson had agreed to this infusion), is charged as risking Allied loss of the war. Trask's incisive critique of the AEF, and of Pershing, is hard but fair.

Critical reexamination of Pershing's leadership of the AEF was begun in the 1980s by his biographer, Donald Smythe, in his second volume, *Pershing: General of the Armies*. Smythe came to believe that the huge managerial task of commanding a US theater of operations in France was too great a challenge for Pershing's limited experience. He concluded, as does Trask, that the AEF was so disorganized in the middle of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign that Pershing might have been relieved had the war not ended suddenly.

Recognition also should be given to James Rainey, one of the earliest of the military Revisionists, whose 1981 master's thesis (unpublished) examined Pershing's open warfare training guidance, concluding that it was misapplied and inappropriate to the war being fought. Rainey's critique of AEF training was later summarized in a September 1983 *Parameters* article, "Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I."

Rainey's early writing, and direct guidance by Smythe and Trask, were valuable to this reviewer's research in the 1980s on AEF operations and tactics. The book developed from that research, *The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign*, is consistent with the judgments of the experts cited above: the AEF was poorly trained and inadequately led during much of the fighting.

At higher AEF staff levels, plans were much too simplistic to manage and support a modern army in the offensive, over rough terrain, against a fortified enemy. At the tactical level, commanders failed to control and maximize their supporting fires, and they committed their reserves directly into areas where their troops were stalled by enemy resistance. Lack of experience was obvious at all levels of leadership. Close study of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, however, has led this reviewer to the conclusion that the AEF ultimately learned to fight effectively—by fighting! In the final phase of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, American combat forces performed as well as any army in France.

A final note: To commemorate the 75th birthday of the AEF, the US Army's Center of Military History recently republished the American Battle Monuments Commission guidebook to US participation in the Great War, *American Armies and Battlefields in Europe: A History, Guide, and Reference Book*. Although this text is light on campaign analyses, and very favorable to the American Expeditionary Forces, it is a treasure of detail on organization, operations, and geography.

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Review Essay

World War II Logistics

CHARLES R. SHRADER

The 50th anniversary of the Second World War has prompted a spate of books and articles on the campaigns, battles, and combat leaders of both sides, but the single most important factor in the Allied victory—superior logistics—remains relatively unexplored. Despite a general recognition of the fact that World War II was indeed "a war of logistics" in which logistical considerations shaped every strategic decision and most operational ones, only a trickle of new books have addressed the crucial problems of mobilization, production, transportation, and support of forces in the field. Fortunately, the lack of quantity is more than compensated by the high quality of the few works which have appeared.

One of the most useful and interesting of the "new" books on logistics in World War II is in fact a reprint. The 1993 edition of *Logistics in World War II: Final Report of the Army Service Forces*, first issued in 1948, forms part of an effort by the US Army Center of Military History to ensure that the key volumes of the Army's official history of World War II are available. Few books, old or new, more clearly outline the importance of logistics in modern war. Although larded with the usual self-congratulation of any after-action report, *Logistics in World War II* is chock full of statistics and interesting details of how the enormous industrial potential of the United States was converted into overwhelming combat power on the battlefields of Europe, Asia, and the Pacific. The book focuses on the achievements of the Army Service Forces in the fields of manpower and industrial mobilization and the production and distribution of "the tools with which our air, ground, and sea forces fashioned victory." *Logistics in World War II* provides a concise explanation of the problems we faced and how they were or were not overcome

as the US Army expanded from 174,000 men in mid-1939 to over 8,290,000 men in 1945, of whom 7,300,000 were deployed overseas. Created as part of the so-called Marshall reorganization of the War Department in March 1942, the Army Service Forces became the focal point of the Army's efforts to manage the complex and difficult problems of supporting large combat forces in an all-out global war. Of particular interest in the story of the Army Service Forces in World War II are the management techniques developed to control mobilization, worldwide operations, and demobilization of military forces on an unprecedented scale. *Logistics in World War II* covers these important developments in some detail, and 116 of the most important Army management improvements introduced during the war are listed at the end of the volume. The concluding chapter on "Logistic Lessons of World War II" should also be of particular interest to modern readers who will recognize that many of those lessons are still valid half a century later.

One of the more dubious conceits of modern historians is to deny the influence of individual personality on the course of historical events. The hero has largely been replaced in recent historical works by the collective effect of teeming masses and faceless bureaucracies. John Kennedy Ohl's *Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in WW II* clearly contradicts such an approach. The author demonstrates convincingly that the tremendous achievements of the Army Service Forces in World War II were not obtained by some anonymous organization but resulted directly from the personal efforts of specific individuals, the most prominent of whom was General Brehon B. Somervell, the commander of Army Service Forces and the key Army logistician in World War II. Ohl's biography of General Somervell makes crystal clear how the personality and energy of one man can shape large organizations and influence the course of world events. It earns Somervell a place in the front rank with George C. Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, and Dwight D. Eisenhower as a shaper of the Allied victory.

Ohl quickly covers the early career of Somervell as a means of explaining his subject's character and early development and then focuses on the role played by General Somervell in World War II. Energetic, efficient, strong-willed, and intolerant of failure are all terms which describe the commander of Army Service Forces. The degree to which the major logistical organizations and decisions of the American effort in World War II were shaped directly by the personality of Brehon B. Somervell is clearly brought out in Ohl's discussion of Somervell's many conflicts with the other civilian and military leaders during the war. Ohl reviews Somervell's battles to subdue the once all-powerful chiefs of the Army's logistical services, his conflicts with the civilian heads of the War Production Board and the War Shipping Administration, and his stubborn resistance to the strategic prima donnas of the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff. By describing these conflicts in some detail, Ohl provides a number of important insights into the principal issues and personalities, the problems solved and unsolved, and the significant defects of the American mobilization and logistical effort in the Second World War.

The World War II activities of General Somervell and his close associates, LeRoy Lutes, Lucius Clay, and John C. H. Lee among others, highlight several of the important general themes in 20th-century US Army logistics: the imposition of centralized direction and decentralized operations; the increasing use of civilian personnel and business techniques in the conduct of military affairs; the changing relationship of

logistics and strategy; and the increasing manpower requirements of the logistical "tail." These key themes all receive detailed attention in *Supplying the Troops*.

General Somervell's persistent drive for centralized control over the Army's logistical system is the continuous thread which binds Ohl's narrative. Somervell saw centralization merely as a means of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of Army logistics. However, his single-minded pursuit of organizational efficiency has often been interpreted as nothing more than egoism and personal "empire-building." But as Ohl convincingly demonstrates, Somervell was motivated not by considerations of personal power but by his perceptions of how the challenges of providing logistical support in a global war could best be met. In retrospect the accuracy of General Somervell's perceptions are undeniable; strong centralized control over the complex, diverse, and enormous mobilization, production, and distribution activities of the Army in World War II probably ensured the results obtained in the end. It is ironic that having achieved an unprecedented centralization of control over the Army's logistical activities, Somervell then saw the centrifugal forces of a petulant Army bureaucracy dismantle his carefully constructed system the moment victory was achieved. Somervell's vindication came 20 years later with the thorough reorganization of defense logistics by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in the early 1960s.

General Somervell also took the lead in applying methods drawn from American business to the management of the Army's logistical effort. During World War II hundreds of America's most prominent business leaders served in the Army Service Forces, where they were able to apply the lessons they had learned in managing a variety of business enterprises to the problems of supporting the Army on a global scale. One of the most significant of Somervell's innovations in the area of management practice was the introduction of the Control Division at Headquarters, Army Service Forces, and in the subordinate commands. Using established goals, periodic reports, statistics, and other measurement tools already common in business, the Control Division acted as the commander's eyes and ears, informing him of areas in which matters were proceeding well and alerting him to the areas most in need of attention. Many of the management techniques now taken for granted by senior Army commanders were first tested and proven in the Control Division of Army Service Forces headquarters during World War II; the concept of management and control by statistical appraisal of progress toward stated goals and objectives is perhaps General Somervell's most lasting legacy to the Army.

The third major area in which General Somervell made his personality felt during World War II was in the fight over the relative importance of logistics and strategy. In retrospect few would deny that logistical considerations dominated every aspect of strategy and operations in World War II, but at the time the strategists and the logisticians faced off on nearly every prominent issue with the strategists usually denying that the logisticians were anything other than second-string players. Somervell entered the battle with the full weight of his forceful personality, arguing that strategy could not be formulated apart from the logistical considerations which limited it and that the logisticians merited equal status with the strategists in the planning process. For the most part Somervell's attempts to ensure that strategy and logistics were developed in coordination were ignored by the strategic planners, often with predictable results. Ultimately, however, Somervell's forceful representations and the unfolding course of events made clear that strategy was indeed determined by

the logistically possible and could not be formulated without the active participation of the logisticians. Even today the point is only grudgingly conceded by strategists, many of whom would prefer to never see or hear a logistician.

Another aspect of the struggle waged by Somervell and the logisticians against the strategists and combat commanders centered on the number of service troops to be provided in the various theaters of war. This conflict reflected the growing necessity in modern war for a large proportion of the available manpower to be in the logistical "tail" rather than in the combat "teeth." US forces deployed overseas in World War II were chronically short of logistical personnel to operate the ports and lines of communications, handle the supplies, and provide the necessary logistical support to the troops in the field. General Somervell consistently argued for the provision of larger proportions of service troops in every theater, but the theater commanders opted on every occasion for additional combat troops rather than additional service troops. The result was not greater combat power, but rather a reduction in combat effectiveness. It is not altogether certain that this lesson has yet been learned, as an examination of the time-phased force deployment list for any recent contingency operation will attest.

The effect of logistics on strategy and operations was nowhere more obvious than in the European Theater of Operations during 1944 and 1945. All of the key decisions—the when and where of Operation Overlord; the rate and duration of the pursuit across France and into Germany; the Anglo-American controversy over the "broad vs. narrow front" strategy; and even the decision as to whether or not the Western Allies should race to Berlin ahead of the Red Army—were determined by logistical considerations. Both *Logistics in World War II* and Ohl's *Supplying the Troops* contain a good deal of material on the effect of logistics on the campaign in northwestern Europe, but some of the most stimulating recent work on the topic has appeared in the form of book chapters or articles in anthologies.

The efficacy of logistical planning for Operation Overlord and the subsequent logistical operations in Europe was called into question by Martin van Creveld some years ago in a chapter from his 1977 book, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, entitled "The War of the Accountants." Van Creveld asserted that the pace of the Allied advance against Germany after the St. Lô breakout was severely limited by the timidity and rigidity of Allied logisticians and their failure to keep pace with the fast-moving combat forces. As Van Creveld himself chose to express it: "The Allied advance from Normandy to the Seine, however successful and even spectacular strategically, was an exercise in logistic pusillanimity unparalleled in modern military history." Although Van Creveld's criticism of the logisticians at first glance seems convincing, if overdrawn, the facts of the matter seem to distribute the blame more evenly—the natural caution of the logisticians being a much-needed brake on the extravagant plans and hopes of the strategists and combat commanders.

The necessary corrective to Van Creveld's frequent preference for polemic over fact is contained in an introductory essay by John A. Lynn entitled "The History of Logistics and Supplying War" which appears in the excellent anthology, edited by Lynn, *Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present*. Lynn's effective critique of Van Creveld's errors of fact and method as well as his cavalier approach to documentary evidence and the use of numbers does much to balance Van Creveld's disparaging portrayal of Army logistical planning for Operation Overlord and the subsequent operations on the Continent from 6 June 1944

to 8 May 1945. It should be noted that the interesting collection of articles on the history of military logistics from the Middle Ages through World War II which Lynn and his contributors have produced is perhaps the best such work yet to appear anywhere. *Feeding Mars* is thus well worth reading not only for its stimulating examination of World War II logistics but also for the other outstanding articles on logistical history which set the World War II logistical issues neatly in context.

Although one may justly question Van Creveld's method and the vehemence of his condemnation of the logisticians in the European Theater, he does correctly point out that despite the strenuous efforts of General Somervell and his associates, the support of Allied forces on the Continent after D-Day left much to be desired. A somewhat better reasoned and more thoroughly documented discussion of the matter is provided by Steve R. Waddell in *United States Army Logistics: The Normandy Campaign, 1944*. Waddell examines in some depth the key issues surrounding the logistical organization and planning for Operation Overlord and concludes that the Allied supply system on the Continent suffered from several serious defects which could, and should, have been avoided. By virtue of its more thorough documentation and attention to detail, Waddell's analysis is altogether more satisfying than Van Creveld's purple prose.

Fifty years have passed since the end of World War II, during which time the nature of warfare has been transformed by technology and the changing political environment in ways only dimly foreseen by the logistical planners and operators of the earlier period. However, the passage of time and the changes in the nature of warfare have only proven the prescience of the authors of *Logistics in World War II* who noted in 1948: "Warfare will become more mobile, more mechanical, more destructive, and more dependent upon science and technology. . . . It is inescapable that logistics will play a predominant role in any future conflict." Their predictions having proven altogether accurate, their prescription for the future should carry added weight: "Granting the fundamental importance of logistics in modern war, it follows that military leaders must have a thorough appreciation and knowledge of the subject as a prerequisite to top command."

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Three Schools of Thought on Nuclear Proliferation

MICHAEL R. BOLDRICK

More, not fewer, nuclear-armed states may dot the globe in the future despite the end of the Cold War. That's the consensus of political, academic, and military authors currently writing about nuclear proliferation. Fifty years after the United States exploded the first atomic bomb in the New Mexico desert, the task of designing, building, and assembling the 6300 components of a nuclear weapon has become more of a physical hurdle than a technological barrier. Today, more than 40 nations are in a position to leap that hurdle and join the once exclusive nuclear club. This prospect, along with gaping loopholes in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (signatories Iran, Iraq, and North Korea all conducted clandestine weapon development programs despite the presence of treaty inspectors) and the end of the bipolar arms race, in which the United States and USSR used their 95-percent monopoly in nuclear weapons to shelter allies from attack, could result in a realignment of regional powers, many protecting their sovereignty with nuclear arsenals.

If there is a second coming of the nuclear arms race, its seeds were sown long ago by the atom's efficiency in generating electric power and by the Cold War rivalry. After the USSR tested an atomic bomb in 1949, the United States ended efforts to restrict nuclear technology to government laboratories so it could compete with its sole rival in a promising world market. Since one pound of uranium can release as much energy as 6000 barrels of oil or a thousand tons of coal, a ready market existed for nuclear power plants.

With Moscow's willingness to sate this demand for political gain, President Eisenhower initiated Atoms for Peace in 1953, allowing the United States to compete with the USSR in the burgeoning nuclear power plant market. Both countries added safeguards to their power plant sales contracts. Russia required the return of nuclear materials, primarily spent fuel rods, to the Soviet Union for reprocessing. In 1957, the United Nations founded the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to oversee transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, to promote safety, and to administer a system of safeguards. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—centerpiece of the growing regime of international agreements, export restrictions, institutions, and legislation focused on peaceful uses of the world's most dangerous technology—was negotiated in 1968. The NPT is still the primary instrument for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.

However, there's no denying a fundamental reality: nuclear reactors, even when used for peaceful purposes, give the states that possess them the potential to

produce nuclear weapons. With 431 reactors worldwide, another 71 under construction, and over 100 tons of plutonium (it takes about 20 pounds to make a bomb) accumulating in power plants located in just four non-weapon states—Japan, Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland—there's no turning back from the atom, especially after the 1973 Mideast oil crisis exposed the frailty of fossil fuel supplies to political manipulation.

Against this background, gleaned from Gary T. Gardner's *Nuclear Nonproliferation, A Primer,* the sudden end of the Cold War offers a window of opportunity for nations to rethink the atom's role in international affairs. Weighing in on what is probably the most important issue of the 1990s, diverse writers confront proliferation principally from three directions. The *idealists* note that the world has survived periods of nuclear monopoly, superiority, and parity without a single nuclear calamity. Buoyed also by the fact that both superpowers lost a war (the United States in Vietnam and Russia in Afghanistan) without resorting to nuclear weapons, they see a future in which the atom has virtually no military utility. They also see a world disillusioned with things nuclear. The Three Mile Island accident in 1979 and the Chernobyl explosion and dispersal of radioactivity in 1986 severely tarnished the credibility of the nuclear industry.

To the contrary, the *realists* cite Winston Churchill's observation that in history "the terrible ifs accumulate," and predict a steady growth in nuclear weapon states as regional alliances replace the bipolarity of the East-West arms race. Finally, the *opportunists*, who were always opposed to nuclear weapons, want to seize the moment to defang US nuclear capabilities.

Former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., and Stanford physicist Sidney Drell promote the idealist viewpoint in *Reducing Nuclear Danger: The Road Away from the Brink.* Believing "there is no nuclear-weapon state today that cannot gain from a reduction of its current reliance on nuclear weapons," the authors advocate putting all nuclear weapons in the hands of an international body. In the interim, fellow idealists Michael J. Mazarr and Alexander T. Lennon, in *Toward a Nuclear Peace,* would add "degrees of unreadiness" to today's nuclear forces, thus delaying any military response to a provocation long enough for a diplomatic solution. These operational restrictions would include removal of warheads from ICBMs, limiting SLBM patrol areas, and banning storage of nuclear weapons at strategic bomber bases.

To strengthen the NPT, Bundy, Crowe, and Drell would commit US intelligence capabilities and troops to assist the IAEA in detecting treaty violations and in enforcing sanctions. They foresee further changes to the treaty in the upcoming NPT renewal conference starting 17 April 1995 in New York City. The US delegation, led by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is expected to support a comprehensive test ban and push for warhead reductions beyond the 3000 to 3500 START II limits. The latter is a political gesture to the non-nuclear-weapon states who see the NPT's Article VI, binding members to complete nuclear disarmament, as an unfulfilled promise. These initiatives and the Clinton Administration's political strategy for the 25th-anniversary NPT conference are discussed in Mitchell Reiss's article "The Last Nuclear Summit?" published in the Summer 1994 issue of *The Washington Quarterly.*

Background facts cited in Gary T. Gardner's nonproliferation primer offer little hope for a significant update of the NPT. Amendments such as the comprehensive

test ban require unanimous consent by the acknowledged nuclear weapon states (United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France), the IAEA's 35-member board of governors, and a majority of the NPT's 150 member states. Reiss concedes that the most likely outcome in New York is merely an extension of the treaty in its present form.

Citing the procedural gridlock that will keep the NPT from changing to meet post-Cold War challenges, the realists expect demand for nuclear weapons to increase. In a study sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Peter van Ham foresees nonproliferation regimes confronted by new problems in the globalization of technology, the emergence of new supplier states (including Russian Federation nuclear republics Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine), and the demise of the Soviet bloc. In his book, *Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s*, Van Ham drives home an ominous warning: "In the absence of concerted international countermeasures, the spread of nuclear weapons will become a fact in the not too distant future. One or two breakouts could lead to the collapse of the international non-proliferation effort."

Researching the motives of the de facto nuclear weapon states, the realists find disturbing evidence supporting their more-not-less hypothesis. Benjamin Frankel's paper "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation" (one of 11 papers compiled in *Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results*) explores why Israel, India, and Pakistan defied world opinion to build the bomb. All did so because nuclear weapons offered salvation to a clear and present national security danger. For Israel, the decision followed a failure to obtain a formal security guarantee from the United States after the improved performance of Arab forces during the 1973 October War and an Arab oil embargo threatened the embattled state's survival. India went nuclear after failing to receive mutual defense guarantees from the United States or the USSR after losing a border war to China in 1962 and seeing its giant neighbor explode a nuclear weapon two years later. Pakistan responded with its own weapon development program after losing a 1971 border clash with India that resulted in an independent Bangladesh. South Africa, which recently destroyed its six weapons, follows Frankel's model. It too developed a nuclear capability because it was surrounded by hostile neighbors and its apartheid stance precluded any international support in maintaining its sovereignty. Van Ham notes that when the Soviet Union recognized South Korea in 1990, North Korea's Foreign Ministry declared this "will leave us no other choice but to take measures to provide . . . for ourselves some weapons for which we have so far relied on from alliance."

Michael May, former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and current Co-Director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control, sides with the realists in believing that strong international security guarantees offer the best defense against further proliferation. May credits NATO and the US mutual defense agreements with Japan as today's most important nonproliferation agreements. Citing the 1992 pullback from Subic Bay and the withdrawal of substantial forces from NATO, Van Ham notes that the commitment of the United States to retain a dominant military presence in Western Europe and Northeast Asia is an open question. If US resolve falters, he opines, Japan and Germany, two threshold nuclear states that have not gone nuclear despite the industrial capability to do so, could follow the path of Israel, opening the floodgates of proliferation.

Siding with the realists, Kathleen C. Bailey, in *Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation,* lists three reasons for going nuclear: increased security, prestige, and political power. When these incentives exist, the nonproliferation regime offers few real disincentives. Reflecting on this reality, William C. Martel and William T. Pendley, in *Nuclear Coexistence: Rethinking U.S. Policy to Promote Stability in an Era of Proliferation,* believe there will be instances in the future where the US can do little about proliferation other than direct military intervention. Writing for their students at the Air University, Martel and Pendley question US post-Cold War policy: "While the cornerstone of nonproliferation policy during the last several decades was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, this policy is fundamentally at odds with the established reality that states increasingly have the wherewithal to develop nuclear weapons on their own despite the opposition of developed states."

Idealists counter by lauding noteworthy successes resulting from the nonproliferation regime. In 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco ended a threatened nuclear arms race between Argentina and Brazil by establishing a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. A similar accord, the Treaty of Rarotonga, secured a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific in 1987. These successes are seen as precedents for bold post-Cold War initiatives such as a nuclear test ban and transfer of all nuclear weapons to the United Nations.

Realists disagree. Kathleen Bailey doubts the effectiveness of a comprehensive test ban. Claiming no countries have yet cited the absence of a comprehensive test ban as a reason for not signing the NPT, she considers it a symbolic issue of more interest to professional arms control negotiators than heads of state. There are technical problems as well: underground explosions below one kiloton can't be detected. While conceding that a comprehensive test ban would limit the modernization programs of countries already possessing nuclear weapons, Bailey doesn't believe that benefit offsets the risks. Reasons for continued testing include maintaining the safety and security of existing stockpiles, developing technologies to disable terrorist nuclear weapons, and evaluating the effects of nuclear phenomena on conventional weapons that could be employed on a nuclear battlefield.

Proposals to turn nuclear weapons over to an international agency such as the UN draw even heavier flack from the realists. In *Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation,* Bailey sees trouble for nations giving up weapons as well as for states that would be protected by an international force. For openers, current nuclear weapon states would be giving up a certain deterrent for an uncertain one. Many questions remain unanswered by proponents. Who secures the international stockpile and shields it from terrorists? Who controls the motives and operations of the international force? How safe would the weapons be from accidental or inadvertent use?

The same author does offer an alternative the idealists could support. She proposes an international consortium of two or more nuclear weapon states offering security assurances. For example, the United States and Russia might persuade India and Pakistan to emulate South Africa by abandoning their arsenals if the superpowers would join forces in making South Asia a nuclear-free zone.

Idealists and realists agree on two points. First, both believe nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated entirely. Nuclear weapons, primarily because of their relatively small size, can easily evade detection by arms control inspectors. The START accords are considered verifiable because they eliminate large strategic delivery vehicles such as ICBMs, bombers, and submarines rather than warheads. Even if

elimination of nuclear weapons could be verified, however, nuclear capable states could quickly make new ones. These factors conspire against the zero option. The second point of agreement centers on the matter of safety. The five acknowledged nuclear states and the de facto states (India, Pakistan, and Israel, the non-NPT nations believed to have the bomb) all have invested heavily in the safety of their stockpiles. If nuclear technology spreads to Third World and terrorist states, safety will likely be deemphasized in favor of lethality, thus increasing the chances of an accidental detonation.

The safety issue gives the opportunists an opening in their campaign to radically restrict the operations of US nuclear forces. In what is the most intriguing book of the lot, Stanford political scientist Scott D. Sagan uses formerly classified documents and you-were-there interviews to challenge the "fail-safe" legacy of US nuclear operations. In *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons*, Sagan develops two models to second-guess strategic alert operations in such hair-raising Cold War confrontations as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1967 Yom Kippur War.

The first model posits a high degree of reliability. In this model large organizations limit accidents by employing effective techniques: leaders emphasize safety; authority and responsibility for safety reside at the operating level; systems are in place to reward and punish compliance and noncompliance; the organizations focus on continuous operations and training; and a feedback loop exists to incorporate lessons learned. The contrasting model is one of normal accidents. In this model—as evidenced by nuclear power plant accidents, petrochemical plant toxic leaks, oil tanker sinkings, jumbo aircraft crashes, and the Space Shuttle *Challenger* disaster—no matter what measures are employed, complex systems eventually fail.

At first glance, Sagan seems to conclude that US nuclear operations fit in the high-reliability model. Then he abruptly cites a number of case histories or "dangerous incidents" to finally side with the normal accidents model. These incidents—a "lost" B-52 flying toward Russia during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the test firing of an Atlas ICBM during the same period, and a false warning of a Cuban missile launch against the United States—all make fascinating reading. The B-52 was turned around by air traffic controllers in Alaska; the Atlas, which never appeared on Russian radar scopes, hit its intended mid-Pacific target area; and the attack warning was corrected in seconds. Yet Sagan concludes these incidents prove that luck, not leadership and discipline, prevented accidental war. One could as easily conclude that the system of redundancy worked by correcting human and equipment failures before they compounded with disastrous results.

Sagan makes his biggest stretch in discussing the "Thule Monitor." In 1961, after the Soviet Union developed its first ICBMs, the US radar site at Thule, Greenland, alone provided sufficient warning for Strategic Air Command to get its bombers airborne during a preemptive attack. The single long-haul communications link between NORAD and Thule was unreliable. SAC prudently reworked its "Chrome Dome" airborne alert routes to keep a B-52 within radio range of Thule. If the link to NORAD failed, the high-flying bomber would serve as a relay. Sagan sees the seeds of World War III in that arrangement. In a highly improbable scenario, the Stanford professor postulates an airborne emergency over the vast Greenland landmass in

which the B-52 crashes squarely into the Thule radar, thus destroying both HF and UHF communications links with the United States. Then, Sagan argues, NORAD would have concluded that Russia had attacked the warning radar to mask an attack against the United States, and SAC would have countered by launching its bombers and missiles!

From all this, Sagan concludes that SAC's successor, the US Strategic Command, cannot regulate itself and should have an oversight committee similar to a police review board. He also would revamp the strategic operations culture by changing the warrior persona of combat crews, requiring them to become "guardians of dangerous technology." Finally, Sagan would put in-flight destruct systems on ICBMs. (Note: powered flight, when a destruct command would be effective, lasts no more than three to five minutes. Would the Commander-in-Chief likely change his mind in those few minutes after ordering a nuclear attack?)

The one thing all of these writers probably would agree on is that proliferation would be worse had it not been for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Successes—nations that considered building nuclear weapons but didn't because of the nonproliferation regime—are said by Benjamin Frankel to include Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Canada, and Syria. Still, the NPT was designed to regulate the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and has few mechanisms for deterring countries that would go nuclear to fulfill perceived national security objectives.

Surprisingly, other than the START treaties negotiated by Russia and the United States, there have been no efforts to limit the arsenals of other nuclear weapon states. Mazarr and Lennon observe that "if fully completed, the French and British nuclear modernization programs will result in a combined sea-based force . . . larger than the US and Russian forces under a finite deterrence regime." This reality limits how far the United States can go in reducing its warhead count. In 1992, President George Bush suggested that the United States plan to maintain an arsenal as large as Russia's and the combined totals of other nuclear weapon states. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch, writing in the Fall 1992 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, observed, "The motivation of most nations to acquire a nuclear weapon has little to do with the size or characteristics of the US arsenal. Their motivations reflect security concerns or geopolitical ambitions."

So far, five years after the end of the Cold War, the idealists' position on increasing proliferation is gaining momentum. Nothing proves this more than the October 1994 US accommodation with North Korea. Under this agreement, North Korea will avoid IAEA inspections for at least three years and will receive $3 billion in aid to replace its three heavy water reactors with the less-menacing light water cooled versions. Curiously, CIA satellite photos of the Yongbyon nuclear complex indicate the absence of a key element in power production: The Kim Jong Il government evidently forgot to add transmission lines to carry power from the reactors to cities and industrial plants. The reality is that North Korea drives home a point made by Martel and Pendley: "There are instances in which it is difficult for the United States to prevent further cases of nuclear proliferation—unless military intervention is envisioned."

If the realists are correct in predicting further proliferation, the United States may find itself on the wrong side of history. An article by RAND's Marc Dean Millot,

"Facing the Emerging Reality of Regional Nuclear Adversaries" (*The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1994), sounds a warning on current US military policy. NATO, Millot observes, used nuclear arms as the equalizer to the Warsaw Pact's superior conventional forces. After smart weapons used in the Persian Gulf War established the United States as the new world leader in conventional strength, why, asks Millot, won't the rest of the world see nuclear weapons as a counter to American military power? Regrettably, Millot notes, many US military officers believe nuclear weapons are obsolete after the Cold War.

Writing in the same issue of *Washington Quarterly*, Roger C. Molander and Peter A. Wilson ("On Dealing with the Prospect of Nuclear Chaos") fault the Clinton Administration for lack of clear vision in establishing a post-Cold War strategy. If the United States doesn't take the lead in countering centrifugal forces pushing a growing number of states to go nuclear, they argue, the result could be an entanglement of regional mini-Mutual Assured Destruction alliances.

Finally, as cuts in military spending continue, *Security Studies* editor Benjamin Frankel offers some sound advice: "Before American policymakers dismantle the Cold War-inspired US military structure, they should keep in mind the beneficial effects it had on nuclear proliferation. If they believe that a runaway proliferation of nuclear weapons is inimical to US interests, they should be careful not to destroy the most effective means to keep such proliferation in check."

Despite US military and diplomatic complacency, nuclear proliferation may well be the most vexing problem of the post-Cold War era.

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Book Reviews

Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World. By Richard N. Haass. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994. 255 pages. $24.95 (cloth), $12.95 (paper). **Reviewed by Colonel Karl Farris**, Director, US Army Peacekeeping Institute.

This is an immensely sensible and very readable treatment of the most fundamental question facing those who make US foreign policy: when to intervene with military forces. In a logical, consistent manner the author lays out the issues involved in US military interventions. This book is an indispensable primer for those wrestling with the proper role and structure for US military forces in the post-Cold War security environment.

In a stage-setting chapter entitled "The Debate over Intervention," Richard Haass characterizes the current period as one of "international deregulation." "There are new players, new capabilities, and new alignments, but as of yet, no new rules." Therefore, he postulates, US military intervention will become more rather than less commonplace and also more rather than less complicated. He then presents 12 cases of recent interventions. He analyzes each case using the following structure: an assessment of the US interest at stake, the purposes and objectives behind the intervention, assumptions about the adversary and how much force would be required, the kind and amount of force actually used, consideration afforded public and congressional support, the involvement of other countries and organizations, and, finally, when force was first used and when it was halted or intended to come to an end. These features form the framework for subsequent discussions about whether to intervene and then how to intervene. Some of the more pertinent conclusions drawn from his analysis are:

- "The inability to readily define the precise mission of a proposed intervention is prima facie evidence that the intervention is ill advised."
- "A president who does not consult with Congress or its leaders before embarking on a major intervention is foolish."
- "Force by itself is unlikely to bring about specific political changes. The only way to increase the likelihood of such change is through highly intrusive forms of intervention, such as nation-building. Short of a readiness to assume a commitment of this magnitude, it is wise not to make specific political outcomes part of the mission or purpose of the intervention."
- If a decision to intervene is made, "sooner tends to be better than later" and "having more forces than are necessary can compensate for Murphy's Law."

The author correctly points out that potential scenarios which require US forces for two major regional conflicts as well as multilateral peace enforcement, peacekeeping, or humanitarian assistance operations will clearly overtax our military capabilities should these occur in any degree of simultaneity. Certainly maintaining combat readiness with a growing participation in operations other than war is already posing a significant challenge for US military forces.

Any military personnel or civilians involved in planning or conducting interventions, whether unilateral, multilateral, or under UN auspices, should understand the analytical method used in this book. Richard Haass has done us all a great service.

A History of Warfare. By John Keegan. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993. 432 pages. $27.50. **Reviewed by Brigadier General Harold Nelson**, currently the General Harold K. Johnson Visiting Professor of Military History at the US Army Military History Institute, USAWC, and, from 1989 to 1994, the US Army Chief of Military History.

When I first saw this book—with its heroic battle scene on the dustcover and an author whose *Face of Battle* had set the standard for describing combat—I was ready for one of the classic surveys that have long been a staple in the field of military history. We all have our favorites. Our British colleagues might turn to Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alemein's *A History of Warfare*. My younger American colleagues might prefer Archer Jones's *The Art of War in the Western World*, while I might show my age by seeking Theodore Ropp's *War in the Modern World* or Spaulding, Nickerson, and Wright's *Warfare*. All of those books provide a straightforward analytical framework and a wealth of campaign history set forth in direct chronological narrative. That's not what John Keegan set out to write, as many old soldiers may have discovered to their disappointment in recent months.

Keegan whets our interest by telling us he will present a single warrior culture: "Its evolution and transformation over time and place, from man's beginnings to his arrival in the contemporary world, is the history of warfare." Most of us would be glad to read that book, because the anthropological and sociological literature on the military profession tends to be dated, biased, and particularist. A transcendent theory in the hands of a mature historian and gifted narrator would be a joy to read. Many descriptive passages in this book are devoted to warrior cultures, but the single culture is difficult to perceive, and Keegan does not fully develop his argument that such a culture can be used to trace the history of warfare.

In his conclusion Keegan follows many other theoreticians in stating that the dominant military culture has been Western, with its moral dimension rooted in the Ancient Greeks' face-to-face battle to the death, its technological roots in an unconstrained arms race, and its intellectual and ideological roots best exemplified by Clausewitz. Karl von Clausewitz takes a heavy beating in this book, most of it undeserved. Keegan misreads much of *On War*, and I believe many of his errors originate in his effort to get to "war" through warriors.

Many years ago, in his preface to Spaulding, Nickerson, and Wright, Tasker Bliss wrote :

> In remotest antiquity individual man discovered the basic principles in the science of war when he learned that in single combat his success depended, first, on his bringing to the contest his own body in the perfection of its physical powers, and second, in bringing his body to bear against his adversary in such a way as to ensure his delivering a completely effective blow. In that are comprised both the art and science of war. The art grew with the perfection of the means by which larger and larger groups of men were best enabled to do what individual man had learned that he must do with his single body.

The emergence of "larger and larger groups" meant that "Warfare is a matter of social organization. Warfare *is* social organization," as Harry Holbert Turney-High wrote in *The Military: The Theory of Land Warfare*. Keegan only cites Turney-High's work on *Primitive War*, which may explain why he disregards this aspect of man at war as he reads Clausewitz. He seldom distinguishes between the warrior who fights for personal advantage and the soldier who subordinates himself to a larger need. Even though he has written extensively on both soldiering and command, he doesn't seem to ask whether some independent commanders are willing to be soldiers while others can be only warriors. The distinction seems to escape him, and yet it is fundamental to understanding Clausewitz, warfare of the modern nation-state, and theories of legitimate revolutionary violence. It is the soldier, not the warrior, who elicits our admiration.

Because Keegan overlooks all of this in his survey of warriors in society, much of the book runs contrary to every category of literature on the history of war, whether it be couched in classical historical, anthropological, sociological, psychological, or political theory. By ignoring Clausewitz's trinity composed of the passionate populace, the calculating, gambling military, and the rational government, and by then "applying" misconstrued theory, Keegan interprets the history he evokes in strange and disturbing ways. Consider one example. We are treated to excellent descriptions of "horse people"—mounted warriors of the Eurasian steppe. But Keegan writes that "their warfare had no political object in the Clausewitzian sense." Yet in the same paragraph he tells us that the booty, tribute, and glory they extracted from their foes gave them the wealth to sustain their way of life. If that isn't an application of Clausewitz's rational government using the risky endeavor of war for its political ends, I don't know where in history we might find a clear example. In our normal approach to military affairs through political science and history, we start with this distinction and then are able to distinguish between justified and unjustified use of violence. Style and method of the warrior are less central than his cause. The absence of this element in Keegan's interpretive framework introduces significant difficulties for the conventional student of military affairs.

But the descriptive history is still fun to read. There's plenty that will be new to most readers, and it is presented with clarity and precision. The margins are almost wide enough for the average reader to register dismay at the strange interpretations.

Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific.
By Gavan Daws. New York: William Morrow, 1994. 462 pages.
$25.00. **Reviewed by Dr. Lewis Sorley**, author of *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times.*

Gavan Daws has written a powerful, disturbing, and necessary book, one that recounts the experiences of more than 140,000 non-Asians held captive by the Japanese, over a quarter of whom "died at the hands of their captors." The language of this book is fresh, evocative, often arresting. Underpinning the writing is a solid scholarly background and a decade of industrious research.

There were hundreds of Japanese prison camps, and those who were crammed into them included Americans, Australians, British, and Dutch. So enormous is the volume of material on their experiences that Daws found himself forced to be highly

selective not only in what he used, but in what aspects of the story he addressed at all. He chose to treat the Americans, finding that they had the broadest range of experience, and across the widest sweep geographically. To further focus the account, he follows in close-up four individuals, including one who survived the Bataan death march and the bombing of Japanese hellships.

Daws, formerly head of historical research on the Pacific region at the Australian National University's Institute for Advanced Studies, built up the POW story through painstaking research that took him to archives and oral history collections in Australia, Great Britain, Singapore, the Netherlands, and the United States. The testimony from the war crimes trials alone, he found, filled a linear mile of file drawers. He drew on official histories, read widely in the secondary literature, and consulted hundreds of POW memoirs. So extensive was the resulting documentation that Daws found it impossible to include it all in the published text. So, he states in an eight-page essay on sources that is in itself a revelation, he prepared a separate set of notes for readers wishing to see a fuller representation of the overall documentation, and these he has deposited in two research libraries.

But the heart of his research was interviews with more than 600 former prisoners, plus a 400-item questionnaire sent to people worldwide. Those who had survived the ordeal, he found, "were branded by the experience. They have borne the tribal scars of the POW ever since."

It is little wonder that this should be so. "In the eyes of the Japanese," writes Daws, "white men who allowed themselves to be captured were despicable. They deserved to die." As a consequence, the Japanese

> drove them toward mass death. . . . They beat them until they fell, then beat them for falling, beat them until they bled, then beat them for bleeding. They denied them medical treatment. They starved them. When the International Red Cross sent food and medicine, the Japanese looted the shipments. They sacrificed prisoners in medical experiments. They watched them die by the tens of thousands from diseases of malnutrition like beriberi, pellagra, and scurvy, and from epidemic tropical diseases: malaria, dysentery, tropical ulcers, cholera. Those who survived could only look ahead to being worked to death.

So grim is the picture that emerges from the collective memories of former prisoners that the author feels constrained to enter a disclaimer: "I have not set out to bash the Japanese with words. I record what POWs say it was like to be in a Japanese prison camp, with the Japanese physically bashing their prisoners, to the death."

In the midst of this shared misery there were heroes and villains, brave men and cowards. Some sacrificed their lives so that others might live a little longer, some took the lives of their fellow prisoners out of malice, greed, or compassion. Some, set to work on projects that might contribute to Japanese military productivity, became masters of ingenious sabotage, from winding electrical coils backward to changing destination markings on freight cars in a railyard.

Afterward some were bitter, some resigned, some just thankful to still be among the living. Daws seems to have absorbed in particular an attitude toward General Douglas MacArthur, describing the capture of his entire army in the Philippines as to that point constituting "the greatest overseas military disaster in the history of the United States." But MacArthur did not share that fate. Instead, writes Daws, he had "gone to Australia to eat steak and eggs, and the United States government

decorated him with a Medal of Honor for his accomplishments on the island of Luzon and the peninsula of Bataan. For MacArthur's seventy-eight thousand troops there was no way out."

Prisoners kept on dying right up to the end of the war. In fact such was the manic determination of the Japanese not to give up their caucasian prisoners that they used scarce transport to evacuate them before advancing allied troops could reach their camps, even moving some prisoners from Japan to Korea when it appeared the homeland itself was threatened with invasion. That final invasion never came, of course, and the reason it did not was use of the atomic bomb. Professor Daws reaches a chilling final judgment, one that to me seems quite relevant to the current debate over revisionist criticisms of that decision: "If the war had lasted another year, there would not have been a POW left alive." His impressive and historically significant book makes that case to a certainty.

A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War. By James A. Winnefeld, et al. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1994. 335 pages. $15.00 (paper). **Reviewed by Colonel Howard D. Barnard, III**, Senior Air Force Representative, US Army War College.

Of all the studies of air power in the Gulf War which have appeared in response to the heightened interest in its contribution to victory, this is by far the most thorough and comprehensive in the search for underlying causes. For policymakers and warriors, the book offers clues as to what air power brings to the battlefield and why it is significant. However, this is far from a manual on how to employ air power. The book is a formidable but carefully ordered body of data. It is left to the reader to determine air power's contributions, although the authors offer some conclusions in the last two chapters. The book is a must read for anyone who wants to enter the debate on the relative merits of air power.

The authors' stated purpose is "to provide an independent evaluation of the role and performance of air power in the Persian Gulf." The book does a superb job of looking at all the facets of air operations, including chapters devoted to strategic mobility, logistics and sustainment, and information management. The book concludes with an appendix on "Statistical Data on Desert Shield and Desert Storm," which alone is worth its price. The authors do not avoid controversy; in some cases they create it by their interpretations of the role of air power.

The book begins with an overview of US security policy in the Gulf region and a concise discussion of trends in military developments prior to the war. A detailed, well-documented review of the initial deployment of air power to the Gulf presents the role of airlift particularly well, highlighting operational achievement despite the lack of detailed advanced planning. The book presents an equally well-documented look at how the air campaign was developed, showing clearly the process of daily planning of the air war.

In a chapter on command, control, and organization, the discussion of the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) is the best I have read. It is very forthcoming in its description of what worked and what didn't work, explaining in detail the services' misunderstandings and disagreements on the concept and its application during the Gulf War. The biggest shortcoming of this part of the narrative

is its failure to show how many people and how much equipment the Air Force needed in responding to one major regional contingency (MRC).

Descriptions of the execution of the air campaign and tactics highlight the few innovations in this area. What was perhaps most noteworthy was that the services fought as they had been trained. The critical analysis of intelligence is the best I've seen, and its not all bad news. The highly successful logistics operations and the incredible tempo at which they operated are covered in great detail. My favorite segment of the book offers a bean-counter approach to every conceivable piece of aircraft operational data. An old A-10 pilot, I found that the description of the Warthog was right on the money. All the weapon systems descriptions are concise and well written. In the authors' concluding thoughts on the performance and role of air power in the Gulf, they not only point out where air power did well but they also document where it fell short of expectations. Their conclusion is simply that "Air power was a decisive instrument of military power in this war."

This book provides fresh analytical insights to air power in the Gulf. While it may not be the definitive text, it is the best I have read. Whether you are a Douhet disciple, a Mahan missionary, or a McNair minion, this book is a must read. It will challenge not only what you think you know about the role of the Air Force in the Gulf but also its role in the next war.

Peacekeepers in Former Yugoslavia: "Croire et Oser, Chronique de Sarajevo." By Lieutenant General Philippe Morillon. Paris: Grasset, 1993. 215 pages. 95FF ($17). **Reviewed by Colonel Bertrand Maupoumé**, French Liaison Officer, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

As Deputy Commander, UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) in the former Yugoslavia, and then Commander of the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, French Lieutenant General Philippe Morillon was both witness to and a main participant in the United Nations attempt to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia. He served from the establishment of the PKO mission in March 1992 until his departure in July 1993. Lieutenant General Morillon earned international recognition and fame, becoming something of a hero in France and throughout the world when he went to the besieged Bosnian Muslim enclave of Srebrenica for 16 days in March 1993, refusing to leave until relief supplies reached the town.

In Sarajevo, Belgrade, Knin (in Krajina), Dubrovnik, Zagreb, Srebrenica, and finally Bihac and Mostar he was responsible for 24,300 troops and observers from 34 countries. His book offers a commander's observations of events during a current international controversy as the UN tried to solve a local problem.

Subtitled "To Believe and to Dare, a Chronicle in Sarajevo," the book tells the daily story of this absurd conflict between people who had lived together for years and now are divided by hatred. It is the description of a reemergence of nationalisms, of ancestral resentments against Muslims, of atrocities committed because of fear of each other. This is a report, intended to be impartial, of continuous disputes between people, often uncontrolled by new political leaders. The book also serves as a monument to the peacekeepers who, under artillery, mortar, and sniper fire, daily

overcame barricades and checkpoints in their efforts to support the people of the region. Their determination and bravery met each challenge, generally successfully, all too often not.

The author's optimism demonstrates his deep belief in negotiation, in talks, in exchanges. Against Serb efforts of ethnic cleansing, he favors a strong international commitment to secure the rights of minorities. He advocates more efficient UN planning and organization. He asks for specific equipment for UN troops, and generally for placing more power in the hands of the UN representatives, civilian as well as military, on the scene of such operations. Rejecting discouragement and passiveness, he recommends patience, abnegation, and obstinacy. American readers will note that General Morillon recognizes and acknowledges the invaluable help in communications and in intelligence matters provided by US forces on the ground.

As the devastating war in Bosnia-Herzegovina continues, the most important contribution this volume makes to the future of that part of Europe is to deliver a touching message of hope.

Intervention! The United States and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1917. By John S. D. Eisenhower. New York: W. W. Norton, 1993. 373 pages. $27.50. **Reviewed by Colonel John B. B. Trussell, USA Ret.,** former Chief of the History Division, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission.

American awareness of our two chief conflicts with Mexico, the Mexican War of 1846-1848 and the sporadic hostilities from 1914 through 1916, has been dimmed by the fact that each was soon overshadowed by struggles of vastly greater magnitude. Among the results have been that the former was long seen as militarily significant primarily for providing a training experience for future Civil War generals, and the latter (when it is remembered at all) has been considered notable chiefly for bringing General John J. Pershing to national prominence.

John Eisenhower's previous splendid history, *So Far From God*, performed a valuable service by dispelling misconceptions regarding the Mexican War. His new book, *Intervention!*, carries the story forward.

Written with the grace and delightfully readable style characteristic of Eisenhower's work, its merits are to be found on several levels. Thorough coverage naturally is given to the relatively familiar operations at Tampico and Vera Cruz, the clashes along the Texas-New Mexico-Arizona border, and the Punitive Expedition's drive deep into Mexico, as well as to the immediate political context in which they occurred. Where this book adds value, however, is in its examination of the Mexican Revolution as a whole, unravelling the tangle of changing alliances and defections within the movement and presenting clear and detailed tactical accounts (with good maps!) of the often mentioned but infrequently described battles between the rival Mexican factions. Beyond this, President Wilson's meddling, stemming from his naïveté, distaste for military affairs and military men, and disinterest in international affairs, represents a fascinating study in itself. In the author's treatment of these matters his revealing insights, based on careful scholarship, are enriched by his rare combination of experience as both a soldier and a diplomat.

Seeing events as having been dictated by the character traits and personal relationships of key figures, Eisenhower develops this theme through biographical profiles that add to the interest of the narrative. Although some of these contain factual errors (one of the book's few flaws), most of the errors are trivial.

More substantive charges, admittedly tangential, concern matters of interpretation rather than factual detail. In the desire to extol Pershing, the book tends in this reviewer's view to slight (when it does not ignore) the importance of the role of Pershing's immediate superior, Major General Frederick Funston, and to give little attention to the effects of mobilizing and deploying virtually the entire National Guard. Also, while some works give greater weight to the acts of deliberate terrorism by Mexican anarchists carrying out their "Plan of San Diego" with the aim of provoking outright war, and of American perceptions of relations between Germans and Mexican revolutionists as increasingly sinister, the actual significance of these aspects of the story is a matter of debate.

The important message of this book, in any case, is not found solely in the events it describes. Rather, it is in the reminder of the persistence of anti-American feelings, already well developed from the Mexican War, which American interference in the Revolution greatly magnified. While Mexico has not been without guilt in its dealings with the United States, the significance of Mexican-American relations—dramatically increased by the North American Free Trade Agreement—demands a better understanding in the United States of Mexican attitudes and their origins. *Intervention!* represents a substantial contribution toward meeting that demand.

Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991. By Kimberly Marten Zisk. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993. $39.95. 286 pages. **Reviewed by Dr. Stephen Blank**, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.

As the title suggests, the author employs organization theory to determine whether the Soviet military was a doctrinally innovative organization during this period. That is, did the Soviets innovate in respect to changes in US doctrine, such as the Schlesinger doctrine, institutionalized in PD 59 in 1974? Not surprisingly, the author finds that the Soviet military was indeed an innovative organization. Rather than addressing the operational significance of US innovations, however, the Soviet military tended to deal instead with threats from civilian leaders to its control over threat assessment and defense policies stemming from those US innovations.

Why this should surprise the author is unclear to me. It is even more dismaying that the author feels she has to disprove or question the idea that military bureaucracies in general, and this one in particular, are hidebound, conservative institutions that do not innovate, valuing their own prestige, stability, and control of resources over everything else. According to the author they only innovate doctrinally or organizationally after major defeat or when facing it, or if civilians forcefully intrude into military decisionmaking.

There is admittedly a great deal of truth in this picture of conservatism and even complacent self-satisfaction within many military organizations. Yet it is not the whole truth to leave it at that. The Soviet military in particular, as its students well

know, has generally been distinguished by a serious study of the issues involved in war even when it went wrong or astray, or when civilian control disfigured that thinking. The fact remains that not all civilian innovation is sound, e.g. Stalin and Hitler's mistakes, and not all militaries are composed of hidebound reactionaries. Instead, it would seem that at any given time there is a balance between conservatism and innovation in militaries as in any large organization, and that there is no a priori guarantee that either conservatism or innovation is right for such organizations in the context within which they function.

Zisk feels that she must debunk a supposedly pervasive view that the Soviet military was intellectually stagnant. Her approach is a consequence of the separation of political science—with its institutionalized fetish for theorizing in a practical vacuum—from active participation in military life. If one looks closely at the Soviet military since Stalin, one finds that, as happened before the purge of the military in 1937, there was real debate and substantial innovation in theory and practice even if the debate and its consequences were often circumscribed from above. The Soviet military's behavior was the norm, not the exception.

The book's conclusion represents a move toward common sense about the Soviet military, an outcome not unfamiliar to a military audience. The conclusion was, however, definitely necessary for political science audiences with firm preconceptions, if not prejudices, about armies to discover or uncover the truth about the Red Army. Unfortunately the separation of civilian intellectuals from the actual life of the military often requires political scientists interested in military issues to rediscover how military institutions actually operate. This book is a testimony to that necessity and to the unhappy effects that often attend the separation of political theory from military practice.

Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in World War II. By Geoffrey Perret. New York: Random House, 1993. 549 pages. $30.00. **Reviewed by Professor I. B. Holley, Jr. (MG, USAFR Ret.)**, author of *Ideas and Weapons* and Professor Emeritus of History, Duke University, Durham, N.C.

This well-written study presents a comprehensive account of the central role of the Army Air Forces in winning World War II. It begins with a brief narrative of the Army Air Service in World War I and the concepts of strategic bombing it inspired in a handful of pilots who later became leaders in the AAF. In tracing their struggles to develop an effective air arm in the between-war years, the author displays his flair for the telling aphorism ("all true success flirts with failure") and the revealing insight (Doolittle's initiative in the 1930s pushing the production of hundred-octane fuel, which gave Allied aircraft a crucial margin of speed). What carries this narrative beyond so many earlier accounts of air power in World War II is the remarkable range of the author's research. He has exhaustively mined not only the official histories, memoirs, and monographic studies but also unpublished doctoral dissertations and the many oral histories accumulated by Air Force historians over the past 40-odd years.

Perret's diligent scanning of the sources gives a richness to the tapestry of his narrative. For example, he traces the critical role of Assistant Secretary Robert A. Lovett

in persuading Chief of Staff George Marshall and Secretary Henry L. Stimson to grant the AAF a high degree of wartime autonomy, which eased the postwar transition to the separate USAF. Similarly, he underscores the wise leadership of General Marshall when he threatened to relieve General Patton if he continued to disregard an umpire's decision in the 1941 Louisiana maneuvers. Occasionally the author leaves his readers hanging in midair, as he does when reporting how the Norden bombsight, so zealously guarded to retain its secret, was actually compromised as early as 1937: Perret tells us that a German-born Norden employee passed the blueprint to the Nazis, but he then fails to tell what, if anything, happened to the betrayer.

Perret has a gift for portraying the qualities of character and personalities of leaders such as Billy Mitchell and Hap Arnold in a few sentences. In fact, what makes his book so readable is the way he tells the AAF story almost entirely in terms of personal anecdotes. This has its down side, for one will have to look elsewhere for a grasp of the important organizational story or the reasoning behind decisions on strategy. But the combat story is extensively covered: from the early defeats in the Philippines, the exploits of Chennault's Flying Tigers in China, the frustration of the Eighth Air Force in Britain, and the setbacks in North Africa, to the more confident and successful operations in Italy and the Overlord invasion. Likewise, many of the major problems are presented: faulty doctrine in coping with close air support; the unexpected difficulties in trying to find targets, especially in weather-bound north Europe; the belated awareness of the necessity for fighter escorts to accompany the bomber stream all the way to the target; and the inter-allied teething problems as to appropriate command structures. While sympathetic, Perret is critical of AAF weaknesses, especially its lack of managerial skills, notably manifested in the production of the long-range B-29 bomber for the assault on Japan.

Because of its sweeping panoramic view, this volume should prove popular as required reading for undergraduate courses on World War II. Professionals will also find it valuable, however, for its frequent insights which address the sheer complexity of modern war-making. Consider, for example, Hap Arnold's insistence on at least two years of college for pilot candidates, a stand disputed by Lovett. Both Lovett and the President of MIT tried out the pilot's entrance exam and both flunked, which may only have indicated the test was ill-devised, but it certainly did not indicate Arnold's stand was mistaken. Was Arnold wrong? Probably so if the only concern was securing effective pilots. But the sorry performance of too many fine pilots who moved up to responsible positions of command in the postwar Air Force suggests that the issue is not all so one-sided. Or again, mark how the author in a single paragraph explains how the seven-ton turbocharged P-47 fighter, sluggish and slow to turn at low altitudes, becomes a superb weapon above 30,000 feet, outperforming the best the enemy could put up. For commanders making crucial decisions on procurement and employment, a grasp of a weapon's strengths and vulnerabilities is essential, but critical journalists seeing only one aspect of that performance can sometimes deter congressional funding of a potentially valuable weapon system before it even enters production. Another example: Perret provides provocative statistics showing five times as many Eighth Air Force pilots were shot down while strafing enemy aircraft on the ground than in aerial combat. If far more dangerous, should ground kills count in becoming an ace? Or is killing an enemy pilot more important than destroying a plane, which can be replaced faster? The decline in

German pilot training was certainly an important factor in the passing of air superiority to the Allies. Insights of this order make this volume worth reading.

Unfortunately, for all its merits this book is in several respects flawed. Although there are endnotes, there is no separate bibliography; a number of subjects discussed in the text are omitted from the index; and there are a few factual errors: production in World War I did not concentrate exclusively on the DH-4, and the B-17 did not have a *turret* in the tail. Yet these are minor flaws. More serious is the author's heavy reliance on postwar interviews, many recorded years afterward, which he uses rather uncritically and sometimes unfairly. Relying on US sources, he criticizes RAF leaders without consulting RAF sources. Similarly, to this reviewer he seemed less than fair-minded in his appraisal of individuals (General Eaker, for instance), relying on postwar interviews with subordinates whose motives are left unquestioned.

The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918. By David F. Trask. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1993. 235 pages. $29.95.

Uneasy Coalition: The Entente Experience in World War I. By Jehuda L. Wallach. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993. 192 pages. $55.00.

Reviewed by Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II (Lieutenant Colonel, USA Ret.), Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.

These two books have arrived on the market at a particularly appropriate time. The US military, facing a roiling world of uncertainty, has already found itself involved in coalition operations with nations and organizations that only days before were considered hostile. As the potentially invaluable experience of Desert Storm demonstrated, coalitions are very different from alliances. One distinction is that coalitions entail a much broader divergence in aims than normally found in an alliance. There is also the touchy matter of party-crashers—states who join in for their own purposes. In short, an alliance is a much more orderly arrangement—rather like the formal courtship, marriage (including a written agreement called a marriage license), and stable family which follows, strains of adolescence and the like notwithstanding. A coalition, on the other hand, is more like a summer romance—two with mutual needs drawn together for the moment, both knowing the day will soon come when they go their separate ways, with no intention that anything more permanent should result.

One potential value of the Desert Storm experience lies in the opportunity it presents to review the business of coalition warfare. In that operation the United States, beginning with the President, conducted the finest coalition operation on the record books. The operation required enormous effort at every echelon to accommodate sensitivities produced by 40 years of interactions with a host of nations around the world. There is much to be learned about coalition operations from the after-action reports and personal memoirs now emerging from the Gulf War. Any study of contemporary coalition warfare will be further aided by reading these two books on its application in World War I.

Wallach should be read first because he presents a well-structured examination of coalition issues that span WWI and the entire Entente. Trask's subject is the AEF, but in reality he focuses on General John J. Pershing. Further, Trask provides us

the best strategic-level reinterpretation of American participation in the Great War that I have found. Coalition issues, though important, are not as significant in his narrative as in Wallach's.

The US military is in an era when coalitions are likely to become commonplace; Wallach's book offers a wealth of insights into such arrangements. Even though his conclusions are based on the experiences of the WWI allies, it is easy to see their current relevance. For example, the Anglo-French military staff talks which preceded WWI roughly resemble some of CENTCOM's discussions with various Gulf states. Romania joined the Entente for purely selfish reasons and was destroyed for its troubles. Although no state was destroyed during the Gulf War, several joined the coalition for dubious reasons. Wallach includes royalty as one of the distracting factors in the WWI coalition experience, and at first glance that would seem out of place today, until one recalls that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are monarchies. Royalty mattered during World War I, and it matters today.

In his conclusion, Wallach lists the "Handicaps of Coalition Warfare" as divergence of war aims, political-military relationships, "particularistic interests," effect of public opinion, language barriers, role of royalty, amalgamation of forces, general reserve, unified command, and logistics coordination. Students of military history, political science, or international relations will readily agree to all. Wallach's list of handicaps should consequently appeal to staff planners throughout the services, particularly those in joint billets.

Even though the arguments about the importance of these handicaps are largely self-evident, we need to consider them now and again to refresh and deepen our understanding of how soldiers and diplomats in the past struggled through issues which seem strikingly contemporary. The importance of public opinion, for example, immediately jumps from the past to the present. As we continue to wrestle with the effects of the Information Age, we are prone to throw up our hands in despair, fuming that the press will soon be able to reveal everything to everyone and that operational security will become impossible at any but the tactical level. In voicing this complaint, however, we should recall that President Woodrow Wilson sought to employ the press and its alleged influence over public opinion to gain support for his long-term strategic agenda—an international system of "open covenants, openly arrived at." Contrary to the opinions of some, the Information Age did not introduce the social element of national power. Wallach has done a superb job in marshalling evidence and cogently arguing his points in easily readable prose. The concluding section also contains observations relevant to near- and long-term concerns; it even contains a brief comment on war under a UN flag.

Trask's work rests on a solid foundation of World War I scholarship, and the reader will find little new in the way of references. Trask uses this material carefully, however. Through a more objective interpretation of the material than normal for American authors, he deftly attacks the sacred myths of our WWI experience while simultaneously examining American actions as a coalition member. In his carefully researched book *Pershing: General of the Armies*, Don Smythe was perhaps the first American to ask serious questions about Pershing's performance in France. Smythe showed Pershing to be less than perfect in his judgments and actions. This is a particularly important conclusion because Smythe was close to the Pershing family,

yet was able to write uncomfortable truths about the myth. Trask similarly has not written with malice nor attempted to denigrate the General's reputation simply to create controversy; General Pershing was, after all, no less human than the rest of us.

One issue which emerges from Trask's work that is not reflected in Wallach's conclusions is that of personality. After the Gulf War, Lieutenant General Calvin Waller discussed the art of command with a team of interviewers at the US Army War College. Early in the interview he held up his hand to arrest the questioning and said forcefully, "You have got to understand that everything hinges upon personality." He went on to describe how personality influenced joint and coalition relationships, including the reasons for his selection as Deputy Commander in Chief. Wallach actually devotes a considerable amount of space to personality issues, but he fails to highlight that factor at the end. Trask centers on Pershing's personality and his personal relations with the French and British senior commanders and French government officials. Pershing was in an unusual position as a relatively junior military member in the councils of war, yet with more authority than any of his military contemporaries. No field commander could hope for greater latitude than that given Pershing, yet that caused problems. With his relatively narrow view of events, the overload of his own making, and his own agenda, matters of strategy frequently escaped his attention or were dealt with in ways which generated conflict when unity was required. General Schwarzkopf could always pass sensitive issues up to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or the Chief of Staff of the Army for resolution, and was answerable to the Secretary of Defense. Pershing had the authority to speak for the President in almost all matters.

There is ample reward in reading these two books, whether or not one is studying coalition operations. For those seeking a deeper study of such operations, Wallach is the place to start; serious students will proceed to his supporting bibliography. Trask is not as useful for the generic study of coalitions, but he does provide insights into the American experience of coalition warfare which are relevant today. ❑

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From the Archives

Raison d'état vs. Professional Ethics

Reason of state, the doctrine that preservation of the nation must be the paramount value of the public servant, received its classic utterance in Machiavelli:

> For where the very safety of the country depends upon the resolution to be taken, no considerations of justice or injustice, humanity or cruelty, nor glory or shame, should be allowed to prevail. But putting all other considerations aside, the only question should be, What course will save the life and liberty of the country?[1]

Colonel Anthony Hartle, however, in a brilliant critique of Oliver North's *Under Fire: An American Story*, sounds a cautionary note for the soldier tempted to adopt the national interest as his overriding moral imperative:

> North's story raises troubling questions about loyalty, morality, and professional conduct. . . . What moral guidance emerges from the professional military ethic that can and should be applied to officers seconded to other government agencies? Is there ever justification for an officer to lie? When should an officer question orders? . . . Must moral principles sometimes be violated in order to achieve critically important ends—are "dirty hands" sometimes unavoidable?[2]

Still more questions arise concerning Oliver North's position when we consider that Machiavelli was positing a state whose actual survival hung in the balance; North, by way of contrast, could hardly have believed that American survival depended upon diverting proceeds from Iranian arms sales to the contra resistance in Nicaragua.

But what if a US soldier ever confronts the true Machiavellian dilemma, where a rational analysis of circumstance convinces him that he must compromise his ethical principles if the nation is to be saved? In such an eventuality, the doctrine of *raison d'état* is surely correct. No soldier is entitled to sacrifice the nation and its 250 million innocent souls on the altar of his own private ethical or moral convictions. Fortunately, the true Machiavellian dilemma will occur seldom if ever. But as long as nuclear weapons remain a fixture in the arsenals of nations, it remains a possibility. Faced with such a dilemma, the soldier must opt for the nation's survival, justifying that decision, if justification were necessary, by appeal to a higher principle: that if our land should perish from the earth, the last best hope for the preservation of Western humane values would perish with it.

NOTES

1. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, bk. 3, chap. XLI (*The Prince and The Discourses* [New York: The Modern Library, 1950], p. 528).
2. Anthony E. Hartle, "The Ethical Odyssey of Oliver North," *Parameters*, 23 (Summer 1993), 28-33.

— Colonel Lloyd J. Matthews, USA Ret.