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The Honorable Sam Nunn  
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate

The Honorable Les Aspin  
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services  
House of Representatives

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This report summarizes the views presented on October 31, 1991, at a GAO-sponsored conference on worldwide threats to U.S. national security.<sup>1</sup> The conference was designed to provide insight into potential military threats to U.S. security interests and necessary modifications to current and planned U.S. forces to meet those threats.

Conference participants, including defense analysts and retired military officers, discussed and analyzed the possibility of U.S. and allied involvement in various regional contingencies in Europe and the Soviet Union, East Asia and the Pacific, and the Near East and South Asia. Topics ranged from the possibility of nuclear war to a general discussion of low-intensity conflict. To serve as a starting point for discussion, we asked several of the participants to provide papers representing a wide range of views.

The participants agreed that for many years the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat to Europe shaped U.S. force planning but that the Soviet Union<sup>2</sup> no longer posed a conventional threat. Nuclear weapons held by the former Soviet republics and other nations, however, remain a concern. There was no agreement on the methodology for sizing U.S. forces. Some argued for sizing based on specific threats; others argued for flexibility to meet any and all contingencies and cited the Gulf War as an example.

The participants suggested several options for responding to the changing security environment, including assisting the former Soviet republics with denuclearization, reducing forward deployed U.S. forces in Europe and the Pacific, increasing U.S. efforts at missile nonproliferation in the Near East,

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<sup>1</sup>In April 1988, GAO co-sponsored a congressionally mandated conference on the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance of conventional forces (GAO/NSIAD-89-23).

<sup>2</sup>In October 1991, the breakup of the Soviet Union was in process.

Details of the conference are in appendixes I through V. Following the conference, we gave participants an opportunity to revise their discussion papers and comment on the abstracts prepared by our staff. The papers are included in a supplement to this report. Abstracts of the papers are in appendix VI. A list of conference participants and their biographies are in appendix VII. This report and the supplement reflect the participants' views and opinions, which are not necessarily those of GAO.

We are sending copies of this report and its supplement to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and appropriate congressional members. Copies will also be made available to others on request.

Frank C Conahan

**Frank C. Conahan**  
**Assistant Comptroller General**

The image is a severely degraded scan of a document page. It features a high level of contrast, resulting in a loss of fine detail and the presence of significant black noise and artifacts. In the upper right portion, there is a faint, illegible header or title that appears to contain several lines of text. The remainder of the page is largely blank, with only scattered noise and very faint, unreadable marks visible.



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## **Contents**

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## **Abbreviations**

ABM	Anti-ballistic missile
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATBM	Anti-tactical ballistic missile
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander in Chief
GAO	General Accounting Office
ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile
LIC	Low-intensity conflict
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SLOC	Sea lines of communication
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks



# Overall Implications for U.S. Conventional Forces

## A New Basis for Force Planning

The participants agreed that the Soviet Union no longer poses a conventional threat to the United States in Europe. In several participants' views, this change requires that the overall roles and missions of U.S. forces be analyzed to determine where U.S. security interests now lie and how the force structure should be altered. Participants identified the following potential power centers that could emerge as a result of worldwide changes:

- Western Europe may become the number one military power.
- The European Community, an Asian community led by Japan, and an Americas bloc, including North and South America, may develop into the three major powers.
- The United States, the European Community, Japan, and the Soviet Union may be the four major powers.
- The spread of military technology may equalize power.

According to the participants, for the past 50 years, the Soviet threat to Europe has shaped the U.S. force structure. The Soviet threat became the basis for the size, organization, research and development, weapon systems, equipment, doctrine, and training of U.S. armed forces. During the Cold War, the Soviet threat to Europe dominated Army and Air Force planning. Ten of the Army's 18 active divisions were devoted to Europe's defense; 5 were based in Europe. More than half of the Air Force's 30 tactical fighter wings were allocated to European defense; 9 were based in Europe.

The Marine Corps and the Navy have been involved in European defense to less extent, but several carrier battle groups, most nuclear-powered submarines, and several nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines have had responsibilities for the defense of Europe. One participant said now that the Cold War has ended, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States needs or can afford antiship and nuclear-powered submarines, which one participant said were developed mainly for the Cold War, bipolar scenario. Two other participants disagreed that naval forces were sized on the basis of the Soviet threat to Europe, however; one noted that the United States had a much larger Navy when the Soviets had no "blue water" navy at all.



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## Methodology for Sizing U.S. Forces

Participants disagreed on the appropriate criteria and methodology for sizing U.S. forces to meet future conventional threats. Some argued that the size of U.S. forces should be based on specific threats, while others believed that the force must be flexible to meet all possible threats. One participant believed that the force structure developed should match President Bush's strategy, which includes four pillars: a forward presence, crisis resolution, reconstitution, and nuclear deterrence.

In arguing for a U.S. force structure based on specific threats, one participant said that the United States should build a force capable of responding to other countries' capabilities and threats to U.S. interests, including the transfer of offensive weapons technology. In analyzing other countries' military capabilities, the United States could determine cooperative or nonmilitary means of reducing those capabilities and influence the emergence of future threats. Overall, only a small number of potential adversaries have the capability to require a U.S. response with a large ground, air, and naval force structure. These countries are Syria, Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia.

Several other participants emphasized that strategic planning would require a force structure flexible enough to respond to unidentified threats. Because the United States cannot predict threats—as exemplified by the U.K.-Argentine conflict and the Persian Gulf War—it must be prepared to meet all contingencies. Thus, the United States needs to build different-sized mixes of Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Army forces for different missions, for example, special operations forces for small missions, evacuation forces to provide humanitarian assistance, and maximum forces for mid-intensity conflicts. To remain flexible, these forces should be based primarily in the United States with the support of airlift and sealift capabilities, equipment prepositioned overseas, and a global, space-based system of early warning, intelligence, communications, and targeting.

Several participants mentioned different methodologies for defining a U.S. force structure. One mentioned that a research organization is studying the force structure size based on the assumption that the United States cannot predict specific threats and that the force would use advanced technologies and could seize and hold territory against any conceivable foe with conventional weapons. Finally, one participant said that 20 years ago U.S. teams would assess U.S. interests and the threats to those interests in countries and recommend resource allocations based on their assessments. The commanders in chief would then analyze the assessments and staff

them with other agencies, including the State and Defense Departments. Although this seemed to be a rational, useful approach, the practice was discontinued. One participant noted that targeting identifiable threats and maintaining flexibility for unpredictable situations would not necessarily be mutually exclusive actions.

Two other important aspects of U.S. force planning involve the reconstitution of forces and the use of space. A participant noted that the United States is the only country in the world that has a national security policy without a defense industrial policy to support it. As it now stands, the United States does not understand the need for reconstitution and lacks the ability to reconstitute the forces that it reduces. In addition, the U.S. defense industry is in deep trouble and is headed for more trouble. Further, the United States has a space program and uses space to pass information; however, it has not yet determined how the use of space fits into its force structure.

Most participants agreed that the structure of the Navy needed careful consideration because the United States would need to retain its maritime power if it were to have any influence outside the North American continent. In the face of severe budget cuts, the Navy will suffer more than the Army or Air Force because of its substantially increasing costs.

Participants disagreed as to whether the Navy could meet its overseas commitments with 10 carrier battle groups. One participant maintained that 10 carrier battle groups could support the Middle East and the Far East. Others argued that with 10 carrier groups, the United States would have difficulty keeping carriers deployed continuously with on-site relief in the Mediterranean and off South Korea and other places. For every three carriers, one is on station, one is in overhaul, and one is in training. The Navy would be very reluctant to have carriers leave the Mediterranean, given reduced U.S. forces in Europe. Participants generally agreed that the United States needs to determine what risks it is willing to take.

# Europe and the Soviet Union

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## Potential Nuclear Threats

Participants agreed that the main nuclear threat to U.S. interests in Europe arises from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the uncertainty about the control of Soviet nuclear weapons, especially strategic weapons, that can threaten U.S. survival. Besides Russia, nuclear weapons are currently deployed in three other republics: Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan.

Independent nuclear forces would be hard to achieve for both techno-economic and political reasons. Technologically, the republics would need to (1) defeat security means and measures (e.g., electronic locks and physical security at sites), (2) establish command and control, (3) insert new targeting data for retargeting, (4) provide ongoing maintenance, and (5) recruit mainly Slavic members of the Soviet nuclear forces and experts from Soviet defense industries. In addition, no republic has all the facilities required to develop and produce nuclear weapons. For example, Kazakhstan dominates Soviet uranium production and has nuclear and missile test sites, while Ukraine has missile production facilities. To overcome this, Ukraine and Kazakhstan might cooperate in developing each other's force. A nuclear-armed Ukraine would be a new, strong nuclear power in the heart of Europe. Russia could replace these facilities only at substantial cost in time and funds.

Politically, the republics would need to overcome strong antinuclear sentiment in Ukraine and Byelorussia because of the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant, which released radiation over these areas, and in Kazakhstan because of the Soviet nuclear test range at Semipalatinsk. Nonetheless, the republics are determined to put down the threat of Russian imperialism.

If the republics overcame these problems over the next 5 to 10 years, a string of independent nuclear powers might develop on the southern perimeter of Russia. Such independent arsenals could be threats to U.S. allies on the Eurasian periphery.

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## U.S. Assistance in Denuclearization

To reduce the nuclear threat in the independent republics, the United States should promote the destruction of their nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, either on site or after removal to Russia. Given U.S. budget constraints, the United States is not likely to offer a large amount of economic aid to help in this process. Instead, the United States could offer technical assistance on the conversion of the defense industry and the destruction of nuclear warheads, together with other resources, such as the use of the U.S. capacity to destroy Soviet warheads. U.S. assistance would

provide a means of minimizing the possibility that such weapons would be out of Soviet military control. The Soviets are interested in working with the United States on the destruction of nuclear weapons and lack the facilities for the amount of destruction that will be required.

Denuclearization would probably take 5 to 10 years, in part because of the difficulty in moving the weapons, dismantling existing nuclear storage sites, and building new sites. Destruction of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear force weapons, for example, completed in May 1991, took nearly 4 years. Political imperatives are also likely to delay this process. The republics are likely to demand reform of the Soviet National Command Authority to include them in nuclear release decisions. The possibility of a massive, premeditated Soviet first strike on the United States would become even more unlikely if there were a collective authority in which several republics had veto power.

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## START and Deeper Reductions in U.S. Strategic Forces

To reach agreement on denuclearization, the United States should use the U.S.-Soviet arms control process. The Senate should quickly approve the treaty on Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) with a caveat that requires all the remaining Soviet republics, if called upon, to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and similar caveats that provide nonnuclear leverage. If done soon, the United States can offer humanitarian and other assistance as leverage in obtaining agreement. In addition, the United States should begin abbreviated START talks with the republics on new reduction agreements, parallel unilateral measures, and confidence-building measures, which would replace formal, negotiated verification regimes for the destruction of nuclear warheads. The United States should use these measures to help the republics understand that their security will not suffer as they denuclearize over time.

Over a 10-year reduction period, all nuclear weapons and launchers in non-Russian republics would be destroyed. The republics would have ground-based limited defense systems based on Western and Soviet technologies and under their control. The republics would depend on a U.S.-developed, space-based early warning system jointly manned by the United States, Russia, and other republics. These would provide assurances to the United States and the remaining republics in the Soviet Union about mutual security. There might also be confidence-building measures and monitoring procedures such as continuous monitoring of nuclear weapons storage sites and cooperation in the destruction of warheads. The United States would not commit forces to peacekeeping or other deployments on

former Soviet territory. Any U.S. personnel would be limited to monitoring activities and confidence-building measures.

Participants disagreed over the need for deep reductions in U.S. strategic forces beyond those in the START treaty. Some argued that the denuclearization of the non-Russian republics would not be achieved without radical reductions in the Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals. Each might need to reduce its inventory to 1,000 to 2,000 nuclear warheads. Another disagreed, saying that the fragmentation of the Soviet nuclear system would make it much less effective as a threat to the United States. Rather, the United States should be more concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in nations like Iraq and Syria. A third said that the United States should focus on the control of nuclear weapons, not the number of weapons. If both sides reduced the number of multiple warhead ballistic missiles, and each side had a few hundred single warhead ballistic missiles, it would be of small importance whether a submarine carried 24 weapons or 200 or a bomber carried one weapon or 20. The most important issue is command and control of the forces.

A participant said that if the United States and Soviets reduced their strategic weapons to 2,000 each, their arsenals would be comparable to the U.K. and French nuclear arsenals, resulting in three equal nuclear-capable groups. In that case, Western Europe would be a major nuclear power. Another noted that the United Kingdom and France have stated that modernization would bring combined U.K. and French nuclear forces to 1,000 strategic weapons. If the United States and the Soviets set a level of 1,000 warheads each as a negotiated goal, the United Kingdom and France might negotiate a reduction of their weapons. Before then, the U.K. and France would negotiate confidence-building measures and stability consultations but not force reductions.

Another stated that U.S. and Soviet intermediate and short-range nuclear forces had been reduced because they lacked much military utility. A third argued that short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons have great utility. If Saddam Hussein had crossed the Saudi Arabian border when the United States had only one brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division and the first Marine task force there, the United States would have seriously thought about whether it needed to use massive firepower, such as tactical nuclear weapons, to ensure their survivability.

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## Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense

Some participants said that the United States should consider serious discussions with the Soviets about limited defenses in concert with discussions about very low levels of nuclear weapons. For the first time, the Soviets are arguing for changes in the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the value of limited deployments of antiballistic missiles as the sides get down to 2,000 weapons. This is starting to make sense from their point of view, and the United States needs to readdress it.

Others said that Western Europeans are concerned about the threat of ballistic missiles that might arise in the future from the south and east (see app. III). Such a threat raises the prospect of multiple limited nuclear threats that might be undeterrable by counter-threats of retaliation. In this view, a European ballistic missile defense would be needed to break up such limited attacks. If the United States favors limited defenses of Europe and perhaps the continental United States, one question is whether, in a world of limited defenses, the United States would want to maintain a deterrent that could penetrate any defense. If so, the United States may require more than 1,000 strategic weapons.

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## Conventional Threats

The principal rationale for maintaining a large, robust U.S. military presence on the European continent has been removed for the foreseeable future. Soviet troops have already left Czechoslovakia and Hungary and will leave Germany and Poland by the end of 1994. The Soviets will continue to withdraw their forces in part to receive German economic aid. Moreover, they have announced a 50-percent reduction in the size of their conventional forces. The Soviets are too focused on their own economic, political, and social crises to reconstitute a threat to Europe. There is no apparent successor hegemony to take their place.

Most participants agreed that near-term post-Cold War conflicts in Europe would not directly engage core U.S. security interests or lead to a U.S. military response. The United States is unlikely to intervene on behalf of one faction or country in Eastern Europe against another, despite a large number of ethnic and territorial disputes within and among Eastern European countries. Also, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is unlikely to intervene to prevent changes in Eastern European borders by force. The current administration has been conspicuous in its refusal to say nearly anything on the violence in Yugoslavia. The United States might, however, provide humanitarian assistance to the Soviet Union.

According to one participant, U.S. security could face long-term dangers from Eastern European nationalist conflicts or the rise of a strong, ruthless leader in Russia who controls sufficient military force to regain stability there and pursue policies very different from those the United States has become accustomed to. Russia may not be the same military threat that it was 10 years ago, but it could pose severe threats to the United States and Europe with its nuclear capability. Germany is also a potential long-term concern. Another agreed that a militarily resurgent Germany is a long-term prospect. The history of Europe with a united Germany is not pleasant, and the German political culture may still be unstable. Such threats would not emerge for 1 to 2 decades, when the United States might be completely out of Europe or have only token forces there and no mobilization base from which to reconstitute the forces.

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## U.S. Role in European Security

Participants disagreed on the U.S. role in Europe and its implications for U.S. forces there. One said that the U.S. role in the world in general and in Europe in particular involves strengthening free-market economies and democracy and playing the leadership role that a great power should play. In this view, in Europe and elsewhere the U.S. military has three missions: to reassure, to deter, and to be capable of winning. The mere presence of U.S. troops in Western Europe is a guarantor of U.S. involvement in European security. Another agreed that convincing both allies and adversaries of continued U.S. involvement is important to promote stability. Another said that the U.S. aim in Europe is to prevent dominance by a single hostile power that would threaten essential U.S. security interests.

In the past, much of U.S. conventional force planning was based on a one-and-a-half war scenario; that is, a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict would be one war and a conflict elsewhere (for example, in the Persian Gulf) would be the half war. In the post-Cold War world, a conflict in Europe is increasingly becoming the residual, half-war scenario. Looking at the U.S. role and the functions of military forces, the half-war scenario is emerging as the driver of U.S. force planning and military strategy for Europe. The United States may deploy forces in Europe for the Iraq-type scenario, but their uses in Europe would be residual rather than primary.

Most participants agreed that the United States should retain forces in Europe at least for the near future (that is, the next 4 to 5 years) to show a continuing commitment to the region's security because of uncertainty about the circumstances there and long-term dangers. In addition, a

continued presence would permit the United States to move forces more rapidly to the Middle East or elsewhere, as it did in the Persian Gulf conflict. One participant said that the Europeans' past reluctance to allow the United States to stage out-of-area activities from Europe, which the United States has had to negotiate each time, raises doubt as to whether the United States would have that option in future conflicts.

Another participant, however, said that the United States must adjust its defense planning to the fact that the United States may not maintain a ground presence in Europe. There is pressure to reduce U.S. forces in Europe for several reasons: an increasing anti-interventionist, isolationist mood in the United States; budgetary constraints; and domestic needs and politics.

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## U.S. Force Levels in Europe

Participants agreed that the existing level of U.S. forward deployments in Europe would probably not be sustainable over time. General Galvin, the Commander in Chief (CINC), Strategic Air Command, Europe, said that in 1987, 320,000 U.S. troops were in Europe. This level is now down to 260,000 and will be reduced to 150,000. However, in one participant's view, 50,000 to 75,000 U.S. troops in Europe would be the most political traffic would bear. Others agreed with this assessment.

General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has proposed an Atlantic force consisting of a heavy Army corps with two divisions, a full-time Navy and Marine presence in the Mediterranean, and Air Force tactical fighter wings. Most U.S. reserves would be allocated to the Atlantic force. According to one participant, this proposal is valid because the United States needs the military capability to deal with mid-intensity conflicts around the world as it did in Iraq.

Some participants said, however, that the United States should retain heavy ground forces in Europe because they convey commitment and assurance. Another agreed that the United States could sustain an armored corps in Europe within a realistic projection of the budget and that such a force would be widely supported. Another said that a smaller U.S. military presence in Europe suggested moving away from a heavy armored involvement in Europe because that is where most of the personnel are required. A third agreed that the U.S. force would probably be far more specialized, with a division of labor between the United States, on the logistic and reinforcing side, and Europe, which would put up whatever it believed was necessary.



The United States should be concerned with the large number of tanks that remain in Eastern Europe and the nuclear weapons in the Soviet republics and not reduce its force to impotence for political purposes. Another responded that the residual U.S. force's survivability depends not only on its size but also on what the enemy throws at it and when. The risks of leaving a small force in Europe are acceptable if one assumes a great distance between Soviet and U.S. forces and substantial warning time.

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### The Role of European Forces

Participants differed on the European forces' ability to substitute for U.S. forces in Europe. Most recognized that the United States needs to rationalize its forces there based on the forces that the allied countries maintain. NATO has reorganized around four main components. The first will be a multinational, rapid-reaction corps of 50,000 to 70,000 troops based in Germany under a British commander with logistical support and lift capability from the United States. Second will be a brigade-size mobile force to respond quickly. Third will be a reinforcing contingent, probably of U.S. active and reserve units based in the United States, and fourth will be a reorganized force of seven mainly multinational corps in Western Europe and eastern Germany (the latter will be wholly German). A U.S. officer will continue to serve as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

One argued that several participants were assuming that the United States is the only military superpower left in the world. By gross national product and population, Western Europe will be 50 percent larger than the United States and will have the technological base to produce military forces equal to those of the United States and matching strategic nuclear weapons if deep reductions are made. Western Europe would then be the world's number one military, political, and economic power.

Other participants, however, doubted Europe's ability to be a military superpower. One said that Western Europe would be very powerful economically but its current military cooperation would depend on France's ability to continue to maintain military superiority over Germany. This situation is problematical because Western Europe's cooperation also depends on continued U.S. participation in European security affairs. The Europeans are very happy to have the United States in their countries to deter the emergence of conflicts, even in Western Europe. Another agreed that a unified Western Europe is some distance in the future. As of now, very little works cohesively in European security without U.S. involvement.

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## A European Collective Security Organization

Participants differed on the ability of NATO to serve as a pan-European security organization that includes both Western and Eastern Europe. One said that there should be a security system to reassure Eastern Europeans that their views will be considered in an all-European security setting and that they will have some guarantees against a spillover of ethnic conflicts or disruption in the former Soviet Union. Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher recently called for a North Atlantic Cooperation Council to include most Eastern European countries. There should be a similar security system that is internal to the Soviet Union and also cross-European. NATO is prepared to be the dominant pan-European security institution through political and military cooperation with Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. Another said, however, that because of its history NATO cannot play the same role in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that it has played successfully elsewhere. What is needed instead is a new pan-European, North American security organization devoted to building a true collective security system in all of Europe. The United States should be a key participant in this.

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## Conventional Force Reductions

Several participants agreed that the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty should be ratified. The treaty is important because it requires reductions of 50 percent of the tanks in Eastern Europe and leads to a 50-percent reduction in Soviet divisions west of the Urals if the Soviets adopt lighter divisions with fewer tanks per division. One participant said that ratification is important to prevent the rise of new conventional military powers in the non-Russian republics. The United States and Western Europe should ensure that the former Soviet republics adhere to the treaty's limits to prevent Ukraine from building an army of 300,000 to 400,000 people, however implausible this seems. Currently, Ukraine is not legally constrained from building such a force beyond the treaty limits. The lasting benefit of the treaty may be the verification regime, which is intrusive and provides at least a limited right for the inspection of everyone's capabilities. The prospect of large numbers of inspections for the indefinite future should be a stabilizing influence in itself.

Participants differed on the prospect for reductions in conventional forces other than those provided for by the treaty. The following views were expressed:

- Eastern European conventional forces and military machines that have no utility for the state will wither away because they are costly to maintain.

- The United States should seek reciprocal cuts in ground and air forces from Europe and the Soviet Union, particularly in Soviet ground forces that might be taken over by Muslim successor states and used to build up divisions along the southern border of the Soviet Union.
- The United States should buy nuclear and conventional weapons from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and assist their defense industries in converting to other production, both as alternatives to military exports that would pose problems for the United States and also as a kind of Marshall Plan directed to U.S. interests. Such a program would alleviate poverty and encourage hope for change, which are root causes of much of the risk of war in Europe. The participants agreed that this proposal was radical.
- Western and Eastern European countries may not want to cut their forces further. The Eastern Europeans believe they have taken as many reductions as they safely can or should. Nothing in the treaty, however, would prevent the negotiation of a side deal with neighboring countries that all would take another 50-percent reduction, in tanks, for example.
- If the United States reduces its forces without reciprocal Soviet cuts, the forces left behind would be at much greater risk, especially in the absence of an overarching security arrangement—either an extended NATO guarantee or an all-European arrangement.
- The United States should develop confidence-building measures that address problems up front and start to articulate challenges.

# The Near East and South Asia

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## The Near East as a Region

The Near East<sup>1</sup> is an uncertain and important area where regional conflicts stem from cultural, religious, irredentist, and other disputes that are decades or hundreds of years old. These disputes have long eluded diplomatic resolution and cannot be fixed by superpowers' edicts. However, the conciliation between the superpowers and the East and West opens major new opportunities for helping to redress conditions that lead to conflict. The United States should not ignore Turkey's importance as a bridge between Europe and Asia and as the only real model of a relatively democratic Islamic country.

The United States has focused its policy on a security regime in the region, but it needs to understand regional actors' perceptions of threats to their security. For example, Saudi Arabian officials see no enemy at the moment, but they must deal with security threats on the horizon.

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## Domestic Factors

Economic deprivations, structural adjustments from North Africa to Jordan and Yemen, Islam, and democratization in the region pose important policy questions to the United States. The most democratic countries are among those opposed to U.S. policy in the region.

Although one participant suggested that the hereditary monarchs in the Gulf, many of which the United States supports, are fragile anachronisms, another replied that some of these monarchies date to the 17th and 18th centuries and their institutions are leavened by an ideological adaptive ability. The *majlis* and the *shura*, for example, are traditional forms of political consultation that have a modern use and represent communication points in the system. The Gulf states are unique, partly because of their status in oil revenues and wealth and partly because of their size, which permits face-to-face relationships that produce a durability the United States should not underestimate. There is not much domestic opposition to these regimes.

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## The Soviet Role in the Near East

Participants agreed that the Near East region and non-Russian Soviet republics are connected where there are resurgent nationalism and ethnic conflicts. As Islam becomes a significant factor in political change, these sources of instability may reinforce each other. Turkey's economic cooperation with Kazakhstan also links events in the Soviet Union and the

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<sup>1</sup>For the purposes of this conference, the Near East includes North Africa, the Arabian peninsula, the Middle East, and Iran.

Middle East. Kazakhstan looks to Turkey as a model of where it would like to be. There are intense economic ties with Turkish industrial facilities that have multinational links—for example, in telephone switching equipment. These economic links might develop at the political level because Kazakhstan's president has close links to the Turkish government. The Soviet Muslim republics, except for Azerbaijan, look to Turkey rather than to other countries.

The long-term Soviet interest in the region is important. The Soviets are selling arms to Syria and Iran, which are obtaining ballistic missiles from North Korea and China. This combination is worrisome. If Iran tries to dominate the Gulf, the historical pattern of Iranian hegemony will resurface, possibly in a more radicalized mode. Iran is moving toward Western Europe as an attractive alternative to the United States.

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## Potential Threats in the Near East

The Near East has three areas of potential conflict: the Gulf, either between Iran and Iraq or Iraq and Kuwait; Lebanon, which Syria resolved by imposing a "pax Syriana"; and Palestine, which poses the key political issue in the Near East. Resolution of this issue would relieve the United States of the burden of Israel's security and contribute to regional stability, enabling the United States to focus on its primary concern, which is oil and the price of oil in the Gulf.

Participants agreed that since the end of the Cold War, conflicts in the Near East have become less threatening. Before, a U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange over a Middle East crisis was a potential risk. This is no longer true. Thus, the Middle East is now less threatening to the United States. One participant noted, however, that Iraq moved against Kuwait when the Cold War ended and not when it was an obedient Soviet client.

A radical bloc with diplomatic potential opposes U.S. intervention in the Gulf. Iran has already taken a militant position against the Middle East peace talks and is positioning itself for a leadership role in this bloc. Syria has a cordial relationship with Iran and may join the bloc if it becomes disillusioned with the peace talks.

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## The U.S. Military Role in the Near East

One participant said that in military terms, the United States is the balancing power in the Middle East, although its ability to play this role may be limited. The United States needs to determine the size, structure, and location of forward-deployed forces in the region for deterrence and combat missions. To maintain a position of power, the United States needs a base in, or close to, the region. Otherwise, it needs airlift and sealift capabilities and prepositioned equipment. These requirements have budget implications.

Another said that the Gulf War demonstrated the kind of forces the United States would need to cope with a crisis in the region. In that war we needed forces for defensive as well as offensive operations. Solving regional problems and controlling the diffusion of military capability may reduce this requirement in the future, but currently, such a force structure is necessary for the United States to respond to emergencies in a region like the Middle East.

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## Role of Regional Forces

According to one participant, the United States has renewed its interest in providing arms to the Middle East. The United States has discussed security pacts, prepositioning, and a more direct role for U.S. forces, as indicated by the recent pact with Kuwait and negotiations with other Gulf Cooperation Council states. This renewed interest has raised political sensitivities to an overt U.S. military presence in the Middle East and has sparked discussion on providing arms to Iran. Another participant said that the United States might be (1) arming states that would be on opposite sides in regional conflicts and (2) creating a situation that would put greater demands on the U.S. force structure.

According to another participant, the United States should rely primarily on regional actors to participate in security regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere through international organizations similar to the Organization of American States in Latin America. From the U.S. point of view, it would be better for Egypt than the United States to provide security in the Middle East. The question is, how can we give Egypt this capability without making it appear that Egypt is a U.S. surrogate? Egypt sees itself as destined to be the hegemon in the region and could lead an Arab forward force supported by a reduced U.S. "over-the-horizon" force. Saudi Arabia does not want this, however.

A participant replied that the United States should be reluctant to tie its capabilities to any one government in the region because of regional

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instability. Rather, the United States should work to gain allies and build capabilities that it can sustain and use unilaterally, independent of any other country. Major portions of such a capability would not be tied to the Middle East, although they might be sized for it.

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## The U.S. Military Role in South Asia

Several participants agreed that the United States would be extremely reluctant to intervene in a conflict in South Asia because the region is highly polarized and volatile and the consequences would be varied and unpredictable. The United States might act in conjunction with other nations in trying to prevent the use of nuclear weapons or in deescalating if they were used, but a participant questioned whether the United States should base its force sizing or strategy on such a probability. In terms of a low-intensity conflict, the United States might become involved in a conflict using nonlethal weapons in Pakistan and India. The United States needs to consider the need for weapons that temporarily prevent tanks from moving or artillery from firing, thus giving the international community time to take diplomatic steps that might resolve such a conflict.

Another participant raised the issue of humanitarian aid. In the past few months, the United States has introduced relief task forces to Bangladesh as part of the reassurance mission in South Asia. The question is, to what extent and at what cost does the United States want to build a capability to provide assistance to Third World countries?

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## Diffusion of Military Capability

According to one participant, the Gulf War jarred many industrial countries into recognizing that military capabilities and power have been diffused over the last 3 or 4 decades. Complicated access to technology through international networks, many of which owe allegiance to no nation, has supplanted the overt purchases of finished weapon systems. Iraq proved that it was possible to tap into the international and commercial networks of technology suppliers and make substantial gains in weapons development, largely without detection. Other countries in the region are also developing advanced weapons, primarily to bolster their sovereignty and demonstrate technological prowess and modernization.

Participants agreed that the United States needs to be concerned about these developments. It is currently focusing on the proliferation of systems like ballistic missiles of increasing range and improved accuracy. These systems threaten regional and internal stabilities because of the premium they put on preemptive strikes and their association with chemical,

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biological, and nuclear weapons. They also pose risks to countries outside the region, especially to those that support U.S. interests and military assets in Europe.

One participant said that conventional force reductions would make large amounts of equipment available and this could create mischief. For example, German tanks are going to Israel. The United States is not postured to do much about this situation. The Defense Department and the U.S. Customs Service appear unable to track exports, and the State Department's munitions control leaves much to be desired. Another said that European scientists and technical personnel faced with economic difficulties might aid in producing and disseminating advanced weapons in Third World countries.

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## Possible Countermeasures

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### U.S. Technological Superiority

In a recent article, a defense analyst wrote that the United States should use its current scientific and technological edge to keep a strategic advantage over the next 5 to 10 years.<sup>2</sup> A participant noted that the author assumes a semipermanent scientific and technological hierarchy. Proliferation is challenging the notion that the United States is generations ahead of other countries in deploying synergistic technologies like those used in the Gulf War. The 1960s-vintage Scuds used by the Iraqis exemplify a weapon that undercuts the meaning of technological superiority.

The United States must decide whether it wants to keep its technological edge and how much it is willing to pay to do so. A participant said that to maintain technological leadership, the United States needs to know that weapons will work, which means developing and producing the weapons, even with disruptions and cost overruns, as it has over the last 50 to 60 years. Another said that the only way to defray the cost of developing these technologies is to unload surplus technology on the rest of world. This means selling F-16 aircraft, not obsolete technology.

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<sup>2</sup>William J. Perry, "Desert Storm and Deterrence," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 4 (fall 1991), pp. 66-82.



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## Economic Sanctions

A participant argued that the West should use its economic leverage to prevent countries from developing weapons of mass destruction. Many countries need Western funds, banking systems, and institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. Economic sanctions would cut these countries off from Western trade and finance. Economic tools do not require massive export control systems and large numbers of personnel to monitor actions. The United States needs an intelligence capability to determine if countries are developing weapons so that we can apply this economic leverage.

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## Arms Control

A participant said that, for a long time, the United States has seen controls on arms proliferation as a diplomatic instrument aimed at saving the Third World countries from themselves. The United States now needs to shift its priority from the control of supplied technology to cooperative control of the applications of the technology we sell. Another said that confidence-building and security measures are important to the management of arms reductions in the Middle East.

One participant said that, as a result of the covert dissemination of military technology, the disaggregation of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons is no longer sensible. Consensual control regimes, such as the nuclear nonproliferation regime, are losing credibility, and current discussions do not address what the United States wants to control. The United States must look at net military capabilities and decide what is threatening and what is the purpose of nonproliferation. The United States might use nonproliferation to control its technological edge, or it might renounce some U.S. military capabilities in a serious nonproliferation regime at the cost of maintaining technological superiority.

A participant asked whether the United States might use recent reductions in tactical nuclear weapons as leverage to urge Third World countries to eliminate their missiles with ranges over 300 miles. Another replied that the United States had set a precedent in its decision not to retain a chemical deterrent and that decision helped make a chemical weapons convention credible. The U.S. renunciation of longer-range theater ballistic missiles, however, would not be sufficient to change the Third World's motivations for acquiring these weapons. If the weapons are not destroyed, they will exacerbate the proliferation problem.

Another said that the United States should adopt the long-term objective of ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction. The United States has

turned a corner in reducing chemical and nuclear weapons in the last few years and can now negotiate very deep cuts in strategic forces. The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty regime has progressed in Latin America and Africa, and even the Chinese have made some favorable moves. The United States should continue strengthening the regime by building international institutions, combined with strategic defenses, to instill confidence that no country could threaten the United States in any reasonable period of time.

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### Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense

Most participants favored development of anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBM) but identified some problems the United States must address. The Gulf War showed the need for a ground-based ATBM in addition to the Patriot to protect U.S. forces and the local populations of countries that invite U.S. intervention. Future ballistic missiles with increased ranges and chemical, biological, and nuclear warheads might threaten U.S. flexibility and increase the need for theater or tactical ballistic missile defense for U.S. allies in the region.

According to one participant, U.S. forces should not be deterred from acting in regional conflicts because of the threat of missiles or weapons of mass destruction. In the past, the United States has deployed nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles as a deterrent in regional conflicts. The President's initiative to denuclearize the fleet might lead to the long-term abandonment of such offensive deterrence. Instead, the United States appears to be turning its national policy and resources toward ATBMs.

A participant asked whether the United States would need space-based sensors and interceptors to develop truly effective tactical missile defenses. If so, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would need to be renegotiated. Another replied that the Defense Science Board had found that relatively simple, short-term software and missile upgrades to the Patriot and the Aegis could substantially increase the area of defense against tactical ballistic missiles. Near-term improvements to the Patriot and the Aegis would not conflict with the treaty. Space-based sensors would enhance both systems but would not be essential. An area defense, such as protection of Western Europe with a few sites against missiles launched from the Middle East, would come close to challenging the treaty in its current form, but even this is arguable.

The United States should deploy tactical defense capabilities and near-term improvements that are possible within the framework of the treaty, another participant agreed. The United States should not let long-term concerns about proliferation distort decisions on its strategic forces in the mid-term. Such decisions should be based on the U.S.-Soviet-European relationship, not on concerns about India, Pakistan, or Iraq.

One participant said that GAO and Congress should examine increased funding for U.S. defensive systems, the Israeli Arrow ATBM, development of more ambitious regional defenses, and interaction between space-based sensors and regional defenses for the Middle East and Europe. Another said that the United States should invest significant amounts of defense resources in ATBM development to beat European and other competition. The United States should buy the technology and market it through the Defense Security Assistance Agency. A third said, however, that the United States needs to debate the consequences of introducing defensive weapons into volatile regions like the Middle East and South Asia, where regional adversaries are competing.

# East Asia and the Pacific

## U.S. Perceptions

According to a participant, most Americans neglect Western Pacific security concerns, despite two recent U.S. wars there. Americans talk of the demise of communism as if China, North Korea, and Vietnam can be ignored. The United States sees East Asia as stable and of no immediate interest. The United States treats Japan with a mixture of fear and disdain and the Chinese as children in a complex environment. In the Philippines, the United States never seriously considered the anti-American sentiments expressed during the anti-Marcos movement. Thus, the United States has many illusions about East Asia.

## The Chinese Threat

A participant said that most Americans do not see China as a threat, but the Chinese openly describe the U.S. military as imperialist forces and the United States as having hegemonic interests. They see themselves as engaged in an international class warfare with the United States and are not loath to use force. The Tiananmen massacre of June 1989 has reduced U.S. enthusiasm for Chinese reform. The Chinese have adopted a local strategy that uses high-intensity conflicts of short duration, which they call small wars, to settle regional disputes.

The Chinese are building rapid deployment forces with combined force capabilities. They have purchased advanced Soviet tactical aircraft, including Sukhoi-24s and -27s, and are negotiating for MiG-29s. Japan is very disturbed that China has bought air refueling kits from Iran. China is also building limited blue-water capabilities in the South China Sea that it has not had before, largely by refitting ships with French equipment and obtaining Soviet advanced capabilities. This equipment will give China power projection capabilities that are very threatening to Southeast Asian countries. In addition, China has an ICBM capability. In terms of command and control and U.S. defenses, centralized control of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is more worrisome than that of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

Most other East Asian countries see China as the principal and enduring threat. China has disputes with other countries on borders, the continental shelf, maritime areas, resources in the water column, and the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Malaysia also have claims on these islands. China's claims on the continental shelf conflict with those of Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia.

According to one participant, the Chinese are prepared to consider the use of force to advance their claims. They were willing to attack the Paracel

Islands, despite South Korean forces there and the U.S.-South Korean security arrangement, at a time when they wanted better relations with the United States. The United States did nothing in response, and the Chinese now have a presence in the Paracel Islands. If the Chinese attacked the Spratly Islands, the United States would probably not do much, but if they became a major regional threat, the United States might need to react. China might attack Southeast Asian countries because it is desperate economically and is fractionated, with major regional problems. The United States should be prepared for such a contingency.

A participant said that China's military threats are generally low intensity and would not lead to U.S. military involvement unless Taiwan was involved. A participant responded that China wants hegemony in the region. Another agreed that these issues are serious to other countries in the region but that some are not significant to the United States directly. For example, if all its demands in the South China Sea were met, China would have a presence along major sea lines of communications (SLOC) in that region. These SLOCs are essential to Taiwan, Japan, and Korea for fossil fuel and other resources. China's presence would lead to diplomatic control over the actions of some countries in the region. For example, the Japanese would have to comply with China's demands because of its command of the SLOCs. Japan is very responsive to threats to cut off oil shipments, as it showed when it changed its policy toward Israel in response to Arab pressure.

The United States has an interest in the stability of the Southeast Asian nations, but they have already begun to write off the United States as not prepared to defend their interests. If China threatened the sea lanes, the United States would have to reroute traffic around Australia and elsewhere, which would add to the cost of shipments. The potential Chinese threat is a major concern because of the trade, communication, and resources that transit through the region. The United States should see China as a potential source of conflict and should limit dual-purpose and military sales to China and encourage its allies and other countries, including the Soviets, to do the same.

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## The North Korean Threat

According to one participant, North Korea is unstable and unpredictable and the threat there is growing. Before Iraq attacked Kuwait, Defense Secretary Cheney said that his main area of concern was the Korean peninsula. With Iraq's military reduced, North Korea has the fourth largest military in the world. It devotes about 25 percent of its gross national product to the military, which directs all its energies to reunification with South Korea. It uses Soviet equipment, doctrine, strategy, and tactics. It has large, forward-deployed forces and rapid deployment and airlift capabilities that threaten South Korea. Its navy has enough missile-capable, fast attack craft to threaten U.S. naval operations in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan. The United States needs a naval presence to deal with this threat.

North Korea is in serious economic trouble. Most analysts estimate its annual economic growth rate as -2 percent; more likely, it is -8 percent. The country has a shortage of basic items, including rice, meat, milk, and winter clothing. It has defaulted on international loans and cannot get further credits, and the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand have frozen its assets. The Soviet Union and China are unable to help, and China does not want a military crisis in Korea to detract from China's own priorities. Earlier this year, the United States and South Korea persuaded the Japanese not to make reparation payments to North Korea. Kim Il Sung has three choices. First, he could keep the society isolated from outside help, but this would probably lead to a coup or a revolution. Second, he could open the country gradually, and if he held onto power during the transition of the regime to his son, Kim Il Jong, he might buy time. Third, he could attack South Korea to stay in power.

One participant noted that North Korea is so desperate economically that the regime could collapse, as happened in Eastern Europe. The United States should pursue 4 to 5 years of holding action and not run any risks. Another said that, with South Korea, Japan, and the Soviet Union, the United States has the funds, technology, and managerial expertise to exert leverage with North Korea. A third noted that North Korea wants a meaningful relationship with the United States and Japan.

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## A New Korean War

One participant said that North Korea might attack South Korea at any time, resulting in a war that would probably last about 120 days. The North Koreans have 60 percent of their forces deployed close to the demilitarized zone and well protected. Forty thousand U.S. troops and the South Korean army could not stop them. In the first half-hour, 30 percent of the South

Korean army would be decimated. Seoul would fall quickly; it is only 25 miles from the demilitarized zone. Some participants agreed that Seoul would fall, but others stated that South Korean's military capability and training are impressive, and Seoul would not be lost.

In such a war, the United States would need to hold some part of the peninsula and reinforce rapidly. If the United States reinforced quickly, South Korean and U.S. forces would stop the North Korean troops, and North Korea would lose the war. The United States does not currently have the airlift or sealift to do this. The United States would have to maintain staging areas and capabilities in Japan to be able to counter a North Korean attack. That is the main expense caused by the North Korean threat, not the U.S. forces in Korea. It is not clear how the United States would react if North Korea used chemical weapons in a conflict. U.S. troops in Korea have the same chemical defense equipment that U.S. troops had in the Gulf War. The United States does not know if that would be enough because it was not used in the Gulf War.

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### The Gulf War and a New Korean War

The United States should be very careful in applying to North Korea lessons learned from the Gulf War. Unlike the Iraqis, the North Koreans would fight. The Gulf War involved a broad coalition based on common vital interests, staging from a neighboring allied country with an unimpeded buildup of forces over months, and climate and terrain that were well suited to air and tank operations.

A participant asked what the Europeans would do as signatories to the U.N. treaty in a new Korean war. Another replied that the United States would not get the Europeans to help in a Korean war. They have an interest in principle but no hard interest. The United States was able to build a military coalition based on oil, but it would not be able to build one based on vital interests in Korea. Moreover, China would not permit U.N. Security Council resolutions against North Korea or boycott its meetings, as the Soviets did in 1950. The Chinese do not want war in Korea, but North Korea is their only close ideological ally, and they would not vote for U.N. action against it. Another observed that 230,000 allied forces (other than U.S.) were in the Gulf War but only about 38,700 U.N. troops (other than Korean and U.S.) have been in Korea at any one time. Although we think of a large U.N. command in the Korean War, the United Nations contributed only a few battalions. Another observed that this force level would be appropriate coalition warfare.

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## The Soviet Threat

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<b>Japan</b>	According to one participant, Japan is very concerned about the Soviet military, which has not reduced its presence in East Asia. It has cut some of its naval fleet, but only its older ships. The Japanese are concerned that a crisis in Europe or Russia might draw the Japanese into a conflict in the Sea of Okhotsk. Participants agreed that Japan would probably determine the future Soviet military presence. It has the capital, technology, and management experience that the Soviets need and is going to influence the size of the Soviet military capability in the region. The Soviets occupy four islands (known as the Kuril Islands by the Soviets) that comprise Japan's northern territories. These islands are a key issue between Moscow and Japan and the last barrier to closer Soviet-Japanese political and economic cooperation (if the Japanese believe that Siberia is a stable area where they can make money). The Japanese want the Kuril Islands back, and they are going to get them back. The Soviets are pulling out about 7,000 troops, and the Japanese are talking more softly. It is uncertain how quickly the Soviets will be able to pull out completely, but this situation will probably get better slowly over the next several years.
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<b>Soviet Arms Sales</b>	A participant said that Soviet arms sales have added to instability in East Asia. Because of foreign exchange concerns, the Soviets have sold their most advanced military equipment to North Korea and China. MiG-29s on Chinese and North Korean airfields are a serious problem. Thus, the Soviet Union is a disturbing presence because of its instability and large forward-deployed force.
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<b>A Sino-Soviet Conflict</b>	A participant said that China may threaten the Soviet Union. Another replied that there is no evidence of disposition, deployments, or force structure to indicate that China expects a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Chinese are focused on limited war, which is designed for high-intensity border conflicts of limited duration that are not a threat to the Soviets. Such a confrontation is a Soviet nightmare, but Soviet military personnel do not see this as a serious concern. In the future, the Soviets and the Chinese will need to resolve some of their disputes in the region.
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## U.S. Interests

One participant noted that the United States has important interests in East Asia. On April 19, 1990, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz described these interests as (1) protecting the United States from attack, (2) supporting global deterrence, (3) maintaining a regional balance of power, (4) strengthening pro-Western orientation, (5) fostering democracy and human rights, (6) deterring nuclear proliferation, and (7) ensuring freedom of navigation. Thirty-seven percent of U.S. global trade is with the region, and the United States and Japan produce 40 percent of the world's gross national product. Moreover, northeast Asian nations want the United States there.

Another said that, even more than in other theaters, there are risks and uncertainties concerning economic issues in East Asia. With Japan, economic interdependencies are great and growing, and the possibility for economic trouble is also great. The United States also has a conflict of interest in its economic relationships with China and problems with South Korea in trade and intellectual property rights violations. Anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States is also important, especially in a presidential election year, and further complicates economic problems. As a result, it is difficult to construct the kind of cohesive security arrangement that the United States would like to have.

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## Mission and Size of U.S. Forces

Most participants agreed that the United States needs a military presence in East Asia to protect U.S. interests. The United States will need to retain a presence to deter China, enhance Japanese confidence in U.S. security, and allay Southeast Asian concerns. U.S. forces will assure Japan that it does not need to build an offensive capability, which would concern other countries, especially in Southeast Asia and China, that were victims of Japanese aggression in World War II.

One participant said, however, that considering the North Korean threat and the limited significance of the Chinese threat, it is not clear that vital U.S. interests are threatened, that countries in the region cannot or should not take over the U.S. military role, or that the United States needs a large force structure there. Another replied that the United States does not have a large force structure in East Asia.

A participant noted that in testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, General Colin Powell called for a forward presence in Korea of one reduced-strength division, which should be one reinforced brigade, and one to two tactical fighter wings, which should be

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based at Kunsan. These would be supported by Japan-based forces of one to two tactical fighter wings, one carrier battle group, one amphibious readiness group, and one Marine expeditionary force. In a crisis, these forces could be augmented by a reinforced division, a tactical air wing based in Hawaii or Alaska, and five U.S.-based carrier battle groups. This is the right force level, but it is probably more than Congress will approve.

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### U.S. Forces in Korea

Participants said that U.S. forces are in Korea to maintain deterrence and reassure Japan. Deterrence requires a U.S. presence on the ground and offshore air and naval capabilities, but it does not require 43,700 troops. The United States should draw down to one reinforced brigade or reinforced battalion task force under the 2d Infantry Division—about 10,000 ground troops. There may be a U.S. promise to South Korea not to go below 30,000, but Congress will not keep that many troops there. The United States does not need enough troops to deter North Korea, only enough in a forward position at Tanduchan or Unchon to engage the United States in a conflict. The United States also needs to have ready-deployment sealift capabilities for heavy forces that may be required in a Korean conflict. The South Koreans want the U.S. forces there, and Japan wants the Korean peninsula to be stable and not under North Korean or Soviet control.

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### South Korean Forces

A participant asked why South Korea is still dependent on the United States, given its growth in gross national product, population, sophistication, and technology. South Korea could substitute for U.S. forces there without a major effect on its economy, but it has been unable since 1954 to build up its forces sufficiently to deter North Korea. One responded that there would be no problem if it were only a question of troops in Korea. The United States needs offshore capabilities because if North Korea attacked, it would reach Seoul immediately. The U.S. forces in South Korea are a trip wire.

Another said that after the Korean War, U.S. policy was to keep South Korea impotent lest it attack North Korea and to retain U.S. forces on the peninsula to maintain stability. The United States opposed greater South Korean military spending and promoted economic development. Because of this focus, South Korea could not be expected to build up the capabilities that North Korea did. South Korea devotes far less of the gross national product to the military than does North Korea. The gross national product in South Korea is \$5,000 to \$6,000 per capita and in North Korea

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is \$450 per capita. South Korea's economic improvement is astounding, but high inflation and massive modernization are causing problems.

Another stated that South Korea is less dependent on the United States than it has been in the past. The United States is shifting military responsibility slowly. It plans to withdraw 7,000 forces between now and 1993, with follow-on withdrawals that are anticipated to result in a level of 10,000 troops. South Korea is prepared to pick up the slack from these reductions. The United States has shifted much to the South Korean army. The Ground Component Commander of U.N. forces, a Korean, is directly under the U.S. Commander. South Korea has picked up much of the burden sharing, and they are doing more. South Korea should be able to defend itself by 1995 or 1996. Hopefully, by that time, North Korea will no longer pose a threat.

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### Nuclear Weapons in Korea

Participants said that the President's September 27, 1991, announcement on withdrawing nuclear weapons from South Korea was a U.S. coup. U.S. nuclear weapons there are a political liability and are redundant because the United States has many other systems for delivering nuclear weapons. They are also old, expensive to maintain, dangerous to handle, and subject to terrorist seizures. They should have been withdrawn long ago. They are an obstacle to North-South Korean arms control and confidence-building measures toward reunification. South Korea does not want a linkage between U.S. nuclear weapons and North Korea's policy of refusing International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of its nuclear facilities, saying that, as a matter of principle, North Korea should permit such inspections. The North Koreans, however, have always held that withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons is essential if North Korea is to limit its nuclear development. Thus, the United States satisfied one of the main demands that North Korea made for permitting inspections.

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### U.S. Forces in Japan

The United States maintains forces in Japan to provide (1) staging areas and support facilities for a Korean conflict and (2) stability in the area. A participant asked whether the United States would need forward bases in Japan and Okinawa to support a Korean war if South Korea could defend itself militarily or the North Korean regime collapsed in the near future. This implies a significant drawdown of U.S. forces from Northeast Asia in 4 to 5 years. One replied that the United States might be able to withdraw its forces from Japan in 4 to 5 years, but it should not do anything precipitous because that might encourage a North Korean attack, given

Kim Il Sung's desperate situation. Another added that any suggestion of U.S. withdrawal would create serious psychological problems. Japan does not want to rebuild its military and wants U.S. forces to stay even if the Korean problem resolves itself. If the United States maintains forces to give Japan a sense of security to prevent rearmament, we will need forces in sufficient quantity and quality to offset any crisis that develops in the region. One participant described this as a "Linus-blanket" strategy to make the East Asians feel comfortable. Another agreed that Japan is holding the United States hostage to prevent Japanese rearmament. The United States is asking Japan not to rearm and is extending U.S. resources to prevent this.

A participant asked whether Japan would allow the United States to maintain its current force levels in Okinawa. Another replied that the only issues involve low-level flying, dual use of an airfield, and use of one port in Okinawa. If the Japanese see limited U.S. use of a facility, they suggest a dual-use arrangement between Japanese civilians and U.S. military. As a government, Japan is enthusiastic about maintaining the U.S. force level. Another said that the Marines believe that it is an advantage to be based in Japan rather than in the United States. The possibility of a U.S. troop deployment in the Philippines, which is much greater than in Korea, is important to the U.S. presence in Okinawa.

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## Japanese Forces

A participant said that Japan is the only powerful and stabilizing country in Asia. It has a large gross national product but spends only one percent of it on defense. Its military force is substantial but complementary to U.S. forces. It does not acquire aircraft carriers and other equipment that make foreign countries nervous but focuses on defense of the home islands, antisubmarine warfare, and air defense. East Asian countries do not want Japanese rearmament, and Japan does not want to rearm.

This situation could change. Shintaro Ishihara and co-author Morita Sony said in The Japan That Can Say No that Japan needs the United States as long as Kim Il Sung is in power, but once the North Korean threat goes away, Japan should dissolve the U.S.-Japanese security treaty. In their view, only the nuclear situation in North Korea makes the treaty necessary, and once that threat is gone, it is Japan's business to expand militarily in Asia if it wishes. This is a minority position, however, that is regarded as extreme even within the conservative wing of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

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## U.S. Naval Forces in the Region

One participant said that the Navy has historically borne a relatively greater burden in protecting U.S. interests in East Asia. The United States needs a naval presence in case of a Korean conflict, to protect the SLOCs, to supplement Japan's defensive naval capabilities, to ensure that Japan does not develop offensive forces, and to prevent China's dominance of East Asia. To promote these missions, the United States must protect the very limited lift capability that it has in the region. The size of the U.S. navy in Japan is based on these contingencies, but U.S. interests may require a larger presence than the one carrier currently based there. The United States has already reduced its naval forces in the region and will probably reduce them further, thereby coming close to the minimum requirements in the region. The question is how much support should back up this presence.

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## Costs of U.S. Forces

Participants said that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region will probably not result in a peace dividend but that Japan and South Korea are prepared to fund the local costs of U.S. forces there. One said that requirements to protect U.S. interests mean that the U.S. force structure and forward deployment are likely to be stable for at least the next 5 years. The need for base relocations or prepositioning means that costs will not be reduced. U.S. forces are leaving the Philippine bases, which concerns Southeast Asian nations. These nations, except for the Philippines, are increasing their military spending steadily but not dramatically. Singapore invited an increased U.S. air presence, but space there is very limited. It would be costly to redeploy to Guam or elsewhere.

Another said that in 1994, Japan will increase its yen contribution to 100 percent. In that case, the United States will pay only personnel costs, and Japan will pay for all base maintenance, base workers' salaries, construction of modernized facilities, and other local costs. Thus, keeping U.S. forces in Japan and Okinawa will be cheaper than keeping them in the United States. No European country offers this subsidy, which the United States has obtained after several years of difficult negotiations with Japan. Another noted that, because Japan and South Korea are prepared to pay all local costs of U.S. forces, there is no urgent budgetary reason to reduce U.S. forces there. The prudent course is to keep them in place because costs are gradually diminishing.

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## Regional Security Arrangements

A participant said that uncertainties about security arrangements in the region affect U.S. force planning. Many countries in the region have an interest in security but no regional security apparatus or plan. The United States has security agreements with Japan and South Korea. Australia and New Zealand have reasonably sized navies, but they have not shown that they would be prepared to act if a crisis arose in the South China Sea. It would depend on the situation. The United States also has residual security arrangements with Thailand that it activates only when it is in its interest to do so. The two countries restored an arrangement due to the recent conflict in Cambodia. If the Thais decided it was not in their interest, however, they would ask the United States to leave, and it would. There is currently a restored arrangement due to the recent conflict in Cambodia. U.S. security relations with the Philippines are very seriously jeopardized until the next election. If a crisis arises the United States must be able to deploy enough forces to contain it or defend its forces in the region without heavy dependence on assistance from other countries.

A participant asked whether the United States might use anti-Japanese sentiment in Southeast Asia to build a security regime with force commitments anchoring in Australia and bringing in Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Another said that Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries do not want a collective security agreement against Japan because they want Japanese aid and trade. They do not want to appear hostile to China, the Soviet Union, or Japan. In their view, if they had a security arrangement, they could not ally themselves with any outside country, including the United States. They have elementary security arrangements among themselves regarding joint exercises, prepositioning, and interoperable equipment, but they would oppose a broader security regime as hostile to one of the major powers. They want to make money, not war. The ASEAN countries do not want the United States to leave, but they are not able to help. Another observed that a comparable situation exists in the Middle East, where the Saudis want the United States to provide military forces and do not want to rely on regional countries such as Egypt.

# Low-Intensity Conflict

A participant noted that low-intensity conflict (LIC) has been a low priority in terms of budget and force structure and should come to the forefront. Former Soviet surrogate states, primarily Cuba, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Vietnam, and Iraq, will pose LIC threats if they obtain economic and military assistance. Radical Islamic fundamentalist movements will also pose LIC threats, as will terrorist groups. Instead of a single Soviet threat, the United States will confront multiple regional and subregional threats.

## Definition of LIC

Participants disagreed on the definition and value of LIC. The definition of LIC has been so broad as to include any conflict below the level of World War II. One said that typical LICs include insurgencies, coups, transnational terrorism, international narcotics trafficking, and counteractions. Unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are also prominent aspects. Armed combat, mainly by small units, attracts the most attention, but nonlethal techniques are often more important. Examples of LIC operations might include the use of U.S. conventional forces in Grenada, Libya, and Panama and the U.S. air campaign during Operation Desert Storm. A single U.S. air strike on an Iranian nuclear reactor to abort a covert nuclear weapons program might also be LIC. The problem in defining LIC is in deciding its threshold. Mr. James Locker, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, asserts that, despite its experience, the United States does not understand LIC and is still developing tools to deal with it. Another agreed that the United States often limits LIC to military issues when it should include social, economic, and political issues.

## Organization and Control

Participants disagreed on centralized control of LIC operations. One said that the United States should establish a Blue Ribbon Panel to review existing U.S. policy on paramilitary forces. They are now controlled by the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and several other agencies. The United States needs to address LIC using an interagency approach, based on an interagency definition of LIC, with institutionalized lead-agency responsibility. The National Security Council should oversee this process, and the State Department should fill the role of lead agency. Another said that without a definition of LIC and a lead agency to integrate various actions, problems can arise. For example, in the drug war overseas, nearly every agency is involved, and these separate activities need to be brought together in a way that makes sense. Another agreed that more coordination is needed between the Department of Defense, the intelligence agencies,

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and the State Department in reviewing responses to conflicts at different levels of escalation before initiating covert or overt operations. There should be an interagency agreement at the intelligence, response, and decision-making levels.

As an example of ad hoc interagency coordination, another cited the U.S. action in forcing the aircraft carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers to land at Sigonella, Sicily, as a combined operation that involved U.S. military aircraft and U.S. civilian agencies and their Italian counterparts. Special operations forces personnel were in Egypt and at Sigonella. Justice Department officials obtained warrants and affidavits from the Italians over the telephone. It was not a traditional military operation but an example of LIC management in which no shots were fired. The situation was delicate, especially with the Italians, and had important diplomatic, legal, and military operational ramifications. Another noted that this operation caused the fall of the Italian government.

A participant disagreed with the proposed LIC organization, saying that it addresses police, military, diplomatic, and economic functions under the same hat, with a horizontal organization, and makes it difficult to differentiate responsibilities. When one puts civilian, police, civil affairs, and military functions under a single head, that official can exercise the functions outside the normal chain of governmental operations, meaning the State Department. Another replied that special operations have never been outside this chain because the ambassador is always in charge. Special operations forces do not come into a country unless the country wants them.

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## Congressional Oversight

A participant said that congressional oversight of the proposed LIC organization would be impossible because it cuts across too many jurisdictions. Committees with responsibilities in one area would not defer to those with responsibilities in others. Moreover, the proposal would give the President a very powerful tool without any congressional oversight. It would involve an integrated package with the ability to conduct covert operations and interfere in the internal affairs of foreign countries, covertly or overtly. If approved, it would make LIC high profile and lead to a great deal of resistance.

In this view, if the President were to decide that a revolutionary force or a political party should not take over a country's government, he could use these forces, if invited by the current government, to suppress any change.



As an example, suppose that President Aquino wanted U.S. low-intensity forces to intervene in Philippine internal affairs to support the government. An intervention like this could result in U.S. actions to change events around the world not because the United States is threatened but because the U.S. view of how the world should be run is threatened.

Another replied that all covert actions are sanctioned by Congress. Congress established the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and created the U.S. Special Operations Command against the will of the Defense Department and the services. Through this action, Congress sought to shift attention to LIC instead of high-intensity conflict. Congress is very attuned to the forces' missions and training.

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## Control of Operations

A participant said that the use of special operations forces is greatly misunderstood. Special operations forces are used by the CINCs, not by lower-level commanders, in the areas where they know how to do this. The President may run an operation to protect secrecy, but this is an exception. Usually, regular and special operations forces perform LIC operations in combination, for example, in counterdrug and counterterrorist operations, which conventional forces are not well designed to do. The CINC in each region is responsible for coordinating these activities. Another said that the Special Operations Command is given its assignments just like any other unified command. Each of the unified CINCs has a special operations forces commander who functions as a counterpart to the commanders of each of the services, plans for special operations, and presents the plan to the CINC.

The ambassador is responsible for the operations in each country in conjunction with the CINC. For example, in antidrug operations in Peru, the Drug Enforcement Agency would provide forces, and the ambassador would monitor the operations daily. All CINCs have political officers from the State Department, and most have CIA personnel with their own communications to report classified traffic. If special operations forces go to a country, the CIA station chief knows about the operation. Another said that the ambassador is responsible for coordinating actions in a country but does not know how to do this now because CIA or the Defense Department directs the forces in the country. The proposed organization would provide a better understanding of how the United States should integrate these LIC-related operations.

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## Implications for the U.S. Force Structure

A participant said that in conjunction with downsizing its forces, the United States should determine what force structure is required for LIC operations. Missions like humanitarian assistance and nation-building, although not combat missions, fall into the areas of special operations forces and combat support or combat services support elements. When former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Crowe formed the Special Operations Command, he said the command had three missions, one of which was to break down barriers to understanding LIC operations by military personnel who grew up in a conventional environment so that they would know how to use special operations forces. Special operations personnel died in Grenada because integration of these kinds of forces was poorly understood. Another said that the way to achieve a better understanding of special operations forces and their mission is to begin joint exercises and train special operations forces with the rest of the military and with civilian entities. Another said that special operations forces should not be a separate service but should be integrated with the other services. Finally, one said that in dealing with LIC, a distinction should be made between special operations, on which there is general agreement, and light divisions, which are questionable. Sometimes they have been combined to justify force structures that have little relevance.

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## Security Assistance and Arms Control

According to one participant, the United States needs to reform security assistance legislation as part of a broader picture that includes economic assistance to address LIC. A bipartisan organization should be established to recommend changes and educate officials in developing and funding security assistance programs. Another said that, if U.S. intelligence organizations were to identify a threat and a host country were willing to cooperate to resolve the problem, the United States should send everything, including military personnel, except weapons. It should send economic support, medicine, engineers, people to set up infrastructure and schools (e.g., from the Peace Corps), military civil assistance, police, and police intelligence.

A participant said that arms control should address the diffusion of military capability for LIC. Without such controls, people will continue to buy arms as long as they have the money to buy them. No one has addressed chemical and biological weapons issues in areas where they can be employed in LIC scenarios. Another said that the United States should deal with potential LICs before they involve paramilitary action by (1) limiting arms transfers or assessing their implications for U.S. security to try to block the emergence of military threats, (2) preventing escalation of ethnic

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**Appendix V**  
**Low-Intensity Conflict**

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and other conflicts before they lead to open military conflict, and  
(3) resolving conflicts before they reach all-out war.

# Abstracts

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## Future Options for the Soviet Nuclear Arsenal: Two Scenarios

by Rose Gottemoeller

Since the chaotic situation in the Soviet Union began to develop and the threat of national disintegration became a reality, the possibility of Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear weapons falling into irresponsible hands has been raised repeatedly. As the balance of power between the republics and the center has shifted, two basic scenarios have appeared regarding the future deployment and character of Soviet nuclear forces. The scenario that leapt to the fore after the coup attempt in Moscow involved the retention of nuclear weapons on the territory of republics that are declaring their independence. An earlier scenario, consistent with previous political declarations emerging from the republics, involved gradual denuclearization of the non-Russian republics.

Most Soviet nuclear weapons are deployed on the territory of the Russian republic. Strategic nuclear weapons are also deployed in three non-Russian republics: Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. These and the other republics have declared their intention to become independent states. Some states, particularly Ukraine, have also declared their intent to retain control over military assets located on their territory. However, because of the difficulty and expense of deploying usable, balanced strategic forces, the emergence of absolutely "independent nuclear arsenals" to serve the newly independent nations seems unlikely in the long term. Competing demands on their resources will be too high.

Denuclearization seems more likely. Prior to the August coup, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan had declared denuclearization to be a goal. The most compelling reasons to continue to pursue it are technoeconomic, but domestic antinuclear feeling and pressure against proliferation from other countries, including the United States, are probably also important. To add to this pressure and speed the process, the United States might augment its proposal for the destruction of short-range nuclear warheads with resources.

Although the direct threat to the United States will probably remain low, the threat to U.S. allies could draw in the United States. Given the threat that independent nuclear arsenals would represent, the United States should clearly use its considerable assets to work toward achieving denuclearization and encourage the international community to participate.

## Europe and the Soviet Union: the Conventional Dimension

by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr.  
(USA ret.)

For most of this century, Europe has been the primary strategic interest of the United States. The danger of attack by the Soviet Union became the basis for the size, organization, and force structure of the American armed forces and provided the reason for its arms and equipment as well. The Soviet threat provided a quick means to justify the defense budget to the Congress and the American people.

Now, with the external decline of Soviet military influence and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its armed forces, conventional Soviet military threats to vital U.S. interests appear minimal. As the withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the newly independent Baltic states, and Vietnam, Africa, and Cuba continues, the focus of the Soviet military will primarily be internal. Because the Soviets' need to react to the high-intensity threat has diminished, its support of low-intensity conflicts or "wars for national liberation" will also end. Nonetheless, while the dangers of attack may have diminished, the means of attack are still there. Thus, prudence dictates that the United States continue to include the Soviet military in the strategic equation.

The primary threat posed by Eastern Europe is its own internal instability. Eastern Europe, like the Soviet Union, finds itself with military capabilities that far exceed its current national security needs. Territorial disputes are conceivable, and the potential for conflicts among national minorities is even greater. These nations' military capabilities almost guarantee that an armed conflict would be a bloody affair. While most U.S. interests are not directly threatened by this violence, such instability is another matter for Eastern Europe's neighbors. The European Community and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have been discussing the formation of peace-keeping forces and even the possibility of armed intervention by military forces of the Western European Union. There is also some talk of allowing the new NATO rapid reaction force to become the core of a Western European Union force. Movement towards a European defense organization would isolate the United States militarily and politically within NATO, and eventually a new European defense organization would compete with NATO.

Europe remains a vital U.S. interest; therefore, the United States must continue to maintain its troop presence in Europe to (1) counter the mid-intensity conflicts likely to occur worldwide, (2) avoid isolation, and (3) shape future security in Europe.

## The New Security Environment in Europe and the Soviet Union

by Jeffrey Record

Recent events have all but removed, at least for the foreseeable future, the principal reason for maintaining a large U.S. military garrison in Europe. Although the Cold War's demise has unchained some old sources of violence on the European continent, the places and issues associated with those conflicts do not directly engage core U.S. security interests. America's role as the primary guarantor of Western Europe's security is fading as NATO's military component shrinks and becomes increasingly European in content.

For years, the defense of Western Europe against a massive Soviet invasion, launched with little warning from Eastern Europe, preoccupied U.S. force planners. The current state of affairs, however, virtually eliminates any prospect of a deliberate East-West conflict in Europe. The Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe creates a buffer zone between the Soviet military and the heart of Europe. Cuts in Soviet conventional forces and the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty indicate that Soviet power is shrinking.

The prospect of serious violence in Europe has not vanished, but such violence is likely to take place in areas or over issues that do not directly engage discrete U.S. security interests and therefore would not elicit U.S. military responses. Civil wars and age-old border disputes among Eastern European countries and within the Soviet Union would not prompt U.S. intervention except to prevent the unauthorized transfers and launches of nuclear weapons. The European community has taken the lead in attempting nonviolent resolution of these crises.

Both the United States and NATO have announced major cuts in force structure in recognition of the declining Soviet threat and the need for greater flexibility against smaller, though more uncertain, new threats. Indeed, given domestic fiscal pressures, significant U.S. reductions would have been inevitable irrespective of favorable changes in Europe's security environment. The reduced Soviet threat makes these cuts less risky, as long as the reductions are orderly and enough U.S. military power remains in Europe to reassure both friends and enemies alike of an abiding American commitment to a peaceful Europe.

The future role of the U.S. military in Europe remains in doubt. In the past, the main reason for America's intervention was prevention of the continent's domination by a single hostile power, which would have

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threatened U.S. security interests. No European state today has either the will or the ability to take over where the Germans, earlier this century, and the Soviets left off.

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## The Middle East: Political Trends and Implications for the U.S. Force Structure

by Louis J. Cantori

The administration's 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment recognizes the importance of regional conflicts in the post-Cold War world and yet in the case of the Middle East does not adjust U.S. policy to this new reality. This is notable in three cases:

- (1) Through security assistance, Egypt has a sizable and wartime-tested military and yet is excluded in regional collective security terms from the Gulf sub-region.
- (2) The assessment does not recognize the Soviet Union's change to a cooperative mode in the Middle East and does not address the Soviet Union's likely continued policy interest.
- (3) The assessment shows a failure to think through the policy problems of this new regionalism.

U.S. policy emphasis on stability in the region not only reinforces the political status quo in presently nondemocratic regimes but also tends to be at odds with nascent democratic trends. Democratic expression so far has brought forth both Islamic and anti-American sentiment. It should also be noted that democratization can be stabilizing to the interests of the United States, for example in Egypt and Jordan.

The unclassified assessment almost ignores regional chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; intermediate missiles; or a new "smart" weapons generation. Chemical and biological weapons will likely continue to be sought or manufactured as the poor man's alternative deterrent to the Israeli nuclear arsenal. The assessment omits any discussion of a regional arms control regime.

U.S. policy should recognize the interdependencies between the Gulf and the rest of the Middle East as a whole. Indeed, present U.S. policy to pursue a settlement of the Palestinian question is evidence of an awareness of this interdependence. But attention needs to be directed to other existing conflicts (e.g., the Western Sahara) or potential ones (e.g., Saudi Arabia-Yemen). Equally important, economic redistribution processes and mechanisms need attention. For example, the Gulf reaction against

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Jordanian and Palestinian workers resulted in the closing of the remittance pipeline to Jordan and the occupied territories as an informal mechanism of economic redistribution. Without a more formal institution for redistribution or the reactivation of existing Kuwait and Gulf development funds, the plunging of remittances may result in significant destabilization.

Both historical and current experience of great power involvement in the Middle East suggests the elusiveness of the pursuit of influence, whether by security assistance or in some other fashion. The cases of Syria, Israel, and perhaps Saudi Arabia as “tails” sometimes wagging the superpower “dog” illustrate this point.

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## Worldwide Threats and Implications for U.S. Force Structure: the Middle East and South Asia

by Janne E. Nolan

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### Middle East

Although the recent war against Iraq altered the region’s balance of power, Iraq’s military destruction has not changed the security concerns of most of the countries in the Middle East in any fundamental sense. Further, the two predominant objectives of the United States—protecting access to oil at a reasonable price and ensuring the security of Israel—have not been altered.

The recent war may have exacerbated proliferation by augmenting the demand for sophisticated weaponry among key potential combatants. The specter of unstable countries possessing long-range, operational ballistic missile forces is accelerating nations’ efforts to develop antimissile defenses and possibly strategic defense systems.

Individually or collectively, Middle Eastern states could pose a threat to U.S. interests if (1) they were to attack Israel, (2) they provided financing or weapons to front-line belligerents, or (3) internal instabilities caused currently friendly governments to leave the pro-Western camp. Of more pressing concern are the growing capabilities of states that traditionally



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have not been friendly to the United States. For example, Syria, Libya, and Iran are all purchasing upgraded Scud-type ballistic missiles from North Korea and China.

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### South Asia

The antagonism between India and Pakistan stems from deeply rooted disparities that have left the two nations in an enduring state of imbalance. In addition to both countries' efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan have recently demonstrated their ability to build ballistic missiles. In the future, the successful development of ballistic missile forces could provide these states with new military options that might heighten the risk of conflict. U.S. interests would be challenged by the effect the use, or threatened use, of a nuclear weapon by one of the powers would have on overall regional stability. Aside from China, the consequences for Japan could be severe and could conceivably prompt Japan to consider developing nuclear forces of its own.

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### Implications for U.S. Policy

Many of the classic missions of power projection may become more difficult and costly, given continued weapons proliferation. In addition, the United States may have to incur heavy costs to protect overseas military assets, including passive measures such as hardening command centers as well as active defenses like antitactical ballistic missiles.

The United States must determine how it will balance cooperation with friendly nations against the requirement to protect the technological edge on which American security has relied. To continue exerting influence in the Third World, retain a competitive share of the global technology market, and protect its own security interests, the United States will have to devise policies that capture the benefits of military trade and at the same time retain some control over highly sensitive technologies with military applications.

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## The United States and Security Issues in East Asia

by A. James Gregor

As a result of the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, a general peace dividend will likely accrue from U.S. reductions in force structures and defense allocations. However, in the case of East Asia this idea may apply only in part. Indeed, it may be that the defense of U.S. interests in the region will allow only a modest reduction in U.S. forward-deployed forces. U.S. interests in the region are the maintenance of peace and stability, which in turn encourage economic development and

international commerce. Within this security context, there are subregional security issues that must be considered.

The Japanese home islands will continue to be in the immediate strike range of large numbers of conventional and nonconventional forces fielded by the Soviets. U.S. forward-deployed forces in Japan provide security to the Japanese and also militate against the destabilizing effects that could be caused by a resurgent and rearmed Japan.

The Korean peninsula remains the greatest threat to U.S. interests in the region. North Korea continues to modernize its forces, pursue a nuclear weapons capability, and call for the reunification of Korea under a communist regime. The continued presence of U.S. forces in South Korea, even if reduced, will remain the most effective deterrent against North Korean aggression.

During the 1970s and 1980s the People's Republic of China was increasingly viewed as a nonthreatening power in the region. However, since the return to communist orthodoxy following the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, China must be recognized as a threat. The Chinese are developing military capabilities, such as sealift, airmobile forces, and special forces units, for power projections. Since China has border disputes with all of its neighbors, it is an emerging regional threat. Forward-deployed U.S. forces will be the only credible deterrent against Chinese imperialism.

Threats to U.S. interests in East Asia will likely arise from regional conflicts and instabilities. The continued presence of forward-deployed U.S. forces is the best guarantor of peace and stability in the region. These forces will dissipate any tendency on the part of Japan to develop its own comprehensive defense force, reduce the potential for conflict on the Korean peninsula, and contain any present or future threats emanating from China. Large force reductions will only decrease U.S. capabilities and limit options for response in the region.

## East Asia and the Pacific: the North Korean Threat and U.S. Responses

by William J. Taylor, Jr.

While there has been great political change in the world, especially in Europe, the situation in East Asia, specifically on the Korean peninsula, has not been substantially altered. The peace, stability, and nonhostile orientation of East Asia are critical to U.S. security and economic interests.

The only way to maintain these conditions will be to maintain a continued military, political, and economic U.S. presence in the region.

While there has been a recent rapprochement between the North and South Koreans towards some form of reunification, the threat of possible military action by the North Koreans remains. In large part this stems from the fact that the North and South have very different views on how and under what system of government Korea would be reunified. Each is pursuing a unique strategy for reunification, but the South's is the most successful. However, North Korea enjoys a quantitative edge over the South in military capability. There is probably about a 20-percent chance that the North will use military force against the South at some point in the future.

Because of the real and substantial threat that North Korea poses, previous U.S./South Korean war plans must be reviewed in light of lessons learned from the Gulf War. The Gulf War provides six lessons for U.S. planners: (1) the Gulf War was a unique experience; (2) the ability to deploy over a 6-month period was crucial; (3) high technology weapons have revolutionized warfare; (4) the quality of people, not technology alone, wins conflicts; (5) the United States lacks sufficient power projection capabilities; and (6) air defense capabilities are critical.

On the Korean peninsula, the United States will have to tailor its Pacific forces for deterrence, a forward presence (tripwire forces), a crisis response, and a capability for reconstitution from forces based in the continental United States. Deterrence against North Korean aggression will have to hinge on the existence of credible resources for rapid power projection.

To meet the threat on the Korean peninsula, the United States will require either capital investment in ships and aircraft designed for rapid, strategic lift or, more reasonably, increased reliance on forward maritime prepositioning of equipment and supplies. Options for prepositioning include offshore bases and equipment stored in South Korea. Ultimately, the United States will have to have greater power projection assets to support land-based tripwire forces to offset planned and future force reductions.

## Low Intensity Conflict in a Changed and Changing World

by Eugene N. Russell

Evolutionary and revolutionary changes in the world and in the area of low-intensity conflict have been far-reaching during the last decade. These changes have significant implications for U.S. involvement in future LIC situations. The United States will have to react to these challenges by altering the way in which it has traditionally defined and reacted to the LIC security threat.

The current definition of LIC is inadequate and does not incorporate the full spectrum of possible means available to contain conflict. The current view of LIC does not take into account the political, economic, social, and informational instruments that can be wielded in LIC as effectively as armed forces can. Also, because the Joint Chiefs of Staff defined LIC, it is erroneously viewed as the purview of the Defense Department, and this tends to shroud the fact that U.S. involvement in LICs requires intense interagency coordination, planning, and cooperation.

The changes of the last decade indicate that the threat of large-scale conflicts is diminishing, but the LIC threat is actually growing. Past U.S. involvement in LIC was in response to threats from the Soviet Union, Soviet surrogates, and communism. Today, the underlying causes of LICs are, and will continue to be, social, political, and economic factors resulting in unrest and violence. The United States will have to respond to changes in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, arms transfers, and the ready availability to governments and organizations of high technology weapons systems and powerful information media. These changes will be manifested in the variety of potential LIC threats to U.S. security interests. These threats include the former Soviet surrogate states, radical state-sponsored Islamic fundamentalist movements, and terrorist organizations.

To respond to this changing LIC environment, the United States must alter its definition of LIC to encompass the broad range of threats that LIC presents to U.S. security interests. The executive branch should institutionalize the State Department as the lead agency for LIC and establish a Blue Ribbon Panel to review current policy on the development and employment of paramilitary forces in LIC. The United States should use lessons learned from recent LICs such as Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Shield/Storm to develop counters to the LIC threat. The United States must also review and reform its security assistance legislation. Lastly, the United States will have to provide economic assistance to the

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Soviet Union and the Eastern European nations to preclude anarchy and unrest that could lead to LIC threats.

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## Intelligence for Low Intensity Conflicts: U.S. Problems and Options

by General Robert C. Kingston (USA ret.)

The U.S. intelligence network is less well prepared than it should be to fulfill low-intensity conflict requirements, primarily because mid- and high-intensity tasks have occupied most of its time since the decade that preceded World War II. The apparatus, people, and equipment are improving but have sharp limitations. As a result of these deficiencies, the U.S. intelligence community is less well prepared than it should be to determine the temper of potential insurgents, locate terrorist hideouts, rescue hostages, predict the outcome of coups, target key personalities, or conduct surgical strikes against small groups in the midst of innocent populations. Unprofessional performance can also have lethal effects on individual agents.

To counter these deficiencies, the United States should

- (1) activate a LIC watch list to focus intelligence resources on those regions where low intensity conflicts seem most likely to threaten U.S. interests;
- (2) assign the CIA specific responsibilities for issuing instructions to the U.S. intelligence community on LIC intelligence activities;
- (3) cultivate a core of area-oriented human intelligence professionals with proficiency in local dialects and familiarity with indigenous leaders and mores;
- (4) increase emphasis on nonmilitary aspects of LIC intelligence (political, economic, social), with particular attention to the types and amounts of security assistance that given countries can absorb (money, weapons, supplies, advice, education, training, construction, and services);
- (5) assign special operations forces intelligence collection tasks as a secondary or tertiary mission;
- (6) establish career patterns for LIC intelligence specialists and stabilize assignments overseas;

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(7) expedite the development of reliable, portable, secure communications systems that can transmit intelligence information to processors without compromising agents; and

(8) expedite the development of cost-effective LIC intelligence support systems that can fuse data from all sources and transmit the final product to users in near-real time.

# Biographical Sketches

Gordon Adams	Dr. Adams, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, is founder and director of the Defense Budget Project, a nonpartisan research organization. He has written extensively on the defense budget and national security, has testified before congressional committees, and has appeared on television and radio programs.
Barry M. Blechman	Dr. Blechman is chairman of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a nonprofit research organization, and is the founder and president of Defense Forecasts, Inc. Previously, he worked for the U.S. Army, the Center for Naval Analyses, and the Brookings Institution and served as the deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Louis J. Cantori	Dr. Cantori is a professor of political science at the University of Maryland and an adjunct professor at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University. A former Marine, he has been a visiting professor at the U.S. Military Academy and a lecturer at the U.S. Air Force Academy. He has published extensively.
Stanley S. Fine	Admiral Fine, who serves on the Comptroller General's Consultant Panel, retired from the Navy in 1979. His last assignment was as the Department of the Navy's budget director. Since retirement, he has served as an officer and director in various businesses and has written and lectured on national security issues.
Randall Forsberg	Dr. Forsberg is the founder and director of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, a nonprofit research center in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Previously, Dr. Forsberg founded the national freeze clearinghouse, chaired the National Freeze Advisory Board, and was president of Freeze Voter '84. She also worked at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Rose Gottemoeller	Ms. Gottemoeller is a social scientist at the RAND Corporation. She specializes in Soviet national security decision-making and strategic force doctrine. Previously, she worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Battelle Memorial Institute, and the Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link ("Hotline").
A. James Gregor	Dr. Gregor is a professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of 16 books, 10 monographs, and about 100 articles in professional journals. He is a Guggenheim fellow and a fellow of the Institute for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences at Hebrew University. He also serves on several editorial boards.
Alan M. Jones	Dr. Jones is a principal with the Systems Research and Applications Corporation. In this capacity, he has conducted studies on NATO's conventional-nuclear force mix and arms control issues. Previously, he analyzed strategic and theater nuclear and space weapons issues at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He served as our conference rapporteur.
Robert C. Kingston	General Kingston (USA, ret.) was commissioned from the Officers' Candidate School in December 1949. He served in special operations units in both Korea and Vietnam and commanded combat units in all 10 officer grades. He was the first commander-in-chief, U.S. Central Command. He has a master's degree in foreign relations.
Frederick J. Kroesen	General Kroesen (USA, ret.) served as commander-in-chief, U.S. Army, Europe, from 1979 to 1983 and vice chief, U.S. Army, from 1978 to 1979. He is currently a senior fellow at the Institute of Land Warfare and a self-employed consultant specializing in national and international defense matters.
Edward C. Meyer	General Meyer (USA, ret.) served as a field officer in Korea and in the Vietnam War. After duty with the 82nd Airborne Division as assistant division commander and deputy commandant of the Army War College, he commanded the 3rd Infantry Division in Germany; was deputy for operations and plans on the Army General Staff; and was chief of staff, U.S. Army, and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is currently a managing partner of Cilluffo Associates, L.P., and an international consultant.

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**Appendix VII**  
**Biographical Sketches**

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Janne E. Nolan	Dr. Nolan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. She was a senior designee to the Senate Armed Services Committee while working at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration and has served as an advisor to several congressional and presidential campaigns. She is the author of several books and numerous articles.
Raymond E. Peet	Admiral Peet (USN, ret.) serves on the Comptroller General's Consultant Panel and, since retirement, has served as consultant or director to numerous U.S. firms. He has served in field commands and held several policy positions, including commanding officer of the first U.S. nuclear-powered cruiser; commander, First Fleet in the Pacific; acting assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs; and director, Defense Security Assistance Agency.
Jeffrey Record	Dr. Record is a senior fellow at the BDM International Center for Technology and Public Policy Research. The author of many books and articles on military affairs, Dr. Record was formerly a legislative assistant for national security affairs to Senator Sam Nunn. For the past 6 years, he has served as a military commentator for the Baltimore Sun.
Eugene N. Russell	Colonel Russell (USA, ret.) works as a defense consultant. He was commissioned from the ROTC program at the Ohio State University and had a variety of assignments in infantry and special operations units, including the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in Vietnam. He commanded the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (ABN), 1st SF. He is a graduate of the National War College.
Edwin H. Simmons	General Simmons (USMC, ret.) serves on the Comptroller General's Consultant Panel and is the director of Marine Corps History and Museums. His uniformed service spanned 36 years, from 1942 to 1978. He is widely published on military affairs and history.
Harry G. Summers, Jr.	Colonel Summers (USA, ret.) is a distinguished fellow of the Army War College and a syndicated columnist for the Los Angeles Times. His sequel to his award-winning analysis of the Vietnam War, <i>On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War</i> , is forthcoming from Dell Publishing in February 1992.
William J. Taylor, Jr.	Dr. Taylor, a retired U.S. Army colonel, is vice president of the International Security Programs and director of Political-Military Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He has been director of National Security Studies, West Point, and a visiting professor at the U.S. National War College. He has published extensively.
R. James Woolsey	Mr. Woolsey was the U.S. representative to the Talks on Conventional Forces in Europe and, from 1977 to 1979, the under secretary of the Navy. Among other positions, he was general counsel to the Senate Armed Services Committee, an advisor to the U.S. Delegation to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), and a member of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. He is currently a partner at the law firm of Shea & Gardner, Washington, D.C. He served as our conference moderator.

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