The Anatomy of Discipline

A Monograph
by
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ABSTRACT

THE ANATOMY OF DISCIPLINE by MAJ Kevin S. Donohue, USA, 110 pages.

This monograph reviews the functions, development, and measurement of military discipline in the US Army, and assesses these concepts against the current needs and limitations of the modern battlefield and society.

By relying primarily on existing literature dealing with military history, psychology, morale, leadership, and discipline, it is concluded that the concept of "discipline," central to military thought and critique throughout history, is a complex, multifunctional amalgam of psychological and physical components. Military discipline is defined as a set of attributes which can be grouped into two complementary categories, each necessary to enhance a soldier's individual and collective combat effectiveness. The first category, DISCIPLINE B(ehavior), consists of the externally enforced or learned habitual behavioral responses functions of obedience, synergism, attention to detail, restraint, and stress resistance. The second category, DISCIPLINE A(ttitude), consists of voluntary, self-sustaining, value-based functions of courage, identification, internalization, and initiative.

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I. Introduction: Issues of Military Discipline

The purpose of this monograph is to review the US Army's concept of discipline. While few question the vital importance of discipline for any effective military organization, there remains widespread disagreement over its functions, development, and measurement. This vital discussion needs to be updated, for many continue to defer to historical aphorisms and platitudes which remain largely unexamined in the context of modern combat and society.

This is not to say that the concept of military discipline has escaped critical examination. Several works dealing with the human dimension of war have sought to analyze the purpose of modern military discipline. For instance, in his chapter on discipline in the Anatomy of Courage, Lord Moran asserts:

"Everywhere men are asking whether a system of discipline and training designed for the illiterate has been modified to meet the needs of an educated rank and file. They agree that discipline is necessary, but hold that it should be a means to an end, and not an end in itself. They complain that the soldier's conception of discipline has hardly altered as men's minds have changed. It is still a discipline of the body and not of the mind, the perfect and polished coordination of certain formal movements. They ask -- and they are open to correction -- if certain relaxation of discipline is necessarily injurious to the efficiency of an army."

This monograph (titled "The Anatomy of Discipline" in tribute to Moran's own important contributions in understanding another aspect of human behavior in combat) accepts the challenge of renewing the dialogue on the purposes, parameters, development, and limits of military discipline.

Before one can understand and discuss discipline, it is essential to overcome the ambiguity of the term. Until the 19th century, discipline was essentially synonymous with tactical training--the skillful execution of unit drill evolutions. Attempting to trace the etymology of "discipline" is entertaining but futile, as the vast majority of those who are
charged with ensuring "good order and discipline" owe no fealty to the Oxford English Dictionary. Furthermore, the roots of the word are sufficiently amorphous to allow for many possible interpretations. For example, while many authors have pointed to the relation between the word "discipline" and the Christian disciples, those that have equated the latter with "follower" have portrayed a very different philosophy than those who equated disciple with "learner."  

A secondary meaning often associated with discipline, and one that continues to be predominant today, is the martial systems of punishments and the military justice system which has arisen to administer these formal sanctions. The fracturing of the concept dates back at least to the Napoleonic era, as is evident in a dispatch written by the Duke of Wellington: "The fact is, that if discipline means obedience to orders, as well as military instructions, we have but little of it in the army."  

While some continue to equate discipline with more simple concepts, such as obedience, training, or punishment, a survey of the literature reveals increasing evidence that the term's commonly accepted meaning has blossomed into a complex cluster of attitudes, traits, and/or behaviors. Therefore, defining discipline is not merely a matter of esoteric academic precision, but the key to understanding the underlying philosophy and intended function(s) behind the concept. The problem led General S.L.A. Marshall to conclude:

Our weakness lies in this -- that we have never got down to an exact definition of what we are seeking. Failing that, we fall short in our attempt to formulate in training how best to obtain it, and our philosophy of discipline falters at the vital point in its practical, tactical application.  

Further confounding any quest for definitional clarity regarding discipline is the continued confusion and interchangability between the many other various concepts of the "human dimension" in war, such as esprit de corps, pride, training, courage, cohesion, and
morale. While there remains a great deal of overlap and sloppiness throughout a collective understanding of the moral (or psychological) domain of war, this larger problem transcends the intended immediate focus of this paper.⁸

A second problem in understanding discipline, undoubtedly exacerbated by the definitional ambiguity, is the traditional focus on the visible, measurable manifestations of discipline. Nature abhors a vacuum; when leaders cannot measure the essence of discipline, they often compensate by ascribing importance to what can be measured -- and depending on these selected indices as accurate indicators of discipline. But there is widespread disagreement on the validity of this approach. General George S. Patton, Jr. proclaimed "If they don't look like soldiers they won't fight like soldiers!"⁹ But, as Lieutenant Colonel Bill Knowlton points out, other leaders will "concentrate on a different indicator, or who will dismiss concern with the indicators of morale as attacking the symptoms rather than the cause."¹⁰ Hence, an exploration of the indices of discipline is an essential component of this monograph.

Carried to their logical extreme, the results of a search for adequate indices of discipline are tragi-comic. For instance, one former battalion commander reported that commanders seeking improved discipline monitored the "Article 15" (non-judicial punishment authorized by the Uniform Code of Military Justice) rates of their subordinate commanders. The subordinate commanders reacted to this visibility in one of three ways, depending on their own interpretations of discipline and its manifestations:

1. by administering (and reporting) more Article 15s;
2. by administering (and reporting) less Article 15s;
3. by administering more Article 15s, but "desk filing" them, hence not reporting them to the higher commander.¹¹

Another retired officer reported that commanders who insist upon low AWOL (Absent Without Leave) rates created a command climate where the tacit agreement
between the soldier and the subordinate commander is that AWOLS are acceptable, since the soldiers know that the CO will not report them, fearing relief for a high AWOL rate.  

The ongoing debate concerning the function, development, and measurement of discipline has evolved from merely a side-effect of the previously noted problems to a problem in itself. The various philosophies too often talk across one another -- when one person argues against discipline, he may really be rejecting the idiocy of "spit and polish," trainee abuse, or unthinking obedience a la My Lai. When his counterpart argues for stronger discipline, she may simply be arguing for enforcing high standards in unit training or ensuring perfect teamwork and mutual trust and confidence among the soldiers. Hence, consensus on the definition and indications of discipline can go a long way toward resolving such disconnected debates over what may be more imagined than real differences.

At their worst, such discussions occasionally degenerate into *ad hominem* stereotyping, with traditionalists caricaturing reformists as social "do-gooders" and naive behavioral scientists who have never known the sting of battle. In turn, the reformists often stereotype the traditionalists as reactionary, narrow-minded authoritarians unable or unwilling to lose their perceived base of positional power and prestige. To complicate matters, both sides of the argument are equally willing to plunder history to support their cases. This is a discussion that too often generates more heat than light, and it will be an object of this paper to sift through the emotions and compare the substance of these arguments.

**Assumptions and Methodology**

The need for discipline is hardly particular to the military institution -- indeed, the word is often invoked when discussing prisons, schools, the workplace, and childrearing.
What is unique about military discipline is its exigency in preparing a person for the ultimate sacrifice -- without resorting to hyperbole, military discipline is a matter of life and death for the soldier and the state.  

The current exploration will focus on US Army active duty combat arms units preparing and training for war. While there are, in all probability, significant differences to consider when addressing discipline in combat service support and National Guard or Reserve units, they are beyond the scope of this paper.

As a starting point for any discussion, it is necessary to settle on a working definition of military discipline. One solution is to conduct a research survey designed to "discover" the accepted meaning(s) of discipline. Another alternative is to accept one or more of the currently available definitions (or some fusion thereof), perhaps attempting to promote a definition which would meet with most readers' expectations. Neither approach, however, is satisfactory.

The former approach was undertaken in an ambitious and well-resourced mid-1970's research program at the Army Research Institute. After conducting surveys of thousands of soldiers, the researchers concluded that discipline was "individual or group compliance with behavioral standards and norms prescribed by army leaders." The problem with this approach is that it simply codifies existing beliefs without examining the validity or appropriateness of these same beliefs. In this case, the researchers' "consensus" definition subverted their original hypothesis that discipline should be examined as an attitude, and not a behavior.

The same fundamental problem exists with the latter approach, since this monograph's stated purpose cannot be attained by citing historical definitions out of context. [Readers eager to plow through some of the many previously advocated definitions of discipline are encouraged to refer to Appendix A, Maxims of Discipline.]
This paper's solution will be to induce an understanding of discipline as dictated by the functions which discipline is intended to achieve on the modern battlefield. Such a functional analysis will be based upon a synthesis of the available literature on military discipline. Thus, a postponement of the definition of discipline is essential in order to achieve a concept based not upon past thought or prevailing beliefs, but upon relevant current and emerging battlefield needs.

Hence, the next step is to review the two major competing demands for military discipline: American society and the modern battlefield. Although not diametrically opposed concepts in the general sense, the need for military discipline often creates significant tension between the two. While the battlefield may illuminate the purpose of discipline, societal and cultural norms may constrain the Army's manner of achieving and exercising it.

The Modern Battlefield

It is necessary to begin with a brief review of the reality of today's and tomorrow's battlefield. This is, after all, discipline's *raison d'être*. For our immediate purposes, it is not necessary to discuss why the battlefield has changed, simply how it has changed. This will reveal the object—what is required of discipline in order to enhance US Army fighting units' combat effectiveness on the future battlefield.

The face of battle is changing, and one must not fall into the trap of assuming traditional leadership techniques that worked in the past will continue to serve an army as well. Future battles will be increasingly dispersed, non-linear, and lethal. The stress of continuous operations with no "rear area" to recover in, as well as the increased likelihood of NBC (Nuclear Biological Chemical) operations requiring MOPP (Mission Oriented Protective Posture) gear will make battle more physically and psychologically
demanding. The increased speed and tempo of battle will reduce action and reaction times, reliable communications will be less likely, and leader casualties will be higher (an NTC analysis of vehicle loss rates per mission indicates that the company commander's vehicle loss rate averages 55 percent).

But how does establishing that the battlefield has changed inform one about the degree and nature of discipline needed? As the US Army's current operational and leadership doctrines suggest, the "empty" or "cellular" battlefield will lead to further decentralization of command, placing a further premium on the intelligence and initiative of all soldiers. Colonel Larry Ingraham says only internally based discipline will ensure victory on new battlefield: "The more dispersed the battlefield, the greater the need for individual initiative driven by an internal sense of commitment." These dynamics clearly represent a major change from past warfare, in which Frederick the Great's soldiers were considered to be little more than cattle herded around.

This very brief snapshot of the future battlefield provides some insight into how discipline might serve to improve the combat effectiveness of soldiers and units. However, it is necessary to consider the expectations of American society before proceeding to a functions analysis. This, in a sense, is discipline's other battlefield. In the words of General Donn Starry: "The Army can defend the nation against anything but the nation itself."
Cultural Parameters

"We have nothing to fear from America, for the soldiers of a democracy can never be disciplined."\textsuperscript{28}
--statement issued by the German General Staff
upon America's declaration of war against Germany in 1917

Armies exist within societies (although the permeability of the boundary between soldier and civilian varies greatly across countries and across history). In democracies, military discipline is largely determined (many, including the Kaiser's General Staff, would say limited) by the society in which the military organization exists. Ironically, rather than rejecting this as a cultural insult, Americans are usually quick to agree that they do not adjust well to rigid discipline.\textsuperscript{29}

What kind of discipline does the American bring to the battlefield, and how should the military adjust or compensate for the peculiarities of a product of modern American society? To understand American society's impact on the battlefield, it is essential to first establish how any army is different from the society it serves. Within any society, the military is a unique institution in that, in order to function effectively as an instrument of national power, it expects the right to demand the death or dismemberment of its members. This proposition clashes with other needs, for given the choice, humans do not normally put themselves in mortal danger.

To ensure that this likely clash between individual and organizational will is resolved in favor of the organization (and ostensibly the society it serves), armies demand rigid obedience.\textsuperscript{30} Furthermore, in order for a military force to effectively achieve its goals, the soldier's individual rights are justifiably subordinated to the needs of the organization.\textsuperscript{31}

Given the universality of this struggle, some comparative societal analyses of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, the former Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries have suggested that a societal "holistic discipline" effectively submerges this clash of wills.
Unfortunately for this investigation, some of these claims, particularly the ones written which viewed the other society as the enemy, betray a bias that subordinates the truth to ethnocentricty, rationalization, and wishful thinking.\(^{32}\) Even after dismissing these propagandists, however, reasoned and objective analyses are available which do suggest that non-democratic societal norms such as childhood indoctrination, the influence of the jung volk or the kollectiv, propaganda, rigid social systems, and autocratic authority all serve as natural springboards into military service.\(^{33}\) Hence, in many countries, the soldier may have a lifetime to prepare for requirements of military discipline.

This stands in stark contrast to democratic societies, where the state exists to serve the peoples' pursuit of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and the demands of military discipline are likely to come as a shock to the system of the young recruit. As a result, while some have speculated that the armies of democratic societies are handicapped from the starting block, others typically suggest that what democratic armies lack in inherent discipline are compensated for with initiative and intelligence (a possible contradiction which is examined in the next section).\(^{34}\)

The soldiers of the US Army are certainly not exceptional in their distaste for traditional discipline. A more extreme example is found among the Israelis, who have no Hebrew word for "sir," little formal discipline, and a vocal abhorrence for "spit and polish."\(^{35}\) A similar mystique has been ascribed to the rugged and individualistic Boers, New Zealanders, and Australians.\(^{36}\)

Despite the widely varying societal context from which each of these armies spring, each army can point to a tradition of combat excellence. Each of these armies has also had dark hours. The US Army is no different. Although military discipline may be harder to achieve in a democratic society, there is no reason that America should not expect its army to be a highly disciplined force.
Clearly, it is important for the American military to candidly assess its societally-imposed limitations. Compared to a totalitarian state or a state that employs foreign mercenaries, the boundary between a democratic society and its armed forces is highly permeable. This boundary becomes further effaced by large scale national mobilizations. The US Army's mandate is to develop and use military discipline not just to enhance combat effectiveness, but to do so responsibly under scrutiny and answerability to the nation.\textsuperscript{37} In order to accomplish this, military leaders must first understand precisely what discipline does, and how it is achieved. This is the purpose of the following sections.

\section*{II. Functions of Military Discipline}

In the last section, even though it was noted that many problems can be traced back to the lack of a commonly understood and accepted definition of discipline, an attempt at defining discipline was postponed until the needs discipline serves on the modern battlefield could be identified. This monograph will rely primarily on existing literature dealing with military history, psychology, morale, leadership, and discipline to reveal what functions others have considered within the realm of discipline.

This analysis will begin by simply cataloging the functions as proposed throughout the literature by others, attempting to cluster advocated functions by general themes. By focusing on the modern purpose of discipline in the US Army, it is hoped that vestigial historical baggage can be identified and discarded. Any aspect of discipline which serves individual, group, or societal needs without enhancing combat effectiveness will be examined, but not retained for further analysis.\textsuperscript{38} For the purposes of this investigation, the purposes of discipline are considered functional if and only if they can increase the combat effectiveness of a modern US Army combat tactical unit.\textsuperscript{39}
Function 1: OBEDIENCE

In any organization, it is through obedience to the instructions of appointed supervisors that an organization achieves a sense of order and efficiency. According to the first phrase of Schofield’s well-known definition of discipline (The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle . . .), a function of discipline is reliability. Without obedience, a collection of individuals is not a reliable instrument for achieving any goal. The efficiency born of obedience is a desirable characteristic in every type of organized effort, to include military efforts. Indeed, obedience is a *sine qua non* for an organization.

As obedience is a necessary norm in an organization, discipline’s relation to obedience is typically demonstrated by its absence (i.e., disobedience). Hence, it is natural that many have equated discipline with punishment. However, punishment in and of itself is not a function of discipline; it is merely one incentive for continued obedience. In the reactive case of a disobedient soldier, punishment seeks to obtain this soldier’s future obedience, and, through example, *pour l’encouragement de les autres*.

The importance of discipline ensuring proper conduct (on and off duty) is essentially a sub-function of obedience, and probably can be argued to have a direct bearing on the battlefield as an issue of preservation of combat power (or force protection). Unfortunately, entirely too much of what has been written ostensibly dedicated to exploring discipline devolves into discussions of military punishment, conduct, and justice, often eclipsing any additional functions of discipline.

Function 2: SYNERGISM

The members of an organization can increase their organization’s effectiveness by working together. Discipline exploits synergism, enabling the whole unit to be more
effective than the sum of the parts. At the lowest tactical levels, this may be the disciplined practice and execution of crew drills within a fighting vehicle or lifting and shifting mortar fires while assaulting an objective. This results in a higher level of reliability, one predicated on both individual obedience and group cooperation to function as an effective unit.  

Proponents of this function of discipline often make comparisons to a smoothly running machine, or a football team, where all the parts must mesh together. This function attempts to address only the physical efficiency aspect of cooperation and practice working as part of a team. Beyond the purely mechanical benefit of teamwork, the moral benefit of increased cohesion and esprit cannot be ignored, and this is treated subsequently as a separate function of discipline.

Function 3: ATTENTION TO DETAIL

One of the more contentious issues surrounding discipline is its normal association with sharp "soldierly" appearance and uniformity, ranging from snappy saluting to perfectly executed parade ground maneuvers to spit-shined shoes. As critics of traditional discipline are quick to mock such practices as appearance-oriented minutiae, much of this paper's subsequent discussion of the indices of discipline will revolve around this function.

The standard response to such criticism is that these exercises are critical in preparing the soldiers' minds for the kind of attention to detail required to soldier effectively. Hence, the value of doing anything to high standards of precision "rubs off" and becomes habitual throughout the soldier's regimen, from taking malaria pills to shaving. Many successful military leaders, General George S. Patton, Jr. among them, have extolled the philosophy that a unit that fails to do the "little things" correctly cannot do the more difficult big things correctly.
Function 4: RESTRAINT

Restraint is a less frequently cited function of discipline, perhaps because discipline has generally been considered an incentive for ensuring that soldiers do not flee violence and danger, not a mechanism for ensuring that soldiers do not inflict too much violence. Nevertheless, history has provided dramatic examples of units suffering as much from impetuosity and misplaced confidence as from fleeing—Harold's right wing at Hastings, the Scots Greys at Waterloo -- combat units that suffered for lack of the discipline of restraint. More recently, Anthony Kellett explained that the tragic events at My Lai were caused by a US Army company which "temporarily forgot disciplinal restraints."\(^48\)

In recent years, the US Army has grown to acknowledge, if not fully embrace, the likelihood of conducting "Operations Other than War" (OOTW). In such operations, destruction of enemy forces is probably not the key objective, and political and public interests will accordingly require severe curbs on an Army unit's ability to unleash violence short of clear and lethal provocation. As IDF psychologist Ben Shalit points out in the wake of the Israeli experience in Lebanon: "In [police actions], discipline is more often required to curb the policeman's action than to encourage it."\(^49\)

Nowhere is this trend more evident than in the 1993 edition of FM 100-5, in which four of the six paragraphs in the section "Disciplined Operations" are actually devoted to discussing discipline as a restraining device which limits collateral damage, protects both Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs) and displaced civilians through Rules of Engagement (ROEs) and strict adherence to the laws of land warfare.\(^50\)
Function 5: STRESS RESISTANCE

When dealing with the physical tasks of combat, learning combat skills is not enough; time-critical and mission essential tasks must be overlearned. Veterans of the US Army Airborne School can attest to the seemingly endless number of times that the simplest actions were rehearsed. However, experienced paratroopers can also share stories of how soldiers react instinctively and correctly during a jump malfunction, even though they were so frightened that they did not recall consciously "thinking" about it.

This phenomenon, once referred to as the "education of soldiers' muscles," is now better understood. When under great physical and mental stress, particularly the kind a soldier experiences in his first combat, performance of a simple task, such as reloading a weapon, drops considerably (often precipitously) from the rifle range. The best way to ameliorate this performance decrement is to "overtrain," or to drill until the necessary combat skills become reflexive habits requiring little or no conscious thought.

Psychologists can explain this in terms of the nuances of the cognitive processing of procedural knowledge, but combat veterans without such insights can readily attest to the power of habit in overcoming the jitters of one's first battle. As with the function of synergism, it is important to separate the physiological "mechanical" aspect of stress resistance, which have just been addressed, from the psychological "spiritual" aspects, which is the next subject.

Function 6: COURAGE

Closely related to the function of stress resistance is the anticipated impact of the spirit of self-preservation on the battlefield. The previous function emphasized being able to mitigate the normal effects of any stress on performance. Since obedience in combat will normally involve putting a soldier in mortal danger, something more is needed to
overcome that entirely reasonable personal survival impulse. Indeed, Field Marshal Montgomery argued that "Discipline helps men display fortitude in the face of fatigue and discomfort, while at the same time it helps them to control fear." But fear of death or injury in whose hands? Historically, ruthless punishment has been used to ensure that leaders inspire more fear than the enemy. According to du Picq's analysis of the ancient battles, "Discipline has for its aim the domination of that instinct [self-preservation] by terror."

The difference between the stress resistance and courage may appear obscure, but I would contend that it is the difference between building up a tolerance to any of a host of stressors, and overcoming the ultimate form of stress -- loss of life. As General Richard Cavazos has noted, "Leadership on the battlefield is different from any other form of leadership . . . because its basic purpose is to induce men to run at machine guns." True courage goes beyond mere obedience; it suggests confidence and conviction, performance, in the words of so many medal citations, "Above and beyond the call of duty."

When Colonel Ardant du Picq looked to the future in his book Battle Studies, he noted that an iron discipline is necessary, but not enough. The discipline produced by surveillance and supervision forms a base, when mixed with cohesion, that leads to confidence and courage. Beyond establishing the need to combat man's instinctive drive for self-preservation, du Picq offers a preview of a major theme of this monograph: that the discipline which sufficed for a Roman Centurion or Prussian Grenadier is no longer sufficient for modern combat -- but neither is it irrelevant.

Function 7: IDENTIFICATION

While individual self-confidence was a component of this function, confidence in the team and the leaders is a component of identification. Indeed, the previous function might
have been labelled "self-confidence," and the current function "team confidence," but there is more to identification. For instance, the phenomena of pride, trust, esprit de corps, and cohesion are conceptually separable from discipline, but it is undeniable that one of the byproducts of a common discipline is a bonding that occurs between the soldier and his peers, leaders, and unit. Furthermore, units which emphasize strict "traditional" discipline seem to benefit from more intense soldier identification. To quote T. R. Fehrenbach:

> Only when superbly trained and conditioned against the shattering experience of war, only knowing almost from rote what to do, can men carry out their tasks come what may. And knowing that they are disciplined, trained, and conditioned brings pride to men -- pride in their own toughness, their own ability; and this pride will hold them true when all else fails.

When taken to extremes, "rite of passage" techniques ostensibly designed to enhance socialization into and identification with an organization (military, college fraternity, or otherwise) can take on bizarre, sadistic, and even tragic proportions. Ironically, those that undergo initiation rituals often become the staunchest defenders of such practices, responding that it may be just such a mystique which promotes the spirit of cohesion. This difficult issue will receive further analysis in the subsequent section on the development of discipline.

**Function 8: INTERNALIZATION**

Internalization can be defined as the acceptance of influence and consequent attitude change due to the intrinsically rewarding nature of the influence attempt. Most modern conceptualizations of discipline explicitly express a need for the soldier not simply to comply, but to be ultimately dedicated to assigned tasks. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-100-2, Leadership and Command on the Battlefield: Battalion and Company recognizes the essence of discipline as "doing what's right, not what's easy, even when no one is
As President Dwight D. Eisenhower asserted, "I would rather try to persuade a man to go along, because once I have persuaded him, he will stick. If I scare him, he will stay just as long as he is scared, and then he is gone."\(^{68}\)

**Function 9: INITIATIVE**

Initiative, or taking action to best accomplish a mission without waiting for new orders or supervision, is an explicitly prescribed tenet of current US Army doctrine.\(^{69}\) US Army leadership doctrine further suggests that initiative is a function of (or at least compatible with) discipline by describing disciplined soldiers as "[doing] their duty promptly and effectively in response to orders, or even in the absence of orders."\(^{70}\)

Nevertheless, the notion of initiative as a function of discipline has been derided by many who simply view the two as polar opposites.\(^{71}\) If one were to accept that discipline can only have a single function, and that function was reflexive obedience, than a contradiction might exist -- but this is a false choice.

If one is capable of envisioning the spectrum of discipline as it is being painted by the multiple functions developed in this analysis, then discipline and initiative need not be regarded as mutually exclusive traits.\(^{72}\) According to Dr. Shalit, "Discipline and initiative can be reconciled when discipline follows guidelines laid out by the superior, but not when it involves following rigid rules predetermining all responses."\(^{73}\) Indeed, since the particular case study of initiative versus obedience provides an ideal friction point for demonstrating the virtues of using a multiple function framework, this debate will be revisited as the entire model of discipline is brought together later in this section.
Function 10: RESPECT

Some authors have stressed respect for superiors as a function of discipline, even to the point of arguing that the primary objective of military training is to teach the soldiers that the officers are "omnipotent."\(^74\) Surely, the notion of visible respect for superiors, or the "etiquette of discipline,"\(^75\) is more than simply a historical artifact from a different age and society. Yet, elevating "respect" to a separate function of discipline confuses the ends (obedience) with the means (respect and courtesy). Moreover, those fixated on the outward and often artificial manifestations of respect, such as saluting and "sirring," have invited ruthless caricature and encouraged organized protest by appearing to perpetuate a caste system in a democratic society.\(^76\) The effectiveness of these and other indices of discipline will be the focus of a forthcoming section.

This is not to suggest that respect and courtesy are undesirable or irrelevant; but these attitudes are more the products of good leadership, training, and combat effectiveness than they are the causes. They may contribute to or enable the previous function of obedience, but respect, by itself, is not conceptually independent goal relevant to battlefield success.

Function 11: SOCIETAL BENEFIT

Some have asserted that it is the Army's business to be concerned with the "molding of raw material into more perfect manhood and distributing the results among the ranks of society."\(^77\) This function has no apparent immediate effect on the battlefield, but it is briefly considered here since the Army itself has advocated its functionality. For instance, recent Army recruiting ads have noted "In a recent survey, 9 out of 10 employers said that they prefer the qualities of determination, good judgment, and self-discipline. Qualities that the Army develops. Qualities that will help you in any career, and throughout life."\(^78\)
The Army is not the only one promulgating this image. American society, thirsting for corporate and educational leadership and productivity in the wake of a desert victory and in the midst of a military downsizing, has embraced military discipline. Mainstream corporate America has even shown a recent tendency to emulate the military, with company adventure training (such as Outward Bound) and a spate of popular books quoting Samurai warrior Miyamoto Musashi, Attila the Hun, and, of course, General George S. Patton, Jr.79

Whether the Army should bear the burden of being the proponent agency for the nation's discipline is clearly a matter of debate -- one outside the avowed purpose of this monograph. Nevertheless, it is interesting that this function, so tangentially related to battlefield reality, may be a self-fulfilling prophecy that drives the US Army's own "corporate culture." However, reflections on this function must be truncated in order to return to the original focus -- battle.

Integration

Thus far, this monograph has combined the thoughts of many to induce a total of eleven distinct functions of discipline. Up to this point, this analysis has discarded the last two listed functions of discipline (respect and societal benefit) which failed to meet the pre-established criteria of being conceptually independent and relevant to modern combat. In one sense, here lies discipline itself, dissected down to a set of basic components. The next analytical step is to reassemble, or synthesize these components into a pattern or framework that has meaning and enhances our collective understanding of discipline.

Any categorizations are bound to be coarse and imperfect. Initiative, for instance, probably can be seen as a special case in that a combination of both skill and will functions of discipline are required. Will without skill is recklessness; skill without will is inertia.80
While this synthesis is intended to make some sense of the pieces, groupings sacrifice a degree of precision for theoretical elegance and parsimony.

One framework might roughly separate the nine components into two piles, hinging on the manner in which the function is inculcated into the soldier or unit: training (a "skill" category) on one hand, inspiration, education, or leadership (a "will" category) on the other. The former category would include the first five components of obedience, synergism, attention to detail, stress resistance, and restraint, while the latter would include courage, identification, internalization, and initiative. To conceptualize it only slightly differently, one might choose to distinguish those functions which are primarily intended to affect behaviors (external discipline) from those functions intended to influence attitudes (internal, or self-discipline).

Such a differentiation is not novel; others have suggested a dichotomy between two distinct kinds of discipline, whether they have been labelled collective versus individual discipline, internal versus external discipline, or discipline versus true discipline.\textsuperscript{81} However, by whatever name, it is apparent that there is an inherent duality essential to understanding the depth of discipline. This monograph seeks to delineate between two basic forms of discipline by proposing a definition which separates attitudes from behaviors. It is hoped that the utility of this particular two-factor framework will be demonstrated throughout the remainder of this monograph, which proposes the following definition of discipline:

DISCIPLINE B(behavior): Externally enforced or learned habitual behavioral responses, both conscious and unconscious, including the functions of obedience, synergism, attention to detail, restraint, and stress resistance.

DISCIPLINE A(Attitude): Voluntary, self-sustaining, value-based attitudes, including the functions of courage, identification, internalization, and initiative.
One may wonder at the logic of disassembling discipline into nine functions, only to reassemble the concept into two more general factors. However, this progression was the result of inductive reasoning. It was necessary to start "fresh" in order to ensure that the advocated functions of discipline retained relevance for today's tactical commander. But identification of the types of discipline is only a first step; in order to establish the nature of the relationship between them, it is necessary to answer the following questions:

- Are DISCIPLINE (A) and DISCIPLINE (B) complementary, mutually exclusive, or independent of one another?
- Is either type sufficient by itself?
- Are both types necessary, or can one substitute for the other?
- Are they sequential, in that one is necessary before the other can occur?

It is through the consideration of these questions, and not simply labelling different types of discipline, that our understanding of concept of discipline will be strengthened.

Few would argue that the functions of Discipline (B) have always been, and continue to be, essential to combat effectiveness. Without obedience, synergism, and restraint, for example, an army is an unpredictable and uncontrollable mob, while lack of stress resistance may cause a unit to panic and dissolve as the first shots are fired.

As banal as this argument may seem, some distinguished critics, focusing on the same tactical and social changes noted in this paper, have suggested that Discipline (B) is no longer needed. Norman Dixon notes that drill once had the purpose of "weld[ing] together a heterogeneous miscellany of uneducated peasants into a single corporate homogenous machine that did as it was told." Dixon's apparent purpose is to ridicule this "ritual," yet he never acknowledges that his description of the obedience and synergism functions of drill remain at least as vital today. Similarly, Nico Keijzer suggests that the term discipline has become "tainted with notions of conditioning and submission of one's own will," indicating a misunderstanding both of the origin of the term and of the continuing relevance of the functions of obedience, synergism, and stress resistance.
Morris Janowitz, a preeminent military sociologist, commits a different logical error when he proposes that

Rather than attempting to develop automatic reaction to combat dangers, [today's military organization] requires a training program designed to teach men not only to count on instruction from superiors but also to exercise their own judgment about the best response to make when confronted by different types of danger.\textsuperscript{84}

Janowitz is clearly arguing against reflexive battle drills and rigid unthinking obedience, and for more initiative (a Discipline (A) function). Janowitz supports his argument by citing the following passage from S. L. A. Marshall's \textit{Men Against Fire}:

The philosophy of discipline has adjusted to changing conditions. As more and more impact has gone into the hitting power of weapons, necessitating ever widening deployments in the forces of battle, the quality of the initiative in the individual has become the most praised of the military virtues.\textsuperscript{85}

The error Janowitz and others commit is central to understanding the anatomy of discipline.\textsuperscript{86} In their eagerness to identify what has changed on the battlefield, they often overlook that many aspects of combat have remained the same. Too often, Discipline (B) and Discipline (A) are juxtaposed against one another, as if they are polar opposites, hence presupposing an either/or relationship. Yet the functions of discipline simultaneously cover a spectrum of attributes, and it is hardly unreasonable to expect an intelligent and committed soldier to display obedience and to benefit from battle drills.\textsuperscript{87} Marshall clearly rebukes this "either/or" misinterpretation of his own words in a later passage in \textit{Men Against Fire}:

We say that we want initiative in our men, that it is the American way of fighting. We say that we want men who can think and act. We are just as steadfast, however, in proclaiming that the supreme object of training is to produce unity of action. These two aims are not mutually exclusive; in fact, they are the complementary halves of an enlightened battle discipline.\textsuperscript{88}
Having asserted that Discipline (A) and Discipline (B) are compatible, are they both necessary? Centuries ago, perhaps Discipline (B) was both necessary and sufficient. The nature of battle and military organizations ensured tight supervision and centralized control of the formations, and relied exclusively on Discipline (B). In fact, for professional and mercenary armies, Discipline (A) may have been a liability, leading Frederick the Great to assert that "If my men began to think, not one would remain in the ranks."89

As the battlefield has transformed, Discipline (A) is has become increasingly necessary, to the point that modern doctrinal definitions of discipline explicitly invoke Discipline (A). This evolution, as seen in the US Army doctrine, is examined in detail in Appendix B. By the Second World War, the opening sentence of the US Army's doctrine on discipline made it clear that the pendulum had swung to favor a balance of both:

Military discipline is intelligent, willing, and cheerful obedience to the will of the leader. Its basis rests on the voluntary subordination of the individual to the welfare of the group. It is the cementing force which binds the members of the unit; which endured after the leader has fallen and every semblance of authority has vanished -- it is the spirit of the military team.90

As suggested earlier in the discussion of the Janowitz and Dixon criticisms, some have asserted that the pendulum must swung even further than this, arguing that the overt domination inherent in Discipline (B) should be relaxed and largely or wholly replaced with the more subtle manipulation of Discipline (A). Yet without the individual and team training inherent in the functions of Discipline (B), Discipline (A) is merely uncontrollable enthusiasm, of little use to a commander, "For an army with high patriotism, but without discipline, is merely a horde fast footing it to certain disaster."91

Hence, modern combat requires two types of discipline, both necessary, both complementary, and neither sufficient by itself.92 With that, it is possible to enhance this
monograph's definition of discipline, and then move on to explore how discipline is developed and maintained.

_Military discipline_ is a complex set of attributes which can be grouped into two complementary categories, each necessary to enhance a soldier's individual and collective combat effectiveness:

**DISCIPLINE B(ehavior):** Externally enforced or learned habitual behavioral responses, both conscious and unconscious, including the functions of obedience, synergism, attention to detail, restraint, and stress resistance.

**DISCIPLINE A(ttitude):** Voluntary, self-sustaining, value-based attitudes, including the functions of courage, identification, internalization, and initiative.

III. The Development and Maintenance of Discipline

In a US Army school text on psychology and leadership, Captain John H. Burns noted that "discipline is expected to be acquired during [the basic training] process in some manner not exactly understood." Even though this observation was written in 1933, the development and maintenance of discipline remains a matter of little certainty and much conjecture. Various writers have posited a wide, almost exhaustive range of contributors to the development of discipline including such disparate factors as feelings of insecurity, patriotism, fear, mental exhaustion, hero worship, risk, public opinion, and punishment, to name but a few.

The first, and perhaps most basic question to examine, is whether there is a necessary difference between the manner in which discipline is developed and the manner in which discipline is maintained. Armies naturally separate the two by adhering to a basic training...
system for recruits which is significantly different in purpose and culture from the soldier's eventual unit of assignment. Basic training provides raw recruits with a repertoire of fundamental behavioral responses, skills and habits which will help that soldier adapt upon arriving at his or her unit, perhaps into combat.

Central to the basic training process is a focus on frequent, closely supervised training and drill, repeated until it is second nature, designed primarily to inculcate the Discipline (B) functions of obedience, synergism, attention to detail, and stress resistance (as well as the function of respect dismissed in an earlier section). Many advocates of this approach liken the rigors of basic training to a "shock treatment" designed to quickly inculcate habits like instantaneous obedience, traits antithetical to the recruit's life before the army. Some have even suggested that the purpose of drill is "simply to break a man, then to rebuild him in his new army role as a servant, pliant and totally subservient." This last position may represent an extreme and even objectionable degree of coercion; yet, if obedience is the \textit{sin qua non} for military organizations, then it also makes sense that this is the first step in the development of discipline; any subsequent differences in opinion must be over degree, and not of kind.

Furthermore, many have argued that there is a necessary psychological progression to the development of discipline, one which requires that Discipline (B) is attained before achieving Discipline (A). In the words of Lord Moran, "Discipline, control from without, can only be relaxed safely when it is replaced by something better, control from within." Lieutenant General A. S. "Ace" Collins made the same point in a speech written for West Point cadets while assigned to the USMA Tactical Department:

Frequently, in discussion with cadets the statement has been made that [coercive] discipline results from fear, and that it should be built on something intangible. Something within the man so that he will automatically do the right thing himself without being corrected. My only answer to that is "PEOPLE AREN'T MADE THAT WAY." That comes later on. In time a man begins to
see a unit function better as a result of doing little things well. As he sees the team play develop, the spirit and pride in that unit grows in the man's mind, and soon he does the correct things automatically because of that spirit and pride.\textsuperscript{100}

General Collins' reasoning is supported by the classical philosopher Aristotle, who asserts in *Nicomachean Ethics* that virtues are initially acquired through their purposeful (and possibly externally reinforced) activation, leading to the habituation of "virtuous deeds." Eventually, the learner internalizes the habitual behavior, leading to the next step of "virtuous character."\textsuperscript{101}

While it seems reasonable to conclude that a greater emphasis needs to be placed on instilling Discipline (B) in recruits, some carry this even further, insisting that the initial period of military socialization justifies a unique manner of instilling this discipline. Hence, physical and psychological abuse and humiliation of various degrees may have inadvertently gained some tacit acceptance by those who have misunderstood the meaning, and the limits, of discipline.\textsuperscript{102} Such rituals compound soldiers' fears and doubts, tear at the fabric of trust and respect between seniors and subordinates, and are contrary to announced policy (and probably illegal).\textsuperscript{103}

Yet these sophomoric hazing rituals which debase and humiliate the recipients are perpetuated through mystical ascriptions of manhood, cohesion and pride.\textsuperscript{104} The common rejoinder that past victims are often the staunchest supporters of such abuses does not excuse it.\textsuperscript{105} When it comes to hazing in the name of discipline, confidence, and cohesion, the ends do not justify the means, as these same positive attributes can be achieved through rituals which challenge without humiliating.\textsuperscript{106}

The Maintenance of Discipline

Many have asserted that the maintenance of discipline is no different from the development of discipline.\textsuperscript{107} Yet, if one subscribes to the previous hypothesis that military service necessarily starts out with a "booster shot" of Discipline (B), the
implication is that the emphasis and relative weightings of Discipline (B) and Discipline (A) evolve over time. This makes good sense if the relative strengths and weaknesses of each are considered, resulting in recognition that some combination of the two is optimal.

At first glance, it is difficult to find fault with Discipline (B), which impacts on behaviors. It is a compelling argument that it really does not matter if a leader effects attitudes, as long as the mission gets done. For a junior leader trying to get a perimeter established, the attitude/behavior dichotomy may seem like a trivial distinction. It is usually simpler and faster to get things done by telling soldiers what to do (how to behave), not what or how to think. Ultimately, one may reasonably argue, behaviors are all that matter in the end, for combat is decided in the physical realm. It is a more indirect and circuitous route to attempt to affect behaviors by way of attitudes.

Yet, there is a cost associated with overreliance on Discipline (B); first, since the soldier's attitude is not engaged or secured, it requires continuous surveillance and enforcement, a luxury which previous analysis reveals is not to be expected in modern combat. This deficiency is well illustrated in Colonel Charles M. Bundel's recollection of a commanding officer who only visited training to criticize and censure:

My most vivid recollection of those days is the unblinking eagle-eye of the Old Man, which followed us everywhere and saw all things. It is needless to say that all of the officers "walked the chalk line" when the eagle-eye was on them. However, I blush now when I recall what was done, or rather what was not done, when that eye was turned the other way. A decided spirit of evasion developed in the command. Officers and men, alike, did not hesitate to take every possible advantage of the Old Man. During his absences practically all work came to a stand-still. Of course, this was a decidedly improper spirit and we must sternly condemn it, yet it did develop in a part of the Regular Army in this particular instance.108

Another limitation of Discipline (B) is its unreliability in tasks where the best possible effort is desired, not simply a good enough "meet the standard" effort. Some have reported, for instance, that some American combat units in the later part of the Vietnam
War complied with orders only so much as to avoid punishment. These units would go out on patrol, but not patrol aggressively. "Search and destroy" missions were apparently informally renamed "search and avoid." As Colonel Edward L. Munson noted in a Second World War text written for Army leaders, "Outward conformity to discipline may be given, but sullenness and passive resistance are almost always bound to result."

Thus, Discipline (B) is most effective for ensuring acquisition of basic soldier skills and habits, and secures short term behavioral compliance when soldiers are being supervised. Discipline (A), on the other hand, seeks to secure the spirit of commitment and enthusiasm for accomplishing the task, even in the absence of orders or supervision. Ultimately, Discipline (A) does affect behaviors, to a degree that could not be achieved through Discipline (B) alone. The former has the negative moral aim of keeping troops in the battle, while the latter has the positive moral aim of making the troops want to fight well and win the battle.

A continued overreliance on Discipline (B) and underreliance on Discipline (A) might rob a competent fighting unit of a moral advantage. Lieutenant Colonel MacKeith, a British Army psychiatrist who studied the wide differences in morale and discipline between similar units, concluded that "The negative use of discipline in the narrow sense could exert only a limited, and very short term effect." Furthermore, while lasting behavioral change can routinely be achieved through attitude change, behavioral changes do not normally cause a corresponding change in attitude.

Hence, there is good reason to shift from a focus to a more even balance, or even a shift favoring Discipline (A), once soldiers have acquired the necessary first step of Discipline (B). John Baynes, the author of *Morale: A Study of Men and Courage* renders this conclusion to his chapter on discipline:
Earlier armies failed to realize the importance of appealing to their soldiers' own sense of service, and recently, many, Western ones at least, may have drifted too far from a proper standard of imposed control, leaving to much to an individual's own resources. The British Army at the start of the First World War had got the mixture between the two disciplines just right, and much of its excellence sprang from this fact.\textsuperscript{113}

Not surprisingly, there are a variety of opinions as to whether this "proper mix" needs to be adjusted when a unit transitions from peacetime to combat. However, Sir Winston Churchill, himself an Army veteran of the Sudan and the Boer war, echoed the most commonly advocated position when he noted "As the severity of military operations increases, so also must the sternness of the discipline."\textsuperscript{114} Over time, death and destruction will take a moral toll on even the most zealous and elite units, and the "positive aims" of Discipline (A) may no longer suppress the self-preservation instinct.\textsuperscript{115}

American military experience tends to support the position that its military leadership cannot rely solely on Discipline (A) to motivate their commands without maintaining Discipline (B) coercive sanctions, at least for disobedience, shirking and desertion. Both George Washington and Robert E. Lee, as commanders-in-chief of American armies, resorted to increasingly severe punishments for serious offenses over the course of their commands. Merrill's Marauders, an elite American combat unit fighting in the China-Burma-India Theatre in World War II, morally disintegrated into stragglers for want of strong leadership in the face of continuous inconceivably adverse combat conditions.\textsuperscript{116}

To quote a popular aphorism, "Fatigue makes cowards of us all."\textsuperscript{117}

In this section, the proposed conceptualization of discipline was extended to an analysis of the development and maintenance of discipline. From this analysis, it appears that an initial reliance on Discipline (B) through a soldiers' orientation into the service should be later moderated with a balance between the two types of discipline, and that this balance should be maintained in combat. This is a critical step before proceeding toward
the eventual goal of suggesting practical applications for these hypotheses. Before reaching that point, however, it is essential to discuss how discipline is measured.

Section IV: Indices of Discipline

Administrative discipline is the index of combat discipline. Any commander who is unwilling or unable to enforce administrative discipline will be incapable of enforcing combat discipline. An experienced officer can tell, by a very cursory administrative inspection of any unit, the caliber of its commanding officer.118

General George S. Patton, Jr.

By true discipline, I mean that cheerful and willing subordination of the individual to the success of the team which is the Army. This kind of discipline is not to be confused with the external appearance of traditional discipline: the salute, the knock on the orderly room door, the formulae of deference to superiors—in short, military courtesy as it is rigidly prescribed in our field manuals. The latter have their place, particularly in the peacetime army; but they are not the indices of the discipline which really counts.119

General Maxwell Taylor

The philosophical conflict apparent between the above quotations might have been resolved by contrasting the 1st US Infantry Division's combat performance under both "loose" disciplinarian Terry De la mesa Allen and "strict" disciplinarian Clarence Ralph Huebner. Yet the division was effective under both commanders.120 So how can such contrasting philosophies for measuring discipline be reconciled? This is a frustrating dilemma, but it is critical to achieve some understanding of how discipline can be measured before any attempt can be made to assess and improve it. According to the current (1988) Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy:

[Discipline] is manifested in individuals and units by cohesion, bonding, and a spirit of teamwork, by smartness of appearance and action, by cleanliness and maintenance of dress, equipment, and quarters; by deference to seniors and mutual respect between senior and subordinate personnel; by the prompt and willing execution of both the letter and the spirit of the legal orders of their lawful commanders, and by fairness, justice, equity for all soldiers, regardless of race, ethnic origin, gender, or religion.121
As is evident from this passage, the search for manifestations of discipline is characterized by various diverse indices which might measure certain functions of Discipline (B) or Discipline (A), but there is rarely any accompanying explanation or theoretical framework. Unless the relationship between an index and its underlying function is clear, commanders will be unable to adjust and balance the two types of discipline to meet their unit's needs.

It may be helpful to group the variously advocated indices into some comprehensive framework. Unlike the earlier inductive analysis of discipline's functions, however, it is possible to adapt the framework already established by ARI researchers. In a 1976 Research Problem Review entitled "Developing a Conceptual and Predictive Model of Discipline in the US Army," Ronald G. Bauer, Robert L. Stout, and Robert F. Holz concluded that there were three manifestations of discipline in the US Army: appearance, conduct, and effectiveness. This trichotomy will serve as the initial framework.

AR 600-20 notes that "smartness of appearance and action, by cleanliness and maintenance of dress, equipment, and quarters," are indicators of discipline. Many American military leaders have advocated this case; as the quotations both at the beginning of this section and in Appendix A suggest, George S. Patton, Jr. was legendary for equating appearance with discipline. The correlation was more recently advocated by Major General Allen H. Light, Jr., who asserted that "No unit ever was good that did not look good in all things that it does, nor will it ever happen." General Light's contention is demonstrably wrong. But there are two reasons why this type of measure should not be dismissed out of hand. First, one effect of sharp unit and personal appearance seems to be pride, an attribute which is associated with discipline through the function of identification.
Second, while the surface issue may be appearance, the underlying issue is more likely the enforcement of standards. Hence, when the 1943 textbook The Psychology of Military Leadership notes that "slackness in saluting will quickly lead to slackness in other matters," the authors are concerned not so much with the salute as the more fundamental indiciplines likely to follow when leaders fail to enforce standards.125 In this context, proper appearance is more than an outward manifestation of discipline; it is an opportunity to reinforce continued obedience to standards.126

As noted at the beginning of this monograph, many authors and commanders treat discipline as synonymous with Uniform Code of Military Justice violations such as unauthorized absences, off-duty misconduct, and court-martial rates within a command.127 The correlation between conduct and combat effectiveness is questioned by the observations of General S. L. A. Marshall and Field Marshall Wavell, the latter of whom suggested:

The best soldier has in him, I think, a seasoning of devilry. Some years ago a friend of mine in a discussion on training defined the ideal infantryman as 'athlete, marksman, stalker.' I retorted that a better ideal would be 'cat-burglar, gunman, poacher.'128

This popular Hollywood image of rough and tumble, hard-drinking, womanizing soldiers who give their COs fits but fight like tigers when the time comes seems compelling; yet the Tailhook scandal reminds all leaders of danger of looking the other way while the self-fashioned fighters indulge themselves in the "rites of manhood."

Colonel David Hackworth also carried this logic to an extreme; by his own admission, he sanctioned and participated in numerous illegal activities as a commander in Vietnam.129 Leaders who ignore regulations with impunity set the conditions to undermine their own authority.

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Unlike indices of appearance, there is considerably more public concern over issues of military conduct. Once again, while the direct cause and effect link between conduct and discipline may be tenuous, the underlying, possibly intervening issue of enforcing standards looms large.

If the purpose of discipline is to ultimately ensure combat effectiveness, why not cut out the above "middlemen" of appearance and conduct and assess performance directly? This seems eminently sensible, but it may be impractical. Armies are not in combat often. When they are, however, the indices of appearance and conduct might prove little.

Consider Andrew Jackson's recollection of the Battle of New Orleans:

> Reasoning always from false principles, [the British] expected little opposition from men whose officers even were not in uniform, who were ignorant of the rules of dress, and who had never been caned into discipline. Fatal mistake!\(^{130}\)

It is possible to pick and choose enough examples of effective yet poorly attired armies throughout the history of warfare; the Armies of the Confederate States of America, the Israeli Defense Force, the Vietcong, and Boer Army come immediately to mind.\(^{131}\) Critics of this approach try to exempt such examples as uninformative for the modern US Army, since those armies were fighting for national survival or some other rationalization.\(^{132}\) However, even in the US Army, past and present, there are particular elite units that tend to display a contempt for "spit and polish" brand of discipline.\(^{133}\)

Likewise, it is possible to think of examples of Armies (almost invariably European) steeped in the vestiges of traditional discipline that quickly crumbled in combat.\(^{134}\) There are limits to what can be deduced from such historical reviews; enough exceptions are evident, however, to demonstrate that discipline as manifested in either "traditional" appearance or conduct is neither necessary nor sufficient for combat effectiveness.
Resorting to a review of the most common indices of discipline has yielded insights, but not solutions. Indeed, there are still a number of minefields to reckon with. One of the first challenges to be candidly confronted is the natural resistance to change which is encountered whenever one questions "the way it always has been done." Traditions are reassuring connections to a soldier's past heritage. According to Field-Marshall Wavell, "Drill learnt for a purpose on the modern battlefield has lost much of its former necessity, but by no means all. In the old days it was not merely the foundation but almost the whole edifice of regular warfare." Even today, the sight of a dress parade is an emotionally stirring and intrinsically rewarding experience to many.

Such affectations were evident in the history of European armies. Ardant du Picq reported that foreign army officials were so impressed by Frederick the Great's Potsdam parades that they felt that these drills must be the key to discipline and battlefield victory. According to Napoleon, Frederick himself laughed at (and encouraged) these misinterpretations. Neither was the US Army was not immune to infatuations with parade appearance. In 1814, for instance, the US Army leadership rejected new drill regulations, based on the less rigid but highly successful French method, for their "unmilitary" lack of emphasis on posture and alignment. Winfield Scott's prettier drills were adopted in their stead.

The relation between close-order drill and functional discipline continues to be a contentious issue. William Hocking, in his 1918 text Morale and Its Enemies suggested that a soldier in mortal danger can remember his parade ground self and realize that he foresaw just these perils. To Colonel Mike Malone, dismounted drill retains utility as a metaphor teaching soldiers that "when one man gets 'out of step,' other men may die." Yet the belief that drill is the perfect control metaphor for combat neglects the realization
that combat is characterized by a willful opponent who attempts to subvert control. Hence, drill may actually work against effective preparation for combat.\textsuperscript{143}

Beyond allowing tradition to focus attention on the wrong indices, another obstacle is the inherent contradiction of measurement. General Maxwell Taylor saw fit to provide clear caution on the outward manifestations of discipline by separating them from "true discipline."\textsuperscript{144} His thoughts are echoed in doctrine of the period; according to the 1942 FM 21-50, Military Courtesy and Discipline:

True military discipline extends far deeper than and beyond mere outward sign. For example, proper dress and smartness of appearance, while desirable and conducive to good discipline, are not alone conclusive proofs of true discipline. A more likely indication is the behavior of individuals or units away from the presence or guidance of their superiors.\textsuperscript{145}

Here lies the paradox. If, as US Army doctrine has suggested, the most accurate index of discipline is how soldiers behave when they are not being watched, how can leaders measure that which, by definition, they cannot observe?

The conventional way to meet this challenge has been to identify "benchmark" behaviors which help one measure the level of discipline in a unit, as one would take the temperature of a roast in the oven. There is certainly nothing wrong with assessing behaviors, which are almost certainly better at measuring Discipline (B) than Discipline (A). However, if the relative ease of measuring behaviors obscures or interferes with a concern for attitudes, leaders may develop a blind spot towards Discipline (A).\textsuperscript{146}

Although Field Marshall Slim tried to downplay any gap between the two disciplines when he stated "I don't believe that troops can have unshakable battle discipline without showing those outward and formal signs," bizarre consequences may occur when Discipline (B) functions are emphasized to the exclusion of any functions of Discipline (A). For instance, British military authorities replaced bronze uniform buttons with brass buttons so that the ranks would have to shine them.\textsuperscript{147} Ostensibly, British authorities
hoped to develop in each soldier an attention to detail that would serve him well in
combat.

Is such an argument plausible, or is it merely a rationalization of the status quo? There is almost certainly some amount of validity to the notion of discipline "transference" from one task to another which IDF Psychiatrist Ben Shalit calls the "principle of
generalization," but the relevance of shined buttons approaches incredulity because it stretches the notion of generalizability to combat effectiveness past the credible point.148

The issue comes down to one of generalization from trivial tasks to critical ones, and the effectiveness of the generalization might be best measured in terms of the "congruence between formal and functional discipline."149 In other words, the greater the perceived difference between the traditional requirements and the requirements of battle, the less likely that the exercise will be viewed as legitimate by the soldiers. Hence, the US Army's past obsession with "spit and polish" led to the criticism that: "[US Army Officers of 19th century] perceived rituals of subordination and punctilious enactment of senseless minutiae as manifestations of discipline."150

When discussing the indices of discipline, one must consider the cumulative effect of fixation on those seemingly unnecessary manifestations which troops through the ages have variously been referred as "BS," "chicken", or "pipe clay."151 According to Brigadier General Munson, such arbitrary restrictions purported to aid discipline will have opposite effect.152 If soldiers do not perceive the connection between these exercises and an increased ability to cope with an enemy or other challenge, trust between seniors and subordinates cannot thrive.153 These objections are even more likely in today's educated soldiers.154 As an example, one study of American soldiers in World War II concluded that morale was eroded by the practice of requiring soldiers to maintain one set of
immaculately maintained equipment for inspections only, and keep another set for field use. 

Even worse, problems invariably arise when the indices of discipline erode into the dysfunctional tools of discipline -- as in the earlier documented case of the commander whose management of AWOL rates as an indicator of discipline led to a command climate in which soldiers knew they could go AWOL anytime, since their CO could ill afford to report them. This, then, is perhaps the best practical guidance that can be distilled from this section: while there is nothing wrong with using a meat thermometer to determine how the roast is cooking, there is a fundamental problem when one attempts to use the meat thermometer to cook the meat.

Having attempted to discern the nature of assessing and measuring discipline, and noting that the act of measurement itself can become a problem, it is now time to turn to an investigation of how leaders armed with these insights may positively impact on the disciplines of their units.

Section V: Recommendations and Conclusions

In the previous sections, military discipline was first dissected, and then reassembled, into a multifunctional model. The development and measurement of discipline were then considered in light of this framework. While the discussion until now has been highly theoretical, this final section will attempt to derive some practical implications and applications from these theoretical underpinnings.

This monograph has focused on the concept of military discipline while glossing over the numerous other aspects of military leadership. Lacking a more complete and holistic overview of the issues of military leadership, it would be imprudent to propose a specific "discipline-based" theory of leadership. Fortunately, it is possible to incorporate this
study's conclusions within the framework of pre-existing leadership theories. One such "off-the-shelf" theory, transformational leadership theory, is particularly compatible because it stresses the distinction between subordinate attitudes and subordinate behaviors, and how leaders affect each. A fusion of this leadership theory with the proposed model of discipline follows. Figure 1, An Integrative Model of Military Discipline, illustrates the concepts and relationships discussed in this section.

In brief, transformational leadership theory asserts that there is an important distinction between leader actions which rely upon rewards and punishment to change subordinate behaviors (transactional leader behaviors) and leader actions which rely upon vision, personal example, and competence to change subordinate attitudes.
(transformational leader behaviors). Hence, this theory parallels the proposed differentiation between behaviorally-based and attitudinally-based discipline. Furthermore, it adds a framework for understanding the relationship between various leader behaviors and the development and maintenance of Discipline (B) and Discipline (A).

The essence of Discipline (B) is a behavioral reaction which transformational leadership proponents frequently label "compliance." Compliance only requires that the soldier publicly acquiesce the leader's influence; the subordinate must change his or her behavior, but no attitude change is necessary. Discipline (A), on the other hand, is an attitudinal reaction, or "commitment." A key assumption of transformational leadership theory asserts that obedience born of commitment can achieve greater success than obedience born of coercion. Hence, some transformational leadership advocates (the present author included) have tended to downplay "transactional" leadership behaviors.

The proposed model of discipline, which concludes that both Discipline (A) and Discipline (B) are needed, stops short of suggesting that transformational leadership techniques are "preferable" to transactional leadership techniques. Furthermore, it follows that transactional leadership techniques (which develop Discipline (B)) normally should receive more emphasis during a soldier's initial training period. But since transactional leadership can be achieved with the blunt tools of leader position (rank and the accompanying authority of coercion and reward), there is relatively little new or enlightening to say about the development of Discipline (B).

Attaining Discipline (A), however, takes considerably more genuine leader skill and dedication, as indicated by the transformational leadership techniques which permeate the US Army's current FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels. None of the techniques are new or radical, with or without the rubric of "transformational leadership," they have long been recognized as effective leadership behaviors. Developing
and communicating a vision is the heart of the process, complemented with other behaviors such as setting a personal example and communicating high standards. When applied, these leader behaviors should enhance Discipline (A) components: courage, identification, internalization, and initiative.

The leader's vision serves as a source of self-esteem and common purpose for organizational members. The vision should convey an intuitive, appealing picture of what the organization can be in the future. An inherent aspect of communicating a vision is the assumption that a leader is willing and able to tell his subordinates why they are doing what they are doing. Insisting that subordinates do it simply "because I say so" is clearly a Discipline (B), not a Discipline (A) technique.

Telling subordinates "why" gives purpose and meaning to what they do beyond simply pleasing the leader or making it to payday, and it enables them to better understand the leader's intent so that they may fulfill that intent through initiative. Courage is enhanced as well, for as Napoleon noted, "A man does not have himself killed for a few half-pence a day or for a petty distinction. You must speak to the soul in order to electrify a man." A common criticism of telling subordinates "why" is that it is a bad habit, "Not compatible with military discipline." Leaders worried that the subordinate expectation of always being given a reason for action will eventually impede effectiveness should consider this advice from an IDF paratrooper battalion commander:

It is poor policy to make a soldier go through acts for which he cannot see any reason, just because orders say so. If one cannot explain the purpose for a way of behavior it is best not to demand it. Occasionally one has, without explanation, to give orders which appear illogical. These will be followed by a soldier who knows that his commanding officer is not in the habit of behaving illogically, that he must have a reason for such orders. Trust has been built up and the commanding officer can call upon this credit when it is needed. But if the soldier has never seen and accepted the reasons behind orders and particular discipline, he will treat all orders as compulsion and coercion, to be avoided wherever possible.
A leader's own commitment and discipline are further demonstrated by setting an example. Self-sacrificing leaders also clearly communicate to subordinates that they really believe in what they are doing, making it much more likely that the subordinates will share in the commitment and sacrifice.

Leaders develop Discipline (B) through training. If the training is realistic (battle-focused) and challenging, if the standards are rigorously enforced, and if the subordinates achieve a sense of pride and cohesion from having met your high standards (as well as recognizing your own technical and tactical competence), Discipline (A) will almost certainly be enhanced as well. The function of identification will grow as cohesion and confidence in the team are built, and self-confidence will contribute further to courage. Furthermore, as the team works together, initiative is enhanced; as Major Dan Bolger notes, "the best way to know intent is not to read about it; it is to know the guy who gave the order."

A final recommendation of this study is that leaders refrain from using indices of discipline to control discipline. These outward and measurable manifestations of discipline might be the only practical way that a senior commander, with an enlarged span of control, can hope to assess trends in discipline on a regular basis. Junior leaders, however, should not make the mistake of assuming that such indices are discipline; they represent Discipline (B) at best, and perhaps also the shadows of Discipline (A). Because there are no easily quantifiable measures for Discipline (A) (save perhaps realistic training and combat), the temptation to give these attitudes short shrift must be resisted.
Conclusions

This monograph undertook Lord Moran’s challenge to validate various theories and approaches to the concept of military discipline. While there is much that remains unanswered, this investigation into the modern functions, limitations, development, and measurement of discipline has yielded a framework from which the following propositions can be drawn:

1. The concept of military discipline is a complex, multifunctional amalgam of psychological and physical components. These components, relevant on the modern battlefield, can be categorized into behaviorally-based components (obedience, synergism, stress resistance, attention to detail, restraint) and attitudinally-based components (courage, identification, internalization, initiative). These two categories of discipline are labeled Discipline (B) and Discipline (A), respectively.

2. Discipline (B) is clearly necessary for military efficiency, and may historically have been sufficient as well. However, Discipline (A) is also necessary for US Army soldiers on the modern battlefield. Fortunately, the functions of Discipline (B) and Discipline (A) are complementary, and not mutually exclusive.

3. Both Discipline (B) and Discipline (A) can be developed in soldiers, but during the initial soldier development process, it is necessary to emphasize the development of Discipline (B) more heavily. Without first acquiring the Discipline (B) functions of obedience, synergism, attention to detail, restraint, and stress resistance, the attitudes embodied in the functions of Discipline (A) will not alone make an effective soldier or unit.

4. Conversely, a soldier (or unit) who has demonstrated proficiency at the functions of Discipline (B) may be developed into a better soldier (or unit) through the functions of Discipline (A), whereas continued heavy reliance on leader behaviors which elicit only
Discipline (B) will lead to resistance, and probably backfire as it lowers the long-term effectiveness of the soldier or unit.

5. When measuring discipline in soldiers or units, most indicators assess Discipline (B) behaviors, since measuring Discipline (A) attitudes is much more difficult. Leaders must exercise caution that they do not ignore the latter by constantly measuring only the former. Even more damaging to soldier and unit effectiveness is a situation where leaders confuse indicators of discipline with developers of discipline, hence attempting to develop discipline through the management or mismanagement of symptoms.

6. Leadership actions reliant on the leader's coercive and reward power effectively develop Discipline (B); leader actions which develop Discipline (A), on the other hand, are based on the personal vision, example, and competence of the leader. A leader who understands the difference between the two types of discipline, and knows when each is desirable, can more effectively act to promote the optimal balance of each.

7. How the leader chooses to combine relative emphases on Discipline (A) and Discipline (B) is probably largely affected by a number of factors, such as the organizational climate, unit mission, and the leader's own experience and "comfort zone." This is not, however, license to replace advance reflection on a genuine command philosophy with the shopworn and mindless leadership advice that "it all depends on the situation;" after all, leaders have a large say in making their situation.
APPENDIX A: MAXIMS OF DISCIPLINE

The purpose of this appendix is to provide a survey of quotations from past and present military leaders and authors in order to provide an appreciation of the disparity of the advice concerning discipline. As such, this selection is intended to be rather more representative of different philosophies than exhaustive of each nuance. When comparing these quotations to the conclusions of the monograph, it must be remembered that the stated purpose of the monograph was to look beyond these aphorisms to the future of warfare.

These quotations were gathered from various articles and books reviewed while conducting the research for this monograph. Particularly useful were books dedicated to collecting military quotations, such as Robert A. Fitton's Leadership: Quotations from the Military Tradition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), Robert Debs Heinl, Jr.'s Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1966), and Peter Tsouras' Warrior's Words: A Quotation Book (London: Cassell, 1992). Each of these books contained a section of quotations on discipline, many of which are recorded in this appendix. This appendix borrowed generously from both sources while further augmenting with quotations found in the course of the research.

While compiling quotations is not a high form of scholarship, this appendix is important because quotations of this type, even if inaccurate, misattributed, or taken out of context, tend to take on a life of their own. In those instances where quotations were cited in secondary sources with incomplete citations to a primary source, their accuracy could not be independently verified. Some apparent inaccuracies are probably the results of more than one person making similar or identical statements. For instance, secondary sources attribute the maxim "discipline is the soul of an army" about equally between Maurice de Saxe, George Washington, and William Tecumseh Sherman; each is correct.
Discipline is as vital to the success of an army as live steam to the operation of a locomotive . . . Discipline may be defined as that psychic something which is always recognized by its manifestations of ever present respect for superiors, and instant cheerful obedience, not only to orders given, but to a high personal sense of duty.
Lieutenant Colonel Lincoln Andrews, Fundamentals of Military Service

An army without discipline is useless in war and dangerous in peace.
Otto von Bismarck, 1815-1898

There are two systems which, generally speaking, divide the disciplinarians, the one is that of training men like spaniels, by the stick; the other . . . of substituting the point of honor in the place of severity. The followers of the first are for reducing the nature of man as low as it will bear . . . The admirers of the latter are for exalting rationality, and they are commonly deceived in their expectations . . . I apprehend a just medium between the two extremes to be the surest means to bring English soldiers to perfection.
Major General John Burgoyne, Code of Instructions for the 15th Dragoons, 1762

As the severity of military operations increases, so also must the sternness of the discipline.
Sir Winston Churchill, The River War (1899)

Grim severity and iron discipline may be able to preserve the virtues of a unit, but it cannot create them. These factors are valuable, but they should not be overrated. Discipline, skill, goodwill, a certain pride, a high morale, are the attributes of an army trained in times of peace. They command respect, but they have no strength of their own. They stand or fall together. One crack, and the whole thing goes, like a glass too quickly cooled.
Karl von Clausewitz, On War (1832)

The superiority which disciplined soldiers show over undisciplined masses is primarily the consequence of confidence which each has in his comrades.
Sir Charles Darwin, 1809-1882, The Descent of Man

Discipline is as necessary to the soldier as the air he breathes. It is not only the source of his strength, it is the source of his contentment.
Jean Doutard, Taxis of the Marne (1957)
The discipline upon which a successful army must be built is a kind that will endure when every semblance of authority has vanished, when the leader has fallen, when the members of the team are dropping out one by one, and when the only driving power that remains is the strong and unconquerable spirit of the team. That serves to give us a working definition of military discipline -- the spirit of the team.

Editorial, Army Navy Register (October 26, 1940)

In a high place, discipline implies mental activity and a display of will. Laziness of mind leads to indiscipline, just as does insubordination.

Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Precepts and Judgments (1919)

To be disciplined . . . means that one frankly adopts the thoughts and views of the superior in command, and that one uses all humanly practicable means in order to give him satisfaction.

Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Precepts and Judgments (1919)

An army is, moreover a delicate being kept alive by discipline. "Discipline is the strength of armies," they say. It is much more; it is the very first condition of their existence. Discipline alone, owing to hierarchic organization, and to the transmission and execution of orders resulting therefrom, permits a commander to direct any action.

Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Precepts and Judgments (1919)

When we speak of conscious discipline, it means that it is built up on the basis of political consciousness of the officers and men, and the most important method of maintaining discipline is education and persuasion, thus making the army men of their own accord, respect and remind each other to observe discipline. When we speak of strict discipline, it means that everyone in the army, regardless of rank or officer must observe discipline and no infringements are allowed.

General Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (1961)

It is a mistaken idea that precision of movement and smartness of appearance, which for the popular mind are often the whole meaning of the word 'discipline,' can only be obtained by the Prussian discipline, where the individuality of man is ground out until only a robot-like body is left . . . Intelligent men whose minds are disciplined in the best sense can acquire these qualities as well as, and more quickly than, the barrack-square product. But the reverse order of progress from the Frederican discipline to initiative is not possible.

Sir B.H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (1944)

Discipline is simply the art of inspiring more fear in the soldiers of their officers than of the enemy.

Helvetius, de l'Esprit (1758)
Discipline means subjection; but not subjection to officers. It means subjection of the body to the mind; it means the superiority of the human spirit to the last efforts of wind and weather, and the demons of fear, pain, and fatigue. It is the element of Stoicism without which no man can do his living well.

William E. Hocking, *Morale and Its Enemies* (1918)

External discipline, held in place by a vista of punishment, develops chiefly the powers of deception and evasion; makes adepts at beating the rules, and turns the times of freedom and furlough into times of kicking over the traces.

William E. Hocking, *Morale and Its Enemies* (1918)

Discipline is the foundation of teamwork and efficiency in my organization. Military discipline has been defined as a mental attitude which renders proper military conduct instinctive on the part of the soldier. It further signifies a deep sense of loyalty and cooperation and cheerful obedience to constituted authority...Discipline in its true sense really means cooperation and teamwork...Discipline cannot be obtained by fear of punishment. It can only be obtained by the precept and example of the leaders.

Major General Clarence R. Huebner

Discipline is summed up in one word -- obedience.

Lord Admiral John Jervis, Earl of St. Vincent, 1735-1823

[One of twelve essential conditions for making a perfect army is] A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of subordination and punctuality based on conviction rather than on the formalities of the service.

Baron Antoine Jomini, *Art of War* (1838)

... discipline should exist in the sentiments and convictions rather than in external forms only.

Baron Antoine Jomini, *Art of War* (1838)

Discipline is willing obedience to attain the greatest good by the greatest number. It means laying aside, for the time being, of ordinary everyday go-as-you-please and do-what-you-like. It means one for all and all for one -- teamwork. It means a machine -- not of inert metal, but one of living men -- an integrated human machine in which each does his part and contributes his full share.

Admiral Ernest J. King, 1878-1956
We had no discipline in the sense in which it is restrictive, submergent of individuality, the Lowest Common Denominator of men. In peace-armies discipline meant the hunt, not of an average, but of an absolute; the hundred per cent standard in which the ninety-nine were played down to the level of the weakest man on parade. The aim was to render the unit a unit, the man a type, in order that their effort might be calculable, and the collective output even in grain and bulk. The deeper the discipline, the lower was the individual excellence; also the more sure the performance.

By the substitution of a sure job for a possible masterpiece, military science made a deliberate sacrifice of capacity in order to reduce the uncertain element, the bionomic factor, in enlisted humanity.

Colonel T. E. Lawrence, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (1926)

They [the soldiers] should be made to understand that discipline contributes no less to their safety than to their efficiency... Let officers and men be made to feel that they will most effectively secure their safety by remaining steadily at their posts, preserving order, and fighting with coolness and vigor.

General Robert E. Lee, Circular to Troops, Army of Northern Virginia (1865)

A compliance with the minutiae of military courtesy is the mark of well-disciplined troops.

General John A. Lejeune, 1867-1942

Discipline, to which officer and private alike are subjected, was, in my opinion, the only basis on which an army could be effectively trained for war. Such training could be acquired through long service. It is only what discipline makes second nature in a man that is lasting, and survives even the demoralizing impressions of the battle-field and the psychological changes wrought by a long campaign.


Few men are brave by nature, but good order and experience make many so. Good order and discipline in any army are more to be depended on than courage alone.

Niccolo di Bernardo Machiavelli, *Arta Della Guerra* (1520)

Good order makes men bold, and confusion, cowards.

Niccolo di Bernardo Machiavelli, *Arta Della Guerra* (1520)
In all armies, obedience of the subordinates to their superiors must be exacted... but the basis for soldier discipline must be the individual conscience. With soldiers, a discipline of coercion is ineffective, discipline must be self-imposed, because only when it is, is the soldier able to understand completely why he fights and how he must obey. This type of discipline becomes a tower of strength within the army, and it is the only type that can truly harmonize the relationship that exists between officers and soldiers.

Mao Tse-tung, *On Protracted War* (1938)

The power of an army cannot be measured in mere numbers. It is based on a high state of discipline and training; on a readiness to carry out its mission wherever and whenever the Commander in Chief and Congress decide. Any compromise with those requirements and that purpose not only minimizes our efforts but largely vitiates our development of military power.


Between these two things -- discipline in itself and a personal faith in the military value of discipline -- lies all the difference between military maturity and mediocrity. A salute from an unwilling soldier is as meaningless as the moving of a leaf on a tree; it is a sign only that the subject has been caught by a gust of wind. But a salute from the man who takes pride in the gesture because he feels privileged to wear the uniform, having found the service good, is an act of the highest military virtue.


No leader ever fails his men --nor will they fail him -- who leads them in respect for the disciplined life. Between these two things -- discipline in itself and a personal faith in the military value of discipline -- lies all the difference between military maturity and mediocrity.


Discipline destroys the spirit and working loyalty of the general force when it is pitched to the minority of malcontented, undutiful men within the organization, whether to punish or appease them.


Very stupid comment has been made upon the discipline of the Australian soldier. That was because the purpose and conception of discipline have been misunderstood. It is, after all, only a means to an end, and that end is to secure the coordinated action among a large number of individuals for achieving a definite purpose. It does not mean obsequious homage to superiors nor servile observance of forms and customs nor a suppression of the individuality.

Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, 1865-1931
An army is a fighting weapon moulded by discipline and controlled by leaders; the essence of the army is discipline. Good morale is impossible without good leaders; both are impossible without good discipline.

Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, 1887-1976

Discipline helps men display fortitude in the face of fatigue and discomfort, while at the same time it helps them to control fear. It enables them uncomplainingly to triumph over difficulties which would have overcome them in times of peace. This constancy in enduring hardship and fatigue is the most frequently required of the soldier. Individual fortitude and corporate courage are twin products of discipline.

Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, 1887-1976

Discipline, control from without, can only be relaxed safely when it is replaced by something better, control from within. To put it differently, discipline loses much of its vital importance when the human material -- officers and men -- is exceptional.


A good general, good officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, good organization, good instruction and strict discipline make good troops independently of the cause for which they are fighting. But enthusiasm, love of country and desire of contributing to the national glory may also animate troops with advantage.

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), *The Military Maxims of Napoleon*

Discipline is essential in military service, but, unfortunately, it cannot be maintained unless stern measures are taken when circumstances call for them.


If you can't get them to salute when they should salute and wear the clothes you tell them to wear, how are you going to get them to die for their country?

General George S. Patton, Jr., 1885-1945

There is only one sort of discipline -- perfect discipline. If you do not enforce and maintain discipline, you are potential murderers.

General George S. Patton, Jr., *Instructions to Third Army corps and division commanders* (1944)

Administrative discipline is the index of combat discipline. Any commander who is unwilling or unable to enforce administrative discipline will be incapable of enforcing combat discipline. An experienced officer can tell, by a very cursory administrative inspection of any unit, the caliber of its commanding officer.

General George S. Patton, Jr., *War as I Knew It* (1947)
There is only one sort of discipline — perfect discipline. Men cannot have good battle
discipline and poor administrative discipline . . . Discipline is based on pride in the
profession of arms, on meticulous attention to details, and on mutual respect and
confidence. Discipline must be a habit so ingrained that it is stronger than the excitement
of battle or fear of death.

General George S. Patton, Jr., War as I Knew It (1947)

All human beings have an innate resistance to obedience. Discipline removes this
resistance and, by constant repetition, makes obedience habitual and subconscious . . . No
sane man is unafraid in battle, but discipline produces in him a form of vicarious courage
which, with his manhood, makes for victory. Self-respect grows directly from discipline.
The Army saying, "Who ever saw a dirty soldier with a medal?" is largely true.

General George S. Patton, Jr., War as I Knew It (1947)

Discipline is not made to order, cannot be created offhand; it is a matter of the
institution of tradition. The commander must have absolute confidence in his right to
command, must have the habit of command, pride in commanding.

Colonel Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies (1871)

The purpose of discipline is to make men fight in spite of themselves.

Colonel Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies (1871)

Discipline itself depends on moral pressure which activates men to advance from
sentiments of fear or pride.

Colonel Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies (1871)

Discipline must be a state of mind, a social institution based on the social virtues and
defects of the nation.

Colonel Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies (1871)

Discipline is an artificial bond, forged for the purpose of converting an unorganized
collection of men into an organized body, amenable to authority. It is in a sense a fetter
which tends to gall the wearer and to repress his individuality, when first submitted to, but
which gradually becomes a source of pride and satisfaction, as he realizes the necessity for
it and the cumulative strength it affords.

Lord Roberts, Speech to House of Lords (July 6, 1914)
After the organization of troops, military discipline is the first matter that presents itself. It is the soul of armies. If it is not established with wisdom and maintained with unshakable resolution you will have no soldiers. Regiments and armies will only be contemptible, armed mobs, more dangerous to their own country than the enemy... It has always been noted that it is with those armies in which the severest discipline is enforced that the greatest deeds are performed.

Marshal Maurice de Saxe, Reveries (1732)

All the mystery of military discipline is to be found in the legs, and he who thinks otherwise is a fool.

Marshal Maurice de Saxe, Reveries (1732)

No soldiers have been so mercilessly flogged as those in the Prussian Army, and no Army has achieved less.

General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, 1755-1813

The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army. It is possible to impart instruction and give commands in such manner and tone of voice to inspire the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels, and hence manifests, disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.

Major General John M. Schofield, Address to US Corps of Cadets at West Point (1879)

Thus discipline becomes an inseparable feature of the army, and its nature and degree are the true measure of the army's efficiency. The more voluntary the nature of the discipline the better, but only a discipline that has become habit and matter of course can survive the test in the hour of danger.

General Hans von Seeckt, Thoughts of a Soldier (1930)

With [Americans] the only means of discipline that is likely to succeed is that which has for its object the development of a willing and cheerful obedience on the part of the soldier. The officer who knows how to attain this end is an extremely valuable one.

Major General David G. Shanks, Management of the American Soldier (ca. 1918)

Military discipline is simply a habit, and it is a habit of slow and sometimes imperceptible growth.

Lieutenant Colonel A. C. Sharpe, Making a Soldier (1908)
The more modern war becomes the more essential appear the basic qualities that from
the beginning of history have distinguished armies from mobs. The first of these is
discipline.

Field Marshal William J. Slim, *Defeat into Victory* (1961)

Discipline is not an evil burden to be endured, but a noble quality to be achieved.
General Sir Arthur Smith

If troops are punished before their loyalty is secured they will be disobedient. If not
obedient, it is difficult to employ them. If troops are loyal, but punishments are not
enforced, you cannot employ them. Thus, command them with civility and imbue them
uniformly with martial ardor and it may then be said that victory is certain. . . . When
orders are consistently trustworthy and observed, the relationship of a commander with his
troops is satisfactory.
Sun-Tsu, *Art of War* (400-320 B.C.)

By true discipline, I mean that cheerful and willing subordination of the individual to
the success of the team which is the Army. This kind of discipline is not to be confused
with the external appearance of traditional discipline: the salute, the knock on the orderly
room door, the formulae of deference to superiors—in short, military courtesy as it is
rigidly prescribed in our field manuals. The latter have their place, particularly in the
peacetime army; but they are not the indices of the discipline which really counts.
General Maxwell Taylor, *Leading the American Soldier* (1947)

The strength of an army lies in strict discipline and undeviating obedience to its
officers.
Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian Wars* (ca. 404 B.C.)

The first thing we must remember is that discipline is not created by edict. You do
not achieve discipline simply by giving orders; discipline is inspired, created and
maintained by leadership. Without that inspiration and without the necessary leadership,
you will never get discipline.
Brigadier General J. H. Thyer, Lecture to soldiers at Changi POW Camp (1942)

The ancients, taught by experience, preferred discipline to numbers.
Vegetius, *De Re Militari* (378)

Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures
success to the weak and esteem to all.
Colonel George Washington, Letter of Instruction to Captains of the Virginia
Regiment (1759)
Be strict in your discipline; that is, to require nothing unreasonable of your officers and men, but see whatever is required be punctually complied with. Reward and punish every man, according to his merit, without partiality or prejudice; hear his complaints; if well founded, redress them; if otherwise, discourage them in order to prevent frivolous ones. Discourage vice in every shape, and impress upon the mind of every man, from the first to lowest, the importance of the cause, and what it is they are contending for.

General George Washington, Letter to Colonel William Woodford (1775)

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving the peace. A free people ought not only be armed but disciplined.

President George Washington, Letter to Congress (1790)

To say that a good soldier must have discipline is no more than to say that he must have learnt his trade well. Discipline is teaching which makes a man do something which he would not, unless he had learnt that it was the right, the proper, and the expedient thing to do. At its best, it is instilled and maintained by pride in oneself, in one's unit, in one's profession; only at its worst by a fear of punishment.

Field Marshal Archibald P. Wavell, Soldiers and Soldiering (1953)

In future war...discipline should be a different matter from the old traditional military discipline. It has changed greatly since I joined, and is changing still. But, whatever the system, it is the general's business to see justice done. The soldier does not mind a severe code, provided it is administered fairly and reasonably.

Field Marshal Archibald P. Wavell, Soldiers and Soldiering (1953)

The fact is, that if discipline means obedience to orders, as well as military instructions, we have but little of it in the army.

Field Marshal Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, 1769-1852

Discipline and blind obedience are things which can be produced and given permanence only by long familiarity.

Wilhelm I of Prussia, 1797-1888

Here it is discipline that makes one feel safe, while lack of discipline has destroyed many people before now.

Xenophon, Anabasis (ca. 401 B.C.)
APPENDIX B: THE HISTORY OF US ARMY DISCIPLINE DOCTRINE

Men accustomed to unbounded freedom, and no control, cannot brook the restraint which is indispensably necessary to the good order and government of an Army.\textsuperscript{166}

--George Washington: Letter to the President of Congress, 1776.

The purpose of this appendix is to review how the concept of discipline has changed within the American military from 1775 to present. The definition of discipline proposed in this monograph will be used as a framework for analysis:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Military discipline} is a complex set of attributes which can be grouped into two complementary categories, each necessary to enhance a soldier's individual and collective combat effectiveness:

DISCIPLINE B(ehavior): Externally enforced or learned habitual behavioral responses, both conscious and unconscious, including the functions of obedience, synergism, attention to detail, restraint, and stress resistance.

DISCIPLINE A(ttitude): Voluntary, self-sustaining, value-based attitudes, including the functions of courage, identification, internalization, and initiative.
\end{quote}

The history of US Army discipline doctrine is the history of the struggle for primacy and the quest for equilibrium between Discipline (A) and Discipline (B). The doctrine never completely dismisses one type of discipline in favor of the other; yet, in studying the definition of discipline, its indices, and even subtle indicators such as where it is found in our doctrine, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the trends toward thinking about discipline in the US Army.

As noted in the body of the monograph and again suggested in the opening quote of this appendix, the very concept of military discipline is somewhat antithetical to the American way of life.\textsuperscript{167} Even during our nation's birth, our army's leaders found that the
Continental soldiers were "too deeply immersed in revolutionary ideas of liberty and democracy to tolerate strict military discipline."  

Initial attempts to drill the ragged Continental Army in the mold of the European professional armies proved difficult. It soon became apparent to General Washington that something different was needed; in November 1775, he wrote a subordinate commander which emphasized the need to "impress upon the mind of every man, from the first to lowest, the importance of the cause, and what it is they are contending for."  

Yet, General Washington displayed at least an equal propensity for resorting to coercive leadership techniques in seeking to achieve an acceptable level of Discipline (B). George Washington was by nature a strict disciplinarian, who continued to express frustration over the state of indiscipline of his soldiers. One of his solutions was to obtain approval to raise the maximum number of lash strokes from the religiously symbolic limit of 39 to 100 (although Congress disapproved Washington's subsequent request to raise the maximum number again to 500).  

Washington solicited, and received, considerable help in establishing the newborn American Army's initial philosophies on training and discipline from the Prussian Baron von Steuben, a veteran of Frederick the Great's staff. von Steuben suggested that, compared with the European professional soldier, it was necessary to take additional steps in training American soldiers. In a letter home to a Prussian Army comrade, Steuben explained:  

In the first place the genius of [America] is not in the least to be compared with that of the Prussians, the Austrians, or French. You say to [one of the soldiers], 'Do this,' and he doeth it. But I am obliged to say [to an American soldier], 'This is the reason why you ought to do that,' and then he does it.  

General Washington found von Steuben's training reforms well suited for his Continental Army, and in 1779 Steuben's Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the
Troops of the United States (often known as the "Blue Book") became the US Army's first field manual, remaining so until 1812. The "Blue Book" did not address the issue of discipline as an entity separate from training or leadership, but von Steuben's emphasis on attitudinally-based discipline is implied in his advice to captains and lieutenants that their "first object" was to gain the love of their men.  

Other early US Army regulations and manuals had relatively little to say about the purpose of discipline, which was usually inseparable from general training and leadership. For instance, in William Duane's 1810 *Military Dictionary*, discipline, "in a military sense, signifies the instruction and government of soldiers." Steven's *Artillery*, published in 1797, provided more information, hinting at the functions of obedience and synergism; it justified discipline as necessary to avoid confusion and disorder, noting that an army is a well-built mechanical machine with many parts.  

By 1813, Duane's *Regulations to be Received and Observed for the Discipline of Infantry in the Army of the United States* elaborated further, building upon Steven's discussion by adding the notion of identification (through confidence) to the advocated functions of discipline:

> The intention of discipline is war, or to produce a body of armed men, such knowledge of a common and uniform mode of movement, in combined numbers, as will give the whole of a large force the same impulse and direction in any manner that may be required by the general, add to this the confidence which every man must feel, in knowing that every man acts in the same way as he does. 

In 1821, the first regulations published by the War Department, *General Regulations for the Army of the United States*, defined discipline in terms of obedience and punishment:

> Definition of Discipline: Correction, or the enforcement of subordination; the award and infliction of punishment consequent on a breach of that subordination, that is consequent on a neglect or breach of some duty. This strict
sense is employed in contradistinction to the general or popular one, which makes discipline include also police and instruction.\textsuperscript{177}

However, this same regulation also betrayed the lingering influence of Steuben's "Blue Book":

Article 2: It is the intention of the Government, that there be established in every regiment or corps, and throughout the army, as one corps, a gradual and universal subordination of authority, which, without loss of force, shall be even, mild, and paternal; and which, founded in justice and firmness, shall maintain all subordinates in the strictest observance of duty. It requires that enlisted soldiers, be treated with particular kindness and humanity; that punishments, sometimes unavoidable, be strictly conformable to martial law; and that all in commission conduct, direct, and protect inferiors of every rank, with care due to men whose patriotism, valor, and obedience, they are to expect a part of their reputation and glory.\textsuperscript{178}

The 1847 edition of General Regulations for the Army of the United States retained Article 2 from the 1821 edition, striking only the confusing phrase "...without loss of force, shall be even, mild, and paternal..." from the paragraph. One other relevant section was added, suggesting further concern with abuse of the senior-subordinate relationship:

In all that concerns the good of the service, the Government requires that the superior shall always find in the inferior a strict obedience; and that all orders given shall be executed with alacrity and good faith; but, in prescribing this kind of obedience, it is understood that orders shall not be manifestly against law or reason; and every superior is strictly enjoined not to injure those under him by abusive or unbecoming language, or by capricious or tyrannical conduct.\textsuperscript{179}

Article 1 (Military Discipline) of the 1857 and subsequent editions of regulations contained several paragraphs which succinctly articulated Army doctrine on discipline. With some changes, these paragraphs would remain in official doctrine through the 1913 edition:

1. All inferiors are required to obey strictly, and to execute with alacrity and good faith, the lawful orders of superiors appointed over them. \textit{In 1913, the word "inferiors" was replaced with "persons," perhaps reflecting a growing sensitivity to the perception that the military was a caste system.}
2. Military authority is to be exercised with firmness, but with kindness and justice to inferiors. Punishments shall be strictly conformable to military law.

3. Superiors of every grade are forbidden to injure those under them by tyrannical or capricious conduct, or by abusive language.  

4. Courtesy among military men is indispensable to discipline; respect to superiors will not be confined to obedience on duty, but will be extended on all occasions. [Introduced in 1881, Paragraph 4 had been transferred from the Infantry Tactics Manual; this paragraph was deleted in the following (1889) edition of regulations, only to be added once again in the 1895 edition.]

5. Deliberations or discussions among any class of military men having the object of conveying praise or censure, or any mark of approbation toward their superiors or others in the military service, and all publications relative to transactions between officers of a private or personal nature, whether newspaper, pamphlet, or hand-bill, are strictly prohibited. [Introduced in 1881, Paragraph 5 was brought from another section of the 1863 regulations dealing with "Military Discussions and Publications"; the 1895 edition would later expand this paragraph to specifically "prohibit attempts to influence legislation concerning the army."]

The regulations do not appear to have been significantly affected by the American Civil War experience, despite both sides' general inclination toward increasingly draconian punishments. The North's 1861 prohibition of harsh punishments such as flogging, "bucking and gagging," and "spread-eagling" proved to be a short-lived experiment. As the war dragged on, Northern officers only found it necessary to reintroduce such tortuous and life-threatening measures to maintain obedience. In the Confederate Army, the lesson and reaction was much the same; in 1865, General Lee issued a circular noting that "Many opportunities have been lost and hundreds of valuable lives have been uselessly sacrificed for want of a strict observance of discipline."  

In 1879, West Point Superintendent Major General Schofield responded to serious hazing incidents in the Corps of Cadets with "Schofield's definition of discipline," a statement memorized by West Point cadets to this day:
The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army. It is possible to impart instruction and give commands in such manner and tone of voice to inspire the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels, and hence manifests, disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.\footnote{184}

It is known that the proximate cause of Schofield's remarks was the haz ing of plebes at West Point, practices Schofield called "vicious and illegal indulgence."\footnote{185} Indeed, even the Army Regulations contain rhetoric admonishing leaders not to psychologically and physically abuse their soldiers, suggesting that there was a problem with seniors abusing the power invested in them. Yet, there is some evidence that physical coercion appears to have gained some tacit acceptance not just at West Point, but in the Army at large. The following advice was written in 1897 by 1st Lieutenant Eli Hoyle, the first captain of the West Point Class of 1875:

> In the enforcement of discipline legal methods, should, of course, be the usual resort, but there are times when physical force must be used on the spot, and it may be the officer that must use his own hands. Prompt and unhesitating action is then required and happy the officer who has the requisite brawn and skill for the occasion.\footnote{186}

Following the First World War, a significant change of tone occurred in US Army doctrine on discipline. Military professional journals were also revealing a gradual shift to what Morris Janowitz referred to as "the doctrine of positive discipline."\footnote{187} For the first time, official War Department doctrine recognized the importance of what the soldier thinks by defining discipline as an attitude, and explicitly connecting discipline with initiative. The new 1929 AR 600-10, Military Discipline referred readers to the following definition, found in the 1921 edition of TR 10-5, Doctrines, Principles, and Methods:
Discipline: An attitude characterized by willing and cheerful obedience to orders, an scrupulous conformity to standardized procedure, and by unremitting effort in the appropriate sphere of initiative, evidenced in part by smartness of appearance and action by cleanliness of person and neatness of dress, and by respect for superiors.\textsuperscript{188}

The 1935 edition of TR 10-5 (the title being changed to \textit{Military Training}) expands the 1921 conception by defining discipline as both an attitude and a "state of training," and further articulating some indices of discipline:

Military discipline is that mental attitude and state of training which render obedience and proper conduct instinctive under all conditions. It is founded on respect for, and loyalty to, properly constituted authority. While it is developed primarily by military drill, every feature of military life has its effect upon military discipline. It is generally indicated in an individual or unit by smartness of appearance and action; by cleanliness and neatness of dress, equipment, or quarters; by respect for seniors; and by the prompt and cheerful execution by subordinates of both the letter and the spirit of the legal orders of their lawful superiors.\textsuperscript{189}

Through its 1944 edition, \textit{AR} 600-10 would continue to cite TR 10-5 as the definition of discipline.

The 1936 \textit{Field Service Pocketbook} reinforced this shift by explicitly relating subordinate attitudes to discipline, asserting that "obedience and loyalty are necessary attributes of the disciplined soldier."\textsuperscript{190} While the 1936 manual retained much of the same verbiage that had been standard since the 1857 regulations, it also expanded considerably on the "Relationships of Superiors toward Subordinates," including advice such as "... all officers in dealing with enlisted men will bear in mind the absolute necessity of so treating them as to preserve their self-respect," and:

Officers will keep in as close touch as possible with the men under their command, will take an interest in their organization life, will hear their complaints, will endeavor on all occasions to remove the existence of those causes which make for dissatisfaction, and will strive to build up such relations of confidence and sympathy as will ensure the free approach of their men to them for counsel and assistance, not only in military and organizational matters but in personal or family distress or perplexity. This relationship may be gained and
maintained without relaxation of the bonds of discipline and with great benefit to the service as a whole.  

The volumes of army manuals were undergoing explosive growth between the First and Second World Wars. While AR 600-10 continued to be in effect, the Field Manual (FM) system, previewed in the 1936 Field Service Pocketbook, had begun providing parallel doctrinal guidance on the matter of discipline. Hence, the trend towards encouraging Discipline (A) was reinforced still further in the 1941 and 1942 editions of FM 21-50, Military Courtesy and Discipline; for the first time, the concept of "true discipline" is discussed in US Army discipline doctrine:

a. Military discipline is intelligent, willing, and cheerful obedience to the will of the leader. Its basis rests on the voluntary subordination of the individual to the welfare of the group. [The 1942 edition of this manual added the following sentence: It is the cementing force which binds the members of the unit; which endured after the leader has fallen and every semblance of authority has vanished — it is the spirit of the military team.]

b. Discipline establishes a state of mind which produces proper action and prompt cooperation under all circumstances regardless of obstacles. It creates in the individual a desire to undertake and accomplish any mission assigned by the leader. [The 1942 edition of this manual added the following phrase: and, in the leader's absence, to make and carry out decisions which it is believed he would make if present.]

c. Acceptance of the authority of the leader does not mean that the individual soldier surrenders all freedom of action or that he has no responsibility. The American system of discipline calls for active cooperation from the subordinate.

d. True military discipline extends far deeper than and beyond mere outward sign. For example, proper dress and smartness of appearance, while desirable and conducive to good discipline, are not alone conclusive proof of true discipline. A more likely indication is the behavior of individuals or units away from the presence or guidance of their superiors.

Following World War II, an abrupt shift occurred in American society at large; with the war over, and a bad taste in the citizen-soldier's mouth for the quality of officer
leadership he had generally been subjected to, there was considerable public pressure to relax disciplinary standards in the service.\(^{194}\)

The War Department frankly acknowledged the problems in an *Army Talk* discussion paper entitled "Why is Discipline Necessary in the Army?" What is interesting about this paper is not its defense of the purpose of discipline *per se*, but how much space was dedicated to explaining why leaders must give orders to followers in the army. This pamphlet included the surprisingly candid *mea culpas* that "[picking good leaders] has been a trouble in the past" and "we had some [World War II leaders] who abused the privileges of a leader."\(^{195}\)

In 1945, the "Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships" (commonly known as the "Doolittle Board" for its chairman) was formed to address public and veteran outcries about various abuses and inequities in senior-subordinate relationships. While the Doolittle Report's recommendations did not radically alter the military system, the very symbolism of such an endeavor caused great concern among the military that further erosion of discipline was inevitable. Nevertheless, the popular military interpretation to this day of the "Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships" has been that it represented a "vast watering down of the disciplinary system."\(^{196}\)

Given the generally angry reaction of the professional military community, what is most surprising about reading the Doolittle Report is how little it had actually recommended changing. The board recommendations actually only impacted on what some called "discipline" by way of the tangential function of "respect" (one that this monograph rejected as a valid current function).\(^{197}\) The Doolittle Board was more likely a democratic society's catharsis rather than the cause of any profound changes in discipline.
The official military counter-reaction to the zeitgeist, however, was to abruptly and unceremoniously jerk the doctrine of discipline back to the 19th century interpretations of the concept. In 1946, what was to be the final FM 21-50. Leadership, Courtesy, and Drill was released. Even though the word "Discipline" had been removed from the title, it states that "Discipline, in a military sense, is the state of order and obedience among military personnel resulting from training." This was the same manual that only four years earlier had espoused that "Military discipline is intelligent, willing, and cheerful obedience to the will of the leader. Its basis rests on the voluntary subordination of the individual to the welfare of the group." Although the importance of true discipline is still discussed in a subsequent section of the 1946 manual, the emphasis on "order and obedience" indicated a shift of philosophy in a direction away from the idea of further embracing Discipline (A).

The 1950 edition of AR 600-10 retained the entire definition from the 1935 TR, with the highly significant insertion of four words that altered its entire meaning: the original phrase "Military discipline is that mental attitude and state of training ..." was changed to "Military discipline is an outward manifestation of that mental attitude and state of training ..." This new definition, fashioned to value appearance and behavior over attitudes, remained in the ARs until AR 600-10 was superseded by AR 600-20 in 1962.

The same philosophical retreat was equally apparent in the Field Manuals. The 1951 edition of the new Field Manual 22-10. Leadership, stated that "Military discipline is a state of order and obedience existing within a command. It involves the ready subordination of the will of the individual for the good of the group."

Nevertheless, these reactionary doctrinal reversals apparently failed to achieve the desired effect on combat readiness, for T.R. Fehrenbach reported in his classic account of the "forgotten war" that:
The new breed of American regular, not liking the service, had insisted, with public support, that the Army be made as much like civilian life and home as possible. Discipline had galled them, and their congressmen had seen to it that it did not become too onerous. They had grown fat.\textsuperscript{202}

If the US Army was unprepared for the Korean War, it could not be blamed on the softness of its discipline doctrine. Yet for many, the Doolittle Board became a scapegoat which was directly and squarely the cause of early military failures in the Korean War.\textsuperscript{203} Another possible cause for poor combat performance is provided by Lieutenant Colonel Faris Kirkland, who asserts that "I submit that it was the insecurity and authoritarian behavior [of the officer corps], with consequent loss of respect and trust downward, that had undermined discipline.\textsuperscript{204} Kirkland supports his assertion by citing, among others, the reflections of noted "warrior officers" David Hackworth and John Paul Vann (as his perceptions were portrayed by Neil Sheehan).

As it turned out, the backpedaling in the US Army's doctrine of discipline was an aberration, only to last for about a decade. After the Korean War, doctrine gradually shifted back towards the approach seen until the end of World War II. For instance, as early as 1953, the new edition of \textit{FM 22-100, Command and Leadership for the Small Unit Leader} took a small step towards acknowledging Discipline (A)'s importance when it defined discipline as "prompt obedience to orders and, in the absence of orders, obedience to what the man believes the orders would have been.\textsuperscript{205}"

In the 1958 edition, however, the definition of discipline shifted to "the individual or group attitude which insures prompt obedience to orders and initiation of appropriate action in the absence of orders."\textsuperscript{206} The 1965 edition further added that "Discipline is a state of mind that produces a readiness for willing and intelligent obedience and appropriate conduct."\textsuperscript{207} After a brief hiatus, the attributes of attitude and initiative had moved back to the forefront of discipline doctrine.
A shift in philosophy was also evident in the indices of discipline. In 1953, "things to watch for" in evaluating discipline were labeled as "indisciplines": inattention to details; quarrels and fights; insubordination; sick call attendance; indifferent response to commands; etc. 208 A trend toward positive behaviors was evident in the 1958 edition, and with the issuance of the 1961 edition of FM 22-100, "factors to be considered" in evaluating discipline accentuated proper behaviors and even attitudes: harmonious relations; promptness; proper conduct; devotion to duty, etc. 209 The 1965 edition added an indicator significant in that it explicitly included the "ability and willingness to perform effectively with little or no supervision." 210

The 1962 edition of AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedure effectively completed the return in Army Regulations to the themes evident in the Training Regulations through 1944:

a. Military discipline is a state of individual and group training that creates a mental attitude resulting in correct conduct and automatic obedience to military law under all conditions. It is founded upon respect for and loyalty to properly constituted authority.

b. While military discipline is enhanced by military training, every feature of military life has its effect upon military discipline. It generally is indicated in an individual or unit by smartness of appearance and action; by cleanliness and neatness of dress, equipment, and quarters; by respect for seniors; and by the prompt and cheerful execution by subordinates of both the letter and the spirit of the legal orders of their lawful superiors. 211

The 1966 AR 600-20 retained the 1962 definition verbatim. By then, the American military was becoming embroiled into the Vietnam Conflict, and the issue of discipline would again gain tremendous currency as an explanation for the military's failure to fulfill expectations in combat. One common military traditionalist response to morale problems was to pin the discipline problem on the "new youth" or the "counterculture." 212 This was recognition (if not acceptance) that the Army is certainly not a closed system apart from
the society it serves. For whatever the political and military issues, it was clear by the late 1960's that social changes both within and outside of the Army were having a deleterious effect on the Army's ability to accomplish its somewhat nebulous mission.

In 1971, retired Marine Colonel and military author Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. published an article entitled "The Collapse of the Armed Forces" in the Armed Forces Journal which is representative of a common reaction among senior and retired military officers of the period. His article began with the thesis that "the morale, discipline, and battleworthiness of the U. S. Armed Forces are, with a few salient exceptions, lower and worse than at any time in this century and possibly in the history of the United States." The post-World War II debate about discipline had erupted with a vengeance, but the problem was more severe because a) the Army was still fighting a war this time; and b) the leaders', soldiers', and American publics' perceptions about the purpose and efficacy of military discipline were demonstrably worse.

As seen earlier in the impetus for the 1945 Doolittle Board, the (in earlier analysis, rather tangential) issues of respect, courtesy, and senior-subordinate relations were hotly debated. In these controversies, as had happened a quarter century earlier, the symbolism of subservience had eclipsed the more relevant issues of battlefield discipline -- but unlike 1945, soldiers still in uniform were now pressing the issue. The American Serviceman's Union (ASU), for example, demanded an end to the "degrading practices" of saluting and "sirring" in their eight-point reform program:

We believe compulsory saluting and Sir-ring of officers is degrading to GIs. This show of obedience is required to create an atmosphere of subservience to the dictatorial orders of the officers. Few civilians realize that men are constantly being court-martialed and often given prison sentences for leaving out the "Sir" in addressing the brass.

For the US Army, the early 1970's was in many ways revisiting the issues of the late 40's. This time, however, the official reaction in the doctrine of discipline was quite
different. Instead of veering sharply back toward prescriptions for Discipline (B), as
document had done from the late 1940's through the late 1950's, Army discipline doctrine
stayed the Discipline (A) course in its ARs and FMs.

The 1973 edition of FM 22-100 devoted an entire chapter to discipline, expanding on
the themes present since the 1958 version. While the definition was clearly rooted in the
1958 and 1965 editions of the manual, the 1973 definition of discipline was expanded still
further:

Discipline is the individual or group attitude that insures prompt obedience
to orders and the initiation of appropriate actions in the absence of orders. Discipline is an internal attitude that motivates men to conform to the informal
and formal requirements of their leaders and the service. It is a state of mind that
produces a readiness for willing and intelligent obedience and proper conduct. Discipline insures stability under stress; it is a prerequisite for predictable
performance.217

...the most constructive form of discipline involves something more than
either punishment or unquestioning obedience. This leads to the third and
highest concept of discipline which involves self-control and a sense of personal
responsibility that goes beyond the threat of punishment or mere obedience.218

While the chapter does address "outward manifestations (indices of discipline), it does
not assume that discipline is the outward manifestation, a philosophy which had been
explicitly stated in the 1950 edition of AR 600-10. This version also tends to belittle
"mere obedience," the staple of its 1951 and 1953 progenitors. In this version, the
"outward manifestations" of discipline are important, not as ends in themselves, but
because they portray the qualities of pride, initiative, self-reliance, self-control, and
dependability.219

The totally reworked 1983 edition of FM 22-100 notably increased emphasis on the
team and on realistic standards. Discipline was briefly defined as "the prompt and
effective performance of duty in response to orders, or taking the right action in the
absence of orders. A disciplined unit forces itself to do its duty in any situation."220
manual clarified that this was not simply an external force: "The forces that drive a disciplined unit come from within that unit. These forces are the values and character of the leaders and of the individual troops."221

The 1983 indices of discipline were in keeping with its theme of emphasis on combat readiness:

Results of a well-disciplined unit shifts toward combat readiness standards:
- All missions are accomplished.
- Soldiers have confidence and a sharp appearance.
- Soldiers are proud of their unit; they know it has a good reputation.
- Weapons and equipment are well maintained.
- Soldiers at all levels are actively engaged in doing their duties. They do not waste time.
- Soldiers cooperate; they willingly help one another.
- Training is well planned, well conducted, and thoroughly evaluated for individual and unit strengths and weaknesses.
- In combat the unit fights successfully under stress.222

The current (1990) edition of FM 22-100 has very little to say about discipline, although self-discipline is subordinated to one of the features of "character building."223 The manual also lauds the attribute of "Disciplined proficiency...soldiers so proficient and motivated that they want to focus all their energy on the mission."224 While no definition of discipline exists in this version, the manual does describe what disciplined soldiers are like, adapting the "values" tone so prominent in the 1983 version:

Disciplined soldiers are orderly, obedient, controlled and dependable. They do their duty promptly and effectively in response to orders, or even in the absence of orders. The forces that drive a disciplined unit come from within the unit. These forces are the values, character, and will of the leader and troops.225

From 1966 until 1986, AR 600-20 continued to retain the definition (with minor wordsmithing) of discipline previewed in the pre-World War II Training Regulations and resurrected in the first (1962) AR 600-20. The definition of discipline in the current (1988) version of this AR, while it evades stating directly what discipline is, demonstrates
a full appreciation for the importance of Discipline (A) and Discipline (B) operating simultaneously:

Military discipline is founded upon self-discipline, respect for properly constituted authority, and the embracing of the professional army ethic with its supporting individual values. Military discipline will be developed by individual and group training to create a mental attitude resulting in proper conduct and prompt obedience to lawful military authority.

While military discipline is the result of effective training, it is affected by every feature of military life. It is manifested in individuals and units by cohesion, bonding, and a spirit of teamwork, by smartness of appearance and action, by cleanliness and maintenance of dress, equipment, and quarters; by deference to seniors and mutual respect between senior and subordinate personnel; by the prompt and willing execution of both the letter and the spirit of the legal orders of their lawful commanders, and by fairness, justice, equity for all soldiers, regardless of race, ethnic origin, gender, or religion.

Hence, after over two centuries of US Army history, it appears that US Army doctrine endorses the belief advanced in this monograph that discipline consists of many functions, some behaviorally-based and some attitudinally-based, both necessary and complementary.
ENDNOTES


2Moran, 163-164.

3William Duane, Military Dictionary (Privately Published by William Duane, Philadelphia, 1810), 121. See also Pennington et al., 128.

4Authors who have used the relationship between the words "discipline" and "disciple" to support an argument that discipline means "learning" include Fielding L. Graves, "A Man Under Authority: Some Thoughts on Discipline and Obedience," Military Review (March 1975) : 26; Allen H. Light, "Discipline is the Soul of an Army," Soldier Support Journal (November/December 1982) : 10; and Eugene A. Ellis, "Discipline: Its Importance to an Armed Force, and the Best Means of Promoting and Maintaining it in the US Army," Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States (March 1895) : 211.

Authors who have used the relationship between the words "discipline" and "disciple" to support an argument that discipline means "following" include Norman C. Meier, Military Psychology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943), 178; and Edward L. Munson, The Management of Men (New York: Henry Holt, 1921), 429.

5See for example: Ronald G. Bauer, Robert L. Stout, and Robert F. Holz, "Developing a Conceptual and Predictive Model of Discipline in the US Army (Research

6Sir Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, cited in Pennington et al., 129.

7Marshall, 23. S. L. A. Marshall's solution to this problem focused on "more and better fire" in battle, and the training that it takes to achieve this fire.

8James P. Isenhower, Jr. notes and compares several interpretations of the relationship between discipline and morale in, "Cohesion: Finding the Key," Military Review (October 1981) : 47. Some examples of these varying assumptions can be found in the following references. Colonel James J. Ford cites contradictions in the handbook Armed Forces Officer on the relationship between discipline and morale in "Coefficients of Leadership," Military Review (July 1968) : 61. Bartlett, 118, more narrowly defines discipline as enforced obedience to external authority, calling self discipline "morale."

Allen Bowman suggests that "weak discipline does not mean that morale was correspondingly weak" in The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army (Washington, DC: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943), 32. Colonel Munson, in Management of Men, 428, suggests that 2 factors make up discipline: training (knowledge, ability to fight) and morale (will to fight); in ibid., 28, Munson notes that "good discipline may be mistaken for good morale when troops execute military movements with precision."

Francis C. Steckel suggests that abusive discipline lowers morale in "Morale and Men: A Study of the American Soldier in World War II" (Dissertation, Temple University, 1990), 85-86.


10Ibid., 35.


14 Ellis, 239. In this prize-winning essay on discipline, Captain Eugene Ellis proclaimed that "The prayer of every one in the army interested in discipline and its maintenance should be: 'Deliver us from the theorists' -- for theory rather than experience has dictated the changes, well-intentioned but ill-advised, from which the army is suffering."

15 Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 177-180. This well-known criticism of the military mind by a British psychiatrist contends that the compulsive military concern for "'Bullshit' (... ritualistic observance of the dominance-submission relationships of the military hierarchy, extreme orderliness and a preoccupation with outward appearances)" is perpetuated by the military mind. Dixon goes on to comment "It is worth noting that [this behavior] marks yet another point of similarity between the oldest profession, militarism, and the second oldest, prostitution."

16 It is common to uncover *post hoc ergo propter hoc* arguments in which the author attempts to support a particular philosophy of discipline by using selected historical examples to correlate the assessed level of discipline within an army with its combat success or failure. For example, disbanding saluting is unwise, as the 1917 Russian Army that abolished this practice quickly disintegrated. See for example, Edmund Waldenowski, "The Polish Soldier: A Study in Combat Motivation, 1956-1982," (Dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1985), 165; "The Report of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships" (Washington DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 9; Reginald V. K. Applin, Lectures on Discipline and Training, (Edited by US Army War College, 1918), 7.

   Another approach to supporting an argument with history is exemplified in Jenkins, 13: "Perhaps the fact is that there is nothing wrong with our system of discipline. It is a fine system. It has stood the test of time and never failed. It is the safeguard of the Republic. He who tampers with it is treading on dangerous ground." Similarly, Eisenhower, 48, attempts to shift the burden of proof away from the *status quo* by suggesting that there is no evidence to show that volunteer soldiers cannot be disciplined "in the traditional sense."


Bauer et al., 40, discovered significantly different conceptualizations of discipline between combat, support, and training units. Moran, 168 noted "I gave this chapter ['Discipline'] to General Marshall to read. 'This,' he said, 'is written for the professional soldier. Go away and tackle the disciplining of the citizen soldier. That is the problem of the war.'" Although not entirely clear, it is presumed that the reference is to George C. Marshall, since S. L. A. Marshall was not promoted to Brigadier General until after Moran wrote The Anatomy of Courage.

Bauer et al.

Ibid., 11.


Pennington et al., 131. See also summaries of this change in Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 38-46 passim; Reginald Hargreaves, "The Root of the Matter," Military Review (February 1968) : 39-47.

Frederick J. Manning and David H. Marlowe cite the following excerpt from 1752 Saxon-Polish Field Regulations in "The Legitimation of Combat for the Soldier," in Legitimacy and Commitment in the Military, edited by Thomas C. Wyatt and Reuven Gal (New York: Greenwood, 1990), 76:

"For the officer, honor is reserved, for the common man obedience and loyalty . . . . From honor flows intrepidity and equanimity in danger, zeal to win ability and experience, respect for superiors, modesty towards one's equals, condescension toward inferiors . . . .
Nothing therefore must incite the officer but honor, which carries its own recompense; but the soldier is driven and restrained and educated to discipline by reward and fear . . . . The worst soldier is an officer without honor, a common man without discipline."


29There is general agreement that discipline is antithetical to American, democratic, individualistic values. General Maxwell D. Taylor notes that national characteristics are the greatest obstacle to the creation of a soldier in "Leading the American Soldier," Field Artillery Journal (January-February 1947) : 9. Lieutenant Colonel A. C. Sharpe suggests that the growth of discipline is slower in Americans because of individuality, independence, liberty, and a disdain for caste systems in Making a Soldier (Cleveland: Acme Publishing, 1908), 60. See also Tooker, 289-292; Pennington et al., 154; Joseph Peterson and Quentin J. David, The Psychology of Handling Men in the Army, (Minneapolis: Perine, 1918), 112; An Infantry Corporal -- Now Reserve Captain, "Discipline," The Coast Artillery Journal (Jul-Aug 1933) : 277; Hocking, 119.

Brigadier General Edward L. Munson exemplifies this assertion in Leadership for American Army Leaders (Washington, DC: The Infantry Journal Press, 1944), 63:

"The autocratic discipline of force and fear has been an effective whip for those peoples who have known the lash for many generations. It has come to be, perhaps, the only language some peoples understand. But, it is far from the ideal concept, and it will not work in the United States of America. The individualism, the independence, the aggressive spirit of the American soldier -- those very qualities which make the discipline of force repugnant to him -- make him particularly adaptable to the highest type of discipline."


32Earlier in this century, for instance, many western authors suggested that the rigid and unthinking discipline of the "hun" the "nip" or the "bosch" is of an inferior nature. See notes 29, 34 (there is a noticeable correlation between the publication of such inflammatory rhetoric and periods of war).

Major Reginald Hargreaves, 40, a British Army veteran of both World Wars, suggested that:
"Since self-discipline is largely the outcome of education and the attainment of a reasonable degree of psychological maturity, the more primitive the people, the more their military commanders must rely on the enforcement of discipline from without. It is only from the fundamentally civilized man that discipline from within can be looked for with any degree of confidence."


34 Pennington et al., 154, assert that: "The American Officer will require more time, however, to produce a well-disciplined organization, that will work together with the utmost co-operation and teamwork. This is because his material is drawn from a less homogenous population and from a free people, who have not been bowed down by the yoke of oppressive authority. They have, however, been accustomed to the discipline of an orderly people and to the discipline of teams, of factories, and of industry -- from which it is but a step to military discipline."

An Infantry Corporal -- Now Reserve Captain, 277: "The very quality in the American which makes the problem of discipline a difficult one, also makes him the finest soldier in the world when handled intelligently."

See also General A. S. Collins, Jr., "Discipline," (Unpublished paper and speech given while assigned as a tactical officer at the United States Military Academy, ca. 1951), 1. Collins, in suggesting that the American soldier needs discipline more than practically any other Army, implies that the American culture is a handicap.


37 Several authors assert that American and Israeli experiences in Vietnam and Lebanon, respectively, demonstrate that armies cannot fight effectively without the legitimacy of a social mandate. See Manning and Marlowe, 81; Kellett, 325.
Bauer et al., argued the necessity of a differentiation between individual discipline and unit discipline, and used a "unit" level of analysis in order to provide diagnostic managerial tools. This monograph did not find it particularly useful to make such a distinction during its analysis, but recognizes that other frameworks of discipline may find it beneficial to do so.

I readily admit that this approach is highly subjective, and that I am as susceptible to the biases of my experiences and values as any other author. This admission, however, does not preclude attempting a reasonably unbiased analysis.


Army Talk notes that discipline is found in "every kind of work in which men organize to get something done by their combined efforts." Army Talk, "Why is Discipline Necessary in the Army?" (Army Talk # 135, Washington, DC: US War Department, 10 August 1946), 1. Foucault, who dissects the anthropology of more general forms of societal discipline in Discipline and Punish, demonstrates that the necessity of obedience is certainly not unique to a military organization. See also Stewart Murray, Discipline: Its Reason and Battle Value (London: Gale and Polden, Ltd., 1894), 7. Murray, a Lieutenant in the 1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders writes that the object of discipline is "to implant in the soldier the seeds of victory, by teaching him the habit of instantaneous and instinctive obedience." Pennington et al., 136, Kellett, 89, and Baynes, 181 also note that obedience is one of the purposes of discipline.

It is not my intention to assert that disobedience and other conduct problems are unrelated to discipline, only to point out that they are too often used as the predominant, or even exclusive, measures of discipline. For instance, Smith, 21-39 passim, focuses on numerous "disciplinary" [conduct] problems in his analysis of disciplinary problems in the Soviet military. Waldenowski, 158-162, employs a similar procedure for the Polish military. Likewise, Bundeswehr Lieutenant Colonel Erich Moebius cites rise in AWOL rates as evidence that discipline has declined p. 90 in "Discipline and Comradery: Changing Concepts?," Military Review (January 1974) : 90; Pugsley, 300, cites low court-martial rates to repudiates charges of badly disciplined New Zealand forces.

D. Bruce Bell measures US AWOL rates as a measure of discipline in "An Evaluation of Two Systems for Reducing Discipline Failure in BCT" (Technical Paper 329; Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1978); Fred D. Baldwin suggests "that general discipline [in the AEF] was good was

43Applin, 8.


46Hocking, 121, using the example of the British Guards Regiment, argues that attention to detail taught in spit and polish paid off in World War I combat. Contrast this with Moran, 169-170, who criticizes this particular example, noting that the Guards had special selection and retention standards which also had impact on their effectiveness.

Hocking, 123, suggests the value of doing one thing to perfection (i.e. drill) will rub off in other endeavors; for example, Lincoln R. Thiesmeyer and John E. Burchard, Science in World War II: Combat Scientists (Boston: Little Brown, 1947), 137, reported a correlation between disciplined units and compliance with taking malaria pills, cited in Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 31. See also Holmes, 42.

Elmar Dinter, in Hero or Coward: Pressures Facing the Soldier in Battle (London: Frank Cass, 1985), 99, suggests that:

"The daily ritual of shaving may seem to bear little relation to the accuracy with which a soldier fires his weapon system. However, someone who carries out this simple routine unfailingly tends to find that self-assurance and equilibrium come easier, and this makes it possible for him to use his weapons systems more effectively."

47Collins, 4.


Colonel Robert B. Rigg, in "Future Military Discipline," Military Review (September 1970) : 18-19, implies through a cartoon accompanying his article that a root cause of the Army's discipline problems is the GI underground press, which encouraged soldiers to "disobey illegal orders." It is ironic that his article appeared at the same time that the Army was investigating the My Lai massacre.

49Shalit, 144.
FM 100-5, 2-3 - 2-4.

Malone, Army of Excellence, 88. See also Weick, 40-41.


This phenomenon is well-substantiated. One social psychological theory which can explain it is "social facilitation," which suggests that less-well learned tasks are more difficult under stress, while habituated tasks can "peak" when under a challenge. For one review of this theory, see Michael J. Saks and Edward Krupat, Social Psychology and its Applications (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 461-462.

See Wavell, 117; Sharpe, 20-21; Shalit, 146; Reilly, 28; Army Talk, 3. Peterson and David, 110-112, stress that habit is an essential element of discipline, and trainers must concentrate on routine, overlearning -- an emphasis on learning by doing.


Kurt-Eric Lindman, "Discipline and Combat Spirit in the Technological Age," Military Review (October 1976) : 35. See also Lane, 9; Baynes, 180; Reilly, 28; Kellett, 89.

Montgomery, cited in Graves, 32.

Helvetius notes in de l'Esprit that: "Discipline is simply the art of inspiring more fear in the soldiers of their officers than of the enemy." Cited in Robert Debs Heiml, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1966), 91.

duPicq, 77.

Cavazos, 15.

duPicq, 122-123.
General Richard Simpkin suggests that "the nub of successful discipline is team spirit." Cited in Holmes, 332. See also Hocking, 123.


While it might seem backwards that behavior changes can lead to shifts in attitudes, there is a significant body of research in the field of social psychology on these seemingly non-intuitive causes of attitude changes. According to the theory of cognitive dissonance, when a person assumes personal responsibility for undergoing an aversive consequence, there is dissonance associated with the apparent attitude (I don't like to do that) and behavior (but I did that). A normal reaction is to shift the attitude so as to reduce the dissonance (maybe I do like that, after all). An obvious parallel between cognitive dissonance and military rites of passage can be seen in a well known experiment conducted by Aronson and Mills in 1959. In this experiment, college women volunteered to undergo an "initiation" in order to join an interesting sounding discussion group (which was designed so that all the initiates subsequently discovered that it was a boring waste of time). However, the initiation itself was either severe or mild (or no initiation at all), depending upon which experimental group the women were randomly assigned to. As predicted by this theory, those who endured the severe initiation (which consisted of some embarrassing tasks) rated these worthless group discussions as more worthwhile than women who had either no initiation or a mild one. Since all other aspects of the experiment except the initiation were held constant between each of the experimental groups, it was the difficulty of the initiation ritual itself which caused attitudes about the subsequent group to be more positive. See Elliot Aronson, "Persuasion via Self-Justification; Large Commitments for Small Rewards," in Readings About the Social Animal, Edited by Elliot Aronson, (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1984), 138-139.


Keijzer, 48.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-100-2, 48; see also Kevin S. Donohue, "No Slack: A Blueprint for Combat Excellence," Field Artillery (October 1988) : 53.

Kevin S. Donohue, "Developing Initiative in Junior Officers," Master of Military Art and Science, Thesis, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 8. This paper's definition of initiative was developed in a manner similar to that used in this monograph to define discipline.


Morris Janowitz, "Changing Patterns of Organizational Authority: The Military Establishment," Administrative Science Quarterly (May-June 1959): 480. See also Wavell, 117: "One great difficulty of training the individual soldier in peace is to instill discipline and yet to preserve the initiative and independence needed in war."

Captain Leconte de Roujou suggests that "active discipline" (with initiative) is preferable to "passive discipline." Cited in Herbert W. Richmond, Command and Discipline (London: Edward Stanford, 1927), 168. Richmond, 169 also notes that "initiative and discipline are far from being hostile to each other." French Marshal Foch sees "intelligent and active discipline (or rather, initiative)" as a necessary component of military spirit: Marshal Foch, Precepts and Judgments, translated by Hilaire Belloc (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920), 181. Steckel, 84-85, noted that World War II leaders George C. Marshall and Brehon Somervell argued for "new thinking" with respect to the promotion of discipline which does not destroy initiative.

Shalit, 145, suggests that the relationship between "no questions asked" obedience and discipline is high, yet it is the nonconformists who succeed in battle. This argument is probably confused by a failure to differentiate between the importance of these attributes for different soldiers' roles and responsibilities on the battlefield. For instance, nonconformity is probably measurably more useful for a commander than for a soldier at the lowest levels in the chain.


Richmond, 183.

"The Bond: The Serviceman's Newspaper." Newspaper of the American Serviceman's Union (20 November 1969). According to Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 44, the post-World War II "Doolittle Board" was prompted by concerns over the differences in status, privileges, and uniforms between officers and enlisted soldiers.
These issues are discussed in more detail in Appendix B: The History of US Army Discipline Doctrine.


78US Army Recruiting Command advertisement running in national magazines during the summer of 1993.

79Diane J. Garsombke, "Organizational Culture Dons the Mantle of Militarism," Organizational Dynamics (Summer 1988): 46-56 passim. Regrettably, Garsombke, an assistant business professor at the University of Maine, presents an analysis incapable of penetrating beyond rather monolithic "militarist" stereotypical attributes in this article. Furthermore, she demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of military-political relations when on page 51 she uses the "...show of military force by both the United States and Great Britain in the respective conflicts on Grenada and the Falkland Islands" as evidence to consider in support of another author's claim that the military personality is "socially irresponsible, impulsive, and egotistical." Hence, this citation is presented only to demonstrate that such arguments exist in a mainstream academic journal, and not to endorse either her scholarship or her arguments.

80Donohue, "Developing Initiative," 56-62.


82Dixon, 178.

83Keijzer, 48.

84Janowitz, "Changing Patterns," 481; in Idem, Professional Soldier, 40, Janowitz argues: "In practice, the maintenance of initiative in combat has become a requirement of more crucial importance than is the rigid enforcement of discipline."

Edwards, 369, has carried the argument several steps further, arguing that the vestiges of traditional discipline are irretrievably contaminated with outmoded authoritarianism. Yet, "American military leaders haven't absorbed this lesson as yet. Consequently, excessive insistence on the specious and showy, rather than on sound combat preparation remains one of its major problems . . . Yet, clearly, in today's Army this system breaks down more often than it works out."

Hayes and Thomas, 180, suggest that the invocation of pride, trust, respect is desirable, but the most immediate means for achieving discipline is through punishment and reward. Frank Richardson, in Fighting Spirit: A Study of Psychological Factors in War, (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1978), 90, says "control from without" (his definition of discipline) will not prevent weaker personalities from yielding, therefore, self-discipline, or "control from within," is required too. Major General David G. Shanks suggests that discipline can enforced with force, like the Germans, or with common sense, pride, and patriotism--but, "no discipline can accomplish much if the force is lacking if it becomes necessary," in Management of the American Soldier, (ns, ca. 1918), 59. The necessity for both types of discipline is also stressed in the following excerpt from the US Army III Corps Commander's Handbook (Fort Hood, TX, 1984), 3:

"Because 'discipline is the soul of an army,' we must pay attention to the concept of faithful response to orders. True discipline is self-discipline. However, exercise of the chain of command in providing clear instructions and enforcing compliance with traditional public military standards (such as in drill and ceremonies, wearing of the uniform, and caring for personal weapons) is essential in building a team and exercising the responsiveness needed in battle."

Marshall, 133.


Tooker, 290.

The hypothesis that both Discipline(A) and Discipline(B) are necessary suggests that neither type, by itself, is sufficient; it further assumes that they are not wholly interchangeable. This view is possibly challenged by Napoleon's 56th Maxim, found in Napoleon, "The Military Maxims of Napoleon," in Roots of Strategy, edited by Thomas R. Phillips (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1985), 424-425.
"A good general, good officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, good instruction and strict discipline make good troops independently of the cause for which they are fighting. But enthusiasm, love of country and the desire of contributing to the national glory may also animate young troops with advantage."

Napoleon's maxim seems to suggest that either Discipline(B) or Discipline(A) can lead to combat effectiveness. This is a plausible alternative hypothesis (and is one that I seriously considered) if one sees the two types of discipline not so much as separate groupings of functions, but as two different paths to motivation. I abandoned development of such a model after concluding that such a framework obscures any differences in the type of discipline obtained as the product of different motivations.


94 Burns, 19.

95 Lane, 5-18, makes an exceptional pioneering attempt to examine 10 broad factors affecting attainment of discipline: The character and natural spirit of troops; public opinion; organization, military policy, etc.; strategical and tactical operations; character of training; character of officers; attitude of officers toward their subordinates; manner of exercising authority; punishments; psychological effects. Steckel, 84, notes that discipline is developed by feelings of insecurity, patriotic motivations, exhausting physical demands, an atmosphere dominated by fear, and constant repetition of acts to mold routinization. Neither author, however, makes it clear how these processes are related to one another, and whether the relationship is mutually exclusive, parallel, or sequential.

96 Sharpe, 20; see also 1942 FM 21-50, 2: "military discipline can be attained only by careful and systematic education and training."

97 Kellett, 89: "The third purpose of discipline ... is the assimilation of the recruit and the differentiation of his new environment from his former one." Steckel, 84, notes that basic training is "shock treatment" designed to ensure obedience and enforcement in a hurry.

98 See Denis Winter, Death's Men: Soldiers of the Great War, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1978), 41. Ellis, 191, notes "Deference to the commands of superiors has to be automatic and unquestioning, and any signs of democratic thinking or individualism that might threaten such a response must be ruthlessly stamped out." See also Duff, 74: "To the Army as a corporate whole, he is called upon to surrender his individuality; the surrender made, his life is wonderfully simplified. He finds himself enfolded in a routine "ancient, effortless, ordered, cycle on cycle set." In the process of instilling obedience as an automatic reaction, the principal agency used is close order drill. Nothing
has yet been found to rival its effectiveness in making other men feel that they are 'members one of another' and the instruments of an authority higher than themselves."

99Moran, 166. See also Captain Hans Ellenbeck, Der Kompegnie Fueher, (Leipzig: Johannes Detke K. G., 1940), cited in Pennington et al., 152:
"A goal of military training should be to inculcate the mere external discipline of the military unit until a point is reached where this discipline will be able to attain the goal by making of himself a living example of conduct for his men."

100Collins, 4.


102Gal, 108, offers insight into the difficulty associated with changing ritualized hazing methods, which persist because of "a misinterpretation of what mil discipline really means." See also Steckel, 85-86.


104Dinter, 44, suggests that "even occasional senseless tasks and unfairness, suffered together, can weld a group."

105Holmes, 44-46, cites several sources fondly remembering mild verbal abuse at the hands of their drill instructors. One explanation for such a reaction is cognitive dissonance (see note 64).

106This is the essence of the "Hahnian" training philosophy endorsed in Brigadier Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985), 315.

1071942 FM 21-50, 3 suggests that discipline is maintained in much the same manner as attained.


110Munson, Leadership, 65-66.


112 Not everyone will agree with the suggestion that attitudes do not generally come from behaviors. For instance, I have heard some leaders suggest that "if you have them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow." It is my belief that complete power of this sort is a dangerous illusion. Generally speaking, coerced people will do what they are told to do, but they will do no more. Even when unwilling subordinates grudgingly comply with an order, they can usually find subtle ways to resist and foil the leader's efforts. Social psychologists studying the attitude-behavior connection have concluded that behavioral change leads to attitude change only when people believe that they freely chose their behavior (see note 64). Since that is not true of a situation in which the followers feel powerless, we cannot assume that behavioral changes will produce the desired attitude changes.

113 Baynes, 198.

114 Sir Winston Churchill, *The River War* (1899), cited in Heinl, *Quotations*, 93. Holmes, 338, notes that when it gets to point that men will not go back into combat, severe penalties must still be available.

115 Holmes, 332-333, suggests that units in combat developed natural discipline based upon respect, affection, and dislike for shirking, but heavy casualties can destroy the cohesion and self discipline of a unit. Goltz, 165, stated that intolerable wartime conditions "may finally destroy the best discipline in the world."


118 Ibid, 332.

119 Taylor, 12.


122 Collins, 3, noted that "The degree of discipline in a unit has always been reflected in the way the men saluted, cleaned their weapons, prepared their food, performed close order drill and guard duty, and a thousand and one other things of every day life."

123 Light, 10.

124 Janowitz, "Changing Patterns," 486, suggests: "Ceremonialism is functional when it contributes to a sense of self-esteem and to the maintenance of organizational efficiency." See also Kellett, 140, which cites British Field Marshal Sir William Slim defending a sharp military appearance on the grounds that these measures were "indicative of the pride men took in themselves and in their units, as well as of a mutual confidence and respect between officers and men."

B.H. Liddell Hart, in his 1944 *Thoughts on War* (cited in Peter G. Tsouras, *Warrior's Words: A Quotation Book* (London: Cassell, 1992), 142), offers the following hypothesis:

"...the common notion that discipline is produced by drill is a case of putting the cart before the horse. A well-drilled battalion has often proved a bad one in the field. By contrast a good battalion is often good at drill -- because if the spirit is right, it likes to do all things well. Here is the real sequence of causation."

125 Pennington et al., 140, underline the importance of saluting, suggesting that it reinforces the authority of the senior: "slackness in saluting will quickly lead to slackness in other matters." Hence, saluting is not simply an effect or a manifestation of discipline, but also a cause of the future discipline of the unit. Similarly, in C. G. Lott, "On Discipline," *Military Review* (January 1946) : 10, the author says these "petty inconveniences" are outward signs of discipline, yet also help teach discipline. Rigg, 16-17, decrives permissive standards of soldiers' hair length, concluding that to concede or

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compromise on this standard is unnecessary and unwise precedent. See also Bruce C. Clarke, Guidelines for the Leader and Commander (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1973), 54: "Only one kind of discipline is acceptable -- it is perfect discipline. When trainees show evidence of poor discipline, it is generally because their commanders have failed to insist on perfect discipline from the start."

It is my personal opinion that this line of reasoning is perilously fragile; while its advocates are quick to point out that any and all standards must be enforced, they rarely answer the equally important question of whether the standard should exist in the first place. The perpetuation of vestigial standards cannot be justified by the desire to have more standards available to discipline the troops with. There are standards enough which can be achieved from accomplishing one's combat tasks without needing to rely upon outdated and useless ones. The fundamental issue this debate raises is how (or rather, if,) an organization can adapt and learn from within.

The issues of saluting and "sirring," revisited time and time again in this monograph, continue to serve as social-military battlegrounds. I doubt very much that either tradition is essential to military excellence. I suspect that, as symbols of continuous tension of subjugation, these issues have assumed additional meaning well beyond their true utility (the Israeli military has managed to function effectively without either tradition).

It was my experience to serve in a three year assignment in which junior officers were expected and encouraged to address senior officers by their first name. I never observed any inefficiency or disrespect that could be traced to this practice. That being said, I am also well aware that the salute and use of "sir" are so deeply engrained in our collective military heritage that they are unassailable traditions, and any attempt to displace such traditions would meet with such a visceral counter-reaction that the cost of change would outweigh the benefits.

See note 42.

Wavell, 118. Steckel, 221, also notes that undisciplined US units in World War II could often fight well, but had conduct problems in the rear when out of combat.

Marshall, 60-61, notes that many of the bravest individuals he had ever known had passed most of peacetime in custody:

"Yet company by company we found in our work that there were men who had been consistently bad actors in the training period, marked by faults of laziness, unruliness, and disorderliness, who had just as consistently become lions on the battlefield, with all of the virtues of sustained aggressiveness, warm obedience, and thoughtfully planned action. When the battle was over and time came to coast, they almost invariably relapsed again. They could fight like hell but they couldn't soldier . . . Did these earlier signs of indiscipline then provide any light in the search for men who would probably act well in battle? Not at all!"


131 Taylor, 12:
"The Army of Northern Virginia would have rated very low in military discipline in the restricted sense. It would never have won 'first line' at a West Point parade, but by its spirit it has won a place among the great fighting units of all times..."

Dixon, 53-66 *passim,* compares British Army to Boers at length. Gal, 103, suggests that Israeli Defense Force discipline focused on "operational and performance accuracy" rather than ceremonial details; ibid., 223 notes that "Military rituals always seemed to [Jews] to be strange and rather ridiculous. It was part of what Jews used to label in Yiddish as 'Goim-nachness' which translates to 'silly Gentile games.'" See also Shalit's discussion of IDF paratroopers, 121-122.

Weigley, 187, describes Alexander William Doniphan's 1st Missouri Regiment of the Mexican War as "unwashed and unshaven... ragged and dirty, without uniforms, and dressed as, and how, they pleased." Nevertheless, this unit covered 6000 miles with the benefit of neither instructions nor supplies, routing several larger Mexican forces before they eventually linked up with General Zachary Taylor's army.

132 Conley, 4, suggests that Boer, IDF were exceptions to traditional discipline because they were fighting for survival -- but that "a different kind of discipline is required for military forces fighting on foreign soil."


134 Dixon, 58, cites the British Highland Brigade at the battle of Magerfontstein, which:
"despite their training and discipline, despite the honor of the regiment, despite all the factors which the high command fondly believed would induce uneducated soldiers to sacrifice themselves for the shortcomings of their generals, they broke ranks, turned tail and fled."

Likewise, ibid., 186, also cites the recollection of a Russian sailor and survivor of the decisive loss to the Japanese fleet at Tsushima Strait: "Again and again we washed the gangways with soap and water, we scrubbed the bridges, touched up the paint, scoured..."
the brass work. Engines and stokeholds were not forgotten . . . cleanliness became a mania!"


136 Wavell, 116.

137 Myerly notes that "[resplendent displays of army imagery] presented an enormously popular free entertainment for all classes of society . . ." in Scott H. Myerly, "The Eye Must Entrap the Mind: Army Spectacle and Paradigm in Nineteenth-Century Britain," Journal of Social History (Fall 1992): 106. See also Wavell, 116: "No one who has participated in [drill] or seen it done well should doubt the inspiration of ceremonial drill. No one has understood the effect of mass display better than our arch-enemy Hitler."

More recently, I asked a Commandant of Cadets at the United States Military Academy about the continued utility of close-order drill and parades. He responded that nothing could replace the sight of teary-eyed swells of emotion among the retired senior officers and veterans who observed the Corps of Cadets executing a "Pass in Review."

138 du Picq, 18-19; ibid., 178-179.


141 Hocking, 128. See also ibid., 130, which suggests what might be described as a "Jungian" approach to discipline: "[Ceremonies] become stabilizers, ways of escape from the ups and downs of feeling, ways of tacit access to the elusive background of meaning and to the 'self of reference' within. It is fair to say that for one's own sake it is impossible to do one's formalities too well." See also Sharpe, 24: "... drill is the only method ever devised by the wisdom of man whereby a recruit can be transformed into a soldier."

143 See, for example, Dinter, 97: "All training must be realistic, and here the forces, in their constant desire to oversee and control everything, make the most serious errors. Instruction, parade ground drill, and shooting range practice give young soldiers the impression that in the forces everything is well organized. It is only in the large-scale maneuvers that they realize for the first time that quite often confusion and chaos predominate."

144 Taylor, 12.

145 1942 FM 21-50, 1.

146 As an example, Tooker, 292, describes the results of surreptitious "saluting tests" conducted by two "regular army" officers in the Washington, DC area. It was found that many junior officers failed to salute. From these data, Tooker drew various far-reaching conclusions about the unacceptable state of discipline among US Army officers.

147 Ibid., 291.

148 Shalit, 126.

149 Ibid., 127.


151 Steckel, 220, notes that the World War II "GI" term for unnecessary discipline was "chicken"; Dixon; 177, notes: "[Bullshit] involves ritualistic observance of the dominance-submission relationships of the military hierarchy, extreme orderliness and a preoccupation with outward appearances." Kellett, 80, refers to this same phenomenon as "pipe clay," a British reference to a type of belt polish.

152 Munson, 427-428. Later, Munson, 429, summarizes the effect of such practices: "[discipline's] measures, in practice are usually seemingly directed more to the training of the body than the mind. It teaches rather the outward conformance with the military environment than the more important purpose of inward adjustment to its characteristics."

153 Shalit, 24.

154 Stouffer et al., 77, report survey results of World War II veterans demonstrating that respondent's level of education was negatively correlated with agreement to the
question "Is some of your Army drill or instruction not needed to make men good soldiers?" See also Richardson, 90: "The educated soldier of today will resist anything which looks like meaningless discipline for discipline's sake, anything he can call 'bull'."

155 Ibid, 78-79.

156 Dixon, 178-179, further argued that the need to measure becomes an irrational and obsessive force, taking on a life of its own. In what is probably an extreme case, the pre-World War I British Royal Navy avoided gunnery practice because the smoke marked paintwork, and soiled the decks.

157 The following discussion of discipline within the framework of transformational leadership is heavily based upon Donohue and Wong.


161 Pennington et al., 136, suggest that "[asking why] is not compatible with military discipline." See also Collins, 5.

162 An unidentified IDF Paratrooper Battalion Commander, cited in Shalit, 121.

163 Donohue, "No Slack," 53: "The most important step in creating discipline is to demonstrate discipline through your own moral courage and conviction." See also Light, 11; Shanks, 59; Ellenbeck, cited in Pennington et al., 152-153; Dandridge M. Malone, "Values and Discipline," Infantry (January-February 1983) : 7-8.

164 Collins, 4, stresses the importance of doing the "little things" correctly. Collins provides numerous anecdotes underlining the importance of constant correction in achieving all standards. Once again, Aristotle, 491, can be used to support Collins' advice: "A state [of character] arises from [the repetition of] certain activities. Hence, we must display the right activities, since differences in these imply corresponding differences in the states." The logical advice that can be drawn from both Collins and Aristotle is that practice does not make perfect; perfect practice makes perfect.

165 Daniel P. Bolger, "Command or Control?," Military Review 70 (July 1990) : 78.
166 George Washington, cited in Heinl, Quotations, 92.

167 See note 29.

168 Bowman, 30.

169 Light, 10-11.

170 Bowman, 29.

171 Weigley, 20.


174 Duane, Military Dictionary, 121; see also Pennington et al., 128.

175 Stevens, 20-22.

176 Duane, Regulations, 5.

177 US Army, General Regulations for the Army (Philadelphia: M. Carey and Sons, 1821), 62.

178 1821 Regulations, 13.


182 Weigley, 231-232.

184 Schofield, cited in Fitton, 84-85 (see note 40).


186 Hoyle, 12.


191 Ibid.

192 1942 FM 21-50, 1.


194 According to Toner, *American Society*, 80, the US Army "relaxed its disciplinary standards on public demand."

195 Army Talk, 6.

196 Howze, 13.
Discipline and obedience can only be accomplished by creating rank and by giving necessary privileges to accompany increased responsibilities. (Ibid., 19: "... no witness maintained that there should not be discipline and strict obedience to orders.


According to Howze, 13, the Doolittle Board "recommended a vast watering down of the disciplinary system. This resulted in the Uniform Code of Military Justice." See also Isenhower, 44.


1961 FM 22-100, 40.

1965 FM 22-100, 27.


214 Heinl, Collapse, 30.


216 The Bond.


218 Ibid., 4-1.

219 Ibid., 4-4-4-5.


221 Ibid., 151.

222 Ibid., 152.


224 Ibid., 42.

225 Ibid.

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