

The Mind is the Key: Preparing Tactical Leaders for Operations Other than War

**A Monograph
by
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Infantry**



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First Term AY93-94

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

19941216 068

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 17 Dec 1993 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MEMORANDUM

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE MIND IS THE KEY: PREPARING TACTICAL LEADERS FOR OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR 5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ RICHARD J. DIXON, USA

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES ATTN: ATZL-SWY FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-6500 COM (913) 684-3437 AUTOVAN 552-3437 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) SEE ATTACHED SHEET

14. SUBJECT TERMS OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR LEADER TRAINING/EDUCATION LOS ANGELES RIDTC-1992 INSTITUTIONAL PREPARATION OPERATIONS RESERVE HIPE-1992

15. NUMBER OF PAGES 60

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED

89091816028

ABSTRACT

This monograph examines whether Army institutions provide tactical leaders a frame of reference which adequately encompasses operations other than war(OOTW). It begins by analyzing the nature of OOTW's environment. Applying Clausewitz's theory of war, this section uses the dialectic method as the basis for developing insights into the nature of OOTW.

The monograph then uses evaluation criteria in conducting a critical analysis of two case studies. The two case studies include: the 1992 Los Angeles Riots, and Operation Restore Hope. The analysis illustrates the planning and decisions required for these operations.

Following this, the monograph develops implications for leader education based on the analysis of the nature of the environment and the case studies. Next, the monograph analyzes the institutional preparation by examining the core program of instruction for the U.S. Army Infantry Officer Basic Course, Infantry Officer Advance Course, Combined Arms Services Staff Course, and Command and General Staff College.

The monograph concludes that Army institutions provide only a very limited education on OOTW. The conclusion shows that this restricted exposure, due to time constraints, has significant detrimental consequences for the preparedness of tactical level leaders in conducting future OOTW.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

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Title of Monograph: The Mind is the Key: Preparing
Tactical Leaders for Operations
Other than War

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Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By _____	
Distribution /	
Availability	
Dist	A-1

Accepted this 17th day of December, 1993

ABSTRACT

THE MIND IS THE KEY: PREPARING TACTICAL LEADERS FOR OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR by MAJ Richard J. Dixon, USA. 60 pages.

This monograph examines whether Army institutions provide tactical leaders a frame of reference which adequately encompasses operations other than war(OOTW). It begins by analyzing the nature of OOTW's environment focusing on the object, aim, ways, and means. Applying Clausewitz's theory of war, this section uses the dialectic method as the basis for developing insights into the nature of OOTW. The synthesis from the dialectic forms the evaluation criteria used in subsequent sections.

The monograph then uses the evaluation criteria in conducting a critical analysis of two case studies. The two case studies include: the 1992 Los Angeles Riots, and Operation Restore Hope. This study does not provide a detailed description of each case study. Instead, the analysis illustrates the planning and decisions required for these operations as related to the evaluation criteria.

Following this, the monograph develops implications for leader education based on the analysis of the nature of the environment and the case studies. Next, the monograph analyzes the institutional preparation by examining the core program of instruction for the U.S. Army Infantry Officer Basic Course, Infantry Officer Advance Course, Combined Arms Services Staff Course, and Command and General Staff College.

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INTRODUCTION

Within the last two years the U.S. Army performed a range of military operations from civil support to peacekeeping. In 1991 this involved humanitarian operations in Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort followed by an increasing number of these operations in 1992. Support to civil authorities during the Los Angeles riots marked the first mission that year followed by humanitarian operations to alleviate the results of Hurricane Andrew and the civil war in Somalia. Additionally, the Clinton administration signaled future support of these operations with the potential of peacekeeping requirements in Bosnia and the Golan as part of an international force.¹ In the last year alone, the number of soldiers engaged in these type operations rose 100 percent from 10,000 to 20,000 soldiers. The number of countries involved also increased from 35 to 75 during the same year.² Clearly, military leaders will confront the requirement to plan and execute these operations in the future.

The 1993 publication of the Army's keystone manual, FM 100-5. Operations, formally recognized the operations described above and classified them as operations other than war(OOTW).³ In recognizing this expanding requirement, the Army established a doctrine for operations during war and other than war; thus, becoming full-dimensional in perspective.⁴ This perspective shifted the

Army from solely "fighting the nation's wars" to a much broader responsibility to "carry out the nation's will and meet its needs, particularly for promoting peace."⁵

Military leaders encounter a unique environment during OOTW. It can either be peacetime, conflict, or a mixture of both.⁶ The environment of OOTW, somewhat antithetical to war in theory, influences how a planner envisions the operation taking place; therefore, affecting the manner in which the plan is developed. Conditions existing in Somalia from June to October of 1993 provide an example of this environment which overlaps both peace and conflict, resulting in a high degree of confusion and complexity. Planners must consider the nature of this environment during the development of initial plans and any subsequent branches or sequels in order to encompass the potential situations.

OOTW's environment also creates a "special leadership challenge since the activities of relatively small units can have operational and even strategic impact."⁷ The tactical engagement on 3 October 1993 in Somalia illustrates this. In this case, special operations forces fought an intense fire-fight during the withdrawal phase of their raid. The results of this engagement created the conditions which forced the President to react within a very short period of time. Ultimately, this firefight resulted in the defining of the mission and an announced end-state.⁸

Future operations will feature more of these type missions. Tactical leaders must prepare themselves to perform in this complex and dynamic environment in which results of tactical actions potentially affect strategy.

This study shows that the environment of OOTW requires tactical leaders to have a frame of reference different than currently established by our institutions. The frame of reference provides the "tool that officers use to make sense" of the situation confronted.⁹

To determine if the nature of OOTW requires a unique frame of reference not yet provided by the Army's institutions, this study is structured into four main parts. The first section examines the nature of the environment. Applying Clausewitz's theory of war, this section uses the dialectic method as the basis for developing insights into the nature of OOTW. The synthesis of the dialectic reasoning method becomes the evaluation criteria used in subsequent sections.

In the second section, a critical analysis of two historical examples of OOTW bridges the gap between theory and reality. The case studies analyzed include: civil support during the Los Angeles riots, 1992, and Operation Restore Hope, 1992. This section does not provide a detailed description of each case study. Instead, the evaluative criteria previously developed illustrate the planning and decisions required for these operations as related to object, aim, ways, and means.

The third section analyzes the two previous sections and elaborates on the implications for leader education. This section identifies salient findings for preparing leaders to operate in the environment of OOTW. These points provide a focus Army institutions can use to supply the basic perspective for OOTW, therefore, preparing tactical leaders for this diverse, complex environment with its unique decision making requirements.

The fourth section examines institutional preparation for OOTW. This study evaluates the core program of instruction (POI) for the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC), Infantry Officer Advanced Course (IOAC), Combined Arms Services Staff Course (CAS3), and Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The analysis identifies educational objective levels attained based on Bloom's categories (Appendix A) and methods the institution uses to develop skills leaders require for OOTW relative to the evaluative criteria. This assessment reveals that institutions do not provide tactical leaders the foundation for a broad frame of reference which encompasses OOTW. Ultimately, this limits a leaders' ability to deal competently and confidently with the challenges encountered in these type operations.

I. The Nature of OOTW

Carl von Clausewitz stated that the first requirement and also the "most far-reaching act of judgement" for the military leader hinged on establishing "the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something alien to its nature."¹⁰ Logically, we must also do the same for OOTW: therefore, we need a sound understanding of its nature.

This study uses a dialectic approach to gain a comprehension of OOTW's nature. This method of reasoning uses Clausewitz's ideas on the nature of war and takes the contrasting idea as representative of OOTW.¹¹ The process begins by stating a thesis, represented by Clausewitz's writings. Development of the antithesis, indicative of OOTW, transpires next. The resulting synthesis provides evaluative criteria which subsequently guide the analysis of case studies and institutional preparation.¹²

In conducting this dialectic, the process orients on those main points which bound war and consequently OOTW: object, aim, ways, and means.¹³ These factors establish the framework for and within which a planner must account and operate. To analyze these type missions, a planner needs to understand how these parameters apply.

Clausewitz's definition of war provides the overarching concept which encompasses the main components this dialectic examines. According to Clausewitz, "war

is thus an *act of force to compel* our enemy to do *our will*."¹⁴ This act "springs from some political purpose" and policy must remain the guiding force.¹⁵ The political object provides the goal for an act of war.

Clausewitz explains the object in his definition of war. The imposition of "our will" on the enemy supplies the object of war.¹⁶ The object, therefore, entails making the enemy do what we want him to do. The original motive for war, the political object, should "define the military objectives of the intervening forces"¹⁷ and the degree of effort available in attempting to achieve the purpose.¹⁸ The object establishes a boundary within which everything else must reside in order to be congruent with that same object.

If imposition of "our will" on the enemy delineates the object during war, what then describes the object of OOTW? Theoretically, the object does not require imposing our will on any entity, but more appropriately orients on "eliminating causes of instability."¹⁹ In his Aspen Institute address, President George Bush described this in his concept of peacetime engagement which,

coordinates the application of political, economic, informational, and military means to promote regional stability, to retain influence abroad, and to defuse crisis.²⁰

These operations should not attempt to impose our "own will" but instead foster or further the will and desires of the groups concerned through some forum which settles

the issue and maintains order.²¹ The will of the elements involved becomes the focus. These type operations usually guide toward supporting "diplomatic goals and objectives."²² Enabling the groups involved control of their destiny versus leaving it to chance or circumstances forms a significant piece in actually designing courses of actions. This creates an atmosphere in which the groups will more readily accept the planned action.

This insight reveals that the issue in OOTW more closely relates to political and societal actions rather than the employment of military forces for traditional purposes. In fact, in OOTW the military force may actually attempt to accomplish the political object directly versus a series of intermediate military goals or objectives as during war.²³ This offers one explanation why actions of tactical units have such an impact on national policy; the normal separation between military objectives and the political object can be missing.

Analysis of the object in OOTW requires one evaluative criterion. Criterion one: the actions of military forces orient primarily on a political object versus a traditional military objective. A tactical leader must understand that "the greatest military consideration... is the non-military objective of the operation."²⁴ This also requires tactical leaders to consider and assess the political consequences of actions contemplated. These operations "demand closer and more continuous coordina-

tion between appointed political authority and the military commander than in war."²⁵

The next point examines what military forces direct actions toward, or in Clausewitz's word, the "aim."²⁶ Theory, according to Clausewitz, shows that rendering an enemy "powerless is the true aim of warfare."²⁷ By accomplishing this aim, military forces usually secure the object. Clausewitz further articulates the "aim would have always and solely to be to overcome the enemy and disarm him."²⁸

An important element related to this aim involves the idea of interaction. The idea of overcoming an enemy takes place on both sides. As Clausewitz succinctly points out, war "is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass...but always the collision of two living forces."²⁹ This point, combined with the political object and the degree of effort used in trying to achieve the purpose generate "factors that...must decisively influence the conduct of war" and provide its nature.³⁰

The aim in OOTW, using the dialectic, must contrast with the aim, as previously set forth, for war. If, during OOTW, imposing our will cannot describe the object, then to "disarm" or "overcome" a particular enemy does not characterize the aim. The aim, consequently, should prevent competing groups from having a situation made up of uncertainty and potential civil strife or anarchy overwhelm them. This should enable the groups to

maintain their semblance of power or control and resolve the situation with other means. Providing support to existing organizations is central to the development of acceptable courses of actions during OOTW.

Evaluation of the aim requires several criteria. Criterion two: the plan should focus on stabilizing the situation and establishing the conditions which allow existing or previously functioning organizations to perform their tasks. To accomplish criterion two requires recognition of criterion three: the tactical leader must comprehend and facilitate the actions of government organizations (GOs), non-government organizations (NGOs), and private organizations (PVOs). Major General MacKenzie, the Canadian officer who formerly commanded UN troops in Bosnia, stated this clearly when he said,

These new missions require much closer integration of political and military assets such as civil authorities, human rights officials, electoral monitors, humanitarian assistance organizations, and civilian observers as well as military peacekeeping forces.³¹

The aim's final criterion results from the need to grasp the concept of interaction and opposing aims. Criterion four: the tactical leader must have an awareness of the culture, its organizations, and the dynamics generated by opposing aims within the culture. Each of these operations is unique; therefore, "the underlying political, social, and economic causes demand different military approaches."³² An understanding of the

dynamics within a culture should help leaders forecast potential consequences of actions.

Clausewitz listed three 'ways' to accomplish the aim: by destroying the enemy's fighting forces, occupying the country, or breaking the will of the enemy to resist.³³ Of those, destroying the armed forces stands out as the most suitable and necessary to achieve victory.³⁴ This desire to destroy the enemy is "central to the very idea of war."³⁵ In war, a tactical leader focuses on producing destruction through the generation of combat power. The 'ways' of war must essentially be anti-humanitarian since killing "people in the most efficient way possible" describes the primary purpose of military forces.³⁶

To properly extrapolate conclusions from the dialectic requires an examination of the two forms which enable the 'ways' to occur. Clausewitz described these as the "two distinct forms of action in war: attack and defence."³⁷ The former focuses on the "positive purpose." The latter orients on resistance, thus, giving it the "negative purpose."³⁸ Ultimately, the policy which develops the positive purpose calls forth "the act of destruction" ,whereas, the negative purpose "waits for" that same act.³⁹

Just as war inherently focuses on destruction, OOTW must stress the avoidance of destruction. The specter of destruction, whether natural or man-made, usually insti-

gates the perceived requirement to conduct a form of OOTW. The 'ways' in OOTW, therefore, must be constructed so they mitigate or repair existing damage while simultaneously taking measures to prevent a continuation of destruction. Also, the 'way' should not call for either a "positive" or "negative" purpose as this implies bringing on or awaiting destruction. If this takes place, polarization could occur with the intervening force becoming the object of contempt and scorn which indicates the environment has gone from benign to hostile.⁴⁰

Hence, like the conclusions drawn from criterion one, this evaluation indicates that the traditional ways of a military force are counterproductive in OOTW. Although counterproductive, the capability to use those traditional ways serve as back up if the environment adversely changes. Evaluation of the ways requires one criterion. Criterion five: the tactical leader must ensure the involved groups understand the capabilities and requirements of the intervening force and be open and forthright with impending actions. This criterion entails announcing what usually gets withheld in combat operations and requires a major reverse from traditional military ways. To further attenuate destruction, the involved elements must consent to the intervening forces' action. Overall, their consent enhances the feasibility of criterion five.

The means to actually achieve the object in war is

force. To Clausewitz the type of force required is physical versus moral.⁴¹ Force manifests itself through combat which he called "the only effective force in war."⁴² Combat forces train to "react swiftly" with overwhelming combat power "to hostile actions on the part of an enemy."⁴³ Through combat, violence resolves the crisis and provides a "decision by force of arms."⁴⁴ The essence of war--violence, serves to regulate the war.⁴⁵ He also felt that engaging in combat was an "expression of hostile intentions" which provided continued impetus for the conflict.⁴⁶

If force provides the means of war, theoretically, compromise and tempering of violence provides the means of OOTW. In these operations, a measured level of force, appropriate to the situation, supplies the proper response.⁴⁷ If military forces do in fact react with overwhelming combat power, their actions "may impede progress in resolving conflict at the lowest possible level."⁴⁸ Use of force in this environment is "designed not to win battles but to halt acts of violence."⁴⁹ This denotes a much different approach to achieve the object than the traditional military means. Negotiation instead of violence should be the norm for resolving the crisis. Tactical leaders responsible for these missions, although still warriors, must "become more negotiators and mediators, reserving use of force to last resort."⁵⁰ This approach will provide a decision by force of discussion

and compromise versus by force of arms, which these operations really attempt to accomplish.⁵¹ Thus, in OOTW, force of arms should become irrelevant.

Evaluation of the means requires two criteria. Criterion six: the tactical leader must realize that the decisive element is not military force; thus, a critical concept for integration into the plan should be suasion by other means. Limiting the use of force to the necessary level helps the intervening force reduce,

the loss of life, maintain status as impartial players, and mitigates the desire to exact revenge as a motive on the part of belligerent parties.⁵²

Nevertheless, when force becomes a salient component of the plan then a final criterion applies. Criterion seven: the tactical leader must recognize that the use of force has/will change the nature of the environment and potentially undermine the accomplishment of the object. The danger for military leaders is blindness to "imperceptible" shifts in the nature of the environment. The inability or "unwillingness of political or military authorities to recognize the new nature of the operation which poses physical risks to the forces or jeopardizes the mission" can lead to misfortune.⁵³ The increased use of force and rising level of violence should cue an adjustment in force protection as a preemptory measure to guard against the potential escalation in violence.

The previous analysis indicates that OOTW cannot be

viewed with the same lens leaders use to understand war. The change in this operating environment is similar to a change in the physical environment when going from an urban location to a jungle. OOTW poses conceptual, intellectual, and practical challenges to the tactical leader simply because of the contrast between the missions in this environment and those in war. Tactical leaders must perceive and process the myriad of variables for OOTW and develop an assessment which adequately analyzes the object, aim, ways, and means.

II. CRITICAL ANALYSIS CASE STUDY ONE: L. A. RIOTS

The anger over the Rodney King verdict simmered...then turned ugly.⁵⁴

That verdict, rendered at 1510 hours on the 29th of April, 1992, was the catalyst for the worst urban riots to plague an American city since the 1960's.⁵⁵ The disturbance began relatively small, but quickly spread and violence escalated. The end result of "36 furious hours" was staggering: 58 killed, 4000 injured, 5200 buildings damaged or destroyed, and total losses in excess of \$1 billion.⁵⁶ The looting, arson, and violence grew so intense that local and state police agencies were quickly overwhelmed. At 2100 hours on the same day of the verdict, Los Angeles Mayor, Tom Bradley, requested assistance from the Governor.⁵⁷ A sequence of events followed beginning with the call up of 2000 California National Guard members and culminated on 1 May, 1992,

with all Guard forces federalized, employment of active Army and Marine units, and the activation of JTF-LA.⁵⁸ Not seen for two decades, U.S. troops once again operated in a unique environment to quell domestic urban violence.⁵⁹

The object for JTF-LA was established on 1 May. In Executive Order 12804, President Bush ordered the military to "suppress the violence" and "to restore order."⁶⁰ Two separate sources demonstrate how closely the military's effort focused on the object. The first is the civil disturbance contingency plan, "Garden Plot." The mission statement for this CONPLAN states,

When directed...designated federal military forces conduct civil disturbance operations ...to assist civil authorities in the restoration of law and order.⁶¹

JTF-LA's mission statement "to conduct civil disturbance operations to assist in restoring law and order"⁶² was the second source. Clearly, the military's operation focused directly on the political object.

The object and mission statement placed the military in a supportive role of local law enforcement agencies. The military, as an enabling force during civil disturbances, actually "augments local and state police forces."⁶³ In fact, the President's Executive Order authorized federal elements not only to assist but to "act in a law enforcement capacity during the civil unrest."⁶⁴

Since the President had issued his written declaration, constraints of the Posse Comitatus Act did not

apply.⁶⁵ However, confusion in the interpretation of Posse Comitatus limitations tempered use of soldiers in this manner, ultimately causing friction between JTF-LA and local law enforcement agencies.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the presence of military forces, in particular the Guard, was believed to be a significant factor in tempering the riot. By getting into place and being visible, military forces were "important psychologically to the restoration of order."⁶⁷

Considering that the object was to assist law enforcement agencies and restore order, the aim became directed at establishing stability. By creating the conditions which stabilized the environment, the military enabled "the duly constituted civilian forces to resume their responsibility."⁶⁸ To do this, military forces primarily occupied areas secured by the police. This effort allowed police to concentrate on their primary task of confronting the lawlessness. Additionally, this reduced police frustration with having to confront mobs in areas previously cleared.⁶⁹

A key ingredient to accomplish this aim for the military was interface with civilian agencies. Military leaders considered establishment of command and control with liaison to the local authorities the first major step.⁷⁰ Several reasons made this essential. First, JTF-LA responded to the FBI whom the Attorney General directed be the lead agency of the combined federal effort in

accordance with 'Garden Plot.'⁷¹ Next, as a large scale civil-military operation, this mission required tactical staffs to coordinate tasks "directly with civil authorities."⁷² Finally, MG Covault, commander of JTF-LA, viewed interaction and coordination with civilian leaders as "his most important personal task."⁷³

Federalization of the Guard somewhat hindered this essential interface between the military and civilian agencies. Although it enhanced unity of command, only 20% of requests for assistance from the civil authorities were accepted after federalization.⁷⁴ At the time, many interpreted this as a result of another layer of bureaucracy and an incorrect view of Posse Comitatus.⁷⁵ In fact, MG Covault reduced tasking acceptance based on his perception that civil agencies had gained the upper hand and therefore could handle requirements. He also wanted to centralize approval of taskings in order to reduce potential mishaps from soldiers performing tasks for which they had limited training.⁷⁶ To mitigate the adverse morale this engendered in the Guard and facilitate overall actions, MG Covault attached the only active Army brigade involved in JTF-LA to the Guard 40th Division.⁷⁷

Achieving the aim in this dynamic environment of diverse groups with conflicting agendas challenged the military. Members of all racial groups, gender and age, not solely African-American males, delineated the threat. Although the violence did not appear organized, one group

in particular, gang members armed with assault rifles, posed the most lethal threat to the military.⁷⁸ Tactical leaders also had to contend with the resistance of police agencies to what the police perceived as interference from an outside group. LAPD Chief Daryl Gates, particularly blatant in this respect, felt his force could deal with "everything without any help from anybody."⁷⁹ Lastly, the "idea of federally controlled Army and Marine personnel, trained to fight a foreign enemy, being deployed on LA streets" adversely impacted on civilians and military alike.⁸⁰ Each of these issues affected how tactical leaders could design the ways and employ the means.

Accomplishment of the aim required employing several ways. This involved traditional tasks like patrolling and key site security or non-traditional tasks such as riding shotgun on fire trucks and police arrest assistance.⁸¹ Interestingly, the Guard employed a dramatically different method than JTF-LA. Essentially, the Guard decentralized their operations. Units also colocated with police precincts and internally coordinated tasks. In many cases soldiers operated in teams of two or three. JTF-LA, on the other hand, centralized operations stressing unit integrity and operations at platoon size.⁸²

Either way required the military and police to openly communicate capabilities and actions. Not only was the need for information flow inherent in the mission; but it was also recognized by real limitations. Gathering intel-

ligence, a capacity JTF-LA could not perform, illustrates how much the military depended on the police for information.⁸³ Likewise, the police had only a vague understanding of how to employ military units as demonstrated by their request to employ soldiers as individuals.⁸⁴ Thus, liaison was critical for any method. MG Covault iterated this when he stated to civilian decision makers that they must realize "what you can do, what you can't do, what you will do, and what you won't do"⁸⁵ regarding military forces.

The threat of using deadly force provided the means for this operation. In this civil disturbance, soldier presence was decisive.⁸⁶ One indicator of the significance presence had over use of force, soldiers only fired 21 rounds.⁸⁷ A specific incident may have set the conditions for this outcome. This event involved a gang member who tried to run down Guardsmen at a roadblock. The assailant tried twice, then soldiers fired and killed him. The press reported this shooting and related that the driver had "one bullet in the shoulder and two in the head."⁸⁸ Prior to this event gang members had repeatedly taunted and threatened soldiers. Threats declined measurably afterwards.⁸⁹ Unfortunately, 'presence' does not quell most riots which actually require "gunfire and bayonets to subdue the mobs."⁹⁰

When considering the means soldiers provide, certain cautions apply. A police officer's use of force varies greatly from the type of force a soldier trains to pro-

duce. The former applies the doctrine of minimum force while the latter focuses on maximum force.⁹¹ An inadvertent use of overwhelming firepower, as happened in the 1960's Watt's riot, could very easily have generated a backlash to the soldier's presence.⁹² Wise planning reduced animosity by leaving high casualty producing weapons like machine guns, grenade launchers, and mortars in unit arms rooms. Regulated operations and disciplined soldiers eased potentially volatile encounters between American soldiers and American citizens.⁹³

CASE STUDY TWO: OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

On the 10th of November, 1992, the 10th Mountain Division (LI) was alerted to prepare for deployment to Somalia.⁹⁴ An unprecedented operation, this mission represented the first U.S. "military intervention in what is essentially an internal conflict to secure the provision of humanitarian relief."⁹⁵ This crisis situation began in 1991 with the overthrow of the Siad Barre government. This resulted in fifteen clans and sub-clans vying for control and began a destructive civil war.⁹⁶ Eventually, the conflict resulted in the extinction of all governmental services, an infrastructure so severely damaged that utilities ceased to function, and a populace starving because of the combined effects of war and drought.⁹⁷ Somalia was a state in anarchy.

In April of 1992, the UN brokered a cease fire between the clans and UNOSOM began.⁹⁸ Initially, 50

peacekeepers monitored the situation and various humanitarian agencies (HAs) attempted to provide famine relief. However, clan fighting and banditry of relief supplies continued. In response, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 775 authorizing the employment of four additional, 750 member units.⁹⁹ Exacerbated by the drought, the situation in Somalia still grew worse. After much media publicity and a formal request for assistance from the UN, President Bush issued an Executive Order to form JTF Somalia, of which the 10th Mountain Division became the ARFOR.¹⁰⁰

With the President's order, Operation Restore Hope began. The object of this entire operation was enunciated in UN Resolution 794 which stated,

The US mission is to secure ports and airfields in the area of operations, facilitate the secure passage of relief supplies, and assist the UN and non-government organizations in providing humanitarian relief.¹⁰¹

The Division similarly defined its mission as creating "a secure environment in which the UN and NGOs could assume full responsibility for unimpeded relief efforts."¹⁰²

Thus, military actions at the tactical level focused on the political object.

This linkage between political object and the tactical level also occurred in the Division's end-state.

The end-state read as follows:

People live in peace without reliance on their own weapons for protection. Humanitarian agencies are able to operate uninterrupted and a market economy begins.¹⁰³

Again, a direct connection between the tactical level and the political object existed. This created unique requirements in the aim, ways, and means which affected tactical leaders. Prior to analyzing those, however, other effects on the mission from this linkage require examination.

At all levels, planners became hindered by what they perceived as ambiguities within the end-state and military conditions required to achieve it. This ambiguity, combined with the lack of a functioning Somali government,

compelled U.S. commanders to become deeply engaged in areas beyond their understanding of the security mission, to include coordination with relief agencies, political negotiations with clan factions, and various nation-assistance functions¹⁰⁴

Known as "mission creep," this plagued commanders and staffs at all levels.¹⁰⁵ Leaders should expect this phenomena of an unclear mission, vague end-states, and other ambiguities in OOTW.

Planning for and reaction to this phenomena contribute to making this operation successful. Leaders should not expect nor require exacting guidance from higher headquarters before starting the estimate process. 10th Mountain leaders indicated their best results "came from developing missions and conditions with limited guidance and sending it forward for approval."¹⁰⁶ Only with the operation well under way did the unit cogently express the conditions required to meet the end-state with the phrase "four NOs: no bandits, no checkpoints, no technical wea-

pons, and no visible weapons."¹⁰⁷ In effect, this phrase became the aim which, if reached, would enable the unit to accomplish the object.

The aim became achievement of the standards embodied by the phrase "four NOs" which would stabilize the environment; therefore, the HAs could "effectively conduct distribution of relief supplies."¹⁰⁸ With a stabilized environment, the HAs could function efficiently and the 10th Mountain AAR acknowledges the 49 HAs as the "real heroes." The HAs provided the "food, shelter, agricultural supplies, medicine, water and a whole host of needs" that enabled Somalia to regain stability.¹⁰⁹ In essence, the military performed the "role of a service provider."¹¹⁰ The aim revolved around the object of supporting and securing HAs operations.

This task required extensive coordination with a "consortium of national and international relief agencies."¹¹¹ Because external coordination became so critical, the 10th Mountain made it an additional Battlefield Operating System (BOS).¹¹² 10th Mountain leaders regarded daily coordinations with Department of State (DOS), HAs, and village elders as a key ingredient to the success of Operation Restore Hope. This interface transpired primarily at brigade and battalion level within unit humanitarian relief sectors (HRS). The dynamics and intricacies involved in orchestrating the HAs, coalition forces, and civilian contractors became a daily "challenge

for each HRS commander."¹¹³

Interestingly, HAs cannot be viewed as one cohesive group. Each agency had "different agendas and varying levels of desired assistance."¹¹⁴ 10th Mountain leaders considered liaison critical for efficient operations. By properly resourcing liaison teams, the unit synchronized the effort of many disparate elements.¹¹⁵ This measure alone enhanced and facilitated unity of effort between the military, DOS, and numerous HAs.¹¹⁶

Political negotiations to settle clan disputes created the other part of the coordination equation challenge for HRS commanders. Two factors brought this requirement about for tactical level commanders: no operating Somali government, and no active U.S. Embassy with a viable country plan to assist in orchestrating the means. For military leaders this meant, at times, that they occupied a position "of being the U.S. representative managing the elements of national power."¹¹⁷ Many times, leaders at the operational and tactical level found themselves as the default U.S. representative.

To effectively execute these external coordinations a leader must understand the culture, its organization and the aims of the many groups. An expanded perspective on IPB and assets for HUMINT collection enhances attaining this knowledge. The 9 December, 1992, amphibious assault by Marine forces provides an illustration of why IPB considerations need adjustment in OOTW. The assault troops did

not encounter hostile fire on the beach. However, the Marines did come upon the international media and a grateful local crowd. This failure to identify the clan intent of not to resisting illustrates how traditional fighting considerations fail to capture the character of the environment.¹¹⁸ The early disregard of special operations forces information contributed to an incorrect assessment that the environment was hostile versus benign. Further complicating this problem, HUMINT teams did not arrive in country until the second week.¹¹⁹ The "fog and friction" of OOTW aggravated a complex, difficult situation.¹²⁰

The Division generally executed a five-phase concept as the 'way' to accomplish the aim. Ambassador Robert Oakley usually initiated the first phase visiting a new area to inform the local populace that forces would soon arrive in their area. The second phase focused on PSYOPs to ensure villagers understood the peaceful nature of the mission, that banditry would not be tolerated, and weapons had to be stored. The PSYOPs effort concentrated on avoiding MOUT operations, thus reducing potential civilian and military casualties. Exact timing of force arrival did not get disseminated during any phase. Phase three, planned as a combat operation with the introduction of forces, oriented on securing and stabilizing the area for HAs. With security established, relief operations began. The final phase included to components: transfer of the area

to coalition forces and subsequent redeployment to a base of operations.¹²¹

Some missions began with a surprise insertion of forces. These operations usually occurred in areas previously stabilized with reliable intelligence confirming bandits or technicals in the area. Commanders designated threat location and potential harm to civilians as a priority intelligence requirement for mission execution.¹²²

In analyzing the Division's method several factors stand out. First, units conducted traditional tasks such as air assaults, cordon and searches, patrolling, and site security.¹²³ Yet, these tasks primarily oriented on establishing the conditions which would enable HAs to accomplish their functions. This also legitimized the force because their efforts avoided showing favoritism toward any of the 15 warring factions; thus, neutralizing any potential animosity.¹²⁴

A second point resulted from the first area assessment with its traditional IPB focus and lack of HUMINT collection assets. Initially, road nets and urban areas determined unit task organization, mission assignment, and boundaries for humanitarian relief sectors (HRSs). If a more "complete analysis of clan, sub-clan...alignments and loyalties had been available to planners, these alignments might have been adjusted" with HRSs overlaying cultural boundaries.¹²⁵

The final point in analyzing the way relates to the

requirement for information dissemination. Reflecting its importance, information dissemination became a BOS for planning operations, similar to external coordination.¹²⁶ Units openly announced pending operations to allow Somalis time to disarm prior to maneuver force arrival. Although the forces took risk, their action reduced the chance of violent clashes which might taint both Somali and American public attitude toward the mission. Surprise operations, however, did catch bandits and factions off-guard, paying large dividends in security and weapons seizure.¹²⁷

The decisive means to accomplish the methods for Operation Restore Hope did not incorporate the use of force. Numerous efforts to win over the support of the Somali people or intimidate select elements without resorting to violence characterized the security operations.¹²⁸ Three areas efficiently cover this point. The first goes back to the significance of HAs performing their function. Once security was established, Civil Affairs (CA) became the major role. This encompassed establishment of distribution sites, coordination of relief supplies and with HAs, ensuring equitable distribution of supplies, and facilitating the reemergence of village councils.¹²⁹ HRS commanders "established individual command relationships, priorities, and set themes for CA units based on their assessment" since the overall theater CA plans did not.¹³⁰

To further illustrate CA's importance, one need only

examine the engineer effort. Each of the HRSs required major infrastructure repair, cleanup, and restoration of lines of communications to expedite movement of relief supplies and forces. The 10th Mountain AAR states that opening of the Somali Road may even have been "the center of gravity for participation...by Army forces."¹³¹ An implied requirement, the CA effort remained a challenge throughout the operation. Although primary responsibility for execution rested with the CA unit, tactical leaders planned and tasked CA units for specific requirements.¹³²

The second area related to the means encompasses dialogue or negotiations. For reasons previously stated, the military performed in every facet of restoring order from limited combat to political negotiations. Commanders worked directly with village elders and leaders of warring factions within their HRS to resolve issues. For some unknown reason, no State Department or U.N. political officers were available to assist. This will probably occur more often than not. Tactical leaders "must be prepared to enter the world of statesman and political negotiator."¹³³

The final area pertained to use of force, commonly called rules of engagement (ROE). Integration of ROE into a mixed peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian operation required finesse. The ROE recognized political and operational concerns to preclude "indiscriminate use of deadly force while allowing soldiers sufficient lati-

tude to defend themselves."¹³⁴ Because of the criticality of this aspect to success, the Division generated another BOS called force protection which included ROE.¹³⁵ ROE ensured the amount of force "used was adequate to resolve the situation at hand while minimizing serious injury and preventing needless loss of life."¹³⁶ The design of operations themselves made every effort to give potential foes a chance to back down. In effect, "this minimized the exchanges of fire and reduced the possibility of fratricide."¹³⁷

The insights gained in this section illustrate how the situation in OOTW differs from war and what tactical leaders should comprehend so they develop viable and feasible plans. Thus, theory combined with results of the critical analysis support the assertion that a tactical leader needs to approach the environment of OOTW with an expanded frame of reference.

III. LEADER DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS

A cogent conceptual understanding of the dynamics related to the object, aim, ways, and means will furnish tactical leaders the skills required for a thorough analysis of the situation. The evaluation criteria provide the basis for developing that understanding.

The first criterion indicated military forces would orient their actions on a political object versus a traditional military objective. In both JTF-LA and Operation Restore Hope the mission statement and military conditions

to achieve the end-state of tactical units included the overall goal politicians established as the operations objective. Few, if any, intermediate objectives existed between the tactical unit focus and the political object. This direct linkage not only created potential mission ambiguities as identified in the Somalia analysis, but also set conditions in which tactical leader actions could affect national policy. Clearly, tactical leaders require an awareness of this linkage and an ability to forecast the consequences of contemplated actions.

The next criteria focused on the aim of the effort. Based on the analysis it became evident military forces participate as an enabling versus decisive element. JTF-LA's plan focused on stabilizing the situation so law enforcement agencies could perform their tasks without being overwhelmed. Similarly, 10th Mountain's plan created the conditions so the 49 HAs could perform their functions. The plan of each unit, as criterion two stated, focused on stabilizing the situation thus establishing the conditions which allowed extant organizations to perform their function.

An enabling force inherently requires extensive interaction with many external groups. This need to coordinate formed the basis for criteria three and four. Criterion three stated tactical leaders must understand and facilitate government organizations, NGOs, and PVOs. In both JTF-LA and Operation Restore Hope external coor-

dination was critical. In Somalia it became so important 10th Mountain made external coordination an additional BOS. In each case study, the nature of the support oriented mission generated significant liaison requirements.

Criterion four addressed an interaction of a different kind--with the culture. In both examples, tactical leaders needed an awareness of the culture, its organizations, and the competing aims within the culture. In the Los Angeles riots this knowledge led to an adjustment of civil disturbance procedures away from crowd control toward gang confrontation in an urban environment. During Somalia, most HRS commanders performed direct coordination with village elders and negotiated with clan leaders. By doing this, groups involved gained some perceived control over their destiny and became a part of the solution which made the action more acceptable. Only by understanding the uniqueness of each situation and the groups involved can the leader possibly stabilize the situation in order to resolve the crisis by means other than force.

The next criterion focused on the 'ways' to accomplish the aim, thus, achieving the object. For the most part, this involved traditional tasks like patrols, site security, air assaults, etc. for which units habitually train. However, the purpose of those methods all related back to establishing the conditions to enable existing

agencies to accomplish their tasks. Operations in L.A. illustrate the need for involved agencies to understand capabilities and limitations of the forces composing JTF-LA. Once JTF-LA initiated new restraints on the use of military forces, law enforcement agency frustration grew. A complete explanation by the JTF commander may have mitigated agencies' misplaced perception.

Similarly, methods used in Somalia demonstrated the need to be open with pending operations as shown by the PSYOPs effort integrated into each mission. Information dissemination's importance expanded to such a level that 10th Mountain made it an additional BOS. As criterion five suggests, tactical leaders need to ensure involved groups understand unit capabilities/limitations. The situation might also require tactical leaders to announce pending actions.

Analysis of the mean, the final area, involved two criteria. As criterion six states, the decisive element was not military force since the actual operations avoided generation of combat power. In both examples the presence of military forces established the essential conditions necessary for stabilizing the situation. This presence ultimately allowed the decisive organizations to resolve the situation. Other indicators of use of force inappropriateness related to: the few rounds fired by the military in LA, the concern over a potential backlash from use of deadly force, the importance of CA actions

during Operation Restore Hope, and the requirement for a clear articulation of ROE.

The last point tactical leaders need to realize involves the interrelationship between the criteria. The final criterion points this out since use of force will change the nature of the environment and potentially undermine the accomplishment of the object. Once force becomes dominant as a means, several consequences occur. First, a polarization of indigenous people against the military will take place. Next a series of reactions between the military and indigenous people lead to an escalation of violence. Hostile feelings result on both sides and the situation inherently destabilizes. Thus, the object becomes subverted, the number of dilemmas increased, and force protection becomes paramount.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT

This assessment evaluates the core POIs for IOBC, IOAC, CAS3, and CGSC to determine if institutions provide tactical leaders a frame of reference which enables them to adequately analyze and develop feasible, viable options for OOTW. The evaluation specifically focused on lessons or courses which directly address OOTW. The criteria previously developed and used in the critical analysis provides the framework for this evaluation with an overall assessment of the instruction based on Bloom's classification of educational objectives. (See Ap A) The data comes from the following areas: a review of POIs,

interviews with course authors or curriculum director, a review of lesson plans and objectives, and a review of material issued to students to include assigned readings. Interviews determined the emphasis of each course and key issues for each block of instruction.

OOTW are not formally addressed in the IOBC. The POI does not list tasks related to this area or low intensity conflict (LIC), the term previously used to describe this activity.¹³⁸ Trainers believe IOBC presently covers too many tasks with not enough time and OOTW just further complicates the issue.¹³⁹ Nevertheless, trainers do informally discuss this subject as time permits.¹⁴⁰

The POI for the IOAC is currently under revision to reflect the change in doctrine from LIC to OOTW. The subject is taught over 29 class hours distributed between four major areas: an introduction, international and domestic organizations, intelligence preparation of the battlefield for OOTW, and OOTW activities.¹⁴¹ The course purpose involves preparing students for special operational missions so they understand the environment, organizations involved, doctrinal principles, and analysis considerations for decision making.¹⁴² The level of learning for these subjects involves 'knowledge' thru 'application.'¹⁴³

Development of the importance of the political object primarily comes through assigned readings.¹⁴⁴ However, some discussion covers this aspect as evidenced

by its incorporation into a proposed vignette.¹⁴⁵ Students reach the 'knowledge' level of educational objectives with this coverage.¹⁴⁶

Instruction of the aim provides students an understanding of each criteria related to this area. A practical exercise supports criterion two, the idea that military forces are an enabling element.¹⁴⁷ Criteria three and four, which cover GOs/NGOs and the culture respectively, each receive a specific class.¹⁴⁸ Students should achieve the 'comprehension' level with this degree of study.¹⁴⁹

With respect to the ways, however, students should reach the level of 'application.'¹⁵⁰ Students achieve this level thru a doctrinal discussion, a series of vignettes, and exercises which require development of a concept sketch.¹⁵¹ Because of time constraints, these exercises only use a compressed estimate. Students do not complete a full estimate process during OOTW instruction.¹⁵²

Assigned readings furnish the primary method for addressing the means. Vignettes expand somewhat on the use of force and ROE. Additionally, one practical exercise has an assigned student develop the ROE.¹⁵³ Students should reach the 'comprehension' level of the educational objectives.¹⁵⁴

CAS3 handles OOTW with a 6-day problem-solving exercise. The focus of this effort involves reinforcing and

enhancing staff skills related to the decision making process.¹⁵⁵ During the exercise, information briefs and case study reviews of past OOTW allow students to further evaluate the dynamics of this environment.¹⁵⁶ The educational objectives involved in this problem span 'knowledge' to 'application.'¹⁵⁷

Students probably only reach the educational objective level of 'knowledge' concerning the significance of the political object. The object's importance really only gets developed in the case studies.¹⁵⁸ Some coverage results from the information briefs but loses emphasis as one of several points covered in a short period.¹⁵⁹

The exercise sufficiently examines the criteria related to the aim so students should attain the level of 'comprehension.' The concept that the military performs as an enabling force develops not only from the OOTW exercise, but also the training management exercise.¹⁶⁰ External agency importance and coordination requirements remain as main issues throughout both the information briefs and the exercise itself.¹⁶¹ Case study analysis and the intelligence estimate for the exercise do elaborate on the cultures' significance to OOTW.¹⁶²

Students become familiar with the 'ways' of OOTW through several modes. The first, and most important, is the OOTW exercise which focuses on the OOTW activity of nation assistance. During this exercise, CA efforts form a large part of the concept for the operation.¹⁶³ In

future exercises, students will analyze a scenario which goes from disaster relief to peacekeeping.¹⁶⁴ Thus, they will need to use a concurrent estimate and adjust their plan with a different activity. Case studies provide the second manner of developing student understanding.¹⁶⁵ The third mode, information briefs, highlights the types of activities involved in OOTW.¹⁶⁶ With this emphasis, students should reach the 'application' level.¹⁶⁷

Adequate exposure to the 'means' takes place during the exercise which enhances student understanding of the appropriateness of force in an OOTW environment. Each of the 'means' criteria receive emphasis during the exercise.¹⁶⁸ Also, the briefs and case studies address the unique requirements for use of force and ROE.¹⁶⁹ This effort should enable students to achieve the educational objective of 'comprehension.'¹⁷⁰

The CGSOC allocates 45 class hours encompassing 12 distinct lessons to OOTW.¹⁷¹ Students should gain knowledge about the environment, doctrinal principles, and military activities involved in OOTW once they complete this instruction.¹⁷² Specific analysis of OOTW incorporates both historical case studies and practical exercises which focus on the development of a training plan.¹⁷³ The level of learning in this course covers 'knowledge' thru 'application.'¹⁷⁴

After completing the OOTW course students should have a basic understanding of the importance of the poli-

tical object. Their understanding should reach the 'knowledge' level of educational objectives.¹⁷⁵ They achieve this through the readings and class discussions for three lessons.¹⁷⁶ The readings, however, may generate confusion. In FM100-5, Operations, objective is listed as a principle in the sense of defined, decisive, and attainable goals.¹⁷⁷ Whereas, FM100-20, LIC, has political dominance as an imperative. To alleviate confusion the course author, LTC Rodger Wilson, stated that during discussions instructors will emphasize political dominance in OOTW.¹⁷⁸

Throughout the 12 lessons, the criteria related to the aim receive repeated emphasis. With this degree of emphasis, students should reach 'analysis' level in understanding.¹⁷⁹ The idea the military serves as an enabling force in support of other agencies comes through in three lessons. These lessons develop this through readings and a counterdrug exercise in which students develop a concept to support law enforcement agencies.¹⁸⁰ The requirement for GO, NGO, PVO, and cultural awareness is a recurring theme. Readings, plan development and historical analysis all convey this facet.¹⁸¹

In contrast to the effort devoted to the aim, the ways for OOTW do not receive much development. Although lessons two and twelve require students to become familiar with the activities of OOTW, neither lesson has students constructing employment concepts using the staff

estimate process.¹⁸² Two out of three practical exercises result in the development of training plans versus a tactical operation.¹⁸³ The third, counterdrug operations, only focuses on broad concepts and support relationships because time available does not allow students to generate the detail required for a plan.¹⁸⁴ Analysis will take place in the historical case studies which should give students an awareness of the ways from those examples; however, no lessons actually require students to apply activities to a given situation.¹⁸⁵ Therefore, students will probably only develop a 'knowledge' level of understanding related to the ways.¹⁸⁶

The final area concerns the criteria for the means. Instruction connected to the use of force should enable students to reach the 'comprehension' level for this subject.¹⁸⁷ FM100-5 Operations, readings and class discussion cover the principles of restraint and security.¹⁸⁸ Follow-on historical studies illustrate the constraints on means in order to develop a basic understanding of reasons for ROE.¹⁸⁹

This analysis reveals that the institutions address OOTW. However, the overall educational objective level attained is probably only 'comprehension.'¹⁹⁰ This results fundamentally from time constraints evident in each of the courses. Between the primary and intermediate education level, an officer receives 116 class hours on OOTW which represents a mere four percent of available

class hours.¹⁹¹ Several consequences stem from insufficient time allocation to accomplish this task.

Students fully exercise the military decision making process only once during the instruction concerning OOTW. In IOAC students only have time to conduct a compressed estimate for the situations encountered. CAS3 does complete the entire staff estimate process. Due to time constraints, however, students get the chance to analyze the environment from only one perspective. The course in CGSC does not even conduct the estimate process. Although an analysis methodology is used for case studies, this only concentrates on determining the various causes of crisis and instability. From an institutional perspective, students actually use the estimate process only once to develop potential options for OOTW scenarios.

Areas the implication section pointed out as key receive only minor attention because of these same time constraints. The potential linkage to the political object is only understood as a bullet under LIC imperatives. Hence, students do not understand the 'mission creep' effect and need to contemplate political effects of pending actions. CA and PSYOPs integration into an actual plan takes place only once. Their immense impact cannot truly be grasped with so limited an exposure. Finally, students do not develop a recognition that the nature of the environment changes once use of force becomes a leading component of the plan.

CONCLUSION

...success, now and in the future, depend not only on his character, knowledge, and skills, but also, and more than ever before, on his ability to understand the changing environment of conflict.¹⁹²

Unquestionably the Army exists to fight and win the Nation's wars.¹⁹³ This primary mission must remain the focus of development in force structure, training and leader development. However, this study shows that OOTW will not only occur in the future, but the nature of the environment poses conceptual, intellectual, and practical challenges which greatly vary from war. Tactical leaders must competently and confidently deal with these changes. To accomplish this, those leaders need a frame of reference which adequately encompasses both war and OOTW.

Army institutions play the key role in establishing that same frame of reference. Although but one pillar in the leader development process, institutions establish the foundation for the problem solving process and significantly affect the shape of a tactical leader's frame of reference.¹⁹⁴ Institutions currently address OOTW, but with a very limited scope. This restricted exposure, due to time constraints, has significant detrimental consequences for the preparedness of the Army Officer Corps in conducting future OOTW.

Ultimately, the consequences adversely hinder officer preparedness in three areas: when the education begins, the methods used to educate, and students' level of under-

standing concerning this problem. Junior officers leaving the IOBC do not even receive formal instruction in this area. This lack of exposure inadvertently reduces their ability to effectively execute the second pillar of the leader development process -- self-study. Without an initial comprehension of this area, junior leaders will neither know what to study in this area, nor understand the meanings and lessons from material studied. A potential four year gap exists for an officer's self-study program in this area between basic course completion and start of the advance course.

The methods used to educate officers currently lacks emphasis in applying the estimate of the situation to OOTW. As this research proves, only one Army educational institution completes the entire estimate for an OOTW scenario -- CAS3. The estimate process covers both analysis of the situation and application of ways to solve the problem. By incorporating varied scenarios reflecting the many activities involved in OOTW, schools can enhance a students' ability to anticipate requirements and plan necessary details for complex situations. But, only with adequate time can students perform the detailed analysis and planning required for a sound estimate.

This constrained exposure inhibits a tactical leaders understanding of OOTW which, as this study indicates, probably only reaches 'comprehension' level. At this stage students do not fully grasp the dynamics involved within

and between the object, aim, ways, and means. Students can achieve a higher educational objective if institutions place more importance in this subject.

Determining the time required for this goes beyond this paper's scope. However, to better cover this topic institutions should take a few measures. First, develop a central plan for educating leaders which integrates the actions of the various institutions through a building block approach, thus, ensuring attainment of a specific educational objective by certain intervals. Next, provide a focus for the instruction content to build a thread of consistency and continuity between schools. The object, aim, ways, and means with their criteria provides that focus. Consistent exposure to these concepts through readings, discussion, exercises using the complete estimate, and historical study, will achieve a cumulative effect.

An expanded frame of reference furnishes tactical leaders the necessary skills and broad perspective so they can develop feasible, suitable, and acceptable options when confronted with the problems of OOTW. A well established foundation also enhances a leader's ability to assimilate experiences during operational assignments and know what personal abilities to develop thru self-study. Confidence and competence within this area could very well determine whether leaders resolve issues at an acceptable level of violence while also lowering the frequency of unintended consequences.

APPENDIX A: Bloom's Educational Objectives and their order of development starting with lowest to highest. 195

1. KNOWLEDGE. Knowledge is defined as the recall of previously learned information. This involves a wide range of information ranging from terminology, to specific facts, to major theories. For purposes of measuring a task, the recall required is no more than "bringing to mind the appropriate material." This level is the base step of learning in the cognitive domain.

2. COMPREHENSION. Comprehension is defined as the type of understanding which enables an individual to make use of previously learned materials or ideas. Certain indicators of this step are: translation or paraphrasing from one form of communication to another, interpretation or the explanation and summation of material, and extrapolation or the ability to forecast trends. This level is the next step up from knowledge but represents the lowest level of understanding.

3. APPLICATION. Application is the ability to use concepts or ideas previously learned in particular and concrete situations. This includes the application of general ideas, rules, methods, principles, and theories. This level requires a greater understanding and grasp of the materials than comprehension.

4. ANALYSIS. Analysis is defined as the ability to breakdown concepts into its basic parts so that the hierarchical structure can be comprehended. This involves the identification of elements, connections and interrelationships between elements, and the organization which holds the concept together. This level represents a higher understanding than the previous steps because an individual must realize the content and structure of the concept or material.

5. SYNTHESIS. Synthesis is ability to put together many disparate parts or elements in order to form a new whole. This could involve developing a unique communication (speech or paper), producing a plan or proposal, or deriving a set of abstract relations. This level requires creative application and stresses each previous level.

6. EVALUATION. Evaluation is defined as the ability to assess the worth of material or methods for a given purpose. This involves assessments in terms of internal evidence or in relation to external criteria. This is the highest level of the cognitive domain because it contains elements of each previous step and requires the use of judgement.

APPENDIX B: Evaluation Criteria

OBJECT:

CRITERION 1. The actions of military forces orient primarily on a political objective versus a traditional military objective. The tactical leader must be able to factor in and assess the political consequences of actions contemplated.

AIM:

CRITERION 2. The plan should focus on stabilizing the situation and establishing the conditions which allow existing or previously functioning organizations to perform their tasks.

CRITERION 3. The tactical leader must understand and facilitate the actions of government organizations, non-government organizations and private organizations.

CRITERION 4. The tactical leader must have an awareness of the culture, its organizations, and the dynamics generated by opposing aims within the culture.

WAY:

CRITERION 5. The tactical leader must ensure the involved groups understand the capabilities and requirements of the intervening force and be open and forthright with impending actions.

MEANS:

CRITERION 6. The tactical leader must realize that the decisive element is not military force; thus, suasion by other means is a critical concept for integration into the plan.

If force becomes a salient component of the plan because of necessary branches then this last criteria applies.

CRITERION 7. The tactical leader must recognize that the use of force has/will change the nature of the environment and potentially undermine the accomplishment of the object.

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⁵⁷William H. Webster, The City in Crisis: A Report by the Special Advisor to the Board of Police Commissioners on the Civil Disorder in Los Angeles. (Los Angeles: Board of Police Commissioners, 1992), 11.

⁵⁸Ibid., 11-20.

⁵⁹Doug Jehl and John Broder, "Bush Sends Force at Request of Bradley, Wilson," Los Angeles Times, 3 May 1992, A17.

⁶⁰George Bush, "Executive Order 12804: Providing for the Restoration of Law and Order in the City and County of Los Angeles, and other Districts of California," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 28, no. 18, (4 May 1992), 1.

⁶¹U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Civil Disturbance Plan: GARDEN PLOT. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 15 February 1991), 4.

⁶²Steven W. Peterson, "Civil Disturbances in the American Urban Environment: An Evaluation of U.S. Army Doctrine," (MMAS Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), 93.

⁶³Cropsey, "Supporting the Civil...", 96.

⁶⁴Webster, The City in Crisis..., 153.

⁶⁵Leroy C. Bryant, "The Posse Comitatus Act, the Military, and Drug Interdiction: Just How Far Can We Go?," The Army Lawyer, (DA PAM 27-50-216, December 1990): 5.

⁶⁶Webster, The City in Crisis..., 27.

⁶⁷Ibid., 154.

⁶⁸Peterson, "Civil Disturbances...", 63.

⁶⁹James D. Delk, "Military Assistance in Los Angeles," Military Review LXXII, #9 (September 1992): 18.

⁷⁰Cropsey, "Supporting the Civil...", 96.

⁷¹Webster, The City in Crisis..., 153.

⁷²CALL, "Operations Other than...", 7.

⁷³Peterson, "Civil Disturbances...", 96.

⁷⁴Webster, The City in Crisis..., 154.

- 75 Ibid.
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- 77 Peterson, "Civil Disturbances....," 95.
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- 81 Peterson, "Civil Disturbances....," 70-71.
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- 83 CALL, "Operations Other than....," 17.
- 84 Peterson, "Civil Disturbances....," 70.
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- 94 U.S. Army Forces Somalia, "After Action Report (AAR)," (Ft Drum NY: HQ, 10th Mountain Division LT, 2 June 1993), 1-2.
- 95 Lewis, "Enhancing Stability....," 29-30.
- 96 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), "Operation Other than War(OOTW): Operation Restore Hope," (16 August 1993): 2.
- 97 Ibid.

- 98 Ibid.
- 99 Ibid., X1-2.
- 100 Ibid.
- 101 Ibid., XIV-24.
- 102 Ibid., III-16.
- 103 U.S. Army Forces Somalia, "AAR...", Annex B,
slide 6.
- 104 CALL, "OOTW: Operation Restore Hope," 5.
- 105 Ibid., I-4.
- 106 U.S. Army Forces Somalia, "AAR...", 5.
- 107 Ibid.
- 108 CALL, "OOTW: Operation Restore Hope," III-3.
- 109 U.S. Army Forces Somalia, "AAR...", i.
- 110 Ibid., 12.
- 111 CALL, "OOTW: Operation Restore Hope," IX-1.
- 112 U.S. Army Forces Somalia, "AAR...", 3.
- 113 Ibid.
- 114 CALL, "OOTW: Operation Restore Hope," 12.
- 115 Ibid., 11.
- 116 Ibid., 16.
- 117 Ibid., I-15.
- 118 Ibid., 6.
- 119 Ibid., XIV-14.
- 120 Ibid., I-7.
- 121 U.S. Army Forces Somalia, "AAR...", 6-7.
- 122 Ibid., 22.
- 123 Ibid., 2-3&6-7.

124 CALL, "OOTW: Operation Restore Hope," 16.

125 Ibid., 6.

126 Ibid., 2-3&6-7.

127 Ibid., III-4.

128 Ibid., XIV-10.

129 Ibid., IX-3.

130 Ibid., IX-8.

131 U.S. Army Forces Somalia, "AAR...", 24.

132 CALL, "OOTW: Operation Restore Hope," 15.

133 U.S. Army Forces Somalia, "AAR...", 13.

134 CALL, "OOTW: Operation Restore Hope," 18.

135 U.S. Army Forces Somalia, "AAR...", 3.

136 CALL, "OOTW: Operation Restore Hope," 18.

137 Ibid., XIV-10.

138 U.S. Army, "Program of Instruction(POI): Infantry Officer Basic Course," (Ft. Benning, GA: United States Army Infantry School, 15 December 1991), a review of this document shows there are no tasks related to LIC or OOTW.

139 Reply to questionnaire by Majors Todd Piester and Rick Gordon, IOBC company commanders, Ft. Benning GA, dated 12 and 19 November 1993, respectively.

140 Ibid.

141 Reply to questionnaire by CPT Kevin Dougherty, Small Group Instructor-Tactics, course author for OOTW, Ft. Benning GA, 9 November 1993.

142 U.S. Army, "Program of Instruction(POI): Infantry Officer Advance Course," (Ft. Benning, GA: United States Army Infantry School, September 1992), 4A01.

143 This assessment is based on the required tasks students will perform as outlined in the POI and which of Bloom's educational objectives the requirement most closely correlates with.

144 U.S. Army, "POI: IOAC," Required readings for certain tasks cover FM 100-20 page 1-5 which elaborate on political dominance as an imperative.

145 Dougherty, Small Group Instructor (SGI), provided the copies of course materials which includes this vignette for use in class discussions.

146 This assessment is based on two factors. The students will only have to remember this information versus incorporate it into any exercises and the amount of time spent on this area is no more than two hours. (See Ap A).

147 Dougherty, SGI, materials provided.

148 Ibid.

149 This assessment is determined because students will have to grasp the meaning of material by interpreting material and incorporating the information into an exercise. (See Ap A)

150 This assessment is derived because the course structure requires individuals to use learned material in new and concrete situations. (See Ap A) This level though is limited because only a few of the activities of OOTW are encountered and time is very constrained.

151 Dougherty, SGI, materials provided.

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid. In a typical seminar class this may involve at most three individuals while the remainder work on concept sketches for specific situations requiring a solution.

154 Because students primarily encounter this concept through readings and short vignettes, they will be able to explain or summarize the material. It is doubtful, however, that they will be proficient at use the concept in any concrete situations other than to give very cursory mention. (See Ap A)

155 U.S Army, Combined Arms Services Staff School, "Advance Sheet: Low-Intensity Conflict Exercise, F727-LIC," (Ft Leavenworth KS: Command and General Staff College, December 1988), 1. This advance sheet is the current one in use for CAS3, once the new course is approved it will get revised.

156 Ibid., 1-3.

157 This assessment is based on the required tasks students will perform as outlined in the advance sheet and Bloom's educational objectives the requirement most closely correallates with.

158 CAS3, "Advance Sheet:...", Section II, Appendix 4 to Advance Sheet, LIC Case Studies, December 1988, II-4-1 to II-4-10.

159 CAS3, "Advance Sheet:...", Section I to Advance Sheet, LIC Briefings, January 1990, I-1 to I-9.

160 Lee F. Kichen, "Memorandum for Director, CAS3, SUBJECT: OOTW Topics in CAS3 Curriculum," from Curriculum Chief, 21 October 1993, used with permission.

161 Ibid.

162 CAS3, "Advance Sheet:...", LIC Case Studies, II-4-1 to II-4-10.

163 Kichen, "Memorandum for...", 21 October 1993.

164 Ibid.

165 CAS3, "Advance Sheet:...", LIC Case Studies, II-4-1 to II-4-10.

166 CAS3, "Advance Sheet:...", Section I to Advance Sheet, LIC Briefings, January 1990, I-1 to I-9.

167 This assessment is derived because the course structure requires individuals to use learned material in new and concrete situations. (See Ap A) The application level is reinforced with the exercise itself which uses the estimate process as a vehicle for the instruction.

168 CAS3, "Advance Sheet:...", 1-3&13.

169 CAS3, "Advance Sheet:...", Section I to Advance Sheet, LIC Briefings, January 1990, I-1 to I-9; LIC Case Studies, II-4-1 to II-4-10.

170 Although students actually incorporate the activities of OOTW within the exercise, their experience to this area is limited to the one role position they function in during the exercise. To actually apply the many ways of OOTW requires repeated exposure to varied situations. With time limited for only one exercise, the students perspective is restricted to the single experience; therefore, their ability to apply the ways to new and concrete situations is reduced. (See Ap A)

171 U.S. Army, Command and General Staff College, (CGSOC), "Advance Sheet: Operations Other than War, C520, Course Syllabus, (Ft Leavenworth KS: CGSC, January 1994), 1.

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid., 1-2, 511-512.

174 Ibid., 1-2, Each of the advance sheets has the level students are expected to reach in relation to the specific requirements for a lesson. There are two terminal learning objectives (TLO) for this course. The first one is to analyze OOTW with a required educational objective of 'analysis.' The second TLO is to develop a unit training plan for an OOTW activity with an objective of 'application.'

175 Ibid., 25.

176 Ibid., 7-8, 25, 37.

177 U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations, 13-3; U.S. Army, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, 1-5.

178 Rodger Wilson, LTC, U.S. Army, C520 Course author, CGSOC, interview by author conducted on 18 November, 1993.

179 Ibid., 1-2, TLO number 1.

180 Ibid., 331-333.

181 Ibid., 63-65, 509-513.

182 Ibid., 25, 509-513.

183 Ibid., lessons six and twelve incorporate the development of a training plan which is in accordance to the second TLO. Lesson nine is the counterdrug operation previously described.

184 Ibid., 331-333.

185 Ibid., lesson nine, which is the sole lesson focused on possibly applying the ways of OOTW, orients primarily on issues and considerations although students do develop a concept of support.

186 Ibid., lesson nine has 'knowledge' listed as the expected educational level achieved.

187 Ibid., 7.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 7-8, 25-26, 37-38, the readings for these lessons includes the areas of FM100-5 (Operations) and FM 100-20 (LIC) which includes the aspect of restraint and security.

¹⁹⁰ Because students will not actually use the estimate of the situation to solve specific situations, their ability to actually apply material to OOTW scenarios will be limited. Although time is allocated to develop a training plan (apply) in two lessons, the crossover benefit is dubious. The actual analysis of the situation in lesson five is also done with an eye toward examining the the causes of the crisis and instability instead of an actual situation(63). For those reasons, students will grasp the meaning of the material (i.e. 'comprehension') but they will have a limited ability to breakdown material into component parts. (analysis) (See Ap A).

¹⁹¹ These numbers are derived by totalling the hours available in each of the courses for OOTW: IOAC(22), CAS3(42), and CGSC(45). The percentage is obtained by taking the total core hours available (3055), to include IOBC, and dividing by the sum of the OOTW hours (116).

¹⁹² John R. Galvin, "Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm," Parameters (Winter 1986): 7.

¹⁹³ U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations, 1-4.

¹⁹⁴ U.S. Army, STP 21-111-MQS, 1&7.

¹⁹⁵ Benjamin S. Bloom, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Book I: Cognitive Domain (New York: Longman, 1984), 201-207.

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