

Leader Development: Leveraging Combat Power Through Leadership

**A Monograph
by
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~~by MAJ John F. Agoglia, Infantry, 60 pages~~

The Army can declare that leader development and training are inseparable; that does not mean they are. Analysis from this study provides a review of the leadership doctrinal manuals and identifies the absence of a concise and coherent doctrine which melds leader development and training together. The doctrinal manuals provide multiple lists, frameworks, and principles that must be adhered to in order to achieve the leadership effects required to generate overwhelming combat power at the point of decision. The doctrine fails to explain how to implement these guidelines. The user is left to pick and choose from this menu of lists and frameworks until by trial and error they hit on a combination that works. Without effective action the frameworks and principles become nothing more than meaningless words. Doctrine that is not used is of no use. THEM.

In order for leader development and training to be inseparable the Army must provide the force with a valid leader development construct that clearly links the training management cycle to the doctrinal leadership frameworks and outlines the hierarchy of leader, team, and unit development. This study provides two such constructs, one which links the training management cycle to the leadership frameworks, and the other that outlines the hierarchy of development. Comprehending the linkage between the doctrinal leadership frameworks and the training management cycle is key for effective leader development. The study expounds upon these constructs, proposing a strategy for translating our leadership and training doctrine into action. The strategy put forth will enable brigade commanders to better develop leaders capable of leveraging the units combat power through their leadership.

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The Army can declare that leader development and training are inseparable; that does not mean they are. Analysis from this study provides a review of the leadership doctrinal manuals and identifies the absence of a concise and coherent doctrine which melds leader development and training together. The doctrinal manuals provide multiple lists, frameworks, and principles that must be adhered to in order to achieve the leadership effects required to generate overwhelming combat power at the point of decision. The doctrine fails to explain how to implement these guidelines. The user is left to pick and choose from this menu of lists and frameworks until by trial and error they hit on a combination that works. Without effective action the frameworks and principles become nothing more than meaningless words. Doctrine that is not used is of no use.

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INTRODUCTION

The cold damp night air is nipping at Colonel Hogan's face as he huddles in his Hummer. He is rapidly approaching checkpoint 75 to link-up with his battalion commanders for a brief back on their concepts for the attack the next day. He can not help thinking how the entire 13th Corps is depending upon his unit's successful seizure of the Macedonian town of Titov Veles and fixing the 7th Serbian Armored Brigade in Skopje. This will allow the 77th Infantry and 27th Armored Division to encircle to the east and destroy the remaining Serb forces in Macedonia, ending the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. As Colonel Hogan reflects upon his plan of attack his anxiety begins to build. . . I sure hope LTC Todd Moriority understands the importance of rapidly penetrating the Serb's security zone and suppressing the Serbian tank positions in the main defensive belt so LTC Clarence Briggs unit can breach the obstacles and penetrate the main defensive. . . LTC Briggs must impress upon his people the need to quickly pass through LTC Loren Ramos' forces to clear OBJ SAMPSON, opening up the 13th Corps bypass route. . . . LTC Ramos must understand he will have to risk mass to generate speed in order to clear OBJ SAMPSON and get in position to fix the 7th Serbian Armored Brigade and allow. . . Suddenly a series of loud explosions, the clatter of semi-automatic fire and the crackle of his command net bring Colonel Hogan back to reality.

. . . . Mortar 7 this is Moriority six fire mission, 50
dismounts in the open, Grid 12345678, Direction 1375. . .

. . . Hogan 6 this is Briggs 6 hold where you are CP75 is
under attack by unidentified forces. . . . pregnant pause. . . .
Hogan 6, Ramos 6 is down. . . .

By now Colonel Hogan can see tracers lighting up the night
sky and can hear the 120mm cannon on the M1A2 Abrams pounding
away. As the mortars come screaming in he hears. . . . Mortar 7
this is Moriority 6 fire for . . . and the net goes dead.

. . . Mortar 6, Briggs 6 fire for effect, Hogan 6, Briggs 6,
Moriority 6's vehicle is burning. I am continuing to engage the
partisans as they withdraw to the south. . .

Colonel Hogan's mind is reeling, two of his three battalion
commanders are dead and the third one is in a tough firefight.

. . . Hogan 6, Briggs 6 the area is secure, you can move to
the linkup now. . .

As Colonel Hogan arrives he is greeted by a visibly shaken
LTC Clarence Briggs. LTC Briggs starts rambling on about how the
partisans just burst upon them killing LTC Ramos immediately and
then blowing up LTC Moriority's vehicle, killing all inside but
the driver.

COL Hogan, assessing the situation, first focuses on getting
LTC Briggs calmed down. He allows LTC Briggs to ramble on and
discovers that LTC Ramos and Moriority had explained their
concepts to LTC Briggs. He has LTC Briggs explain his dead
comrades concepts and can see the calm creep back into LTC

Briggs's eyes. He is satisfied with both LTC Ramos and Moriority's concepts and now has LTC Briggs explain his own. Satisfied with what he has heard and confident LTC Briggs has regained his composure, Colonel Hogan sends him back to his unit. Now comes the hard part. Colonel Hogan ponders the situation and his mind races off in a stream of consciousness. . . . Can I overcome the loss of two battalion commanders? . . . Who can I replace them with? . . . Do I really know what their executive officers are capable of? . . . Should I pull replacements from my staff? . . . I need to notify division and ask for guidance. . . . No, I need to inform them of the situation and tell them how I am going to handle it. . . . How am I going to handle it? Do the company commanders know and trust the executive officers. . . . The S-3's? . . . Do I trust the company commanders to overcome this adversity? . . . There's no way the attack can be delayed nor can I ask to have another brigade lead the attack. . . . I sure wish I had spent more time working with and developing my subordinates. . . . Do my subordinates trust me? . . .

COL Hogan jerks upright in a cold sweat. He feels around frantically as his eyes struggle to focus in. He sighs with relief. He is still in Hoge Hall in a cozy BOQ room at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas attending the Pre-Command Course and not in the Balkans. What a nightmare he thinks to himself. Right then he makes a commitment to the men he will command in the 2d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division that the ensuing two months prior

to taking command will be dedicated to determining how to design and implement a viable leader development program. A program which will allow his subordinates to persevere in a situation as nightmarish as his dream and enable him to leverage combat power through their leadership.

Colonel Hogan thinks to himself. . . I must clarify what the responsibilities of a brigade commander are for leader development. . . I need to understand how leader development is supposed to occur within a brigade. . . I must gain an appreciation for the current army wide perceptions of and attitudes towards leader development.

Colonel Hogan decides to review the Army's operations, leadership, and training doctrines to identify the doctrine requirements for leader development and determine what guidance for action doctrine provides. Next Colonel Hogan plans to examine the Army's organizational structure and process for leader development. This will aid him in determining how the Army attempts to translate the doctrine into action and provide him a skeletal framework for developing a unit leader development program. Colonel Hogan will then coordinate with the Center for Army Leadership to review any data they have concerning the current Army-wide perceptions to ensure his program addresses the relevant issues and areas of concern as well as avoids any predetermined pitfalls. Colonel Hogan realizes to be effective his leader development program must be rooted in doctrine,

integrated with training, able to be evaluated, and not administratively burdensome in terms of paperwork and time.

WHAT USE IS THE DOCTRINE?

Any review of U.S. Army doctrine must begin with a review of FM 100-5, Operations, the Army's keystone warfighting doctrine. FM 100-5 provides the authoritative basis for all other Army doctrine.¹ The warfighting doctrine found in FM 100-5, "Permeates the entire organizational structure of the Army and sets. . . the standard for leader development and soldier training."² All subordinate doctrines must complement FM 100-5 since the need for these doctrines derive from the requirements identified in FM 100-5. In order to understand the requirements for leader development one must comprehend the role of the leader and the importance of leadership in our warfighting doctrine.

Combat power, "The ability to fight"³ consists of four elements: maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. The ability to fight is created by the skillful manipulation and integration of these four elements by the leader.⁴ Generating combat power is a very dynamic process. Confident and competent leaders are the most essential element because their leadership provides the direction, purpose, and motivation required to inspire their soldiers. Inspired soldiers provide the leader with the flexibility needed to dynamically manipulate the remaining three elements ensuring the effective generation of combat power against the enemy.⁵ Combat power is generated

effectively when leaders are able to seize, retain and exploit the initiative,⁶ against the enemy.

Initiative is the inclination or tendency displayed in causing or facilitating the beginning of action.⁷ FM 100-5 identifies initiative as a tenet of our doctrine, "A base truth held by the organization."⁸; And defines it as setting or changing, ". . . the terms of battle by action. . . ." ⁹ At the organizational level the force as a whole must constantly strive to impose the commanders will on the enemy while retaining freedom of action. This forces the enemy to adjust his tempo to the commander's concept of operation.¹⁰ At the individual and leader level initiative, ". . . requires a willingness and ability to act independently with in the framework of the higher commanders intent."¹¹

Leaders generate combat power by integrating maneuver, firepower, and protection. They create synergism by generating combat power at a decisive time and place identified by the higher commanders intent for a purpose linked to seizing retaining and or exploiting the initiative from the enemy. This will cause the enemy to be in a reactive rather than proactive mode of operation. An enemy that is always reacting will have trouble anticipating future events on the battlefield. If the enemy can not anticipate future events he loses his ability to generate combat power through the integration of firepower, maneuver and protection; he loses the ability to fight.

Leadership and leader initiative are key to victory in any conflict, but so is training. "Training to high standards is essential in both peace and war;. . . . Leaders have the responsibility to train subordinates. This may be their most solemn responsibility."¹² Our operational doctrine puts a heavy responsibility upon a leaders shoulders. The Army's leadership and training doctrines to be useful should be focused on aiding leaders to accomplish their "solemn responsibility" by outlining how to develop and train themselves, their subordinate leaders, and their soldiers.

The Army's basic manual for leadership doctrine is FM 22-100, Military Leadership. General Carl E. Vuono, the former Chief of Staff of the Army, explains in the preface that the manual examines the doctrinal leadership principles required to apply leadership theory in pursuit of the operational requirements and, ". . . prescribe[s] the leadership necessary to be effective in peace and in war."¹³ He states the basis of a well trained army is confident and competent leaders developed through institutional training, operational assignments and self-development.¹⁴

GEN Vuono has identified the basic premises of U.S. Army leadership doctrine. His comments demonstrate the belief that leaders can be developed overtime with training and experience and that there are prescriptive aspects of leadership doctrine such as the leadership principles which can not be violated. He

feels all soldiers are potential leaders who require effective training and leadership to develop.

Based on these premises, FM 22-100 Military Leadership identifies the focal point of the Army's leadership doctrine, the four leadership requirements; leading in peace to be prepared for war; developing individual leaders; developing leadership teams; and decentralizing decisionmaking authority to the lowest level.¹⁵ Leaders who satisfy these leadership requirements will inspire their subordinates and be capable of generating effective combat power when required.

The rest of FM 22-100 expands upon these requirements by using three key words; Be, Know, and Do.¹⁶ These words define what a leader must be, must know, and must do to lead in the U.S. Army. A leader is a person who internalizes the Army values and ethics as evidenced by behavior that demonstrates character traits such as initiative, self-discipline, compassion and consistency. A leader knows himself, his job, his unit, and the human dimension of leadership. Finally, a leader provides purpose, direction, and motivation (leadership) to subordinates. (Appendix A) A salient point here is good leadership does not equal good leader development. Good leadership is essential for good leader development just as good leadership is essential for any good training. Leadership is action, it is doing; leader development is training a leader how to "Do".

Incorporated into the "Be, Know, Do" of leadership are the prescriptive elements of army leadership doctrine: the eleven

leadership principles, the four leadership factors, and the nine leadership competencies. (Figure 1) The four leadership factors provide a framework for leader action and assist a leader in identifying whether to use a directing, participating, or delegating leadership style. "The nine leadership competencies provide a framework for structuring leadership development and assessment. They establish broad categories of skills, knowledge, and attitudes that define leader behavior."¹⁷ Within the framework of leader action, the eleven leadership principles provide general guidelines for action.¹⁸

The Prescriptive Elements of U.S. Army Leadership Doctrine

4 Factors of Leadership

- The Led
- The Leader
- The Situation
- Communications

9 Leadership Competencies

- o Communications
- o Supervision
- o Teaching and Counseling
- o Soldier Team Development
- o Technical and Tactical Proficiency
- o Use of Available Systems
- o Professional Ethics
- o Decision Making
- o Planning

11 Principles of Leadership

- o Know yourself and seek self-improvement
- o Be technically and tactically proficient
- o Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions
- o Make sound and timely decisions
- o Set the example
- o Know your soldiers and lookout for their well being
- o Keep your subordinates informed
- o Develop a sense of responsibility in your subordinates
- o Ensure the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished
- o Employ your unit IAW its capabilities
- o Build our team

Figure 1¹⁹

FM 22-100 clearly identifies the four requirements of leadership that must be satisfied to enable leaders to execute the Army's operations doctrine. The manual provides useful analytical frameworks and broad principles for action. However, the manual presents so many frameworks, lists, tasks, challenges

and requirements in such a disjointed manner it loses focus. The manual fails to coherently summarize the theory and communicate it in a fashion that is easily translatable into action at the user level.

FM 22-101 Leadership Counseling provides guidelines on how to counsel and suggestions on how to prepare for counseling. Leaders are required to regularly counsel subordinates and those who fail to do so are negligent in their performance of duty.²⁰ Counseling is a principal tool of leadership,²¹ because it enables leaders to provide feedback, assistance, assessment, and correction to their subordinates. This form of communications allows leaders to effectively develop subordinate leaders and leadership teams.

Soldiers need initiative tempered by good judgment and a willingness to accept responsibility to operate within the framework of the commanders intent. FM 22-102 Soldier Team Development explains that a soldiers confidence in his own capabilities as well as in the capabilities of his peers, subordinates, and superiors will influence whether or not the soldier exercises that initiative. Soldiers and leaders develop mutual trust and confidence by undergoing rigorous realistic training. Soldier team development is required, so that soldiers and leaders can be confident in the capabilities and judgment of all members of the team. Soldier team development is a necessary preconditions for subordinate leaders and soldiers to exercise initiative in the crucible of battle.²²

Both FM 22-101 and FM 22-102 provide guidance on how to achieve two of the four leadership requirements, developing leaders and developing teams. There is some very specific "How to" information in both but it is not coherently linked back to the frameworks in FM 22-100 Military Leadership. The manuals are extremely redundant, and like FM 22-100, present so many lists and information they also lose focus and are not user friendly.

The working draft version of FM 22-103 Leadership at Organizational and Strategic Levels explains the differences between the leadership challenges at the direct, organizational, and strategic levels of leadership.²³ (See Appendix B) Battalion commanders provide direct level leadership. Corps though brigade commanders provide organizational level leadership. Unified and specified commanders, service chiefs, and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff provide strategic level leadership. Organizational level leaders through the exercise of their direct and indirect influence establish the necessary conditions for sustained organizational success.²⁴ Effective leader development is a key component of sustained organizational success.

Organizational leaders can significantly impact on the development of the Army's future leadership by encouraging and resourcing their subordinates' leader development programs.²⁵ They determine the success or failure of the subordinate's program based on how much time and emphasis they allocate to leader development.²⁶ The working draft of FM 22-103 clearly

places the primary responsibility for ensuring the effectiveness of leader development in the hands of the organizational leaders. The first organizational leader in the chain of command is the brigade commander.

FM 25-100 Training the Force describes the training management cycle which provides authoritative guidelines on how to plan, execute, and assess soldier, leader, and unit training.²⁷ Leaders are instructed to use the training management cycle to ensure they train as they would fight, in a combined arms environment using multiecheloned, performance oriented training. Leaders must focus on developing and sustaining tactical proficiency while maintaining a high state of readiness and being assessed by their commander against doctrinal standards.²⁸ Within this environment, training must focus on improving the highly perishable tactical and technical skills and the long term leadership skills, while imbuing the unit with confidence in their collective ability to fight and win.

FM 25-100 is a leadership manual because training management is a leaders responsibility.²⁹ As a leadership manual 25-100 fails. There is no explanation of how the training management cycle is linked back to the leadership frameworks presented in the premier leadership manual FM 22-100. FM 25-100 presents another daunting series of lists, tasks, and frameworks that pay lip service to leader development yet provide little "How to" information.

The review of the doctrinal manuals identifies the absence of a concise and coherent doctrine which melds leadership and training together. The translation of "how to" implement these multiple lists, frameworks, and principles, is vague. The users are left to pick and choose from these lists of leadership and training doctrine until, by trial and error, they hit on a combination that seems to work. Without effective action the frameworks and principles in the manuals become nothing more than meaningless lists. Manuals not applicable to reality soon become manuals that no one reads. If the manuals are not read the Army's doctrine is of no use. Even though the Army's leadership and training doctrine are not user friendly, a review of the Army's organizational leader development process will illuminate how the Army attempts to translate the doctrine into action.

CRACKS IN THE LEADER DEVELOPMENT PILLARS AND THE CURRENT ARMY ENVIRONMENT

The leader development process is both progressive and sequential (Figure 2). It depends on the three pillars of institutional training, operational assignments and self development for success.³⁰ The institutional education an officer receives at the various army schools provides the foundation of knowledge and skills required to serve effectively when assigned to units in the field. This base knowledge is the

start point for continued development by the unit commander as well as the officers own self-development plan.³¹




Figure 2³²

The operational assignments provide officers the chance to put their institutional knowledge to work in a practical setting. They can evaluate the usefulness and limitations of theory when confronted with the reality of leadership in a unit. The unit commanders must monitor and guide the officers performance and assess him in terms of that performance as well as his potential.³³

Self-development is a critical pillar because the army realizes the process can not be tailored to meet the needs of every individual officer. Each officer must tailor the process to meet their needs themselves. Officers must conduct a realistic self-assessment to identify their strengths and weaknesses. They should seek input from as many sources as possible to ensure they have an accurate and balanced assessment. The self-assessment becomes the basis of action for self-

development. The minimum recommended elements of a self development program are; a professional reading program, duty related correspondence programs, advanced civil schooling, study and research, and leadership roles or public service in the military or civilian communities.³⁴

The Officer Evaluation Report (OER) supports the leader development process by ensuring every officer is rated in terms of current performance by their rater and future potential by their senior rater. The OER is the instrument used by the Army to formally assess an officers developmental progress. The information on an OER provides feedback on potential to the promotion system. This allows a promotion board to forecast how an officer will perform at the next higher level. Based on the board's forecast, an officer is either selected for advancement to the next developmental level or retained at the current level for remediation.³⁵

The responsibility for the leader's overall development is shared by the school commandants, the field commanders, and the leaders themselves.³⁶ The Military Qualification Standards (MQS) system is the instrument the army employs to synchronize the actions of these leaders across the three pillars to establish the progressive and sequential nature of the process. The MQS philosophy is that all three pillars are important but ". . . the Army MQS system places final responsibility for development on the officers shoulders."³⁷

The MQS system consists of three phases focusing on development from pre-commissioning training until promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel. MQS I focuses on standardizing the precommissioning training received by all cadets and officer candidates. The program is task based and consists of two components; military tasks and knowledge and professional military education. MQS I prepares all cadets and officer candidates for attendance at the branch officer basic courses.³⁸

MQS II focuses on company grade officer development. MQS II also consists of task based components. The MQS II tasks are divided into common core and branch specific tasks. MQS II prepares officers for promotion to first lieutenant, captain, and major.³⁹

MQS III focuses on the development of majors and lieutenant colonels. This program is not task based. Instead, MQS III orients on broad bases of knowledge and skills which will enhance a field grade officers ability to perform in positions of greater responsibility. Each individual officer is expected to use the MQS III program to define and expand their frame of reference.⁴⁰

"The cornerstone of MQS III. . . is individual self-development."⁴¹

The Army's leader development process appears to be conceptually sound and easy to implement. However, there is no direct discussion of how the conceptual leader development process translates the doctrinal leadership concepts and frameworks into action. An examination of how the process works

at the brigade level within the operational assignments pillar will identify if the Army can effectively translate these varied concepts into action.

Within the operational assignments pillar at the brigade level, every officer except the brigade commander is working to achieve the MQS II or MQS III requirements. The leader development process requires the brigade commander to ensure every officer is initially assessed against a common standard, trained, provided an opportunity to perform, reassessed then provided remediation or additional training. Finally at some point every officer must be formally evaluated, against a common standard using an Officer Evaluation Report based on the information accumulated from the various assessments. The common standards the Army has for assessing and evaluating performance are the MQS system the Mission Training Plans (MTP), the Self Development Tests (SDT), and the Common Training Tasks (CTT). The leadership competencies are another mechanism that can be used for assessment but they are not as definitive as the MQS or MTP standards. The MQS, MTP, SDT, and CTT standards are focused on the cognitive domain skills such as technical and tactical competence, planning and decision making. The leadership competencies focus on the effective domain skills, such as communications, ethics, team building and supervision, as well as the cognitive domain skills. The MQS, SDT, MTP, and CTT standards identify standards of performance, the competencies identify performance and the potential to perform.

Senior raters and raters have the responsibility to assess a leader's performance and potential. To fulfill their responsibilities they must work together to structure a leader development program which provides them numerous opportunities to assess and provide developmental feedback to each officer. The feedback for performance and potential an officer receives should be in terms of the nine competencies as assessed while leading his subordinates in pursuit of the training standards. However, MQS III states field grade officers must self-develop themselves because their immediate rater (which in a brigade could be either the brigade or the battalion commander) will be far more concerned with company grade leader development.⁴² MQS III tasks field grade officers to expand their frame of reference by performing a self-assessment.⁴³ This sort of logic presupposes that every field grade officer is capable of identifying and is willing to acknowledge their shortcomings. A feasible concept on paper but, in reality it illustrates a lack of understanding of human nature and the human dimensions of leadership. Unless there is guidance directing who to pass assessment forms to and some means to control the interpretation and use of the data to ensure non-retribution, the self-assessment process could easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This would defeat the purpose of self-assessment. Furthermore, this concept of field grade officers primarily self-developing themselves confuses the situation in terms of the role the brigade or battalion

commanders have in leader development or how they assess field grade officers performance or potential.

FM 25-100 states a senior leader assesses the organization to ensure units train effectively by focusing on training results.⁴⁴ The implication is if the results of training are good then the training management cycle must be functioning correctly and therefore the leaders performing well. If the results of training are poor, then the leader must not be synchronizing the training management cycle.

Carl Von Clausewitz, the 19th century military theorist, recognized that the iron will of a commander could drive his unit to achieve a seemingly insurmountable objective, but at the cost of destroying the men within the unit.⁴⁵ Today by having senior leaders focus on results to assess subordinate leader performance the subordinate leaders could very easily run their units into the ground. This can occur because the senior leaders are not examining the method that produced those results. In this environment leaders will stop focusing on leader development and start focusing on just achieving the highly visible easily assessable training results.

In regards to leader development, doctrine is written so broadly at every level, it is confusing at best if not outright contradictory. The determination of who is tasked to examine the training and leader development process to ensure it is being adhered to is vague. The draft FM 22-103 tasks the brigade commander to encourage and resource his subordinate leaders

developmental programs. FM 25-101 Battle Focused Training, a manual for battalion and company level, places the responsibility for establishing leader development programs with the battalion and company commanders.⁴⁶ Meanwhile FM 22-100 cautions leaders against oversupervising subordinates and stifling initiative or under supervising and creating the perception you do not care.⁴⁷ The doctrinal literature is very unclear about the division of responsibility between the company, battalion, and brigade commanders.

The leader development process is descriptive. The MQS system is structured and stratified from precommission to promotion to lieutenant colonel and ties together the three pillars of leader development. However, in trying to translate the concepts into action, cracks in the operational assignments and self-development pillars begin to surface. There is a definite inclination towards focusing leader development on the achievement of the easily measured and highly important cognitive domain skills. There is little emphasis on assessing the affective domain skills.

The guidance on the responsibilities for leader development at the different levels within a brigade is confusing. The broadness of the doctrine can be used at any level to justify any action or inaction. Basically there is a large pool of doctrinal concepts, processes, and frameworks but very little guidance and how to link this information together and make use of it.

The conclusions drawn from examining the Army's leader development process within the operational assignments pillar are collaborated by data collected by the Center for Army Leadership (CAL), located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This data reveals some trends and perceptions that are affecting the current Army environment.

Officers and soldiers feel they are operating in a "Zero Defects" environment.⁴⁸ Officers generally do not approve of their superiors leader development program. Numerous commanders feel a lack of time, and their lack of knowledge on how to design a program are the two biggest inhibitors to effective leader development. For those few programs identified as successful, the brigade commander's support in terms of the allocation of resources and emphasis were cited as the key reasons.⁴⁹

Junior officers felt ethics and initiative were unimportant to their success. A majority of the lieutenants felt that ethics were a problem in their units. This perception appeared to be further aggravated by poor communications within the unit. Senior officers rated ethics as the most important competency for lieutenants followed closely by communicative skills and initiative. Lieutenants also rated supervision, decision making, and planning as unimportant. They did very little in these area's due to a "zero defects" environment and their fear of making a mistake.⁵⁰

Performance counseling is broken across the Army. Both senior and junior officers reported that performance standards

were not adequately conveyed to them and feedback was minimal. Senior officers indicated a lack of time and a lack of confidence in their own counseling skills inhibited their ability to provide structured performance counselling.⁵¹

The overall perceptions held by officers of the current army environment is bleak. They feel honest mistakes are not underwritten (zero defects) and competition is increasing while mutual trust is decreasing. These conditions are resulting in ethical stress and a lack of confidence in a long-term career. Officers of all ranks feel less evaluation and more counseling and feedback are needed for development.⁵²

CAL's data concerning the current Army environment confirms that there is in fact confusion on how to implement effective leader development programs and problems with affective domain skills such as communications and counseling. Determining the exact causes of the problems identified by CAL is beyond the scope of this monograph. However, recognizing they exist and being prepared to address them is essential when developing a comprehensive strategy for leader development.

SOME REPAIRS FOR THE PILLARS

FM 25-100 Training the Force provides a prescriptive construct that standardizes the Army's method of planning, executing and assessing training. The Army can declare that leader development and training are inseparable⁵³; that does not

mean they are. In order for leader development and training to be inseparable the Army must also provide the force with a valid construct for leader development that clearly links the training management cycle to the doctrinal leadership frameworks and outlines the hierarchy of leader, team, and unit development. Comprehending the linkage between the doctrinal leadership frameworks and the training management cycle is key to developing a leader development program rooted in the Army's doctrinal foundation and integrated with training. (Figure 3)




FIGURE 3

Understanding the hierarchy of leader, team, and unit development is essential to clarifying the roles of the various levels of leadership within a brigade, in regards to leader development. Only when these two requirements are satisfied will a leader be

able to translate our leadership doctrine into action and truly leverage combat power through leadership.

The training management cycle provides the means to replicate the expected operating environments of war, conflict, and operations other than war (OOTW) as closely as possible in training within the confines of risk/safety, resources and complexity. The purpose of training management is to produce confident, competent leaders, effective leader and soldier teams, and cohesive tactical units that can execute operational doctrine successfully in any environment. The nine training principles provide the framework to structure the training situation to mirror the operating environments of war, conflict, and OOTW. The training situation links the training process to the leadership doctrine. (See Figure 3) The situation is one of the four leadership factors. The other three factors are the leader, the led, and communications. (See Figure 1, Page 9) The four factors are always present and enable leaders to identify when and what actions to take.⁵⁴ In the training situations a leader faces, the 11 Principles of Leadership guide him in choosing what leadership style to use and what actions to take. The leader develops the led by embedding leader development in every training situation. Focusing on the nine competencies, the doctrinal framework for leader development, provides the means to embed leader development in training. The leader assesses the effectiveness of this embedded leader development and training management process through the dynamic factor of leadership,

communications.⁵⁵ Feedback between the leader and the led is necessary to ensure the led are developed, the situation is realistic but safe, and the leader achieves maximum organizational benefit from this expenditure of scarce resources such as time and emphasis.

While specific leader and individual tasks will change based on new equipment or by varying the operating environment across the spectrum of war, conflict, or OOTW; the hierarchy of development that must occur to produce confident, competent leaders and cohesive units will remain the same.⁵⁶ (Figure 4)

HIERARCHY OF LEADER, TEAM AND UNIT DEVELOPMENT




FIGURE 4

Senior leaders must first be personally competent in the technical and tactical skills required by their branch. The

leaders then must learn how to train others (A). Once their training abilities are certified they will have the competence and confidence required to train junior leaders (B).⁵⁷ These junior leaders will become competent and confident once they are technically and tactically proficient and able to train (C). A soldier's technical and tactical competence and a leader's confidence in his ability to train is the first order effect of training in the hierarchy of development. The second order effect is the development of a bond of confidence and trust (D) between the two leaders resulting in the formation of a leader team. The junior leader now trains his subordinate soldier (E). When the soldier demonstrates his proficiency, a bond of confidence and trust (F) develops between the soldier and the junior leader and the initial leader team bond (D) is strengthened. This second order effect of training results in the initial development of leader and soldier teams.

The trust and confidence of the soldier and the leader do not transcend their teams. The higher level leadership must recognize this and structure unit training situations (See Figure 3, Page 23) so that the senior leader and the soldier can observe each other in action (G). This training cascades the second order effect into the third order effect in which the trust and confidence transcends the initial teams and imbues the unit.⁵⁸ This feeling of mutual trust and confidence up and down the chain of command, results in the third order effect of unit cohesion. This unit cohesion establishes the necessary

conditions, identified in FM 22-102 Soldier Team Development, for the exercise of initiative (H) by soldiers and leaders at all levels. Once this stage is reached the leaders must structure all situations, not just training, to ensure the leader and soldier teams continue to be strengthened and the third order effect of unit cohesion, which manifests itself in terms of soldiers initiative, is sustained.

A unit will always have individuals and subunits at various stages within this hierarchy of development due to personnel losses and rotations. Very rarely in peacetime will a commander be able to stabilize the personnel situation so that all subunits will be completely developed. This matches the reality of the operating environments training must mirror. Across the spectrum of conflict in today's power projection Army, leaders will face this problem of personnel turnover due to sickness, battle losses, accidents, and personnel rotations. Understanding leader development and training in terms of first, second, and third order effects will help leaders identify what level of collective or individual training is required to rapidly and efficiently bring the new subordinate and his subunit backup to standard.

The second and third order effects of the actions of junior officers, NCOs, and soldiers will have a great impact during conflicts or operations in which we are trying to influence two belligerents to terminate or deter armed conflict. By teaching leaders to focus on second and third order effects in training we are expanding their frame of reference and better preparing them

for the reality of operations across the spectrum of operating environments they are expected to face.

Leaders who just focus on first order technical and tactical training can create soldier and leader teams. However, unaware of the need to provide impetus to achieve the third order effect, their ability to create the cohesive units required to accomplish our operational doctrine will be haphazard or random at best. When the trust and confidence does not transcend the initial teams, units are formed in which there are numerous cohesive subunits linked together only by the individual leaders' personalities up and down the chain of command.

Units consisting of these subunits, linked only by the personalities of individual leaders, may be very capable of achieving superior results during training exercises due to the drive of select leaders. Yet, the unit's success is hollow because when those select leaders become casualties the unit slowly grinds to a halt. No one takes the initiative to step forward and assume the leadership role required to ensure the subunit's actions continue to support the accomplishment of the parent unit's mission. The subunits continue taking action but, the actions may or may not be synchronized. This lack of synchronization impedes the senior leaders ability to generate combat power at the decisive time and place.⁵⁹

Leaders who just focus on training results instead of the training methods used to produce those results stand a good chance of rendering inaccurate and false leader evaluations. The

Army's assessment logic states if a leader performs well when assessed during training and the training situation closely replicates the anticipated operating environment, then the leader will do well in the actual situation.⁶⁰ If no one is monitoring the training situation to ensure its realism in terms of leaders being forced to confront the second and third order effects of their units' actions then the leader assessments rendered will be inaccurate. Therefore the officer evaluation reports derived from these inaccurate assessments will be false.

The constructs depicted in Figures 3 and 4 (pages 23 and 25) may appear simplistic, but that simplicity is their strength. They visually communicate to the user the linkage between the leadership and training doctrines, providing a coherent mechanism to translate doctrine into action. Since these constructs are user friendly they will be the focal point around which the leader development strategy is constructed.

Based on the results of this study the leader development and training management system should provide realistic and challenging training which quickly moves individuals through the first order of technical and tactical training. This allows leaders to concentrate their time on sustaining the second order teams and creating the unit cohesiveness required to exercise initiative. Such a system would establish the necessary conditions for sustained organizational success. Brigade commanders, as the first organizational leaders in the chain of command, are responsible for establishing the conditions for

sustained organizational success. They must be the ones to oversee the development and implementation of such a system.

The brigade commanders' strategy for leader development needs to first focus on emplacing organizational mechanisms and doctrinally required programs that will establish the essential elements of command trust, organizational consistency and simplicity and reduced dysfunctional stress.⁶¹ These elements are key to establishing the command climate necessary to transition from the initial soldier/leader teams to a cohesive unit. The strategy must identify the methods of supervision desired to ensure proper implementation of the programs and the efficient functioning of the overall system. Proper implementation will facilitate the creation and sustainment of unit cohesiveness; improper implementation could destroy it.⁶²

The organizational mechanisms and doctrinal programs the brigade commander must emplace are; the development of standard operating procedures (SOPs); the structuring of the duty day; a leader certification program; and a communications/feedback program. The brigade commander should identify to the battalion commanders and the brigade staff the purpose and objectives of each of these pieces. This will define for the subordinates the boundaries within which they must operate and allows them to develop the details, based on their situation in terms of manning, structure, and current facilities and equipment.

The purpose of SOPs are to provide operating instructions which clearly state the organizational goals of the unit. The

SOPs identify how the complex network of subunits and individuals that comprise the whole interact to achieve maximum organizational effectiveness in any operating environment. The development or refinement of SOPs should be an exercise in participatory leadership. As such, SOPs become a contract of performance between the senior leaders, the subordinate leaders, and the led, providing the basis for the initial development of command trust.

SOPs provide the junior leaders with power. When a leader consistently tells subordinates how to correctly accomplish a task, the subordinates begin to trust and believe in the leader.⁶³ SOPs should drive organizational simplicity by reducing to a minimum the administrative work required to keep the unit functioning and clearly identifying what routine tasks can be delegated to what level. By facilitating decentralization, the SOPs empower subordinates, contributing to organizational consistency and furthering the building of command trust.⁶⁴

The structured garrison duty day provides consistency. Leaders can plan meetings, counseling, leader training and allow time for other leader tasks without interfering with subordinate training. An example of a structured duty day⁶⁵ is; 0600-1500 prime time training beginning with physical training at 0600 followed by breakfast and then the major training activity from 0845-1500; 1500-1730 leader time. Leaders rotate soldiers through lunch while the unit continues working. Soldiers take

care of all personal business and if practicable, schedule all appointments after 1500 hours. This ensures maximum participation during training while still providing time for soldiers to take care of quality of life issues, thus reducing a major source of dysfunctional stress for the soldier. The two and half hours of leader time allows leaders to more efficiently manage their training preparation and provides the organizational consistency needed to implement effective counseling and leader certification programs. The structured duty day is a simple solution that increases organizational consistency and simplicity, reduces dysfunctional stress and furthers command trust because soldiers and leaders know they are being taken care of.

Leader certification programs allow for the initial assessment of all incoming leaders and provide the chain of command with the necessary information to shape an initial leader development program based on the individual's needs. Leader certification should rapidly move a leader through the reception and integration and basic skills development phases of the doctrinal leader development program outlined in Appendix B of FM 25-101 Battle Focused Training.⁶⁶ The initial assessment must be focused on determining the incoming leaders proficiency in terms of the five first order effect leadership competencies of tactical and technical competence, planning, decision making, communications, and use of available systems (See Appendix C).

An effective certification program should consist of four parts. Part I should be structured as a "rite of passage"⁶⁷ that every soldier and leader in the brigade must pass through. The first part orients on common soldier tasks, branch specific soldier qualification tasks, and physical endurance tasks (i.e. APFT, 12-mile road march, 300-meter individual movement techniques course). Having a "rite of passage" focused heavily on basic soldier technical and tactical proficiency and physical stamina, provides a common, challenging experience that unifies all members of the unit. The experience clearly identifies that the minimal acceptable performance standards required for unit entry are high and applicable to all.

Part II orients on assessing the leaders proficiency in terms of the first order competencies as they relate to the specific duty position. This assessment is based on a mixture of essay exams on doctrine, and mutually supporting operations order briefs (OPORDs), and offensive and defensive tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs). The leader's rater, peers, and senior rater (as available) conduct an after action review (AAR) after each OPORD and TEWT. The AAR serves many purposes besides just providing feedback on the leader's performance as assessed against MTP, MQS, CTT, and SDT standards. The AAR establishes the fact that mistakes or lack of knowledge are expected; a failure to take corrective action or an inability to admit to a mistake or lack of knowledge is unacceptable. The AAR can also establish the conditions for open candid communications between

the leader and his peers. By participating in the leader's AARs and providing critiques and solutions, the peers identify themselves as people who are willing to assist rather than compete with the new leader. This allows the development of a cooperative versus a competitive unit climate which furthers the sustainment of command trust.⁶⁸

Part III and IV consist of the rater's formal assessment and the development of the initial leader development action plan.⁶⁹ Based on the formal assessment in Part III, a leader is either certified or provided remediation. Once certified, the rater and leader develop a developmental action plan. The rater identifies how and when the leader will be initially assessed against the other four competencies of teaching/counseling, team building, professional ethics and supervision (Appendix C). The rater also provides guidance on how to sustain/improve the leader's current level of proficiency through self-development. This is the start of the advanced development and sustainment phase of a leader development program. The four parts of this leader certification program will clearly demonstrate to the new leader and the entire unit the importance the chain of command places on leader certification and development as well as their willingness to assist.

Doctrine requires leaders to periodically counsel subordinates.⁷⁰ Leaders need to conduct performance counseling to provide subordinates periodic leadership assessments. These assessments provide subordinates feedback on how they are

progressing; they provide the counselor a base of knowledge necessary to write an accurate evaluation report. A complete and accurate leadership assessment requires feedback from multiple sources.⁷¹

FM 22-100 Military Leadership discusses the importance of leaders knowing themselves. In order to truly know themselves leaders must understand they are three people; who they think they are; who others think they are; and who they are.⁷² The first two "persons" are perceptions, the last "person" is reality. However, perceptions become reality because people act based on their perceptions. Therefore raters must bring their subordinates perceptions in line with reality and aid them in pushing others perceptions closer to reality. The rater accomplishes this by soliciting feedback from the leaders' peers⁷³ and subordinates and the leaders themselves. Raters record their own assessments and collate the other assessments. They present this data to their subordinates in a formal performance counseling session. During these counseling sessions, the raters interpret the data and help the subordinate leader identify the differences between their three selves.⁷⁴ The raters then focus on updating the leaders' developmental action plan by identifying what actions, in terms of each of the 9 competencies, should be taken to address these differences.

While collating the assessments, if the rater finds any that are particularly negative or positive, the rater should seek out the individuals and discuss their assessments. Raters may

discover something they were unaware of or find out the assessor's perception was overly influenced by one incident. The raters can either clarify the issue themselves or direct the individual to discuss the issue with the person involved. By these non-retributive actions, the rater signals to all the importance of these peer and subordinate ratings and reinforces the effectiveness of open and honest communications.⁷⁵ The Army developed self and peer assessment forms for the Leadership Action Development Program (LADP). These forms are based on the doctrinal framework for leader development, the nine leadership competencies. These forms provide the unit a professionally prepared and standardized assessment tool.⁷⁶ Use of this form would contribute to organizational consistency and simplicity.

Every leader in the unit, to include the brigade commander, requires feedback from their subordinates and peers. Field grade officers have been in the Army for at least twelve years. However they only spend one or two years in a brigade at a time. At least one of their three selves change with every change in duty position, "Who others think they are." Field grade officers must be aware of this change so they can ensure it does not hinder their leader team development with subordinates and superiors. Effective counseling based on feedback from multiple sources is the best mechanism to open up the unit channels of communication. This ensures all leaders are aware of their three selves and are receiving assistance addressing the differences.⁷⁷

Effective counseling also facilitates the rendering of accurate and honest evaluation reports. Each officer rater/ratee pair is a senior rater/rater team for a senior NCO or officer. Senior rater/rater teams with an open and honest rater/ratee relationship are more likely to provide accurate evaluation reports. If either team member fails to be honest, their failure could seriously damage their team relationship they so carefully cultivated. Counseling assists in developing and sustaining leader teams by building command trust and contributing to organizational consistency.

Once brigade commanders emplace the organizational mechanisms and doctrinally required programs of this strategy they need to emplace methods of supervision to ensure the proper implementation of the strategy and efficient functioning of the organization. Brigade commanders can task their staff to set up inspection programs aimed at assessing compliance, aiding implementation via the sharing of good ideas between units, and identifying and solving unforeseen problems. Commanders have an infinite number of options available to monitor the system.⁷⁸ However, the effects of the brigade commanders' actions (Direct Leadership Mode) cascade throughout the units and signals what they want emphasized (Indirect Leadership Mode).⁷⁹ Commanders who claim to emphasize counseling should be willing to receive subordinate and peer assessments. They must also counsel their direct subordinates quarterly and make the review of the subordinates counseling techniques and files a key part of the

counseling sessions. Commanders who emphasize SOPs must ensure they participate in the development of and are conversant in them.

Accurate organizational assessments also require feedback from multiple sources. Leaders should request feedback from two levels down in terms of positive and negative comments bulletized on index cards. They should conduct an AAR of the event with all key leaders one level down. The leader should also solicit feedback from his rater or request the rater's participation in the AAR. The index cards should be collected the day after the event. The AAR, for consistency, should be incorporated into the unit's weekly training meeting scheduled during leaders time. In these AARs leaders should assess proficiency, correlate lessons learned and determine the impact of future training.⁸⁰

Inclusion of this method in the SOP and implementation as applicable from company to brigade, provides an immediate, consistent and simple foundation for organizational assessments that can be built upon.

Brigade commanders should restrict the ability of incoming battalion commanders to change the mode of operation of the battalion. New battalion commanders should be required to identify to the commander how they plan to adjust the functioning of the staff to fit their personality without radically changing SOPs and altering the functioning of the entire battalion. This action will minimize the disruption that occurs after battalion changes of command and demonstrate the brigade commanders long

term resolve for maintaining organizational consistency.⁸¹

Failure to monitor compliance at every level could easily result in incoming personnel, fundamentally but inadvertently, changing the system overtime. Continuous emphasis will prevent this.

Brigade commanders, aware of the need to provide the impetus to create unit cohesion, must closely monitor unit training to ensure the emphasis is placed on generating second and third order effects. Creating cohesion takes time and requires a paradigm shift from focusing on quick, shallow results to focusing on the long term process of developing cohesive units. Brigade commanders must educate their subordinates during the training management process. At the quarterly training briefs (QTBs) commanders should demand their subordinates orient the briefing on the training evaluation plan. Force the subordinates to articulate how they will structure training evaluations and produce soldier/leader teams and cohesive units.⁸² Brigade commanders, comprehending the training plan from the evaluation plan brief, can now focus the discussion on the various training and evaluation techniques available to produce the desired results.

The detailed discussion of the evaluation plan also allows the commander to identify windows of opportunity for them to visit training and observe or participate in the assessment of leaders they rate or senior rate. Using the brigade S1 and S3 to track these opportunities is an efficient means of ensuring the accomplishment of three required training assessments in one

training visit. The commander assesses a subordinate leader's performance (Ratee), another leader's potential (senior ratee), and a subunit's organizational effectiveness.⁸³ In summary, the key to inspecting training is an awareness that a commanders presence and actions are going to have an indirect impact throughout the organization. Leaders ensure they create the desired impact by embedding specific leader and organizational assessments into each training visit.

This strategy builds on the constructs depicted in Figures 3 and 4 (pages 23 and 25) to translate U.S. Army leadership doctrine into action. This strategy facilitates action by implementing counseling and leader certification programs, structuring the duty day and developing SOPs and various means to monitor organizational effectiveness. The strategy integrates training and leader development as depicted in Figure 3 (page 23). The strategy drives leader development by orienting on the hierarchy of leader, team, and unit development as depicted in Figure 4 (page 25).

The strategy provides the means for continuous critical evaluation of the leader development system through counseling, multi-source feedback, training visits, inspections, and AARs. The counseling program requires time and paperwork. The structured duty day provides leaders' time. The SOPs reduce other unnecessary paperwork. The requirement to focus on second and third order training effects and the additional emphasis placed on the training evaluation plan require a paradigm shift;

but not additional time and resources. The strategy is not an administrative burden in terms of time and paperwork. This comprehensive strategy will develop leaders who can leverage combat power through their leadership.

APPENDIX A

LEADERSHIP IN ACTION			
BE	As a Leader, You Must:	Examples:	
Be a person of strong and honorable character.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Determination. ● Compassion. ● Self-discipline. ● Role Modeling. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Initiative. ● Flexibility. ● Consistency. 	
Be committed to the professional Army ethic.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Loyalty to the nation, the Army, and the unit. ● Selfless service. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Integrity. ● Duty. 	
Be an example of individual values.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Courage. ● Candor. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Competence. ● Commitment. 	
Be able to resolve complex ethical dilemmas.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interpret the situation. ● Analyze all the factors and forces that apply. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Choose a course of action that seems best for the nation. 	
KNOW	Know the four factors of leadership and how they affect each other.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The Leader. ● The situation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The Led. ● Communications.
Know standards.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Sources of Army standards. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● How standards relate to warfighting. 	
Know yourself.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Personality and performance. ● Strengths and weaknesses. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Knowledge, skills, and attitudes. 	
Know human nature.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Potential for good and bad behavior. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● How depression and sadness contribute to fear and panic, and how fear affects performance. 	
Know your job.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Plan and communicate effectively. ● Supervise, teach, coach, and counsel. ● Display technical and tactical competence. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Develop subordinates. ● Make good decisions that your soldiers accept. ● Use available systems. 	
Know your unit.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Unit capabilities and unit limitations. 		
DO	Provide purpose.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Explain the "why" of missions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Communicate your intent.
Provide direction.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Plan. ● Maintain standards. ● Set goals. ● Make decisions and solve problems. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Supervise, evaluate, teach, coach, and counsel. ● Train soldiers and soldier teams. 	
Provide motivation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Take care of soldiers. ● Serve as the ethical standard bearer. ● Develop cohesive soldier teams. ● Make soldiering meaningful. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Reward performance that exceeds standards. ● Correct performance not meeting standards. ● Punish soldiers who intentionally fail to meet standards or follow orders. 	

The Nine Principles of Training:

- o Train as a combined arms and service team.
- o Train as you fight.
- o Use appropriate doctrine.
- o Use performance oriented training.
- o Train to challenge.
- o Train to sustain proficiency.
- o Train using multiechelon techniques.
- o Train to maintain.

These principles are outlined on pages 1-3 to 1-5 of FM 25-100 Train the Force.

The Three Styles of Leadership

- o Directing
- o Participating
- o Delegating

These leadership styles are discussed in detail on pages 69-71 of FM 22-100 Military Leadership.

APPENDIX B

THE ARMY LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES AS IDENTIFIED AND PORTRAYED IN FIGURE 1-1
ON PAGE 1-8 OF FM 22-103 (WORKING DRAFT)

Strategic Level

Frame of Reference Construction
Problem Management
Planning/Envisioning
Rational Risk Taking
Opportunity Recognition
Systems Understanding
Joint and Command Relationship
Understanding
Political Competence
Cultural Competence
Consensus Building
Negotiations
Communications

Organizational Level

Communications
Vision
Planning and Integrating
Clarification of Ambiguity
Assessment
Development
Evaluator

Direct Level

Communications
Ethics
Supervision
Teaching/Counseling
Technical and Tactical Proficiency
Decision Making
Planning
Team Building
Use of Available Systems

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT

APPENDIX C

The Predictive and Forecasting Competencies

Tactical and technical competence, planning decision making, communications and use of available systems are competencies that can be assessed by observing a leaders performance for short periods of time. A leader certification program should allow senior leaders to assess a junior leaders strengths and weaknesses in terms of these competencies while performing under the actual environmental conditions they will face. This type of assessment provides a more realistic understanding of the junior leaders' capabilities. These competencies are easily qualifiable as satisfactory or unsatisfactory. They allow you to predict whether a leader will have success based on the leader's ability or inability to perform. Because they are easily quantifiable they are also easy to remediate or reinforce.

The remaining competencies of team building, teaching and counseling, ethics and supervision can not be assessed in just one observation of a junior leaders performance. These competencies must be assessed by continuous periodic observations of how junior leaders interact with their peers, subordinates and superiors in different circumstances. These competencies require a sampling of the junior leaders interactions over time. A senior leader who does this sampling over time is now able to forecast how a leader will perform in the future.

If leaders are deficient in the predictive competencies they will not be strong in forecasting competencies. Leaders who can

not "Do" or understand what they desire their subordinates to "Do" can not lead. But even if leaders perform superbly in all aspects of the predictive competencies if they do not master the other competencies their leadership abilities will be minimal.

Effective leadership requires a balance in terms of the predictive and forecasting competencies. Effective leader development must focus on both. Leader certification addresses strictly the predictive competencies. The rest of the strategy addresses how to sustain or improve upon the predictive competencies while building up the forecasting competencies.

APPENDIX D

GLOSSARY

Assessment is a method used to determine, from performance, the proficiency and potential of a leader. Ideally, assessment is characterized by an objective judgment against a standard (criterion-based). An assessment should be non-threatening, unbiased, and uninflated. It is not an evaluation.

Reinforcement nurtures continued success. In effect, the leader tells the subordinate he/she did a good job and they review the factors that contributed to that success so that they can be applied later in similar situations.

Remediation includes actions which attempt to correct a subordinate's weaknesses and bring him/her up to the stated standards. Throughout the process of assessment and reinforcement/remediation the subordinate should receive guidance and updates on the status of his/her progress. This "feedback"--both internal and external--is key in the leader's self-assessment and determination of where to focus his/her developmental efforts.

Feedback can be positive or negative. The best feedback is that which is presented in a positive, helpful manner--or, better yet, allows the individual to self-discover his/her own

strengths/weaknesses. The after action review (AAR) exemplifies the self-discovery technique. However, no one solution is good for every situation.

Counseling is the summation of a series assessments which compares observations against a standard and makes recommendations for improvement. As the key tool for leader development, a counseling session should be planned, not be new information and include an evaluation or grade.

An evaluation is a formal, documented, permanent record of performance, knowledge, and capabilities covering a specified period of time. It is the formal rating of past performance. The evaluation is the cumulative result of previous assessment, feedback, and reinforcement and remediation should continue upon conclusion of the evaluation phase. In contrast with assessments, evaluations are directly linked to a leader's selection for promotion, schooling, and various duty assignments.

NOTE: This glossary is in Appendix C of TC xxx-xxx Commander's Guide for Leader Development (Initial Working Draft), pp. C-1 to C-2.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 Operations . (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 June 1993), p. IV.
2. Ibid., p. 1-1.
3. Ibid., p. 2-10.
4. Kevin B. Smith, "The Calculus of War: The Role of Quantitative Decision Aids at the Tactical Level of War." Thesis (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: 1993) pp. 139 to 142. MAJ Smith discusses to what extent leadership can impact upon combat power. He identifies that leadership can only have a finite impact on improving combat power due to human and equipment limitations.
5. Ibid., p. 2-11.
6. Ibid., p. 2-4. Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative is the purpose of the principle of war offensive.
7. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster Inc, 1986). I derived this definition of initiative by dissecting the definition of initiative given on page 623 - energy of aptitude displayed in initiation of action. Next I looked up initiation on page 622 - the act or an instance of initiating. On the same page initiate(ing) is defined as - to cause or facilitate the beginning of. Finally I looked up aptitude on page 98 - inclination or tendency.
8. FM 100-5, p. 2-6.
9. Ibid., p. 2-6.
10. Ibid., p. 2-6.
11. Ibid., p. 2-6.
12. Ibid., p. 1-5.
13. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 22-100 Military Leadership (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 31 July 1990), p. i.
14. Ibid., p. i.
15. Ibid., p. VII and VIII.
16. Ibid., pp. 22 through 54.
17. Ibid., p. 66.

18. Ibid., p. 5.
19. Ibid. The 11 principles are discussed in detail on pages 5 to 7. The 9 competencies are discussed in Appendix A and the 4 factors of leadership are discussed on pages 3 to 5.
20. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 22-101 Leadership Counseling (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 3 June 1985), p. 8.
21. Ibid., p. i.
22. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 22-102 Soldier Team Development (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2 March 1987), pp. 3 and 4.
23. The draft version of FM 22-103 is strongly influenced by Dr. Owen Jacobs stratified systems theory and his strategic leadership research.
24. U.S. Department of the Army FM 22-103 (Working Draft) Organizational and Strategic Level Leadership (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2 July 1993), p. VII.
25. Ibid., p. 1-12.
26. Ibid., p. 5-8.
27. U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual 25-100 Training the Force (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 15 November 1988), p. i.
28. Ibid., p. 1-3 to 1-5. In other words train in accordance with the 9 training principles: See Appendix A pg__ of this monograph.
29. FM 22-100, p. ix. On this page FM 25-100 is identified as a source of leadership doctrine.
30. U.S. Department of the Army Soldier Training Publication 21-III-MQS Military Qualification Standards III (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (30 June 1993), p.1.
31. U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-32 Leader Development for the Total Army (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 31 May 1991), p. 14-16.
32. STP 21-III-MQS, p. 1.
33. DA Pam 600-32, pp. 17-20.
34. DA Pam 600-32, pp. 20-22.

35. U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 (Final Draft) Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 1993) paragraph 6-1 and 6-2. These paragraphs discuss how the OER is used to determine who is promoted or reduced; the Army's definition for remediation is on pg 47 of Appendix D of this monograph.
36. DA Pam 600-32, p. 10.
37. STP 21-III-MQS, p. 1.
38. DA Pam 600-32, pp. 25-26; STP 21-III-MQS, pp. 1-2; DA Pam 600-3, Chapter 2 paragraph 2-6a.
39. DA Pam 600-32, pp. 26-28; STP 21-III-MQS, pp. 1-2; DA Pam 100-3, Chapter 2, paragraphs 2-66 and 2-6e.
40. STP 21-III-MQS, p. 5.
41. DA Pam 600-32, p. 26.
42. STP 21-III-MQS, p. 16.
43. Ibid., pp. 50-52. Provides a good discussion on how to perform a self assessment.
44. FM 25-100, p. 5-3.
45. Carl von Clausewitz On War translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 119-120.
46. U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual 25-101 Battle Focused Training (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 30 September 1990), p. B-2.
47. FM 22-100, pp. 47-48.
48. Unpublished data, Center for Army Leadership, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. FM 25-100, pp. i-ii.
54. FM 22-100, p. 3.

55. Ibid., p. 5.

56. I derived this concept for the hierarchy of leader, team, and unit development from two doctrinal leadership manuals. FM 22-100 Military Leadership provided the framework by the sequence in which the four leadership requirements were presented. The requirements identified the importance of having effective leadership to have effective leader development. The sequencing implied that the interaction between leaders during the leader development process leads to the development of leadership teams. Based on the development of trust between the members of the leadership team the subordinate members of the team could be further empowered by the pushing of decision making authority down to the lowest level. In the preface to FM 22-102 Soldier Team Development the discussion identifies the formation, development, and sustainment of teams as a process which results in unit cohesion that multiplies combat effectiveness. FM 22-100 discusses the linkage between soldier initiative and soldier confidence and trust in the capabilities of all members in the unit. These ideas provided the framework around which I built Figure 4.

57. Ideally the Officer Basic and Advance Courses and the Command and General Staff College provide attendees with a firm foundation in the technical and tactical skills required to perform at the next higher level. Leader certification programs should focus on confirming newly arriving officers capabilities and identifying what skills need additional development.

58. One way to generate second and third order training effects is to give a unit a defensive mission. After the unit has completed its preparation and evaluators have assessed the unit's proficiency radically change the situation and give the unit 15 to 20 minutes to adjust before being attacked. You could radically change the situation by inserting a rear area threat, killing off the commander and the executive officer, order the unit to counterattack or order the unit to withdraw under pressure. This sudden change in the situation induces uncertainty into the training and allows you to evaluate how the leader teams and soldier teams function under pressure. Do they still follow the SOP? Do the leaders continue to trust the NCO's judgment or do they take complete control? Do the soldiers and NCOs take initiative or do they wait for instructions? These quick decision exercises provide you the opportunity to really examine the human integration within the unit and determine how far along the hierarchy of development a unit is.

59. I personally observed this happen countless times during my three years from September 1986 to July 1989 (38 rotations) as a mechanized infantry company/team observer controller. I was not sure at the time what exactly the problem was but this construct of leader, team and unit development has provided me with a viable answer to a question that begged an answer.

60. STP 21-III-MQS, p. 49.

61. U.S. Department of the Army Leadership Lessons Learned Pamphlet Fort Hood Leadership Study (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Training Activity, 24 November 1986), p. 8.

62. Ibid., p. 13.

63. FM 22-101, pp. 14 and 15. SOPs provide the junior leader with expert power which if properly used can cascade into referent power. See the manual for further discussion of sources of power.

64. Fort Hood Leadership Study, p. 14. "The command staff alone cannot create the command climate conducive to implementing power down. Power down must be enabled. Policy directives can facilitate or inhibit the exercise of leadership, but they cannot produce it."

65. LTC Pierce T. Graney, Commander 3rd Battalion 19th Infantry from December 1982 to June 1985 instituted this structured duty day in March 1983. The idea was a great success. The soldiers and leaders were very positive about the idea.

66. FM 25-101, Appendix B, Leader Development.

67. Mark T. Littel, "Leader Development in the 1990s: One Way to Success" Army Trainer (Fall: 1992), pp. 23-24. This article discusses leader certification as a rite of passage. The Ranger Regiment's Ranger Indoctrination Program (RIP) for all ranks joining the unit is a certification and skill revalidation program. RIP sets the baseline standard of performance for all rangers, officer and enlisted.

68. Stephen R. Covey, The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People: Restoring the Character Ethic. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp. 204-234. Covey identifies the importance of developing a cooperative versus competitive climate when trying to build trust and teamwork among subordinates. He calls this habit, "Think win/win."

69. FM 22-100, p. 77. Provides general guidance on developing a leader action plan.

70. FM 22-101, p. 8.

71. Ibid., p. 77. Identifies the six sources of feedback that would provide an individual with a complete and accurate leadership assessment.

72. FM 22-100, p. 38.

73. Michael L. MacGee and Dandridge M. Malone "Peer Ratings" Army (September: 1987), pp. 40-44. This article discusses the effectiveness of peer ratings when used within a battalion by company commanders and then by first sergeants. The authors state the peer ratings became a major focus of attention that significantly improved the command climate.

74. FM 22-100, p. 49. Good synopsis of the requirements of effective counseling.

75. When using peer and subordinate feedback the peers and subordinates have to know that their privacy will be absolutely protected. If they feel their names will be linked to data when it is presented to the counselee they will be hesitant to provide honest feedback. Because of this you may want to start off seeking the feedback and not asking for the respondents' names. As the command trust in the unit improves, start asking for people to include their name so you can address overly negative or positive feedback with that individual. As long as this process remains non-attributive it will work and more people will begin placing their names on the forms.

76. The LADP Self and Peer Assessment forms consist of a series of statements in which the respondent must choose a number (1 to 5) to indicate where they fall along the scale between strongly disagree (1) or strongly agree (5). CPT Myhand, an Infantry Officer Basic Course Platoon Trainer in E Company 2nd Battalion 11th Infantry, would collate the raw numbers from the peer assessments and come up with an average score for each second lieutenant based on his 5-7 peer's ratings. He would then compare this number to the raw number score from each individual lieutenants self assessment. The difference between the two numbers provided quantifiable evidence to the individual lieutenants about how much of a difference there was between their own perception and their peer's perceptions of themselves. This was such an effective counseling technique I made it SOP for the other four platoon trainers. The second lieutenants also found it very useful and claimed it greatly aided their individual development and unit cohesion. Alma G. Steinberg based a major portion of her study, Factors Influencing the Acceptance of Formal Leader Development on how LADP was instituted in E Company. CPT Myhand's techniques impressed her.

77. True leaders do not fear feedback from any source. The only thing that can result from feedback is learning; learning to accept someone else has a better idea; learning to correct behavior so it's no longer misperceived; and learning how to disagree without creating animosity.

78. Ibid., p. 5-2 Sources of Assessment and p. 5-3 Types of Evaluation.

79. FM 22-100, p. ix.

80. FM 25-101, p. 5-3.

81. Brigade commanders who institute this policy for battalion commanders should approach their division commander and ask him to do the same to their replacement.

82. Quick decision exercises and moving key leaders up to the next higher position in the chain of command are just two ways of creating 2nd and 3rd order training effects. The number of methods available are limitless, it just requires a little thought and a constant focus on embedding leader development in training.

83. FM 25-101, p. 5-3. This allows the commander to provide immediate feedback to the leaders involved in training.

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