The Role of Fire Support in Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations

A Monograph
by

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Field Artillery

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# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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Enforcement Operations.   By Major Harold H. Worrell, Jr., USA,
51 pages.

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peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.   Peacekeeping
and peace enforcement are unique operations.   Peacekeeping
relies more on *forces* to accomplish its mission, whereas
peace enforcement relies on the *measured use force*. The
Unites States military is capable of supporting either mission.
Presently, Army doctrine does not address the use of fire
support in peace operations.

This monograph serves as an initial assault into the
doctrinal void regarding the role of fire support in
peacekeeping and peace enforcement.   The first two sections
review the definitions of peacekeeping and peace engagement,
examine rules of engagement, and provide an overview of the
doctrinal foundations for fire support in operations other than
war.   The third section discusses the fire support Battlefield
Operating System, highlighting the implications for the use of
force and fire support.   The fourth and fifth sections analyze
historical case studies for each operation from the fire
support perspective.

This monograph concludes that although peacekeeping and
peace enforcement are distinct missions, fire support can play
a role in each.   The application of the capabilities inherent to
fire support should not be rejected out-of-hand, but considered
an integral part of the planning and execution of peace
operations.

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
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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

> The soldier's voice must be heard. But
> it should be a quiet voice, speaking in
> wisdom based on sound knowledge of
> his profession, firm in its encouraging
> tone of keeping the peace.[1]
>
> - General Omar N. Bradley

"The Army's primary focus is to fight and win the nation's wars. However, Army forces and soldiers operate around the world in an environment that may not involve combat."[2] The Army currently operates in an environment marked by change. The end of the cold war has compelled us to reassess our approach to national security and military operations. Answering threats to regional stability and peace has replaced our policy of containing global communism. Operations other than war (OOTW) are evolving as major components in the new world order and pose many challenges with inherent implications for the use of Army forces. This monograph focuses on two of the activities listed under the heading OOTW, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and the role that fire support plays in each.

In the past, the Army has deployed forces in support of the United Nations (UN) for peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in Lebanon and the Sinai. Currently US troops are involved in operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Recent trends suggest the future holds an

increased likelihood of United States Army participation in similar missions elsewhere around the world.

During the cold war, from 1945 to 1988, the UN conducted thirteen peacekeeping operations. These operations ranged from overseeing the withdrawal of forces and monitoring cease fires to supervising elections, providing security for humanitarian aid, and implementing peace settlements.[3] Since the end of the cold war in 1989, however, the UN has engaged in fifteen separate peacekeeping missions. Indeed, the UN has come under increased scrutiny with regard to deploying forces for peacekeeping operations. In his address to the UN on September 27, 1993, President Bill Clinton stated that the UN must begin asking tougher questions about new peacekeeping missions. "Is there a real threat to international peace? Does the mission have clear objectives? ... The UN cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts."[4]

As President Clinton is asking the UN to address these considerations, the Army needs to address a set of its own questions in determining the size and structure of the force needed for peacekeeping and enforcement operations, such as the size fore required, the appropriate mix of combat, combat support and combat service support elements, and the threat to force protection. The major challenge for any peacekeeping force is to be sufficiently lethal to ensure

self-protection based on analysis of the threat, while also conforming with political constraints for the use of minimum force.

The Army's new keystone doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 100-5 *Operations*, has expanded the range of military operations from war to operations other than war as compared to the 1986 edition of FM 100-5. While the likelihood of war has decreased along the continuum of operations the possibility of OOTW has increased (FIG 1). This expansion of missions has sparked much professional debate regarding the impact of OOTW on training, leader development, material, doctrine and organizations.

FM 100-5 COMPARISON

LIKELIHOOD

FM 100-5 1993   FM 100-5 1986

| PEACE	CONFLICT	WAR
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR		

FIGURE 1.

Presently, the Field Artillery school at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, is developing concepts based on force packaging

of contingency forces, but has not yet published any doctrinal work addressing OOTW. This monograph seeks to serve as an initial foray into the doctrinal void regarding the role of fire support in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The section following this introduction reviews the definitions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, examine rules of engagement, and provide an overview of the doctrinal foundations for fire support in OOTW. The third section discusses the fire support Battlefield Operating System, highlighting the implications for the use of force and fire support. The fourth and fifth sections contain analysis of historical case studies for each operation from the fire support perspective. The conclusion states findings and outlines specific recommendations for the use of fire support in OOTW.

SECTION II:

Definitions -- Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement

The world security climate is becoming increasingly complex and fluid. It affects our national strategy and, therefore, directly impacts on Army missions. The operational continuum is used as a model to classify possible military operations ranging from war at the highest level of intensity to peacetime at the lowest end of the spectrum. The arena of conflict lies between the two extremes. Conflict and peacetime bound the realm of

operations other than war (OOTW) (Fig 2). While the military is comfortable with training and preparing for the combat situations anticipated in war or conflict, OOTW presents a set of unfamiliar roles for Army forces. FM 100-5 lists examples of OOTW activities as follows:

- noncombatant evacuation operations
- arms control
- support to domestic civil authorities
- humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
- security assistance
- nation assistance
- support to counterdrug operations
- combating terrorism
- peacekeeping operations
- peace enforcement
- show of force
- support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies
- attacks and raids.

Range of Miltary Operations

STATES OF THE CONTINUUM	MILITARY OPERATIONS	EXAMPLES		
WAR	WAR	LARGE SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS ATTACK DEFEND	C O M B A T	
CONFLICT	OTHER THAN WAR	STRIKES AND RAIDS PEACE ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY ANTITERRORISM PEACEKEEPING NEO		N O N C O M B A T
PEACETIME	OTHER THAN WAR	SHOW OF FORCE COUNTER DRUG DISASTER RELIEF CIVIL SUPPORT PEACE BUILDING NATION ASSISTANCE		

FIGURE 2.

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The October 3, 1993, engagement involving American forces at the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia, focused national attention specifically on the role of US forces as peacekeepers. The televised sight of captured helicopter pilot Michael Durant and the desecration of his fellow soldiers' bodies created a demand by the U.S. Congress and the American people for the definitions and limits of peacekeeping and enforcement.[5]

The draft National Security Strategy of the United States makes a clear commitment to keeping the peace around the world and recognizes such peacekeeping operations as key components of maintaining regional stability:

> Although it is not necessary for the US
> to intervene in every conflict or
> problem, we will find it necessary to
> deal with many. If we let anarchy or
> ethnic conflicts fester too long or if
> we permit regional conflict to spin out
> of control, the cost to restore order
> will be higher and the danger to
> America greater than acting to halt
> conflicts before they spread.[6]

International organizations such as the United Nations have expanded their definitions of these terms since the end of the cold war. Initially confined to monitoring border buffer zones following regional wars, the concept has expanded to include the implementation or oversight of

agreements, implementation of political transitions to independence, maintenance of security conditions for the conduct of free and fair elections, demobilization of armed forces and investigation of human rights abuses.[7]

FM 100-5, *Operations*, defines peacekeeping as: "Operations using military forces and/or civilian personnel, at the request of the parties to a dispute, to help supervise a cease-fire agreement and/or separate the parties."[8] In contrast, under the same Army doctrine peace enforcement is defined as "military intervention to forcefully restore peace between belligerents who may be engaged in combat."[9]

Both terms refer to military operations conducted in unstable and ambiguous situations. However, a close examination of these two definitions shows that each outlines distinct operational situations. Peacekeeping is characterized by a request for intervention by belligerents to provide supervision and assistance. Peace enforcement is distinguished by intervention with the use of force to restore peace. These definitions are derived from the United Nations charter, specifically Chapters VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes and VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, ... and Acts of Violence.[10]

The important difference between the two missions is the use of force. In peacekeeping the use of force is reserved for self protection. Forces engaged in peacekeeping operations endeavor to deter violence by their presence and

avoid becoming entangled in disputes between the belligerent parties. Peace enforcement operations "permit commanders greater latitude and more active 'rules of engagement'" in accomplishing their mission.[11] As previously noted, the introduction of peacekeeping forces is requested by the parties in conflict under a covenant of impartiality. Conversely, in peace enforcement, forces can be introduced either by invitation of one of the belligerents, by UN mandate, or unilaterally because a nation perceives they have a "duty to intervene."[12]

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations take place in an environment where political considerations rather than military are paramount. Clearly, military actions can have far reaching political consequences. The latitude of commanders and objective of operations may be severely constrained in order to comply with the "real politik" of the situation. These considerations, not to mention the ever present attention of the media, require commanders to exercise restraint in the employment of force and or forces. Therefore, the measures of effectiveness defining success in peace operations may be less apparent than in combat operations.[13] A victory on the battlefield is not always the goal; in OOTW a peaceful settlement could spell victory.

Rules of Engagement

Rules of engagement (ROE) are the way a commander conveys legal, political, and military guidance on the use of force. More specifically, ROE can place restrictions on the use of fire support in peacekeeping and peace engagement operations. These directives delineate circumstances where US forces may initiate or continue to use armed force against a hostile foe. ROE may reinforce operational considerations or the mandate under which forces are employed. Such guidelines should be considered in planning and execution of missions. Peacekeeping will normally authorize use of force only for individual or unit self defense, while remaining impartial, whereas peace enforcement often authorizes the use of all necessary means to accomplish the mission.

The application of ROE is a factor of discipline and training, because soldiers who "thoroughly understand ROE are better prepared to act with initiative and defend themselves and members of their unit."[14] Each member of the force must understand the specifics and the intent of the ROE before engaging in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Commanders should have the ability to alter ROE as necessary, however, to adapt to changing circumstances in ensuring protection of the force and mission accomplishment. The chain of command normally accomplishes such modification.

Doctrinal Overview

FM 100-5, *Operations*, serves as the "authoritative guide to how Army forces fight and conduct operations other than war."[15]   In the 1986 edition of *Operations*, the term Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) encompassed the same missions currently listed under OOTW.   LIC received only cursory consideration however.[16]   The 1993 edition of FM 100-5 has expanded the range of possible missions that Army units can undertake, by placing more importance on OOTW.

FM 100-5 (1993), devotes an entire chapter to the discussion of OOTW.   One section outlines specific principles for guiding actions in OOTW.   These principles are as follows:

- Objective - Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
- Unity of Effort - Seek unity of effort toward every objective.
- Legitimacy - Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.
- Perseverance - Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.

- Restraint - Apply appropriate military capability prudently.

- Security - Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.[17]

The application of these six principles depends on the particular operation and the environment in which it takes place. Commanders balance the relative importance of one principle over the others against specific METT-T requirements.

Until it is updated, FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict,* serves as the primary doctrinal basis for OOTW. The purpose of this manual was to fill a doctrinal void that existed and provides operational guidance from which "implementing doctrine can be developed."[18] It was therefore expected that the "implementing doctrine" would indeed be developed and then integrated into specific branch and combined arms manuals.

In the case of Field Artillery branch manuals, the development and integration of LIC "implementing doctrine" did not occur. FM 6-20, *Fire Support in the AirLand Battle,* does not address the involvement of fire support in LIC operations. The preface directs readers to use the manual in conjunction with FM 100-5, *Operations,* FM 100-6, *Large Unit Operations,* FM 100-15; *Corps Operations,* and FM 71-100, *Division Operations,* but excludes FM 100-20. [19]

Field Manual 6-20-50, *Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Light)*, is the sole fire support manual that addresses LIC. Appendix A, divides LIC into four categories: peacekeeping, foreign internal defense, peacetime contingency operations, and terrorism counteraction. The section devoted to peacekeeping does not address any aspect of fire support however.[20] There is a similar deficiency in fire support doctrine for peace enforcement operations.

Joint Publication (JP) 3.07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, explains peacekeeping operations from a joint perspective. It does not, however, address peace enforcement operations. JP 3-07 outlines force composition, support provided by joint forces, and the tasks performed by peacekeeping forces. It does not directly discuss the use of fire support.[21]

SECTION III

The Fire Support Battlefield Operating System

The Blueprint of the Battlefield serves as an analytical framework and reference system structured to provide a description of Army requirements, capabilities, and combat activities. *The Blueprint* establishes a hierarchical structure for use in the analysis of battles, campaigns, and strategic plans. Each level of war, strategic, operational and tactical, is distinguished by its own operating system.

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Each operating system outlines a major function performed at that level of war, which is deemed necessary for the successful execution of operations. As such, the Blueprint serves as a conduit through which existing doctrine, training, leader development, organizational structure and material issues can be examined.[22]

At the tactical level, the Blueprint of the Battlefield is divided into seven battlefield operating systems (BOS): intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability, combat service support, and command and control.[23] Each BOS outlines the "major functions occurring on the battlefield, performed by the force to successfully execute operations, ..., directed by the operational commander."[24] The Blueprint has recently been updated at the theater strategic level to incorporate peacekeeping as a major function.[25] This monograph will utilize the fire support BOS in assessing peacekeeping and peace engagement operations.

The Blueprint of the Battlefield defines the Fire Support BOS as follows:

> The tactical Fire Support BOS is the collective and coordinated use of target acquisition data, indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft (less attack helicopters), and other lethal and non lethal means against ground targets in support of maneuver force operations. The Fire Support BOS includes artillery, mortar and other nonline-of-sight

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fires, naval gun fire, close air support and electronic countermeasures.[26]

The following three functions describe the Fire Support BOS : processing of ground targets, engagement of ground targets, and integration of fire support. Although target acquisition is considered a traditional function in the fire support arena, it is not included in the Fire Support BOS. Target acquisition is listed as part of the intelligence BOS as the sub-function of "collect information."[27] Since the fire support community controls target acquisition assets and employs counter-mortar and counter-battery radars, it will be included in this discussion under the fire support heading.(fig 3)

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+-----------------------------------------+
|            FIRE SUPPORT                  |
|    BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM          |
+-----------------------------------------+

              +-----------+
              |   FIRE    |        INTEL BOS
              | SUPPORT   |=====================
              |   BOS     |
              +-----------+
         |         |          |           |
   +---------+ +---------+ +-----------+ +---------+
   | PROCESS | | ENGAGE  | | INTEGRATE | | COLLECT |
   | GROUND  | | GROUND  | |   FIRE    | | TARGET  |
   | TARGETS | | TARGETS | |  SUPPORT  | |  INFO   |
   +---------+ +---------+ +-----------+ +---------+
```

FIGURE 3.

In the process ground targets sub-function, the task is to select targets and match the appropriate attack means to the desired result. The engage ground targets sub-function enters an engagement using lethal and nonlethal fire support

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systems. The intent of lethal engagement is to cause casualties to troops or to destroy materiel or facilities by the application of ground-based or air-to-ground attack. Nonlethal engagement employs means designed to impair the performance of enemy personnel and equipment using psychological operations, employment of incapacitating agents, and electronic jamming.[28]

The integration of fire support combines and coordinates all fire support means. This integration is accomplished through the development of fire plans and application of the targeting process. The goal of the sub-function titled collect target information, is to acquire information to detect, identify and locate targets for attack by friendly weapons systems. Counter-mortar, counter-battery radar systems and remotely piloted vehicles will be considered for the purpose of this study.[29]

SECTION IV:

Peacekeeping: Historical Perspective

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been actively involved in supporting peacekeeping operations throughout the world. Initially, our principal involvement was limited to indirect financial aid and logistics support, but more recently it has expanded to include the commitment of combat forces for peacekeeping duty. A

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small number of US personnel were first deployed to Palestine in 1948 to support the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) as observers . UNTSO was established to monitor compliance of the truce agreement along the Israeli border following the Arab-Israeli War in 1948. UNTSO is still an active mission, although US forces are not participating.[30] In 1949 the UN established the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to monitor a cease fire in the disputed state of Kashmir, where the two countries had been at war. In this case too, the US contributed combat forces for the mission.[31]

The United States dispatched a joint force to the Middle East in 1958 for a peacekeeping mission code named Operation Bluebat.[32] Ships from the US Sixth fleet landed the second provisional Marine Force, consisting of three battalions ashore and one battalion serving as the reserve afloat.[33] A Composite Air Force Strike Force consisting of thirty fighter, twelve bomber, and nine reconnaissance aircraft was also deployed.[34] The Army contributed the 201st Logistical Command and the 24th Airborne Brigade, made up of the 187th Infantry Combat Team, 3d Battalion 35th Armor, a Cavalry troop, an Air Defense battery, support personnel, and A Battery 1st Battalion 13th Field Artillery.[34]

This force successfully served as a peacekeeping force. After 102 days in Lebanon the fire power of the joint force was not used and no ground combat occurred. In spite of an unpredictable and potentially explosive combat situation, only one American soldier died as a result of hostile fire.[35]

Since these early missions, the United States has participated in many other peacekeeping operations. Most have been under the auspices of the United Nations; some have not. A notable example is the Sinai Support Mission (SSM). Established in 1976 by an agreement between Egypt and Israel, the SSM manned an electronic eavesdropping station that monitored the Giddi and Mitla Passes in the Sinai. Aerial surveillance flights were also conducted with the consent of both parties. These operations complemented on-going UN patrols of the buffer zone.[36] SSM consisted of 200 civilians and served as the predecessor for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) that was created in 1981.[37]

The Multinational Force and Observers

The MFO was established on August 3, 1981 as a result of the United Nations Security Council's inability to agree on the make-up of a UN peacekeeping force to enforce the 1979 Egyptian - Israeli peace treaty. The peace treaty stipulated that the United Nations Force and Observer Group secure the

areas abandoned by Israeli forces. The group would then establish a buffer zone along the international border to separate Egyptian and Israeli forces. Due to strong Arab and Soviet opposition, the UN was unable to meet the requirements of the 1979 treaty. The Arabs would not agree to any treaty that did not include the return of all Israeli captured territory and address the problem of establishing a Palestinian homeland. The Soviets, who were not participants in the peace process, protested to show solidarity with their Arab allies. As a result a non-UN Multinational Force and Observers organization was formed.[38]

Initially ten nations provided personnel, now eleven nations are involved. The United States provides one Light Infantry Battalion, which is rotated every six months. The MFO divides logistical support for the mission three ways between the United States, Israel, and Egypt.[39] On 25 April 1982, the MFO assumed the "functions and responsibilities stipulated in the Treaty for the United Nations Forces and observers ... [to] supervise implementation ... and employ its [the MFO] best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms."[40] Specifically, the MFO was to perform the following tasks:

> • Operation of checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts along the international boundary and Line B, and within Zone C.

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- Periodic verification of the
implementation of the provisions of
Annex I ... carried out not less than
twice a month unless otherwise agreed
by the Parties.

- Additional verifications within 48
hours after the receipt of a request
from either party.

- Ensuring the freedom of navigation
through the Strait of Tiran in
Accordance with Article V of the Treaty
of Peace.[41]

The MFO has clearly defined and attainable objectives.
It emerged from a commitment by Egypt and Israel for peace
and has had continuous support from both parties. Default by
any one party would violate the MFO protocol. Egypt and
Israel share the responsibility for the financial support with
the United States. Their cooperation in all aspects of the
mission includes status of forces agreements, allowance for
freedom of movement by members of the MFO, and authority
to implement the peace treaty. Physical separation of the
conflicting forces by the establishment of a buffer zone also
contributes to maintaining stability. The MFO is still in
existence and generally regarded as a success. As such it
serves as model for peacekeeping operations.

Did fire support have a role in the success of the MFO
mission? At first glance it would seem that it did not.
Given the cooperative nature of the Egyptian and Israeli

forces and the specific provisions of the MFO protocol, there would appear to be little need for fire support. Under the provisions of the protocol, the MFO carries only small arms for self defense purposes. The largest weapon employed is the M60 Machine gun.

A review of the functions listed under the Battlefield Operating System does indicate a fire support contribution, however. The MFO battalion deploys with an Artillery officer who serves as the battalion fire support officer. This officer performs one of the functions of fire support. He plans for the employment of fire support assets that may be needed for force protection. He also prepares contingency plans for the use of naval gunfire and artillery that could be deployed from Europe to reinforce the MFO. Additionally, he collects targeting information from observer teams and aerial reconnaissance flights.

Multinational Force I

With the success of the MFO operation in the Sinai fresh on the minds of the politicians in Washington DC, the United States embarked on another peacekeeping mission in the Middle East. This time US Marines deployed to Beirut for duty in support of Operation Peace for Galilee, a result of an Israeli invasion of Lebanon. [42]

Israel invaded Lebanon on June 6,1982. The purpose of the invasion was to "ensure that the area north of the

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Lebanese border would be demilitarized from all hostile elements for a distance [40 kilometers] which would place the Israeli towns and villages along the border out of [terrorist artillery] range."[43]   The Israelis subsequently expanded their original objective and continued to drive toward Beirut, trapping 8,000 Palestine Liberation Organization forces led by Yassar Arafat in the western part of the city.[44]   Following numerous attempts to end the siege of PLO forces in west Beirut, US Ambassador Philip Habib managed to negotiate the evacuation of those forces from the city to prearranged Arab nations.   In addition to the 8,000 PLO forces, 6,000 Syrians were also evacuated.   The United States, Italy and France assisted in the withdrawal.[45]

These three nations formed the Multinational Force I (MNF I) and initiated operations on 26 August.   The United States sent approximately 850 Marines from the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit, commanded by Colonel James Mead.[46]   The US, Italian, and French forces successfully completed the mission with nothing but a few minor incidents to report. On 10 September the MNF I mission came to an end, two weeks ahead of schedule.[47]   One reason cited for the success of the mission is that the mandate and mission of the force were "politically and militarily precise, well defined, and feasible ... understood more or less in the same way by all those concerned."[48]

Multinational Force II

The withdrawal of Marine forces from Lebanon did not mark the end of United States presence in the Middle East. Nineteen days after the MNF I contingent departed Beirut, another multinational force deployed to take its place under a different mandate with no fixed withdrawal date.[49] The Lebanese government requested this return of the Multinational Force in order to introduce a military force in Beirut that could "facilitate the restoration of Lebanese government sovereignty .... American forces will not engage in combat. It may, however, exercise the right to self defense."[50]

The situation in Beirut had deteriorated abruptly two days after the departure of MNF I. Three events led to the return of a Multinational Force. The assassination of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel occurred on September 14. One day later Israeli forces returned to West Beirut filling the void created by the evacuation of the PLO. And on September 18, the massacre of over 700 Palestinian civilians took place in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps outside of Beirut. The world was outraged by the televised images of the incident.[51]

On 20 September, President Ronald Reagan announced the intention to return the Multinational Force to Beirut. President Reagan's stated guidance for the force was to :

> ... not act as a police force but to make it possible for the lawful authorities of Lebanon to discharge those duties themselves. They must rely solely on Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) who are willing and able to bring security to their country.[52]

The Multinational Force for this operation again consisted of forces from the United States, Italy, and France, and later from the United Kingdom as well. The United States forces landed for duty in Beirut on September 29, with approximately 1700 Marines. Besides manpower the Marine force included significant fire power in the form of a platoon of tanks, one artillery battery, and support helicopters. France provided one armored car squadron of the Foreign Legion Cavalry (2000 men), while the Italians sent 2000 mechanized infantry troops.[53]

Unlike MNF I the participants of MNF II did not always interpret the mandate for the operation in the same manner. Each nation brought forward their own national perspective, which resulted in three separate bilateral agreements with the Lebanese government. MNF II was not the strong unified body of before.[54]

In December 1982, the decision was made to train and equip Lebanese Armed Forces as a first step in rebuilding the legitimacy and authority of the Lebanese government. The Marines of MNF II conducted training in basic infantry skills, artillery cross training, and armor crew skills, and

set up a school for vehicle mechanics. Additionally, the Marines trained the Lebanese First Air Assault Battalion helicopter assaults.[55]

Following sporadic encounters, attacks on United States forces and facilities increased in 1983. In April the US Embassy was destroyed by a truck bomb that killed 47. Subsequently, mortar and rocket fire hit Marine positions in and around Beirut International Airport for the first time in July.[56]

Since September 1982 the Marines had operated under the same rules of engagement. Each Marine deployed to Beirut carried a card in his wallet listing the ROE. The ROE guidance emanated from the Joint Chiefs of Staff down to the MNF commander.[57] Essentially the ROE stated that force could only be used for self defense or in defense of LAF forces. If fired upon, return fire was to be proportional; "small arms fire should be met with small arms fire not with artillery."[58] The Marines clearly faced a dilemma on the use of force as a result of the July 1983 attacks. On August 10, when rockets and mortars again fell on the Airport, the Marines responded by firing mortar illumination rounds to signal their intention to defend themselves. This tactic worked on that occasion but started an escalation of violent acts against MNF forces that would test their resolve to remain impartial.[59]

Lebanon and Israel had signed an Agreement on the Withdrawal of Troops from Lebanon on May 17. On September 1, Israeli forces began withdrawing from positions in the Shuf Mountains to positions to the south. Lebanese Armed Forces moved into the Shuf Mountains to occupy the vacated Israeli positions and were confronted by Syrian backed Druze military factions. At the same time, Shiite factions in Beirut took advantage of the LAF move to the mountains and became more active. Consequently, civil war erupted again. The MNF II responded by remaining neutral.[60]

The battle in the Shuf Mountains and the resurgence of the civil war was of great significance to the Lebanese government. A victory would demonstrate resolve and highlight the newly trained LAF's ability fight. Due to their support of the LAF, the MNF was interested in the outcome of the fighting.[61]

While the ROE changed little during the first eighteen months for the Marines, increasing acts of aggression tested the restraint and neutrality of the force. On 29 August, following two days of intermittent small arms fire and artillery fire, two Marines lay dead and fourteen wounded. The temptation to retaliate with indirect fires surfaced. The use of naval gunfire, artillery and reconnaissance flights escalated. On September 8, the MNF II used naval gunfire from the USS Bowen to silence incoming artillery

fire.[62] This response contributed to a decline in neutrality. The Marine force was caught in the middle of an artillery duel between the LAF, Lebanese Christian militia forces, and Syrian backed Druze and Shiite forces.[63]

Battery H 2d Battalion 8th Marines provided counterbattery fire against hostile mortar and multiple launch rocket firing positions. Battery H was later replaced by Battery C 1st Battalion 10th Marines. An Army Target Acquisition Battery (TAB), C Battery 25th Field Artillery, provided radar support in locating positions of firing units. C Battery, 25th TAB served a valuable role for the MNF II by accurately locating hostile fire units for subsequent engagement as needed.[64]

The requirement to support the Lebanese Armed Forces and the failure on the part of the Lebanese government to come to a political solution resulted in an escalation in the use of force by the Marines. On September 19, the United States used naval gunfire in direct support of the LAF. Over the course of the next month, the use of force escalated further with the employment of close air support and artillery fire.[65] The Marines were now serving in a military assistance role to the LAF. As a result, the MNF II compromised their position as a peacekeeping force and increased the likelihood of hostile retaliation.

The most significant action taken against the MNF II was the October 23 bomb attack on the Marine barracks.

This act of strategic terrorism killed 241 Marines and led to the withdrawal of United States forces from Beirut, leaving the situation just as it was upon arrival in 1982.[66]

The MNF II mission is considered a failure. The force violated one of the key principles of peacekeeping by forfeiting its neutrality. This error in judgment, along with the overt use of force, and inability to establish a "buffer zone" between the belligerents, destined it to disaster. Furthermore, the conditions for success were not present. Interpretation of the mandate establishing the MNF II was different among the participating nations, and it could be questioned whether the conflicting parties involved truly desired a peaceful settlement.

Fire support played a significant role in these later stages of the MNF II mission in Beirut. The Marine Artillerymen executed all the functions listed under the fire support Battlefield Operating System (BOS). Artillerymen of the MNF II processed targets for engagement, deciding the appropriate weapon system and desired effect on the target, requested naval gunfire and close air support, and engaged targets with their organic howitzer battery. Their deliberate planning was evident in the initial decision to use mortar illumination to signal the intent to defend themselves, and the later decision to use naval gunfire, close air support and artillery to silence artillery and mortar firing positions. Also, the MNF II aided Lebanese

Armed Forces by providing fires in support of their operations. It is clear, therefore, that fire support can compromise as well as enhance peacekeeping operations.

SECTION V:

Peace Enforcement: Historical Perspective

Peacekeeping is based on the following criteria: consent of the host nation, impartiality, and the use of force for self defense only. Peace enforcement, on the other hand, also involves the consent of a host nation, but is not impartial and willingly uses force to restore peace. In the absence of peace, or even the desire for peace, force may be necessary to coerce or persuade a belligerent to seek a peaceful solution. Although the Multinational Force in Lebanon began as a peacekeeping mission, with the loss of impartiality it became a peace enforcement operation.

Peace enforcement is similar to wars of intervention. In his book, *Firepower in Limited War*, Colonel Robert Scales Jr., cites the Falklands Campaign, Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada and Operation Just Cause in Panama as examples of wars of intervention. He characterizes wars of intervention by the limited use of force, short duration, and ability to "achieve a political or military objective, and then withdraw once the objective is secured."[67] The designation of any operation as one of peace enforcement is difficult. Arguably

each of the operations listed above could be considered a peace enforcement mission.

It should be noted that peace enforcement does not always involve the use of force to accomplish its objective however. In the cases of Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq and Restore Hope in Somalia (prior to May 1993), the mere threat of employing military power was adequate to restore order and maintain security.[68]

The Dominican Republic, 1965 - Operation Power Pack

United States intervention in the Dominican Republic serves as a classic example of a peace enforcement operation. The assassination of Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo in May 1961 served as the prelude to US intervention. The Dominican Republic was left in a state of anarchy, potentially leaning toward communism. In 1963 there was a military coup, followed by the rise to power of a three-man civilian junta led by Donald Reid Cabral. By April 1965 civil war had erupted and threatened the lives of US citizens. The eventual establishment of a pro-communist government seemed probable.[69]

On April 29, 1965, US forces from the 82d Airborne Division landed in the Dominican Republic, under code name Operation Power Pack, LTG Bruce Palmer commanding. LTG Palmer recalls the force was to "protect American lives and

property; my unstated mission was to prevent another Cuba and ... avoid another situation like that in Vietnam."[70] In spite of this unilateral action, President Lyndon Johnson wanted support from the Organization of American States (OAS) in order to provide legitimacy and multinational support for the Dominican Republic intervention.[71] The OAS formed the Inter-American Peace force (IAPF) composed of 21,500 US forces and approximately 2,000 from other OAS nations.[72]

During the execution of operation Power Pack, US forces participated in a series of operations ranging from humanitarian assistance to direct conflict. US forces were able to produce a military stalemate resulting in the end of civil war and a return to peace for the island. The use of force was minimized and controlled through Rules of Engagement. The ROE changed twice. The 82d Airborne Division used one set of ROE for stability operations and another set during the subsequent cease-fire phase.[73]

During the seventeen-month-long deployment, fire support was used on only two occasions. On the first night of operations, May 1, eight illumination rounds were fired, then halted for fear of starting fires in the city. The artillery would not fire again. Subsequently, all but one battery of artillery was removed from the island.[74] On the other occasion, counter-mortar radars were flown to the Dominican Republic to pinpoint "mortar firing positions" and

provide evidence of rebel responsibility for mortar attacks into the rebel zone resulting in civilian casualties.[75]

Strict rules of engagement and the urban environment of the fighting in Santo Domingo limited the use of fire support in this operation. It is clear, however, that commanders on the ground considered the use of fire support. The use of a non-lethal system such as a counter-mortar radar played a role in targeting rebel positions and gathering intelligence.

Urgent Fury, Grenada

Many look to another Caribbean Island intervention for a different example of peace enforcement. Actions on the Island of Grenada in October 1983 again highlight the use of military force to support diplomatic efforts and establish conditions for peace. In many ways Urgent Fury served as a watershed event that led to an emphasis on joint operations. This operation revealed weaknesses in many areas to include compatibility of communications equipment, command and control procedures, and the planning, execution and control of fire support.

On October 19, 1983, Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and several of his cabinet members were brutally murdered on the orders of his former Deputy Prime Minister and Marxist ideologist, Bernard Coard.[76] The assassinations were perceived as a threat to the security of the region and

the United States.[77] An appeal for assistance from the Governor-General of Grenada caused the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to respond.

The objective of Operation Urgent Fury was to halt the shift of Grenada toward a Marxist military power and rescue the American medical students on the island attending St. George's Medical School. President Ronald Reagan's goals for the operation were clear: "to protect our own citizens, to facilitate the evacuation of those who want to leave and to help in the restoration of democratic institutions in Grenada."[78]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked United States Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) to plan and conduct Urgent Fury. The joint plan included forces from all four services organized under Joint Task Force 120(JTF). Three separate land combat task forces (TF) were established: TF Marine, TF Ranger, and TF 82d Airborne. The Marines and Rangers conducted the initial assaults to secure the two airfields on the island in the north and south. This action essentially split responsibility for the Island in half. TF 82d ABN was tasked to relieve TF Ranger and then TF Marines, and to assist with the evacuation of the medical students. Following the accomplishment of these objectives, TF 82d ABN would start operations to neutralize the guerrilla forces and return a state of calm to the Island.[79]

On October 25, Operation Urgent Fury started. Most of the significant combat action occurred during the first three days of the operation. TF Marine seized the Pearls Airport by helicopter assault. At the same time, TF Ranger secured the Point Salines Airfield by airborne assault. TF 82d ABN followed the Rangers and air landed at Point Salines. Combat operations by each task force continued for the next two days, highlighted by the attack of the Calliste signal complex, the rescue of the medical students at Grand Anse. and the concluding TF Ranger raid on the compound at Camp Calivigny.[80]

The Army derived many lessons on the coordination and execution of fire support from Operation Urgent Fury. The lack of maps and coordination prior to deploying the force lead to problems for fire support in this operation. The only map available for use was a tourist map; only make-shift grid lines made it compatible for use to direct indirect fires. Due to the inadequacy of joint training and procedures, the coordination of fire support for Urgent Fury was lacking. Operational security restrictions, a shortage of time, and an absence of fire support expertise on the LANTCOM staff formed the basis for this deficiency in coordination. Efforts to request fire support assets, control aircraft on station or request fires were stymied primarily by an inability to communicate over incompatible radio systems or to authenticate requests for fire.

Communications were so poor that at one point the Fire Support Element borrowed a UHF radio from the Marine Headquarters in order to communicate with destroyers off shore. Additionally, restrictions on the use of naval gunfire in effect eliminated it from use as a support weapon for ground forces.[81] The services have improved many of these deficiencies identified during the operation.

There were a number of fire support assets available for ground operations. These assets included AC-130 Gunships, naval gunfire from destroyers off shore, close air support from A7's flying off the USS Independence, organic mortars, and howitzers from the 82d Division Artillery. Of all assets available, the AC 130 Gunship consistently provided excellent fire support throughout the operation. Its ability to loiter over a target, day or night, acquire and fire made it a valuable asset.[82] Such lessons from Operation Urgent Fury were not swept under the table and lost.

Operation Desert Storm

Operation Desert Storm was the culmination of lessons from the successes and failures in previous peace enforcement operations. Drawing on the experience of Operation Power Pack, Urgent Fury, and Just Cause in Panama, the Joint forces, under the command of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf were victorious. Although public opinion characterized Desert Storm as the "War in the Gulf,"

the mission is more accurately described as on of peace enforcement. The United States, along with a coalition of nations, forcibly intervened to restore peace in that region.

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait with elements of seven divisions, securing Kuwait City and the Kuwait oil fields. By August 7, Iraqi forces completed their build-up of forces and occupied positions along the Saudi Arabian border with over 150,000 troops 1,500 tanks and 750 artillery pieces. Iraq possessed enough combat power in Kuwait to continue offensive operations and seize the oil fields in Saudi Arabia. [83]

The United States, acting within the authority of a United Nations mandate, deployed forces to Saudi Arabia and conducted defensive operations to deter further Iraqi aggression.[84] The following objectives were established: restore the legitimate Kuwaiti government, require unconditional Iraqi withdrawal, ensure safety of all American citizens, and restore regional stability. On November 8, President George Bush ordered the VII Corps to join the XVIII Corps already in country in order to increase capabilities for future offensive operations.[85]

Coalition forces initiated offensive air operations on January 16, 1992 to achieve air superiority, isolate the Kuwaiti theater of operations, attrit Republican Guard forces, and establish the conditions for ground operations. All services, Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines,

participated. By January 24, air operations had accomplished their objectives, flying over 109,876 sorties, and dropping over 88,500 tons of ordnance.[86]

Desert Storm ground operations commenced on February 24, with coalition and Marine forces attacking to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait. VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps forces attacked into Iraq to cut off and isolate Iraqi forces from reinforcing or exiting the Kuwaiti theater of operations. At the close of fighting on February 28, US and coalition forces liberated Kuwait, rendered forty of forty-two Iraqi Divisions combat ineffective, and capturing over 100,000 prisoners of war. [87]

Fire support played a key role in the success of Desert Storm. Coalition forces used overwhelming firepower and maneuver to defeat and expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. US forces also tested many new systems and technologies in battle, which directly affected how commanders employed fire support.

One of the new systems first showcased in Desert Storm was the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). Although only a prototype, it significantly enhanced the deep target intelligence collection effort by identifying high value targets, cueing fire support systems, and directing aircraft to targets. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), were also used for target acquisition, surveillance, and intelligence gathering. [88]

The Army Tactical Missile System and the Multiple Launch Rocket System made their debut in Desert Storm as well. Commanders and soldiers alike lauded the accuracy and responsive deep strike capability of these two weapons systems. These systems were used against air defense and logistics sites, command centers, and for counter-battery fire. [8][9]

Precision guided munitions dropped by aircraft and the tomahawk missile were remarkable in terms of their surgical accuracy and destructive power. This precision helped eliminate unnecessary collateral damage and focused effects only against the chosen target. The fusion of target intelligence, accurate deep strike capability, and the ability to plan and engage targets made for a lethal combination during Operation Desert Storm. [9][0]

SECTION VI:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The aim of this monograph is to determine the role of fire support in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Fire support serves a purpose in both missions. A doctrinal foundation for the use of fire support in such operations does not exist however. Efforts by the Training and Doctrine Command to write FM 100-23 (Draft), *Peace Support Operations*, are timely but simply fail to address fire support. Military planners, therefore, have entered

uncharted territory in the fire support arena. Nonetheless, the use of fire support must be appropriate and measured, since misuse can have unintended consequences that can compromise a mission.

In a peacekeeping environment, many of the fire support battlefield operating system functions are performed to varying degrees. It is evident, based on this analysis, that the most constructive roles for fire support are those involving the employment of radars and contingency planning.

The recommendation here is to use radars in peacekeeping operations. Counter-mortar and counter-battery radars can locate hostile firing positions, thus providing "ground truth" in situations where one side engages the other with indirect fires. This information could play a useful role in mediating disputes between belligerents.

Recommend also that a minimum number of heavy weapons, such as howitzers and mortars, should accompany peacekeeping forces, tailored to conform with the rules of engagement. Since the presence of artillery pieces may signal an intention to use force, they should be kept out of sight, yet close enough to be accessible in emergency situations. Only fire support can provide the flexibility to deal with unpredicted situations, especially where

peacekeeping makes an abrupt transition to peace enforcement.

A central concern is that peacekeeping forces may not be suitable for an immediate change to a peace enforcement mission. Since peacekeepers normally do not employ their heavy weapons, they can quickly lose their fighting edge. Soldiers who normally man firing systems have been re-trained to perform basic peacekeeping tasks such as conducting patrols, providing humanitarian assistance, operating checkpoints, or monitoring base security. These training requirements for peace keeping place a heavy burden on time management and may exclude training for conventional missions. Upon change of mission there is a requirement for extensive combat training to regain lost combat skills.

The role of fire support in peace enforcement is much more clear. It differs little from its use in war. Rules of engagement establish the limits for the use of force. Furthermore, impartiality is not a consideration for peace enforcement. The effects of fire support are designed to coerce the enemy into accepting a peaceful solution. Recognition of the proportional amount of fire support needed is critical, however, since the goal is not to destroy, but to compel compliance in order to restore peace.

Technology provides an advantage for US forces. The surgical striking capability of AC 130 gunships, precision

guided bombs and stealth aircraft, and state of the art acquisition systems are the best in the world. The challenge is to combine these technological advantages with intelligent leadership in order to achieve desired effect.

The biggest obstacle to overcome in acknowledging the role fire support plays in peacekeeping and peace enforcement is changing the views of the senior leadership in the military. Contrary to conventional wisdom, peacekeeping is not the sole domain of the light infantry or military police. The demand for training should not be limited to only soldiers. Training of officers and senior noncommissioned officers is necessary to overcome their preconceptions as well as the peculiar challenges presented by peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions.

It is the considered opinion of this author that judicious use of fire support does provide a valuable asset in peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The application of the capabilities inherent to fire support should not be rejected out-of-hand, but instead considered an integral part of the planning and execution of peace operations.

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