

# **Initiative as a Measure of Battle Command Effectiveness**

**A Monograph  
by**

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## ABSTRACT

INITIATIVE AS A MEASURE OF BATTLE COMMAND EFFECTIVENESS by  
MAJ Michael W. Schneider, USA, 56 pages.

The June 1993 version of FM 100-5, Operations, introduced the concept of battle command into United States Army Doctrine. The battle command concept emphasizes the 'art of command' and implies that battle command drives the requirements for command and control processes and systems. In order to place the same emphasis on the training of our commanders, a measure of battle command effectiveness is needed which addresses the art of command. This measure would also assist in the definition of requirements for command and control processes and systems.

This monograph determines if the concept of initiative is a viable measure of battle command effectiveness. It analyzes this issue by first examining the battle command concept. Command and control theory is studied to establish its relationship to battle command. Decision making and leadership are studied to determine the essential qualities of effective battle command. The monograph then examines the concept of initiative. Battle initiative and individual initiative are studied to determine their relationship to each other and to success in battle. Finally, the monograph examines initiative as a measure of effectiveness. The characteristics of initiative are compared to the essential qualities of effective battle command to determine if initiative as a measure of effectiveness is relevant to battle command. The monograph develops a framework of analysis for battle command using initiative as a measure of effectiveness to establish the measure's usefulness.

This monograph concludes that initiative is a viable measure of battle command effectiveness. Initiative, as a measure of effectiveness, addresses the essential qualities of effective battle command and it has enough resolution to provide a vehicle for discussion and analysis of battle command in real or simulated situations. Initiative provides a basis for feedback to a commander to assess his degree of success or failure in applying the art of command and provides insight toward what effective battle command is without restricting the creative instincts of commanders.


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
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## I. INTRODUCTION

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley was quoted as saying that "Man for man, one division is as good as another. They vary only in the skill and leadership of their commanders."<sup>1</sup> His comment was reinforced more recently by a statement in a Lessons Learned Commanders Memorandum from the National Training Center, "There is nothing more important to success on the battlefield than effective command and control."<sup>2</sup> If this is true, then improving the effectiveness of command and control will go a long way toward establishing our ability to achieve decisive victory, the standard set for the Army by its Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan.<sup>3</sup>

It has always been difficult to define an adequate measure of effectiveness for tactical command and control (C2). An accepted measure of effectiveness of a unit's command and control system is its ability to function more effectively and more quickly than the enemy.<sup>4</sup> The primary criticism of this approach is that it emphasizes process over content.<sup>5</sup> It recognizes the requirement for speed in the C2 process but fails to address what it means to 'function more effectively'. What is lacking is a means of assessing the 'art of command.'

To properly assess the art of command there is a need for a measure of effectiveness which addresses the quality of the commander's decisions and leadership in terms of their proper function on the battlefield. The Army has recently developed a new concept which is intended to direct the focus of command and control toward the art of command, this concept is called battle command. Battle command is more than command and control, it "is the art of battle decision making, leading, and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions."<sup>6</sup> Merely measuring the speed with which a commander and his staff are able to make and execute decisions will not be enough for measuring battle command.

Defining an appropriate measure of effectiveness for battle command is crucial to focusing commanders on the art of command. The measure of effectiveness provides feedback to the commander to assess his degree of success or failure in

applying the art of command to real or simulated battle conditions. It also reinforces Army doctrinal concepts which commanders are expected to apply.

Initiative in battle, or, for the purposes of this paper, "battle initiative", may be an appropriate measure of effectiveness for battle command. Like battle command, initiative in battle is a function of both the military decision making process and leadership. Like success in battle itself, possessing the initiative is a zero sum game, if one side has it, the other side does not. If possession of the initiative is necessary to win a battle, then taking or maintaining the initiative should be the ultimate motive for any decision made in battle.

Each successive level of command executes its higher command's decisions through its own decisions and leadership. General William Depuy captured the essential relationship between command and control at successive levels of command when he said, "Poor execution can render the most brilliant concept null and void, but the most magnificent execution can rarely offset the deadweight of a flawed concept."<sup>7</sup> Taking or maintaining the initiative in battle requires both brilliant concepts and magnificent execution at each successive level of command. Speed of execution will only accelerate defeat if the concept is flawed.

To determine whether battle initiative is an appropriate measure of effectiveness, it is first necessary to understand that which it intends to measure, battle command. Battle command has its roots in command and control. To understand battle command, we must understand the theoretical logic of command and control as well as the Army's vision of the battle command concept. Ultimately, this investigation must identify the intrinsic qualities which differentiate effective from ineffective battle command and determine if effective battle command is necessary to take and maintain the initiative.

Initiative is a descriptive measure of a subjective quality. We must understand this quality in order to determine if it is appropriate as a measure of effectiveness of battle command. Initiative, as a military concept is present in one form or another in virtually every military theory and is one of the cornerstones of our own warfighting

doctrine. Its validity is in its recognition of the two sided, competitive nature of warfare. Once we have defined initiative, we must ask ourselves, does it capture the dominant quality of effective battle command?

Finally, the measure of effectiveness must provide insight toward the appreciation of what effective battle command is without restricting the creative instincts of commanders. In the old Soviet system of troop control, norms were developed based on tactical analysis of exercises and wartime experience. These norms formed the "basis for establishing and assessing combat effectiveness". While this may have been an efficient way of measuring effectiveness like one would measure distance with a yardstick, it had the "disadvantage of offering little encouragement or guidance to commanders faced with the necessity of selecting a course of action which falls outside the 'normative' tactical guidelines."<sup>8</sup>

Our measure of effectiveness should be more of a vehicle for discussing and analyzing battle command in training with respect to our doctrine and the situation at hand rather than a yardstick for determining absolute values of performance quality. Therefore, we must determine if initiative as a measure of effectiveness provides sufficient resolution to be useful while at the same time encouraging expansion rather than inhibition of creativity.

## II. UNDERSTANDING BATTLE COMMAND

The battle command concept paper states that battle command is "predominantly an art form with some incorporation of elements of scientific analysis, control, and direction."<sup>9</sup> Yet Clausewitz argued that

"war does not belong in the arts and sciences; rather it is part of man's social existence. ... The essential difference is that war is not an exercise of the will directed at inanimate matter, as is the case with the mechanical arts, or at matter which is animate but passive and yielding, as is the case with the human mind and emotions in the fine arts. In war, the will is directed at an animate object that *reacts*."<sup>10</sup>

If we are going to consider battle command as an art form in order to acknowledge its creative aspects, we must do so in the context of military art. As Clausewitz pointed out, war is directed at a dynamic enemy who is also creative. Therefore, military art acknowledges that the creative quality of military operations does not exist as an end unto itself, but rather as a means to defeat an enemy whose aim is to defeat us. This is the medium in which the art of battle command functions.

To understand battle command at the tactical level, it is instructive to begin with a discussion of the most basic tactical level, the individual rifleman in combat. The rifleman is first and foremost a human being, subject to the strengths and frailties of human nature. He is a product of his culture, his training, and of his leaders. He has a will of his own and he is the principal means of carrying out the will of his leaders. He is in command of himself and his implements of destruction and yet is responsible to his leaders to act in accordance with their intent.

In a typical combat situation, the rifleman may find himself in a position, scanning with all his senses for indicators of enemy activity. If he hears something he turns to look for movement. He may move in order to get a better look. Suddenly he sees another soldier. He quickly assesses that the soldier is an enemy and he realizes that he must do something. He weighs his options. Should he move forward to get into a position of advantage or should he wait for the enemy to come closer? Should he use his rifle, a grenade, or his bayonet? Or should he succumb to his human instincts which are screaming for him to seek cover and freeze? His dilemma is how to accomplish his mission without getting killed. He decides to move into a better position in order to shoot. Once in a position which affords a better shot, he raises his weapon, unconsciously using the eight steady hold factors to ensure accuracy, he fires. Immediately he scans the target area to determine if he must fire again at the same or other soldiers. He hears shots being fired from the left front. Their impact is close, he realizes he must do something, either move or shoot back. And thus the process continuously repeats itself.

This process is the command and control process at its most basic level. It is nothing more than the timeless logic of reasoned action. It is a process which has been followed throughout history,<sup>11</sup> but which has more recently become known as the Boyd Cycle or the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) Loop. According to Theorist William S. Lind,

"Conflict can be seen as time-competitive observation-orientation-decision-action cycles. Each party to a conflict begins by observing. He observes himself, his physical surroundings and his enemy. On the basis of his observation he orients, that is to say, he makes a mental image or "snapshot" of his situation. On the basis of this orientation, he makes a decision. He puts the decision into effect, i.e., he acts. Then because he assumes his action has changed the situation, he observes again, and starts the process anew."<sup>12</sup>

The basic dilemma faced by the rifleman is common to military decision makers at all levels, how to accomplish the mission without getting destroyed by the enemy first.<sup>13</sup> According to Lind this is best done by being able to go through the OODA Loop faster than the enemy so that "by the time the slower side acts, the faster side is doing something different from what he observed, and his action is inappropriate."<sup>14</sup> This logic underlies our system of command and control and its accepted measure of effectiveness, but it presupposes that not only is the OODA Loop executed more quickly, but that each of the steps is performed at least as well as the enemy.

All things being equal, quicker is indisputably better, but what if we can distort the enemy's view of the battlefield so that his orientation, decision, and action steps are all wrong? Quicker decisions are made with less information and thus are more subject to deception. If both sides see the battlefield equally well but the quality of the decision on one side is more effective than on the other then perhaps the more effective side would gain some time.

Finally, the missing ingredient to all this logic is leadership. The difference between the rifleman deciding to act against the enemy rather than acting to protect himself. Apparently his squad leader had made it clear what was expected of him.


Confidence that the squad leader would direct the other fire team to lay down an adequate base of fire to suppress the enemy probably assisted in his decision to move forward and shoot as well. There is an integral relationship between leadership and the combat decision. All other steps in the loop being equal, how much difference does leadership make in the effectiveness of the actions? Our command and control system is based on the logic of the OODA Loop. Battle Command is the Army's initiative to focus on the quality of combat decisions and leadership.

### **Command and Control.**

In the past, the phrase 'command and control' has been used with many different meanings. The most common are as a verb as in 'to provide command and control to assigned and attached forces' and as a noun as in the command and control system or command and control process. With the advent of the battle command concept, the use of the phrase 'command and control' as a verb could be replaced by battle command. This would split the official DOD definition of command and control in half.

"Joint Publication 1-02 defines command and control as the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through *an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures a commander employs in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. This combination is referred to as the command and control system.*(emphasis added)"<sup>15</sup>

The United States Army command and control system is in fact an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, and facilities. And it operates based on a set of procedures which moves it continuously through the OODA loop (refer to figure one). The staff continuously *tracks* the battle in terms of the enemy situation, the friendly situation, and the terrain and weather (OBSERVE). They continuously make *assessments* or estimates with regard to the impact of the current situation on future



**FIGURE 1 : COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS**

operations periodically requesting that the commander provide guidance or make a decision (ORIENT). If the commander decides a decision is necessary, the staff develops various courses of action, wargames them, and makes a recommendation to the commander (DECIDE). Finally, once the decision has been made, the staff prepares the orders, transmits them to subordinate units, and monitors their execution (ACT).<sup>16</sup>

FM 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staff (Draft), states that "The commander's goal is to generate and decisively apply combat power. The C2 system enables the commander to use his military leadership skills to press and sustain

that end. Such skills help transfer a unit's potential combat power into actual combat power."<sup>17</sup> Perhaps Major General Wayne Knudson stated it even more clearly when he said, "The commander is the hub of the C2 process--he alone commands, leads and is responsible for all decisions. All other activities are subordinate to, and supportive of, his actions." General Knudson makes a distinction between "command" and "command and control." He says that "Command resides in a single person--the commander." Whereas the C2 system exists to "assist the commander in making reasoned decisions and executing them in a manner to accomplish his missions (such as defeat an enemy force, attain an objective and so on), **which forces the enemy into a reactive mode.**"<sup>18</sup>

The relationship between a commander and his C2 system is much like the relationship between computer programmer and his computer. Without the programmer, the computer is nothing more than a complex system of circuits, transistors, and diodes. The programmer enters commands to direct the computer to perform some task. His combination of commands can run the gamut from a clumsy attempt to an elegant routine which causes the computer to perform to its fullest capability. Ultimately, however, the programmer is limited by the maximum capability of the computer.

Similarly, a commander's command and control system is responsive to him. The responsibility of command is total<sup>19</sup> but his limits of creativity are bounded by the capabilities of his C2 system. He is limited by the speed and accuracy with which the C2 system tracks the battle, the veracity of its assessments, the strength of its recommendations, the quality of its orders, and the faithfulness of its execution monitoring. In this sense, the expression of the art of command is bounded by the limits of a commander's command and control system. A weak C2 system in a complex and dynamic battlefield environment can produce command errors in even the best commander. These command errors can be equated to each step of the OODA loop as stimulus errors ("I didn't know..."), hypothesis errors ("I didn't

understand..."), option errors ("I didn't consider..."), and response errors ("I didn't act...")."<sup>20</sup>

The Army's new concept of battle command should not lead us to deemphasize the improvement of the command and control system. On the contrary, battle command should set the requirements for C2 system improvements which will continue to expand the limits of expression of the art of command.

### **Battle Command Concept.**

The Army's Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan, stated that "The complexity of the battlefield has increased, while the commander's tools to command and control the modern battlefield have not improved proportionately."<sup>21</sup> he goes on to state that "we must compensate by becoming more capable of dealing with the unexpected. Our best tool for doing this is the commander, guided by sound doctrine...".<sup>22</sup> Since General Sullivan wrote that statement, the doctrinal concept of battle command has been introduced.

"Battle Command is the ability to envision the *activities* over time and space to achieve an endstate, translate and communicate that vision into a brief but clear intent, formulate concepts, and provide the force of will through the presence of leadership throughout the battlefield that will cause the concentration of overwhelming combat power at the right time and place to win decisively with minimal friendly casualties."(emphasis added)<sup>23</sup>

Analysis of this definition reveals that the purpose of battle command is to produce *action* in the form of combat power with the effect of accomplishing the mission while simultaneously protecting one's combat potential from destruction by the enemy. James Macgregor Burns, in his Pulitzer Prize winning book, "Leadership", points out that actions require power and power requires both motive and resources. According to Burns, "The two are interrelated. Lacking motive, resource diminishes; lacking resource, motive lies idle. Lacking either one, power collapses. ... To understand the nature of leadership requires understanding of the essence of power, for leadership is a special form of power."<sup>24</sup> Thus the purpose of battle command is not

only to develop creative concepts for the use of assigned forces, but also to impart the motive or strength of will to carry out those concepts energetically and faithfully. At each level of command, *action is created* by assigning missions, allocating resources, and imparting the will of the commander to subordinates. This is the essential relationship between decision making and leadership from the highest levels of command down to the squad leader and his squad of riflemen.

Referring back to military art, the medium in which the art of battle command must function, we are reminded that we must not only be concerned with our own resources and motives but also those of the enemy. Clausewitz understood this when he wrote that "If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. *the total means at his disposal* and *the strength of his will*."<sup>25</sup> From this reasoning theorists of the past 150 years have developed theories of exhaustion versus annihilation, maneuver versus attrition, and combinations of all of the above. Fundamentally, an army's forces and its will constitute the two entities against which an opponent's *action* can have effect.

"Decision making and leadership are two of the most important functions of battle command. Making effective decisions in a timely manner is an imperative of effective battle command. Equally important is the leadership that provides the strength and force of will to follow through on the chosen courses of action to achieve the stated end conditions."<sup>26</sup> If military art is the medium in which the art of command is expressed, then decision making and leadership are the artist's principle tools. It is through the combined effect of these tools within the context of the competitive nature of military art that a commander *creates action* to destroy enemy forces and the enemy's will to fight before the enemy can do the same to him. The significance of the *action* is defined by its destructive impact and / or its influence on the will of the enemy. "The experienced commander must evince an intuitive feel for what direction

to take and a knack for blending the process and product of command to achieve success."<sup>27</sup>

### **The Art of Battlefield Decision Making.**

The art of battlefield decision making does not refer to the military decision making process, rather it concerns the substance of the decision itself. It is at the heart of almost all military theory and doctrine. The art of battlefield decision making is in effect what tactics, operational art, and strategy are all about, how best to use military forces to achieve objectives. Clausewitz called it a "relentless struggle with the unforeseen" which required two indispensable qualities, "First, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour retains one glimmering of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light where ever it may lead."<sup>28</sup> Jomini believed that war could be understood. He felt that maxims could be developed which would lead to victory. High on his list was the importance of the decisive point.

"He (the commander) should endeavor in all his combinations, whether deliberately arranged or adopted on the spur of the moment, to form a sound conclusion as to the important point of the battlefield. This he can do only by observing well the direction of the enemy's line of battle, and not forgetting the direction in which strategy requires him to operate."<sup>29</sup>

In these two sentences, Jomini summarizes the fundamental requirements for the commander to make a sound military decision, the need to visualize the battlefield and the need to understand the end state required by the higher commander. The challenge is to see the battlefield clearly enough and quickly enough to create action which achieves the desired end state *before* the enemy is able to put it beyond reach.

Returning to the story of the rifleman, his OODA Loop involved a span of control of one, himself. The OODA Loop represented his cognitive processes stimulated by his senses. As we move up the chain of command, the commander's cognitive process is increasingly assisted by his staff, his senses are assisted by the myriad of intelligence systems and friendly reporting procedures, and his decisions are executed by ever increasing numbers of subordinate leaders each with their own

independent will. In spite of the increasingly distributed nature of his force, the commander's cognitive process remains central to the logic of the decision.

The command and control system which supports battle command must be capable of supporting the commander's decision making needs. Our doctrine requires the commander to specify commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) to focus battle tracking and battle assessment.<sup>30</sup> Continuous tracking and assessment by the staff and by the commander allow the commander to see the battlefield. The command and control system should enable the commander to practice forward command, thus allowing him to track and assess the battle at the most important point for himself.<sup>31</sup> The better he can see the battlefield, the better he can discern the need to act to counter unforeseen situations or to exploit opportunities.

Once the need to act is determined, the military decision making process is used to determine the action the commander desires to create. The action is created by the issuance of orders to subordinates and their subsequent execution of those orders. Our doctrine calls for mission type orders which preserve the freedom of action of subordinates to determine the best way to accomplish their missions within the intent of their higher commanders.<sup>32</sup>

The command and control process is critical to understanding the decision making component of battle command. It reveals that there are two decisions the commander must make within the process. First is the decision that action is necessary and second is the selection of a course of action. The first decision dictates the timing of the second decision and may require a good deal more of what Clausewitz termed Coup d' Oeil or what General Sullivan calls mental agility.<sup>33</sup> Failure to realize the need for action at best results in lost opportunities, at worst it could force the unit into a reactive mode from which it would be difficult to recover. Making the decision to act depends upon the ability to see the battlefield clearly and the freedom of action to rapidly change direction within the higher commander's intent. The key to defeating the enemy before he can defeat you is to realize the need for action sooner, to be able

to implement that action more quickly, and to be sure that the action is going to strike home with both physical and moral effect.

The decision that action is necessary can range from the simple triggering of a planned action, the implementation of a planned branch or sequel, the exploitation of an unforeseen opportunity, or the *reaction* to an unforeseen enemy action. If the purpose of all military action is to defeat the enemy before he can defeat you, then the preferred situation is to act rather than to react. This requires flexible plans based on solid intelligence about the full range of possible enemy courses of action.<sup>34</sup> It also requires the commander to be able to visualize the battlefield. Visualizing the battlefield requires not only seeing it as it currently exists, but also to be able to project into the future the probable outcomes of current actions and the need for future actions.<sup>35</sup> Flexible plans give commanders the ability to act against a range of possible enemy actions and they minimize the negative effects of reacting to unforeseen enemy actions.<sup>36</sup>

Flexible plans also involve the considerations of time and space factors which dictate the timing requirements for decisions. This is an aspect of battle command which should not be underestimated. Clausewitz called it the most essential factor in achieving superiority at the decisive point.<sup>37</sup> Today time/space relationships may be even more important.

"One of the more difficult conceptual tasks ... is the requirement to deal with time/space relationships. The very high projected mobility of both friendly and opposing forces, the porous nature of the battlefield, and the need for senior-level commanders to execute actions in the "now" time frame far to the rear of the opposing force, in order to influence events at the front two to three days later, are factors which require significant conceptual ability beyond that previously required in battle."<sup>38</sup>

Decisions which are anticipated can be made relatively quickly, plans are normally already coordinated, and orders can be rapidly executed. Therefore, decisions which are anticipated normally serve to accelerate action.<sup>39</sup> Unforeseen

situations are just the opposite. The decision must be considered and coordinated at each level of command. The execution of the decision will take longer. Therefore, unanticipated decisions tend to decelerate action.

The course of action chosen by either side in a battle is chosen because it appears to the commander that it offers the best *chance* of defeating the enemy with the least *chance* being defeated first. Like the individual rifleman, commanders at every level are faced with the same dilemma, how to kill without being killed. The dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that commanders will never be able to see the battlefield perfectly.

Martin Van Creveld called the history of command in war an "endless quest for certainty--certainty about the state and intentions of the enemy's forces; certainty about the manifold factors that together constitute the environment...; and, last but definitely not least, certainty about the state, intentions, and activities of one's own forces."<sup>40</sup> Where there is uncertainty, the decision can range from the very timid to the very bold.

Clausewitz had this to say about boldness in a commander, "...boldness in war even has its own prerogatives. It must be granted a certain power over and above successful calculations involving space, time, and magnitude of forces, for wherever it is superior, it will take advantage of its opponent's weakness. In other words, it is a *genuinely creative force*(emphasis added)." Clausewitz further distinguished acts of true boldness from those taken out of sheer necessity. He points out that bold acts taken out of necessity are really only a reflection of the commander's resolution.<sup>41</sup> Today we would distinguish them as acts which are proactive versus reactive.

This creative force must balance the need to protect oneself with the need to strike the enemy. Theorist B. H. Liddell Hart pointed out the fundamental truth that "...war is a two-party affair, so imposing the need that while hitting one must guard. Its corollary is that, in order to hit with effect, the enemy must be taken off his guard."<sup>42</sup> The need to guard is what keeps pressure on the enemy. To the extent that he feels threatened, he will tend to guard more than hit. His boldness will be tempered

leaving only his resolution or will to survive. In order to threaten the enemy however, one must forego a certain amount of protection in order to strike a blow. This requires true boldness. Both sides will follow this logic in the design of their plan. The key is to make their plan obsolete by creating actions which the enemy does not expect. This causes the enemy to react thus decelerating his action.

B. H. Liddell Hart summarized his theory as follows "...for success two major problems must be solved--dislocation and exploitation. One precedes and one follows the actual blow--which in comparison is a simple act."<sup>43</sup> Dislocation involves rendering the enemy's plan ineffective. This is done in numerous ways, both physical and psychological. Deception causes the enemy commander to base his plan on incorrect assumptions about our intentions or capabilities enabling us to surprise him.<sup>44</sup> C3CM disrupts the enemy's ability to direct his force. Deep attacks eliminate or attrit key enemy capabilities or disrupt the timing of his plan. Raids and spoiling attacks decelerate enemy action by forcing him to react to unexpected actions. Supporting missions or economy of force missions cause the enemy to dilute his force. Psychological operations can involve all of the above as well as its own unique operations but its effect is aimed at the enemy's will rather than physical forces.<sup>45</sup> At the tactical level, dislocation is successful if it results in favorable combat power ratios at the intended point of impact.

At the point of impact, overwhelming combat power is what truly counts. The blow is executed by the subordinate as an integral part of the higher commander's plan. If the higher commander successfully dislocated the enemy (set the conditions), then the subordinate's operation will have a better chance of success. If the subordinate is able to overwhelm the enemy, then he creates an opportunity which his high commander can exploit. At each level of command this same logic applies. Every level of command attempts to set the conditions for its subordinates through its concept for the operation, its allocation of resources appropriate to assigned missions, and its preparation to

exploit opportunities. At each level of command, enough combat power must be developed to overwhelm the enemy at the point of the blow.<sup>46</sup>

The theoretical logic for determining the force required for the engagement was defined by Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege in his paper, *Understanding and Developing Combat Power*. He said that the side which was able to develop the greatest combat power would win in battle. His logic holds that combat potential is turned into combat power by leadership, or within the context of this paper, decision making and leadership, i.e., battle command. He maintained that combat power is a function of what leaders do with the firepower, maneuver, and protection capabilities of their force. He also recognized the two sided nature of war and realized that the enemy would be able to negate at least some of the combat potential before it could become combat power.<sup>47</sup>

Exploitation involves following up on the opportunities created by the force of the blow. Its effect is both physical and psychological. It involves the application of relatively fresh forces against demoralized or shaken forces. Its intent is to accelerate action by enlarging the scope of the success and breaking the will of the enemy to fight. Like the dislocation, it must be planned for as an integral part of any offensive or defensive plan. The window of opportunity for conducting the exploitation may be short so the commander must anticipate the decision to launch the exploitation force. This is one of the key decisions that action is necessary. In the offense, the exploitation may involve use of the reserves to reinforce success. In the defense, it begins with the launching of the counter-attack after a successful defense.<sup>48</sup> It continues from that point as an offensive operation.

The allocation of resources to subordinates to accomplish their mission only provides them with combat potential. What the subordinate leaders do with the resources will define their level of battle command effectiveness. Dislocating the enemy is a key part of developing combat power, allocating resources to subordinates appropriate to their assigned mission is a key part of developing combat power, and

finally, planning to exploit the success of subordinates is a key part of developing combat power.

Battle command effectiveness cannot be viewed at a single level of command in isolation. Battle command is inherently *vertical* in nature. Any particular level is dependent on the higher level of command for resources, a workable concept, and freedom of action to develop combat power. Furthermore, it is dependent on the success of its subordinates so that their success can be exploited. Likewise, the C2 system must support commanders at all levels and provide for a common vision of the battlefield on a near real-time basis.

Regardless of whether you are a proponent of maneuver theory or attrition theory, or of strategies of exhaustion or annihilation, at the tactical level the logic of the dislocation, the blow, and exploitation is inescapable. Furthermore it is consistent with the Army's warfighting doctrine.<sup>49</sup> Returning to the rifleman, his squad leader dislocated the enemy by using a fire team to suppress the enemy and to focus their attention in another direction. This allowed the rifleman's fire team to move into a position of advantage in order to maximize their ability to kill the enemy without getting themselves killed. It would have been up to the fire team leaders to determine how best to deliver the blow. After the blow, the squad leader then would have used the rifleman's fire team to lay down a base of fire so that the other fire team could continue to move forward toward the objective.

Similarly, a corps commander would use deception, C3CM, PSYOPS, and deep attacks to dislocate the enemy so that his divisions could mass combat power against the enemy in the close fight. The corps commander would then use his reserve to exploit success in the close fight in order to maintain pressure on the enemy and defeat him in detail. At each level of command down to the squad leader, the higher commander should plan to dislocate the enemy to set the conditions for the subordinate level and then be prepared to exploit the opportunity created by the subordinate. He does this by developing a concept for the operation to include his intent statement, assigning

missions to subordinate commanders, and allocating resources. The subordinate's blow likewise consists of dislocation, the blow by his subordinate, and the exploitation.

In order to deal with the uncertainty of the enemy's course of action and the uncertainty of the effect of the dislocation, subordinate commanders are allowed the freedom of action to strike the blow in accordance with the situation as it unfolds so long as their action is not counter productive to the overall plan for action. If each level of command has planned for flexibility and enjoys the freedom of action to make rapid decisions, then the action created by the force will continue to accelerate. Under this concept, unity of purpose from higher to lower is preserved by the use of mission type orders and use of the commander's intent. In this way, the action created by commanders and leaders at all levels contributes toward the common objective of defeating the enemy's forces and / or his will before he can do the same to us.

To be effective, any plan for action chosen by the commander must be flexible and it must provide for the dislocation, the blow, and the exploitation of the enemy force. Flexibility requires that the commander see the battlefield, be able to anticipate future outcomes or events, and develop a course of action with branches and sequels. Dislocation causes the enemy to drop his guard and *decelerate* his action. It requires that our action be unexpected or so quick that the enemy cannot respond in time. The blow masses our combat power to destroy the enemy while off guard or while his guard has been rendered irrelevant. The exploitation allows us to continue to *accelerate* our action relative to the enemy to prevent him from recovering his cohesion before he is entirely defeated. It normally means the application of additional force such as the reserve to maintain the pressure on the enemy.

### **The Art of Battlefield Leadership.**

Leadership in battle is a broad subject. The purpose of this section is not to review all the theories of leadership, but rather to determine its function on the battlefield and what distinguishes effective from ineffective battle leadership.

A review of the various theories of war reveals that leadership performs at least two major functions on the battlefield. First and foremost it inspires and motivates the army to "do difficult things in trying times"<sup>50</sup>, secondly, it sets the threshold of victory or defeat within the moral domain.

Theorists as long ago as Sun Tzu (400-320 B.C.) understood the role of morale in war. Sun Tzu said, "The responsibility for a martial host of a million lies in one man. He is the trigger of its spirit. ... If an army has been deprived of its morale, its general will also lose his heart."<sup>51</sup> Clausewitz believed that military spirit was "one of the most important moral elements in war." and that it was "a tool whose power is measurable"... and "whose influence may therefore be estimated".<sup>52</sup> Like Sun Tzu, Clausewitz believed that the commander was ultimately responsible for his unit's military spirit. He also realized that the "inertia of the whole gradually comes to rest on the commander's will alone. The ardor of his spirit must rekindle the flame of purpose in all others; his inward fire must revive their hope."<sup>53</sup>

Likewise, J. F. C. Fuller noted that physical loss is normally the most obvious effect of disaster or defeat but that there is also a moral component consisting in the reduction in the endurance of the soldiers and more importantly the loss of the "will-power of the commander over his men". This he said could only be made good by "success in the field".<sup>54</sup>

Fuller identified "The conflict of reason and instinct" as "one of the outstanding problems of war." He said that fear and danger tend to cause soldiers to act in terms of self preservation. On the other hand, the commander must somehow convince soldiers to act on his idea and "unless the will of his men responds to his idea their actions will be out of harmony with it."<sup>55</sup> Fuller concludes that the commander's "knowledge and his prestige for doing right must be unimpeachable, and reliance in him must be so complete that the will of his men is merged into his own."<sup>56</sup>

Our doctrine requires that decision making be decentralized within the commander's overall intent. As we have seen, decision making is only part of the

problem. The other part is inspiring and motivating subordinates to carry out those decisions in the face of adversity. This requires strong leadership at every level of command. At the lower levels of command it involves leadership which is directly involved with soldiers whose instincts drive them away from danger. At the higher levels leadership is more indirect but no less important. According to theorist Richard Simpkin, the commander's requirement to establish will power over the unit plays a double role. First, "It sets the threshold at which a commander will see his mental picture of the situation as representing defeat and succumb to his opponent." Second, it "determines the ability of their respective subordinates."<sup>57</sup>

Battle command leadership like decision making, cannot be viewed at a single level in isolation. Field Marshall Erwin Von Rommel was quoted as saying "It is sheer nonsense to say that maintenance of men's morale is the job of the battalion commander alone. The higher the rank, the greater the effect of the example..."<sup>58</sup> The converse of this may also be true, in spite of great high level leadership, poor leadership at the intermediate or lower levels may undo the positive effects on morale.

Likewise, if higher commanders expect their subordinates to lead effectively, they must not only provide purpose and motivation but also resources. This entails the delegation of authority and the concept of directive control. In the mid 1980s this was termed "power down". One of conclusions reached concerning power-down during a leadership study conducted at Fort Hood, Texas was that "Any command/leadership level that is unwilling to give up micromanagement can block the flow of Power Down to subordinate elements. The entire thrust of Power Down can be interrupted; its potential advantages can be lost."<sup>59</sup> Certainly part of leadership must include the provision of good leadership down to the lowest level and the development of trust between commanders at each level.

To be effective, battle command leadership must instill in the force, at each successive level, the will to act in accordance with the intent of the higher commanders. The will to act must flow freely from top to bottom of the unit. It must be a strong,

determined will which will persevere in the face of hardship and danger and which resists being demoralized by set backs. Subordinate commanders must not only have the will to act, but also the freedom to act on their own volition. The will to act is born from the morale of the force, its confidence in its leaders, and the soundness of the plan. The freedom to act is a product of the concept of directive control and the trust between seniors and subordinates.

### **The Product of Battle Command : Action**

Although the art of decision making and the art of leadership have been discussed separately, the two components of battle command are inseparable and it is their synergistic effect which creates action. The decision represents the conceptual design of the action in the mind's eye of the commander. Leadership reflects the commander's skill at communicating the design and the necessity of each subordinate in its fruition. The action which battle command endeavors to create must be designed and executed so as to defeat the enemy before he can defeat us.

This overriding imperative should drive our actions to slow the enemy down while it motivates us to accelerate. We must plan to strike the enemy with maximum physical and moral effect before he can strike us. And we must instill in our leaders the will to act rather than to react. This requires bold plans and bold leaders.

Our review of leadership's role in battle applies to both sides. Therefore it follows that the enemy's will is a viable objective for our action especially if his leadership is weak. Sun Tzu said, "the expert at controlling his enemy frustrates him and then moves against him. He aggravates him to confuse him and harasses him to make him fearful. Thus, he robs his enemy of his heart and of his ability to plan."<sup>60</sup> Clausewitz said that "In the engagement, the loss of morale has proved the major decisive factor. ... This becomes the means of achieving the margin of profit in the destruction of the enemy's physical forces which is the real purpose of the engagement."<sup>61</sup> Our plans must incorporate actions which directly robs the enemy of his heart, strikes strong blows, and which plan for the exploitation of local successes.

We must exercise strong leadership to reduce our vulnerability to similar actions by the enemy, ensure unity of effort, and which will sustain our force's ability to continue to accelerate the action beyond initial success.

FM 100-5, Operations, defines tempo as the "rate of military action".<sup>62</sup> Battle command creates action. Actions can be proactive or reactive depending upon which side has the advantage. Setting or controlling the tempo marks the distinction between acting and reacting. Effective battle command sets the tempo of the operation forcing the enemy to react.

### **III. UNDERSTANDING INITIATIVE.**

"Our job is to develop bold audacious leaders, competent enough to know the difference between risk and gamble, and willing to take risk to get inside the decision cycle of the enemy in order to wrest the initiative from him. We must develop commanders who trust their subordinates, who delegate responsibility and authority to them, and who encourage them to exercise initiative within the framework of their intent."<sup>63</sup>

This quotation by Lieutenant General Gerald T. Bartlett, former Commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, uses the term initiative in two different ways. The first refers to "the initiative" as a noun, as if it were something which can be possessed by the force as a whole with respect to the enemy. The second use of the word initiative refers to the "exercise of initiative" as if it were a quality possessed by individual unit commanders or leaders with respect to their tendency to act on their own. Understanding of both these uses of the term initiative are necessary to use the concept of initiative as a measure of effectiveness for battle command.

FM 100-5, Operations, doctrinally states the two uses of the term initiative as follows:

"Initiative sets or changes the terms of battle by action and implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. Applied to the force as a whole, initiative requires a constant effort to force the enemy to conform to

commander's operational purposes and tempos, while retaining freedom of action. ... Applied to individual soldiers and leaders, initiative requires a willingness and ability to act independently within the framework of the higher commander's intent."<sup>64</sup>

Both types of initiative require the creation of action. Initiative applied to the force as a whole requires action which is designed to preempt the enemy's plans and cause him to react to the effects of our action. To the extent that the force is successful in that objective then they possess the initiative. Initiative applied to individual soldiers and leaders refers to their will to act or to create action which facilitates the taking of the initiative by the force. It facilitates it by acting as soon as the leader realizes the need for action rather than waiting for instructions from above. It implies that the soldier or leader on the scene is better able to see the battlefield and act appropriately than commanders who are several times removed.

### **Battle Initiative**

Initiative applied to the force as a whole, or battle initiative, is closely related to the concept of the decision cycle or OODA Loop.<sup>65</sup> Both sides in a battle attempt to see the battlefield within the context of their objectives and what they believe the enemy will do, they adopt the course of action they believe will most likely result in success, and then they act to carry out that course of action. Each side believes he has the necessary combat power at every point of impact to be successful. If each side were 100% correct in their assessment, then both sides would win each engagement. Obviously one side has to be more right than the other. The key to success is to lead the enemy to make incorrect assessments, i.e., mistakes.<sup>66</sup> To the extent this is successful, our actions will not be anticipated by the enemy. Simultaneously, we must ensure that the enemy cannot do the same to us. We must force the enemy to react by presenting him with situations he did not anticipate and cannot tolerate. Meanwhile, we must anticipate his reactions and take actions to further frustrate his plan. This is what General Bartlett called getting "inside the decision cycle of the enemy".

In the section on battle command, the monograph highlighted the importance of the decision that action is necessary. This decision is made in light of information garnered through the battle tracking and battle analysis processes. When we have planned branches to our course of action based on anticipated enemy actions or reactions, we are able to decelerate the enemy's action while accelerating our own. When we fail to anticipate the enemy's actions, then commanders must have the freedom to rapidly improvise adjustments to the plan within the context of their higher commander's intent.

When the enemy succeeds in initiating an unanticipated action against us, we may be forced to react. At whatever level this occurs (the lower the better), rapidly improvised adjustments to the plan should serve to limit the effect of the enemy's action so that the higher commander's plan is not also disrupted. Conversely, when our plans are successful, we must be able to rapidly exploit the opportunity before the enemy can react to limit our success. If each level of command is able to rapidly act to exploit success then the magnitude of the success can be expanded by successively higher levels of command.

According to FM 100-15, Corps Operations, "Defeat may or may not entail the destruction of any part of the enemy army; rather, the objective is to either disrupt or nullify his plan and/or subdue his will to fight so that he is either unwilling or unable to further pursue his adopted course of action."<sup>67</sup> There are many ways to distort or nullify the enemy's plan or subdue his will to fight. All of them require creativity and a certain amount of unpredictability. Deception distorts the enemy commander's expectation of our intentions.<sup>68</sup> C3CM disrupts the enemy commander's ability to direct his forces. Rapid maneuvers surprise the enemy in the realm of time and space. Deep attacks destroy or disrupt key enemy capabilities relied on by his plan.<sup>69</sup> Psychological operations demoralize the enemy and weaken his will to fight. At the lower levels, well placed minefields slow the enemy down and channelize his

movements.<sup>70</sup> Integrated fire support disrupts and suppresses the enemy. And smoke blinds the enemy.


All of these actions are designed to ensure overwhelming combat power at the point of impact. They are all positive actions taken against the enemy regardless of whether the force as a whole is on the defense or the offense. Each of these actions require that we envision the battlefield more clearly and more quickly than the enemy, that we more accurately assess the current situation with respect to the desired end state, and that our actions have greater moral and physical effect than the enemy's.

Tempo is an important related concept to battle initiative. If every positive action taken by each side is considered an initiative, then the rate of initiatives can be considered tempo. Each initiative varies in significance. Some initiatives have very little effect on the enemy while others have profound physical and moral effects. Therefore, tempo is not just the quantity of initiatives over time but also there is a component of significance<sup>71</sup> which serves to accelerate the tempo relative to the enemy.

To possess the advantage in terms of tempo is essentially the same as possessing battle initiative.<sup>72</sup> In any engagement or battle, each side is able to create positive actions against its adversary. The absolute value (quantity and quality) of our initiatives must be greater than the enemy during any period of time in order to control the tempo. Refer to figure two for an example. The attacker is normally credited with initially possessing the initiative.<sup>73</sup> This is because he is able to choose the time and place of the attack. Initially he is able to create the most significant military action by massing at the point of the attack against a fraction of the defender. However, the strength of the defense offers advantages which facilitate slowing the tempo of the attacker. To the extent the defender is able to increase his own tempo in terms of quantity and quality of his actions, parity may be reached. Clausewitz called this the point of culmination.<sup>74</sup> It is at this point that the defender's actions have been successful in stalling and breaking the cohesion of the attack. If the defender still has enough strength, he can wrest the initiative from the attacker by conducting a counter-

attack to exploit the success of the defense. At this point the defender's initiatives outweigh the attacker's, his tempo is accelerating while the original attacker's is decelerating, and the initiative belongs to the counter-attacker.

The key to winning is to take the initiative and maintain it by forcing the enemy's tempo to constantly decelerate while keeping your tempo greater than his. Defeating the enemy's plan decelerates his tempo. Destroying his forces also decelerates his tempo. Both have physical effects and both have psychological effects.



**FIGURE 2 : INITIATIVE, TEMPO, AND THE CULMINATING POINT**

The combination of the two is intended to cause the enemy to lose his will to fight before he can do the same to us.

While we normally associate the initiative with the offense, the defender can create initiatives against the attacker which decelerate the attacker's action. The

defender accelerates his own tempo in relation to the attacker to the extent he is able to shape the battlefield in accordance with his own plan. Ultimately he can wrest the initiative from the attacker by exceeding the attacker's tempo.

A cycle of the OODA Loop is required to create action. Battle tracking and battle assessment are continuous activities. The decision that action is necessary is the critical link in the OODA loop in terms of setting the tempo. Failure to realize that action is necessary might go unnoticed because it results in non-action. The result is opportunity lost or forfeiture of the initiative to the enemy. Late realization that action is necessary results in a slower tempo and a hastily produced action. The commander whose visualization of the battlefield anticipates the need for action and improvises rapid adjustments to the current plan will be able to set the tempo at an ever increasing rate. This commander possesses individual initiative.

#### **Individual Initiative**

S.L.A. Marshall said "...by a rough approximation: 60 per cent of the art of command is the ability to anticipate; 40 per cent of the art of command is the ability to improvise, to reject the preconceived idea that has been tested and proved wrong in the crucible of operations, and to rule by action instead of acting by rules."<sup>75</sup> Anticipation means being able to envision the battlefield, e.g., seeing the current situation in terms of probable outcomes of current actions and the series of actions necessary to reach the desired end state. Improvisation means the ability to rapidly adjust plans in accordance with the vision of the battlefield.

J.F.C. Fuller believed that action largely depended on the individual initiative of leaders. He referred to it as the "will to act". According to Fuller, "If subordinate leaders have definitely been delegated control of certain operations, then they should be allowed full freedom of action within the terms of references of the plan." He argued that interference by the higher commander usurps the responsibility delegated to the subordinate and thus weakens the will of the subordinate to act.<sup>76</sup> Therefore,

individual initiative requires not only the ability to anticipate and the ability to improvise but also the will to act.

Like Fuller, S.L.A. Marshall realized that individual initiative had to be limited to the "terms of references of the plan". He said that "I think we can put it down as an axiom that initiative is a desirable characteristic in a soldier only when its effect is concentric rather than eccentric: the rifleman who plunges ahead and seizes a point of high ground which common sense says cannot be held can bring greater jeopardy to a company than any mere malingerer."<sup>77</sup> The same may be said about the commander who launches an initiative which is counter-productive to the higher commander's plan. Individual initiative in the context of our doctrine means initiative which is constructive to the overall plan rather than destructive.

At the individual rifleman level, any action he takes in the face of danger toward the accomplishment of his mission is arguably initiative. The rifleman must overcome the inertia of fear to take a positive action against the enemy. S.L.A. Marshall said "the act of moving is initiative" and that firing one's weapon was also initiative. Additionally, Marshall believed that speech, the act of communicating pertinent information in battle, was a critical component of individual initiative. He defined pertinent information as "any information which will enable the uniting of strength, which in turn means the multiplication of strength." According to Marshall, this information flow must be two-way. He believed that "the greatest possible stimulant to the initiative of the commander is for the subordinate to continue to supply him with all information as it develops, and that conversely, to build initiative in his men, the commander must keep them informed of the general situation, the object, and the role of all elements."<sup>78</sup> He felt that communicating was important on a moral level to increase the will to act (overcoming the inertia of fear) and in terms of assisting commanders and leaders to more clearly visualize the battlefield. By improving a leader's ability to see and understand the battlefield, Marshall believed that the individual initiatives of soldiers could be united to accelerate the unit's tempo.

Moving up the chain of command from the rifleman, individual initiative retains the character of overcoming the inertia of fear to take positive action against the enemy. The responsibility for doing so rests with the unit commander or leader. He must have a predisposition toward action against the enemy rather than to protect against him. Protection is important but it does not win battles. This concept returns us to Clausewitz's view on boldness. In his opinion, true boldness increased the farther removed the action was from necessity.<sup>79</sup> Applied to individual initiative, true boldness is required for actions which are taken *early* in anticipation of future battlefield situations. Actions that are forced due to necessity are actions to protect. Clausewitz said these actions only displayed resolution. Positive actions taken against the enemy to preempt his action requires the ability to visualize the battlefield and to anticipate enemy plans. These actions also require that subordinates be given the freedom to act within the context of the higher commander's intent for the operation. Finally, commanders must possess a certain creative boldness in their decision making.

#### **The Relationship Between Individual Initiative and Battle Initiative**

There seems to be symbiotic relationship between individual initiative and battle initiative. Battle initiative means having the ability to act rather than react, to beat the enemy to the punch. It requires bold plans which dislocate the enemy's plans through unexpected actions leading the enemy to make mistakes. The effect it seeks is the destruction of enemy forces and its will to fight. Battle initiative requires bold leaders with individual initiative to rapidly seize fleeting opportunities created by enemy mistakes. Individual initiative senses opportunities to take action against the enemy and rapidly adjusts plans to ensure maximum physical and moral effect. Individual initiative develops the situation from the bottom up enabling each successively higher commander to exploit the opportunities created by their subordinates. The combined effect is high tempo operations to defeat the enemy before he can defeat us.

#### IV. INITIATIVE AS A MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS.

The development of officers who are accomplished in the art of battle command is crucial to the United States Army's ability to win on the future battlefield.<sup>80</sup> This task is especially difficult for the profession of arms due to the constrained peacetime learning environment. Theorist B. H. Liddell Hart lamented that in peacetime training, the concentration on tactical technique results in a "cult of soundness rather than surprise. It breeds commanders who are so intent not to do anything wrong...that they forget the necessity of making the enemy do something wrong. The result is that their plans have no result. For, in war, it is by compelling mistakes that the scales are most often turned."<sup>81</sup> General Sullivan also recognized this problem when he said that we must develop the ability "to recognize acceptable risks and take them." He believes that the best way to develop this ability is by rewarding initiative and innovation in our training. He summarized that "Fostering creative, adaptive behavior is the essence of leader development."<sup>82</sup>

The introduction of the battle command concept in our newest doctrine is aimed at fostering creative, adaptive commanders who are able to compel the enemy to make mistakes and who can recognize and exploit opportunities as they are created. In order to reinforce the battle command concept in our training and in our study of war, we need an appropriate measure of effectiveness.

To be appropriate, the measure of effectiveness must address the essential qualities of battle command and it must also provide sufficient resolution to facilitate the discussion and study of training exercises or the analysis of historical case studies, e.g., it must be useful. The concept of initiative may be such a measure. The two sided, competitive nature of war is fundamental to both concepts. Battle command creates action within this environment. Initiative is a concept which describes the results of such action in relative terms between the two adversaries.

During the monograph's discussion of battle command and of initiative, several strong parallels emerged between the two concepts. These parallels link the essential qualities of effective battle command to the concept of initiative.

First and foremost, battle command is an art form. Its purpose is to create military action. Unlike other art forms however, it does not exist as an end unto itself. Rather, it exists as a means to defeat an enemy whose aim is to defeat us. Within this interactive medium, battle command effectiveness should be judged not only by the ability to orchestrate the actions of our own forces, but also by the degree to which commanders are able to orchestrate the enemy's actions. Orchestration of one's own forces is difficult enough. The orchestration of one's own forces for the purpose of orchestrating the enemy's actions requires commanders characterized by creative boldness at each level in the chain of command working together to produce the artistic effect we have defined as battle initiative.

Initiative is a subjective quality which describes the net effects of each opponent's actions. According to our doctrinal understanding of initiative, gaining battle initiative requires "a constant effort to force the enemy to conform to a commander's operational purposes and tempos, while retaining freedom of action". ... It also requires soldiers and leaders to have the will and "ability to act independently within the framework of the higher commander's intent."<sup>83</sup>

The commander who is able to create actions which out weigh the enemy's actions in both the physical and moral domain possesses battle initiative. Even when a unit is in the defense, the commander may take positive actions to deceive the enemy leading him to attack at a time and place of the defending commander's choosing. In this case, the defender possesses the initiative. He is setting the terms of battle and controlling the tempo. A well known example of possessing the initiative while in the defense is Napoleon's deception of the allies of the Third Coalition at the battle of Austerlitz. Napoleon, after pursuing the Russians from Munich to Vienna, no longer had the ability to carry the fight to the enemy. However, by feigning weakness in

general and especially on his right flank, he was able to entice the Russians and Austrians into attacking him almost exactly as he expected. He subsequently was able to exploit this dislocation of the enemy's plan with his counter-attack which completed the destruction of his enemy.<sup>84</sup> Napoleon, through the brilliance of his concept and its synchronized execution by his subordinates, possessed the initiative in that defensive battle from the time the allied commanders took his bait until the conclusion of the fight.

Battle command's two principal tools, decision making and leadership combine to create actions which implement commander's plans. Our discussion of battle command concluded that we must plan to strike the enemy with maximum physical and moral effect before he can strike us and that we must instill in our leaders and soldiers the will to act rather than to react. This requires bold plans and bold leaders. Our C2 systems must provide the commander the information he needs to envision the battlefield clearly. Battle plans must incorporate actions which dislocate the enemy physically and psychologically so that when we strike the main blow, the enemy's guard is down. Commanders must also plan for exploitation of success leading to pursuit to keep pressure on the enemy preventing his recovery. Battle leadership must function to reduce our vulnerability to similar actions by the enemy, ensure unity of effort, and sustain our force's ability to continue to accelerate the action beyond initial success. Finally, we concluded that effective battle command sets or controls the tempo by orchestrating action on both sides of the engagement.

Gaining and maintaining battle initiative requires that we do all of these things better than the enemy. In the section on initiative we concluded that battle initiative requires bold plans which dislocate the enemy leading him to make mistakes and it requires bold leaders with individual initiative to rapidly seize fleeting opportunities created by those mistakes. The combined effect of these two requirements is high tempo operations to defeat the enemy before he can defeat us, the same effect which battle command endeavors to create. Battle command leadership functions to instill in

subordinates the will to act which is required to take the initiative. Battle command decision making produces actions designed to decelerate the enemy's action by making his plans irrelevant while constantly accelerating our own action by taking advantage of opportunities as they occur. This is also required to seize and maintain the initiative.

The concept of battle initiative provides an overarching measure of effectiveness which addresses the net effect of each sides ability to battle command its forces. It addresses the requirements for effective decision making in battle and for leadership in battle. The concept of individual initiative addresses the effectiveness of leadership's ability to inspire subordinates to act rather than to react. It also addresses the effectiveness of a commander's ability to envision the battlefield, recognize opportunities early, and then implement their willingness to act. The two concepts taken together provide a suitable means for analyzing battle command.

Battle command's measure of effectiveness must have enough resolution to be useful. In the introduction to this paper, we resolved that the measure of effectiveness for battle command should not attempt to provide a yardstick form of measurement. Rather, our measure ought to have enough resolution to provide a framework for discussion and analysis of battle command in real or simulated situations, it ought to be a basis for feedback to a commander to assess his degree of success or failure in applying the art of command, and it must provide insights toward what effective battle command is without restricting the creative instincts of commanders.

This monograph discusses several key concepts which refine the understanding of battle command and initiative. These concepts appear consistently in most of the major theories of war since the time of Sun Tzu and are key components of our doctrine as well. They also provide a thread of continuity between battle command and the concept of initiative. It is this set of concepts which provide the resolution necessary to assess battle command. They include such ideas as the commander's vision, anticipation, flexibility in planning, dislocation of the enemy, improvisation,

freedom of action, the will to act, and the role of creative boldness in the art of command.

From these ideas, and the relationship between battle command and initiative, a framework of analysis for effective battle command has been developed. This framework is a first step toward providing the resolution necessary to use initiative as a measure of effectiveness. The framework consists of a series of questions with associated phrases to focus analysis of the question's answer. The intent is that this framework may be useful to structure battle command after action reviews during field training exercises or command post exercises. The framework of analysis follows in italics with explanatory notes.

**1. *How well did the commander envision the battlefield?*** A clear commander's vision of the battlefield is fundamental to effective battle command and absolutely must be clearer than the enemy commander's vision of the battlefield in order to seize and retain the initiative. As such, the commander's vision is one of the most lucrative targets on the battlefield. The commander must continuously envision the battlefield, updating in his mind the significance of every development. The clarity of his vision can change during the course of the battle. Every action created by battle command has an effect on the enemy commander's vision of the battlefield. To the extent his vision can be blurred, his decision cycle will be slowed and his decision corrupted. A clear vision of the battlefield helps the commander to accelerate action as opportunities arise. Exercising forward command is necessary to minimize the effects of enemy efforts to blur the commander's vision the battlefield.

**a. *Enemy expectation of friendly intentions.*** Unexpected actions catch the enemy with his guard down, forcing him to react. In order to create actions the enemy does not expect, the commander must understand what the enemy expects us to do. This is an approach to intelligence which is not commonly taken.

**b. *Enemy intentions.*** When the enemy does something we do not expect, then we are forced to react. In order to prevent being surprised by the enemy, the

commander must understand what the enemy intends to do. Knowing what the enemy intends to do helps the commander find ways to frustrate the enemy's plan.

**c. *Time-Space Relationships.*** Time-space relationships define the difference between feasible and infeasible plans. It defines the range of options which are available to the commander and allows him to time actions to achieve the greatest effect. At the tactical level, the greatest opportunity for surprise lies in the ability to rapidly move combat power to unexpected places on the battlefield before the enemy can react. Slowing the enemy's ability to react requires that commanders think and fight throughout the depth of the battlefield. Friendly actions are often keyed to enemy actions. This requires that commanders be able to closely track enemy actions and that they be intimately familiar with the physical limitations of their own force's capabilities in order to synchronize actions at the desired time and place.

**d. *Current Situation to Desired End State.*** The commander's vision must discern the significance of the current situation with respect to the desired end state. It must chart a path to get there at the expense of the enemy.

**2. *Did the commander's plans and decisions endeavor to seize and maintain the initiative?*** Plans provide the blueprint for the actions the commander wants to create in pursuit of his objective. The commander's decisions implement those plans and when required adjusts those plans. The dominant motive behind every action should be to seize or retain battle initiative. When in the defense, the plan should include actions to make the enemy do what we want him to do. When in the offense, the plan should be completely unexpected by the enemy. Each of the commander's decisions should be analyzed to assess the degree to which it endeavored to seize and maintain the initiative.

**a. *By causing the enemy to make incorrect assessments leading to bad plans. (dislocate the enemy through deception, surprise, or preemption)*** Actions which successfully lead the enemy to make incorrect assessments tend to accelerate the tempo by increasing the significance of our other subsequent actions and decreasing the significance of enemy actions.

**b. By planning to accelerate tempo beyond the enemy's capability, making his adjustments irrelevant.** The commander's understanding of the time-space relationships within his area of operations dictates the timing of each action so that they can be executed before the enemy can react.

**c. By making faster adjustments to own plan. (Anticipation and improvisation, branches to the plan)** The decision that action is necessary is a key component of battle command decision making. A clear vision of the battlefield gives the commander the ability to anticipate. A flexible plan with branches gives the commander the ability to rapidly improvise, freedom of action within the intent of the higher commander gives the commander the authority to act rapidly, boldness gives the commander the desire to act early rather than wait to react.

**d. By concentrating overwhelming combat power (maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership) to strike the main blow with both physical and moral effect.** Each commander must ensure that the necessary resources are allocated commensurate with the missions assigned to each subordinate. At the point of impact, commanders must have overwhelming combat power. All the stratagems, the deceptions, and the maneuvers are intended to manipulate the combat power ratios at the point of impact. Each level of command sets the conditions for its subordinates. If combat power at the point of impact is not overwhelming, then there has been a failure, at some level or levels, of battle command decision making, leadership, or both. If the combat power failed to overwhelm the enemy, then we will lose the initiative at whatever level the failure occurred. If the enemy exploits our failure (his success), then the initiative will be lost at the next higher level until the enemy can be contained. This is the essence of the connection between battle command decision making and battle initiative. The U.S. Army tends plan for success to the exclusion of failure. However, prudent planning dictates that branches be prepared to limit the effects of enemy successes. The decision that this type of action is necessary requires continuous two-way communication between levels of command, accurate battle tracking, and freedom

of action for subordinates to improvise rapid actions within the higher commander's intent.

**e. *By planning for the exploitation of success.*** The converse is true of the above comments. If the commander's subordinate achieves overwhelming combat power at the point of impact, then he must be prepared to exploit the opportunity. To the extent his exploitation is successful, then he possesses the battle initiative and creates opportunity for his higher commander to exploit.

**f. *By balancing boldness with judgment.*** The commander must recognize the difference between risk and gamble. Taking risks will always be necessary in order to act early enough to avoid reacting. The commander must balance these risks by taking adequate precautions to ensure he is not walking into a trap.

**3. *Did the commander's Leadership motivate and inspire his subordinates to do difficult things in trying times, to show individual initiative?*** Battle command decision making and leadership combine to create military actions. Leadership accelerates that action by instilling in soldiers the will to act rather than react. Individual initiative at the lowest levels create the first opportunities for exploitation. Individual initiative is required at every level to rapidly exploit opportunities before the enemy is able to close the opportunity. Likewise, individual initiative is required to make rapid adjustments to the plan before the adjustment becomes a reaction.

**a. *By maintaining high morale.*** High morale is necessary for the creation of aggressive action. Leadership is the dominant influence in the creation of high morale.

**b. *By ensuring subordinate's will to act was in harmony with his while preserving the subordinate's freedom to act.*** When the will to act is in harmony at every level of command, there is a synergistic effect which creates action greater than the sum of its parts. This effect is created by the use of directive orders and monitoring execution by subordinates to ensure their efforts are constructive rather than destructive to the overall plan. While the commander's intent places some limits on the actions of

subordinates, it is intended to give them the freedom of action they need to most effectively accomplish their part of the higher unit's plan.

*c. By setting a high moral threshold of defeat.* The commander, by his personal example, his moral courage, and his ability to maintain the morale of his unit, is able to set a high moral threshold of defeat. This makes the unit less vulnerable to the psychological effects of enemy actions and gives them a higher degree of determination to accomplish the mission.

**4. At what points during the operation did the initiative shift between the two adversaries?** This question must be analyzed vertically through all the levels of command. Subordinates can gain the initiative at their level but their superiors may fail to recognize and exploit it. Subordinates can have their freedom of action so constrained by lack of resources or by a failure of higher commander's leadership that they are unable to seize opportunities when they arise. Analyzing an exercise or an actual operation in terms of the shifting of battle initiative from one side to the other provides valuable insight into the relative effectiveness of each side's battle command decision making and leadership. If every military action is considered a discrete initiative which varies in significance, then the net effect of initiatives taken by each side indicates which side possesses the battle initiative. While it may be very difficult to judge the significance of individual actions standing alone, it is relatively easier to track the shift of initiative at a particular level of command. Battle initiative shifts when the major actions of a unit become reactions. Working backwards from this point, one can begin to discern the actions which had the greatest significance.

This framework of analysis for battle command uses the concept of initiative as its measure of performance. The framework has enough resolution to provide a vehicle for discussion and analysis of battle command in real or simulated situations, it provides a basis for feedback to a commander to assess his degree of success or failure in applying the art of command, and it provides insight toward what effective battle command is without restricting the creative instincts of commanders.

FM 100-5, Operations, says that battle command "is often guided by intuition and feel gained from years of practice and study."<sup>85</sup> The concept of initiative is a viable measure of effectiveness for focusing the practice and study of battle command. Taking and maintaining the initiative in battle requires commanders who possess individual initiative and who encourage it in their subordinates. Battle initiative requires actions which are integrated at each level of command to dislocate the enemy, hit him with overwhelming combat power, and then exploit the enemy while his cohesion is shattered. Battle initiative requires effective battle command.

This monograph offers the concept of initiative as a means of assessing the art of battle command. The monograph is only a first step towards developing a useful construct to improve the quality of our officer's education and training and towards focusing improvements in our command and control system and process. There are many implications requiring further thought and study.

Battle command assessment must be viewed vertically. There are physical and moral conditions which the higher commander sets for his subordinates at each level of command and which evolve continuously throughout an operation. These conditions must be simulated in training in order to reinforce the need for dialogue between levels of command and in order to develop the trust which is so critical in battle. Our training evaluation systems tend to look at individual levels of command in isolation rather than as a part of a larger whole. Our training also tends to ignore the influences of higher levels of command not represented in the field.

Individual initiative is not an innate quality that a commander possesses purely due to personality, rather it must be nurtured and encouraged by each successive level of command.<sup>86</sup> This form of "power-down" can be short-circuited at any point in the chain of command. When a commander fails to show initiative, his entire higher chain of command should be suspect.

As was pointed out in the introduction to this paper, "the most magnificent execution can rarely offset the deadweight of a flawed concept."<sup>87</sup> Like the

encouragement of individual initiative, brilliant concepts at higher levels can be short-circuited by flawed concepts at intermediate or lower levels of command. Command failures must be analyzed by looking at all the levels of command rather than just the level which was defeated. Commanders must ensure that realistic conditions have been set for the unit in training rather than stacking the deck against them.

In order to reward initiative in training, the moral effects of battle must be simulated. So long as a defender is required to prevent penetration of an arbitrary phase line, commanders will act to protect that line rather than to defeat the enemy. They will counter-attack into the face of the enemy to destroy him physically rather than into his flank or rear to destroy him morally and then physically.

The decision that action is necessary is a key part of battle command's role in accelerating tempo while decelerating the enemy's tempo. Little if any time is devoted to this aspect of decision making in an officer's education and training. The execution of plans against a thinking enemy in a command post exercise or field training exercise format is the best tool for practising this critical commander's task. The after action review must dedicate time to discussing this type of decision. Improvements to our command and control system must be focused to support this decision.

Rapid exploitation of a subordinate's success should be a mandatory part of any commander's concept of the operation. Exploitation begins at the lowest levels of the chain of command. To the extent each level of command is able to exploit opportunities before the enemy is able to react, the scope of the success can be expanded. Too often in training, 'change of mission' or 'end of exercise' is called before exploitation even reaches the battalion level. U.S. Army training should endeavor to make exploitation a reflexive action to ensure the thorough defeat of the enemy both physically and morally.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 Battle Command Battle Laboratory. Battle Command Concept. (Draft). (Fort Leavenworth, KS, Undated), p. 1.
- 2 National Training Center. NTC Observations. (Fort Irwin, CA, 20 November 1985), p. 17.
- 3 General Gordon R. Sullivan, "Delivering Decisive Victory: Improving Synchronization." Military Review, Vol: LXXII, n.s. 9 (September 1992) p. 3.
- 4 United States Army. FM 100-5, Operations. (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, May 1986), p. 22.
- 5 Sullivan, "Delivering Decisive Victory: Improving Synchronization," p. 9.
- 6 Battle Command Battle Laboratory. Battle Command Concept, (Draft). p. 4.
- 7 Center for Army Lessons Learned. Newsletter - The Battalion and Brigade Battle Staff. No 93-3. (Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 1993) quote by General W. E. Depuy, USA, Ret. p. 7.
- 8 John Hemsley, Soviet Troop Control, The Role of Command Technology in the Soviet Military System. (Oxford: Brassey's (UK), 1982) p. 102.
- 9 Battle Command Battle Laboratory. Battle Command Concept, (Draft) p. 4.
- 10 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, 1984), p. 149-150.
- 11 Martin Van Creveld, Command in War. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 7-9. In these pages, Van Creveld describes the functions of command which essentially equate to the steps in the OODA loop. He calls these functions eternal. Command in War, traces the logic of command throughout history.
- 12 William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Westview Special Studies in Military Affairs. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p. 5-6.

13 Clausewitz, On War, p. 77. "The ultimate aim of waging war" ("to overcome the enemy, or disarm him"), "as formulated here, must be taken and applying to both sides. Once again, there is interaction. So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus I am not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him."

14 Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, p. 5-6.

15 United States Army. FM 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staffs. (Coordinating Draft) (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, July 1992), p. 1-1, 1-2.

16 The US Army command and control process is documented in numerous sources. For more information begin with FM 101-5 and CGSC Special Text 100-9. Figure one, which depicts the command and control process, represents a combination of the OODA loop and my own understanding of the command and control process.

17 United States Army. FM 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staffs. (Coordinating Draft), p. 1-2.

18 MG Wayne Knudson, "The Future of C2." Military Review, Vol: LXX, n.s. 7 (July 1990), p. 19.

19 United States Army. FM 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staffs. (Coordinating Draft), p. 1-1.

20 Joseph G. Wohl, "Force Management Decision Requirements for Air Force Tactical Command and Control". In IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics. Vol. SMC-11, No. 9, (September, 1981) pp. 619-625.

21 GEN Gordon Sullivan, "Delivering Decisive Victory: Improving Synchronization," p. 4.

22 GEN Gordon Sullivan, "Delivering Decisive Victory: Improving Synchronization," p. 9.

- 23 United States Army. ST 100-9, The Command Estimate Process. (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. June 1993), p. 1-3.
- 24 James MacGregor Burns, Leadership. (New York, Harper Colophon Books, 1979), p. 12.
- 25 Clausewitz, On War, p. 77.
- 26 United States Army. ST 100-9, The Command Estimate Process, p. 1-1.
- 27 Battle Command Battle Laboratory. Battle Command Concept. (Draft), p. 3-4.
- 28 Clausewitz, On War, p. 102-103.
- 29 Antoine Henri Jomini, "Jomini and His Summary of The Art of War". Edited and with an Introduction by Brig. Gen J.D. Hittle, U.S. Marine Corps, Ret.. Roots of Strategy, Book 2. (Harrisburg, PA, Stackpole Books, 1987), p. 508-509.
- 30 United States Army. ST 100-9, The Command Estimate Process, p. 2-9, 2-10.
- 31 Battle Command Battle Laboratory. Battle Command Concept. (Draft), p. 5-6. and United States Army. FM 100-5, Operations. (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, June 1993), p. 2-15.
- 32 United States Army. FM 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staffs. (Coordinating Draft), p. 1-13, "The philosophy the Army typically endorses involves mission-type control; a commander expects subordinate commanders to sense and exploit battlefield opportunities while working with minimal constraints to achieve his intent. This philosophy empowers the commander with authority, responsibility, and inherent trust to execute mission orders as necessary." and General John W. Foss, "Command," Military Review, Vol: LXX, n.s. 5 (May 1990), p. 4, "The commander's intent is designed not to restrain, but to unleash a subordinate by giving him greater freedom of action to accomplish the mission. Subordinate commanders view their mission within the context of the higher commander's intent."
- 33 GEN Gordon Sullivan, "Delivering Decisive Victory: Improving Synchronization", p. 10, and Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Translated and with an Introduction by Samuel B. Griffith. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.

101., "Thus, one able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine.", p. 65, "If wise, a commander is able to recognize changing circumstances and to act expediently."

34 United States Army. ST 100-9, The Command Estimate Process, p. 1-4 and p. 7-1.

35 United States Army. FM 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staffs. (Coordinating Draft), p. 1-7, "This assessment process is continuous and is fed by focused information requirements. The key here is that the process does occur and is the direct link the commander uses in assessing the activities of the current fight with his vision of the future branch or sequel."

36 Sullivan, "Delivering Decisive Victory: Improving Synchronization," p. 10, "The best plans will accommodate changes that are likely to be required once the operation begins. Commanders who make a habit of thorough wargaming as part of their estimate process acquire the ability to foresee the unexpected and to develop branches to the basic plan to cover contingencies. They must insist that the staff also learn such anticipation."

37 Clausewitz, On War, p. 195-197.

38 T. Owen Jacobs, "The AirLand Battle and Leadership Requirements", Hunt, James G. and Blair, John D., ed.. Leadership on the Future Battlefield. (Washington, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), p.26.

39 United States Army. ST 100-9, The Command Estimate Process, p. 7-1, "Because proper deliberate decision making identifies branches and sequels to the operation, adjustments made during the CDP can be accomplished more easily."

40 van Creveld, Command in War, p. 264.

41 Clausewitz, On War, p. 190-2

42 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, (New York, Meridian, 1991), p.329.

43 Hart, Strategy, p.336.

- 44 Center for Army Lessons Learned. Newsletter - Winning in the Desert II. No 90-8. (Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 1990), p. 24.
- 45 This listing of actions which can be used within the context of B.H. Liddell Hart's definition of dislocation, (Strategy, pp. 326-329) is my own interpretation of US Army doctrinal use of capabilities to set the conditions for the subordinate commander to strike the blow.
- 46 Trevor N. Dupuy, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat. (New York, Paragon, 1987), p. 6.
- 47 Huba Wass de Czege, "Understanding and Developing Combat Power." School of Advanced Military Studies. Monograph, (United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1984), p. 9.
- 48 James J. Schneider, "The Theory of Operational Art." School of Advanced Military Studies. Theoretical Paper No. 3, 2d revision, (United States Army command and General Staff College, March 1988), p.39 and Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, pp. 19-22.
- 49 United States Army. FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force. (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, September 1988), p. 1-3 and United States Army. FM 100-5, Operations, p. 7-1, 7-2 and United States Army, FM 100-5, Operations, (1986).
- 50 Wass de Czege, "Understanding and Developing Combat Power", p. 9.
- 51 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, p. 108.
- 52 Clausewitz, On War, p. 188-189.
- 53 Clausewitz, On War, p. 104.
- 54 J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, A Military Classic Reprint. (Fort Leavenworth, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1993), p. 241-2.
- 55 Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, p. 241.

- 56 Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, p. 242.
- 57 Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift, Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, (New York, Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986), p. 226.
- 58 Luck, Gary. Speech to The School of Advanced Military Studies, (Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 1993), quote from Field Marshal Erwin von Rommel was taken from this briefing.
- 59 Center for Army Leadership. Fort Hood Leadership Study. (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 November 1986), p. 14.
- 60 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, p. 108.
- 61 Clausewitz, On War, p. 231.
- 62 United States Army, FM 100-5, Operations, p. Glossary-9.
- 63 Center for Army Lessons Learned. NTC Lessons Learned. No. 88-1. (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 31 January 1988), p.5. Quote by LTG Gerald T. Bartlett.
- 64 United States Army. FM 100-5, Operations, p. Glossary-4.
- 65 John F. Antal, "Maneuver versus Attrition: A Historical Perspective." Military Review, Vol: LXXII, n.s. 10 (October 1992), p. 31. Major Antal's article led me to conclude that taking and maintaining battle initiative is a function of out thinking the enemy by isolating "the critical criteria that set the conditions for success in battle", focusing "intelligence assets on those criteria and" anticipating "enemy actions." The result is the ability to get inside the enemy's OODA loop and ultimately rendering his C2 system ineffective.
- 66 Hart, Strategy, p. 336-337.
- 67 United States Army, FM 100-15, Corps Operations, p. 5-0.

- 68 Center for Army Lessons Learned. Bulletin - No 3-88. (Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 1988), p. 2.
- 69 Allard, C. Kenneth. Command Control and the Common Defense. (New Haven, Conn, Yale University Press, 1990), p. 178 and Combined Arms Center. Corps Deep Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Handbook - (1990). (Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 1990), pp. 1-2, 1-8.
- 70 Bellamy, Chris. The Future of Land Warfare. (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 284 and Simpkin, Race to the Swift, Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, p. 109-112.
- 71 S. L. Canby, "A Comparative Assessment of the NATO Corps Battle", Unpublished Paper, 24 November 1978, pp. 3-19. quoted in John Hemsley's, Soviet Troop Control, The Role of Command Technology in the Soviet Military System, Brassey's Publisher Limited, New York, 1982. p. 96., "Tempo is not synonymous with speed, speed being an obvious (and sometimes trivial) component. Rather *tempo* is the agility by which a commander can sense opportunities to translate them into action systematically to obtain advantages over an opponent."(emphasis added)
- 72 United States Army, FM 100-5, Operations, p. 2-6 and Combined Arms Center. Corps Deep Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Handbook - (1990), p.1-2.
- 73 Dupuy, Understanding War., p. 5.
- 74 Clausewitz, On War, p. 383.
- 75 S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War. (Gloucester, MA, Peter Smith, 1978), p. 108.
- 76 Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, p. 247, 248.
- 77 Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War, p. 132.
- 78 Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War, p. 128.

- 79 Clausewitz, On War, p. 191.
- 80 LTG Leonard P. Wishart III, "Leader Development and Command and Control", Military Review, Vol: LXX, n.s. 7 (July 1990), p. 12.
- 81 Hart, Strategy, p.336-337
- 82 Sullivan, "Delivering Decisive Victory: Improving Synchronization," p. 11.
- 83 United States Army, FM 100-5, Operations, p. Glossary-4.
- 84 David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, (New York, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1966), p. 413-439.
- 85 United States Army, FM 100-5, Operations, p. 2-15.
- 86 Center for Army Leadership. Fort Hood Leadership Study, p. 20.
- 87 Center for Army Lessons Learned. Newsletter - The Battalion and Brigade Battle Staff. No 93-3. (Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 1993) quote by General W. E. Depuy, USA, Ret. p. 7.

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