


1994
Executive Research Project
S12

Is Islam a Threat to the West? Maybe (Maybe Not)



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The Industrial College of the Armed Forces
National Defense University
Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319-6000

19941201 063

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY N/A		3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE N/A		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) Same	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) NDU-ICAF-94-812		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION National Defense University	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Industrial College of the Armed Forces	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable) ICAF-FAP	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, D.C. 20319-6000	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, D.C. 20319-6000	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO. WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) <i>Is Osama a Threat to the West?</i> <i>Maybe (Maybe Not)</i>			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) <i>DONALD A. FRAHLER</i>			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Research	13b. TIME COVERED FROM <i>Aug 93</i> TO <i>Apr 94</i>	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) April 1994	15. PAGE COUNT <i>38</i>
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) SEE ATTACHED			
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Judy Clark		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (202) 475-1889	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL ICAF-FAP

ABSTRACT
for
Is Islam a Threat to the West?
by
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Khomeini's revolution, terrorism, and oil have all caused the West to look with concern to the East. Academics have fueled this concern with numerous articles describing the problem as a Islamic threat or a "clash of civilizations." The author provides a review of Islam and Muslim revivals, and asserts that Islam is not the next threat to replace the Soviet *Red Menace*. He suggests that Western policy makers should only view the Eastern concern for Western secularism as a warning to the West to return to its heritage. America will survive the Muslim "onslaught" much as it has assimilated other cultures over the past two hundred years.

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IS ISLAM A THREAT TO THE WEST? Maybe (Maybe Not)

Britain is basically English-speaking, Christian and white, and if one starts to think that it might become basically Urdu-speaking, Muslim and brown, one gets frightened and angry.

Charles Moore, *Spectator*, 1991

Frightening Times

Christendom, for most of the past millennium and a half, denoted mainly white Christians from the Urals to the Atlantic. By the middle of the last century and as it became increasingly more secularized, Christendom became known simply as Europe. “Europe discovered, named, and in a sense made America.”¹ Although other races and cultures participated in the creation of America, in the eyes of the rest of the world, Europeans dominated in the giving of religion, language, and customs. Together these two became the West, the most influential power of the last four centuries. Today, the West feels the influence of a “new” power—Islam—and this change is frightening not only ordinary men, but even the intelligentsia.

Man has always struggled with change, especially sudden change. My sub-title is with apologies to Robert Fulghum, American folk philosopher, whose book of the same title, *Maybe (Maybe Not)*, addresses uncertainty. He discusses man’s struggles between his public and private lives—his inner struggle. Fulghum muses about man’s contradictory notions and the kaleidoscopic pictures revolving in his mind. (Such as: Look before you leap. vs. He who hesitates is lost.) Fulghum meditates on his “secret” life, and confesses these word pictures play games in his head. He admits that he is secretly scared because nothing seems absolutely certain.² For Fulghum, though, uncertainty is okay because if he were “absolutely certain about all things, (he) would spend (his) life in anxious misery, fearful of losing (his) way.”³

Despite his folk wisdom, most people are at least wary, and some, like Charles Moore, are “frightened and angry.” It seemed less confusing or fearful when the West was largely unchallenged; when it was white and Christian, and the East was dark and either Muslim, Hindu or Confucian. It was simpler when it appeared to be a culturally bipolar world—the West (Christendom) and the rest. There wasn’t a powerful “evil empire,” like the Soviet Union in the geopolitical world, so the West felt safe. Strangely, the Soviet Union’s collapse has complicated the “cultural world.” These geopolitical giants, the West and the Soviet Union, were upholding secular nationalism and suppressing religious nationalism with their respective precepts of “separation of church and state” and atheism. Even though Westerners despise communism, many actually long for the stability of the old rivalry. The uncertainty of the future, particularly with the rise of religious nationalism, especially when it’s fueled by Islamic terrorism and fundamentalism, plays fiendishly, fearful games inside Western minds. Is their fear unfounded? Should the West fear Islam? Robert Fulghum might say, “Maybe (Maybe Not),” and I agree.

Islam, a New Leader in the New World Order

Some in the West are suggesting that Islam is indeed the next ideological contender to fill the challenger’s corner of the “world’s boxing arena” which was vacated when communism fell with the Soviet Union. With the *Red Menace* gone they posit that the *Green Peril*—green being the color of Islam—is next. Many see Islam, like communism of the Cold War era, as

. . . a cancer spreading around the globe, undermining the legitimacy of Western values and threatening the national security of the United States. Tehran is the center of the ideological subversion, the world’s new Comintern.⁴

Westerners know little about this religion and the nations where it is the major faith—from northern Africa, through the Middle East, across Persia and Pakistan, down Southeast Asia

into Indonesia. Their knowledge consists of a superficial understanding of the Crusades, and some recent exposure to the Ayatollah Khomeini. Unfortunately, ignorance often breeds bigotry and even fear. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to:

- review the academic arguments concerning the threat of Islam,
- increase the reader's knowledge of Islam,
- dispel the fear that Islam is the new "evil empire," and
- challenge Western policy makers to reconsider their concerns about the threat of Islam.

To further narrow the paper's focus I will discuss mainly African, Arab and Persian Islam. This is in spite of President Suharto's recent pilgrimage to Mecca which stirred an Islamic revival in Indonesia, and caused a "spate of attacks on (Christian) churches in Java," increasing the "strains within Indonesian society—between Muslims and Christians."⁵ The narrower focus, to remain inside the limits of this paper, should not affect my conclusions.

THE ISLAMIC THREAT

Why this Sense of Uneasiness?

In academic circles, especially over the last five years, there has been an increasing attention in the number of scholarly articles concerning the "Islamic Threat." Even an ordinary reader cannot miss the excessive volume of books and essays about the Islamic resurgence. Ayotollah Khomeini's Iranian revolution, Saddam Hussein's attack on Kuwait, and recent world-wide acts of terrorism have also alerted the West that a cultural storm is building on the horizon. Last year's bombing of the World Trade Center, a Western icon, was perhaps the most piercing "lightening bolt" of all. Suddenly, even America was not immune to Islamic terrorists.

In key Western capitals, this causes

. . . a deep sense of unease about the future. The confidence that the West would remain a dominant force in the 21st century, as it has for the past four or five centuries, is giving way to a sense of foreboding.⁶

What makes Islam so foreboding is the dramatic differences it has with Christianity despite certain root similarities. Both have a common heritage drawn from Judaism, but each considers the other a grave heresy. Both also have a different view of the proper relationship of religion and government. While the West recognizes the important place that Christian moral and ethical values have on its society, values that favorably impact the law, government, and the economy, the separation of church and state is a fundamental foundation—possibly the crux of freedom. This idea, that church and state can be separate, is absolutely foreign to Islam. “(T)he world of Islam (is) one polity ruled by one sovereign, the caliph.”⁷ This ideal of a single polity still has considerable appeal for Muslims. The opposite, two institutions: the state (as superior) and the church (as subordinate), is cherished by the West. As a result, Christendom is frightened by Islam. Frightened because the “great experiment” in freedom—freedom *of* religion and freedom *from* religion—may fall prey to the onslaught of a world-wide, Islamic revolution. Academics have often fueled this sense of uneasiness, causing many to secretly agree with Charles Moore. Perhaps the most vivid discussion of this threat has been portrayed by Samuel P. Huntington, the Eaton Professor of the Science of Government and Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, in his essay, “The Clash of Civilizations?”

The Clashes

Huntington postulates that the next pattern of conflict will be the interaction between Western and non-Western civilizations. This conflict between civilizations is the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. In other words, the focus has evolved from a conflict between princes, nation states and ideologies—Western concepts—to a conflict between civilizations or cultures. He further concludes,

. . .that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the domination source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.⁸

Mark Juergensmeyer, dean of the School of Hawaiian, Asian and Pacific Studies, and professor of Religion and Political Science at the University of Hawaii, sees a different clash, though a clash nonetheless. In his book, *The New Cold War?*, Juergensmeyer says today's world is returning to its religious roots as a reaction to the failed movement of secular nationalism. In the mid-1950s, the spread of nationalism, in reaction to colonialism, occurred at a fevered pace. New nations were "forged entirely from a sense of secular citizenship. . .divorced from any religious sanction."⁹ Nehru, Nasser, and other secular nationalists were the heroes of that era. The Shah of Iran carried this secular mantle into the late 1970s. By the end of that decade, however, Middle Eastern citizens began to lose faith in secularism and longed for an "indigenous form of religious politics."¹⁰ They abandoned the Shah to embrace Khomeini. And, although Westerners hope Iran will return to its senses, in the Muslim world, the Iranian revolution is viewed as a "march of history." Marches can lead to clashes, and clashes to victors and vanquished, with a preferred Islamic end-state of a nationless, Muslim world worshipping Allah.

Contrarily, Huntington's theory is that nation states *will* remain powerful actors, but that they may consist of different divisions than what we are used to. Rather than being divided in terms of political (East vs. West) or economic (First, Second or Third World) systems, they will be divided by culture. "Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. . ."¹¹ and these entities will clash because:

1. Differences among civilizations are real.
2. The world is becoming a smaller place.

3. Processes of economic modernization and social change are separating people.
4. There is a growth of civilization-consciousness.
5. Cultural characteristics are less mutable than political and economic ones.
6. Economic regionalism is increasing, despite political efforts toward globalism.¹²

Further, Huntington sees a “major fault line” separating these “tectonic” plates of civilization. It runs between Western Christianity (circa 1500), and Orthodox Christianity plus Islam. The line is drawn along Finland’s eastern border, separates the Baltic states from Russia, splits Belarus and Ukraine, divides Transylvania from Romania, and goes through old Yugoslavia separating Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of the Balkan states. The latter portion of this line, of course, was the historical boundary that divided the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. The West—predominantly Catholic or Protestant—experienced the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the Industrial Revolution. They are generally better off than those east of this line—predominantly Greek Orthodox or Muslim. Huntington believes these Eastern countries, because they were only “lightly shaped” by these events in Western Europe, are much less likely to develop stable democratic political systems. “The Velvet Curtain of culture (the fault line) has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe.”¹³ This line has seen plenty of bloody conflicts, even over the last two years.

Bernard Lewis, Professor of Near Eastern Studies Emeritus at Princeton University and considered by many to be the West’s premier scholar of Islamic history and culture, takes a slightly different approach in his books and essays. Although he sees Islam as “the most effective form of consensus in Muslim countries,”¹⁴ this movement will not be increasingly effective until the Muslim regimes become genuinely popular. He sees Islam as a powerful but undirected force in politics. If the right kind of leadership, an educated, modern leadership becomes a powerful force, then Islam will be able to clash with the West.

Mark Juergensmeyer would more closely agree with Huntington. He advocates that religious nationalists are modern activists pursuing legitimate politics. They have gained power because of the political and religious malaise of the modern West. It is in this weakness that the clash will occur. Although he acknowledges some religious activists tend toward too much violence and disregard Western notions of human rights, he believes religious movements, such as Islam, will come through this, embrace a more tolerant view, and become more acceptable.

Regardless of the details of the clash, academics are setting the stage for an impending confrontation like prophets of doom. Daniel Pipes, director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, titled his recent article on this subject of the Islamic threat "The Muslims are Coming! The Muslims are Coming!"¹⁵ Pipes and the other academics almost give the reader a sense that the horse hoofs of the Apocalypse are coming. Perhaps a review of the history and origin of Islam will help clarify the real purposes of this Eastern religion and ease Western misunderstandings.

A PRIMER IN ISLAM

Muhammad and the Qur'ân

According to Islamic tradition, in 610 A.D., when its founder, Muhammad, was about 40, he saw a vision while on a retreat at the top of Mount Hira. The angel Gabriel commanded him to begin preaching God's (Allah's) word. Although Allah had given His laws to Moses and other prophets, mankind had failed to obey these laws. Consequently, Allah chose Muhammad for His last revelation—the *Qur'ân*. The Prophet Muhammad, a merchant from Mecca, did not claim divinity, but believed he was entrusted with God's truth much like Moses and the other biblical prophets who wrote the *Torah* and the *Bible*. Islam claims Muhammad was the last, the

seal of the prophets, the final messenger from God. The Qur'án, however, is somewhat different from the Judeo-Christian scriptures in its style and form. That is,

. . . (t)he general tone of the Qur'án is sombre and meditative. It is a dialogue between God and humanity. At the core is a moral earnestness. Because it is not an academic thesis it needs no structure, no order, no introduction and conclusion. It is a vibrant outpouring of divine messages, of powerful bursts reflecting different moods. It warns, advises and exhorts in flashes.¹⁶

The Five Pillars

“Islam has five pillars or basic tenets that all Muslims must practice.”¹⁷ They are:

1. Faith in One God (*Tauhid*) – Allah is one Lord and creator of the Universe. This is affirmed by citing the *Shahadah*: “There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is the prophet of Allah.”
2. Pray (*Salat*) – It is incumbent on Muslims to perform the prayers five times daily. Prayer is an institution in Islam. It is not left to individual choice.¹⁸
3. Show charity (*Zakat*) – this is a system of doing good for others, making a payment to the community (the giving of alms), a system of social welfare—re-distributing the wealth. Charity is the closest English term to use from the Arabic, but it is not a direct translation.
4. Fast (*Sawn*) – during the month of Ramadan (ninth lunar month) all Muslims must fast during daylight hours.
5. Go on a pilgrimage (*Haj*) – all Muslims, if they are physically and financially able, must make one pilgrimage to Mecca during their lifetime.

Another important religious “duty” is aiding the struggle between good and evil—*jihád*.

While most Muslims see this as a continuing battle to maintain their belief in the face of the world's temptations, some view it as a holy war of believers against infidels. “Islam is a *jihád*—struggle, fight—to improve the world, to bring it into accord with the ideal.”¹⁹ Unfortunately, *jihád* has too often meant bloody struggles, revolts, slaughters, and even Muslims fighting Muslims.

The Hadith and the Shari'a

The *Hadith* is an additional collection of Muhammad's sayings, teachings and actions. Over time, religious leaders collected over 600,000 sayings, but the Hadith was reduced by an accepted authority, Imam Kukhari, to about 7300 sayings in 97 books. The Qur'an and the Hadith combine to form the *Sunna* which is the guideline for proper Moslem living.

The *Shari'a* is the law based on the Qur'an and the Sunna; literally, it is "the path to be followed." This does not mean every Muslim action is predetermined. The following discussion between the Prophet and Muadh ibn Jabal, a *qadi* (judge) making preparations to judge, shows sound reasoning is also acceptable in Islam.

Prophet: How will you decide a problem?

Muadh: According to the Quran.

Prophet: If it is not in it?

Muadh: According to the *sunna*.

Prophet: If it is not in that either?

Muadh: Then I will use my own reasoning.²⁰

The Sunni and the Shía

Those Muslims who follow the Sunna are called *Sunnis*. They make up about 80 percent of the world's nearly 1 billion Muslims. Sunnis revere five Muslim men—the Prophet and the first four *caliphs* (successors or Rulers of Islam). They are: Abu Bakr and Umar (Muhammad's fathers-in-law), and Uthman and 'Alí (Muhammad's sons-in-law). The Sunnis are generally considered the orthodox or traditional Muslims.

Shía Muslims make up the majority of the remaining 20 percent of Muslims. Splinter Shía groups (Assassins, Druzes, 'Alawites, Ahl-i Haqq, and Bahá'ís) make up most of the rest, but they have a long history of operating well outside orthodox Islam. The Shía Muslims are:

...those who follow the example of Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law Ali and who differ from the more orthodox Sunnis by interpreting the laws, seeking

hidden or mystical meanings in the Quran and Hadith, and creating a priestly class of religious leaders.²¹

Ayatollah Khomeini was a Shía religious leader. He and the other Shía believe that all Islamic sovereigns since Hassan's (the son of 'Alí) abdication are usurpers. They believe Muslims are living in sin and history has turned the wrong way. Since this split occurred early in the history of Islam, an entire set of differentiated customs, rituals and forms of prayers have evolved over time. Examples of these divergences include: the different opening and closing of the fast during Ramadan, and the washing of feet before rather than after the daily prayers.

These two main groups of Islam differ far less from each other than it appears some of their doctrines may demand. Both groups revere the caliph 'Alí, and the core theological beliefs of the Shía and the Sunni are the same:

- Allah is in the central and omnipotent position.
- The Prophet is the supreme messenger of Allah.
- The holy Qur'án is the divine message of Allah.

What, then, are the problems? "The problems are rooted in the history not theology of Islam."²² These problems arose when 'Alí was not made the first caliph. Even though he later became the fourth caliph, he was subsequently assassinated. 'Alí's two sons, Hassan and Hussein were also martyred. Hussein, his infant son, and about 70 men were slaughtered at the battle of Karbala, against overwhelming odds, defending the faith. Hussein's heroic sacrifice provides a powerful and emotional rallying point against political and religious oppression. A popular saying is: "Islam is reborn after every Karbala."²³ In recent years, the Iranians named their major offensive thrusts during the Iran-Iraq war as Karbala 1, Karbala 2, etc.

Hussein's death has led to a great deal of Shía mythology. His shrine, flag, and horse are symbols of mourning in Shía households. Hussein's family names have become Shía favorites: *Fatimah*, his mother and the daughter of Muhammad; *Zainab*, his sister; and *Abbas*,

Zain-ul-Abedin and *Asghar*, his brother and sons. The only son to survive Karbala was *Zain-ul-Abedin*, who was ill at the time of the battle. The *Sayyed*, the descendents of the Prophet, claim their heritage through him.

Islamic Revival Movements

*At the turn of each century there will arise in my nation
a man who will call for a religious revival.*

Prophet Muhammad

Besides this Islamic struggle between Sunnis and Shías over their historic roots, Islam has also experienced a problem not atypical of other world religions—a departure from the original faith. “Over the years, there have been several revival movements aimed at returning Muslims to the pure Islam of the Quran and Hadith.”²⁴ Most reformers or revivalists, both Sunni and Shía, renounce secularism and encourage returning to a simplified, pure form of Islamic practice grounded in the basic tenets. Today’s revivalist tends to also denounced modernism, democracy and foreign, particularly Western, influences. A few reformers, both past and present, advocate using any means, including terrorism, to remove or eliminate the secular influences that vie for the people’s allegiance. Historians have separated these revival movements into two distinct types: the *legalist*, and the *autonomist*. A legalist movement encourages Muslims to avoid non-Islamic customs and attitudes. An autonomist movement is an attack on a non-Muslim power. Many times both the legalist and autonomist

. . . elements exist simultaneously, sometimes in fairly equal proportion. For example, both are strong in the Libyan government of Mu‘ammar al-Qadhdháfi, among the Muslim Brethren of Egypt, in the groups that attacked the Great Mosque in Mecca, (and) in Khomeini’s revolution.²⁵

One of the first legalist movements occurred as early as the 9th century, when a scholar, Ahmad al-Hanbal, rejected the legalistic interpretations that had crept into Islam. The *Hanbalis*,

as his followers were known, would raid houses, “. . .and if they found wine, they poured it out; if they found a singing girl, they beat her and broke her instruments.”²⁶ Although this movement gained great momentum and was quite successful in returning Muslims to their faith, eventually the people revolted from this severe form of orthodoxy.

In the 14th century, a scholar named Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymíya, revived interest in Hanbal’s writings by calling for a return to the original articles of faith. He preached against the Shí’a theology and the Súfí brotherhoods (para-church groups that attempted to reform the individual Muslim through preaching and worship). Although this too was a legalist movement, Taymíya also believed political activism would be necessary to reform society, a bold step away from traditional Muslim teaching and more towards an autonomist movement.

Examples of autonomist movements probably best come from the two great Muslim empires which were really extensions of such movements. These two were the Ottoman and Mughal empires, which were contemporaneous. Both of these societies were created because of confrontations with major alien ideologies which already existed—Christianity for the Ottomans and Hinduism for the Mughals. These two movements were attacks on non-Muslim empires that were suppressing Islam.

Later Revival Movements

Between the end of the 18th century and the beginning of World War I, three additional revival movements are worthy of note. These

. . .are the Wahhábíya in the late eighteenth-and, after a long hiatus, early twentieth-century Arabia; the Sanúsíya in Libya, from its origins in the 1840s down to its bloody suppression by the Italians in 1931; and the Sudanese Mahdíya, short-lived but spectacular, from 1881 to 1898.²⁷

Each of these movements had a different interpretation of the Qur’án and the Prophet’s example.

The first reformer, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahháb, saw his role as that of a *mujadid*, a renewer and restorer of the faith. The father of the Wahhábíya movement (legalist) lashed out at idol worship, mysticism, debauchery and the lack of unity amongst Muslims. The al-Saud family, current rulers of Saudi Arabia, were among the first converts to al-Wahhab’s preaching. Al-Wahháb was also inspired by Ibn Taymíya’s dislike for Súfí and Shí‘ite traditions.

In the Sudanese Mahdíya movement, on the other hand, we find quite a different approach to reformation. The revival was started by Al-Mahdí Muhammad Ahmad, who regarded himself as divinely inspired and divinely called to the task of purification. Mahdí had also been trained in the confraternity of a Súfí tradition and he openly preached an autonomist revival or rebellion. The Mahdíya rebellion was focused against colonialism. The jihád was fixed against a European (Western) power as the corruption that was tearing the people’s allegiance away from Islam. This was a militant attack against a corrupt government designed to restore the people to pure Islam.

In this single respect, the Mahdíya and Wahhábíya movements were similar. Each called for the violent overthrow of societies and governments that they regarded as corrupt and heretical. However, they differed in their political enemy. The Mahdíya movement rebelled against a foreign power. The first Wahhábí revolt took place within an Islamic political order—against the Ottoman government. The second Wahhábí revival occurred early in this century, but this rebellion was not specifically against the Europeans. In fact, the Saudi government has gone out of its way to accommodate first Great Britain, and then the United States while attempting to maintain a strict Wahhábí regime internally.

In contrast to the Wahhábí and Mahdíst movements, the Sanúsíya movement was originally pacifist. Muhammad ibn 'Alí al-Sanúsí began his movement as a missionary in the eastern Sahara. He practiced peaceful conversions to Islam along a

. . . voluntary network of trade routes and pasture rights coordinated by the Sanúsí skeikhs. The movement became a militant one only in its third generation, when it confronted a grave and immediate imperialistic threat. For the Sanúsíya, imperialism was not an aspect of jihád but the essential cause of it.²⁸

The Sanúsíya movement particularly resembles the Wahhábí movement in its sobriety, and the cultural and ethnic atmosphere of its framework. It differs from the Wahhábí movement in three areas: (1) súfism, (2) lack of militancy, and (3) a refusal to link its fortunes to a family, like the Wahhábí's did with the al-Saud family. As a result, this legalist movement did not maintain the same strength of the Wahhábíya in Saudi Arabia, and was ultimately suppressed.

Although these three revivals, the Wahhábíya, Sanúsíya, and the Mahdíya, fail to provide complete models for the present day movements, they do provide a sort of mythological resonance in today's political rhetoric. They often become rallying points for modern reformers.

While there were many other reformers, one who was of particular importance to the modern Islamic reform movements was the 19th century Persian traveler, theologian, and lecturer Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. He taught that Islam was democratic and favored a pan-Islamic movement toward constitutionalism to counter colonialism. One of his students, Muhammad Abduh promoted the concept of nationalism, but refused to support violence as a means of promoting Islam. One of Abduh's students, Muhammad Rashid Rida, helped adapt the Islamic reform movement to modern life. The *Muslim Brotherhood* (a Súfí), founded in 1928, organized themselves largely because of the combined teachings of Afghani, Abduh and Rida.

Khomeini's Islamic Revival

The most recent reform movement of popular note was the Muslim revolution that dethroned the Shah of Iran. Khomeini's revolution, and his theocratic republic dominated by Shia clerics, differed from contemporary revolutions because it was led by a cleric whose goal was to Islamicize Muslims, or to return them to "the path to be followed." Shia Muslims believe 'history has turned the wrong way,' so Khomeini's revivalism was acceptable both to Sunnis, who were tired of secular nationalists, and to Shias, who were looking for Shia leadership. A review of Khomeini's world view, which can be narrowed to four basic points, follows:

1. *Rejection of the contemporary international system* – the Western notion of the nation-state and the present international system is flawed. "Modern states are the products of man's limited ideas', and the world is 'the home of all the masses of people under the law of God.'"²⁹
2. *Islamic universalism* – Khomeini doesn't advocate pan-Shi'ism, nor pan-Islamism, he is only calling for the establishment of Islam throughout the world. This will be the "liberation of mankind."
3. *Iran must establish an Islamic world order* – Iranian leadership is uniquely qualified to exert worldwide leadership and has a "divine obligation," a "sacred trust from God" to bestow Islam to the entire world.
4. *Iranian leadership is obligated to export the Islamic Revolution* – the exportation to the rest of the world should be accomplished peacefully through example and propaganda. "The export of ideas by force is no export."³⁰

Perhaps, it is this proclaimed politico-religious doctrine that has the West conjuring up an "Islamic problem." The combination of the American Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran, Khomeini's accession to ruler of Iran, and his foreign policy theme of exporting the revolution, stirred new fears in Christendom. Islam, which had seemed quite dormant from the days of colonialism until the late 1970s, now appeared to be the new Goliath.

ISLAM, THE NEW "EVIL EMPIRE?"

What is the true picture of Islam?

In attempting to understand Islam, Bernard Lewis states that the West has created two distorted stereotypes to portray intolerance and tolerance

...in the Islamic world. The first depicts a fanatical warrior, an Arab horseman riding out of the desert with a sword in one hand and the Qur'án in the other, offering his victims the choice between the two. . .it is not only false but impossible—unless we are to assume a race of left-handed swordsmen. In Muslim practice, the left hand is reserved for unclean purposes. . .The other image, almost equally preposterous, is that of an interfaith, interracial utopia.³¹

Both of Lewis' images contain elements of truth. Islam, like most religions, suffers from failing to *value tolerance* and failing to *condemn intolerance*. Claims, that today's Islam is somehow better, are mere propaganda. How could a follower of Islam behave equally to those who adhere to the "true" faith and those who willfully reject it? It is theological and logical absurdity. This intolerance for other religions is even evident in the human relationship where you would expect the most tolerance to exist—marriage. For example, Dr. David Gotaas, Executive Director, Southeast Center for World Missions, reported³² that a Protestant woman married to a Turkish Muslim had been unable to worship as she pleased in her Turkish hometown. Dr. Gotaas met her at a religious meeting in Moldova, where for the first time in eight years she was able to sing her favorite songs. Many would consider Turkey the most secularized "Muslim nation" in the world, yet religious intolerance exists here despite "...its commitment to Western values since the days of Atatürk."³³ This inability to inculcate the trait of tolerance in Muslims, in place of religious rage, often frightens Westerners.

The source of this rage against the West

The question of intolerance is not new nor unique to Islam. Yet, why is it that Muslims seem to react so violently to the West and specifically toward Americans? What is the source of the rage that has the West so concerned? Is this recent rage another revival movement?

From my last section on the history of Islam, I have shown that revival movements focus on restoring Muslims to the faith (legalist) and keeping foreign powers from ruling over Muslims (autonomist). While the former category of revival may be routinely necessary to recall “straying pilgrims” back to the faith, the latter situation—foreign domination—does not exist today. There are no Western powers controlling Muslim lands. While it is also true that some Muslims live in Western lands, on the whole they are not being routinely persecuted and live a rather peaceful existence. Generally they are better off than their brethren in Muslim lands, and they have no desire to overthrow the Western governments they serve. Captain Abdul Rasheed Muhammad, USA, the first Islamic chaplain in the U.S. Army, balked at the idea of some sort of shared allegiance would cause him to reject the U.S. in favor of his Muslim brothers abroad. There was no inherent conflict; he was extremely proud to be an American serviceman and a Muslim cleric.

If an autonomist movement is not the reason for this rage, then a legalist movement must hold the clue to unravel this mystery of Western hatred. Indeed, Middle Eastern Muslims do appear to be returning to the classical Islamic world view. This view divides the world and all mankind into two camps: the House of Islam and the House of Unbelief (or the House of War). It is the duty of Muslims to bring the “unbelievers” into the House of Islam. Muslim radicals believe the greater part of the world is still outside Islam, and even inside Islamic lands, Islamic faith has been undermined and Islamic law has been quashed.

This repression of Islam is one source of Muslim rage, but the universalist struggle (the desire to be the world’s single religion) with Christianity is yet another cause for this hatred of the West. Most world religions have remained regional, and few actively seek converts. Only two have universalist aspirations—Christianity and Islam. A major difference between these

two, as stated before, is their approach to civil government. Since the time of Christ, Christianity has usually practiced forms of separation. This is normally based on Christ's famous quote to the Pharisees, when asked whether the Jewish people should pay taxes to Rome. He said, "...render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things which are God's." (Matthew 22: 21)

While opinions have differed as to the real meaning of this phrase, it has generally been interpreted as legitimizing a situation in which two institutions exist side by side, each with its own laws and chain of authority—one concerned with religion, called the Church, the other concerned with politics, call the State.³⁴

In classical Islam, religion and government cannot be separated. Where they exist separated, they are only aberrations of truth. Since both religions seek universalist aspirations, and both traditions seek radically different solutions to the tension between religion and government, there has always been a tremendous conflict between these two religions. Sometimes this conflict is resolved in peaceful, albeit distant, coexistence. Other times this conflict is characterized by hatred and violence as solutions to the dilemma. The West has the misfortune that it is now going through a period when hatred *is* directed against it by at least *part* of the Muslim world, though certainly not all of the Muslim world. In the last fifteen years, the West has been "attacked" emotionally and physically by those, such as Khomeini and his followers, who want to see a single polity, at other times, by those who view the West as a representation of the other universalist religion that is challenging Islam, and finally by those zealots that view the West as the incarnation of evil, the diabolic opponent of all that is good—the Great Satan.

One might question why, then, aren't all Muslims attacking the West? The reason is twofold: (1) Islam is a one of the world's great religions. It has brought comfort and peace of mind to countless millions, by teaching them to practice *tolerance* and encouraging them to live creative and useful lives. Many Muslims really do want to live peacefully and despise the

intolerance and bigotry that have recently crept into Islam, and (2) the attacks on the West are by no means unanimously approved by Muslims because many believe the problems with Islam lie within Islam (a legalist approach). These Muslims desire to purify the hearts of the true believers, before attacking the infidels.

Yet, some Muslims do deeply resent the West and their bitterness is not readily appeased because the Muslim world sees itself as the center of truth and enlightenment. History is moving dreadfully in the wrong direction. For its first thousand years, Islam was advancing; for the last four hundred years, it has been retreating. This pains Muslims, especially radical Muslims, as they envision the West gripping Islam much like it almost gripped Europe, from Spain in the west and Vienna in the east. This pain has caused a rising tide of rebellion—provoked by the numerous Muslim setbacks of the past four hundred years—against Western paramountcy. It is accompanied by a desire to restore traditional Muslim values and previous Arab greatness.

Muslim setbacks

From the Muslim perspective, in the last four centuries they have suffered a series of staggering defeats. The first was the “loss of domination in the world, to the advancing power of Russia and the West.”³⁵ The second was the sabotage of authority in Muslim lands, by an invasion of foreign—mostly Western—ideas, laws and customs. The third, and probably most crippling, was the emancipation of women and children. This final attack was within the Muslim’s own home; it challenged his mastery over outspoken women and rebellious children.

These three setbacks were too much to tolerate, and an explosion of fury was inevitable. The natural enemy was Europe—Christendom—its millennial enemy. The source of strength was a revival movement—Iran’s revolution—its perennial rejoinder to return to the faith.

Americans, however, are confused by the anger that is focused against them. After all, America does not see itself as part of Europe. The American revolution was, after all, about religious and political freedom from European—mainly British—suppression. Americans refer to their later kindred spirit with the British as “two nations divided by a common language.” The isolationist movement has often been an American ideal to avoid the woes of European history and their continental wars. America’s more recent NATO participation was as much to fulfill the role of referee between the European states as it was to unify them against the Soviet Union. So, Americans find the Muslim rage, concentrated almost solely against them, very perplexing.

Americans have not dominated Muslim lands like the Russians and Europeans. True, the U.S. does support Israel, a factor of significant importance, but there are some oddities in the factual history that cannot explain the intensity and focus of this Muslim anger. The U.S. remained politically aloof in Israel’s infancy. The Soviet Union immediately granted Israel recognition, and Czechoslovakia saved it from an initial defeat at the hands of the Palestinians. Yet, no anger is directed towards these countries. In 1956, the U.S. intervened against the British, French and Israeli forces causing them to withdraw from Egypt. Subsequently, Egypt shunned American political and economic help, and began accepting Soviet arms and influence. Iran vehemently opposes Zionism, however they have found it more tolerable to conduct talks with Jerusalem than Washington. Again, Americans find this quite puzzling and unjust.

Disillusionment with America

To be fair to Islam, loathing America and the West is not limited to the Muslim world. This disillusionment toward Americans can be found in other parts of the world: in the recent

past from the Soviet Union, today in the Third World, and it's even popular within some factions of America itself (the Religious Right, Conservatives, and leaders of the African American community). Many people detest what Christendom—America—has become.

The accusations against America are centered on its ignoble side: *sexism*, *racism*, and *imperialism*. Although in none of these sins is the West exclusively guilty or even the worst offender, it cannot plead that it is innocent. The West has often oppressed women, but their lot is far better than under the rule of polygamy and concubinage found elsewhere. Racism and its ugly sister, slavery, have been practiced regularly. Yet, oddly it is the West, and particularly America, that has been the world leader in abolishing this crime against humanity. The West is a modern perpetrator of imperialism, but certainly its quality of moral repugnancy is no more heinous than that of the Arabs, the Mongols, the Ottomen, or more recently the Soviet Union. Where the West is uniquely different, however, is in recognizing these sins, judging itself guilty, and attempting to right, with some degree of success, the wrongs. America looks down on its Eastern brother and questions why the attacks when it is the West that is leading the way in reforming the injustices of the world. And, it is America that buys Muslim oil or provides monetary grants (especially to Egypt) to support Muslim economies.

The heart of this source of rage

Muslim setbacks and disillusionment with America form the background for the conflict that arises between the West and Islam, but none of these really pinpoint the true *raison d'guerre* of the present day hatred. Fundamentally, to return to Huntington's thesis, it is a clash of civilizations that is at the core of the disagreement, and the answer lies in the Western movement toward secularism.

Muslims have had their religious differences between Shía and Sunni. They have had the revolts of reformers such as Hanbal, al-Wahháb, and Khomeini. These have been painful and occasionally bloody, but these

. . .religious disagreements were nothing remotely approaching the ferocity of the Christian struggles between Protestants and Catholics, which devastated Christian Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and finally drove Christians in desperation to evolve a doctrine of the separation of religion from the state.³⁶

The Protestant Reformation may have been as much a wrestling of political bondage from the Roman Catholic Church as it was breaking a needless religious yoke. It's focus was on understanding that God could be personally known, and that he required no special works for salvation. Salvation was on faith *alone*. The true believers were the faithful, not the "Pharisees" (the doers of good works), nor the community ruled by the Church. The indulgences, rituals and required works of the Roman Catholic Church were designed to show people "the path to God." Despite the originally righteous intentions of the Church, however, corruption changed these acts into coercive burdens. In the same way, the Church's intolerant civil rule was flawed with human corruption. The Catholic polity was particularly repressive. John Calvin, one of the leaders of the Reformation, tried to execute a Protestant theocracy, but it too eventually failed. Christendom finally realized it could only restrain the intolerance and persecution it had inflicted both on followers of other religions, as well as on those who professed other forms of their own religion, by depriving the religious institutions of coercive power.

Muslims have no need to evolve such a doctrine. Separating religion and government is so foreign it is almost incomprehensible to the Muslim. And, Islam was never prepared to grant full equality to those who hold other religious beliefs. It has accorded some partial tolerance to Christians and Jews because of their "partial truth" of God; tolerance that was far better than what Christians granted other religions prior to adopting their measures of secularism.

Secularism is clearly the crux of the issue. Islam was at first enamored with the success of the West; its wealth, economic security and immense scientific and technological achievements, especially compared to the backwardness of the Islamic world. This disparity was most vividly displayed on the battlefield in the Gulf War. The secret of the West's success seem to lie in its economic advancements and its political institutions. Adapting to these institutions was believed to be the way out of poverty and perhaps the road back to Islamic superiority. However, this meant accepting secularism much like the Shah of Iran had done. Islamic fundamentalist leaders were keen to see that the secularism of Western civilization was the greatest challenge to the way of life they wished to restore to Muslims. It placed politics over religion, and that was seen as the root of destruction of their sacred faith. These Muslim leaders wanted no part of secularism. Khomeini's movement and that of the other fundamentalist's movements have given direction to the umbrage and anger of the Muslim masses at the forces they believe have degraded their traditional values.

The natural response

The history of Islam is sprinkled with many varied movements. Some have been quiet reformations, while others were clearly more active. Not all of the active ones have had militant or terrorists overtures. Occasionally some organizations have created subsidiary groups for para-military activity. For example, a subsidiary of the Muslim Brotherhood, the al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah group, claimed credit for the assassination of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat.

More recently, the bombing of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993 seems to be tied to Umar Abd al-Rahman, who is "the spiritual leader of an organization known as the Islamic Group in Egypt that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt."³⁷ Subsequent reports

allege that *Islamic Group* militants were trained in Sudan by Iran's Revolutionary Guard. However, most scholars would discount the *Islamic Group* as a radical element of Islam, not indicative of mainline Islamic thought. And, some investigators suggest that the bombing should more properly be linked to Iraq as the bomb exploded on the second anniversary of the Desert Storm ground offensive against Iraq.

"That an Islamic resurgence has occurred cannot be taken for granted."³⁸ The West is much more aware of Islam since the introduction of Ayatollah Khomeini on the world scene in the late 1970s. Other scholars argue that oil is the reason for the increased interest in the Muslim faith. This view implies that the resurgence of Islam is new attentiveness, not new activity among Muslims.

To the Muslim, Islamic resurgence is simply revival; to the Westerner it is probably best defined as activism. Just as each religion is different, so too is its definition for activism. Too often the West attempts to understand things in a Western paradigm. Shifting into the proper paradigm is often difficult or impossible. For instance, Christians demonstrate their devotion to the faith—activism—by regular church attendance, tithing, missionary work, adhering to the proper ethics of daily living, or by demonstrating love to one another. For the Muslim, activism almost always means working toward the goals of the Shari'a. This legal structure is without equivalent in Christianity. The Ten Commandments provide specific guidance in ten general areas—Sabbath day observance, idolatry, stealing, adultery, coveting, etc. The rest of daily living is implicit in the message of the Ten Commandments. In fact, they were reduced from ten to two when Jesus was asked what is the greatest commandment. The gospel reports,

Jesus said unto him, 'You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like it, You shall love your neighbor as

yourself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.'
(Matthew 22:37-40)

Islam, however, requires Muslims to follow the Shari'a in minute and exact detail. And, the sacred law of Islam covers most of a Muslim's daily routine—everything from his eating habits to his familial and social relations. Publicly the Shari'a rules on taxation, political authority, justice and welfare. In the ideal, the Shari'a should impregnate a Muslim's mind and completely guide his daily activities. He almost becomes one with the law. The law, however, is much too difficult to follow exactly, and Islamic history is replete with failures. Thus the reason for periodic "movements" to bring the Muslim back to the Shari'a.

The state also has a role in accomplishing the law's goals. It must implement the Shari'a, dispense its punishments, levy its taxes, and respect the legal experts who interpret the law. The state must also protect Muslim subjects, going to war, if necessary, to defend them.

Present Day Movements

In this century prior to 1970, Islamic activism was minimal. Muslim authors of that era asserted that Islam played only a limited role in shaping the attitudes and behavior of Muslim states. Today, few would agree with that statement. The evidence abounds. In Senegal, Sheikh Abdoulaye Niasse organized a 300,000 member Islamic party that called for a return to the Shari'a. In Morocco, Islamic sentiments are growing quite rapidly. In Libya, Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi came to power in September 1969. In Egypt, numerous Shari'a-orientated groups have gained power. In 1976, several Muslim groups attempted a coup against the Sudanese government, casting that country into a bloody civil war. Even Saudi Arabia's leaders, who pride themselves on the purity of their devotion to the Shari'a, were surprised by the attack at the Great Mosque at Mecca in November 1975.

Elsewhere, despite Turkey's secular legacy sustained by Atatürk's commandments, the National Salvation party of Turkey has stirred sufficient trouble to cause two military coups to ensure Islamic rule was not initiated.³⁹ And, the Iranian revolution was quite a dramatic show of Islamic force that stunned the world in 1979. Finally, even in old Yugoslavia, President Tito had to suppress Bosnian Muslims who expressed interest in the activities in Iran.

While it is true that funding for many of these movements are sustained by oil revenues, the resurgence is still impressive. The oil-based wealth that fuels this resurgence will eventually decline. Since most Islamic countries do not have an industrial base nor the means to generate it, their influence will wane. For now, though, we can only expect the present movements to remain semi-permanent with more movements arising as long as the oil market lasts. Because there is the lack of a single voice directing an overarching theme of Islamic unity, such as Khomeini would have preferred, combined with the lack of an adequate funding base, and the diversity in each movement, it seems safe to say Islam will not be the next "evil empire."

RECOMMENDATIONS

There is No Green Peril

The *Red Menace* (the Soviet Union) was an established country with an impressive army. The *Green Peril* is a mosaic of many national, ethnic and religious groups competing for power and influence without sophisticated armies. Journalists and lobby organizations continuing to impose the term Islamic fundamentalism on almost every unrelated movement. Their crystal

ball sees a unified and monolithic Islam. "Far from being a unified power that is about to reach again the gates of Vienna and the shores of Spain, Islam is, in fact, currently on the defensive."⁴⁰

Second, most Easterners are not looking to overthrow the West. American leadership, and Western domination have been relatively benign especially compared to a world under Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia. To many in the East, a ". . . Western retreat could be more damaging than Western domination."⁴¹

Third, everywhere Muslims are fighting Western forces, they are losing: Azeris, Palestinians, Iraqis, Iranians, and Bosnian Muslims. And, all the fear, about Muslim immigrant backlash in Western countries prior to the coalition attack during Desert Storm, proved unfounded. Not a single demonstration was mounted in Germany, France, Great Britain or the United States.

Americans are beginning to adopt a European paranoia about Islam, especially since the World Trade Center bombing. Does the U.S. have an identity crisis? Isn't America the melting pot of peoples, ideas and religions? The great experiment hasn't failed yet. Even if the West becomes more Islamic, will that destroy America. "Undoubtedly the Islamicisation of the West, to the degree that it happens, will usher in changes. Most immediately, (however). . . the growth of Islam will fortify the side of faith."⁴² Most Muslims are staunch supporters of family values, and oppose abortion, pornography, homosexuality, and sexual promiscuity. On the other hand, America should not expect Muslims to be Jeffersonian democrats. The true Muslim will want to practice the Sharif'a and may well expect this nation to implement their laws in direct conflict with Western ideals of freedom. But, this "Islamic threat" will certainly not be the Asian hordes conquering from the East, nor the terrorists bringing America to its knees emotionally or

Notes

- ¹ Lewis, Bernard. *Islam and the West*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3.
- ² Most religions, Christianity for sure, argue that God is absolutely sovereign. He is the one being in which man can be absolutely certain, the one being that can rescue us from our greatest fear—death.
- ³ Fulghum, Robert. *Maybe (Maybe Not), Second Thoughts from a Secret Life*. (New York: Villard Books, 1993), 5.
- ⁴ Hadar, Leon T. “What Green Peril?” *Foreign Affairs*. (Vol. 72, No. 2, Spring 1993), 27-29.
- ⁵ Survey **Indonesia**. “An Islamic Awakening.” *The Economist*. (Vol. 327, Iss. 7807), 15.
- ⁶ Mahbubani, Kishore. “The Dangers of Decadence, What the Rest Can Teach the West” *Foreign Affairs*. (Vol. 72, No. 4, September/October 1993), 10.
- ⁷ Lewis, Bernard. *op. cit.*, 5.
- ⁸ Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs*. (Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993), 22.
- ⁹ Juergensmeyer, Mark. *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 11.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.
- ¹¹ Huntington, Samuel P. *op. cit.*, 23-24.
- ¹² Huntington, Samuel P. *op. cit.*, 25-27.
- ¹³ Huntington, Samuel P. *op. cit.*, 30-31.
- ¹⁴ Lewis, Bernard. *op. cit.*, 154.
- ¹⁵ Pipes, Daniel. “The Muslims are Coming! The Muslims are Coming!” *National Review*. (November 19, 1990), 28.
- ¹⁶ Ahmed, Akbar S. *Discovering Islam, Making Sense of Muslim History and Society*. (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul Inc., 1988), 16.
- ¹⁷ Muhammad, Chaplain Abdul Rasheed, Captain, USA. Telephone interview, 27 January 1994.
- ¹⁸ The prayers are given “five times daily:
1. The morning prayer (Al-Fajr)

politically. Despite the cries of the academics, the *Green Peril* is not now, nor in the foreseeable future, a unified power that is threatening the West. It is not the next *Red Menace*.

Look within to withhold the enemy

Before, the West makes a case for fearing the Islamic hordes, it needs to sit back and take a good look at what is reality. These countries and the religion of Islam have been around for many centuries. Why are they suddenly posing a challenge? It may be because the West has discovered its own fatal flaw—secularism and the structural weakness in its core values. If so, it certainly appears that its not too late to fix the problem. If we can get our own house in order, fixing the economy, applying economic equity across the human spectrum, improving education to all classes of people, providing more jobs, improving the work ethic, and returning to our religious heritage, the West won't have to worry about an Islamic onslaught. If America fails in the greatest experiment in freedom the world has ever known, it won't be because it lost on the battlefield. It will be because Americans allowed its own moral and spiritual decline.

Western policy makers should see this clash of civilizations as an alert to review their internal policies, rather than as an Islamic attack. The West needs a revival movement. A return to old fashion values without the intolerance, bigotry and hatred of the past should be America's political aim. Having a belief in God, understanding the dignity of man, and showing a loyalty to country are all important traditional values that we can peacefully re-adopt because of the warning generated by our Muslim brethren. If we can fix the internal problems, most probably there won't be as significant a clash of civilizations. If Muslims see the evils of secularization—lack of faith, crime, disintegration of the family, etc.—waning in America, maybe their hatred of this civilization will wane as well.

2. The noon prayer (Al-Zohr)
3. The afternoon prayer (Al-'Asr)
4. The sunset prayer (Al-Maghrib)
5. The after-sunset prayer (Al-'Ashaa')

Prayer helps man to realize the Divine in him, and that realization not only urges him to do disinterested service for humanity but also makes him attain the highest degree of moral and spiritual perfection. In the Holy Qurán prayer is frequently mentioned along with *Zakat* or charity; the two are considered the manifestation of piety most loved by God." (Gaber, Dr. Hosny M. *Essentials of Muslim Prayer*. (Washington: The Islamic Center (Dupont Printing), 1980), 2.)

¹⁹ Ahmed, Akbar S. *op. cit.*, 61.

²⁰ Ibid., 24.

²¹ U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. "Islamic Reform Movements in Middle Eastern Countries," by Clyde Mark. (CRS Report for Congress, March 15, 1993), 1.

²² Ahmed, Akbar S. *op. cit.*, 57.

²³ Ahmed, Akbar S. *op. cit.*, 57.

²⁴ U.S. Library of Congress. Mark, Clyde. *op. cit.*, 1.

²⁵ Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal. ed. *op. cit.*, 37.

²⁶ Ahmed, Akbar S. *op. cit.*, 53.

²⁷ Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal, ed. *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World*. "The Contemporary Resurgence in the Context of Modern Islam." By R. Stephen Humphreys. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 72.

²⁸ Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal. *op. cit.*, 74.

²⁹ Dawisha, Adeed, ed. *Islam in Foreign Policy*. "Khumayni's Islam in Iran's Foreign Policy." By R. K. Ramazani. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 17.

³⁰ Ibid., 19.

³¹ Lewis, Bernard. *The Jews of Islam*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 3.

³² Gotaas, Dr. David S. Executive Director, Southeast Center for World Missions. Personal interview, 25 November 1993.

- ³³ Rustow, Dankwart A. "A Democratic Turkey Faces New Challenges." *Global Affairs*. (Spring, 1993), 67.
- ³⁴ Lewis, Bernard. "The Roots of Muslim Rage." *The Atlantic Monthly*. (September 1990), 47.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, 49.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, 56.
- ³⁷ U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. "Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman and his Followers." by Kenneth Katzman. (CRS Report for Congress, July 28, 1993), 1.
- ³⁸ Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal. ed. *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World*. "Oil Wealth and Islamic Resurgence." By Daniel Pipes. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 35.
- ³⁹ Knowlton, William K., General, USA. Personal interview, 18 November 1993.
- ⁴⁰ Hadar, Leon T. *op. cit.*, 31.
- ⁴¹ Mahbubani, Kishore. *op. cit.*, 10.
- ⁴² Gates, Henry Louis. "Blood and irony." *The Economist*. (September 11, 1993), 34.

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