




UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE  
IN  
OPERATION DESERT STORM



19941201 119

Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq

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*Adding Value to the Total Force and to the Nation*



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-2400



FOREWORD

This is one in a series of monographs describing and assessing the role of the United States Army Reserve in winning the war in the Persian Gulf. Countless reports have been written and numerous books published about the coalition victory. None have appeared, however, that focus on the valuable contributions of Army Reserve soldiers and civilians to the favorable outcome of the conflict. This monograph and others in the series fill that void.

This report on civil affairs activities in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm illustrates another unique capability of the Army Reserve and focuses specifically on the activation, deployment and employment of the 352d Civil Affairs Command. The report discusses the role of Army Reserve special operations forces and the recognition of a requirement in the war against Iraq for civil affairs units. It also discusses the operations of civil affairs units during combat as well as the operations that followed the fighting. This is a report that highlights the successful employment in the Persian Gulf of an Army capability that resides primarily within the Army Reserve.

Other monographs will be issued to describe the roles of a variety of Army Reserve units and individual soldiers. They will include military police, infantrymen, engineers, trainers, communicators, medical personnel, transporters and strategic intelligence units. These monographs, and the results of additional research on contributions of the Army Reserve to operations in the Persian Gulf, will be bound eventually in a single volume.

Your comments on this and future issuances are most welcome.

FOR THE CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE:

RONALD E. SMITH  
Colonel, General Staff  
Chief, Program Analysis and  
Evaluation Division



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Questions concerning this report may be addressed to:

Headquarters  
Department of the Army  
ATTN: DAAR-PAE  
Room 1D416, The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20310-2400

Phone: (703) 695-2288  
DSN 225-2288

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## FOREWORD

In his classic 1950 film, Rashomon, Japanese film-maker Akira Kurosawa told the story of the same violent episode through the eyes of four different narrators, each of which told the tale from his own viewpoint. The stories--based on the self-interest and knowledge of the narrators--were all different. In pursuing the story of civil affairs in DESERT STORM, we have had a similar experience. Each of the participants and headquarters involved tells a different story of the same events. This is natural because none of the headquarters know the whole story, but it makes it hard to tell exactly what happened. Unlike Rashomon, in the Civil Affairs story there are no villains, only honest men with different perspectives.

We have tried to find the truth--an elusive goal. The story is accurate as far as it goes, but there may be some facts of which we were not aware. We talked to many people in doing the research for this paper, and believe we talked to the principal actors, but there are many participants who could probably add more to the story -- a fact here and an insight there.

The original assignment was to do a story about the 352nd CA Command, but we soon found that one could not tell that story without explaining other aspects of the Civil Affairs operation, so it became necessary to expand the scope to cover the whole thing. For a brief moment consideration was given to including Psychological Operations in this article, but there was insufficient time to do justice to that aspect of the war. However, the Psychological Operations story deserves -- and remains -- to be told.

Our appreciation goes to those who spent much time telling the story, gathering documentation, checking facts, and reviewing the drafts. They are listed in the note on sources at the end of this paper. This is their story as they told it.

UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE  
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Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq

The Taking of Tallil by Task Force PSYOP

Colonel Glynn Hale, Commander of the Third Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, had a problem. The Brigade was about to launch a combined arms assault on the Tallil Air Base when President Bush announced on 27 February 1991 a cessation of offensive action by Coalition Forces. The Tallil Air Base was the major Iraqi Air Force installation in southern Iraq. Colonel Hale wanted to take the air base because it was a major target and also because his higher headquarters wanted to neutralize the base. But it had to be done in a non-offensive manner. He huddled with the commander of the attached Civil Affairs company and worked out a solution.<sup>1</sup>

The solution was to form Task Force PSYOP. The core of the task force was the 450th Civil Affairs Company, an Army Reserve unit from Riverdale, MD. The civil affairs specialists of the 450th were trained to deal with civilians--the local populace and refugees--keeping them out of the way of the combat elements of the division. They also had some Kuwaiti interpreters. A detachment of the 4th Psychological Operations Group was also part of the Task Force. These troops had loudspeakers for crowd control and the know-how to use them to reach the Iraqi troops inside the air base. Colonel Hale appointed Lieutenant Colonel King F. Davis, Jr, commander of the 450th CA Company, as the Task Force commander and gave Davis some infantry, military police, some jeeps with machine guns, helicopter support, and the promise of tanks and attack helicopters if needed. The mission: talk the Iraqi troops at the Tallil Air Base into surrendering or fleeing.

On the 28th of February 1991, a helicopter was used to deliver a PSYOP message to the Iraqis. Right after the broadcast, Colonel Davis and Task Force PSYOP advanced into Tallil Air Base by a circuitous and surreptitious route and seized the airfield control tower. Then the PSYOP warriors opened up again with their loudspeakers. The initial reaction of the Iraqis was to open fire with their weapons, but then reality overtook them, and they gave up. Over 50 were captured by the Task Force and 100 more fled to the North. Task Force PSYOP captured 20 first line Iraqi jet aircraft and 5 Soviet-made attack helicopters along with tons of ammunition, weapons, and other war material. Tallil Air Base had been taken without engaging in offensive action or indeed firing any shots other than verbal ones.

That afternoon Tallil Air Base was turned over to the 1st Battalion of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, Task Force PSYOP was disbanded, and the 450th Civil Affairs Company returned to its normal mission of supporting the 82nd Airborne Division by keeping civilians, refugees, and enemy prisoners out of the way of the Division's combat elements.<sup>2</sup>

The 82nd Airborne Division troopers got a big kick out of the fact that a big air base had been taken by a few Reserve Civil Affairs troops.

The 450th Civil Affairs Company was one of 16 Army Reserve Civil Affairs units called up for Operation DESERT STORM.<sup>3</sup> The unit was called up on 27 December 1990 and reported to Fort Bragg, NC, four days later. The 450th CA Company had been designated for over 10 years as the civil affairs unit to support the 82nd Airborne Division. In Army parlance, it was CAPSTONE to the Division.<sup>4</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Davis took over the company on 7 January 1991, just a few weeks before the unit deployed to Saudi Arabia to join the Division and participate in the land campaign. The unit deployed on 1 February 1991 with 104 personnel--47 officers and 57 enlisted personnel. About half of the personnel were original members of the unit. After reporting to Fort Bragg, the unit lost about 30 members who failed to meet the demanding standards for Special Operations Forces unit members. Some of the personnel could not pass the physical fitness test; some were overweight; some lacked aptitude or had a bad attitude. The remaining members of the unit were joined by other Reserve civil affairs specialists. When the unit arrived in Saudi Arabia, it was lean, mean, well qualified, and eager to go.

Upon arrival, the 450th CA Company was attached to the 82nd Airborne Division with the mission of providing support for all of the elements of the Division. Six person direct support teams were attached to each of the three maneuver brigades and the Aviation Brigade. A detachment of 18 members was attached to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment to provide Civil Affairs support to that organization. Support for elements in the Division rear area was provided by about 30 members, including all the women, who were not permitted forward of the Division tactical operations center. The remaining 25-30 members of the 450th were with Lieutenant Colonel Davis at his headquarters co-located with the 3rd Brigade. The company had 4-5 Kuwaiti interpreters to help communicate with the local populace, and these were assigned to the various teams.

Lieutenant Colonel Davis was with the 3rd Brigade by choice. With the approval of the Division Commander, Major General James H. Johnson, Jr., and the 3d Brigade Commander, Colonel Hale, Lieutenant Colonel Davis had attached his company "jump TOC" to the 3rd Brigade headquarters at the outset of the operation. This was done to provide a central, forward position from which the 450th could react to any CA mission in the Division area of operations. As luck would have it, the 3rd Brigade ended up in the position where the 450th was needed the most. At that time the 3rd Brigade was the only Division unit committed, and it was deep inside Western Iraq along the Euphrates River.

The 82nd Airborne Division expected very little contact with civilians in their area of operations during the land campaign. The Division was in the West--a sparsely populated area with a few nomadic Bedouins. Consequently, the Division planned to bring only small CA elements along in the advance to the Euphrates River. However, Colonel Davis took the initiative to assure that he and his unit were in the forefront of the advance because his training told him that was the proper place to be in a position to help. This turned out to be fortunate, for from the start of the campaign the Division ran into large numbers of Iraqis trying to surrender. The Division activated an Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Team to take care of the unexpected numbers of prisoners, and the CA personnel were tasked to assist in this mission. Over 3,000 prisoners were processed in the first few days of the war. The CA company had practiced many hours on how to deal with hostile civilians, using loudspeakers, wrist restraints, and crowd control tactics, and although there were no hostile civilians, these same techniques were very useful for dealing with prisoners.

After the capture of Tallil Air Base, the 450th CA Company was operating in the area of the 3rd Brigade on 1 March 1991, when the Division started receiving Kuwaiti and other allied nationals who had been released from Iraqi prisons in towns just across the Euphrates. These people were sick, malnourished, and obviously maltreated. They had been captured by the Iraqi security forces and tortured and imprisoned. In the confusion of the Coalition victory, they had been released by dissident Iraqis. Now they were coming South into the 82nd Division area looking for safe haven.

The 82nd Division asked XVIII Airborne Corps for permission to set up refugee camps for these people. When Corps approved the request, the mission was assigned to the 450th CA Company. Camp Mercy was established, and over 150 released prisoners were cared for over the next 7-8 days. Then the word came down that Camp Mercy had to be moved. Lieutenant Colonel Davis loaded his troops and the refugees in some captured Iraqi trucks and started down the "Six Lane" headed East.<sup>5</sup>

The convoy of trucks moved toward the 24th Division area, but that Division would not take responsibility for the refugees. Lieutenant Colonel Davis kept going. About 20 miles from Kuwait, they stopped at a checkpoint manned by a platoon of Abrams tanks. They were informed that Iraqi troops were still defending road blocks down the road. The convoy could not continue to go down the Six Lane and moved back to the 24th Division area and regrouped. The next step was to head cross-country. It was nighttime, and it was cold. The refugees were suffering, and some relief had to be obtained. The convoy crossed the Kuwait border at 0200 and arrived in Kuwait City at 0600.

Upon arrival in Kuwait City the refugees were greeted with great joy and relief. The Minister of the Interior of the Kuwait Government came down to thank the members of the 450th CA Company for their help. The total number of this kind of refugees repatriated was over 500. They included many prominent Kuwaitis and citizens of other Coalition Nations who

had been treated brutally by the Iraqi security forces.

Still later, another phase began after Iraqi forces started moving back into areas they had evacuated to avoid the Coalition Forces. The returning Iraqi forces were determined to take revenge on their own countrymen and shelled and attacked the towns along the Euphrates mercilessly. These brutal acts generated still another wave of refugees--composed this time of Iraqis fleeing from their own government. The 450th CA Company set up Camp Mercy again and took in first 1,500, then over 3,000 refugees. In accordance with international law, the mission of the US Army was to provide emergency humanitarian assistance. Food and water were in short supply, but the 450th managed to get supplies to help the refugees. The CA soldiers gave advice on sanitation and how to establish a supply of drinking water and helped the refugees to set up the camp. US medical units treated over 700 sick and wounded in Camp Mercy, including over 200 civilians wounded by the Iraqi shelling. Finally, the 82nd Airborne Division and the 450th CA Company were pulled out of the area on 30 March, and the 2nd Armored Cavalry took over the area. The 450th CA Company returned to its home station in Maryland on 21 April 1991.

The 450th CA Company was in the Theater for 74 days. It moved, worked, and fought with the front-line infantry of the 82nd Airborne Division. The unit members were a part of the team, and they proudly wear the 82nd Airborne Division patch on their right shoulders as visible evidence that they served together in combat.<sup>6</sup> Although some of the tasks accomplished by the 450th were not exactly those envisaged in the Civil Affairs Manual, the special skills and training of the unit allowed it to cope with prisoners, repatriated citizens, and refugees with great effectiveness. Like their CA counterparts with other divisions or on other missions, they provided a combat multiplier for the operations of the 82nd Airborne Division.

The operations of the 450th CA Company and other Civil Affairs units in support of DESERT STORM were the first major test of the CA units in their new organizational arrangement as part of the Army's Special Operations Forces.

### Army Reserve Special Operations Forces

The system for command and control of Army Reserve Special Operations Forces (SOF) which existed in the Autumn of 1990 was one result of the much larger process of consolidating and emphasizing all SOF within DOD. A full discussion of this development is beyond the scope of this paper, but it involves a new Unified Command, a new Major Army Command, and a new, unique Army Reserve Headquarters--USACAPOC, which epitomizes the Total Army Concept.<sup>7</sup>

### US Special Operations Command

The mission of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is to provide Special Operations Forces for the theater unified commands. USSOCOM was formed in April 1987 to consolidate command, control, training, and funding for all special operations forces in the Department of Defense. USSOCOM was mandated by Congress because of perceptions that the SOF were not receiving adequate funding, policy guidance, oversight, and operational emphasis from their own Services.

The Defense Authorization Act for FY 1987 directed DOD to do several things with respect to the SOF. To assure high level oversight and support for the consolidation of SOF forces and functions, the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) was established. To establish visibility for SOF funding, a new Program 11 was created for Special Operations Forces in the DOD planning, programming, and budgeting system. The Act also specified the establishment of USSOCOM and the consolidation of all SOF into subordinate commands for each Service. The Navy formed the Navy Special Warfare Command; the Air Force formed the USAF Special Operations Command; and the Army formed its own US Army Special Operations Command. This new line up for SOF received its first test during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in December 1989. When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the new arrangements were still in transition within the Army.

### US Army Special Operations Command

The US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) commands all active Army Special Operations Forces and exercises operational control of all Army Reserve SOF. Starting in October 1991, USASOC will exercise command of the Army Reserve SOF units as well. USASOC is a major army command reporting directly to the Department of the Army for administration, but it also is the Army Component Command of USSOCOM, reporting to CINCSOC for readiness, training, and--in this case--funding.

Army Special Operations Forces include Special Forces, Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs.

Special Forces conduct unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), special reconnaissance, and counter-terrorism operations. The essence of these operations is to utilize small teams of highly skilled soldiers to organize and train indigenous personnel to fight an outside enemy (UW) or an internal enemy (FID). In addition, the exceptional capabilities of these teams make them valuable for military missions involving operations in hostile territory for observation (intelligence) or military action (counter-terrorism). There are 9 Special Forces Groups: five Active; two Army Reserve; and two Army National Guard.

Rangers are particularly well trained light infantry designed to conduct direct military operations under difficult conditions. The Army has the 75th Ranger Regiment with three Ranger Battalions.

Special Operations Aviation is the result of 20 years of work by the Army in developing the equipment and tactics to support special operations with helicopters. Special Operations Aviation units are equipped with both light and medium helicopters and are trained to support the insertion, resupply, fire support, and extraction of other SOF. The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment includes three Active battalions and one Army National Guard battalion.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units provide a means of influencing the attitudes and/or behavior of people--enemies, friendlies, or neutrals, in both conventional and low-intensity combat operations. PSYOP units have a capability for sociological research; analysis of target audiences; development and production of propaganda; and planning of psychological campaigns. A PSYOP group normally commands all of the PSYOP units--battalions and companies--in a theater. There are 4 PSYOP groups: one Active and three in the Reserve.

It was clear at the outset that the first three of these elements--Special Forces, Rangers, and Special Operations Aviation would be included in the new USASOC. Initially it was not clear whether the other two functions--Psychological Operations or Civil Affairs would be included. The two functions had some similarities: both were involved in activities which many conventional soldiers believe are marginal to battlefield success; both require relatively few personnel but consist almost entirely of highly skilled specialists; and both were relegated largely to the Army Reserve. After considerable discussion, it was decided to include both PSYOP and CA in the SOF command. The SOF leaders saw the two functions as useful--even essential--adjuncts to the kinds of things they would have to do in low intensity conflict. Reserve leaders saw inclusion in SOF as a way to protect and perhaps even to enhance the forces and funding devoted to their PSYOP and CA units.

Thus, as the Army began forming its new major command in response to Congressional mandate, it had to cope with the consequences of the decision to include the PSYOP and CA functions. Since almost all of these assets were in the Army Reserve, this required the formulation of a new approach to Army Reserve units. The result is that when USASOC becomes fully operational on 1 October 1991, it will be the only major Army command which commands and funds its own wartime Reserve units other than the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM).<sup>8</sup> With the exception of a few Army Reserve units commanded (but not funded) by USAREUR and USARPAC, the rest of the Army Reserve units will be commanded by the US Army Reserve Command, a FORSCOM subordinate command, and funded by the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve even when they are earmarked for another command during wartime.<sup>9</sup>

The initial response of the Army was to use its existing 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM) to command all active SOF units but continue the dispersion of the USAR SOF units among 22 different Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs). This arrangement made it hard for the active SOF elements to influence the training and readiness of the Reserve PSYOP and CA units, which comprise 86% and 97% respectively of Total Army assets in these functional areas. It was apparent that this arrangement did not meet Congressional intent to consolidate and emphasize SOF forces. Accordingly, 1st SOCOM continued to develop a structure to simplify the command and control of the Reserve units. This met with resistance from some ARCOM commanders who would lose units under a consolidation and asserted that the active Army did not understand the Reserves. Nevertheless, the consolidation of the USAR SOF units continued to be accomplished incrementally. The first move was to consolidate command of all Reserve SOF units under a single ARCOM within each CONUS Army Area. This was a step in the right direction but still left the Reserve SOF separated from the Active SOF units.

Accordingly, the Army decided that it was necessary to create a new major command--coequal with FORSCOM--to command both active and Reserve SOF units. This would also involve creation of a new Reserve headquarters to command all USAR SOF units. This was a radical departure from previous arrangements and was accomplished only after much discussion and coordination. The concept of a subordinate Reserve SOF command was presented to the Chief of Staff of the Army in June 1989. The Chief of Staff directed development of a detailed plan for creation of a major Army command for all Army SOF with two subordinate commands--one for Active and the other for Reserve units. The plan for the new MACOM was approved on 15 August 1989.

The US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) was activated on 1 December 1989 and assumed command of all Active SOF and operational control of USAR SOF units. It also assumed operational control of the USAJFK Special Warfare Center and School. When formed, USASOC had over 20,000 soldiers, about 9,500 in the Active Component and about 10,500 in the Army Reserve. The 1st SOCOM retained command of all Active Army SOF under the new USASOC. A new US Army Reserve Special Operations Command (USARSOC) was activated provisionally and took operational control of the 36 CA units, 34 PSYOP units, and 2 Special Forces Groups of the USAR.<sup>10</sup>

Until it becomes fully operational in October 1991, USASOC shares responsibility for the USAR units with FORSCOM, the US Army Reserve Command, the five CONUS Armies (to some extent during the transition), and five ARCOMs. The ARCOMs provide installation support and services, make recommendations on personnel actions, share in the rating of unit commander performance, coordinate on budget decisions, and participate in the selection of unit commanders and key personnel. USASOC is responsible for combat readiness, training, personnel actions, logistical support, intelligence support, and funding. This multiple command arrangement could have posed some problems during the mobilization but worked satisfactorily because all participants cooperated to get the job done.

In November 1990, the command arrangements within USASOC were changed to integrate the SOF of both components according to their specialty. Under this new arrangement, the 3,000 Reservists of the 11th and 12th Special Forces Groups were transferred to a new US Army Special Forces Command. The 75th Ranger Regiment and the 160th Special Operation Regiment were made major subordinate commands of USASOC. The US Army Reserve Special Operations Command became the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) and assumed command of two active units--the 96th CA Battalion and the 4th Psychological Operations Group. USASOC, USASFC, and USACAPOC are unique in their integration of Active and Reserve units and personnel under a single headquarters. USACAPOC has eight major subordinate commands: three CA Commands, the 96th CA Battalion, and four Psychological Operations Groups. These comprise the CA and PSYOP force structure of the US Army. The major elements of USASOC are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Major Elements of the US Army Special Operations Command

US Army Special Forces Command	US Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command	160th Special Operations Aviation	75th Ranger Regiment	US Army JFK Special Warfare Center & School
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Civil Affairs Background

Civil Affairs units originated in the US Army during World War II to meet the need for military specialists to administer areas liberated from German and Japanese occupation and govern areas in Germany and Japan occupied by the US Army during and after the war. Numerous enthusiastic personnel with appropriate education and training were formed into military government units to assure law and order and provide essential services to the populations of territories administered by the US Army. After World War II, the mission of these units--renamed Civil Affairs--was not so obvious. The probability that the US would occupy and administer large areas of foreign nations appeared remote in the early days of the Cold War.

By the early 1960s, almost all of the Army's Civil Affairs capability was in the Army Reserve. This was appropriate because the professional competence of officers in the Civil Affairs field is derived principally from civilian careers, as demonstrated in the 20 functional areas of civil affairs shown in Figure 2. Civil Affairs was kept alive by enthusiastic Reservists who believed in the importance of the mission.

Figure 2.  
Civil Affairs Functional Specialties

Arts & Monuments	Property Control
Civil Defense	Public Administration
Civil Information	Public Communications
Civilian Supply	Public Education
Cultural Affairs	Public Finance
Dislocated Civilians	Public Health
Economics & Commerce	Public Safety
Food & Agriculture	Public Welfare
Labor	Public Works & Utilities
Legal	Transportation

During the 1960s, as interest in counter-insurgency grew, it became evident that the special skills and abilities of Civil Affairs soldiers to assist local populations to improve their living conditions would be useful. During the Vietnam War, the Army relied heavily on CA methods and approaches to counter the Viet Cong. The 95th CA Group, Fort Gordon, GA, in support of the Army Civil Affairs School, began in 1965 to send teams to Vietnam to perform area assessments and planning for civic action projects. The 1st Civil Affairs Battalion was activated in Vietnam with three companies, and CA and PSYOP cells were assigned to Special Forces units in Vietnam as the mission required.<sup>11</sup> This was done by expanding active Army CA strength, and the Army did not call up Army Reserve Civil Affairs units for the Vietnam War.

After the Vietnam War, emphasis within DOD and the Army turned to creating a credible capability for waging conventional war with the Soviet Union in Europe as part of NATO. One aspect of this NATO program was to maximize the US contribution to NATO combat capability by obtaining logistical support from local resources in Europe, or Host Nation Support (HNS). It soon became apparent that there was a requirement for some specially trained personnel to manage HNS during wartime. The skills and orientation of the Civil Affairs units matched the requirements of this job closely, and many CA units were oriented to providing liaison and coordination of HNS in Europe.<sup>12</sup>

As a by-product of this development, the Army discovered that the European battlefield (as is true of almost all battlefields) would be cluttered with civilians not participating in the battle. These civilians get in the way of military forces and often are put at risk by combat operations. There was a practical need to keep civilians from interfering with our own operations and a moral imperative to reduce their suffering caused by the combat operations of

both sides. This mission was also ideally suited to the training and temperament of Civil Affairs units.

Thus, at the outset of the SOF consolidation, the Civil Affairs units were focused primarily on support of conventional operations. The CA job was to interact with local civilians--keeping them out of the way while trying to obtain support from them for the fighting forces. The role of Civil Affairs in Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Foreign Internal Defense was not clearly defined, although the utility of highly trained specialists in law and order, government, and provision of essential public services was apparent to many.<sup>13</sup>

There was another consideration--how to save the Civil Affairs capability at all. Despite having respectable missions, the priority within the Army for Civil Affairs was low. Given the choice of a tank company or even a truck company over a civil affairs company, the Army might let the CA units go if there were reductions to be made. Accordingly, there was much to be gained from designating CA as part of SOF--provided the SOF leadership would protect and defend the CA capability. Major General William R. Berkman, as Chief, Army Reserve, from 1979 to 1986, supported the designation as SOF of the entire CA unit structure.<sup>14</sup>

Not all agreed with the inclusion of CA in SOF. Some of the CA leaders were apprehensive about retaining for CA a role in support of conventional operations as well as special operations. The image of the Reserve Civil Affairs unit was not compatible to the SOF image in the minds of others. CA Reservists were thought of as basically civilian experts in military uniform but not particularly military in attitude or aspect. Putting floppy hat Reservists together with Green Berets gave pause to many. Despite these reservations, there was general support in the CA community for the 1987 decision by the Secretary of the Army to include the CA units in SOF.<sup>15</sup>

### Civil Affairs Mission<sup>16</sup>

Civil Affairs operates at all three levels of combat operations: strategic, operational, and tactical. At the strategic level, civil affairs supports the National Command Authorities (NCA) by conducting missions for the theater commanders in support of US nation building activities, performing regional planning, and assisting in intelligence collection.<sup>17</sup>

At the operational level, civil affairs supports a theater commander in three general areas:

1. Providing advice and assistance in population and resource control measures, civic action, and civil assistance. Population and resource control measures (PRC) are designed to facilitate the effective conduct of US combat operations by minimizing interference by local populations and obtaining local resources to support US forces. Military civic action is the use of mostly indigenous military forces to help the local population by actions which contribute to

economic and social development.<sup>18</sup> Civil assistance is the provision of US resources to local governments to help them administer their populations. All three of these missions are inter-related, but they differ in emphasis.

2. Supporting other SOF in foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare operations by providing advice and assistance on population and resource control, organizing auxiliaries, conducting civic action, and fostering institutional development to achieve internal stability and expand government legitimacy in contested areas.

3. Conducting civil administration missions by helping host governments to maintain stable and viable civil governments, establishing temporary civil administrations in host government territory to maintain law and order, and/or establishing a civil administration in occupied enemy territory.

At the tactical level, civil affairs support the tactical commander (corps, division, brigade, regiment) by accomplishing five tasks:

1. Identifying and obtaining local resources, facilities, and support which could be useful to the unit.
2. Minimizing civilian interference with US military operations.
3. Meeting legal and moral obligations of the military commander to the local populace by providing essential goods and services through local governments.
4. Supplementing the human intelligence collection effort.
5. Acting as a staff focal point for consideration of civilian and cultural factors that could impact on military operations.

#### Civil Affairs Force Structure

The Army has almost all of the Civil Affairs capability in the Department of Defense, with about 172 Active Component and 4,650 Army Reserve personnel in CA units.<sup>19</sup> Civil Affairs is a branch of the Army, comparable in some respects to the Corps of Engineers or Military Intelligence, but restricted to the Army Reserve. USAR officers and enlisted personnel assigned to the branch wear distinctive branch insignia.<sup>20</sup> Active Army officers serving in CA units are not assigned to the Civil Affairs Branch but may have a Civil Affairs additional skill identifier.

The current Civil Affairs force structure organized under the H-Series TOE consists of

four kinds of units: commands; brigades; groups; and companies.

The CA Command is a headquarters designed to plan, manage, and conduct civil affairs operations in support of a theater, theater army, or joint task force commander. The command provides staff support to the theater commander and other services in the theater. It normally will command the civil affairs units in the theater.<sup>21</sup> A CA command has an authorized strength of 63 officers and 73 enlisted personnel and is commanded by a brigadier general. The three CA commands in the force structure are oriented toward support of one of the unified commands, as follows: 351st CA Command, PACOM; 352nd CA Command, CENTCOM; 353rd CA Command, EUCOM.

The CA Brigade is designed to support an army corps, which consists of 3-5 divisions, or a theater army area command. A CA brigade has an authorized strength of 58 officers and 67 enlisted personnel. The CA Brigade is commanded by a colonel in peacetime and a brigadier general upon mobilization. Two brigades are oriented to unified commands: 358th to LANTCOM and the 361st to SOUTHCOM.

The CA Group is designed to assist the CA Command by performing civil affairs missions in the theater army area of operations, usually behind the combat zone. A CA Group has an authorized strength of 53 officers and 98 enlisted personnel and is commanded by a colonel.

The CA Company is designed to support a division, a corps support command, or a similar logistical command in the theater army area. A CA Company has an authorized strength of 51 officers and 74 enlisted personnel and is commanded by a lieutenant colonel.

The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) stationed at Fort Bragg, NC, has a global orientation. The 96th CA Battalion consists of a headquarters and 4 companies, each oriented to a different theater: SOUTHCOM, PACOM, CENTCOM, and EUCOM/LANTCOM. The authorized strength of the 96th CA Battalion is 72 officers and 99 enlisted personnel, and it is commanded by a lieutenant colonel. As an Active Army unit, the 96th CA Battalion is available as a rapid reaction force for contingencies which would not justify calling Reserve units.

The operational elements of all CA units consist of several teams of 4-12 specialists which are sent to perform assessment, planning, management, and coordination tasks to guide the work of Army units or local personnel to accomplish CA missions. A typical CA team consists of 1-5 officers and 3-8 enlisted personnel and is led by a major. The team includes specialists in functions such as food, public health, public safety, public works and utilities, transportation, education, finance, supply, cultural affairs, and public administration. These specialists apply their knowledge and training collectively to perform the CA mission.

In 1992 the Civil Affairs units will be reorganized into the new L-Series TOEs, and their

designations will be changed to reflect a slightly new alignment with the supported organizations. Figure 3 below shows the relationship between the new and old structures.

Figure 3.

Comparison of H & L Series CA TOEs

	H-Series	L-Series
Theater or JTF	CA Command	CA Command
Theater Army	CA Command	CA Command
Corps	CA Brigade	CA Brigade
TAACOM	CA Group	CA Brigade
COSCOM	CA Company	CA Battalion (GP)
Division	CA Company	CA Battalion (DS)
Special Opns	CA Company or Battalion	CA Battalion (FID&W)

The full listing of USACAPOC CA units and their home stations is in Figure 4. The 322nd CA Group, Honolulu, HI, is assigned to US Army Pacific and is the only Army Reserve CA unit not assigned to USACAPOC.<sup>22</sup>

Figure 4.

US Army Civil Affairs Units

<u>96th CA Battalion (Airborne), Fort Bragg, NC</u>
<u>351st Civil Affairs Command, Mountain View, CA</u>  364th CA Brigade, Portland, OR 425th CA Company, Santa Barbara, CA 426th CA Company, Upland, CA 445th CA Company, Oakland, CA 448th CA Company, Fort Lewis, WA 361st CA Brigade, Pensacola, FL 478th CA Company, Coral Gables, FL
<u>352nd Civil Affairs Command, Riverdale, MD</u>  304th CA Group, Philadelphia, PA 404th CA Company, Trenton, NJ 414th CA Company, Utica, NY 354th CA Brigade, Riverdale, MD 403rd CA Company, Liverpool, NY 450th CA Company, Riverdale, MD 360th CA Brigade, Columbia, SC 422nd CA Company, Greensboro, NC 489th CA Company, Knoxville, TN
<u>353rd Civil Affairs Command, Bronx, NY</u>  358th CA Brigade, Norristown, PA 401st CA Company, Webster, NY 402nd CA Company, Tonawanda, NY 411th CA Company, West Hartford, CT 416th CA Company, Norristown, PA 443rd CA Company, Warwick, RI 308th CA Group, Homewood, IL 407th CA Company, St Paul, MN 415th CA Company, Kalamazoo, MI 432nd CA Company, Green Bay, WI 321st CA Group, San Antonio, TX 413th CA Company, Lubbock, TX 418th CA Company, Richards Gebaur ANGB, MO 431st CA Company, Little Rock, AR 436th CA Company, Broken Arrow, OK 490th CA Company, Abilene, TX

Headquarters, USACAPOC

The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) is the full name of the new Army Civil Affairs Headquarters. USACAPOC is somewhat unique. It is a USAR organization assigned directly to a Major Army Command--The US Army Special Operations Command--USASOC. It commands both Army Reserve and Active Army units and receives its funding support for operations and maintenance directly from a Unified Command through USASOC.

Headquarters, USACAPOC, is commanded by a drilling Reservist. It is manned by a mixture of personnel: Active Component soldiers; full-time Reservists; military technicians (also unit members); drilling Reservists; and civilians. Figure 5 shows the strength authorization for the headquarters.

Figure 5.

Authorized Strength of Hqs, USACAPOC

Active Component:	5
Active Duty Guard/Reserve:	24
Military Technicians:	43
Drilling Reservists:	63
Civilians:	2
Total:	137

After Iraq invaded Kuwait, Headquarters, USACAPOC and its subordinate units prepared for the action they knew would be ahead.

The Theater Build-Up

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, it was clear at the outset to planners at the Joint Staff, DA, CENTCOM, and Third US Army (ARCENT) that a CA capability would be useful. Department of the Army included CA units in the initial list of Reserve units to be called up. However, these units were removed from the call up list, and it was not until Christmas 1990 that they

were in fact mobilized and deployed to the theater to arrive just in time for the start of the war.<sup>23</sup>

The build-up of CA assets in the Southwest Asia Theater was graduated. The doctrinal CA organization was achieved just before it was needed. This was the result of many different forces and circumstances which impacted on the pace. Essentially, there were three major phases to the build-up of these assets: the Defensive Phase from 2 August until 7 November; the Offensive Planning Phase from 7 November until early December; and the Unit Phase from early December until the end of the operation in Spring 1991. The time-phased strength in theater is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6.

CA Strength in SWA Theater

<u>Oct 90</u>	<u>Dec 90</u>	<u>Feb 91</u>	<u>Apr 91</u>	<u>Jun 91</u>
136	240	2,060	947	21

The reason given for this graduated build-up differs according to the source. The planners at DA and USASOC maintain that this was a deliberate, phased build-up of assets in response to the stated requirements of the CINC. The impression of other participants is that there was a lack of attention to CA involvement initially and some resistance to calling up and deploying Reserve units. The CA staff officers in the theater maintain that they planned and executed a logical build-up of CA resources in accordance with events and plans at CENTCOM and ARCENT. These three viewpoints, although contrasting, are not necessarily incompatible. All participants in the process agree that there was some resistance to calling up the CA units, and some have characterized it as a "struggle." Despite that struggle, or perhaps because of it, the CA force structure achieved ultimately for Operation DESERT STORM was essentially that established in doctrine for a mature theater of operations.

The CA Situation at the Outset

Neither of the two top headquarters responsible for the Southwest Asia Theater were well prepared to deal with the civil affairs aspects of possible US reactions to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Headquarters, CENTCOM had no Civil Affairs Section or Division, and the responsibility for CA planning and staff actions fell to Major Paul Christian, who did the job as an additional duty to his primary work as a political-military analyst in the J5 Directorate.

Major Christian is a Foreign Area Officer specialist in the Middle-East, but he knew little about Civil Affairs and had no experience in this work. Major Christian and his boss, Colonel Bob Ward, Chief of the Politico-Military Division, learned a lot about the value of Civil Affairs during DESERT STORM and later became advocates for using it, but initially, there was little interest in CA among the CENTCOM Staff.<sup>24</sup> Partially this was because CENTCOM had not been involved in JUST CAUSE and had no direct feedback from the way in which CA was handled during that operation. There was little understanding among the CENTCOM staff of CA or the way it might be used to help CENTCOM to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraq, which was the immediate problem in early August. Besides, CENTCOM had given the CA planning mission to Third US Army.

The outbreak of war in the Middle East found Third US Army also poorly prepared to exercise its role as the executive agent for Civil Affairs in the CENTCOM Region.<sup>25</sup> By a quirk of fate, there were no experienced CA staff officers on duty at Headquarters, Third US Army, on 2 August 1990. There was not even a separate G5 Civil Military Operations section since the G3 Operations and Training Section had absorbed the G5 in January 1990. The chief of the Civil Affairs Division of G3 in January, Colonel Wesley A. Groesbeck, was an experienced CA officer, but in April he was reassigned for compassionate reasons to Fort Douglas, UT. His successor as Chief of the CA Division was Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Davies, an MI officer and a Foreign Area Officer Specialist on the Middle East. Colonel Davies had never served as a CA officer, but he had been in the G5 Section and then the CA Division since 1986. He understood and appreciated the value of CA, but he was reassigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency in June 1990.<sup>26</sup> The top CA position was unfilled until 27 August 1990 when Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Peters arrived in the theater and was named as G5 in addition to his duties as Commander, 96th CA Battalion. On 18 October 1990, Colonel James T. Kerr, Jr., became the G5.

Colonel Jim Kerr was the senior G5 officer in the Army Reserve Augmentation unit for Headquarters, Third US Army. In civilian life a personnel management specialist for FORSCOM Headquarters at Fort McPherson, GA, he had much experience in Civil Affairs both on active duty and as a Reservist. Colonel Kerr was called to active duty on 27 September 1990 with the ARCENT Augmentation Unit and deployed to Saudi Arabia on 9 October 1990 as Chief, CA Command Support Division. There was no need for a large CA staff at ARCENT Headquarters because the plan was for the 352nd CA Command to do the planning and the Commander of the 352nd to be the ARCENT G5.

However, Third US Army Headquarters was not enthusiastic about Civil Affairs. There was no real sense of what CA could do for the organization. The major role of CA in Europe was host nation support, but in Third US Army planning, this job was assumed by the logisticians and contracting specialists. Other CA activities such as civic action and humanitarian assistance were not popular among the nations of the CENTCOM region, who considered themselves above "taking charity." There appeared to be no opportunities for civil

administration of occupied territory, and dealing with dislocated civilians or refugees was not considered likely. In short, it was hard to find something that CA could do for Third US Army.

The CA staff officers at Third US Army had worked closely with the 352nd CA Command for at least 7 years prior to DESERT STORM. The 352nd had prepared CA annexes to all of the ARCENT operations plans, including an annex for OPLAN 1002--the Iraq-based scenario for reinforcement of the theater that was implemented for DESERT STORM. This latest plan was rehearsed in Exercise INTERNAL LOOK in July 1990. The 352nd planners believe they did a good job of planning in support of Third US Army but that they received insufficient guidance from the Third US Army staff.

The CA planners at Third US Army, on the other hand, were not satisfied with the state of CA planning at the Army level. They thought that CA planning was good at corps and below and integrated well in the plans of the 377th TAACOM (the CAPSTONE logistical headquarters for Third US Army). The Army planners thought that the 352nd, despite repeated urging, had not provided a detailed plan of what to do and how to organize in the event of a major operation in the CENTCOM area of operations. One reason for this was that the 352nd CA Command did not have command of all of the CENTCOM designated CA units. The CAPSTONE trace of the 377th TAACOM included the 304th CA Group and two CA companies, and the 377th TAACOM, wanting to retain control of these units for possible host nation support missions, resisted Third Army attempts to transfer these units to the 352nd trace. It was not until the formation of USASOC in December 1989 that the 352nd assumed the responsibility for planning for a full set of subordinate units.

The situation on 2 August 1990 was that there was no approved theater level CA plan and a wide divergence between the Third US Army and the 352nd CA Command. The close ties which had been built up over several years between the two headquarters had been loosened by the transfers of Colonel Groesbeck and Lieutenant Colonel Davies. Thus, when the time came, there was no propensity in Third US Army Headquarters to use the 352nd in its planned role, despite urging by senior CA staff officers on the Joint Staff and at HQs USSOCOM. In addition, there was no senior CA advocate on the staffs of either CENTCOM or Third US Army to urge the use of Civil Affairs assets to help accomplish their missions or to push for an approved CA annex to the CENTCOM OPLAN.

### The Defensive Phase

Right after the Iraq invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 Headquarters, Third US Army assumed the operational role of ARCENT--the Army Component Command of CENTCOM--for which it had been planning. As ARCENT, the headquarters became the executive agent for all CA matters for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

The initial view at ARCENT was that there would be little need for CA capability. The thrust of Operation DESERT SHIELD was to defend Saudi Arabia against an Iraqi invasion. The defensive mission did not envisage operations in populated areas, indeed, US units were situated deliberately in unpopulated or sparsely populated areas. Since the mission was defensive, there was little need for preparing to administer occupied territory in Iraq or even liberated territory in Kuwait. The initial estimate was that management of host nation support was not needed very much in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had great experience in contracting for services and needed no help in doing this. As Colonel Kerr says "the entire nation was in a host nation support mode."<sup>27</sup> It was believed that coordinating the Saudi support to the US forces could be handled by the 96th CA Battalion.

As soon as the crisis started, the 96th CA Battalion sent some officers to HQs CENTCOM to provide planning assistance for CA, but these officers were not knowledgeable of the entire CA force structure required to support the mission. The draft CA plan did not indicate the actual CAPSTONE trace task organization. HQs USACAPOC provided advice on the CAPSTONE trace and the allocation of CA units to the deploying forces that provided the basis for the plans that ultimately were adopted.<sup>28</sup>

Another problem was that the priorities established by CINCCENT favored combat units over other kinds of units. The increased authority of the theater CINCS, derived from the Goldwater-Nichols Act, gave General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, CINCCENT, the prerogative as to what units would be deployed to the theater, and when. General Schwarzkopf initially wanted only units "that could kill tanks." Even with the massive airlift which was mounted, there was competition for available seats. Moreover, CENTCOM had to live within the theater strength ceiling imposed by the Secretary of Defense. There was little room for CA units whose utility was doubtful at the time because defensive operations would take place in areas with few civilians.

The 96th CA Battalion was the first to deploy. Four members of the 96th deployed early in August with the initial brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division. The battalion headquarters and 4 companies deployed incrementally, and the entire battalion had closed in Saudi Arabia by 27 November 1991. Prior to his departure Colonel Peters and General Hurteau had worked out a plan for Colonel Peters to make an assessment of the situation and report back to USACAPOC on the need for CA resources. Colonel Peters had an excellent grasp of CA capabilities, was familiar with the plan that USACAPOC had prepared to provide CA support, and had worked with many of the Reserve CA unit commanders. After his arrival in Saudi Arabia, he was unable to convince the ARCENT leadership of the need for a sizeable CA capability. The assessment was that few CA assets would be needed to defend Saudi Arabia and there was no requirement at that time for calling up entire USAR CA units. However, Colonel Peters recognized that his tactically trained CA troops were not trained to be staff officers, and he did recommend that some USAR CA resources be deployed to beef up the undermanned CA staff elements at the corps and division headquarters.<sup>29</sup>

After taking over from Lieutenant Colonel Peters as the ARCENT G5, Colonel Kerr became responsible for planning the CA build-up for DESERT SHIELD. He soon realized that the theater strength ceiling would be restrictive. Moreover, the environment in Saudi Arabia at the time was very austere, and the logistical system was strained to support the troops already there. The USAR CA units lacked organic support capability and would have to be supported by other units. They would be "another mouth to feed" and would exacerbate the already difficult logistical problem. Accordingly, he decided that as a first step he would ask for staff augmentations for all of the major headquarters in the field. Whole units were not considered necessary at this time, but the staff augmentations would provide a big payoff at little cost.

Colonel Kerr foresaw the need for a major CA planning effort and wanted to bring the 352nd CA Command over to do the job. He talked two or three times a month with Colonel Larry Blount and other officers at the 352nd's home station to keep them informed of what was going on and sharing ideas. He did not talk directly to Brigadier General Mooney, Commander of the 352nd CA Command, until he met with him at ARCENT Headquarters on 20 January 1991.<sup>30</sup>

Colonel Kerr discussed the CA situation with Brigadier General Stephen Arnold, the ARCENT G3, Colonel Robert Bettingfield, the Assistant G3, and Colonel John Jorgensen, the Deputy Chief of Staff. There was general agreement about the need for CA staff augmentations but general reluctance to use the 352nd CA Command. The ARCENT staff had bad feelings from their experience with 352nd participation in INTERNAL LOOK and resented the fact that the 352nd had a large number of full colonels assigned. The phrase "26 colonels" was mentioned frequently in a disparaging way.<sup>31</sup> The upshot was that the 352nd was not considered at this initial stage.

The ARCENT action to bring the staff augmentation detachments to the theater started in October. When the process started only XVIII Airborne Corps and 4 divisions were in the theater, but before it was finished, the VII Corps and 3 more divisions were added to the list to be supported with CA detachments. Approval was obtained in mid-November, but the initial request for the units was delayed 10 days because it was processed outside proper channels. All other ARCENT requests for USAR units went to FORSCOM directly and were processed quickly. Because the CA units were part of SOF, ARCENT tried to place the request with SOCOM. SOCOM informed ARCENT telephonically that the request would have to go through CENTCOM, the Joint Staff, then to SOCOM for relay to USASOC, and then finally to USACAPOC.<sup>32</sup>

Finally, on 29 November 1991, CENTCOM asked for 104 CA soldiers organized into 19 staff augmentation teams. These teams were called up to active duty on 11 December 1990. They were processed and validated by USACAPOC at Fort Bragg and arrived in Saudi Arabia on 18 December 1990. Upon arrival, the teams went out to their organizations and started to plan the CA part of the forthcoming offensive operations. The initial staff augmentation teams

were assigned to the following headquarters: CENTCOM; ARCENT; CENTAF; NAVCENT; MARCENT; SOCCENT; XVIII Airborne Corps; VII Corps; seven divisions; two corps support commands; the 22nd Support Command, and the Marine Expeditionary Force. Subsequently, Colonel Kerr asked for an additional 15 staff personnel to provide a 24-hour operational capability for the G5 Directorate at ARCENT. These people, under the command of Colonel Richard Brackney, 353rd CA Command, arrived several weeks after the initial teams and just prior to the start of the air war, bringing the total to 119.

During this period the CA staff officers at USSOCOM and the Joint Staff were generally unaware of what was going on in the theater. The security restrictions placed on the operational concept were severe, and even many officers at CENTCOM and ARCENT did not know what was going to happen as the mission shifted from defense to offense. Thus, there was considerable frustration in the Joint Staff and at SOCOM and a general belief that too little was being done to plan and accomplish the Civil Affair mission.<sup>33</sup>

### The Offensive Planning Phase

It became apparent in mid-October that President Bush's goal was to liberate Kuwait--by force if necessary. As the argument over sanctions versus war proceeded and negotiations stalled, CENTCOM started getting ready for the offensive phase.

As the mission changed from strictly defensive to openly offensive, there was a need for more CA troops. The liberation of Kuwait would require provision of humanitarian assistance and dealing with the local populace. Even if the attacks were made through sparsely populated areas, there might be dislocated civilians to deal with. As the concept of the attack evolved, the need for CA assets became more obvious. Instead of sitting in defensive positions in sparsely populated areas, the US Army would be attacking into Kuwait and Southern Iraq, with the possibility of encountering dislocated civilians and, hopefully, numerous prisoners. And if, as was expected, the Coalition Forces achieved victory, there would have to be CA troops to plan and manage the emergency restoration of Kuwait.

Accordingly, CENTCOM decided to ask for the full slate of USAR CA units needed to support the concept. On 5 December 1990, CENTCOM sent a message to the Joint Staff requesting the call up of the CA units. Interestingly, the CENTCOM message requesting the call up of the initial CA staff augmentation teams is dated 4 December 1990. Although the messages are close in their time of dispatch, they were separate actions. CENTCOM actually wanted the full CAPSTONE trace of CA units in early December, but the theater strength ceiling precluded deploying the CA companies, and CENTCOM settled for the staff augmentation teams. The initial message requesting the CA teams was delayed for several days waiting for ARCENT to agree.<sup>34</sup> By the time the coordination had been accomplished, it was 4 December. However, on 4 December the theater strength ceiling was increased so that the

full CA units could be deployed. Accordingly, CENTCOM prepared a message requesting the units and sent it out the next day--5 December.<sup>35</sup>

Much of the planning work for the CA effort fell to Colonel Lawrence C. Blount, head of the CENTCOM support cell of the 352nd CA Command. During July 1990, he had participated in Exercise INTERNAL LOOK, whose scenario was very similar to the actual events unfolding in the Persian Gulf. Blount comments that it was difficult to separate exercise traffic from the real traffic. When the exercise ended on 24 July, Colonel Blount offered to help CENTCOM with their planning for DESERT SHIELD. He went on TTAD for 26 days from 21 August to 16 September for duty with the J5 Directorate of the CENTCOM Staff. When Colonel Bob Ward deployed to Saudi Arabia on 1 September, Colonel Blount became chief of the Political Military Division. Although planning for CA support had started early--even in July 1990--at that point it was uncertain what had to be done.<sup>36</sup>

After his release from TTAD, Colonel Blount worked during November 1990 at the home station of the 352nd CA Command. He and others prepared outlines of CA plans, but the plans developed by the 352nd were not integrated into the CENTCOM war plan because the 352nd planners did not have access to the war plans being developed in the theater.

On 11 December, Colonel Blount was called up as part of the 104 staff augmentation detachments activations. After four days of processing at Fort Bragg, the detachments deployed to Saudi Arabia on 15 December, with Blount as movement commander. Colonel Blount and his 7 person team reported to CENTCOM Headquarters on 18 December 1990 and started work on the CA Annex. The team was assigned to work for Colonel Bob Ward, Chief of the Political Military Division, J5. Under the direction of Colonel Ward and with the assistance of Major Christian, Colonel Blount's team prepared Annex G's for the several CENTCOM Operations Plans which were drawn up for the offensive phase.<sup>37</sup> The operative Annex G was part of the Draft Joint DESERT STORM OPLAN published early in January 1991. This Annex G was distributed to the subordinate headquarters and provided overall guidance on CA operations for the theater. Among other things, CENTCOM made ARCENT the Executive Agency for Civil Affairs in the theater in accordance with Army doctrine.

A meeting of representatives of all Civil Affairs staff augmentations was held in Dhahran on 2 January 1991. The attendees were briefed on the CENTCOM War Plan. For most, this was their first glimpse at what they were to support. ARCENT representatives briefed on the ARCENT scheme of maneuver and gave an outline of a CA plan to support it. There was much useful discussion at this meeting. The issue of occupying Iraq was raised, and the guidance was that while the US forces did not anticipate occupying Iraq, it was to be included in the plan on a "be prepared" basis. The meeting assisted greatly in coordinating CA operations across the theater.

When the ground combat phase of the War with Iraq started on 24 February 1991, a full

array of CA units was in Saudi Arabia married up with their supported organizations, basically in accordance with Army doctrine. Sixteen CA units of the Army Reserve, including the 352nd CA Command, had been called to active duty and deployed to Saudi Arabia to join the Active Component 96th CA Battalion already employed in the theater. USACAPOC had validated and deployed 136 Active and 1,924 Reserve CA troops.

### The Call Up: Validating the Units

After CINCCENT requested the call up of 16 CA units, the mechanism to activate them and get them to the theater went into high gear. USACAPOC had already processed and validated in early December 1990 the 104 CA personnel being deployed as staff augmentation teams. Validating the units would be a much bigger job. The units were alerted on 19 December and reported to their mobilization station in two phases on 27 December 1990 and 14 January 1991. They were processed for overseas deployment and validated as SOF. The first CA unit--the 360th CA Brigade--arrived in Saudi Arabia on 16 January 1991, and last CA unit--the 407th CA Company--on 9 February 1991, just 15 days before the start of the ground campaign. The process of calling the units and preparing them was important to the success of CA operations in the theater and also to the future of these units in the Army's SOF.<sup>38</sup>

### Processing the Units

The responsibility to mobilize the units and deploy them was split between FORSCOM and USASOC. This was because USACAPOC at this time had only operational control over its units while FORSCOM, the CONUS Armies, and 5 ARCOMs retained command. It was up to USACAPOC, however, to do the work and negotiate among all of the various headquarters having some sort of involvement. Because of the overlapping responsibilities, there was some tension among the ARCOMs, FORSCOM, and USACAPOC over who should call and process the units. The fact that so many different headquarters were involved led inevitably to some confusion, and afterwards there were some charges of "doing the same thing twice." There were administrative problems, such as different situation report formats for different headquarters. However, the headquarters involved recognized the urgency of the situation, and there was no disagreement on the basic procedures. The deployment process proceeded steadily if not always smoothly toward the goal of validating and deploying all of the units.

Brigadier General Joseph C. Hurteau, US Army Reserve, was the man in charge. He was assigned at the outset to the position of the Deputy Commander of USASOC as an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA). In December 1989 he was reassigned as Commander, USARSOC, and stayed on when the organization became USACAPOC. General

Hurteau made two important decisions when called on to implement the call up of the CA and PSYOP units. First, he determined to apply the SOF validation process to qualify the units for deployment in a strict manner. Second, he got the mobilization stations for all USACAPOC units changed to Fort Bragg, NC.

The USASOC policy was that every soldier deploying to the SWA Theater had to be validated by the command and had to meet the exacting standards established for special operations forces. The validation process is designed to assure that each soldier can function and survive in combat and emphasizes physical fitness and soldier skills. Lieutenant General Michael F. Spigelmire, Commander of USASOC, believed that his Reservists should meet the same standards as their Active counterparts--both to be effective in combat and to be credible members of USASOC.

The decision to apply validation standards strictly forced General Hurteau to decide how he was going to do that. Under the previous mobilization plan organized by FORSCOM, each CA and PSYOP unit was assigned a mobilization station in its geographic area in accordance with the pattern for all USAR units. The assigned mobilization stations were all over the country. General Hurteau would have to send validation teams to each of these mobilization stations on a complicated time schedule. This would overtax the limited number of personnel available to accomplish the validation of the units. General Hurteau recommended to General Spigelmire that the mobilization station of all of the CA units being called up be changed to Fort Bragg. If they were all at Fort Bragg, USACAPOC could do the job with fewer resources and greater attention to detail. General Spigelmire agreed and proposed the change to FORSCOM and DA, where it was approved.

Accordingly, on 20 Dec 90, the mobilizing units were notified that they would report to Fort Bragg instead of their previous mobilization stations. This caused significant inconvenience for the units. All previous arrangements for support from the old mobilization stations were nullified. Mobilization and movement plans had to be remade. Some units had already moved or prepositioned equipment at the old mobilization stations, and this equipment had to be moved again. There was heartburn all around at the change. Fort Bragg would have to cope with unexpected and unprogrammed workload. General Hurteau's original estimate that the job could be done with the personnel of his own headquarters, including the drilling reservists, was overly optimistic. The 351st CA Command was tasked to provide personnel to run the validation process at Fort Bragg and sent 65 personnel to Fort Bragg on Annual Training status. Except for the 352nd CA Command Headquarters and the Kuwait Task Force, all of the CA and PYSOP personnel deploying to Saudi Arabia were processed and validated at Fort Bragg.

### The SOF Validation Process

The SOF Validation Program for CA and PSYOP units and personnel scheduled to

participate in DESERT STORM was specified by USASOC in October 1990.<sup>39</sup> The program consisted of three phases. Phase I was training in critical skills at home station prior to departure for the mobilization station. Phase II was mobilization training and certification conducted by the unit at the mobilization station. Phase III was validation of critical skills and unit readiness prior to departure from the mobilization station by USACAPOC. The third phase turned out to be the major area of emphasis.

General Hurteau saw it as his responsibility to assure that every one of his soldiers and units went to the theater ready individually and collectively to fight and survive. This meant a strict--even ruthless--adherence to high standards of performance. It also meant that USACAPOC took over and ran the show, combining an intensive training program with the validation process. There were five major areas of validation: physical condition; weapons qualification; basic soldier skills; specialty skills and leadership; and unit readiness.

Physical Condition was judged on three measures: the height to weight ratio; the Army Physical Fitness Test; and the Rucksack March. The purpose of the height to weight ratio standard was to disqualify soldiers who were overweight. The Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) consists of three events: pushups in two minutes; situps in two minutes; and a two mile run. The minimum scores required for the SOF troops were 70 for each event and a cumulative score of 210 for all events; these compare to 60 and 180 points respectively required for other Army troops. The third test for physical fitness was the "Ruck March" which involved carrying one-third of one's weight (weapon and pack combined) for a two hour, 10 kilometer march wearing BDUs, boots, and full combat gear including the rucksack. The "Ruck March" achieved great notoriety among the troops of USASOC as a definitive test of endurance and will.

General Hurteau recognized that achieving physical fitness would be a problem for Reserve units, which might not have had either the time or the inclination to stress physical training during weekend drills. He decreed that each unit would undergo the APFT immediately after arrival at Fort Bragg for diagnostic purposes. The results were uniformly poor and the policy the source of much griping, but the initial test scores showed what had to be done for the next three weeks of processing. Each day started at 0540 hours with physical conditioning led by General Hurteau personally. The emphasis on physical conditioning paid off in terms of weight lost, strength gained, and confidence restored, and scores on the final tests were significantly higher.

Weapons Qualification was also stressed. It became apparent early that unit performance on the range did not match the scores reported from firing at home station. Judging that the infamous M16 pencil had been at work, General Hurteau made each soldier zero his assigned individual weapon and qualify on an automated range while processing at Fort Bragg. This was not easy, for both ranges and personnel to operate the ranges were in short supply at this time. USACAPOC did it by good scheduling and with the help of CA units which had completed their own training but volunteered to assist other units which had to shoot.

Basic Soldier Skills were stressed for the desert environment. This included considerable training in nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense, learning how to put on the chemical protective mask, replace mask filters, don and wear chemical protective overgarments, recognize a chemical hazard, and administer a nerve agent antidote. There was training and testing on the basic soldier skills, such as weapons maintenance, radio telephone procedure, field sanitation, ground navigation, first aid, and map reading.

Specialty Qualifications also were an important part of the validation process. The essence of CA is to form small teams of several highly qualified specialists in various aspects of the overall mission. It was absolutely essential that the public health specialists knew medicine and sanitation; that the public works and utility knew water supply and electrical systems; that the public safety specialists knew how to preserve order; and that the public administration specialists knew how to establish local groups to assist in administration. Tests were administered to assure that the soldiers were qualified in their MOSs and skill areas. This included evaluation of the general knowledge of the leaders on the broad missions and doctrine for CA.

Unit Readiness was the final hurdle of the SOF validation process. The decision on each deploying unit's ability to operate successfully in the theater was made by General Hurteau on the advice of his staff and selected members of the validation teams from the 351st CA Command. The process consisted of a thorough review and evaluation of the overall condition of the unit based on the results of individual validation tests and observation of the unit's work as a group. The process started when the unit reported to Fort Bragg and the unit commander first sat down with General Hurteau for a frank discussion of the unit's readiness. During the three weeks of training and evaluation, General Hurteau and each unit commander met frequently to review progress and highlight problems. As a result of this continuous process, each unit was adjudged fully capable of operating in the theater, although some units had to improve a lot to obtain a satisfactory rating.

### Results of CA Validation

The result of the training and validation process performed at Fort Bragg was that each CA soldier deploying to the theater met the same minimum standards set and enforced for all of the other SOF troops.<sup>40</sup> This was the good news. The bad news was that some CA Reservists were disqualified from deploying.

This meant that USACAPOC in general and unit commanders in particular had to tell some of their members that they were not cutting it and had to stay behind. This was particular tough for Reserve units whose members live together in a community and who have worked together for many years. It meant telling an old friend of 10 years standing that he or she would not go with the unit to the desert. This was difficult, but it was done.

Overall, about 85% of the CA Reservists qualified for deployment. Fifteen percent of the CA soldiers did not meet SOF standards or were disqualified for medical reasons. Most of these 276 personnel were retained and used in CONUS, and they contributed to the mission.<sup>41</sup>

Personnel cross-leveling was accomplished by USACAPOC. A data base was established at the headquarters containing the names and skills of over 900 personnel in non-deploying CA units who indicated a willingness to deploy. The Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) provided names of IRR personnel with appropriate skills. Volunteers were solicited and applications received. In the end, the cross-leveling process worked. Those who fell out during validation were replaced by qualified soldiers, and all units deployed at C2 or better in personnel.

The leadership of the Army Reserve units stood up well under the trying process of validation and preparation for deployment. Most company commanders tried hard to meet the demanding standards set by USACAPOC and to set the example for their troops. Only one company commander was relieved for ineffective performance; his unit had reported in very poor condition and did not seem to improve. A new company commander was named from the USACAPOC staff, and the company improved rapidly thereafter. Another company was uncooperative during validation, ineffective in the theater, and particularly disruptive during the demobilization process by demanding special treatment and moving ahead of other units, and the USACAPOC staff thought this was largely because of the attitude of the commander. Most of the CA commanders, however, rose to the challenge and led their units well.

#### Materiel Problems with Deploying Units

The CA units called up for DESERT STORM were poorly equipped for their wartime missions when they reported to Fort Bragg. This was due in part to inadequate authorizations in their TOEs but also to lack of funding and care in peacetime. USACAPOC had to spend a lot of time and money to get these units in minimal condition to deploy and operate in the desert. Some of the more important materiel problems are discussed below.

Uniforms. The CA units all wore the green camouflage Battle Dress Uniforms (BDUs). Although other Army units, including the entire VII Corps, which had deployed from Europe, fought in the BDUs, most Army units wore the tan and brown Desert Camouflage Uniform--DCUs. By the time the CA units mobilized, the Army had run out of DCUs, so they wore what they had. When supporting a division clothed in DCUs, the green clad CA troops were instantly marked as latecomers and Reservists. They could not blend into their supporting elements very well, thus obviating the whole point of having a force clad in a uniformly inconspicuous uniform. Many of the soldiers were issued one set of DCUs on their way back to the US.

Weapons. Incredibly, the CA units were deployed with obsolescent weapons for which ammunition was in short supply. These were the cal .45 Pistol and the M16A1 Rifle, long since

replaced by the 9mm Pistol and M16A2 Rifle in Active Army units. The CA units had only the ammunition in their unit basic loads. Fortunately, there was no need for ammunition resupply in this war.

Vehicles. Most Active Army units in SWA Theater were equipped with HMMWVs (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle).<sup>42</sup> A HMMWV is a diesel powered 5/4 ton truck with a wide wheel base and an incredible capability for cross-country movement in difficult terrain. The USAR CA units were not even authorized these latest vehicles and were equipped with CUCVs--a military version of the Chevrolet Blazer.<sup>43</sup> Although equipped with 4-wheel drive and having diesel engines, the CTVs simply could not keep up with the HMMWVs. The number of vehicles authorized the CA units was insufficient even to transport the entire unit at one time much less than allow them to operate in teams according to their doctrine for employment. The CA units had to acquire additional vehicles both in the US and in the theater before they could even operate. One CA unit showed up at Fort Bragg with a full set of civilian pick up trucks of which they were most proud, only to find that there was a rule excluding gasoline operated vehicles from the theater. Since even those CA units with adequate numbers of vehicles did not possess tactical mobility comparable to that of the units they were charged with supporting, they had trouble keeping up during the fast moving land offensive in late February.

Radios. The CA units had trouble with communications. They had too few radios and telephones to operate in their small teams, and they had no capability for secure voice communications. Many of the units obtained additional radio equipment from their supported units. Others simply had to resort to couriers. While most units solved the problem of communicating with their supported units, there was great difficulty in coordinating CA activities for a large organization. The 360th CA Brigade, for example, was in support of the entire XVIII Airborne Corps but could not communicate directly with the CA companies supporting the divisions in that corps. USACAPOC purchased commercial radios locally and issued them to the units, and arranged for two sets of Special Operations Communications Assemblies to allow major units to communicate over long distances. Despite these efforts, the CA units did not have the same splendid communications capabilities provided other elements of the SOF. They needed those capabilities in DESERT STORM.

Navigation Gear. The CA units were not authorized the ground stations for the new satellite based land navigation systems. Their vehicles did not have the standard vehicular compass provided for most Army trucks. Although some units were provided the ground station equipment, most CA units had to rely on simple lensatic compasses for navigation in the desert. This was difficult, and as a result there were some cases of units getting lost, including one case which could have had disastrous consequences.

Mission Essential Items. Public Address Systems and sound recording equipment are essential "weapons" used by both CA and PSYOP units for projecting messages to target

audiences, including enemy soldiers being persuaded to surrender. Yet, many units reported to Fort Bragg short public address systems and other mission essential equipment. USACAPOC hustled to arrange lateral transfers from non-deploying units and purchased some items commercially. USACAPOC bought Sony boom boxes with dual audio cassette recorders to issue to units lacking this essential capability.

Repair Parts. There was a shortage of repair parts at the organizational maintenance level for the special equipment used primarily by CA units. The units brought sufficient unit level maintenance parts in their own PLLs, but these were not appropriate for major repair work. A new public address system had been fielded without any provision for organizational maintenance in the field, and inoperative units had to be sent for repair all the way back to St Louis, MO.

USACAPOC put great emphasis on outfitting the deploying units. By arranging lateral transfers from non-deploying units, drawing stocks from depots, and buying items commercially, they filled up the units. Much work was done also by the units, and the ARCOMs helped on cross-leveling. The result was that all CA units deployed at C1 in materiel. As discussed above, however, deficiencies in the makes and models and supportability of their equipment degraded the performance of these units in the theater relative to other Army units.

#### The Role of USACAPOC HQs and General Hurteau

USACAPOC played the major role and had the responsibility for providing CA support to DESERT STORM. The headquarters worked continuously from 2 August 1990 to do the necessary work. The personnel worked seven days a week and 24 hours a day when that was necessary. They always did what had to be done. However, the Headquarters was never placed on active duty to do this work. Instead, the drilling reservists comprising most of the headquarters used a variety of inactive duty and active duty statuses to be compensated for their work. They worked while on IDT, AT, ADT, ADSW, TTAD, and MT. IDT is inactive duty training, or "drills" which some Reservists performed at the headquarters running the deployment. AT is annual training which consists of 14 days per year. ADT is active duty for training which usually involves short courses of instruction but which was used in this case to operate the headquarters--contrary to DOD policy. ADSW is Active Duty for Special Work which is authorized to be used only to accomplish work in support of the Army Reserve. TTAD is temporary tour of active duty, which is to be used only to accomplish work in support of the Active Army. IDT, AT, ADT, and ADSW are funded from the Reserve Appropriation; TTAD from the Active Army appropriation. Oh yes, MT stands for "My Time" contributed gratis by numerous Reservists of HQs, USACAPOC, and other units.

General Joe Hurteau was absolutely essential to the success of the call up and validation effort. He had been a successful business executive and was a Vice President of American

Thread Company when he took early retirement in 1988 from his civilian career, primarily to be able to devote more time to his career in the US Army Reserve.

General Hurteau worked for the US Army almost continuously from 2 August 1990 until after the war was won. Yet, he was not called to active duty. He worked voluntarily on ADSW during this time.<sup>44</sup> Since the limit for ADSW is 179 days per year, General Hurteau limited the days he worked on ADSW to 160 and did his duty for Reserve retirement points after that. This reduced his income to less than it would have been if he had been ordered to active duty, but he made up the difference to support himself and his family by drawing on a modest bequest which he had received unexpectedly. Like other senior Reserve officers, he saw the mission as more important than his status.

### Consequences of CA Validation

The short-term consequences of the SOF validation process are that the theater received CA units manned entirely by physically fit, well trained soldiers with knowledge of their specialties and led by competent officers and NCOs. This paid off on the battlefield during and after the combat phase and played an important part in establishing the credibility of the Reservists when they were in the theater. The Army in the theater saw that these CA soldiers were lean, fit, and ready to go. There were no overweight, sloppy, unqualified soldiers with bad attitudes in the CA units. This contributed to their ability to provide CA support.

SOF validation was not popular with everyone. Some CA leaders preferred the FORSCOM approach and thought that USACAPOC's emphasis on physical fitness slighted qualification in the CA specialties. They believed that there was too much emphasis on SOF in what was really a conventional war and that it was hard to deal with the bureaucracy at USASOC and USACAPOC. There was also a lot of complaining by the CA unit members having to undergo the SOF Validation process--while they were doing it. As one unit wrote later: "It was just like boot camp."<sup>45</sup> The days were long, and there was some grumbling about the regimen. When the troops got to the theater, the grumbling turned to appreciation that the standards were met. USACAPOC Command Sergeant Major Steven M. Foust visited the troops in Saudi Arabia and found that once the units arrived in the theater, they were glad they had done it.<sup>46</sup> There was a lot of pain involved in disqualifying members of the units, but there was a lot of pride among those who qualified.

A more serious charge is that the arrival of CA units in theater was delayed by the longer SOF validation so that they got there only after their supported divisions had already moved to their combat locations. This late arrival made establishing good working relationships difficult. This is certainly the view of Colonel Jim Kerr at ARCENT and Colonel Larry Blount at CENTCOM. Both of these CA officers, having finally obtained approval for the deployment of the units, were concerned that the units would arrive too late to be effective. While some of

the delays in arrival appear to be the result of transportation priorities, the insistence on SOF validation caused the units to arrive two weeks later than would otherwise have been the case. Since the war went so well, this delay turned out not to be very serious.

In the long-term, the SOF validation process contributed to a major change in the nature of the CA forces. These Reservists showed that they could be--indeed, were--men and women meeting the standards of an elite military force. This achievement has tremendous significance for the future of USACAPOC. Doing the SOF Validation the way it was done and insisting on strict adherence to standards was a major step in the evolution of Reserve CA soldiers into full-fledged members of Special Operations Forces.

### Combat Support Operations

CINCCENT's war aims were threefold: Damage the Iraq war machine; restore the natural boundaries of Kuwait; and liberate Kuwait City. The third war aim brought with it the implied mission of providing for the people of Kuwait. This meant CA troops and skills, and it meant CA plans had to be prepared.<sup>47</sup>

The primary role of CA in Operation DESERT STORM was to support the combat elements of the US and Coalition Forces. CA units exist primarily for this purpose. The CA units help combat commanders to avoid problems due to local civilians, and they did this job well during their time in the desert. CA operations, however, were hampered by lack of overall direction and coherence. The doctrinal organization for combat support for CA calls for a theater-wide command which exercises some degree of influence over all functional activities within the theater. This was not achieved for CA during Operation DESERT STORM.

### Civil Affairs Organization for Combat Support

The organization of CA units for the combat support mission during the war reflected the realities of the situation as perceived at ARCENT. As Colonel Jim Kerr, the G5, developed Annex G to the ARCENT OPLAN, in early December 1990, he had to consider several factors. The war was due to start in about a month. There was no overall command and control headquarters available for the CA units, and Colonel Kerr thought there was little likelihood that the 352nd CA Command would be used in that role. Kerr felt he could not command the units from his staff position as ARCENT G5, and he thought that placing Lieutenant Colonel Ted Sahlin, CO of the 96th CA Battalion, in charge of two full colonels commanding the CA brigades would not work either. Yet, some way of organizing for combat had to be found.

Kerr's solution was to place the responsibility for CA command and control at the corps level. The corps would be given the resources, and execution would be decentralized at that level. Accordingly, the two CA brigades and their subordinate CA companies were attached to XVIII and VII Corps respectively. The brigades retained command of their CA companies and placed them in direct support of the divisions. The 304th CA Group was attached to the 22nd Support Command. The 403rd CA Company was attached to the Marine Expeditionary Force. The 96th CA Battalion took over the responsibility for CA support of other organizations outside the two corps. This was the ARCENT CA organization which was used during the war. Colonel Kerr signed Annex G to the ARCENT OPLAN early in January 1991.<sup>48</sup>

The decentralized approach taken by ARCENT was not the doctrinal solution, which would have retained some form of command at the ARCENT level, and there has been much criticism of it.<sup>49</sup> The critics point out that once the units were attached to the corps, ARCENT had no ability to provide a common theme for CA operations, provide guidance on how to handle dislocated civilians or refugees, arrange for transfer of responsibilities when combat organizations moved, or move CA assets around to match the changing workload. They say that ARCENT even had difficulty finding out what was going on with respect to CA functions and was not able to influence the action. Colonel Blount believes in retrospect that it was a mistake to make ARCENT the executive agent for CA because ARCENT was unable to function effectively in that role and neither CENTCOM nor ARCENT had control of CA resources.<sup>50</sup> This meant that there would be an imbalance between CA resources and the need for them.

Colonel Kerr believes that the doctrinal approach was not possible and that his solution was appropriate for the war plan, which called for rapid maneuver and decentralized execution. He points out that ARCENT retained considerable flexibility in matching missions to resources and had no difficulty reassigning a CA company from each corps when the Kuwait emergency restoration mission emerged. Colonel Kerr contends that it is not clear that another headquarters layer with command less OPCON would have improved the situation. The real problem in his view is that many combat commanders did not understand how to use their CA units, and control by ARCENT would not have helped correct that during a fast moving war.

There are indications, however, that the decision to decentralize command and control of CA assets did cause problems. In some of the divisions, the CA company was broken down into teams according to doctrine but with instructions that the CA company commander was not to check on the CA teams or communicate with them. This, of course, did lead to imbalances between workload and assets and deprived those divisions of the best possible CA support. The practical result of this method of decentralizing CA operations was great diversity in missions and methods. In some cases CA units were employed in their doctrinal roles; in other cases they did whatever came up in the course of the operation.

Each corps had a different mission and used their CA assets slightly differently. The maneuver of the two corps did avoid populated areas, and it was only after the combat phase

ended and US units halted in Southern Iraq that large numbers of displaced civilians and refugees were encountered. It was not until the Shiites were attacked by the Iraqi forces that really large numbers of civilians showed up in the area controlled by US forces.

### CA Support for XVIII Airborne Corps

The 360th CA Brigade, commanded by Colonel Miller J. Love, was attached to the XVIII Airborne Corps. This unit was the CAPSTONE unit for the corps and had worked with the corps headquarters extensively. This facilitated working out the CA support arrangements. The allocation of CA units to the corps is shown in Figure 7. These CA companies were all oriented to the SWA theater, with the exception of the 413th, which was Europe oriented. The 431st CA Company, originally planned to be in support of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, was diverted upon arrival in the theater to the Kuwait emergency recovery mission.

Figure 7.

### CA Unit Support for XVIII Airborne Corps

360th CA Brigade	Corps Headquarters
450th CA Company	82nd Airborne Division
489th CA Company	101st Airborne Division
422nd CA Company	24th Infantry Division
413th CA Company	1st Cavalry Division
407th CA Company	1st Corps Support Command

Civil Affairs operations in support of XVIII Airborne Corps were very successful. The Corps wanted a lot of CA help, and they were willing to provide vehicles, radios, and other equipment to their CA units. XVIII Airborne Corps units had extensive experience in classical CA involving displaced civilians and refugees. For the most part, the divisions were familiar with their supporting companies, and this contributed to the good working relationships which prevailed in the corps.

CA Support for VII Corps

The 354th CA Brigade, commanded by Colonel Robert H. Beahm, was attached to the VII Corps. The 354th was not originally intended for VII Corps. The 308th CA Group had sent a staff augmentation to VII Corps early in December, but the unit had low readiness ratings and was never called to active duty--the only anomaly in the process. Instead, the 354th was deployed in January 1991 from Fort Bragg to support the VII Corps. The allocation of CA units to the corps is shown in Figure 8. The 401st and 418th CA Companies were Europe oriented, but the 404th and 414th were oriented to the CENTCOM area and placed with VII Corps to beef up CA support to that organization. The 432nd CA Company, originally planned to be in support of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, was diverted upon arrival in the theater to the Kuwait emergency recovery mission.

Figure 8.

CA Unit Support for VII Corps

354th CA Brigade	Corps Headquarters
418th CA Company	1st Infantry Division
401st CA Company	1st Armored Division
404th CA Company	3rd Armored Division
414th CA Company	2nd Corps Support Command

Civil Affairs operations in support of VII Corps were only moderately successful. The VII Corps units did not provide their supporting CA units with vehicles, radios, or other equipment and supplies. In some cases, the CA units were allowed to take only 30-40% of their people along on the movement into Iraq. VII Corps did not have much experience in the classical CA operations. The emphasis in Europe was on using CA to manage host nation support and provide liaison with the German Territorial Army (CIMIC). The Corps G5 and Deputy G5 did not even deploy to the Persian Gulf with the Corps. Colonel Art Hotop, a SWA Foreign Area Officer in the J4 Security Assistance Division of USEUCOM, was named to be the G5 for DESERT STORM. Colonel Hotop had little experience in CA. Another factor was the rapidity of movement of the armored columns which made it hard for the CA units to keep up. The tendency of the armored units was to push through and pay no attention to the civilians in the area. This worked all right until the units were ordered to stop and had to consider the civilians then around them.

407th CA Company Operations

The 407th CA Company, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Michael W. Halvorson, was in support of the 1st Corps Support Command (COSCOM) of the XVIII Airborne Corps. Its operations were typical of the way in which CA helped the Army in the field. A four person advance party of the 407th arrived in Saudi Arabia on 20 December as part of the staff augmentation detachments. The main body of the company arrived on 8 February 1991, with a total strength of 120 personnel.

A corps support command is a logistical organization designed to support a corps of several divisions. It includes composite support groups and battalions with supply, maintenance, and transportation capabilities. It includes other organizations which provide a particular type of support, such as transportation or medical services. During DESERT STORM the 1st COSCOM had a strength of about 20,000 soldiers and was commanded by Colonel John G. Zierdt, Jr. The allocation of the CA teams for the COSCOM is shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9.  
CA Teams in Support of the 1st COSCOM

<u>CA Personnel</u>	<u>COSCOM Organization</u>
12	171st Composite Support Group
12	101st Composite Support Group
12	46th Composite Support Group
12	507th Area Support Group (Trans)
12	553rd Composite Support Battalion
11	44th Medical Brigade
2	5th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
16	COSCOM Headquarters
5	COSCOM Forward Headquarters
12	Reserve Team
14	Company Headquarters
120	Total

The tasks accomplished by the CA teams were many and varied. They usually operated in smaller teams of two to three persons. Some of their activities were as follows:

- Coordinated with local Saudi Officials, including the local emir, the Red Crescent, and the Civil Defense Office.
- Located potential sources of water: wells, plants, and lakes. Arranged for obtaining water from a local water plant producing 500,000 gallons per day. Persuaded a local farmer not to evict US Army units drawing water from his well. Coordinated with other farmers to permit US forces to use their wells.
- Assisted in the EPW mission by interviewing prisoners, exposing Iraqi soldiers posing as civilians, and processing prisoners for turnover to the MPs.
- Processed dislocated civilians. Gave food, water, and fuel to civilians to minimize their interference with US military operations. Warned them to avoid the main supply routes and not to interfere with convoys. Found 15 gallons of fuel for a civilian with a receipt for same after his fuel had been confiscated by US troops; threw in a case of MRE's for good measure.
- Arranged for local support. Purchased local food and other supplies for dislocated civilian holding areas. Engaged in trouble shooting problems with local host nation support agreements. Arranged for repair of leased trucks by local mechanics.
- Made area surveys. Studied the terrain and the local economy, people, culture, and resources. Advised commanders on how to accommodate to local culture. Advised on search procedures for Iraqi women. Advised on looking out for Iraqi antiquities.
- Surveyed local facilities for US use. Assessed damage to the facilities. Found hot mix asphalt plant (partially usable), housing areas (unusable), construction equipment (some usable). Looked for refrigerator truck to haul blood supplies, but was unable to find one.
- In one incident, persuaded 23 Iraqi soldiers to surrender.
- Inspected food and tested local water for quality.
- Assisted medical units to provide medical care for dislocated civilians and prisoners; provided interpreter services in some cases; helped maintain family integrity.

- Located abandoned US equipment and supplies.
- Located enemy supplies: ammunition; food; bottled water; tents; farm equipment. Found a large food storage warehouse with grain; inventoried contents; and distributed food to local Bedouins.

These are small tasks, but important ones. The presence of CA specialists to do these kinds of things meant that supported commanders could concentrate on fighting the enemy or accomplishing their support missions. The CA support was appreciated. Colonel Jerome V. Foust, Commander of the 44th Medical Brigade, showed his appreciation by awarding a Certificate of Achievement to the 407th CA Company "for exceptionally meritorious service in support of combat operations against a hostile force..."<sup>51</sup>

### 96th CA Battalion Operations

The 96th CA Battalion, commanded after the departure of Colonel Mike Peters by Lieutenant Colonel Carl T. (Ted) Sahlin, Jr., engaged in a wide variety of tasks to provide tactical CA support. Company A and Company D were split up into teams providing CA support to a wide variety of combat support and combat service support headquarters. Company C was in support of the 22nd Support Command assisting in host nation support arrangements. Company B was in support of the French 6th Light Armored Division.

Company B of the 96th CA Battalion got the job of supporting the French Army because it was oriented toward operations in Europe and had several French linguists. The French Army forces were employed on the extreme Western flank of the Coalition forces in a screening mission to prevent surprise across the desert expanse. In the course of their highly successful mission, the 6th Light Armored Division, with Company B, moved into the town of al Salman. There were only 12 people in the town when the French troops arrived; the Iraqis had fled leaving behind equipment and supplies. Company B established a population and resource control system. As the people started coming back into town, they were registered and given ID cards. This allowed positive control over the distribution of the limited supplies of water, food, and medicine available. By the time Company B left six weeks later, the population being assisted had grown to 2,500 people. Company B, 96th CA Battalion had conducted a classic Civil Affairs operation.

### 304th CA Group Operations

The main body of the 304th CA Group, commanded by Colonel Robert J. Mitkus, arrived in Saudi Arabia 129 strong on 20 and 21 January 1991.<sup>52</sup> It was met by its advance party and joined later by a detachment left behind at Fort Bragg to supervise the movement of

some of the unit's equipment. The Group immediately assumed its wartime mission of providing CA support to the 22nd Support Command (SUPCOM), responsible for providing logistical support for the Army in the theater. The 304th accomplished many varied tasks. They provided staff support to Headquarters, 22nd SUPCOM and its subordinate commands. Liaison teams were provided to the three area support groups (ASGs) of the SUPCOM because two CA companies earmarked for ASG support had been diverted to provide tactical CA support to combat divisions. Liaison was effected with the Kuwait Task Force, the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force, and the American Consulate in Dhahran. The Group assumed from the 96th CA Battalion responsibility for evacuating over 1,000 US civilians. Training on Middle East Culture was provided for replacements, and cultural issues pertaining to burial and provision of religious materials to prisoners were resolved. After the liberation of Kuwait, the 304th provided support to the restoration effort there, including procedures for movement of vehicles into Kuwait and for providing equipment and services to the forces there.

The primary mission of the 304th was in host nation support (HNS). The Assistant Chief of Staff, Host Nation Activities (ACSHNA) of the 22nd SUPCOM was in overall charge of this important activity. About half of the 304th was assigned to support the ACSHNA. The 304th established day-to-day working relationships with Saudi officials at the Ministry of Defense and Aviation. The work consisted of working out arrangements for facilities, vendors, and government-to-government relations. Arrangements were made for laundry, shower, and mail facilities, ramp space for C-23 aircraft and Apache helicopters, warehouses for medical supplies and enemy weapons, maintenance space for the French Air Force, and many other uses. Lists of vendors for local purchase were made and compared to requirements. Inter-governmental issues, such as off-limits areas, facilities, and services at Khobar Towers, a large billeting facility for US troops, were worked out. In addition, the 304th prepared HNS plans and reports for the 22nd SUPCOM.

After the victory, the US forces began the task of redeploying back to CONUS and Europe. HNS would become even more important to support the movement of the units out of Saudi Arabia. ACSHNA and the 304th CA Group worked hard during March and April 1991 to facilitate the redeployment. New requirements for storage sites for captured Iraqi equipment, for recreational facilities, for disposal sites, for cleaning US equipment, and staging areas for the ports, were met. Issues on maintenance of US constructed roads and Saudi donated facilities were resolved. Support for the restoration of Kuwait continued. Finally, on 10 May 1991, the 304th CA Unit redeployed to CONUS, leaving behind a volunteer stay-behind detachment of 16 personnel.

The operations of the 304th CA Group were marked by the great diversity of the tasks it accomplished--not all of which were envisioned by CA doctrine. As the 304th Commander, Colonel Bob Mitkus put it, "the ability of the unit to successfully perform these missions, is indicative of the value of Civil Affairs assets."<sup>53</sup>

### CENTCOM Operations

CENTCOM Headquarters also played a role in providing CA support for the combat operations. The CA planners at CENTCOM had given a lot of thought to the potential problems of civilians in the combat zone. They worked closely with the Saudi Government to arrange for evacuation of Saudi civilians from the areas near Kuwait and through which the combat forces would move. There was a Saudi school vacation scheduled for the period 21-28 January, and the custom was for families to take vacation trips during the school holidays. In this instance everyone was told to take a trip. So the evacuation of Saudi civilians was accomplished quietly and without tipping off the imminence of land combat operations. When the Iraqis attacked the Saudi town of Khafji on 23 January, the people were gone. There were no Saudi civilian casualties during the entire war.<sup>54</sup>

The CENTCOM CA staff also briefed the American community--workers and dependents--on what to expect and what to do.

CENTCOM had foreseen that the major job would be dealing with large numbers of dislocated civilians and had arranged for some modest quantities of food, water, and medicine to be purchased and prestocked for both EPWs and dislocated civilians. CENTCOM, however, did not want to get into the business of operating permanent refugee camps and put out guidance to ARCENT to avoid setting up refugee camps unless it was necessary and then only with the CINC's permission. This guidance was taken literally by the subordinate commands as a prohibition of any camps. Most of the dislocated civilians were transients attracted by distribution of supplies, and they returned to their homes as soon as they were able. After the massive attacks by the Iraqis on their own people, however, there was more of a tendency to stay in the US controlled areas. In March 1991, after a visit to the area by the CENTCOM J5, it became apparent that there was a need for a camp in the Safwan area, and CENTCOM ordered ARCENT to move food and water to the area and assist the refugees. ARCENT welcomed getting a green light to do what the people on the ground knew had to be done.<sup>55</sup>

CENTCOM worked with the International Red Cross and other international relief organizations on the refugee and prisoner problems. The Saudis had their own Red Crescent organization and were not clear about the role of the Red Cross in prisoner of war matters, so CENTCOM worked with the US Embassy and the United Nations to clarify the relationship between the Red Cross and the Red Crescent. As it turned out, the Red Cross played a major role in expediting the repatriation of the 85,000 Iraqi prisoners taken during the war. The Red Cross coordinated all arrangements for transportation and medical evacuation. They also helped to coordinate the return of US, British, and other Coalition prisoners from Iraq.<sup>56</sup>

### Assessment of Combat Support

Civil Affairs combat support operations concentrated on dislocated civilians and enemy prisoners of war with significant attention also by the 96th CA Battalion and later the 304th CA Group to managing host nation support. CA units helped the Military Police units cope with the unexpectedly large numbers of prisoners which had to be handled. The skills of the CA teams designed to control hostile civilians proved useful in dealing with prisoners, few of whom were hostile. CA units also assisted in providing human intelligence through interrogation of prisoners and dislocated civilians. Good sources and intelligence were passed to the Military Intelligence units after initial processing.

There were some basic lessons learned in Operation DESERT STORM for CA operations. The most important is that there needs to be a better understanding by Army officers of the kinds of things that CA units can do to help overall mission accomplishment. In many cases the unit commanders simply did not know what to do with their CA support. Another lesson is that CA units should deploy at the same time as their supported units. The CA units arrived in Saudi Arabia just a few days before the start of the land campaign. They could have done a much better job if they had been with their supported units for several months. The bulk of the CA work occurs before the battle and after it--that is when the military must consider the local civilians. The CA work after the combat ended was hampered by the large number of unexploded munitions which precluded using many local facilities and supplies. It would be helpful to coordinate clearing operations with CA operations. Finally, the distribution of CA assets was uneven. In some cases, there were too many CA troops; in other cases too few.<sup>57</sup> Better planning would have made it possible to allocate CA assets on the basis of expected CA workload (e.g., local population) instead of simply placing a team with every unit.

Despite the difficulties imposed by the decentralized command and control structure, the civil affairs mission was accomplished overall. Large numbers of civilians and prisoners were processed. Civilians did not impede the combat operations. In fact, working in conjunction with PSYOP units, the CA units contributed to the weakening of Iraqi ability and will to resist. Despite a slow build-up, the overall conclusion is that CA demonstrated that it is a combat multiplier in a conventional regional war and an essential resource for dealing with the aftermath of victory.

Some CA specialists point out, however, that the ability of the CA units to deal successfully with the dislocated civilian workload was facilitated greatly by the overwhelming victory of the combat forces in a short period of time. This quick win freed up resources which could be used to help deal with civilians and prisoners. If the fighting had continued for a long period of time, performing the CA mission would not have been so easy, and the doctrinal and organizational flaws which did not have time to become a problem in 100 hours, might have caused some difficulty.

## The Kuwait Task Force

One of the most interesting and unique Army Reserve Civil Affairs operations connected with Operation DESERT STORM was the Kuwait Task Force (KTF) initiated, staffed, and operated primarily by members of the 352nd CA Command and the 354th CA Brigade, Riverdale, MD. Although the origins and operations of the KTF are somewhat complex, the results were outstanding.<sup>58</sup>

### How the KTF Got Started

The Kuwaitis themselves initiated the program. Based on the President's early determination to liberate Kuwait and the systematic destruction of Kuwait by Iraqi forces, the Government of Kuwait (GOK) wanted to start planning for reconstruction of their nation. The Emir of Kuwait and many GOK officials had escaped from Kuwait just before the invading Iraqi troops. Kuwait had large deposits of funds in foreign banks and numerous profitable investments, so there was money to fund the effort. The Government of Kuwait had two aims: first, support efforts to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait; second, prepare to restore Kuwait to its pre-war condition as soon as possible after goal one was achieved. Led by the highly effective Ambassador to the United States, Saud Nasir al-Sabah, an effort was started to get the US Government involved in the restoration and reconstruction effort. A team of 20 Kuwaiti officials was sent in September 1990 to Washington, DC, to set up a Reconstruction Planning office. During the last week of September, the Kuwaitis found out about the existence in the US Army of a Civil Affairs capability which might be helpful to them in planning the reconstruction program.

The connection between the Kuwaiti need and the Army's CA capability was the result of the initiative of an Army Reserve colonel whose two careers converged in this instance. Mister Randall Elliott was the Chief of the Middle East Division of the Department of State in Washington, DC. Colonel Randall Elliott, USAR, was at the same time the deputy chief of staff for operations of the 352nd CA Command, also specializing in the Middle East. Mister Elliott saw the need to provide planning assistance to the GOK group in Washington, and Colonel Elliott knew where to get it.

In late July it became clear to Elliott that war would occur. As events unfolded after the Iraqi invasion, he started to think about the value of bringing civil affairs skills to bear on the problem of assisting Kuwait. Elliott made several trips down the hall in the Department of State and mentioned to several people that a Civil Affairs capability was available. It was an educational process; the State Department people were surprised to learn that resources of this nature were available. Elliott gave several informal briefings on the subject. He also discussed the possibilities with Edward (Skip) Gnehm, newly nominated to be US Ambassador to Kuwait,

who was in Washington waiting confirmation and the opportunity to go to Kuwait.<sup>59</sup>

Ambassador Gnehm was not the type to be bound by bureaucratic constraints and recognized instantly the value of providing planning support for the Kuwaitis. Having served in OSD as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Gnehm appreciated that a Civil Affairs unit would be ideal for the job. His Pentagon experience also, however, gave Ambassador Gnehm an appreciation that obtaining the services of the 352nd CA Command might not be easy. Testing to see if the idea would be acceptable, Gnehm told the Kuwaitis about the possibility of planning advice, and they requested a briefing on the matter. The Department of State passed the request to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and on 3 October 1990, Henry S. Rowen, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs requested the Director of the Joint Staff to arrange a briefing on 4 October for officials of the Government of Kuwait.<sup>60</sup>

The briefing on 4 October 1991 was prepared and delivered by Lieutenant Colonel Dennis C. Barlow, J33 Joint Staff. Barlow had been alerted on the possibility of such a presentation as early as 29 September. He asked the Army if they would like to present the briefing since the Army acts as executive agency for Civil Affairs for the Joint Staff. The Army demurred. The principals at the briefing for the United States were Ambassador Gnehm and Lieutenant General Thomas W. Kelly, the J3 of the Joint Staff. There were large numbers of other US officials and action officers at the briefing, including representatives of the Department of the Army.

The Kuwaitis liked what they heard. On 9 October 1990, the Kuwaiti Ambassador sent a letter to President Bush formally requesting assistance "in putting together an emergency and recovery program." The GOK had "an immediate and pressing need for certain specialties and expertise resident...in the United States Department of Defense."<sup>61</sup> In response, Secretary of State James A. Baker III replied on 15 December 1990 approving the Kuwaiti request for assistance.<sup>62</sup> Although the formal reply was delayed, in the meantime, the wheels had been turning to convert the concept of planning advice into reality.

#### Staffing the Kuwaiti Request for Assistance

The Director, Joint Staff sent a memorandum back to OASD(ISA) saying that the Joint Staff agreed with the idea of providing planning advice to the Government of Kuwait. An informal group of action officers formed to consider how to respond to the Kuwaiti need for reconstruction planning assistance. This group included representatives from OASD(ISA), OASD(SO/LIC), J3 Joint Staff, J5 Joint Staff, and DA, and met in brainstorming sessions three times during the week following the 4 October briefing.

The matter was also being considered at the highest levels of the US Government. On

15 October 1990, the Deputies Committee, an NSC sponsored group consisting of the Deputy Secretaries of selected Cabinet Departments, met to consider the GOK request. The result was a recommendation to provide the support to the Kuwaitis and establish a steering group committee to see that it would be provided.

On 17 October 1990, a meeting of all interested agencies was convened to consider how to provide planning advice to the Government of Kuwait for reconstruction of their country after it was liberated. Representatives of DOS; OASD(ISA); OASD(SO/LIC); J3; J5; and DA considered such items as the relationship between DOD and DOS, who should take the lead within DOD, what agreements should be made with GOK, and similar concrete matters. The emphasis had become how to do it.

Another briefing was presented for the Kuwaitis on 1 November 1990 in response to a Kuwaiti request for more information on DOD's capability to help. This time the cast was larger. There were 13 Kuwaiti officials as well as both ambassadors. The Kuwaitis said they were eager to obtain advice from DOD. They wanted help. They were interested in how soon they could get advice on how to plan for the restoration and reconstruction of their country. The message was clear. The Kuwaitis wanted action in response to their request.

That same day, 1 November 1990, the Steering Group Committee consisting of Ambassador Designate Gnehm, A. H. Hughes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Rear Admiral Fitzgerald, J33, Rear Admiral M. W. Ruck, Deputy Director of Politico-Military Affairs, and Brigadier General Charles E. Wilhelm, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Mission and Applications (OASD(SO/LIC)), was established by the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council. The Committee met for the first time on 2 November 1990 to review the Terms of Reference for United States Civil Affairs Assistance to the State of Kuwait drafted by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). The recommended terms of reference were sent forward for final approval.

On 5 November 1990, Henry S. Rowen, ASD(ISA) approved the Terms of Reference and established working-level committees to oversee the execution of the project.<sup>63</sup> The ISA memorandum also expressed the need for a sense of urgency about the work to be done. The Terms of Reference establish the objective as follows:<sup>64</sup>

"To assist the legitimate Government of Kuwait in planning and implementing a civil affairs program to restore as quickly as possible the functions and services of their government upon the withdrawal of Iraqi armed forces from Kuwaiti territory."

The Terms of Reference also provided for the establishment of a US-Kuwait Civil Affairs Group, a US Steering Group Committee with representatives from DOS, OSD, and JCS to

oversee planning efforts, and working groups for each of the civil affairs functional areas. It also specified that all contracts with civilian firms would be executed by the Government of Kuwait and that the US Government may ask to be reimbursed for the costs of the services provided.

There was some opposition within DOD to providing advice to the GOK. The Department of the Army did not want to get involved in a long-term non-military project which would divert resources from military operations and thought that the reconstruction of Kuwait was a job for the Department of State. The Army regarded the initial briefing of the Kuwaiti officials as a "done deal" and resented the lack of opportunity to weigh the pros and cons of providing the assistance before the Kuwaitis were briefed. Although DA representatives attended all of the meetings, they maintained a low profile. The Army indicated that it preferred to accomplish the mission with active component logisticians instead of Reserve Civil Affairs soldiers. The Army's "go slow" attitude was a factor in the Steering Group Committee's decision not to designate the Army as executive agent. The Army did not want the lead, and the belief in OSD and the Joint Staff was that results would be slow in coming if it were left up to the Army.<sup>65</sup>

That position was reinforced by a view stated within the Joint Staff that the Army was not the proper organization to lead this project and that it was primarily a civilian function to be headed up by the Department of State. Because of the earlier experience when the DOD was not joined by other Government agencies to help out in Panama, the Director of the Joint Staff wanted to make certain that this time the Department of State and other US Government agencies would participate.

Because of the general reluctance to undertake the mission, there was little progress between 4 November 1990 when the Terms of Reference were issued, and 19 November when the issue was resolved by OSD putting the pressure on to get things moving. Three assistant secretaries--ISA, SO/LIC, and Reserve Affairs--made concerted efforts to get the job done in accordance with the Terms of Reference using Army Civil Affairs assets. These high level officials prevailed. On the evening of 21 November, the Director of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General M. P. C. Carns, USAF, reluctantly gave the go ahead on forming the Kuwait Task Force with Civil Affairs soldiers. Accordingly, on 22 November 1990 the Chairman sent a message to Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) and CINCSOC requesting CSA to activate elements of the 352nd Civil Affairs Command to form the Kuwait Task Force.<sup>66</sup>

President Bush approved the concept of providing assistance to the Kuwaitis on reconstruction planning in January 1991.<sup>67</sup> By this time, the KTF had been hard at work for weeks.

### Forming the Kuwait Task Force

Almost from the very start of the project, the 352nd CA Command had been earmarked for the Kuwait mission. The 352nd was earmarked for operations in the CENTCOM area and had been working with Third US Army (ARCENT) for several years. At an early meeting the Army Staff representative had in fact suggested that the 352nd was the most appropriate unit, and this was supported by Sam Routson, the representative from OASD(SO/LIC). Another plus was that because the unit home station was close to Washington, DC, the members would be able to start work immediately without having to relocate.

The Commander and members of the 352nd CA Command knew that something was coming up.<sup>68</sup> Since 2 August the headquarters had been planning and preparing to accomplish its CAPSTONE role in support of Third US Army--ARCENT. The 352nd placed 15 people on voluntary active duty at Fort Bragg to look at CA doctrine, needs, and possible problems. General Mooney was getting ready for a possible deployment. Special training programs were put into effect, and lists of people who could or could not deploy were prepared. General Mooney and his staff developed a concept of operations and briefed this to General Hurteau in late October 1990. Around 1 November 1990, the 352nd was notified by its higher headquarters, USACAPOC, that it and some of its subordinate units might be called up. General Mooney had been keeping close contact with General Hurteau at USACAPOC.

In his job as deputy chief of staff for operations of the 352nd CA Command, Colonel Randall Elliott had been busy preparing for the mission he had envisioned. He used the "CA Skills Data Base" at the 352nd to identify key people with useful civilian experience and came up with the names of 50 officers and 7 enlisted personnel. Because he was spending more and more time on his CA duties, Colonel Elliott, with the blessings of his superiors in the State Department, went on voluntary active duty in mid-November 1990 to work at the 352nd on the project.<sup>69</sup>

There were a series of on-again-off-again orders--perhaps reflecting the ambivalence of DA and the Joint Staff about the mission. On 15 November 1990, the 352nd received a call from USACAPOC saying that portions of the unit would be activated in the near future. On 17 November the Chief of Staff of USASOC called and said the unit was alerted for activation. On 18 November, USACAPOC called saying the activation was canceled. On 19 November, General Mooney and his staff gave a briefing to Lieutenant General Spigelmire, Commander of USASOC, and General Hurteau on the concept of CA operations for the theater. On 20 November, USASOC called General Mooney at his home at 0400 and informed him that a portion of the unit was activated and that details would follow.<sup>70</sup> Later that day, however, the mission was canceled and the personnel were notified to stand down. On 21 November, General Hurteau called and said that 50-60 personnel of the 352nd would be called up effective 1 December 1990 and that General Mooney would be in command of the activated unit. General Mooney notified his people and started the mobilization process. General Mooney and 12 key

personnel came on voluntary ADSW on 25 November to start the process. In Mooney's judgment there were too few full-time personnel in the unit qualified and willing to do the job in the time available.

Much was accomplished between 25 November and 1 December, when the call up was to take effect. Because the Terms of Reference were very broad, General Mooney wanted to get a better handle on his mission. General Mooney and his officers talked to Mr. Fred Smith, OASD(ISA); Ambassador Gnehm; Major General Glynn C. Mallory, Jr., ODCSOPS, DA; Major General James W. Ray and other officers of the Army Corps of Engineers; Brigadier General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, OASD(SO/LIC); Rear Admiral James Fitzgerald, J33, and many others, including the Kuwaiti officials. On 28 November 1990, an important meeting of the Working Group Committee chaired by Fred Smith was held at which General Mooney introduced the members of his unit and briefed the committee on their capabilities. At this meeting, DOD established guidelines for the activities of what was to be the Kuwait Task Force.

Finally, on 1 December 1990, 57 Army Reservists--38 from the 352nd CA Command and 18 from the 354th CA Brigade--mustered at the Army Reserve Center in Riverdale, MD, to be activated. They drove to Fort Meade, MD, that same day and were processed administratively. The next day they got organized back at the Reserve Center. On 3 December they went to the Pentagon for a briefing by Fred Smith in the morning and met with their Kuwaiti counterparts at the Kuwait offices in downtown Washington, DC, in the afternoon. After that brief transition, they worked a full day every day except Christmas and New Year's until they deployed to the theater on 26 January 1991.

The KTF foraged to get the facilities and equipment they needed to get the job done. Initially the personnel of KTF thought they might work in offices furnished by the Kuwaitis, but DA and General Mooney thought that this could pose a security problem. Accordingly, the KTF moved to a location near the Kuwaiti Embassy in available leased office space that had been declared unfit for Government habitation. The KTF acquired excess furniture from GSA and office equipment from DA. Eventually, the KTF was outfitted so that the work could proceed. The bill for the heating and lighting for the offices finally ended up at USACAPOC Headquarters to be paid by General Hurteau out of his operating funds.

The members of the KTF believe that the Department of the Army--specifically the Operations Directorate of the Office of the Deputy Chief for Operations--did not support the KTF very well. The KTF had to obtain their own space and furniture, but were criticized by the Army for being too demanding. The opening argument about office space and furniture set the tone for the relationship between DA and KTF. Some DA officials thought the KTF officers had a superior and arrogant attitude, "were forgetting that they wore green suits," and were getting big heads from consorting with ministers and high level officials. There was anger in DA over the alleged refusal of Colonel Elliott, the KTF Commander, to make himself available to be "on call" to brief the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Actually, Colonel Elliott did brief

the Vice Chief of Staff at the proper time in the proper uniform after waiting at the Pentagon six hours before going back to the KTF offices to perform work while waiting "on-call." KTF members point out that DA representatives never visited the KTF while it was located in the Washington, DC, area and were conspicuously non-supportive.<sup>71</sup>

### General Mooney's Call Up

General Howard T. Mooney took command of the 352nd CA Command in May 1989. He had served as a logistician and a transportation terminal unit commander, but he was quick on the up-take and learned the CA business rapidly. More important, he brought to the 352nd CA Command solid leadership and management ability which would be needed during Operation DESERT STORM.

When the 352nd elements were activated on 1 December 1990, General Mooney was on the list and was activated. His initial activation lasted two days. On 3 December 1990, General Mooney started the day hard at work on the KTF. At the end of the day he was no longer in charge of the KTF. In the morning, General Mooney attended a meeting of the Steering Group Committee and introduced his people and their qualifications. He was scheduled for a legal briefing in the afternoon, but in the interim he was called by General Hurteau and informed that he could not be activated because "DA won't buy it." General Mooney had to inform the group that he was no longer on active duty and left. He was also ordered not to attend any more KTF meetings, even informally.<sup>72</sup> General Mooney had nothing more to do with the KTF until he arrived in Saudi Arabia weeks later. This episode was personally very embarrassing for him.

The decision to reverse the call up of General Mooney is attributed to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan. All requests for Reserve general officers were to be referred to the Chief of Staff for decision. Apparently, the Army was angered that General Mooney was called up without having first obtained CSA approval.

This decision left the leadership of the KTF to Colonel Randall Elliott, Mooney's deputy chief of staff for operations. While Elliott was not the senior colonel in the 352nd, Mooney thought he was the officer best qualified for this job because of his experience. The loss of General Mooney "demoralized the KTF" initially according to one observer.<sup>73</sup> Colonel Elliott said they needed Mooney. While Colonel Elliott proved to be an outstanding leader who got the job done, it is likely that the work of the KTF would have progressed better with the official commander than without.

General Mooney continued to function as commander of the balance of the 352nd CA Command and served on various active duty statuses at the unit home station. He was on Annual Training from 1 - 17 December; 30 days ADSW from 18 December to 16 January 1991; then another 10 days ADSW from 11 January until he finally was ordered to active duty on 25

January 1991 with the rest of the 352nd CA Command. Even at this time, however, special pressure had to be brought to bear by the Joint Staff and OSD--including a call from Henry Rowen to Michael Stone, the Secretary of the Army--to get General Mooney on active duty.

### Planning the Reconstruction of Kuwait

The KTF married up with their Kuwaiti counterparts, who were ministerial level officials of GOK. The initial planning emphasis by the Kuwaitis was on public safety, public health, public works and utilities, transportation, public administration, public communication, and public welfare. To deal with the 20 functional specialties of civil affairs,<sup>74</sup> the KTF was organized into the following five teams: Public Security and Safety; Human Services; Infrastructure; Public Services; and Commercial Matters.

The Steering Group Committee and the Working Group Committee met frequently to monitor progress and provide guidance to the KTF. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs and Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict maintained close interest in the work. The J3 and J5 directorates of the Joint Staff also monitored the activity continuously.

Considerable effort was made by the Joint Staff, DA, and USSOCOM during this period to keep CENTCOM in the loop. Messages were sent in late November and early December 1990 informing CENTCOM of the activation and concept of the KTF and the approach being taken to the restoration of Kuwait. CENTCOM was sent daily reports on the progress of the planning effort and had its own member of the Steering Group Committee, Colonel Randy Carlton. CENTCOM was invited to send a liaison officer to work with the KTF but declined.<sup>75</sup> Thus, CENTCOM was fully aware of the KTF and the work it was doing.

The work was divided into four phases. For the first two weeks, from 1 to 15 December, the KTF became familiar with the mission and prepared the initial draft of the work plan. The next two weeks from 15 - 30 December was spent in performing initial estimates of what had to be done. During the next 30 days the plan was refined for implementation. By 15 January 1991, the KTF had completed a preliminary Annex G, Civilian Action Plan. The contents of this plan were sent to CINCCENT for information. The CA Planning Team at the CENTCOM J5 Section was very interested in the KTF work and wanted even faster planning and preparation.<sup>76</sup>

One of the major jobs performed by KTF was to assist in the process of contracting for work to be done in Kuwait for the reconstruction. As part of the overall effort the US Government arranged for the release of \$500 million in frozen GOK funds to be used to fund the initial reconstruction effort. The GOK awarded 271 contracts worth \$558 million for goods and services. Most of the contracting was done after the KTF arrived in Saudi Arabia. Seventy

percent of the contracts were with US firms. Two hundred twenty-five of them were for short-term consumer items--food, water, medical supplies, and other essential supplies to be prepositioned in Saudi Arabia for movement to Kuwait immediately after the liberation. The role of the members of the KTF was to assist in the definition of requirements, review the contract proposals, and advise the GOK on the merits of these proposals. GOK officials made the actual contracting decisions and awarded the contracts. All CA personnel had been informed of the necessity to avoid conflicts of interest in contractual matters. According to one high official, the CA personnel were trusted by the Kuwaitis to give objective advice. This was important because the Kuwaitis did not trust many of the other Americans beating at their doors for lucrative contracts. The GOK was most appreciative of the honest and objective work done by KTF in this matter.

In mid-January CINCCENT, at the instigation of the CENTCOM J5, requested that the KTF be deployed to Saudi Arabia to continue work there. Of the original 57 members, 48 deployed to Saudi Arabia on 26 January 1991. Four members of the KTF stayed behind in Washington, DC, to work with the Kuwaitis there. Three more members of the KTF deployed on 14 February 1991.

When the KTF arrived in Saudi Arabia, the focus shifted from long-term reconstitution to short-term recovery. The GOK and KTF concentrated on seven key areas: food; water; medicine; transportation; telecommunications; sanitation; and power. The planning estimate was there would be 600,000 people in Kuwait to assist. This number included 200,000 Kuwaitis and 400,000 people of other nationalities. The KTF had a hard time persuading the GOK to provide supplies for the non-Kuwaitis, but they finally agreed. Food, water, and medicine were organized into "push packages" and several small convoys were set up using the 2,200 vehicles purchased for this purpose. Because the US forces had taken up all of the local supply, water was brought from Turkey and trucked in by 150 water tankers. Two hundred fifty electrical generators from 10 kva to 3,000 kva were purchased from Caterpillar and prepared for movement to GOK buildings, all of which were constructed to use portable generators.<sup>77</sup>

The KTF concept was that it was necessary to accomplish the recovery before it would be possible to address reconstruction. The KTF thought it would turnover the immediate work to the Corps of Engineers and then remain to focus on the long-range planning. The KTF convinced GOK to hire the Corps of Engineers to manage construction projects in Kuwait and worked well with Colonel Ralph Lucurcio, the Engineer on the ground. Although the GOK wanted the KTF to stay until December 1991, the US Government did not agree, and the KTF ended its mission in May 1991.

### Results of the KTF

The emergency restoration of Kuwait was a success. Not one Kuwaiti died from thirst,

starvation, or lack of medical care after the liberation. After one month, 50% of the telecommunications and transportation systems were restored. One-third of the electrical power was restored--providing austere but adequate service.

This was no small feat. Extensive damage was done in Kuwait by the Iraqis. For the first six weeks of the occupation, the plundering was deliberate and conducted by organized groups of Iraqis. Thereafter, the damage was mostly from random vandalism by individual soldiers and gangs. There was wanton destruction everywhere. Even buildings which appeared sound from the outside, were completely destroyed inside. The Iraqis ripped out plumbing, electrical outlets, appliances, everything of value and some things not of value. When asked why the Iraqis would destroy what they were advertising as their own 19th Province, some Kuwaitis would speculate that the Iraqis were so jealous of the wealth of Kuwait that they wanted to reduce it to the level of poverty that prevailed in the rest of Iraq.<sup>78</sup>

The advice provided by the KTF also was successful. An evaluation of the contents of the plan is beyond the scope of this study, but the customers liked the product. Assistant Secretary Jim Locher thought that the 352nd did a good job on the KTF.<sup>79</sup> Fred Smith says that "this was one of the best things we did."<sup>80</sup> There was widespread praise for the ability of the KTF to coordinate their actions with many agencies within DOD and elsewhere in the US Government. Although the authority of the KTF was broad and general and they worked in an advisory capacity only, they were able to get many things done by logic and persuasion. They worked hard and prepared a plan which served as the basic framework for reconstruction activities. The reconstruction of Kuwait went far better because of the KTF than it would have if there had been no advanced planning and preparation.

The citizen-soldiers of the KTF brought to their work years of experience in their civilian occupations plus years of training and professional development in civil affairs. This combination was highly effective. Fred Smith, OSD representative to the Steering Committee, attributes the success of the KTF to the fact that it had the right people for the various CA functional areas. A listing of the KTF specialties and civilian occupations of 56 members of the task force is appended. Examination of this roster shows that there was an excellent match between the requirements of the job and the experience of the members. For example, Major Joseph G. Mack, a Deputy Fire Chief from Philadelphia, worked on restoring fire fighting capability in Kuwait. Major Andrew Natsios, the head of the State Department Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, worked for 90 days with the KTF and later was instrumental in obtaining \$5 million from the Department of State for refugee care in Southern Iraq.

The members of the KTF brought dedication as well as expertise to the job. For example, Colonel Ronald M. Smith, Chief of the Public Security and Safety Division insisted on strict adherence to due process and maintenance of law and order. Well before the liberation, Colonel Smith was advising the GOK not to exact retribution on the Iraqis and suspected collaborators, but to act in a legal manner to obtain justice. US human rights laws were

included in all agreements with GOK. While in Kuwait as advisor to the police, he continued to advocate that stance. Some observers thought that Colonel Smith became too involved, citing as evidence the time he personally rescued a Palestinian being mistreated by some members of the Kuwait Resistance. (There were several other instances in which US personnel intervened to prevent miscarriages of justice.) However, the dedication paid off, and the results were good. Colonel Smith got through the critical second and third weeks of the liberation without serious incident. There was no blood bath, and most agree that excesses that did occur when Kuwaitis sought revenge for wrongs done them during the war were much less than might otherwise have occurred if Colonel Smith had not been involved.

The Task Force Leader, Colonel Randy Elliott gets high praise from those who worked with him. He has been called the "Real Hero" of the operation. He worked assiduously at coordinating the various efforts of other Government agencies and kept everyone informed. Since the work of the KTF depended on voluntary contributions (it had no authority to command assistance), Colonel Elliott's success in obtaining assistance made him the key man of the operation.

One way to assess the value of the work is to consider what would have been the case if there had been no KTF. Even with the advantage of a complete plan and numerous contracts in place, the program to restore Kuwait has run into problems and delays. If there had been no plan and no preparations, the job would simply have been too much, and there would have been monumental confusion and chaos instead of a few problems and some delays. Seizing the moment to do some proper prior planning did in this case prevent poor performance.

The value of the contribution by the 352nd CA Command was recognized by the Secretary of the Army, Michael P. W. Stone, when he wrote: "It is not an exaggeration to say that bringing Kuwait back to life in the early days following the Iraqi departure would not have been possible without the 352nd."<sup>81</sup> Close examination of the record validates the Secretary of the Army's opinion. KTF was a success!

### Task Force Freedom

Long before the fighting stopped on 27 February 1991, it became apparent that the US Armed Forces and other Coalition forces would have a lot of work to do to help the people in Kuwait survive after the liberation. The death and destruction brought upon the Kuwaitis by the Iraqi Army went beyond anything expected. There would be an urgent need for essential supplies and services to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Kuwait. This meant that the emphasis would shift for the time being from long-term reconstruction to short-term

emergency restoration. ARCENT created Task Force Freedom to administer the humanitarian aid and emergency relief for Kuwait. This was an outgrowth in many respects of the work of the KTF and the awareness at CENTCOM and ARCENT headquarters that the Kuwait mission ultimately would have to be done by the US forces.<sup>82</sup>

### The KTF and General Mooney Arrive in Theater

After the KTF arrived in Saudi Arabia, it was reunited with its Kuwaiti counterparts in Dammam. Initially, there were some problems. Observers at OSD thought that CENTCOM and ARCENT did not understand what the KTF had been doing and did not want to get involved. The KTF was considered a bunch of Reservists who were trying to get into the act, an extension of OSD, and "prima donnas" who were not "military guys." CENTCOM and ARCENT wanted to break up the KTF and use the individuals to augment their own staffs. The situation was resolved by Ambassador Gnehm, at that time waiting in Saudi Arabia for the opportunity to take up his post in Kuwait City. Ambassador Gnehm had private talks with General Schwarzkopf, and the result was that an advanced party of 12 members of the KTF were kept together and continued work on the planning. Then the entire KTF was consolidated, and Ambassador Gnehm took the KTF (as part of Task Force Freedom) with him to implement their plan when he entered Kuwait City on 1 March 1991.

General Mooney and his Command Sergeant Major William Freeman finally deployed on 31 January 1991 after processing through Fort Meade, MD, and arrived in Saudi Arabia late on 1 February 1991. He stayed in Dammam for two days coordinating with the KTF. On 4 February he went to Riyadh and took an office at ARCENT Headquarters.

In anticipation of General Mooney's arrival, Lieutenant General John Yeosock, the ARCENT Commander, had requested a staff action be run to determine the best way to use him. Since most of the CA units had already been attached to the Corps, only the CA units in support of the 22nd SUPCOM and other non-corps elements directly under ARCENT could be under his command. Colonel Kerr recommended that General Mooney become the ARCENT G5 and assume command of all CA units not attached to the corps. However, Major General Stephen Arnold, the ARCENT G3, non-concurred. His position was that it was not the time to make this kind of change--the war was only a few days off, and that Mooney should be focused on the Kuwait mission. General Yeosock agreed with General Arnold.<sup>83</sup>

It fell to Colonel Jim Kerr, the ARCENT G5, to inform General Mooney that he (Mooney) would not become the ARCENT G5 and that all CA units had been allocated out to the corps so there was no way to control them directly from ARCENT. Colonel Kerr wanted to inform General Mooney of the previous decision before Mooney talked to General Yeosock.

General Mooney got the feeling that ARCENT did not know what to do with a Civil Affairs general officer. General Mooney later briefed Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock and his ARCENT staff and Rear Admiral Grant Sharp, the CENTCOM J5 on the KTF. He detected considerable skepticism about the mission of the KTF. General Mooney believes that this skepticism was caused primarily by lack of understanding and that it would have been better if the JCS and OSD had consulted both CENTCOM and ARCENT in November 1990 before setting the KTF into motion.<sup>84</sup> As related earlier, however, the Joint Staff and other agencies in CONUS had taken pains to keep CENTCOM informed of the KTF, so they were not uninformed. Perhaps, it would have been judicious to have made CENTCOM a partner in the enterprise rather than just a customer.

#### Formation of the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF)

The necessity for providing humanitarian assistance to Kuwait following the inevitable liberation had become evident to CENTCOM and ARCENT in mid-December. The initial view of CENTCOM with respect to the recovery and reconstitution of Kuwait was that it was a job for the Arab nations. The Arabs wanted to do it, and it was a good Coalition mission. However, CENTCOM supported the creation of a task force to do the job. They wanted it to be a joint combined task force run by General Mooney and including Coalition Forces and Marine Corps elements as well as Army units. They proposed a plan in which the commander of the 3rd Civil Affairs Group, USMC, would be the deputy or chief of staff of the task force, but this did not happen.<sup>85</sup>

ARCENT formed the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF) under the command of General Mooney. The CCATF consisted of the 352nd CA Command (less detachments working elsewhere), the 431st CA Company, the 432nd CA Company, and the Kuwait Task Force. These units were made available by withdrawing from the two corps, the two CA companies intended to support the armored cavalry regiments. Despite some grumbling from the corps smaller CA detachments were made available for the armored cavalry regiments.<sup>86</sup>

The 96th CA Battalion (-) was placed in direct support of the CCATF to help General Mooney prepare his other units for the Kuwait mission. This was more difficult to arrange. The entire battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Ted Sahlin, was in the theater and was supposed to support the SOF in theater when the USAR units arrived. However, Colonel Kerr avoided placing the 96th under SOCCENT control because he was concerned that the USAR units might not arrive in time for the war. B Company of the 96th, as previously related, was supporting the French. C Company was in support of the 22nd SUPCOM, but with the arrival of the 304th CA Group for this mission, Lieutenant General Pagonis, Commander of the 22nd SUPCOM, released that company for the Kuwait mission. A and D Companies were spread out in teams doing work throughout the area but were assembled to join Task Force Freedom.<sup>87</sup>

The CCATF assembled at Camp 1 near Al Jubail on 14 February 1991 and began planning and training for the emergency restoration of Kuwait. An operations order was prepared. The mission: Go into Kuwait right after the combat forces and provide for emergency restoration of essential services. General Mooney's plan stressed seven essential areas: food; water; medical support; power; sanitation; telecommunications; and transportation. The idea was to relieve the suffering of the Kuwaitis as soon as possible and get the nation running again under Kuwaiti control.

The CCATF turned the attention of the KTF from long-term reconstruction to short-term relief. The planners became doers. They set out to obtain food and water, inventory medical supplies, prepackage supplies for distribution, arrange for trucks and drivers, marshal the supplies and stage them for loading, and getting the relief convoys ready to go. They also worked with the Kuwaitis to keep the pipeline of supplies full as they started distribution. One of the most essential items was to have enough generators to assure that electrical power would be available for critical facilities. They worked with the 8th PSYOP Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Jones, to provide a capability for broadcasting radio messages and providing printed material to the Kuwaitis. They used Kuwaiti assets for transportation. They arranged for sanitation contractors to clean up the debris. The CCATF made things happen.

#### Formation of Task Force Freedom

Early in February 1991, Major General (then brigadier general) Robert Frix, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of ARCENT, was told he would be given the job of handling the liberation and restoration of Kuwait. He hosted a meeting at King Khalid Military City to discuss how to accomplish this mission. The CENTCOM representatives briefed their concept, and a day was spent scoping out what to do and how to do it. General Frix determined to command the overall effort from the ARCENT forward headquarters.

On 13 February 1991, ARCENT created Task Force Freedom under the command of General Frix as a small command and control cell for all relief and reconstruction activities in Kuwait. It consisted of two elements: a logistical support package under the command of Brigadier General Kenneth Guest, Deputy Commander of the 22nd Support Command, and the CCATF under General Mooney. This was an effective organization. General Frix provided the high level coordination and the clout needed to get resources. General Guest provided the logistical support. General Mooney provided the civil affairs know how. Engineer, signal, military police, maintenance, aviation, and medical units were included in Task Force Freedom. The CA units assumed their doctrinal role of coordination and advice to assure that the assets of the other units were applied usefully to best effect. Task Force Freedom comprised over 3,500 troops for most of its existence. Much useful work was accomplished by this organization during the time it was active.

The ground war started on 24 February 1991. The CCATF was on alert to go into Kuwait City as soon as it was "reasonably safe." On 26 February the 96th CA Battalion and its liaison teams with the Coalition forces (Egyptian, Saudi, and Kuwaiti) deployed to Kuwait City. They moved up with the Coalition forces and Marines advancing into the City. On 27 February 1991, General Frix called General Mooney at midnight and said he wanted the entire CCATF to be at the Kuwait City International Airport not later than midnight on 28 February.

The CCATF moved up as ordered. The advance parties left at 1000 hours on 28 February. The main body moved out at 1300 in a convoy of 250 military vehicles and 75 Kuwaiti supply trucks carrying personnel, equipment, and relief supplies. The CCATF closed in at the International Airport at 0100, 1 March 1991. They slept for a few hours and then rose at 0600 to start the work of performing damage assessments and providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Kuwait. The assessment teams were sent out early, and food and water distribution started at 0900 on 1 March 1991. The emergency restoration of Kuwait by the CCATF continued under Task Force Freedom every day from then until 30 April 1991.

As the work progressed, the operation settled into a steady state. The condition of the 7 critical functions changed from red to amber and green as more and more supplies were distributed and more essential services were restored. It became possible to reduce the number of people involved. The tactical CA companies could be released back to ARCENT for redeployment back to the United States or for other missions. The 96th CA Battalion was released on 25 March; the 431st CA Company, on 31 March; and the 432nd, on 6 April.<sup>88</sup> The KTF started working again on the long-term reconstruction effort. On 15 April, the ARCENT forward headquarters moved back to Riyadh from Kuwait City, and General Mooney was placed in command of Task Force Freedom.

Task Force Freedom was disestablished on 30 April, and the work to finish the reconstruction of Kuwait was turned over to Major General Patrick J. Kelly, Corps of Engineers, head of the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office (DRAO).<sup>89</sup> General Kelly works directly for the Secretary of the Army, who is the executive agent of the Secretary of Defense for this mission. DRAO kept 20 members of the KTF there to oversee work in some areas, and these people returned to the United States on 1 June 1991.

The work of the 352nd CA Command ended officially on 30 April 1991, although the troops kept working with DRAO until 5 May. In addition to the 20 members with DRAO, a team of 5 personnel was left with the 22nd Support Command to assist in coordination of host nation support until September 1991. The rest of the unit arrived back in the United States on 10 May 1991 and were demobilized.

### Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

Just as the workload from Operation DESERT STORM was diminishing and the troops were being sent home, the Law of Unintended Consequences sent another mission to the Civil Affairs units in the SWA Theater.<sup>90</sup> During March 1991, Iraqi forces were wreaking vengeance against the Kurds in Northern Iraq for rebelling against the Government of Saddam Hussein in the aftermath of the Coalition Victory. In the first week of April 1991, many Kurds left their villages and went into the mountains to escape the artillery and napalm of Saddam, and some sought sanctuary in Turkey. The result was a deplorable situation in which a half million Kurdish men, women, and children were in the open in hostile mountain terrain, exposed to bad weather, and without food or shelter.<sup>91</sup> The US Government determined to do something to ease the plight of the Kurds while negotiating a solution with Saddam to permit them to return to their homes in safety. The result was Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the humanitarian assistance mission in support of the Kurdish displaced civilians.

#### Preparation for the Mission

Preparation for this mission began even before the need became apparent. In January 1991, EUCOM had requested that 19 CA soldiers from the 353rd CA Command, Bronx, NY, be called up and deployed to Europe to help coordinate support for Operation DESERT STORM. CINCEUR specified the unit and even the names of the personnel it wanted. DA resisted this request from CINCEUR for specific personnel from a particular unit, even though it had routinely agreed to similar requests from CINCCENT, and offered to send logistical specialists from the Active Component instead of Reserve CA specialists. CINCEUR insisted, and the 19 CA soldiers were sent to Europe on 13 February 1991 on TTAD. They were stationed at Stuttgart, Germany, and coordinated host nation support for DESERT STORM.

The EUCOM approach to the utilization of its supporting civil affairs units was based on long association and mutual respect. The EUCOM staff was familiar with CA missions, capability, and--most important--personalities. The Europe-oriented CA units had focused on host nation support and CIMIC (civil-military coordination), which explains why the J4 exercised staff supervision of CA activities for EUCOM. They had worked with the EUCOM staff and subordinate commands on many exercises. General John R. Galvin, the CINCEUR, knew and appreciated the value of civil affairs units, perhaps because of his previous experience as CINCSOUTH. He also knew General Campbell and wanted his expertise available as the crisis erupted in Northern Iraq.

As the situation in Iraq worsened, General Galvin took additional steps to assure that he would be prepared to plan and conduct possible humanitarian assistance programs in Turkey or Northern Iraq. He asked that Brigadier General Donald F. Campbell, Commander of the 353rd

CA Command, and six members of his staff be called up and deployed to Europe to take charge of planning for these missions. DA resisted providing a Reserve general officer, but the Joint Staff J3 persisted in efforts to meet the request of the EUCOM J4. However, while the members of his team were accorded TTAD status, General Campbell himself initially performed his duty while on short tours of Special Active Duty for Training (SADT)--a status normally reserved for short tours at school not exceeding 30 days. General Campbell initially was placed on a 29 day tour starting 12 April 1991, which was extended for another 29 days. General Campbell was finally placed on TTAD on 27 June 1991, after almost 60 days in Turkey and Iraq.<sup>92</sup>

### Formation of the Task Force

The PROVIDE COMFORT Task Force (CTF) was formed on 6 April 1991, and Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili, Deputy CINCUSAREUR, assumed command on 17 April. The Task Force was based at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. It was composed of about 5,000 US soldiers, including Marines, Special Forces, Engineer, Medical, and other units, and about 5,000 Allied troops, including British, French, Italian, and Canadian, and other national contingents.

General Campbell and his six person planning team arrived in Turkey on 11 April 1991, at which time he was appointed the CA Commander for the Task Force. He established his headquarters at Incirlik Air Base, near Adana, Turkey. Civil-Military Operations Centers (Forward) were established at Salopi and Zakhu in Northern Iraq. The initial job for General Campbell and his team was to conduct an assessment of the requirements for providing humanitarian assistance for the Kurdish refugees. This assessment became the basis for the plan that was carried out. It also was the basis for requesting the assignment of additional CA and other units to do the work.

Based on the assessment, EUCOM requested one CA brigade, three CA companies, and elements of the 96th CA Battalion for Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT. These requests were made upon the USSOCOM, whose mission is to provide CA units to the theater CINCs. The J3, Joint Staff monitored the process to assure that actions were coordinated in OSD. The request caught USSOCOM and CENTCOM in mid-stride. CENTCOM was phasing down CA assets, and nine CA units had already been moved back to the United States. These redeployments had been accomplished by CENTCOM without coordinating with J3 Joint Staff. When J3 found what had happened, it requested that CENTCOM inform USCINCEUR and the Joint Staff of the intent to send CA units back the US, so that CA support could be provided for Northern Iraq from units already in the region. Some consideration was given to activating new CA units for the mission, but these units would have been delayed a month for CONUS validation. The Joint Staff plan was to send to Turkey the 96th CA Battalion plus some of the CA units still in Saudi Arabia.

The Army opposed the Joint Staff plan. The Army did not want an Active Component unit--the 96th CA Battalion--serving under the command of a Reserve officer or headquarters. The entire staff action was run on 24 April 1991. In the morning, the Army opposed the deployment entirely, saying that the 96th CA Battalion--which was at Fort Bragg, NC, after returning from Saudi Arabia--was not available. In the afternoon, the Army changed its position to advocate sending 60 members of the 96th CA Battalion instead of the 500 Reservists slated to go also. Then the Army said that the commander of the 96th CA Battalion--an Active lieutenant colonel-- should exercise command of the entire operation including the Reserve brigadier general.<sup>93</sup> The final decision, however, was to support the Joint Staff plan to meet the original EUCOM request for CA units.

The requirement for CA units to serve in Northern Iraq landed on the desk of Colonel Jim Kerr, G5 of ARCENT. At that time, ARCENT was in the process of redeploying major elements of its forces back to the US. The war was over. The American people wanted the troops home, as did the Saudis. Essentially, the entire XVIII Airborne Corps was being redeployed, and the Corps Commander, LTG Gary Luck, insisted that the entire Corps, including its attached CA units, return to the US at the same time. The VII Corps was still committed in Iraq, and there was still a substantial CA workload dealing with displaced civilians in Iraq and Kuwait. Colonel Kerr expressed reservations about losing additional CA units at this time, but the order to support EUCOM stood. ARCENT decided that it would take units from both VII Corps and Task Force Freedom as they became available.<sup>94</sup> Fortunately, the emergency reconstitution of Kuwait was proceeding well, and the 431st and 432nd CA Companies from Task Force Freedom were made available from Task Force Freedom and arrived in Turkey on 26 April 1991. When the 1st Infantry Division moved from Iraq, the 418th CA Company was detached from VII Corps and reassigned to Turkey. Finally, to provide a CA control element, the 354th CA Brigade was detached from VII Corps with the reluctant agreement of the Corps Commander and arrived in Turkey on 7 May 1991. In addition, 63 members of the 96th CA Battalion were sent from the US to join the operation and arrived on 5 May 1991. These soldiers had served seven months in Saudi Arabia and had just returned and were on leave when they were told to return to the theater. To their credit, they did so without complaint.

It took a lot of negotiation and work to move the CA units to Turkey to join the PROVIDE COMFORT Task Force. About half of the personnel of these units were moved rapidly, but the other half waited almost three weeks at the airfields in Saudi Arabia for flights to Turkey. Disagreement over priorities between CENTCOM and EUCOM and within EUCOM between logisticians and CA personnel delayed them despite the efforts of Lieutenant General Shalikashvili to have them flown to Turkey right away.<sup>95</sup>

### Operations in Northern Iraq

Although Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was based at Incirlik Air Base in Eastern Turkey, most operations took place in Northern Iraq. Airlifted supplies all came through Incirlik, and seaborne supplies were unloaded at the ports of Iskenderun and Mersin and forwarded by rail and truck from these ports of entry. The CTF was divided into two sub-elements. Joint Task Force Alpha, under Major General Richard W. Potter, operated in the hills to persuade the Kurdish refugees to abandon the highlands and go to the camps in the lowlands. Joint Task Force Bravo, under Brigadier General Jay M. Garner, cleared a secure area for the Kurds, then established and operated several transit centers (refugee camps) near Zaku, in Northern Iraq. Initially, the detachment from the 96th CA Battalion was to have been assigned to Task Force Alpha, but this became unnecessary when the Kurds started moving voluntarily to the camps, and the 96th detachment went to Task Force Bravo, where it served with the 3rd British Commandos at Al Amadiya.

General Campbell, as Deputy CTF Commander for Civil Affairs, was assigned command less operational control of the CA units in-theater. This arrangement meant that the task force commanders had the authority necessary to direct the day-to-day operations of the units, but General Campbell could communicate with them, guide them on how to perform CA tasks, take care of their individual needs, and solve problems.

The major work of the CA units involved establishing and operating the camps and coordinating international support efforts. Three refugee camps were operated at Zaku by the 431st and 432nd CA Companies. An additional camp at al Amadiya was established with CA advice in planning and implementation. CA personnel operated in their doctrinal role of assessors, planners, and coordinators during this operation. Humanitarian assistance requires the services of many types of units, and the job of the Civil Affairs personnel was to provide overall direction and coordination for the activities of these various supporting units. The civil affairs personnel applied their expertise in sanitation, water supply, electrical supply, civil administration, and supply distribution to assist those actually doing the work. The CA personnel talked constantly to everyone in order to keep tensions down and cooperation up. During a period in which the Turkish Government closed the border to the Kurds, CA personnel visited local authorities to ameliorate the worst aspects of the situation.

One of General Campbell's principal duties was to deal personally with the representatives of the 50 or more international agencies seeking to help the Kurds. These included the Red Cross, the Red Crescent, and the United Nations. General Campbell and his staff helped these agencies to apply their efforts in the best way and smoothed out the inevitable frictions which occur when so many different groups work in a limited area. He maintained close contact with the Kizilay--the Turkish Red Cross--an organization with a strong sense of identity that insisted on being consulted on all matters pertaining to the operation.

Eventually, much of the humanitarian assistance work was turned over to the international agencies, and the US forces were reduced in strength as the situation stabilized. As the CTF workload decreased, the CA units were released and moved back to the US. The three CA companies left on 10 June 1991; the 354th CA Brigade on 13 June; and the CA headquarters elements on 23 June. General Campbell remained in Turkey until 20 July and reached the US on 24 July after a stopover in Germany to debrief USEUCOM on the results of his mission. The CTF was converted into a residual force on 22 July 1991. Its mission had been accomplished.<sup>96</sup>

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT is a good example--almost a textbook example--of using Civil Affairs assets well. The CA planners were brought in early and had time to make an assessment of what was involved and what would be needed to do the job. The Civil Affairs commander was given the authority needed to assure that the job was done correctly without impairing the ability of the operational commanders to do their jobs. The units were brought in, assigned to proper CA roles, and proceeded to accomplish the mission. General Campbell commented that he was very pleased with the performance of his Civil Affairs soldiers and that "this has been a tremendous learning experience and professional opportunity for all concerned."<sup>97</sup>

### Implications for the Future

The CA community operates on the fault lines of major divides between larger communities. CA is involved in the tension between the Special Operations Forces and the conventional forces of the Army. CA is involved in the tension between the Active Army and the Army Reserve and National Guard. CA is involved in the tension within the SOF between the warriors and the non-warriors. CA is not even integrated internally into a single CA-PSYOP community. These two similar disciplines exist currently as friendly but wary neighbors associated only by a common headquarters. The utility of CA troops may be increasing in the Post-Cold-War Era just as their budget is diminishing due to their traditional low position on the Army's totem pole.

Yet, the future of civil affairs troops may be bright because, despite a slow start and many problems, they provided a useful service in the desert. They were in fact the combat multiplier they were advertised to be. They did help mitigate the peace after the war was won. They did help Kuwait recover from its ordeal at the hand of the Iraqis. They did demonstrate flexibility when they provided humanitarian assistance to the Kurds in Northern Iraq and Shiites in Southern Iraq. They did the job. It remains to be seen whether they will capitalize on their experience to maximize their future contribution.

### SOF-Conventional Issues

One enduring conflict in the Army since the 1960s is between the SOF and the conventional Army. This tension is evidenced by the forced creation of a special pipeline command system for SOF to insulate and protect them from the conventional forces budgetarily and doctrinally. The decision to place the CA units into SOF means that they will share any onus placed on SOF by the conventional force leaders. Whether this will pay off or lead to further deterioration in their status and funding remains to be seen.

### Internal SOF Issues

There also is a split within the SOF community between those charged primarily with direct military action--the Special Forces, Rangers, and Special Operations Aviation--and those charged with quasi-military functions--Civil Affairs and PSYOP. This tension exists, but the USASOC is taking active steps to diminish it, particularly in the doctrinal development and education efforts of the Special Warfare Center and School. The tension is recognized, but the leadership seeks to turn it to useful ends.

This is encouraging because the nature of operations for all SOF forces is remarkably similar. CA, PSYOP, and Special Forces all tend to operate in small teams staffed with highly skilled and trained soldiers who have been selected specifically for this work and have met strict standards. All of these teams are designed to work with, instruct, and coordinate the activities of other people--allied military forces, local civilians, or other US forces. The composition of their basic teams is remarkably similar. Essentially, they all do the same kinds of things but with some difference in emphasis. As USASOC and the USAJFKSWCS work on new organizations and doctrine for employment, this similarity will work to ease the tensions within the SOF, and the entire organization will become a really coherent force.

### The Reserve General Officer Issue

One fact that stands out in the narrative of Civil Affairs in DESERT STORM is the treatment of the Reserve general officers. Generals Hurteau, Mooney, and Campbell all were forced to do their duty using a variety of subterfuges, such as training time and short tours of active duty. These generals were in Army authorized positions, and they had been selected and promoted into these positions by the Army. Yet, when the time came to use them to do what they had been trained to do, the Army chose not to call them to active duty in the normal and expected way. Since all three of these generals were treated about the same, it is hard to attribute the Army's obvious reluctance to call them to active duty as a personal thing. Several other Reserve general officers were treated in the same way. Yet, some Reserve generals, such as the commander of the 416th Engineer Command, were called to active duty with their

headquarters and performed in the intended manner. Why were some called and others not?

The Army's story is that bringing Reserve generals on active duty would have slowed down promotion of active Army colonels to general because of Congressional ceilings on the number of general officers who could be on active duty. Even if one accepts the relative priorities implicit in this statement, the argument does not stand up. As it turned out, the Army did call up Reserve General officers, and the ceiling was waived so that no disadvantage accrued to the promotable colonels. Many Reservists believe that the real reason for the Army's reluctance to call up Reserve general officers is prejudice against Reservists by the top Army leadership. This may or may not be true, but the fact is that the three Civil Affairs generals who combined to provide outstanding support to the Army and the Nation in this war were not called up to active duty. The issue of Reserve general officers is a potentially divisive one which needs to be addressed openly by the Army's leadership in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM.

#### Active-Reserve Issues

The most significant tension within the SOF (as within the rest of the Army) is between the Active and Reserve Components. The experience of the SOF, however, provides a basis for easing or even eliminating this tension as a problem and converting it into a positive force. USASOC has the opportunity to lead the way toward a real Total Army as it continues to develop the roles and relationships among its subordinate commands and particularly within USACAPOC.

The most interesting new development is to visit USACAPOC and see the officers and troops at this Reserve unit. Old stereotypes go out the window. One sees lean, fit, soldiers who are thoroughly professional in their attitudes and performance. Many of them wear the parachute qualification badge; many wear the tab showing they have completed the demanding Ranger training course. In fact, they are every bit as qualified as soldiers as their counterparts in the other USASOC commands. It is important to note that Headquarters USACAPOC is an Airborne unit. It is also important to note that its personnel proudly wear the Maroon Beret as a mark of their distinctive nature.<sup>98</sup> These are a new breed of CA soldiers. Most important of all, it is hard to tell which is Active Component, which is AGR, and which is drilling Reservist. They all look the same and act in the same professional Army way.

#### The Future of USACAPOC

Based on the results of Operation DESERT STORM, the future of Headquarters USACAPOC ought to be bright, but in the Army success is not always an assurance of support. One of the best features of USASOC is the integration of Active and Reserve units of the same

type under a common headquarters. For the Special Forces Groups, the common headquarters is Active. For the CA and PYSOP units, the common headquarters is Reserve. This is a remarkable development which bodes well for the future of the Total Army. Already, there are indications that DA will renege on this arrangement and try to remove the 96th CA Battalion and 4th PSYOP Group from the command of a Reserve general. The SOF chain of command supports the current arrangement and hopefully will prevail.

There are some problems and concerns. Some are worried that the CA units will become so involved in physical fitness and warrior skills that they will lose their expertise in their technical specialties. This is a potential problem, but Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated that it is necessary that these troops be able to operate and survive as part of the Army in the field, and also that it is possible to be both soldiers and specialists. Certainly, viewing the soldiers of the 450th CA Company smartly outfitted in their desert camouflage uniforms and maroon berets inspires the sure feeling that this can be done.

### The Future of Civil Affairs

There were problems with CA employment in DESERT STORM. The planning was not particularly good or timely. The units were called late, and there were some poor aspects of their utilization. There was a surprising reluctance by the Department of the Army to use their CA units or support them or their commanders. Major headquarters at the outset had few experienced CA staff officers. Initially, there was widespread lack of understanding of the CA units and appreciation for what they should and could do.

The Civil Affairs effort in DESERT STORM has to be considered a success. Despite the delays, the units arrived in time to support the fighting corps and divisions during the combat phase. During the fighting they saved US lives and were a combat multiplier. They helped win the war. After the fighting they helped win the peace by taking care of dislocated civilians. Despite difficulties getting started, the Kuwait Task Force did prepare a plan and assist in preparatory measures for the reconstruction of Kuwait which were sound and which were carried out. Despite some problems, effective humanitarian assistance was provided to the Kurds. This is good news for the CA community, for the SOF, and for the US Army.

As the United States enters a multipolar world in the post- Cold War Era, it is likely that the importance of Civil Affairs will increase relative to other means of applying military power. Certainly, in situations of violent peace and low intensity conflict this will be the case. The experience of DESERT STORM shows that CA forces properly applied are an essential adjunct to the conventional forces in regional war as well. Not only do the CA forces act as a combat multiplier, but they also act to mitigate the adverse and often unexpected consequences of the military operation on the local society. The challenge is to establish and support a role for Army Reserve Civil Affairs Units both as Special Operations Forces and as valued members of the Total Army.

Note on Sources

Data for this paper was obtained through interviews with, briefings by, or information from the following persons, shown below in the positions they held during OPERATION DESERT STORM:

Office of the Secretary of Defense:

The Honorable James R. Locher, III, Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

Major General William R Berkman, Military Executive, Reserve Forces Policy Board, OSD

Brigadier General Charles E. Wilhelm, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Missions and Applications, OASD(SO/LIC)

Mr Frederick C. Smith, Director, Near East and South Asia Region, OASD(ISA)

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Mikesh, OASD(SO/LIC)

Joint Staff:

Colonel Patrick W. Carlton, J3 Directorate

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis C. Barlow, J3 Directorate

United States Special Operations Command:

Colonel John H. Donnelly, Deputy Director, Directorate of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, J9

Col Harold W. Youmans

Lieutenant Colonel Bryan N. Karabaich

United States Central Command:

Colonel Lawrence C. Blount, Civil Affairs Staff Chief

Major Paul Christian, Political-Military Staff Officer, J5 Directorate

Headquarters, Department of the Army:

Mr Anthony J. Auletta, Chief, Civil Affairs Branch, ODSCOPS

Headquarters, US Army Special Operations Command:

Colonel Jimmie J. Holt, DSCOPS

US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School:

Brigadier General David J. Baratto, Commandant  
Colonel George A. Hutchinson, Reserve Component Advisor  
Lieutenant Colonel Larry Wayne, CA Integrator

Headquarters, US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command:

Brigadier General Joseph C. Hurteau, Commander  
Colonel John W. Geiger, Resource Management Officer  
Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Camp, Assistant G3  
Major Henry M. Fitts, Secretary of the General Staff  
Cpt Kimberly A. Weaver, G4 Plans & Operations Officer  
CSM Stephen M. Foust, USACAPOC Command Sergeant Major

Headquarters, Third US Army (ARCENT):

Colonel James T. Kerr, Jr., G5  
Lieutenant Colonel T. E. Davies, former Assistant G5

352nd Civil Affairs Command:

Brigadier General Howard T. Mooney, Jr., Commander  
Colonel Randall Elliott, Commander, Kuwait Task Force

304th CA Group

Lieutenant Colonel Richard P. Konstance, Executive Officer

96th CA Battalion:

Colonel Michael P. Peters, Commander

450th Civil Affairs Company:

Lieutenant Colonel King F. Davis, Jr, Commander  
Sergeant First Class Arla V. Brown

End Notes

1. The account of the 450th CA Company's experiences is based on interviews with Lieutenant Colonel King F. Davis, Jr. and Sergeant First Class Arla V. Brown, 450th CA Company. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Mikesh, OASD(SO/LIC) furnished additional information. LTC Davis reviewed the draft manuscript.
2. Although the Military Police Corps has primary responsibility for dealing with enemy prisoners of war (EPW), in this operation there were so many EPW that the CA troops had to help out. As noted, CA training to deal with civilians was easily adapted to deal with prisoners--especially eager prisoners.
3. In this paper the term Operation DESERT STORM will be used to mean both Operation DESERT SHIELD--the buildup phase--and Operation DESERT STORM--the combat phase.
4. CAPSTONE is the name of an Army program to assign each active, Guard, and Reserve unit to a planned organizational hierarchy to be used in the event of mobilization. These CAPSTONE relationships were used as the basis for training and mutual support in peacetime.
5. The Six Lane is the name given by the DESERT STORM troops to the single major superhighway running Northwest to Southeast generally along the Euphrates to Basra in the South.
6. It is not clear that the 450th CA Company will be permitted to wear the 82nd Division patch for long. Third US Army (ARCENT) policy is that the CA companies supporting divisions will wear the patch of the CA Brigades supporting the corps. This would require the 450th personnel to wear the patch of the 360th CA Brigade, which supported XVIII Airborne Corps. Initially, however, the members of the unit are following the guidance of the Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division who explicitly approved the wearing of the Division patch by the members of the 450th who served in the Persian Gulf.
7. Chapter II is based on the following sources: briefing by Colonel Jimmie F. Holt, DCSOPS of USASOC on 3 May 1991; a presentation by LTG Spigelmire at the 59th MORSS on 13 June 1991, briefings and extensive discussions at USACAPOC on 3 May 1991, discussions with Major General Berkman, and documents cited in the notes. General Berkman, Mr. Auletta, DA Staff, General Hurteau and the staff at USACAPOC, and LTC Barlow, J3 Joint Staff reviewed the draft and made several helpful corrections.
8. The US Forces Command is simultaneously a specified command reporting to the Secretary of Defense and a major Army command reporting to the Chief of Staff of the Army. It is similar in this respect to the Strategic Air Command.

9. The US Army Reserve Command was activated in 1991 to command and fund all CONUS USAR units (except SOF) under FORSCOM. This will eliminate the CONUS armies from the USAR chain of command but retain the ARCOMs. The commander of the Army Reserve Command and the Chief of the Army Reserve are the same individual.
10. The two Special Forces Groups and the Special Operations Aviation Battalion of the Army National Guard remain under the command of their respective governors, but their training and readiness is supervised by USACAPOC.
11. HQs, USACAPOC, 3 July 1991.
12. In Europe, the term "civil military cooperation" (CIMIC) is used along with HNS to describe the arrangements for mutual support between the US armed forces and local authorities.
13. Foreign Internal Defense is defined as "participation by civilian and military agencies of government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 June 1987 p. 152.) Foreign Internal Defense would be US participation in or support for counter-insurgency operations being conducted by another government.
14. General Berkman, now Military Executive to the Reserve Forces Policy Board, OSD, had extensive experience in Civil Affairs and commanded the 351st CA Command before his appointment in 1979 as Chief, Army Reserve.
15. This is a complicated story. Secretary of the Army Marsh for a period was also acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC. While the law did not require the inclusion of CA or PSYOP units in SOF, Secretary Marsh in effect decided that all Army CA and PSYOP units--Active and Reserve--would be SOF and was instrumental in obtaining Secretary of Defense approval. The real struggle was with the PSYOP units, whose leaders and sponsors in OSD opposed this move but were overruled, and the CA units just followed along with the general trend.
16. Army Special Operations Forces Reference Data, Appendix D, "Civil Affairs," 8 February 1991, is the source of information on the Civil Affairs mission and force structure, supplemented by comments from HQs, USACAPOC, 3 July 1991.
17. The Department of Defense defines the National Command Authorities as the "President and Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors." (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 June 1987, p. 243.)
18. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 June 1987, p. 230.

19. The Marine Corps has two Reserve Civil Affairs Groups and about 125 active duty Marines with CA training. Each CA Group is designed to provide tactical CA support for a Marine Expeditionary Force. The Marine Corps does not designate their CA units as SOF, and they are not assigned to USSOCOM, although the Marine Corps acknowledges that the units have SOF capabilities
20. The Civil Affairs Regiment is established as part of the Army's Regimental System. The Honorary Chief of Civil Affairs is Major General William R. Berkman.
21. A theater commander retains command authority over all units, including CA units, in the theater; he may direct subordinate joint or Service component commanders to assume operational control of all CA units operating in the theater. The senior CA commander may in turn be delegated operational control of all CA units. (HQs, USACAPOC, 3 July 1991.)
22. The status of the 322nd CA Group and its relationship to USACAPOC is still under consideration at DA.
23. Chapter III is based on interviews with Brigadier General Howard T. Mooney, Jr. and Colonel Lawrence C. Blount, 352nd CA Command; Lieutenant Colonel Dennis C. Barlow, J3 Joint Staff; Colonel James T. Kerr, Jr., ARCENT G5; Colonel John H. Donnelly, Colonel Harold W. Youmans, and Lieutenant Colonel Bryan N. Karabaich, J9 USSOCOM; and Major Paul Christian, Jr USCENTCOM. General Mooney, Colonel Blount, LTC Barlow, and Colonel Kerr reviewed the manuscript in draft.
24. Major Christian, 13 May 1991.
25. The paragraphs describing the pre-war situation at HQs, Third US Army are based primarily on an interview with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Davies, 20 May 1991.
26. LTC Davies, 20 May 1991.
27. Colonel Kerr, 28 June 1991.
28. HQs USACAPOC, 3 July 1991.
29. HQs USACAPOC, 3 July 1991.
30. Interview with Colonel Kerr, 28 June 1991.
31. Colonel Kerr points out that the CA units went to war with outmoded H-Series TO&Es that were scheduled to be changed to the L-Series in 1992. The authorization for colonels in a CA command headquarters is reduced from 26 to 9 in the revised TO&E.
32. Colonel Kerr, 28 June 1991.

33. CA staff officers on the Joint Staff and at HQs USSOCOM were unaware that CENTCOM and ARCENT had published Annex G's to their OPLANS. LTC Barlow, the CA action officer for the Joint Staff was required during this period to provide three slides daily on CA activities for the daily briefing of Secretary Cheney and General Powell. Barlow had difficulty in obtaining real time information from CENTCOM Headquarters (which was busy preparing the war plan) and relied on CNN and reviews of CENTCOM cable traffic for much of his information.
34. The ARCENT and CENTCOM staffs disagree on this; Colonel Kerr maintains that the message was not delayed at ARCENT Headquarters.
35. Major Christian, 13 May 1991.
36. Colonel Blount, 19 June 1991.
37. Major Christian, 13 May 1991, and Colonel Blount, 20 August 1991. Colonel Blount points out that the planning was a continuous process as the concept evolved over time. He and his group prepared Annex G's for each version of the OPLAN during this period.
38. Chapter IV is based on presentations and discussion at HQs USACAPOC on 3 May 1991, interviews with General Mooney and Colonel Blount, 352nd CA Command, and the after-action report of the 407th CA Company. HQs USACAPOC reviewed the draft manuscript.
39. HQs, USARSOC, MOI for US Army Reserve Special Operations Command: Operation DESERT SHIELD Validation Program, 21 October 1990.
40. Special Forces and Ranger units were held to higher standards than the general SOF standards applied to the USACAPOC PSYOP and CA units.
41. HQs, USACAPOC, Statistical Analysis of Mobilization and Validation, April 1991.
42. This acronym is pronounced "hum-vee."
43. This acronym is pronounced "cuck-vee."
44. Even obtaining permission to place General Hurteau on ADSW was not easy, and it took the personal intervention of General James J. Lindsay, then CINCSOC, to do it.
45. After Action Report, 407th CA Company.
46. CSM Foust, 3 May 1991.

47. This Chapter is based on interviews with Colonel James T. Kerr, G5 ARCENT; Colonel Lawrence C. Blount, G5 Section CENTCOM; the After Action Report of the 407th CA Company, March 1991, and information from HQs USACAPOC.

48. Colonel Kerr, 28 June 1991.

49. The approach taken to the PSYOP units was different. The commander of the 4th PSYOP Group operated at the CENTCOM level and retained directive authority over all PSYOP units in the theater.

50. Colonel Blount, 19 June 1991.

51. 44th Medical Brigade, Certificate of Achievement for 407th CA Company, 12 March 1991.

52. The section on the 304th CA Group is based on the after action reports of the Group transmitted to Hqs USACAPOC by memorandum, 18 May 1991.

53. 304th CA Group, AFKA-ACDM-E, Memorandum for Commanding General, 22nd Support Command, "Command Report, Operation Desert Storm," 15 April 1991.

54. Colonel Blount, 19 June 1991.

55. Colonel Blount, 19 June 1991, and Colonel Kerr, 25 July 1991.

56. Colonel Kerr, 25 July 1991.

57. The after-action reports of the 304th CA Group and 407th CA Company make this point clearly as does the experience of the 450th CA Company.

58. Chapter VI is based on interviews with the Honorable James R. Locher, ASD(SO/LIC); Lieutenant Colonel Dennis C. Barlow, J3 Joint Staff; Mr. Anthony J. Auletta, Department of the Army; Brigadier General Howard T. Mooney, Jr., and Colonel Randall Elliott, 352nd CA Command; and Mr. Fred Smith, OASD(ISA). General Mooney, Mr. Auletta, Mr. Smith, LTC Barlow, and Colonel Elliott reviewed the draft manuscript.

59. Colonel Elliott, 25 June 1991.

60. OASD(ISA) Memorandum to Director, Joint Staff, I-90/04716, 3 October 1990.

61. Letter, Kuwait Ambassador to President Bush, 9 October 1990. This letter was drafted originally by Mr. Sam Routson, OASD(SO/LIC) and passed to the Kuwaiti Embassy.

62. Letter, James A. Baker, III, to Kuwaiti Ambassador, 15 December 1990.

63. (C) ASD(ISA) Memorandum to Director, Joint Staff, Subject: US-Kuwait Civil Affairs (U), 5 November 1990.
64. Terms of Reference, United States Civil Affairs Assistance to the State of Kuwait, 2 November 1990.
65. The Army finally was designated Executive Agent for the Kuwait mission on 30 April 1991 after implementation of the plan for reconstruction of Kuwait had started.
66. Message, CJCS, Subject: 173 Restoration of Kuwait, 22 November 1991.
67. Fred Smith, 8 May 1991.
68. General Mooney kept a daily log of events which was most helpful in preparing an accurate account of this confusing period.
69. Colonel Elliott, 25 June 1991.
70. DA Message 201230Z Nov 90, Subject: "Civil Affairs (CA) Support to Restoration of Kuwait," ordered the 352nd element to active duty effective 21 November and gave detailed guidance for their mission. DA Message 202345Z Nov 90, Subject: "Amendment No. 3 to Presidential Order of Selected Reserve to Active Federal Duty - Order No. 13," removed the 352nd from the call up. Finally, DA Message 232125Z Nov 90, Subject: "Civil Affairs (CA) Support to Restoration of Kuwait," directed the unit to remain on alert and anticipate call up on or about 1 December 1990.
71. Colonel Elliott, 25 June 1991, and Mr. Auletta, 19 April 1991.
72. General Mooney will not comment about this incident, but it is confirmed by other sources. Who gave that order remains uncertain.
73. Fred Smith, 8 May 1991.
74. See Figure 2, Page 10.
75. LTC Barlow, 12 August 1991. Messages to CINCCENT include JS Msg, 220020Z Nov 90; DA Msg 201230Z Nov 90; USSOCOM Msg 221430Z Nov 90; DA Msg 232125Z Nov 90; and JS Msg 150849Z 2 Dec 90.
76. Colonel Blount, July 1991. The impression of the KTF members, however, was that CENTCOM was not very interested in their work.
77. Colonel Elliott, 25 June 1991.

78. Colonel Elliott, 25 June 1991.
79. Mr. Locher, 29 April 1991.
80. Fred Smith, 8 May 1991.
81. Letter, Secretary of the Army to Major General William F. Ward, Jr., 5 April 1991.
82. This chapter is based on interviews with General Howard T. Mooney, Jr., Colonel Lawrence C. Blount, and Colonel Randall Elliott, 352nd CA Command; LTC Dennis C. Barlow, J3 Joint Staff, and Colonel James T. Kerr, Jr., G5 ARCENT.
83. Colonel Kerr, 28 June 1991.
84. General Mooney, 17 May 1991.
85. Colonel Blount, 19 June 1991.
86. Colonel Kerr, 28 June 1991.
87. Colonel Kerr, 28 June 1991.
88. All of these units ended up serving in Northern Iraq on Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. See Chapter VIII.
89. General Kelly was Assistant Chief of Engineers for Public Works at the time of his assignment to Kuwait.
90. This account of the CA operations in Northern Iraq is based on discussions with Colonel Patrick W. Carlton and Lieutenant Colonel Dennis C. Barlow, J3 Joint Staff, and Colonel James T. Kerr, Jr., ARCENT G5. Colonel Carlton, the Joint Staff action officer for PROVIDE COMFORT, reviewed the draft manuscript and made several helpful suggestions.
91. This was a repeat of an earlier episode during 1988 when hostilities between the Kurds and the Hussein government caused 60,000 Kurds to flee into Turkey. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, almost 28,000 of these earlier displaced civilians were still in Turkish camps.
92. Colonel Carlton, 2 July 1991 and 12 August 1991.
93. LTC Barlow, 20 May 1991.
94. Colonel Kerr, 28 June 1991.

95. General Campbell comments that he wishes now that he had taken more aggressive action to have his troops moved quickly from Saudi Arabia. After their arrival in Turkey, some units reported seeing plane loads of supplies leaving while they waited at the airfield. Conversation, 23 August 1991.

96. Colonel Carlton, 12 August 1991.

97. Telephone conversation between General Campbell and Colonel Carlton, 11 June 1991.

98. The green beret is worn by members of the Special Forces Command, including members of the Reserve and National Guard units. The black beret is worn by the members of the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Appendix: Members of the Kuwait Task Force

<u>Command Section</u>	<u>KTF Specialty</u>	<u>Civilian Occupation</u>
COL Randall T. Elliott	Commander	Mid-East Bureau, Department of State
MAJ Patsy Floyd	Protocol/Admin	Asset Manager, Naval Air Systems Command
CSM William Freeman	Liaison/Protocol	Electricity Analyst, Dept of Energy
<u>Public Security &amp; Safety Division</u>		
COL Ronald Smith	Division Chief	Attorney, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
MAJ(P) Joseph G. Mack	Public Safety	Deputy Chief, Philadelphia Fire Dept.
COL Richard Geyer	Legal	Assoc Chief Counsel, Food & Drug Admin
LTC Robert Feidler	Legal	Attorney, Admin Officer, US Courts
LTC Edward George	Property Control	Construction Company Owner
SGT Karen Bryant	Property Control	Real Estate Specialist, GSA
SGT Kevin Murphy	Admin/Protocol	Automobile Salesman
<u>Infrastructure Division</u>		
COL Arthur Walz	Division Chief	Civil Engineer, USA Corps of Engineers
LTC David Webber	Public Works	Civil Engineer, USA Corps of Engineers
LTC James Evans	Petroleum Restoration	Civil Engineer, USA Corps of Engineers
MAJ Thomas Wilson	Petroleum Restoration	Purchasing Representative, Hunt Oil Co.
LTC Schappi Marsh	Industrial Engineer	Civil Engineer, USA Corps of Engineers
COL Lester Wilson	Public Transport	Traffic Mgr, Defense Fuel Supply Center
MAJ John Gibmeyer	Public Transport	Insurance Administrator, US F&G Ins. Co.
SPC Kelly Reilly	Admin/Support	Accounting & Research Analyst

Appendix: Members of the Kuwait Task Force

<u>KTF Specialty</u>	<u>Civilian Occupation</u>
<u>Human Services Division</u>	
COL Ralph Young	Manager, TRW Defense Systems
COL Herbert Smith	Doctor of Veterinary Medicine
MAJ John Harbell	PhD, Microbiology, NIH
COL George Z. Padar	High School Teacher
LTC Peter J. Paternoster	Operations Research Analyst, NSC
MAJ Coulborne Winder	Manager, Cleaning & Maintenance Co
LTC Donald McKinney	Community College Administrator
MAJ Bruce Alcan	High School Teacher
SSG Hazel Cook	Administrative Specialist, GSA
<u>Commercial Division</u>	
COL Charles Sadek	Manager, Naval Surface Warfare Center
LTC Barbara K. Sanders	Admin Asst, Resolution Trust Corporation
SFC Sheila Venson	Employee Relations, Forest Service
LTC Gary Meyer	Installation Planner, USA Corps of Engrs
MAJ George Thomas	International Banker, Philadelphia
MAJ John Williams	Staff Veterinarian, Emergency Pgms, USDA
SFC David Yost	Soils Specialist, Dept of Agriculture
COL James Gulick	Director, Cmd Eval, Navy Matl Trans Off
LTC James Luedeke	Procurement Expert, DOD Inspector Genl.
LTC Andrew Setzer	Superintendent, Construction Company
LTC Wilson Baker, Jr.	Computer Scientist, Computer Sci. Corp. SFC Layton
McDonald	Computer Systems Spec, Dept of Labor

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<u>KTF Specialty</u>	<u>Civilian Occupation</u>
<u>Public Service Division</u>	
COL Edward Duncan	Assistant Town Manager, Culpeper, VA
LTC David Mitchell	Staff Asst, Office, Secy of the Army
LTC James Carr	Dean, EPA Institute
LTC Jorge Lambrinos	Admin Asst to Member of Congress
LTC Jeffrey Greenhut	Historian, Naval Security Command
MAJ Robert Thorsen	Computer Programmer, US House of Reps
LTC Artie Polk	Bell Atlantic Equipment Corporation
LTC James Ghent	Computer Systems Engineer, UNYSIS Corp
LTC Rafael Perl	Attorney, Library of Congress
SFC Gracie White	Admin Asst, Centers for Disease Control

<u>Contingency Planning Division</u>	
COL Edward King	Program Mgr, Health Care Financing Admin
COL John Guerre	Emergency Management Specialist, FEMA
COL Gordon Hasenel	Logistics Officer, First US Army
MAJ(P) Charles Howton	Senior Management Analyst, GSA
CPT Robert Driessen	Security Compliance Specialist, SEC
1SG Francis Matthews	Program Analyst, Social Security Admin
SFC Carmen Daugherty	Computer Operator, Computer Company

Source: Short Biographies of Kuwait Task Force Personnel as of 4 December 1990.

## The Principal Author

Mr. John Brinkerhoff is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, California Institute of Technology, Columbia University, and George Washington University. He is a retired Army engineer corps colonel. He has served two tours on the Army staff in force development and manpower related positions. Subsequent to his military service, he was Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, after which he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Additionally, he served as an Associate Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), where he was responsible for mobilization policy. Mr. Brinkerhoff is serving as a consultant to the ANDRULIS Research Corporation.

## The Editors and Contributing Authors

Mr. Ted Silva is a graduate of Northeastern University, the University of Hawaii, the Executive Development Program of Cornell University, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He is a retired Army signal corps colonel. His Reserve Component experience includes service as Chief, Reserve Forces and Mobilization Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. For the past three years, Mr. Silva has served as a program manager and research analyst for the ANDRULIS Research Corporation, evaluating Federal emergency preparedness and the Army Reserve participation in Operation DESERT STORM.

Mr. John Seitz is a graduate of the University of Missouri, Shippensburg University, and the Army War College. He is a retired Army field artillery colonel. His Reserve Component experience includes service as Chief, Readiness Group Fort Riley and Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans, Fourth Army. For the past three years, Mr. Seitz has worked as a research analyst and program manager for the ANDRULIS Research Corporation, evaluating Federal emergency preparedness and the Army Reserve participation in Operation DESERT STORM.

Headquarters, Department of the Army  
Office of the Chief, Army Reserve  
ATTN: DAAR-PAE, Room 1D416  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D. C. 20310-2400