DECISIVE FORCE—THE NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR?

by

F. G. HOFFMAN
Major, United States Marine Corps Reserve

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI

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Paper directed by
Mackubin T. Owens, Ph.D.
Department of National Security Decision Making


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**Decisive Force: The New American Way of War?**

The 1992 National Military Strategy contained a new strategic concept titled "Decisive Force." The project traced the development and evaluated the merits of a "New American Way of War" embodied in the Decisive Force concept. Lessons about the utility of force from 4 different conflicts were examined. These conflicts included Vietnam; Lebanon 1982-1984; Panama; and the Persian Gulf Conflict. The examination of each conflict was made using a four-stage assessment including; the objectives of each case; how force was used or limited; civil-military relationships; and finally, aspects of popular support for each intervention. The following conclusions were drawn about Decisive Force:

1. It is derived from perceived lessons learned from the past two decades;
2. It is consistent with our strategic culture;
3. It is a very useful declaratory policy;
4. It is not universally applicable across the conflict spectrum;
5. It does not represent a direct challenge to effective civil-military relations.

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22a. **NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL**

Professor John B. Hattendorf

22b. **TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)**

(401) 841-2101

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The existence of a national style of warfare, an American Way of War, has been used to characterize the fundamental elements of American military strategy. The traditional American military style uses the vast economic and technology base of the U.S. to grind down opponents with firepower and mass. Our style is built around our robust economic production capacity, technological capability, and abundance of resources. The American Way of War has become a convenient and useful description to characterize our unique approach to warfare, an approach that reflects the collective history, attitudes, and political culture of the American experience. In 1991, the rebuilt armed forces of the United States demonstrated which nation was the world’s foremost military power in a most convincing manner. To those who had advocated an American Way of War, as the natural and unchangeable exposition of our strategic culture, Operation Desert Storm stood as vindication. During his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell became the proponent for a strategic framework to guide the consideration of how military force should be used to support national policy objectives. His framework was reflected in the Chairman’s National Military Strategy published in early 1992 after Desert Storm under a concept titled "Decisive Force." Decisive Force, in shorthand, means assembling the necessary forces and overwhelming an opponent swiftly and decisively.

The purpose of this project is to trace the development and evaluate the merits of a "New American Way of War" embodied in the Decisive Force concept. Military attitudes and lessons about the utility of force drawn from four different conflicts were examined. The four conflicts include Vietnam; the U.S. intervention in Lebanon 1982-1984; the invasion of Panama in 1989; and; the Persian Gulf Conflict, 1991.

The examination of each conflict was made using a four-stage assessment regarding military perceptions, attitudes, or lessons learned. The four elements of the assessment
include; the objectives of each case; how force was used or limited; the relationships between policy makers and military leaders during the planning and conduct of the conflict; and finally, the degree of popular support for each intervention.

The following questions have been used to frame the project:

-What is the principle of Decisive Force?

-What historical experiences lie under the principle?

-Is it consistent with our strategic culture?

-What are the advantages and disadvantages of Decisive Force in both strategic and operational terms?

The project has three theses. The first concerns the existence of a New American Way of War, which reflects subtle changes from the traditional description made famous by Professor Russell Weigley in his seminal *The American Way of War*. The second thesis concerns how the military came to the conclusions that shifted the operating code that functioned from the Civil War through World War II. The lessons learned from these conflicts are at best oversimplified. At worst they are erroneous. The third thesis involves the present status of civil-military relations in this country. The thesis, simply stated, is that the relationship is in a state of subliminal crisis in the United States.

Based on the study effort, the following conclusions have been drawn:

1. Decisive Force is derived from the military's perceived lessons learned from the past two decades, particularly Vietnam, Lebanon, and Desert Storm. While the lessons are not altogether accurate, they have served to focus attention on the principal considerations to be evaluated before employing violent force.

2. Decisive Force is consistent with our strategic culture and the American Way of War. While it appears well matched to the military's operational preference, it also reflects the limits of our political culture. In particular, it reflects the need to maintain popular
support and preclude casualties endemic to the American political culture.

3. Decisive Force is a very useful declaratory policy and enhances the use of military force as an instrument of diplomacy. Decisive Force as a national strategic concept supports deterrence, defense, decisive influence and diplomacy. The military does not like limited warfare or the use of military force as a bargaining tool, or a substitute for diplomacy, unless the ramifications have been thought out thoroughly.

4. Decisive Force, while stated as an overarching strategic concept, is not universally applicable across the conflict spectrum. It is applicable to almost all uses of force for violent means. Some situations, such as counterinsurgency, may require greater restraint and persistence, and less violence.

5. Decisive Force does not represent a direct challenge to effective civil-military relations. It does represent the considered judgment of the military about how combat forces should be employed, which must be noted.

The decision to use force is a critical matter for any state. Military leaders make a major contribution to these decisions. Their professional advice is a crucial element of the policy decision making process. This expert input is founded on a number of their own attitudes and lessons from earlier conflicts. The lessons of these experiences, often subjectively drawn, are now buried into the institutional sub-conscious of the Armed Forces, for better or worse. These attitudes and lessons should be understood by those involved in making policy decisions. How these attitudes mesh with our strategic culture and the demands placed on the U.S. in the post-Cold War environment is crucial if effective civil-military relations are to be maintained in the years ahead. Such relationships produce effective strategies that best correspond to the desired ends of policy. Poorly balanced relations seriously impair the alloy of military and policy perspectives that produce effective strategic decisions.
PREFACE

For the past twenty years, ever since the last helicopter ignominiously left the rooftop of the American Embassy in Saigon, our country has debated how to use military force to serve the Nation's best interests. This issue remains unanswered today. Despite a rich legacy of examples to draw from, our reluctance to conduct critical strategic studies limits our grasp of the problem and a deeper understanding of our own history.

In the immediate aftermath of Vietnam, there was a deeply emotional debate about the political, social, and moral aspects of the war. Many serving military officers participated in this debate, but the military as an institution pushed the memories of the Central Highlands and the Mekong Delta out of its consciousness. Instead the Armed Forces focused therapeutically on the threat the Soviet Union posed in Europe. Over time, the "lessons" of Vietnam passed implicitly into the military culture; into its doctrine, training and education, and thought process. The collective conclusion can be reduced to the simplistic cry of "No More Vietnams."

Most observers agree that Vietnam was lost at the political and strategic level of war. The existence of a national style of warfare, an American Way of War, was raised as a fundamental and immutable element of American strategy. The American Way of War is built around a strategy that employs the vast economic and technology base of the U.S. to grind down opponents with firepower and mass. Our style is built around economic production capacity and resources. Because of its costs, this style is predicated upon national mobilization and national commitment. This national style reflects both our comparative advantages and the limits of a democratic government.

The American Way of War has become a convenient and useful description to characterize our unique approach to warfare, an approach that reflects the collective
history, attitudes, geography, and political culture of the American experience. It is
admittedly somewhat of an overgeneralization, but it is a useful one. National styles do
exist, and their study serves a valid analytical and practical purpose.

Regrettably, Vietnam was a scenario that did not match our national style. Yet many
would argue that the American Way of War reflects the strategic culture of the United
States, and that policy aims and strategies must be crafted consistent with this distinctive
fundamental style or face the calamity of another Vietnam.

In the early 1980's this debate was renewed as the Reagan Administration sought to
cast off the malaise of the 1970's and the reticence of the "Vietnam Syndrome." This
condition supposedly restrained America from asserting itself as a global power. The
Reagan Administration sought to "draw a line" against the Soviet Union somewhere,
anywhere. Eventually, U.S. military forces were introduced into Latin America and in
the Middle East. The tragedy of the Marine barracks bombing in October 1983
resurfaced the great debate of when, why, and how U.S. military might should be
applied. Ultimately, a formula was generated by the Defense Department, and advocated
aggressively by then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1984.

This formula was phrased in a series of criteria that restricted the use of military
forces to those situations where vital interests were at stake, where all other means had
failed, where public support from Congress and the American people was assured, and
with the wholehearted intent of winning. This set of guidelines, which eventually became
known as the Weinberger Doctrine, was widely accepted in the military. It was castigated
by some observers, including then-Secretary of State George Shultz, as utterly
unreasonable and inconsistent with the country's standing as a world power.

In 1991, the rebuilt armed forces of the United States demonstrated which nation
reigned supreme as the world's foremost military power in a most convincing manner.
The stunning victory over Saddam Hussein seemed to finally bury the haunting memories and painful lessons of Vietnam. To those who had advocated an American Way of War, as the natural and unchangeable exposition of our national and strategic culture, Operation Desert Storm stood as vindication.

During his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell became the proponent for another strategic framework to guide the consideration of how military force should be used to support national policy objectives. General Powell brought a unique perspective to this task: a veteran of Vietnam, an Executive Assistant to Mr. Weinberger during the Beirut deployment, and a former National Security Advisor. His framework was reflected in the Chairman’s National Military Strategy published in early 1992 in the warm afterglow of Desert Storm under a concept titled "Decisive Force." Decisive Force, in shorthand, means assembling the necessary forces and overwhelming an opponent swiftly and decisively. The concept was explained further, and better, in a series of speeches and articles in late 1992.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this project is to trace the development and evaluate the merits of a "New American Way of War" embodied in the Decisive Force concept. Military attitudes and lessons about the utility of force drawn from four different conflicts will be examined. The four examples include:

- Vietnam;
- The U.S. intervention in Lebanon 1982-1984;
- The invasion of Panama in 1989; and

The examination of each conflict will include a four-stage assessment regarding military perceptions, attitudes, or lessons learned. The four elements of the assessment include; the objectives of each case; how force was used or limited; the relationships
between policy makers and military leaders during the planning and conduct of the conflict; and finally, the degree of popular support for each intervention.

The focus of this effort is not to discern the correct "lessons" of each conflict from a policy or strategic perspective. The focus is on what the U.S. military absorbed from each conflict, and the pattern of these lessons over the course of two decades. The research effort will highlight both the existence and limitations of a body of thought within the military about the use of force.

The following questions have been used to frame the project:

- What is the principle of Decisive Force?
- What historical experiences lie under the principle?
- Is it consistent with our strategic culture?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of Decisive Force in both strategic and operational terms?

Ultimately, this research paper will explore the existence and limitations of a New American Way of War. A chief concern in this endeavor is to establish and examine attitudes extant in the U.S. military about the conditions necessary for the successful employment of violent means in the service of the State. Over the last generation, the country has moved towards a better understanding of exactly what it means to use military force. This has been a long journey. In many respects we are at an historic intersection about the use of military as an instrument of national power today. Tragic incidents in Somalia during the course of this project, and the debate about potential American intervention in Bosnia, belay any positive conclusions at this point.
Theses

This project has three theses. The first concerns the existence of a New American Way of War, which reflects subtle changes from the traditional description made famous by Professor Russell Weigley in his seminal *The American Way of War*. Implicit to the definition of a national style of warfare is the delineation of cultural attributes and attitudes that constitute the preferred operational codes and methods of any given culture. The American military culture has been predisposed towards large and offensive methods of warfare, and has evidenced a lack of political dexterity in the conduct of military operations. A national style also implies a prescriptive manner to warfare. In this century, other countries have had serious problems resulting from fixed offensive doctrines ostensibly tied to strategic or operational paradigms. Fixed doctrines or prescriptive styles are not a useful guide to policy makers because inflexible approaches seldom satisfy the myriad complex situations faced in foreign affairs.

The second thesis concerns how the military came to the conclusions that shifted the operating code that functioned from the Civil War through WW II. Vietnam initiated the change, and subsequent conflicts in Lebanon, Panama, and Kuwait have locked in changes in the manner in which the American military views the employment of the military instrument to serve policy goals. The lessons learned from these conflicts are at best oversimplified. At worst they are erroneous.

The third thesis involves the present status of civil-military relations in this country. My thesis, simply stated, is that the relationship is in a state of subliminal crisis in the United States. Civil-military relations have not had the degree of study and care that they
should get. The necessary involvement of military leaders in the political aspects of decision making has drawbacks, and the increasingly narrow perspective about the utility of force in the U.S. military exacerbates a precarious problem.

Summary

The decision to use force is a critical matter for any state. Military leaders make a major contribution to these decisions. Their professional advice is a crucial element of the policy decision making process. This expert input is founded on a number of their own attitudes and lessons from earlier conflicts. The lessons of these experiences are now buried into the institutional sub-conscious of the Armed Forces, for better or worse. These attitudes and lessons should be understood by those involved in making policy decisions. How these attitudes mesh with our strategic culture and the demands placed on the U.S. in the post-Cold War environment is crucial if effective civil-military relations are to be maintained in the years ahead. Such relationships produce effective strategies that best correspond to the desired ends of policy.

What Ernest May once called the "ultimate decision," the decision to use force to resolve conflict, is an act that defines a nation. No other decision raises so many factors and questions, or puts so much treasure and blood at risk. There is no greater measure of national leadership, on the part of politicians and military leaders, than the issue of war. Ultimately, this project seeks to contribute to ensuring that this decision is made wisely and well.
CHAPTER I
THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR

The "American Way of War" used in this project is somewhat different and more narrowly constructed than the phrase made popular by the eminent American historian Russell Weigley.\(^1\) Recent scholarship underscores the conclusion that culture is the prime determinant in how societies approach the nature of warfare.\(^2\) The study of strategic culture, representing the nexus of many attitudes, beliefs, and values, is now a recognized area of strategic study. The strategic culture of the United States is the combination of both U.S. socio-political culture and our military sub-culture. Strategic culture and its attitudes shape and drive the basic beliefs of social institutions including branches of the government and the Armed Forces. These beliefs and behaviors constitute our national approach to war as a rational instrument of policy.\(^3\)

Instead of a broad definition of a strategic culture comprising the geopolitical environment, political, social, economic, and military elements and ideology of the United States, the "American Way of War" employed in the following project addresses the military's orientation and preferred operational style. Dr. Weigley aptly described this style as it evolved from the American Civil War through the world wars of the Twentieth Century. The U.S. military shows a marked predisposition for strategic offensives supported by full national mobilization, employing the economic and technological assets of the nation, to bring to bear a preponderance of power in the most direct and decisive manner possible.

Strategic culture does not necessarily move institutions in the same direction. A frequent assumption is the U.S. military’s culture is directly derived from or responsive to the society it represents. However, a brief review of history shows there are elements of contrast
between the two. It may be more accurate to describe the military as a subset of a given society. Thus, the military reflects the culture and population, but it is not a perfect reflection.

A corollary of this definition is that cultures are not necessarily perfect or correct. They are neither accurate or incorrect, they exist as the learned, however imperfectly, distillation of experience. They are shaped by geopolitics, history, and myths. The most significant influences in the military culture are lessons drawn from the cauldron of war.

Culture also generates normative values and operational codes passed on to new members through socialization and education. Military cultures have effective socialization processes such as professional schools and doctrine. The value systems inherent to cultures organize and filter information and may lead to preformatted or preconditioned responses. They also lead to predispositions about what is acceptable or not acceptable. Strategic culture can be "an indispensable but subjective guide" to the interpretation of facts, and the organization of choices, but it can be "the product of ambiguous sources, potentially a source of prejudice and self-deception."  

During periods of great pressures and tensions, such as those experienced by democratic governments in crisis situations, cultural differences between the political and military cultures come into play. The interchange is usually tense, and sometimes disruptive. What one element of the culture views as acceptable or desirable is not necessarily acceptable to the other. Successfully integrating the different perspectives, or resolving the "dichotomy between the demands of policy and the dictates of the battlefield" is an inescapable problem.
of armed conflict. Strategic cultures that contain wildly divergent attitudes between policy
makers and strategists contain fault lines that can be fatal.

While conflict is inherent, there are rules and bounds accepted by both sides for the
proper exchange of views in a democratic society. In our society these rules are structurally
institutionalized in our form of government, and in the laws legislat ing the organization and
functions of the Armed Services. However, as in all social organizations, substantial
interaction occurs in the form of internal and bureaucratic politics. In the U.S., the
interchange between political and military considerations comes under the area of civil-
military relations.

The interaction known as civil-military relations is the testing ground of "strategic
acceptability" for the selection of policy aims and the use of military force. As Clausewitz
forewarned, "purely military" viewpoints are not useful in this discourse, for politics is the
controlling factor and the source of logic. Military actions are rarely executed without
considering "the distraction of politics" and ensuring that strategic options pass muster with
the political culture. Viewed in this manner, strategic culture is the domestic "equivalent of
battlefield friction that erodes the cold rationality of the strategic process." Some strategic
cultures contain more friction than others.

In sum, strategic culture is the resulting confluence of political, social and military
viewpoints. The exchange can cause sparks of friction, as well as sparks of inspiration.
Cultures reflect deeply rooted beliefs that drive institutional preferences and perspectives.
Such preferences and perspectives have great impact during the flux of emotions and options
present during major policy decisions. There may be no more important policy decision than the decision to wage war.

We need to be aware of the influence culture plays when studying history and analyzing the actions taken by policy makers. Likewise, future decision makers and military professionals must be aware of the influence of strategic culture in national security problems. Our political and military cultures do not bring the same interests or influences to the table. Their interests and influences are not homogenous, but the final product must integrate conflicting values inherent in the strategic culture to produce a successful strategy. Thus, in the words of one group of strategists

Americans must...always be conscious of those distinct aspects of their strategic culture that both provide the undergirding strength of their policies and strategies and bias their perspectives of what is and of what is possible. Wise statecraft requires not only that external policies be shaped in terms of fundamental national character but that national predispositions be so understood as to allow compensation for the defects inherent in that character.9

Accordingly, a primary purpose of this study is to explore the experiences and hidden assumptions behind changes in American military strategy over the past two decades, to assess the validity of the perspectives and conclusions drawn by the military, and to come closer to fully understanding both the defects and strengths of our strategic culture.

American Political Culture

Our political culture is essentially bounded by the unique form of democracy perfected by the Founding Fathers two centuries ago. Ours is a liberal and pluralistic social order. It represents a sharing and distribution of competitive power centers, with an abhorrence of a centralized or overly strong source of power. This has generated a slight tinge of suspicion to large military institutions or military influence in politics.
Ours is an idealistic society, in many ways naive at best, or poorly informed at the other extreme, about the ways of the world. In many ways we are self-centered and chauvinistic about our values and political institutions. We are prone towards "mirror imaging" and overlooking key differences from the enemy's point of view. We like to export our values and social systems, as well as economic mechanisms, for emulation throughout the world. When challenged we prefer lofty goals and moral crusades to galvanize our collective efforts towards a common objective. We sometimes let idealism run to moralism in our external affairs.

Our political culture is heavily influenced by several social attitudes endemic to America. One major attitude is the American problem solving orientation which is both pragmatic and relatively focused on short term fixes. We are an impatient people used to ready access to drive-through windows and guaranteed 30-minute pizzas. Our impatience to get things done is supported by our wealthy economic position and our capacity for innovation and technology.

Our naivete and problem solving habits combine to create a "can do" attitude about challenges. This is reinforced by an activist orientation and our emphasis on rationalism. We do not accept intractability—all problems have solutions. Our sense of activism is balanced by our disinterest in foreign entanglements, and suspicions about international affairs that do not directly affect us.

Another element about American culture is the manner in which our society looks at war. War is viewed as an aberration, and not as a normal or frequent occurrence in international
relations. This is a product of our ahistoricism and our collective inability to see things the way other cultures and societies see them.\(^\text{12}\)

Thucydides was probably the first to point out that the nature of democracies created great tensions during the conduct of foreign affairs, particularly during wars. The most distinguished of commentators on the nature of democracy in America also pointed that democracies were inferior when it came to the design and execution of foreign policy. They find it hard to develop a plan and stick to it in the face of strife and internal debate. In de Tocqueville’s words

It is especially in the conduct of foreign relations that democracies appear to be decidedly inferior to other governments,...A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience.\(^\text{13}\)

De Tocqueville was critical about democracies in terms of their external relations, and believed they tended to follow their feelings instead of rational calculations. He also knew the strengths of a popular government based on the power in the people when he acknowledged that "democracy does not provide a people with the most skillful of governments," but properly aroused it can generate "a restless activity, superabundant force, and energy never found elsewhere."\(^\text{14}\)

Popular support is normally considered a constraining factor in our political culture. One of the greatest paradoxes for democracies is that the cold rational, and often secretive, nature of diplomacy and foreign relations is not consistent with generating the necessary amount of public support for a given policy. Hans Morgenthau has noted that a democratic government has two tasks: pursue policy objectives effectively and secure approval for the policies.
However, the conditions for generating public support are not necessarily identical or conducive to achieving a given policy objective. Yet, eventually all efforts will fail without the consent of the governed to any activity conducted in their name that the majority comes to believe is not conducive to their interests. This paradox is most acute during protracted conflicts that require sacrifice or heavy costs.

The challenge for democratic leaders in our strategic culture is to create and sustain public support for policies that are in the long term national interest, especially when such policy aims are not apparent on their face value. In Edmund Burke’s harsh terms, leaders exist to maintain and serve the interests of the people and must “be a pillar of the state, and not a weathercock.” This is a demanding obstacle in a diverse culture, with many competing interest groups. This challenge is one that several of our leaders have met successfully while others have failed to “prepare the battlefield” on the domestic front.

American Military Culture

The culture of the American military maintains deeply held convictions and “myths.” In some ways the military culture is not completely representative of society. As noted earlier, its reflection is not a perfect representation. This distinction has become more clear now that we have implemented an all volunteer force in place of conscription. The military’s social and power structure is not egalitarian or pluralistic, but hierarchial and heavily biased towards a conservative realism. As a social order, the military stresses the group over individualism. Elements of commonality within the strategic culture include a bias for action, an emphasis on technology, and a pragmatic approach to getting results.
Like the rest of the country, the American military is an impatient culture. Furthermore, our country has provided the resources and technology to apply decisive force for quick results. We prefer to overwhelm our opponents with mass and firepower. Our society has had a comparative advantage in resources to give us the wherewithal to do so. We are frustrated when political constraints or a lack of trust from civilians results in limitations on the use of force best suited to our technological and economic strengths.

Limited wars, while not preferred, are a frequent occurrence. We have had a long legacy of experience in such conflicts going back to the American Revolution, the Indian Wars, and various incursions in Mexico, the Philippines, and Central and Latin America. But our cultural orientation is towards large scale, production line, conventional warfare. Some find this bias reduces the utility of the U.S. military in lesser contingencies where force or the threat of force could be used as a preventive option or low cost problem solver.

The U.S. military sees force more as a tool of last resort, rather than an aberration. The military recognizes the inherent risks and costs associated with its application. When politics and diplomacy fail, other instruments such as economic sanctions should be tested and found wanting before "the dogs of war" are unleashed. The military has internalized the basic truth that military power is a blunt instrument, whose utilization cannot be entirely predicted or controlled with any degree of precision. Opening "Pandora's box" creates risks and a dynamic all its own.

There are three major elements within the American military culture that are relevant to the intended focus of this study. All three elements raise conflicts within the strategic
culture, and contain both myths and contradictions with each other. These include the central themes of:

a. Autonomy—Professionalism
b. Apoliticism—Separation of Politics and Military Power
c. Absolutism—Strategic Conception of Victory

Autonomy and Professionalism

An especially vital element of American military culture is found in its adherence to a strong sense of professionalism. The professional ethic originated late in the 18th Century after the Civil War and developed continuously until World War II. Harvard's Samuel Huntington has delineated three distinct characteristics of professionalism within the American military; its specific expertise, its corporateness, and its sense of social responsibility.

Expertise is the first element of military professionalism. Warfare is viewed as a complicated matter involving multi-disciplinary skills, special training and technical knowledge. Like most professions, entry to the profession is barred by society which mandates special qualifications and obligations to those commissioned into service.

The second aspect of professionalism involves the corporate nature of military life, particularly the officer corps. Like other professions, the military generates a degree of organizational and professional commitment which results in a strong identification with the profession. This is reinforced by the nature of military life, its work routines, social life, and deployments. It is further reinforced by professional military associations and other forms of socialization.
The third element of professionalism deals with the social responsibility assigned to the military. Like other professions, the military provides a social service and evokes an ethic of social responsibility over personal gain. The military serves the State, and its status is afforded certain rewards and considerations in pursuit of this function.

All three aspects of professionalism have drawbacks when taken to extremes. With respect to expertise, an orientation on the purely technical side of the profession limits the deft use of power. By focusing solely on the military arts and sciences to the exclusion of the social, political, and economic nature of the culture it represents, any military can reduce its effectiveness, or challenge the State's civilian policy makers. Ignorance of the political objectives or conditions when employed in conflicts abroad can result in strategic defeats like Vietnam, or Pyrrhic victories. The military must understand both its own political environment, and the political context in which it is employed.

The concept of social responsibility can also be taken to an extreme and lead to the idea that loyalty and obligations are only owed to the State as opposed to elected civil authority. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur reflects this erroneous sense of duty. In Congressional testimony, General MacArthur found curious the understanding that the military "owe primary allegiance to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the executive branch," and implied he had a higher duty to the country and its Constitution.24

MacArthur believed the idea that allegiance was owed to the State as a whole and that anything else was a dangerous proposition. Under our strategic culture, he was constitutionally and legally bound to obey the orders of those appointed over him. The Constitution clearly defines civilian control over the military. MacArthur represents a far
more dangerous concept whereby the military interprets the Constitution, and pursues policy aims independent of civilian control. While the "Man on Horseback" crossing the Rubicon (or the Potomac in our case) is not likely to occur in the U.S., the subversion of the principle of civilian authority can occur in less overt ways.

The overarching element of professionalism is the concept of professional autonomy. Professions are normally seen as self-functioning and self-regulating. Autonomy is a classic characteristic of professions, but one that must be limited in the military to constrain its power in a pluralistic government and ensure its application in accordance with the principle of civil supremacy. The military naturally prefers to conduct military operations without strict oversight or interference from civilians. This aspect of the American military culture has been noted by one of the most respected military theorists in the area of civil military relations. Sir John Hackett acknowledges that in American circles "those who have accepted that they serve the state have not necessarily bought into the complementary idea that the statesmen is the master."25

In a final assessment, several analysts believe that professionalism can be carried too far, resulting in a force "unresponsive to society, rationalizing its actions as servants of the state and cloaked in the barrier of military expertise—that is most dangerous to professional ideals and to professional compatibility with democratic society."26 The conflicting pressures of professionalism, autonomy, and the need for extensive interaction in the American political process bear close watching.
Another trend in American military culture is the relation of politics to the military institution. Apart from the interaction expected of the military in a pluralistic government, the armed forces are in theory an apolitical institution. As a firm rule it eschews any association with partisan politics, and historically has even avoided understanding the interaction of political factors with military implications in war and peacetime. At the individual level, it is operationalized in a completely neutral stance for military officers in political matters, to include not even exercising the right to vote. This tradition has lessened considerably in the last few decades.

At the institutional level though is the false separation of political matters from war. Concomitant with the rise of professionalism was the distinct separation and isolation of the U.S. military from politics. This reinforces the separation of political matters from military operations in the American military culture. The origins of apoliticism can be traced back to General William T. Sherman and his lieutenant Brevet Major General Emory Upton. Upton conducted a tour of European military establishments during the 1880's and came back with a series of recommendations to professionalize the U.S. military.

Upton's recommendations were largely lifted from the Prussian military establishment and focused on entry qualifications, promotion policies, professional education, and the establishment of the equivalent of a German general staff. Mostly unknown are several policy recommendations to separate the military from politics, that reflected Sherman's distaste for partisan politics and Von Moltke the Elder's influence in Prussia. Russell Weigley assesses Upton's overall influence on U.S. military policy:
Emory Upton did lasting harm in setting the main current of American military thought not to the task of shaping military institutions that would serve both military and national purposes, but to the futile task of demanding that the national institutions be adjusted to purely military expediency.29

Although struck down by his own hand, Emory Upton was a significant contributor to early U.S. military strategy and his ghost lives on. Emory Upton’s place in American military history is well recognized by historians, and there are indications that his influence is alive and well.30

Upton’s influence was seen during the Second World War, where contrary to popular beliefs, FDR and his military chiefs had distinctly different approaches to war. General Marshall, despite holding several positions that required extensive exposure to political issues, believed that the military should stay away from political issues, in order to maintain its "sacred trust" from the American people.31 Accordingly, Marshall failed to press several military proposals during the war, and reluctantly deferred many times to Roosevelt’s political acumen.

Even General Eisenhower, a politically astute general, could succumb to a false separation of political aims and military efforts. Pressured by Churchill to press forward rapidly to seize Berlin before the Russians could get there, Eisenhower replied, "personally and aside from all logistical, tactical or strategical implications I would be loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes."32 (emphasis added)

Because of a preference for total war, our military leaders often forget that policy aims serve as guidelines for directing war and for rational calculations involving both the magnitude and duration of conflict. Clausewitz rightfully warned against subordinating policy to military expediency. "Wars cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this
occurs...,” he warned, "the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.”

The stress generated by the view that war should be fought strictly according to military logic resulted in the famous Truman-MacArthur controversy during the Korean War. General MacArthur was a product of a culture that artificially separated policy aims from military means. He attempted to conduct the Korean war as a sphere apart from the basic policy aim of the U.S. government, and actually attempted to subvert the policy by his involvement in both domestic and international politics. After his relief, MacArthur sounded like Upton or Moltke. A theater commander, MacArthur claimed:

Commands the whole area, politically, economically and militarily. At that stage of the game when politics fails and the military takes over, you must trust the military...I do unquestionably state...there should be no artifice under the name of politics which should handicap your own men.

Moltke, Upton and MacArthur would have preferred leaving those decisions to the military, despite Clausewitz’s warning. The many dictums of Clausewitz, extensively employed in the halls of erudition and higher learning, are often "shallowly comprehended and constantly forgotten" in the U.S. military. While MacArthur represents a single case in U.S. military history, the desire to exclude politics from military operations is extant today. From one recent assessment of U.S. strategic culture:

...the American military tends to view war and peace as sharply delineated activities rather than as a continuum. The use of force tends to be seen as a last resort, a response to the failure of politics or diplomacy rather than as an instrument of politics or diplomacy.
Absolutism

The most distinguishing characteristic of the American Way of War is the military's penchant for total warfare. We prefer quick and decisive results as opposed to limited warfare, and see decisive military victories over the enemy's main force as the quickest road to that end. "There is no substitute for victory" is one of MacArthur's most often quoted expressions and an apt summarization of the American style.

This orientation towards total warfare in the U.S. military is well recorded. Professor Russell F. Weigley, the distinguished American historian, first documented our style of war. In his seminal *The American Way of War*, Weigley established a concise taxonomy of two basic approaches to warfare. He contrasted our preference for the strategy of annihilation, based on the destruction of the enemy's military capability, over the strategy of attrition. This preference was traced back to the early examples of Generals Grant and Sherman during the great internal cataclysm of the American Civil War.

Our preference is for "winning victory by the means sanctioned by the most deeply rooted historical American conceptions of strategy, the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and his ability to wage war." Our institutional preference, reinforced by both our national character and resources, is for total warfare fought for unlimited ends by the complete destruction of the enemy's capacity to resist including both the enemy's military forces and war-making capability. America's vast economic base and advanced technological state have matched our preferred military strategy very well.

The preference for strategies of annihilation is not unique to the American military culture. Military organizations have historically preferred offensive strategies. Some
research supports a finding that military organizations prefer offensive doctrines, regardless of political or technological circumstances, because it maximizes professional autonomy and minimizes civilian interference. The institutional motivation for offensive warfare “to disarm the adversary quickly and decisively by offensive means” should be examined carefully in each context. Under conditions of weak civilian control, as occurred prior to World War I, the military’s “purity in its devotion to victory,” has not always served politicians or democratic states well.

The two major approaches to warfare are also represented in two major groupings of military officers. Morris Janowitz, the prominent sociologist and author, made a distinction between “absolutists” and “pragmatists” in categorizing professional soldiers in the U.S. military. The former are military officers who believe in the traditional type of total military victory rather than the measured application of military force and its relative consequence to a specific situation. Pragmatists are more inclined to understand the utility of employing partial means for specified purposes when those ends are limited in nature.

Clearly, coming out of the Second World War, the absolutist tradition was firmly entrenched in the American Way of War. During the 1950’s, some military officers and academics, particularly Army Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor, developed a theory of “Flexible Response” to describe the need for a more flexible range of options than Armageddon and the over-reliance on nuclear retaliation contained in Eisenhower’s low budget New Look strategy. Taylor’s strategy was eventually adopted by the new Kennedy administration and was an underlying element in the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and America’s entry into Vietnam.
The scars of Vietnam reinforced the position and attitudes of *absolutists*, or Warrior Generals, who descend from a long lineage of great names in American military history including Grant, Sherman, Pershing, MacArthur, Lemay, and perhaps now Schwarzkopf. This represents a long and proud pantheon in the American military culture. Pragmatists have their own luminaries including Generals George Marshall, Matthew Ridgway, and Max Taylor, but they out significantly outnumbered.

Absolutist attitudes have come into conflict with policy when America has pursued war for limited objectives with limited means. The first instance was during the Korean war, and resulted in the relief of General MacArthur. MacArthur never accepted the basic concept of limitations on means. War, he said, meant that all other means were exhausted, and "there is no alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very objective is victory—not prolonged indecision." MacArthur remains the most obvious representation of the American style, although admittedly at the extreme end. His public statements during the hearing following his relief reflect both the artificial separation of political and military considerations and absolutism.

To MacArthur anything less than a total approach introduced the "concept of appeasement, the concept that when you use force you can limit that force." He expressly disagreed with a limitless extension of bloodshed without creating the potential for the decisive battle to destroy the enemy in the minimum amount of time and loss.

This does not suggest that the military is heavy handed or prone to military interventions. Quite the contrary, the U.S. military has been historically reluctant to recommend military action. This resistance to resort to force is largely based on the U.S. military's understanding
of the dynamic and costly nature of war, in political, social, and military terms. However, while reluctant to resort to arms, the military does not support limitations or restraints on the nature of force once the decision to employ military means has been made.

Over the past 20 years, American military experience has retained and even reinforced the absolutist tradition in the American military culture. Our experience in the jungles of Vietnam, and limited excursions throughout the 1980's where U.S. forces were employed in ambiguous situations for limited purposes, was not accepted as consistent with the American Way of War. Restraints on the effective employment of the full panoply of American armed might was gravely frustrating.

The problem, however, is that prescriptions like absolutism do not match the contingent nature of warfare. The bias for short, intense, conventional, and total warfare creates conflict when the political situation does not permit the unlimited application of American force. A direct result of our preference for strategies of annihilation with maximum means for unlimited ends, is a distaste and poor capacity for unconventional warfare or for messy protracted conflicts with extensive constraints or political oversight.

Our preferences and professional ethos has resulted in a poor track record in "small wars" which by their very definition are limited and often protracted in time. "Resistance to a central role for special operations forces or recognition of the importance of the low intensity challenge continue to be deeply rooted" in our culture and the senior leadership. The central issue remains one of reconciling our need for effective intervention in situations not conducive to the organizational paradigms of our military culture, with the our status as a global power with global interests. It could be argued that either our national or political
culture place us at a disadvantage in such situations. It could be further advanced that our strategic culture precludes effective intervention in such conflicts, and thus, we should avoid them. Others, however, have concluded that our poor track record is more the function of the military's cultural distaste for less than clear cut situations that are more conducive to their preferred operating style, concluding that:

The most substantial constraints on America's ability to conduct small wars result from the resistance of the American defense establishment to the very notion of engaging in such conflicts, and from the unsuitability of that establishment for fighting such wars.

However, past history continues to reveal situations where civilian authority deemed intervention necessary. Can our strategic culture, particularly the military institution, be adapted to the peculiar requirements of limited war?

Civil-Military Relations: The Modern Professional Officer and the State

Civil-military relations constitute the arena where political considerations and military viewpoints merge. It is also the area of national security policy where political and functional perspectives clash. Within the American Way of War, civil-military relations is where the tectonic plates between our political culture and the military culture grind into one another. The sole lubricant that reduces friction is the principle of civilian control of the military which is embodied in both law and our professional ethic. This area of study is frequently overlooked in national security studies, although well recognized as one of the timeless dimensions of conflict.

Within the literature on civil-military relations, there are two schools of thought about the maintenance of civilian control. The first school of thought emphasizes separation of
military perspectives and the military from the political process entirely. This line of thought emphasizes that the military has little time to be involved in, nor is competent at, the intrinsically complicated matters of international and domestic politics. This school, most ably represented by Samuel Huntington, prefers a form of objective control over the military by keeping them in a neutral and isolated position from politics. This form of control is consistent with the traditional and the absolutist approaches to military force. Civilian control is essentially maintained by excluding the military from inputs on anything other than an advisory role on technical matters.

The other school in civil-military relations theory holds that political factors must be integrated with military advice and military considerations to produce effective policy decisions. Thus, the subjective control form of civilian control argues for maintaining civilian control over the military by integrating the military as a representative into policy making decisions. The military’s interests and advice become "fused" into the political and decision making process under this line of thinking. The "modern" general in this scenario reflects the Soldier/Statesman mold, vice the traditional, purely functional Warrior. The distinction to be emphasized in this alternative is that the military remains nonpartisan in domestic politics in this role. This view of the military’s role is closer to Janowitz’s pragmatist categorization.

Table I below captures the two basic schools of civil-military relations and contrasts some differences in the interaction and focus of the military in policy making. The American Way of War was originally built around the traditionist, absolutist style and relied upon an objective form of control. This traditional approach may no longer hold.
Subjective control is frequently criticized on two bases. The first being the lack of time for senior military officials to pick up the necessary perspectives and knowledge to function and advise on political-military matters. The other more frequently cited observation is a concern over the politicization of the military, and the potential loss of an unvarnished military perspective on matters. The Iran-Contra Affair of the 1980's is evidence of the dangers of politicizing the military.

However, there is an even greater danger than infusing the military into political matters and sacrificing their detached professionalism. This deals with the corruption of the professional ethos and the reduction of its social responsibility as an unconditional servant of the State. Infusing the military as a distinct institution in political discussions permits the military to represent itself, and insert its preferences and biases, as professional military advice.

Such a corrupted sense of professionalism would seriously undermine civilian control, and the effectiveness of civil-military relations, during a crisis. "The principle of civilian control requires not only that the military not be policy makers," notes one recent examination of the

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### Table I

Forms and Roles of Civil-Military Control
issue by a team of political scientists, "but also that they not be seen (nor see themselves) as a separate constituency whose interests are to be considered in policy debates."32 This requires a delicate equilibrium, and a refined sense of professionalism.

However, the alternative, objective control, is an even greater sin. Politicization of the military must be avoided, but since the nature of war, and democracy, mixes political factors and military considerations, the military is and must be politically conscious. "To presume that military professionals should remain unconcerned about the political and social conditions of potential aggressors, and that the military should not be involved until the first shot is fired" is to neglect the lessons of modern war.33 To extend Clemenceau's maxim—war is too serious to be left solely to Generals or Statesmen.

During the past two decades the rise of the modern Soldier/Statesman has been clearly ascendent in the United States. This is consistent with the operative mode of civil-military relations, but conflicts with the conclusion that absolutism remains the predominant view of force in the military culture. In the past generation, numerous military officers, many with advanced education and experience outside a traditional military career pattern have emerged. Most of these officers have served in the White House in crisis management situations, involving extensive military and political decision making. The list includes Generals Haig, Powell, Scowcroft, Colonel McFarlane, and Admiral Poindexter. During one point during the late 1980's, four consecutive National Security Advisors were retired or active military officers. The military's political consciousness and influence has increased with this representation.
Summary

The foregoing review supports the conclusion that the American Way of War now includes extensive representation of the military in policy making circles, and the supporting contention that subjective control is the operative form of maintaining civilian control over the military today.

The difficulties of subjective control, particularly given the military's pervasive integration in the national security bureaucracy, needs to be underscored. Furthermore, the military's professional culture, absolutist preferences, and political presence could make for difficult times. We have taken the issue of civil-military relations for granted. In a period when the Cold War military establishment is being dismantled, and when extensive societal influences are being imposed by fiat over the advice of the professional military leadership, harmonious relations are at risk. While a crisis is not inevitable, the potential exists and anyone who denies that "today's military shows symptoms of evident distemper" ignores grave risks.  

The potential for conflict between elements of our strategic culture are greatest during deliberations over the employment of military force to achieve policy objectives. Governments face nothing more serious than a decision to use violent means to resolve conflict. As stated very early in this chapter wise statecraft requires that we understand the predispositions of our national culture, including the military element, to account for the defects and differences inherent in their character. Wise statesman will pay careful attention to "strategic culture" and the state of civil-military relations in these decisions. Professor Huntington has warned:

23
Nations which develop a properly balanced pattern of civil-military relations have a great advantage in the search for security. They increase their likelihood of reaching right answers to operating issues of military policy. Nations which fail to develop a balanced pattern of civil-military relations squander their resources and run uncalculated risks.

The American Way of War has changed in subtle ways over the past two decades. The next four chapters will trace these changes and assess their implications on our search for security and a properly balanced pattern of civil-military relations.
CHAPTER I END NOTES


4. John Keegan has argued that the culture of the warrior can never be the same as the broader civilization it protects. Keegan, A History of Warfare, p. xvi.


6. Ibid., p. 6.


14. Ibid., p. 244.


23. Ibid., pp. 7-18.


28. Moltke thought there was a strict separation between policy and war, and thus statesmen and generals, writing that "the politician should fall silent the moment that mobilization begins." Moltke put great faith in the technical and operational virtuosity of the military preferring that "the direction of the military effort should be defined by the soldiers alone." As Moltke saw it "politics uses war for the attainment of its ends; it operates decisively at the beginning and the end of the conflict..." In the middle, the military directs "its efforts towards the highest goal which the means available make attainable." In this way, it aids politics best, working only for its objectives, but in its operations independent of it. See Gehard Ritter, *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany*, Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1969, Vol 1. and Gordon Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1955.


35. Snow and Drew, p. 3.

36. Carnes Lord, "American Strategic Culture in Small Wars," *Small Wars and
The same point is stressed by Downey and Metz, p. 38.


38. Ibid., pp. 464-465.


43. Spanier, p. 222.

44. Spanier, p. 6.

45. The military man rarely favors war, despite the stereotype of the "military mind." See Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, p. 68-69. The work of Dr. Richard Betts is the classic assessment of this attitude in the post-World War II American military. Betts has recently completed a new chapter adding the post-Vietnam era to his original dissertation. His original thesis was that the military was more cautious about the use of force than civilian policy makers. His new extension only found this to be more obvious and extreme in the post-Vietnam era. Richard K. Betts *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, pp. 214-236.


CHAPTER II

THE LEGACIES OF VIETNAM

Over twenty years have passed since America's withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973, and yet no national consensus exists regarding what lessons should be drawn from that traumatic experience. The only common conclusion is the universal cry of "No More Vietnams," without any agreement on what that actually means in political or military terms. To members of Congress, it means that an Imperial Executive should not be given blank checks and permitted to let the nation "drift" into war. To civilian academics, the lessons deal with foreign policy and the inherent defects in the policy of containment. To the media it means not relying on the military or the government for the truth. To military officers, there are numerous meanings. It could mean the end of limited warfare, the end of civilian micro-management and systems analysis, or the demise of gradualism. One's view of the war in Southeast Asia literally is based on where one sat.

The U.S. government never conducted a comprehensive assessment of the failures of Vietnam. If one had been attempted, the dichotomy in the views between civilians, academics, and the military would have been deafening. The ensuing debate would have rivaled the tenacity and chaos of the Battle of Ia Drang. The debate still goes on today.

The following chapter will draw on the professional literature to determine the military's definition of "No More Vietnams." The major lessons have been organized into four separate areas; clarity of purpose, how force was used or "playing to win," civil-military relations, and popular support. These categorizations were deduced from the Weinberger Doctrine as the major focus areas for lessons derived from the Vietnamese conflict.
The lessons culled from the literature reflect only the positions and attitudes of the professional military. The principal interest of this research project is assessing the internalized attitudes about the use of force that exists in the military culture. Thus, the views of civilian executives, strategists, and historians are noted, but are not immediately relevant. The focus is on determining what the U.S. military has accepted as the truth, and how this is built into the institutional biases and preferences of that culture. These will be assessed and compared with other views where appropriate to gauge the validity of the lessons. In the end, the reader will be to evaluate the summarization made by one officer who came to the "ineluctable conclusion that if the Army has learned any lessons from Vietnam, it has learned many of the wrong ones." 

Clarity of purpose

It is a fundamental principle of U.S. military doctrine that "every military operation must be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective." Many military writers have criticized the civilian leadership of the United States for never having established clearly defined objectives in Southeast Asia.

Not the least important or the most daunting of war’s many tasks is the determination of exactly what purpose is to be secured by "unleashing the dogs of war." "The essence of war," notes one strategist, "consists of the political decision that a given cause is worth killing and sacrificing for." No one, wrote Clausewitz, presuming he has any sense, starts a war without a clear picture of exactly what he wants to achieve by resorting to war, and generally how he intends to use military means in the conduct of the war. Clausewitz called this the first and supreme act of judgment during war. However, it is largely accepted that
this advice is frequently overlooked. Still, "the supreme decision in war, the one that makes a conflict a war, is designating an objective as important enough to kill and die for."

The American military exited from Vietnam era with the conclusion that U.S. policy makers had violated Clausewitz's first dictum and had never made the first and most supreme judgement. Colonel Harry G. Summers would have us believe that "American political objectives were never clear during the entire course of the war."

This conclusion is supported by two research efforts. The first was conducted by Nebraska professor Hugh M. Arnold who examined official justifications and pronouncements regarding American political objectives in Southeast Asia from 1949 through 1967. He found that the American leadership announced a total of 22 separate rationales for our involvement ranging from resisting Communist aggression, conducting a counterinsurgency, and after 1968, stretching our position to preserving American credibility and commitments.

A more focused effort targeted the attitudes of military officers. Army General Douglas Kinnard conducted a formal survey in 1974 of 173 officers who had commanded brigades and above during the war. "Almost 70 percent of the Army generals who managed the war were uncertain of its objectives," was his major finding. To Kinnard and many others this reflects a major failure—"the inability of policy-makers to frame tangible, obtainable goals." This study is cited by many critics of the government's conduct of the war.

Another senior participant, Lieutenant General Phillip Davidson, the author of a massive history of the war, believes that up until the advent of the Nixon administration, the U.S. could never determine clearly its national objective in Vietnam. However, it is not clear if such criticisms reflect a criticism of the objectives's ambiguity or if it was the goal itself that
was not sufficient. The one unequivocal statement of national policy is found in NASM 288 dated 17 March 1964, which clearly states that our objective was "an independent, non-communist South Vietnam." 12

Davidson finds the NASM so broad as to be worthless since it could be interpreted in a number of ways. 13 Even worse, "the objective was essentially defensive in nature and did not define success or victory and lacked any appeal around which the American people could rally." 14 Davidson’s comments point to a different, more qualitative objection about objectives. To the military, objectives need to define victory in military terms, require offensive means, and ensure public support.

Generals who fought in Vietnam were not the only veterans who complained about the lack of clarity of purpose. General Bruce Palmer, author of an excellent history of what he calls "the Incomprehensible War," uses an illustrative anecdote. He writes of Pittsburgh Steeler fullback Rocky Blier who upon returning to the Steelers after his Vietnam tour, noted "no one told me what it was all about." "I wanted some reason for doing what I was going to do," he stated, "but I never got it." 15 The general conclusion from the literature is that the U.S. government was peculiarly inept at making a convincing case about what it was trying to achieve in Vietnam, but not from lack of trying. 16

Playing to Win

The second lesson or legacy from Vietnam is that U.S. military forces should be employed decisively and be permitted to win. The reverse corollary from this lesson is that U.S. forces were not permitted to win in Vietnam because of political constraints imposed by civilian authorities in Washington. Deep in the minds of many military officers is the firm
belief the war was won on the battlefield tactically, but lost at the strategic and political level due to self-imposed limitations on force or strategic incompetence from micro-managing politicians and amateurs. The lesson is that in future wars limitations should be minimized and the American military should not have to "fight with one hand tied behind its back." One can find vestiges, and counter-arguments, to this legacy in the professional literature from military writers in generally two phases.

In Phase I, the participants and the institutional defenders were the most vocal and voluminous (1978-1982). Later, in the second phase, a number of junior officers who did not serve in Vietnam have applied a degree of distance and objective analysis to the war, and have come to different conclusions. Thus, the legacy of "playing to win" in the professional culture appears mixed.

The elements of this legacy can be seen in much of the Vietnam literature. The first vestiges began immediately after the war by the published memoirs of many of the senior military officers who led the military effort, including General Westmoreland, the Commanding General of U.S. forces in the Military Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV), in his memoirs _A Soldier Reports_. Similarly, Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), criticized the management of the U.S. war effort in his post-war critique _A Strategy for Defeat_.

General Westmoreland identified himself with the MacArthur dictum that there is no substitute for victory. Writing from his retirement, he asserted that Vietnam had been a winnable war, particularly in 1968, and that MacArthur's words should have been heeded. "For all who would face reality," he noted, "the truth of those words was proven not only
in South Vietnam but in all of Indochina."\(^{17}\)

Looking back on his nearly five years in Vietnam, and his four years as Army Chief of Staff, Westmoreland laid America's defeat at the foot of our "ill considered policy of graduated response." To the former Commanding General of MACV, the war was still winnable after the defeat of the enemy Tet offensive. If President Johnson had permitted him to change our strategy and authorized operations into Laos and Cambodia, coupled with the intensified bombing and mining of Haiphong, "the North Vietnamese would doubtlessly would have broken."\(^{18}\)

Thus, General Westmoreland's assessment is that the war should have been expanded, despite the political ramifications from domestic and international sources. Implicit in his argument is the belief that the North Vietnamese would have been forced to the negotiating table by this sudden escalation and the realization we were willing to permit the military to decisively engage NVN forces wherever they took sanctuary. The strategy of attrition and gradualism doomed us to a prolonged endeavor. In this matter, General Westmoreland quoted Sun Tzu—"There has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefitted."

Admiral Sharp was equally critical of political limitations from Washington. In his caustic memoirs, *The Strategy of Defeat*, he was particularly critical about the handcuffs that had been placed on the application of air power and the incremental manner in which air power was applied throughout the war.\(^{19}\)

**The Institutional Defenders**

The next element in the first phase in the literature begins with the publication of Colonel
H. G. Summers, Jr. On Strategy. Colonel Summers is a veteran of both Korea and Vietnam, and is a decorated infantryman with a flare for strategic analysis. Colonel Summers arguments are wrapped into a Clausewitzian framework that is often as contradictory as the Prussian philosopher himself. Colonel Summer’s is perhaps the leading proponent of the "tactical victory, strategic defeat" school of thought on the Southeast Asia conflict. While many acerbic quotes can be taken from the book to criticize civilians, Colonel Summer’s assessment is far more balanced and is just as quick to blame senior leaders for the strategic errors of the war.

Colonel Summers believes that the fundamental error of the war was the failure to properly identify the nature of the war. The author believes that the Army overconcentrated on the unconventional aspects of the war, and overinvested in counterinsurgency operations.

Summers argues that the U.S. military should have taken the tactical offensive to isolate the battlefield by employing the El Paso plans for a major incursion into Laos that he assisted in developing during his tour in Vietnam. This position is consistent with General Westmoreland and many other senior Army officers. By establishing a major Corps-level blocking forces across the DMZ and into the Laotian panhandle, the argument goes, we would have struck at the source of the war, the North's aggression and support to the Viet Cong. Instead, writes Summers, we turned to symptoms—the "simulated insurgency" in the South—rather than causes.

The cardinal principle of war, according to Summers, is that offensive action is needed to achieve decisive results. This permits our forces to gain the initiative and facilitates the
imposition of our will upon the opponent. Military forces was employed defensively in South Vietnam, according to this line of reasoning, and military forces were maldeployed in many security operations, security assistance programs, and pacification efforts that should have been addressed by another agency. Summers adamantly holds this position, despite the many "search and destroy" operations mounted in the 1967-1969 timeframe.

Summers also argues that we essentially misemployed our military by concentrating on "the other war" the pacification effort. He underscores the need to understand the nature of the armed forces. "They are designed, equipped and trained for a specific task:" he wrote, "to fight, and win on the battlefield." They are a "battle ax," a crude instrument of national policy with only a singular purpose, "not a force for providing for nation-building activities."22

Underpinning Summers argument is the premise that the American Way of War is not only a function of our own unique strategic culture, but a fundamental and universal military principle. "Carrying the war to the enemy and the destruction of his armed forces and his will to fight through the strategic offensive is the classic way wars are fought and won."23 Such arguments clash with advocates of limited war which Summers apparently takes great relish in castigating as "academic gurus" who never saw a battlefield.

This assessment has been very popular, and was distributed upon publication to the White House and to all serving Army general officers. It is required reading at most major institutions of professional military education, where Colonel Summers is an invited speaker on an annual basis.
The Revisionists

A new set of lessons learned, or more accurately a new set of critics to the legacies of "playing to win" emerged in the mid-1980's. Two specific efforts are of note because of their superb scholarship and the author's standing as military officers vice political scientists or journalists. These two efforts are The Army and Vietnam by then Major Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., U.S. Army, and The Limits of Air Power by Major Mark Clodfelter, U.S. Air Force. Krepinevich's book stands in stark contrast with those sympathetic to Colonel Summer's interpretation about the application of overwhelming force in Vietnam.

Krepinevich's argument is succinct. Instead of adapting its institutional mindset and capabilities to the war at hand, a largely unconventional conflict, the U.S. Army doggedly insisted on fighting the war consistent with the American Way of War as it understood it—the application of conventional forces and massive amounts of firepower to decisively engage and destroy the main battle force of the opponent.

Dr. Krepinevich accuses the Army of remaining fixated with its own institutional paradigms and of "refighting the last war" despite the dramatically different circumstances it found itself in Vietnam. When the Army came to Vietnam, it was neither trained or equipped to fight effectively in an insurgency conflict, and stuck to what Krepinevich calls the Army Concept—a style of warfare consistent with the American Way of War deeply embedded in the service's psyche or memory. The Concept reflects the army's precept on how war's ought to be fought—short wars with decisive military battles relying on technology and fire power.

This says little for the institutional agility of the U.S. Army in particular and the
American military as a whole. Moreover, Dr. Krepinevich, who has recently retired from active duty, but who is still deeply engaged in the study and assessment of U.S. national security thinks that the Army still lacks the ability to adjust its organization, tactics and doctrine to properly counter its opponent in an unconventional conflict comments:

For the Army, the Vietnam War still represents a series of unanswered questions, the foremost of which is; How could the army of the most powerful nation on earth, materially supported on a scale unprecedented in history, equipped with the most sophisticated technology in an age when technology has assumed the role of a god of war, fail to emerge victorious against a numerically inferior foe of lightly armed irregulars?23

Contrary to the positions of the participants or the institutional defenders, the revisionists and a number of Service unconventional warfare experts feel that the U.S. Army persistently ignored counterinsurgency warfare. According to Summers, the internal guerrilla threat was ignored because it would "wither on the vine" if external logistics support and infiltration from North Vietnam was eliminated. The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and the support of the North were seen as the center of gravity. This permitted us to focus on the war which we were best prepared for, both in material and doctrinal terms. The revisionists feel that we under-resourced the internal threat defense and the pacification program, a point supported by several government officials who served in Vietnam during this time.24

Thus, Krepinevich's argument runs directly counter to Summer's assessment that we lost the war by our distraction with civilian strategists and guerilla warfare. The revisionist argument is that we lost the war because the military ignored the revolutionary and political aspects of the war. Our only lens of looking at the war made it seem a conventional military problem. Thus, "with its perspective on counterinsurgency distorted by its Concept, writes Krepinevich, "the Army convinced itself that airmobile forces provided the ability to conduct
counterinsurgency operations using traditional operational doctrine.²⁷

Thus, to the new school, the war was lost not by the fact that we were not permitted to win, but that the American military remained true to its own operational concepts about conventional war, based the firepower, technological and logistical dimensions of strategy while ignoring the political and social dimension that formed the foundation of an unconventional war. Taking the argument to its conclusion, Krepinevich feels the army failed because "It expended human resources at a relatively high rate and material resources in a profligate manner as part of a strategy of attrition." The goal was to win a quick victory. Yet the U.S. achieved neither a quick victory nor the maintenance of support on the home front for a continued U.S. presence.²⁸

The disproportionate emphasis on the external threat made the war more manageable in terms of the American Way of War. Yet, it turned out to be the wrong strategy according to the unconventional war school. "The tragedy is," writes Krepinevich, "that the nature of the war required that emphasis be placed, first and foremost, on the internal threat to the stability and legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government."²⁹ This is again, in direct opposition to Colonel Summer's views that the war was lost because we dissipated our attention on "the other war" and failed to see the conventional threat presented by the PAVN in the North.

Air Power Revisionism

Like the Army, the U.S. Air Force was anxious to put Vietnam behind it and thus failed to learn anything from it.³⁰ What ever it did gain dealt with strategic bombing, tactics, or technology. Strategic lessons or errors were quickly phased out by a selective sorting of
history. Like the Army, the Air Force did not teach anything about Vietnam in its professional schools, and it was not mentioned in their doctrinal manuals.\textsuperscript{31}

Air power was a significant element in the war against North Vietnam. A total of 8,000,000 tons of bombs were delivered, with over 6 million tons by the Air Force alone. The Air Force lost 617 fixed wing planes, and the United States lost a total of 8,588 fixed and rotary wing aircraft.\textsuperscript{32} Air power enthusiasts almost universally concluded it was the limits on air power not the inherent limitations of air power that failed to bring the war to a conclusive ending in short order.\textsuperscript{33}

Like the Army, the Air Force’s "unhealthy myths" resulted in what air power historian Dr. Earl Tilford calls a subtle "stab in the back" thesis.\textsuperscript{34} The myths resulted in an institutional form of self-delusion about the efficacy of air power in Vietnam. The most pervasive of these myths is that airpower, specifically the Linebacker II campaign, won the war in 1972 by forcing the North Vietnamese to agree to our terms in Paris. The contention is that if air power had been employed unfettered earlier, in 1965, the war could be terminated quickly and more favorably. In Admiral Thomas Moorer’s words, "Gradualism forced airpower into an expanded and inconclusive war of attrition."\textsuperscript{35}

To subsequent air power scholars the Air Force developed a series of "unhealthy myths" that prevent it from learning anything from the war and from looking at it uncritically.\textsuperscript{36} The military’s professional advice was for a decisive and massive air campaign was rejected, by the "flagrant arrogance or naive wishful thinking" of a few civilians.\textsuperscript{37} Instead of a crushing "quick squeeze," the civilians tried their own form of political signalling and gradualism. The result was the incremental "on again, off again" approach of Rolling
Thunder. This three year campaign was a bust. With targets picked by the President, and additional restrictions placed on mission size, collateral damage, and routes, both Air Force and Navy aviators felt that the time honored principles and concepts of strategic bombing had been utterly misused.38

Strategic bombing is close to the central operational values of the U.S. Air Force. According to Dr. Caroline Ziemke of the Institute for Defense Analysis, it is as central to the identity of the Air Force as the New Testament is to the Catholic Church.39 Without strategic bombing, there is no need for an air force. Thus, it was impossible for the Air Force to seriously reconsider its organizational raison d'être.

Yet this strategic bombing doctrine was the root problem in how the Air Force approached the air campaign over North Vietnam. Largely drawn from the lessons of the Combined Bomber Offensive of World War II, the Air Force applied what it knew to be the central truths about air power. This strategic bombing doctrine "led Air Force leaders to believe that North Vietnam, a preindustrial, agricultural nation, could be subdued by the same kind of bombing that helped to defeat industrialized Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan."40

In the same way that Krepinevich's argument represented a contrarian view, a number of Air Force officers and air power historians began to dismantle the scaffolding of myths surrounding the Rolling Thunder and Linebacker bombing campaigns. The best of these is Major Mark A. Clodfelter's The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam who rejects the "we had our hands tied" theory. Clodfelter's major argument is the Air Force misapplied their European war doctrine to the Vietnamese conflict without any thought. In effect, the Air Force followed their preferred Concept just like the Army.
Clodfelter’s thesis is that the failure of U.S. airpower in Vietnam cannot be blamed entirely on a lack of resolve by civilian politicians, micromanagement, constraints, or a myopic media. The problems experienced by the Air Force were caused as much by poor strategy, lack of targets, undeveloped technology, and poor coordination between Services, as by civilian oversight.\(^{41}\)

Clodfelter shows persuasively that any significance between the effects of the different bombing campaigns had less to do with the efficacy of air power or civilian mismanagement and more to do with the changes in technology, and the differences in available targets when the North converted from guerrilla to a more conventional military strategy in preparing to invade the South. Clodfelter’s superlative scholarship, and position at the Air University show that the Air Force, like the Army, has passed into a new phase in assessing the lessons of Vietnam.

The legacy of Vietnam remains mixed when it comes to how force should be applied. The veterans of Vietnam claim the war supports the absolutist position about using force quickly and decisively. The argument still goes on today:

\textit{No More Vietnams means to me that when we do launch military forces in that noble cause of freedom we must do so with an absolute desire to win. When we go to war, we must go to win—that or stay at home.}^{42}

The revisionists counter that military had no effective strategies for winning and ignored the contingent aspects of the war. Dr. Ronald Spector, a historian who served in Vietnam in 1968 as a Marine, feels the root cause of the military’s failure was its fixation on its traditional style of warfare which proved pointless and ineffective. Based on a position developed two decades after the war, Spector insists the failure to adapt to the situation
contributed to the stalemate and indecision that was the war's primary characteristic.  

Which school of thought is now operational among the Officers that comprise today's Officer corps? Recent research on the issue has concluded "the Army has no institutionally accepted Vietnam strategic critique" of the Vietnam war. An assessment of "America's Longest War" eludes consensus—a dubious distinction for an organization planning on prosecuting future low-intensity conflict situations. But the same research disproves the hypothesis that the U.S. Army specifically, and the Officer Corps in general has internalized an "all or nothing" approach based on Vietnam. In a survey of nearly 200 Army Officers attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College course at Leavenworth, the following question was asked, "Which statement below comes closest to characterizing your overall views on the "lessons" of Vietnam?" A narrow majority support the view that the U.S. did not have the right strategy to win the war, and overlooked key elements of the strategic situation.  

This pre-Desert Storm attitudinal survey suggests that the military culture has eventually moved away from Colonel Summers' view of the war, and accepted something closer to the conclusions of the revisionists.

Civil-Military Relations

The area of civil-military relations remains one of the least conclusive legacies from Vietnam. Much of the literature from the military perspective resents the impression that the military's performance was less than adequate, and the general opinion exists that the military was cast as the scapegoat. The participants hoped that history would eventually become more favorable to military than to the politicians and policy makers who called the shots.

As one author has noted, Vietnam "was a painful reminder for the military that they, not
the transient occupants of high office, generally bear the heaviest burden during armed conflict.\textsuperscript{47} The Vietnam experience reinforced the military perception that it was they who would bear the burden of blame in the policy port mortems. As one Army general quipped, "Those who ordered the meal were not there when the waiter brought the check."\textsuperscript{48}

Regrettably, one of the lessons learned and institutionalized by many of the senior level participants is that civil-military relations were largely satisfactory. In his very last paragraph of his memoirs, General Westmoreland proudly observes, "the American people can be particularly proud that their military leaders scrupulously adhered to a basic tenet of our Constitution prescribing civilian control of the military."\textsuperscript{49} General Westmoreland may be proud, but the American people should not be. The Vietnam War was fought employing a narrow interpretation of the proper interplay between policy makers and military men, and the end result speaks for itself. We can be satisfied that the principle of civilian control was maintained, but it is pretty clear that effective interaction between the Statesman and the Generals was far from satisfactory.

One Army general, in an understatement, wrote after the war that "civil-military relations in the United States, especially at the highest levels where political and strategic issues become entwined, have not always been close and harmonious."\textsuperscript{50} General Palmer disagrees with premise that the military had their hands tied, and can pass off all blame. The military must share the onus of failure as well, he insists. He is especially critical of the senior military leaders in Washington for being unable to articulate their misgivings and communicate effectively to the policy makers. "The central point is that U.S military leaders failed to get across the point that our strategy was not working," and that it would achieve
U.S. policy objectives within a reasonable cost.\textsuperscript{31}

The poor interaction between civilian policy makers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff began with Kennedy's assessment of the decision making process and inputs that led to the Bay of Pigs debacle. The general conclusion drawn by President Kennedy and his advisors was that the military viewpoint's was excessively narrow and the military lacked the ability to integrate social, political, and economic factors into their assessments and advice.

This conclusion was immediately reinforced by the events surrounding the Cuban missile crisis. Both Kennedy's took away several negative lessons about the flexibility and depth of recommendations from the Joint Chiefs. Eventually he felt compelled to issue a national security action memorandum to the Joint Chiefs charging them to include political and economic factors into their recommendations.\textsuperscript{52} Then Vice President Lyndon Johnson apparently picked up the same perspective on the quality and clarity of advice given by the Pentagon during these same crises. This fostered a degree of mutual distrust manifested when LBJ decided to control target selection and rules of engagement from the Oval Office itself. Likewise, the Secretary of Defense, in a often cited example, had a clash with then Chief of Naval Operations over operational details during the Cuban missile crisis which did not increase his confidence that the U.S. military would remain, in the midst of super-heated confrontations with other nuclear powers, a responsive instrument of national policy.\textsuperscript{53}

During the war, LBJ was particularly harsh on his military advisors. He dressed down the Army Chief of Staff for "not giving me any...solutions to this damn little piss-ant country...I don't need ten generals to come in here...and tell me to bomb. I want some solutions...some answers."\textsuperscript{54} During the war, LBJ desrcied the overreliance of American
military leaders on strategic bombing. He was also worried about controlling the generals, and warned Westmoreland "don't pull a MacArthur on me." His solution was to retain control of the targeting process to preclude inadvertent or deliberate bombing missions from escalating the war.

For their part, the military leaders were critical of the intensive micromanagement they received at the Pentagon and from the White House. The literature is replete with strong criticisms of "McNamara's Whiz kids," the arrogance of Ivy League political scientists, the pipe-smoking professors with "tree full of owls" ideas. Nothing more grated the professional military establishment than the rise of the ubiquitous systems analysts who introduced the overly quantitative and mechanistic Planning Programming and Budgeting System into the art of war. "By default," insists Colonel Summers, "the military had allowed strategy to be dominated by civilian analysts--political scientists in academia and systems analysts in the defense bureaucracy."a

Yet when given a chance by the new administration in 1969, Dr. Henry Kissinger claims the military never offered useful strategic recommendations when Nixon came in and was eager for fresh military advice.7 Clausewitz warned that policy cannot be a tyrant and cannot get involved in tactical and operational details. Policy, he said, does not deal with the posting of guards and the sending of patrols. Yet during Vietnam, policy makers did post guards and send patrols. But the military never forcefully put its foot down and insisted on the proper division of labor between policy makers and military professionals.

The lesson learned was that politicians would hold the military responsible for policy failures even when politicians imposed limitations, failed to heed professional advice, or
ignored the costs and risks inherent in using force. The senior military closed ranks after Vietnam and become even further reluctant to recommend the use of force.

**Popular Support**

Another popular conclusion about Vietnam among the military is the belief that the war was lost at home because we violated Clausewitz’s dictum "the people provide the passion and the motivation for war." Explicit among various commentators is the belief that the civilian leadership made several key strategic errors during the course of the war to maintain public support. Within this line of reasoning are complaints about our:

- Failure to formally declare war
- Failure to mobilize the reserves
- Failure to ensure the draft was equitable
- Failure to rally public support

The lesson learned by the American military in Vietnam involves the third leg of the Clausewitz’s "remarkable trinity"—the people. The consensus, particularly acute among Army officers, seems to suggest that the American people has a duty and a role in the authorization of military force, beyond that delegated to their elected representatives in the Congress and the President. This conviction can be summed up by the statement that war is a shared responsibility between the people, the government, and the military.

Such a conclusion from Vietnam also reflects a popular assessment of the capacity of democracies to effectively wage war that dates back to Thucydides and runs to de Tocqueville. In the American military experience, this has been captured by General Marshall’s oft quoted comment that "democracies cannot fight a Seven Year’s War."
To many military officers, the Vietnam war only reinforced this conclusion. The social unrest and turmoil generated by opposition to the war, the fragging of officers, resistance to conscription, and widespread drug abuse throughout our society reflected the disintegration of a social system cracked by pressures beyond its capacity to withstand. This is traced back to a failure to unite the American people behind a war effort requiring social and personal sacrifices. To several prominent analysts, the solution is the promulgation of a declaration of war to validate the support of the people and the employment of the people’s Army. As Colonel Summers has noted:

If Vietnam proved nothing else, it proved that the equivalent of a declaration of war—that is, the fixing of public will and the sharing of the responsibility for the war among the American people and the Congress and the Executive—is absolutely vital for any future war of the United States.  

Military writers have concluded that the failure to marshal the Nation’s will behind the effort in Southeast was a major strategic error. To such officers, the National will is generated by mobilization and a formal declaration of war. The same writers are quick to criticize limited war theorists for excluding the American people from the strategic equation. “Public support is an essential precondition for the conduct of military operations,” is how Colonel Summers wraps it up. Such arguments are find support in the interpretation that the framers of the Constitution intended all military excursions be supported by popular acclaim via the Congress via formal declaration.

The common position developed by military authors is once again best captured by Summers and Palmers. To both authors, the blame belongs to President Johnson for attempting to fight the war without raising the ire or the passions of the American people. In Dean Rusk’s words, we tried to fight the war as a police action rather than a full scale war-
-in effect fighting a war "in cold blood" what required the stirring of the passions of the people.

The Commanding General of all American forces in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland agreed with this argument. "President Johnson should have forced Congress to face its constitutional responsibility for waging war" and had the legislature publicly declare war. Another officer, General Palmer agrees,

Our government, itself lacking a clear understanding of what it means and what it takes to commit a nation to war, failed to persuade the public that it was necessary for us to fight in Vietnam. This was a fatal weakness, and a result of it the American people did not lend their whole hearted support to the war effort. This might have been obtained had the Congress been deeply involved in the decision to commit our forces to battle and been persuaded that a declaration of war was in the national interest.

Such assessments are well embedded in the American military psyche. The declaration of war "legitimizes" the relationship between the people and what the Army is doing in the eyes of the world, provides certain responsibilities and creates impediments to dissolution, according to these strategic analyses. Impediments to dissolution are important, because the U.S. military does not want their support cut out from under them after they have been introduced into a conflict. This point of view also ensures that the Army retains its relationship with the people it sees itself as serving. As General Westmoreland put it, "If a war is deemed worthy of the dedication and sacrifice of the military services, it is also worthy of the commitment of the entire population."

Another reason that military officers frequently see mobilization as useful has nothing to do with Constitutional prerogatives of the Legislature or supporting the will of the people. One prominent author sees mobilization as a cure for emasculating the troublesome media
which "demolished popular support by misreporting the war, sometimes intentionally." "Not only does such a declaration commit the Congress and the people," so the argument goes, "but it brings into force other laws, regulations, and executive orders needed to fight a war (censorship for example)." 68

This brings up the issue of rallying public support, and the role of the media in reducing public support during the war. The overall feeling in the Services is that the media contributed to ruining public support at home and weakened the morale of the Armed Forces in Vietnam. General Westmoreland was critical of the press, and General Kinnard's research showed that over 90 percent of the Generals felt that the press had been irresponsible in Vietnam. Without any doubt the U.S. military came out of Vietnam convinced that the press had undercut their efforts and morale on the homefront.69 The wounds from this aspect of the Vietnam war have not healed.

Looking back on the discussion of the purported necessity of public support, it appears that such conclusions are warranted when the United States intends to fight major conflicts to which significant amounts of forces and resources are being applied. This is of course axiomatic of the American Way of War as seen by the U.S. military. But the lesson to draw is not that democracies cannot fight long wars, but that popular support is difficult to maintain during stalemates or protracted struggles with little apparent progress.

Former CIA Director, and a former pacification program participant, William Colby who argues "The real lesson is not that Americans cannot fight a long war or that we should eschew revolutionary conflicts because we found ourselves at a cultural disadvantage. 70 The real lesson from the war is more accurately reflected in a general proposition that
prolonged and inconclusive ground warfare will not command public support indefinitely.  

Above all, Americans remain pragmatic. To be continue providing support, Americans must sense that the results are commensurate with the involvement. They must perceive some sense of reasonable benefit, derived from a general cost-benefit analysis. The general population seems to be willing to sustain major involvements over a short term, or a minor involvement over a longer term, if convinced that the results are worth the effort. What pragmatic Americans cannot support is a major involvement over a long term without results. If a minor conflict is going to be extended in terms of time, the military strategy and political leadership will have to provide the American people "incremental dividends" that indicate some progress towards a reasonably clear goal.  

Long wars or unconventional conflicts are not an inherent weakness of democracy itself. The Soviet Union's experience in Afghanistan showed that neither totalitarian regimes nor democracies can long endure "a long, unfocused, inconclusive, and bloody war far from home, for unidentified or ill-defined national objectives." Additionally, both the Israelis and the British have had long experiences with low-intensity conflicts.

**Summing Up**

The American military in the decade after Vietnam fervently believed that the war was lost in Washington at the strategic and political level. The civilians failed to define clear objectives, overrode professional advice, and hamstrung the military in the execution of the war. This line of thought ignores the fact that the basic policy aim of the U.S. was both clear and consistent in the form of NSAM 288. The overall goal did change over time with new stages of the war. The major policy aims changed from the nation-building/security
assistance era (1955-1964), the post-1965 period of conventional defense, and the post-Tet disengagement and Vietnamization phase. What never seems to have been clear was how the military strategies would achieve the desired policy aims within the limits and resources available.

The lack of clarity between military objectives or political objectives is also a criticism of the military’s leaders. It does not speak well of the military if over 100 generals admit to having sent 500,000 men to combat in a sense of confusion. Nor does it say much for the leadership to have fought a conflict that claimed 58,000 lives, without any clear sense of purpose.

No one has satisfactorily proven that their alternative strategies would produce a decisive victory. Colonel Summer’s thesis that a massive defensive barrier in Laos and Cambodia is predicated on an assumption that such a force would eliminate support from the North for the Viet Cong. How such a defensive and passive effort, not to mention costly and protracted program, would achieve U.S. aims is problematic. No one has yet offered a plan for "playing to win" aside from full scale invasion options which clearly exceed the policy limits of the Administration and the international political context of the Cold War.

Civil-military relations were marginal because the military submitted passively to the decisions made by the President and the Secretary of Defense. More effective relations would have resulted in a better integration of political and military perspectives and helped the President understand the costs and risks of the decisions he made in 1965. The military properly learned that it would have to be more vocal, and that their voice would have to integrate military and political considerations.
The military feels that public support is crucial to the war. The failures of the civilian leadership to generate and sustain this support via mobilization generated a subtle "stab in the back" syndrome. American policy makers should get the primary credit for losing the war, but not on the basis of poor maintenance of the home front. Krepinevich finds that the U.S. military is "perpetuating the fiction that its Concept of war remains valid in all conflict environments" and that future problems can be solved by staying the course with national consensus from the President, Congress, and the American people and by acceding execution of the war entirely to the military. This is the most significant lesson learned, and the most erroneous, since the U.S. military never had an effective strategy for "playing to win" in Vietnam. What might be a more appropriate lesson is the conclusion that public support is a product of success, not a pre-condition.

Thus, the military moved into the 1980's convinced that a vocal insistence for clear objectives (spelled out in military terms), sufficient troops and resources to accomplish the mission, with few constraints or interference, and an assurance of public support was a reasonable and justifiable set of conditions to be met for the military to accept another U.S. intervention. These lessons were carried forward into the next decade by a new generation of generals.
1. The Pentagon Papers constituted an attempt to pull together all the documentation related to the decisions made during the course of the war, but it is not an assessment and it is incomplete. The Army commissioned a study of the war, which the BDM Corporation completed in 1980. The eight-volume effort is largely ignored, perhaps because it criticizes the Army for approaching the war consistent with its conventional American Way of War style. The BDM study also disputes the myth that the Army won every battle. BDM Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, 8 vols., McLean VA: BDM Corporation, 1990.

2. The Battle of Ia Drang is considered a seminal event in the Vietnam war, where U.S. forces met NVA regulars in combat for the first time. The battle saw the first employment of the "air cavalry" concept and extensive use of helicopter mobility. Many reports cite this battle as the origin of General Westmoreland's strategy of attrition and the emphasis on fighting the North in conventional terms using American firepower and technology consistent with the American military culture. Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once...And Young, New York: Random House, 1992.

3. This term was lifted from an article written by Samuel Huntington in 1986 by the same title, National Interest, Spring 1986, pp. 13-20.


5. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 1962, p. 46. The principle of the objective has been the first principle of war for the American military since such principles have been formally established.


14. Ibid.


16. Ibid., p. xx.


18. Ibid., p. 410.


22. Ibid., p. 184.

23. Ibid., p. 187.


28. Ibid., p. 259

29. Ibid., p. 268.


42. Raymond G. Davis, "Politics and War: Twelve Fatal Decisions That Rendered Defeat in Vietnam," Marine Corps Gazette, August 1989, p. 78. General Davis was a Marine Division Commander in I Corps in Vietnam. For another recent example see Oliver L. North and David Roth, One More Mission: Oliver North Returns to Vietnam, New York, Zondervan/Harper Collins, 1993, p. 47. LtCol North makes the statement in his recent semi-autobiographical account of a trip to Vietnam, that the U.S. did not intend to "win" in Southeast Asia, and that the military fought "with one hand tied behind their backs."


45. Ibid., pp. 262, 282.

46. For example see Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 424-425.


51. Ibid., p. 191. Admiral Sharp suggests that military leadership was not forceful enough. Sharp, *Strategy for Defeat*, p. 278.


68. Davidson, *Vietnam at War*, p. 810.


71. Earnest May, in "Vietnam Reappraised," *International Security*, Summer 1981, p. 4; This is also Dr. Spector's conclusion, p. 313.

72. I am indebted to Professor David E. Kaiser, of the Strategy and Policy Department of the U.S. Naval War College for this concept and conclusion.

73. Davidson, *Vietnam at War*, p. 798.
CHAPTER III

BABES IN BEIRUT

Blessed are the Peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.
Matthew 5:9

The introduction of U.S. forces to Lebanon in 1982 was the next event in the development of institutionalized attitudes about the proper use of force. It was not a pleasant experience. In many ways it was "De ja vu, all over again," to borrow an aphorism from Yogi Berra. Ambiguous missions, political interference, constraints, and interaction in a messy political situation were all associated with Vietnam and were seen again in Lebanon.

It was not a situation conducive to the American Way of War, military victory was not sought nor defined in terms the U.S. military could understand. Vietnam's bitter lessons were reinforced and hardened by the loss of 241 warriors. Post-conflict analyses, in the form of commissions and hearings, sought convenient answers, clouding the adoption of useful lessons out of the experience. The lessons that did evolve sought to reduce the reliance on military force as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. These lessons established guidelines for when and how the harsh cutting edge of military force could be best employed. These guidelines mirrored the military culture's operational code.

Yet the record has been subjected to erroneous revisionism and distortion. It is difficult to determine if the military has learned lessons at all. In the words of one major participant, writing to help set the "distorted" record straight, "the Marines will surely have died in vain if we do not learn the right lessons."1

The U.S. military did not escape the fallout from the policy failure. Nor did it sit still
in the aftermath and stoically accept blame. In many ways, Beirut reinforced the lessons of Vietnam about politicians, and the irresponsible actions of a Congress more concerned with partisan advantage and eluding responsibility than fulfilling a meaningful role in foreign policy. Like Vietnam, the military failed to accept any of its own shortfalls, either in the policy-making arena, or on the ground in Lebanon. In the words of one observer of the Joint Chiefs and military influence in policy circles:

The U.S. intervention in Lebanon was the most crucial of the 1980’s. Both phases of U.S. participation were opposed by professional military leaders, and when the venture ended grimly it thoroughly reinforced the lessons of Vietnam to them.²

A detailed overview of the events leading up to the tragedy in Beirut is necessary to come to grips with an assessment of military lessons learned and institutional myths surrounding the Marine deployment to what was once the Paris of the Middle East.

The U.S. Marines in Lebanon: 1982-1984

U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East must be clearly understood to evaluate the Reagan administration’s policy aims and the means it chose to achieve them. Stability in the Middle East was an overarching strategic requirement for the United States. Events in Lebanon threatened both peace in the region, and U.S. interests. American prestige and policy for the region was tied to the Camp David accords arranged by the Carter Administration. The accords were stalled in 1982, and PLO-generated violence against Israel’s northern borders was not conducive to regional deals. Syrian hegemony into Lebanon was seen as a projection of Soviet influence to be blunted. Thus, U.S. influence in the region had to be preserved, wider conflagrations avoided, and access to oil maintained.³

Israel’s Operation Peace for Gallilee in June 1982 threatened those goals. A major clash
between the Arab nations and Israel was at risk. The IDF had already tangled with Syrian armored forces in Lebanon, as well as seriously bloodying the Syrian Air Force in the Bekka Valley. As the IDF invasion force closed on Beirut, an expansion of the conflict was feared. The U.S. dispatched Philip Habib to negotiate a cease fire, and to try to arrange a permanent cessation of hostilities. The worst case scenario for the U.S. was to get dragged into a Cold War conflict with the Soviets. If the Syrians and Israelis went at each others throats, just such a scenario could evolve.4

Despite these critical interests, the U.S. ventured forth into a volatile region with no game plan. The players were suited up and sent to the arena, but no one really knew who the opponents were, and what the rules of the game applied.

Phase I—The PLO Evacuation

The Marine odyssey in the Levant began on 24 June 1982 when the 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) docked at Juniyah to evacuate U.S. citizens from strife-torn Lebanon. Because of the deteriorating situation, violence in Beirut was unchecked and American lives were at risk. The nearby Navy/Marine task force afloat in the Mediterranean was ordered to proceed to Beirut immediately and evacuate U.S. citizens.

The Marines were given the execute order to land at Juniyah, five miles north of Beirut to avoid the heavy shelling and indiscriminate violence in downtown Beirut. The Marines successfully evacuated 580 U.S. nationals back to U.S. Navy ships afloat off the coast. After transporting the evacuees to Cyprus, the naval task force remained off the coast near Beirut, and provided support to U.S. diplomatic efforts headed by special envoy Philip Habib who was seeking a compromise to get the PLO out of Lebanon.

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Back in Washington, Mr. Weinberger fought to limit the deployment of U.S. forces into the region. He was purportedly vehemently opposed to using Marines to assist in the PLO evacuation. He strove to limit the time the force was deployed to the absolute minimum. The State Department and the NSC wanted a 60-day deployment, but compromised on a 30-day maximum. Instead of deploying the Marines as an interpositionary force along Beirut’s infamous Green Line, Weinberger successfully limited the Marines to the port area, with no authority to venture further than the limited facility. Additionally the Pentagon resisted establishment of UN mandates or a formal international military force. The result was that U.S. military forces remained responsive solely to Weinberger and the JCS, and precluded any U.S. diplomat on the scene from exercising any direct command authority over the force. DOD’s express purpose was to resist becoming an instrument of any bargaining strategies by the State Department inside war-torn Beirut. The Reagan cabinet debated the matter and a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) was signed by the President ordering the use of U.S. forces.

Mr. Habib began political-military planning to use a multinational force (MNF) to support the disengagement of the antagonists in and around Beirut and to support the evacuation of the PLO. Habib established a formal committee to facilitate planning comprised of U.S. military and diplomatic representatives, as well as military officers from the Italian and French forces. The technical problems and operational risks of the MNF were not overlooked. In the words of Colonel Mead, "the obvious concerns of inserting some portion of this force between 30,000 Israelis and 15,000 PLO and Syrian fighters were well recognized."
The size of the force was limited to 800 French, 800 Marines and 400 Italians. The role of the MNF was to support the LAF at checkpoints between the PLO and Syrian forces in West Beirut and the Israeli forces and the Christian allies in East Beirut. The Marine commanders understood the task was to be delicate.9

The first troops went ashore on the 25th of August where they were met by Habib and all the diplomatic and press corps of the area. The role of the MNF as a neutral peacekeeping body was quickly established. Upon securing the port area, the Marine commander ran up the Lebanese flag, instead of hoisting the American colors. This distinction was duly noticed in the Arab press.10 Marine forces went ashore with only personal weapons and light crew-served machine guns. No weapons were loaded, except for several designated marksmen standing by prepared to engage targets at the discretion of commissioned officers.11

Evacuation of the PLO began that morning as 1,066 Palestinian fighters loaded onto the Greek vessel Sol Georgious, and by the end of the evacuation a total of 6,436 Palestinians had been withdrawn. By 3 September, all PLO and Syrian forces had been evacuated.

In Washington, Mr. Weinberger insisted that the MNF had now achieved its purpose and that it should be withdrawn at once.12 The President agreed, and on 10 September, the MAU was ordered to withdraw from Beirut only 16 days into its 30 day mission. That day Colonel Mead received calls from both President Reagan and Secretary of Defense complimenting him and his Marines on a job well done.13

The early departure created severe problems however on the political level. Ambassador Habib had given assurances to the PLO leadership the U.S. force would stay for 30 days, the
IDF would withdraw, and that the remaining refugees would be protected. Both the Lebanese Government and the United States provided these assurances. The Pentagon's conclusion that their mission was complete would prove fatally unfounded.

Phase II - The Peacekeepers Return

Before long the 32nd MAU learned of the assassination of Lebanon’s charismatic President-elect Bashir Gemayel. Despite the Israeli pledge during the evacuation negotiations, the IDF rushed back into Beirut in the aftermath of the bombing. Under the watch of senior IDF officers, the Christian Phalangists took their revenge immediately during 16-17 September by systematically killing about 700 refugees, largely women and children, left behind by the PLO fighters. The massacres of Shabra and Shatila stunned the world.

With little discussion, but with an obvious sense of guilt, President Reagan ordered the reintroduction of U.S. forces. Although the situation was now significantly altered from the previous commitment, the Marines were reintroduced with the same mindset, same mission, and the same peacetime rules of engagement they had operated under during the PLO evacuation.

President Reagan convened a meeting of the NSC over a weekend in September to discuss the deployment. The Pentagon still had problems with reintroducing forces. Weinberger states he was urged by the NSC to send in a multi-division contingent to enforce a separation between Syria and Israel. Such a proposal was put together by the NSC, but it was opposed by both Weinberger and Shultz. In little mood to broker between the dissenting elements in his own Cabinet, Reagan communicated clearly that he wanted something done. Mr. Weinberger was silent, but according to Shultz resisted implementing actions during
subsequent meetings between State and OSD.\textsuperscript{19}

An officer familiar with the background on this momentous decision and the continued resistance from Weinberger and the Pentagon noted that they "had not been able to avoid a deployment into Lebanon, but they did ensure that any deployment would be kept small, militarily noncommittal, and ready to be withdrawn as soon as politically possible.\textsuperscript{20}

"Cribbing" off the NSDD that directed the deployment, the crucial mission statement for the MAU was largely written by EUCOM itself, and was closely reviewed by senior officers including General Rogers.\textsuperscript{21} The mission statement was closely coordinated with the Joint Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and EUCOM. The mission was detailed as follows:

To establish an environment which will permit the LAF to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut Area. When directed, USCINCEUR will introduce U.S. Forces as part of a multinational force presence in the Beirut area to occupy and secure positions along a designated section of the line from south of the BIA to a position in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace; be prepared to protect U.S. Forces; and on order, conduct retrograde operations as required.\textsuperscript{22}

The Marines landed in Beirut on September 29, 1982. They were assigned positions in and around the Beirut International Airport (BIA), which was specifically selected by the Defense Department because it presented the least exposed of the military sectors being allotted to the MNF. The French took up positions in downtown Beirut and its labyrinth of streets and alleys. The French had a different perception of their mission, they "kicked ass" when they arrived and maintained a firm posture that brooked no nonsense in their sector. As Eric Hammel wrote later, "they were never loved nor even admired, but they were respected."\textsuperscript{23} The Italians got the worst of the lot and were assigned the slums and three major refugee camps.

The Marine position at the BIA was hardly a resort. It was an area visited by extensive
fighting during the past several years. Buildings around the airport had been used by fighting forces from both sides during the combat operations of the previous year. Many destroyed vehicles and numerous minefields would have to be cleared to make the area usable.

During the month of October, the Marines stayed busy with their internal guard requirements and local security patrols. Reaction from the Lebanese populace was generally favorable, and several MNF intramural sporting events were staged. There were little official MNF interaction and little political-military coordination in the absence of Ambassador Habib as the tour of the 32nd MAU came to a close. Colonel Mead and his 32nd MAU, properly proud of their role in providing for a measure of stability, were relieved by Colonel Thomas M. Stokes and the 24th MAU on November 1, 1982.

The Marine's mission was expanded on 1 November to authorize motorized and foot patrols. The mission was again extended, at the request of the Lebanese president on 11 November, to permit the Marines to train the LAF. The authority for this change was spelled out in NSDD 64 which authorized limited noncombat-related support (training and supplies) and directed the MAU to begin patrols in Christian-dominated East Beirut. Training in general military subjects, physical fitness training, live-fire exercises, and antimechanized operations, began on 13 December. Some students of the Marine deployment have noted this seemingly sensible training mission inadvertently compromised the neutrality the Marines strived so hard to maintain.

The MAU was relieved in place by the 22nd MAU, with Colonel Mead returning once again to Lebanon on 15 February 1983. Diplomatic efforts proceeded apace, that is at a slow pace. The terrorist threat was gauged higher as factional violence in the area increased, and
appropriate precautions were taken. The Marines felt exposed and knew that their vulnerabilities were apparent to the local Moslems. "The Marines continued to perceive that their best defense was their posture of neutrality," so that the Moslem perception of U.S. neutrality was actively sought. 26

The Ides of March were not kind to the MNF. An Italian foot patrol was attacked on 15 March. A hand grenade was thrown at a Marine patrol on the 16th, and the Italian command post fired on the 17th. A French paratrooper was wounded that same day. Random attacks continued through early April. A sense of doom rose, but no one accurately predicted the next step. A light van, previously stolen from the U.S. embassy, was returned on 18 April by an unknown assailant who slipped past a sleeping Lebanese guard outside the building. The van was parked immediately in front of the embassy. It contained a 2,000-pound gas-enhanced bomb which demolished and collapsed the front portion of the eight floor structure. The explosion killed 63 occupants, including 17 Americans. Four of the dead were U.S. Marines and several were CIA representatives. The MAU immediately sent its quick reaction force for security around the devastated embassy building.

The 24th MAU under command of Col Tim Geraghty arrived a month later, on 30 May 1983. The relief in place went smoothly and the new MAU immediately began mobile and foot patrols. The 24th MAU moved into the same general buildings and cantonment arrangement as the 32nd MAU. It did not merely accept the defensive arrangements of the preceding command, however, and industriously applied itself to improving local defensive measures by filling 500,000 sandbags and laying 10,000 feet of wire to enhance its security. 27
The MAU continued an active patrolling schedule and Colonel Geraghty proposed to the MNF Military Committee on 20 June that LAF personnel accompany his patrols. This step was approved and initiated the same week indicating the erroneous assumption that the LAF was multi-factional and confessionally neutral remained. The program of cross training with the LAF and other contingents of the MNF continued as the remainder of the month passed quietly.

This period of quiet was rudely shattered in mid-July by rocket and mortar shelling from Druse elements believed under the control of Walid Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). A total of 12 shells or rockets landed inside the Marine perimeter at the BIA on 22 July, wounding two Marines. Foot patrols in the Hay es Salaam area were subjected to verbal taunts, and shots were fired at the Marines from beyond the fence surrounding the airport area.

The remainder of the month of August should have dispelled any concept of neutrality remained in Beirut. The MAU received rocket fire on 8 August and on 10 August. Later that day the entire airport was subjected to a rocket barrage and the airport was closed. The MAU fired 81mm illumination rounds over the suspected locations of the firing sites to warn off the attackers.

Outside the BIA area, fierce fighting between Christians and Druze, Druze and LAF, LAF and Amal militia was raging. Everyone was preparing to scramble for advantage as the IDF prepared to pull out. Fighting in around Beirut continued to escalate. In one 2-day period over 100 rounds of 82mm mortar and 122mm rocket fire landed in or around the airport. Marines only returned fire when targets were readily identifiable, only in self
defense, and ceased firing when the threat stop directing fire at them per their rules of engagement.

Still by late August, a concerted effort was being made to target the Marine force. Druze mortar fire killed two Marines and wounded another 12 one day. Later that day, "Marine artillery fired in anger for the first time." For the last several days of August, Marine positions were under intermittent attack and harassing rifle and rocket-propelled grenade fire. On 31 August Marines fired 155mm fire on a suspected PSP position that was shelling the Ministry of Defense, where the American Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) was situated. Violence was breaking out everywhere in Beirut. To preclude casualties, Colonel Geraghty stopped foot patrols in the surrounding area, trading off the intelligence and initiative for a reduced exposure.

During the first week of September the LAF assembled forces to seize areas that the IDF would withdraw from. As the IDF withdrew the Druze prepared to seize the crucial Shouf mountain spur overlooking Beirut and the Marines. The LAF did not do well in its first efforts, and remained on the defense in a small garrison at Suq al Gharb. The Marines continued to get hit, and a rocket barrage on 5 September killed two and wounded two Marines. According to the official Marine history, a total of 120 rounds of various ordnance had exploded at the airport during early September.

On the seventh of September, after three rounds impacted inside the Marine lines, the MAU returned fire with a battery sheaf of six rounds of 155mm howitzer fire. The next day Marines answered in earnest again with artillery and naval gunfire when three rockets landed within 200 meters of two visiting Marine generals.
These events preceded what many military observers consider to be the crucial event, and the precursor to the tragic barracks bombing. Special Envoy McFarlane had gone back to Washington and engineered another change to the Marine mission that authorized the use of naval gunfire to support the LAF at Suq al Gharb. The authority, however, was delegated solely to the MAU commander based on his assessment as to whether the LAF could hold the garrison.

McFarlane and his military advisor, BGen Stiner, pressured Geraghty to authorize the naval gunfire. The MAU Commander resisted for several days, fully cognizant that the gunfire would expose his troops to any retaliation. He reportedly had several acrimonious exchanges with McFarlane. "We’ll pay the price," said the MAU Commander, prophetically during one such argument, "We’ll get slaughtered down here." 31

Though opposed by Weinberger, Mr. Reagan had authorized use of naval gunfire to fire upon non-Lebanese forces attacking Suq al Gharb. The Suq al Gharb had been redefined as essential to the Marine’s own defense, but the real purpose was to support the Lebanese with a show of solidarity. But the authority to employ the Navy’s guns was conditional because it delegated the decision to the MAU commander if he felt the post was in imminent danger of falling. 32 The change in the rules of engagement was not written solely to give the commander in the field greater authority. It was colored by attempts on the House floor to get the War Powers Act invoked. The language in the NSDD was a cover story designed to avoid triggering any Congressional interference, and a compromise between the NSC and the Pentagon. 33

Colonel Geraghty resisted entreaties by Mr. McFarlane and the Lebanese to provide

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gunfire support for over a week. Eventually, he relented when he heard that the Syrians had moved up some armor to assist the Druze. The Navy fired a total of 360 5-inch shells into the Shouf. The shaky LAF held their ground. Many have attempted to paint this incident as the watershed event in the expansion of the Marines mission from one of pure "presence" and neutral peacekeeping to an engaged ally of the Christian Gemayel government. Geraghty himself is the originator of this argument—"The firing we did in support of the LAF up at Suq al Gharb, that clearly changed our role...It's a milestone, no question about it in my opinion."34

This ignores the earlier artillery missions and a major naval gunfire mission executed on the night of 16 September. That night, in response to Druze shelling of the Ministry of Defense and the American ambassador's residence, the frigate Bowen and the USS Rogers fired a total of 72 rounds in six separate fire missions. The Navy fired an additional 150 rounds 20-21 September at other suspected Druze positions.

One of the few clear points raised by the admittedly lengthy historical narrative preceding this point is to show that the Druze and Amal militia had been targeting the Marines for some time at this point. The Marines had received several hundred rounds of incoming mortar and rocket fire. Furthermore the Marines had responded in kind several times and were credited for several successful fire missions resulting in PSP or Amal casualties. Additionally, in the aftermath of the battles in the Shouf, there was an increase in sniper activity around BIA early in October. The Marines countered with specially trained snipers, and publicly displayed their capabilities to the press on 15 October.35 The Marines were passive observers no longer.
Bombing Aftermath

Little more than a week later, the Reagan Lebanese policy literally went up in smoke in a funeral pyre. Once again, American troops paid the price for poor decisions and bureaucratic politics manufactured in Washington. To many it was a very familiar and almost predictable tragedy. "The peacekeeping operation in Lebanon was doomed from the start," notes a typical observer, "Plagued by murky objectives and restrictive rules of engagement, failure was almost inevitable....placing the Marines in such an ambiguous and vulnerable position certainly invited trouble."36

In the aftermath of the bombing, Weinberger proposed establishing a commission to study the tragedy. He appointed four military officers and one civilian defense expert to what became known as the Long Commission named after its Chairman, Admiral Robert Long, USN (retired). The Commission was not restricted with a narrow charter, and made several careful observations regarding the mission, supervision, chain of command, and local security procedures. The group was chartered on 7 November, and had a classified report prepared for the President by 20 December. A carefully worded 143-page unclassified version was ultimately released. While the Commission's report could hardly be considered a whitewash, it supported Weinberger's major points regarding the vague "presence" mission assigned to the Marines, and the lack of a vigorously prosecuted diplomatic effort.37

Naturally, George Shultz was not happy with the Commission's report, a thinly veiled attack on the foreign policy process.38 The sparring between the Defense Department and Foggy Bottom continued. Eventually, Weinberger, with the advice of several senior military officers, both serving and retired, reduced the Pentagon's lessons from both Vietnam and
Beirut into a set of criteria to guide future uses of America's combat force. This criteria eventually became widely known as the Weinberger doctrine after its originator and most vigorous defender.

Mr. Weinberger's criteria on when force should be used were reduced to six relatively simple steps. Force should be used only:

- In support of vital U.S. interests.
- With the full and wholehearted intent of "winning."
- With clearly defined political and military objectives.
- When circumstances change, reassessments must determine if force is still required. If fighting and winning are not required, then forces should be withdrawn.
- With "reasonable assurance" of public and congressional support.
- Only as a last resort, when all other means have failed.

The doctrine reflected the Pentagon's view of the American Way of War, and the collective lessons of both Vietnam and Beirut. The doctrine was not acceptable to the State Department and Mr. Shultz countered with several speeches and articles about matching force to diplomacy. Both Shultz and Weinberger continued to debate the necessary conditions for successful military interventions in the public domain. While generally couched in polite and generalized terms, the debate was really over whose hands were bloody over the disaster in Lebanon.

Clarity of Purpose

As distilled and absorbed by the military, the overarching lesson from Beirut involves the necessity of clearly defining political and military objectives. The military, particularly the Marine leadership, took a defensive attitude after the tragic bombing. The primary reason
for the tragedy was shifted from one of poor military security to the ill-defined mission of "presence." In his Congressional testimony, General Kelley noted that this was not really a military mission and one not found in military doctrine or taught in the Service's schools.40

The collective memory of the Pentagon, as represented in its formal investigation and findings of the disastrous bombing, established this view. However, this lesson is too convenient. This view shields the local commander in Lebanon, but also shifts blame well away from the senior military leadership at OSD and EUCOM which molded the parameters under which they were deployed. The collective embodiment of the Defense Department's lessons learned from Lebanon is found in the statements of Secretary of Defense and the Commandant of the Marine Corps General P. X. Kelley. Weinberger leaves little doubt about the ongoing struggle between the NSC and the Defense Department over the employment of U.S. forces. Weinberger is especially critical over the NSC's "great eagerness to have a force even without any defined objective."41

The original proposal, developed by the NSC, was to have a large force composed of several divisions to physically separate all warring parties. Mr. Weinberger resisted this attempt, which he found consistent with "the passionate desire to use our military" on the part of the NSC staff.42 He opposed the idea strenuously and was supported by the JCS. His reasons, in his memoirs, focus on the lack of specificity of the mission. "Its objectives were stated in the fuzziest possible terms, and then later, when that objective was "clarified" the newly defined objective was demonstrably unobtainable." The JCS also opposed a renewed MNF effort, "because without a clearly defined objective, determining the proper size and armament and rules of engagement for such a force is difficult at best."43 Yet Mr.
Weinberger was actually resisting sending any forces.

What Mr. Weinberger memoirs do not describe is any contributions he made to refining the mission statement to ensure the Pentagon understood what was required of them. Nor does he describe his own efforts to offer alternatives or cost/risk assessments to assist the NSC in properly constituting a mission, or the proper size and guidelines for the intervention. Mr. Reagan and the NSC were aware of Pentagon resistance to the deployment, and saw both OSD and the Joint Staff as obstructionists saddled with the infamous Vietnam Syndrome. Thus, their voice in policy making circles was ignored because of the perception that they were not part of any solution. The objective remained clear to Mr. Reagan, the NSC, and the State Department, yet no one knew how to get there. The Pentagon's resistance did not ameliorate this problem.

After the decision was made to deploy the force, Mr. Weinberger continued efforts to define the mission in the narrowest of terms, limiting the size and the capability of the force.

What was the mission? The Reagan administration, contrary to critics, had defined a political objective and end state in Lebanon. A sovereign and peaceful Lebanon, secure within its own borders, without either civil war or foreign forces, was the objective. The NSC failed to translate that objective into a strategy comprised of ways and means that would contribute to the desired end state. No one matched the political objective to the various efforts being executed in the Nation's name.

The Marines on the ground in Lebanon perceived their mission as one of presence. However, "presence" is not assigned as the mission or the intent. The action verb and overall intent is to "establish an environment" in which the government of Lebanon could
reconstitute itself and assert rule and order over Beirut and eventually the rest of the country. A key element of the mission statement called for reestablishing the LAF. This implies a function of "nation building" and security assistance which the military disdained since Vietnam.

For many reasons, the Marines defined their role in both neutral and passive terms as one of "presence." In his testimony after the bombing, General Kelley stated "Our basic mission is presence, and the logical question is —how do you define presence.....It is not a classic military mission." This term was interpreted by the Marines to mean that they had to be visible to provide "a backdrop which would be conducive to the stability of Lebanon, we had to be seen by the people."45 To be seen, the Marines had established patrols and regular contacts with various factions. They developed links to the communities through minor civic action projects and a medical assistance program.

The Marines imply that the "presence" mission precluded massive fortifications to defend themselves. The argument is that sealing off the airport from traffic, and isolating the Marines from the populace was inconsistent with their assigned mission. In his testimony, General Kelley claimed it was impossible to establish a hard point defense consistent with the mission statement as perceived, and the position of the BLT building poised as it was in the midst of a busy international airport, a facility "literally crawling with civilians."46

In retrospect, the excuse that fortifications were inconsistent with the mission, and the view that the Marines were expected to "tough it out" while exposed to mortar, rocket, and RPG fire seems lame. The perception of presence and neutrality should have worn off after the bombing at the American embassy in April, and far greater efforts taken to protect the
Marines as violence increased in August. This perception of the mission is inconsistent with the other portions of the overall strategy in Lebanon, including the training and equipping of the LAF which the Marines were aware of, and participating in. The OMC was proving tanks, Armored Personnel Carriers and howitzers. In retrospect, the delusion of neutrality was inconsistent with these other efforts. Later, Colonel Fintel, who headed the security assistance project, noted, "In Lebanon, we a peacekeeping mission and a force-building mission and the two were inherently contradictory."  

Other observers point to the training program initiated at the Marine request as the key point where the contradictions began. Eric Hammel notes that the December training program was "among the most crucial decisions taken during the entire experience in Beirut, for it inextricably linked the intentionally visible Marines to the fate of the LAF, and by extensions identified the Marines and their government completely with the fate of the Gemayel government."  

Others still point to McFarlane's insistence of providing naval gunfire support to the LAF in the Suq al Gharb on 19 September. John Lehman, the Secretary of the Navy at that time points out that naval gunfire had already been employed on 16 September, and that it would be impossible for the many Moselm positions to have been able to distinguish between gunfire intended for self-defense and that intended to support the LAF. "There were those who claimed that these actions cost us the protection of our neutral status," noted Lehman, but the Marines were seen by all factions as combatants and therefore "fair game" long before September. "As for the policy of neutrality," Lehman adds, "it was difficult to understand what our mission could be, if it was not to support the legal Lebanese government, however
In sum, it was not that the purpose of the deployment was not clear. The military resisted being integrated with the other instruments of national power, in a subordinate position, in an operational environment inconsistent with its preferred paradigm. The Pentagon did not agree with the policy, at best just misinterpreted it, and at worst provided half-hearted support.

Playing to Win

The U.S. military was not permitted to carry out its mission in Lebanon in accordance with its historical and deeply rooted preference for "carrying the war to the enemy," and seeking "the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces and his ability to wage war." Offensive operations against an opposing force, playing by the sort of rules the Pentagon’s military culture understands, was not appropriate in Lebanon. This should not have ruled out an effective role for the Marines in support of the diplomatic mission and the MNF.

However, many within the U.S. military did not walk away with that as a lesson. The lesson heard from many is that the Marines should never have been sent. This is true, in the sense that the policy and strategy should have been developed prior to the deployment. In the military’s eyes, they once again found themselves hamstrung by politicians and meddlers who failed to understand the inherent nature of war or military force. As detailed in the Weinberger doctrine, if you cannot enter into a situation with sufficient force, and with the clear intention of "winning," then the military should not be sent. The last thing the military wanted was another quagmire where they became shooting ducks while diplomats dallied. The military did not want to find itself in another swamp, incrementally adding firepower,
to achieve some nebulous political objective.

Another aspect very reminiscent of Vietnam is the myth that the Marines had their "hands tied behind their backs" with restrictive rules of engagement. "Because of ROE restrictions, the sentries weapons were not loaded," noted one military writer basing his assessment from the published Long Commission. What does not come out in the record is the fact that the rules of engagement (ROE) were controlled by the military at EUCOM, not the diplomatic corps. Furthermore, the ROE did not preclude insertion of magazines in weapons. The ROE did not preclude sufficient defensive measures, obstacles, or an alert guard force. The Long Commission faulted the local commanders for adjusting their own security steps, despite the great tensions that existed in Beirut since August.

Colonel Geraghty was asked by both the Long Commission and by Congressional investigators whether or not his rules of engagement were derived from his own perceptions of the mission; or forced down by an indifferent outside source such as the State Department. The MAU commander admitted "No sir, in all honesty, it was my own perception." However, many other writers continue to insist that the Marines were not permitted to defend themselves. One Marine veteran recalls that "When asked to improve the position, the answer was: "Denied. We requested to build tank ditches around the building, we were told no. Officials didn't want to send the impression that we were hunkering down." Such comments do not square with Colonel Geraghty's testimony and have not been proven by anything in the historical record.

Civil-Military Relations

The term civil-military relations in this research effort goes beyond the more traditional
view of the proper relationship between civilian policy makers and military leaders who execute policy. While civilian control of the military is a given under our system, effective policy making and implementation goes past just a simple dominance of policy over the military. A proper civil-military working relationship makes policy implementation feasible. An honest and candid exchange of viewpoints is needed before the Statesman and the General make that first supreme judgment.

It is during the course of the interaction between policy and military considerations that the ground is set for success. Good decisions are neither the result of a purely political or purely military viewpoint. Bad policy dooms the conduct of military operations. In fact, a brilliant military strategy will rarely salvage a poorly defined objective or an inappropriate policy.

Within the context of this project, civil-military relations addresses the broader scope of the management of the inherent tensions between political considerations and the military instrument. It includes the provision for an adequate voice for military considerations during the development of policy. Additionally, it also addresses the proper interaction of political and military considerations since "policy cannot be a tyrant" and may have to be radically changed in light of military factors.55

Civil-military relations in this country have been tenuous during our major conflicts. Lebanon was not a major conflict, but the seeds of discontent and mistrust planted during Vietnam were in full bloom. The degree of mistrust threatened effective civilian control and the proper integration of military viewpoints during the development of policy aims and the corresponding strategy.
The concept of civilian control of the military is taken for granted in the U.S., and it is not even defined in the American military literature. In fact, some naively believe "the absence of a definition has served us well." Yet, the specter of Vietnam was a large hangover on the U.S. military, and the absence of any concrete perspective on the proper consideration of civilian and military viewpoints is something that cannot ever be taken for granted. The debacle of Beirut was, in large part, a product of poor relationships established after Vietnam.

By 1983, a decade had passed since most troops had pulled out of Vietnam, but the hangover remained. The American military's reluctance to use of force in anything less than a clear cut situation was a stolid orthodoxy—and the Army was more extreme and cautionary of the Services. Weinberger parroted the "never again" attitude of his military subordinates. This significantly contributed to the manifest failure to develop an adequate matching of policy and strategy during the ill-fated Lebanon intervention.

The Reagan Presidency was marred by a management style that failed to resolutely resolve viewpoints from various departments prior to implementation. The Defense Department was well represented in this discussions by Mr. Weinberger who was a "civilian front man" for the Joint Chiefs and shared their bitterness over Vietnam and their reluctance to get entangled. Mr. Weinberger's perspectives on the use of force were very much out of step with the active interventionist attitudes of the President and his symmetric interpretations of containment. Accordingly, he found himself cut out of some national security decisions.

Mr. Reagan's management style emphasized a Cabinet-oriented approach which left his
principal deputies to design and implement programs to satisfy policy decisions. Any lack of consensus was overlooked, and Mr. Reagan appears to have been reluctant to make clear decisions. Thus, his NSC harmonized decision memoranda into overly negotiated compromises. In the end "the lowest common denominator prevailed."

The military leadership should not have accepted the lowest common denominator as the precondition for inserting the sons of American taxpayers into Lebanon as the "honest brokers" of Hades. The military leaders did not stand up, just like in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs were all opposed to the reintroduction of the Marines, but doubted their opposition would have changed the President’s mind. General Vessey, the Chairman of the JCS, eventually relented to dispatching the Marines. "It’s not that we decided to go along with it," he said later, "we obeyed our orders." Such a lame excuse reflects the seriously flawed nature of civil-military relations of the times.

Popular Support

The issue of popular support was much more subtle during the Marine deployment in Beirut. In complete contradiction to Vietnam, the press got along well with the Marines and public support was high. Declaring war, or mobilizing the Reserves were not appropriate or germane either.

Yet, the intervention into Lebanon once again initiated the age old tug-of-war between the Executive and Legislative branches over primacy in national security. The clash over the Congressional power to declare war versus the Executive power to initiate action in defense of national interests is older than the Republic itself. The Congress was slow to flex its constitutional muscle over the deployment of the Marines. The PLO evacuation was
successful, and the horrible refugee camp massacres required some response. As the deployment extended into 1983, however, a partisan debate ensued. Congressional Democrats were quick to compare the extension of the Marine mission as "the first step towards another Vietnam."64

Opponents of the Administration threatened to impose provisions of the War Powers resolution instituted in 1973 over President Nixon's veto.65 The War Powers Act in many ways represents the Congressional version of the Vietnam Syndrome.66 The act represents the Congress's lessons learned from the conflict in Southeast Asia. "Never again" will they be duped into another war or permit the country to drift into any quagmires.

Several policy experts, with Pentagon, NSC, and State Department experience have challenged the myth that Congress was somehow duped into supporting the Vietnam War and never had any say in either its scope or duration. One, Dr. R. Turner, a former official at both State and OSD, finds the statute "essentially a fraud designed to absolve Congress of responsibility" for Vietnam.67

Yet ignoring the Congress only builds problems on the domestic front, while the President and his staff should be focusing on the troops they have placed in harm's way. Unfortunately, Congressional input into the policy making process in Lebanon was next to nil. The Administration attempted to placate the Legislature and took steps to characterize the Marine mission as benignly as possible to preclude interference. Former Secretary of the Navy, Mr. John Lehman is sharply critical of the Administration's approach in trying to walk a tight rope between Congressional interference and its desire to play a role in Lebanon. In his view the Administration was trapped by verbal acrobatics it had undertaken to avoid
congressional restrictions:

Though everyone knew that the Marines were never neutral, in attempting to avoid the strictures of the War Powers Act and satisfy the delusions of the State Department, the military chain of command institutionally forgot the reality of the Marine's true status as combatants, whatever the political rhetoric. Catastrophe was sure to result.

Both Turner and Lehman have written extensively on the War Powers Act and its influence in Lebanon. They are both especially critical of Congress's callous disregard for creating incentives for terrorists to pegging timelines to troop deployment. Both underscore that Congress was warned by several officials including the Commandant of the Marines that imposing deadlines on the Marines would stimulate more attacks. General Kelley's testimony was ignored and Congress, in effect, put a bounty on the lives of the Marines. "The tragic loss of the 241 Marines in Beirut," Turner writes, "ought to serve as evidence of this predictable consequence and Congressional respect for their memory ought to lead to prompt revision of this unconstitutional and dangerous statute."

Out of this experience, the U.S. military relearned that popular support is necessary to maintain freedom of action in difficult circumstances but Congressional interference can be fatal. To preclude this, support should be gained in advance.

Assessment

Lessons learned about Lebanon and the tragedy of the Marine unit have turned into a "round robin of recrimination." The only clear record seems to be that once again the wrong lessons if any have been learned from the debacle. The intervention in Lebanon did have many similar factors between it and the dismal experience of Vietnam. But not all of these were correctly sensed or applied.
The false lesson about the clarity of purpose and the vagueness of the "presence mission" masks the real lesson that there was a lack of congruence between what we were trying to accomplish in terms of a political end state, and the role and tasks assigned to the military. The clarity of purpose issue also hides the failure of the policy making apparatus to evaluate, and direct adjustments to if necessary, the proposed military actions taken by the Defense Department.

With respect to the establishment of clear objectives, both political and military, the Pentagon bears a great burden. Both the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs resisted the deployment of the Marines as part of the MNF. The President overruled the military advice rendered by the Pentagon, without really ever getting a full hearing for their position. Rather than providing full support after the President’s decision had been rendered, the JCS resisted the task further. The Pentagon defined a narrow mission for the Marines, ensured they were deployed in inappropriate size or capability, and limited their freedom of action in support of the policy objectives sought by the Administration.

Had the military been able to throw off the Vietnam syndrome and taken energetic steps to deploy a force properly sized and equipped to the mission dictated by the political situation, the ultimate tragedy of October, 1983 might have been avoided. Rather than see the Marines employed decisively in support of the Lebanese government, the Defense establishment sought to preserve an illusion of neutrality that permitted the Marine unit to "hunker down" in BIA and wait for a window of opportunity to withdraw them. Waiting out the situation also exposed the Marines to the risk that some pro-Syrian or Iranian group would exploit the opportunity.
Ultimately, the failure in Lebanon belongs in Washington, and should be shared by the full membership of the NSC. The military prefers to define the problem as simply a matter of a fuzzy objectives or an improper use of military force to support diplomacy. Actually, as shown earlier, the political objective is clear. The problem lies in developing a military strategy that could buy sufficient time to generate a viable Lebanese government, with the necessary supporting institutions (which includes a vastly improved LAF) to govern the greater Beirut area. Such a task should not have been perceived as requiring a neutral stance. In fact an activist stance to establish a satisfactory environment for both the Lebanese government and the LAF to assert itself was the mission. The military failed to sense this or carry it out.

Much of the handwashing over the bombing places great store over the need for the perception of neutrality. It is true that such perceptions were crucial in the first phase of the deployment during the PLO evacuation. However, the situation during the second phase in Lebanon is dramatically different and called for a different strategy. The Pentagon failed to recognize the political implications of the massacres at the refugee camps and the resulting resentment generated by those factions sympathetic to the Palestinians.

The illusion of neutrality, which clearly influenced both Colonel Geraghty’s tactical dispositions, and General Kelley’s defense of his decisions, goes past Shabra and Shatila. Over the course of the previous year, the U.S. military was providing substantial amounts of training, ammunition and equipment for the LAF. The LAF was long seen as an instrument of Christian political control in Lebanon. The American support provided by the OMC identified the U.S. with the present regime in power. The Marines contributed to the
reduction of their own perceptions of neutrality by conducting training of the LAF, by collocating fighting positions with LAF units, by the sharing of intelligence, and by providing the LAF with vast quantities of ammunition.

In sum, there is little credence to be given to the charge that the mission was poorly defined or an inevitable failure. A solution was feasible, if the proper means were placed at the disposal of the commander on the scene. What had happened though was something in between. One Representative hit the nail on the head. "If we are there to keep peace, we are far too few," noted one Congressman. "If we are there to die, then we are far too many." Since the local tactical commander accurately sensed that he had insufficient forces to accomplish anything reasonably approaching a solution to the political environment he found himself in, he was reduced to limiting his vulnerabilities. The "illusion of neutrality" was his answer, and the loss of 241 souls the result.

The Pentagon's lessons are found in Mr. Weinberger's six criteria. Force is only to be used as a last resort, for vital interests, for clear political and military objectives, when the conditions permit the military to be deployed with the wholehearted intent of winning, and with some expectation of support from Congress and the American people. Beirut met none of these. The U.S. military collectively agreed with Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Thomas Friedman, who spent seven years in Lebanon and Israel, and empathized with the beleaguered Marines "sent to Lebanon by politicians who put them in an impossible situation and then blamed them when things went badly wrong."
CHAPTER III END NOTES

1. Robert C. McFarlane, "Lessons of the Beirut Bombing," unpublished article, dated October 23, 1993. Mr. McFarlane, a retired Marine officer, served as Special Envoy to Lebanon, and later as National Security Advisor to President Reagan. Mr. McFarlane's wrote this paper for a symposium on Marine peacekeeping operations at the Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia.


4. For some deeper background on U.S. interests in the region see Alexander Haig, Caveat, New York: MacMillan, 1984, pp. 317-352. A very good overview of the history and policy objectives of the Reagan Administration during this time period is also found in George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph. My Six Years As Secretary of State, New York, Scribner's, 1993, pp. 43-115.

5. Roy Gutman, "Battle Over Lebanon," Foreign Service Journal, June 1984, p. 28. Also Ralph Hallenbeck, The Use of Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, New York: Praeger, 1991, p. 14. Hallenbeck was in the operations directorate of the U.S. European Command during the Marine intervention. He describes the argument between the NSC and the Pentagon as a prelude to the Weinberger doctrine. The Pentagon insisted that if a declaration of war was not warranted, then forces were not warranted citing the drift into Vietnam.


7. Ibid., p. 15.


10. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon, p. 35.


Colonel McFarlane asserts that a formal decision had never been achieved and that Mr. Weinberger issued the order to withdraw the Marines by himself, McFarlane, "Lessons of the Beirut Bombing," p. 3. A formal documented decision does not appear to exist.


14. The importance of these assurances has been largely overlooked. Failure to comply with the agreement weakened U.S. credibility, and generated mistrust over the U.S.'s alleged neutral stance. Perry, Four Stars, p. 307; Hallenbeck, Military Force, p. 21; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 102-103; Eric Hammel, The Root, Pacifica CA: Pacifica Press, 1985, pp. 15-16.


17. An option to send a force of approximately 15,000 American troops similar to the American intervention in Lebanon in 1958 was developed and rejected. As Dr. Hallenbeck describes the decision, "the lessons of Vietnam were too fresh in the minds of all concerned." Hallenbeck, Military Force, p. 29. See also Gutman, "Battle Over Lebanon," p. 31; John Prados, Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council From Truman to Bush, New York: William Morrow, 1990, p. 471; and by Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 151.


19. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 107. Shultz criticized the Pentagon for placing inordinate conditions on its participation to drag out the debate. "When you don’t want to do something, agree to do it—but with such an impossible set of conditions and on such a preposterously gigantic scale that the outcome will be to do nothing."


26. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon, p. 55. The "presence" mission became a tactic designed to minimize the Marine's exposure. This is not the result of shirking. The mission required an
engaged possible, but the factional violence, small Marine force, and the nature of the positions around the airport imposed a greater degree of vulnerability than perceived in Washington.

27. Ibid., p. 72.

28. Hallenbeck, Military Force, p. 77; Frank, Marines in Lebanon, p. 73.

29. Hallenbeck, Military Force, p. 77; Frank, Marines in Lebanon, p. 78.

30. Frank, Marines in Lebanon, p. 83.

31. Quoted in Hammel, The Root, p. 220. The background over the development of NSDD 103 that authorized naval gunfire support on behalf of the LAF is found in Prados, Keepers of the Keys, p. 473. See also Hallenbeck, Military Force, pp. 81-83.


34. Frank, Marines in Lebanon, p. 89.


37. Long Commission Report, p. 8. A condensed version of the Long Commission’s conclusions and recommendations can be found in the appendices to Frank’s Marines in Beirut, pp. 172-177.

38. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 231-232.


40. General Kelley’s Congressional statement is found as an appendix in Frank, Marines In Lebanon, pp. 163-171. See also Betts, p. 218. See also Mark Perry, Four Stars, pp. 325-326.

42. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, p. 151. Mr. Shultz also described the NSC staff as militaristic, but he also found the Pentagon far too reluctant to employ force effectively in hand with other instruments of national power, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 225.

43. Ibid., p. 152.

44. Hallenback, p. 36-37; Willis, pp. 101-102.


46. Ibid., p. 111.


52. Long Commission, pp. 48-51, 137; U. S. Congress, HASC staff report, "Adequacy of U.S. Marine Corps Security in Beirut," 98th Congress, 1st session, Washington DC: GPO, Dec. 19, 1983, p. 78. The House report indicates that weapons were not loaded nor magazines inserted because of a rash of accidental discharges by the Marines. The House report, coupled with the Marine's own historical account, highlights the problem. The Marines had suffered seven wounded of their own from these incidents, had wounded a member of the press in another. Additionally, a Marine accidentally shot two Lebanese soldiers. An anti-tank weapon was also inadvertently fired, and hit an airport control tower. This information was pointed out in an interview with Colonel J. B. Matthews, 9 December 1993.


62. Perry, *Four Stars*, p. 309; Cannon quotes Vesey's assessment that the Joint Chiefs thought that the Marines could be pulled out in 60 days, pp. 408-409.

63. Friedman, "Fair Game," p. 50.


73. Friedman, "Fair Game," p. 50.
CHAPTER IV

THE STORMING OF PANAMA—PREFERRED PARADIGM TESTED

In October 1989, the Bush Administration had yet to define itself. Its new national security team remained untested but problems in Panama were ready to boil over. Congress was irate when neither the White House or Pentagon took any risks during an attempted coup against Manuel Noriega in September 1989. Noriega had resisted intense pressure to stand aside and let democracy have a chance. Economic sanctions had been applied for over year, and were having a telling effect on the Panamanian economy. The U.S. had waged a war of nerves with Noriega since he had appointed himself President. Matters escalated in 1989 to the point where Noriega claimed that a "state of war" existed between Panama and the United States.

The Administration vowed to be better prepared the next time an opportunity rose to deal with Noriega. The Pentagon, particularly the new JCS Chairman, General Colin Powell, took deliberate steps to ensure that U.S. interests in the region were protected. This included replacing the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) commander, General Frederick Woerner, a Latin American area expert, with the more activist General Maxwell Thurman. General Thurman reinvigorated contingency planning and the alert status in the region with a series of plans and exercises that prepared his troops for the eventual showdown with Noriega and his entrenched cronies in the Panama Defense Force (PDF).

Noriega eventually taxed the President's patience and U.S. credibility. On December 16, 1989, a Marine Officer, Lieutenant Robert Paz, was shot and killed at a Panamanian roadblock. The same night a Navy Officer and his wife were detained and assaulted. The
President believed he now had an actionable offense to justify a U.S. intervention. The President turned to his military advisors who presented their plan for taking care of both Noriega and the PDF at one fell swoop. The operation was seen as an enormous and resounding military success to almost everyone." While Panama was unique in its details, "it was exactly what Operation Desert Storm would later become: a distillation of nearly every lesson learned from the Vietnam War."

Behind the backdrop of the success of 1989 was the lingering tensions of Vietnam and Beirut. Proposed actions for troop deployments in Panama put forward by the State Department in 1988 revealed the existence of the orthodoxy reviewed in the preceding chapter. A revealing *New York Times* article published in April 1988, reflected the great mistrust that existed in the military. The article underscored the emotional wariness of the military about ill-considered interventions, vague missions, and restraints that did not permit them to "win." "Why don't we want to go to Panama?" asked one general, "Because of Vietnam, pure and simple. We've been in that stuff before." What the military wanted was feasible and attainable objectives set in clear terms with no hesitation to use military force in the manner in which the senior leadership felt it could be optimally used.

In the conduct of his research, the same reporter found that the military officers he spoke to, in case after case, referred to Weinberger's criteria. They all also insisted that "deploying combat troops to Panama met none of those criteria." Yet, all added that if ordered to execute a feasible plan with clearly defined military missions, they would execute the orders of their superiors.

Operation Just Cause, designed by several Vietnam veterans, reflected everything they
knew about war. The planning reflected the military’s paradigm in every manner. There was no gradualism, passive "presence," signalling, or obtuse academic bargaining strategies. The invasion of Panama marked the post-Vietnam turning point in U.S. military strategy and the manifestation of its internalized operational code.

**Operation Just Cause**

After receiving the recommendations of his senior foreign policy and military advisors at a two hour meeting on Sunday, December 17, 1989, President Bush ordered the execution of Operation Just Cause. It was a highly complex operation involving the integrated use of hundred helicopters and hundred of fixed wing aircraft including the vaunted Stealth fighter F-117 getting their baptism in fire. The military offered a single plan, the "maximum option" which would decapitate Noriega and his military thugs from Panama forever. Ultimately the NCA approved the plan, almost unmodified except for the employment of yet unveiled F-117 Stealth fighters. The plan was daring and extremely intricate. It called for moving thousands of troops from the Continental U.S. and inserting them suddenly at night when the U.S. would have the greatest amount of surprise and shock. The plan put several hundred aircraft in motion at one time in a small air zone. A total of 27 separate targets, many of which were struck simultaneously, were planned and rehearsed in detail. More than 12,000 troops were to be airlifted into Panama to reinforce the 13,000 or more already there. The plan also called for massive applications of troops and firepower to overwhelm any resistance, and shock the PDF from further resistance.

The operation was conducted by a series of task forces coded by color that were assigned the major tasks and missions that comprised the operations order.
Task Force Black was comprised of special operations forces (SOF) who were poised to strike prior to H-Hour. The very first action of Operation Just Cause was a Delta Force strike against the Model Jail to extricate radio operator and CIA agent Kurt Muse. The special operations team grabbed Muse amid a hail of gunfire. The entire raid took little more than five minutes. The other raids were just as sudden and overwhelming.

Task Force Bayonet had three missions. The major task was to seize and secure the Commandancia, the walled PDF headquarters compound in El Chorillo defended by elements of the 6th and 7th PDF companies. Just prior to H-hour, the 193rd Brigade supported by Sheridan tanks from the 82nd Airborne arrived at the Commandancia. Sniper fire impeded the movement of the American forces and numerous roadblocks had been hastily thrown up. AC-130 Spectre gunships and helicopter attack craft hovered over the area and supported the ground force. American tanks breached the compound, but the assault troops could not move forward. The Brigade commander called on the Spectres for direct support, who responded with a flurry of 105mm fire that destroyed the top floor of the 40-year old brick building.

While this fight was progressing another battalion from the 193rd, supported by Blackhawk helicopters, assaulted Fort Amador where the 5th Company of the PDF was located. Fort Amador was near U.S. family housing, and the PDF had to be quickly stunned and overcome to prevent any hostages being taken. The American troops used Vulcan 20mm cannon and 105mm howitzers to stun the Panamanians, who immediately retreated.

The third element of this task force required to secure the National Department of Investigation building and the headquarters of the transportation department. The PDF troops
put up limited opposition but refused to surrender until taken under fire by 90mm recoilless rifle and machine gun fire. The direct use of firepower against Panamanians defenders was only used when the PDF refused to surrender immediately. This demonstrated the very effective but controlled employment of fire power as a psychological weapon to subdue the Panamanians.

Task Force Atlantic was assigned to deal with a PDF unit at Colon, and some military units at Coco Solo. They rapidly overran the 8th PDF company located at Colon. "Light fighters" from the 7th Infantry Division and 82nd Airborne moved out against the Naval Infantry at Coco Solo where they met some stiff resistance, losing a SOF helicopter to ground fire.\[12\]

Task Force Red was comprised of Rangers from two locations in CONUS (Ft. Lewis in Washington, and Ft. Bragg in North Carolina) which came thousands of miles via airlift. Their mission was to attack and seize the Tocumen military airport, and the adjacent Omar Torrijos International Airport by a night airborne assault. The facilities were defended by roughly 350 Panamanians, including the 2d Infantry Company of the PDF. Two AC-130's softened up Tocumen and destroyed the PDF barracks with 105mm fire just prior to the jump by 700 Rangers from the 1st Ranger Battalion who landed on schedule at 0103. Airport watch towers were sprayed with fire from AH-6s to eliminate PDF communications.

The Rangers met little resistance. The Spectres had done their job and stunned any real opposition. The Rangers needed to quickly secure the facilities for the follow on jump of nearly 2,000 troops from the 82nd Airborne. A secure field for the airborne troops was required, and the Rangers had to be prepared to defend the field in the event "Battalion
2000, an elite unit believed to be loyal to Noriega, and which was armed with V-300 light armored vehicles mounting 90mm cannon, moved down from Fort Cimarron only 16 miles away.

Charlie Company, 3rd Battalion/75th Rangers jumped into Torrijos with the mission of securing the terminal, prior to the follow on landings. It met light resistance from the PDF troops there. At just before 0200 in the morning, a total of 28 C-141’s dropped the armor and transportation assets of the 82nd Airborne Division. Many of the chutes and their heavy loads fell east of the runway into the tall elephant grass and swampy area southwest of the Torrijos terminal.

The last major assault of the operation was the airborne assault on Rio Hato, home of the 6th and 7th PDF companies. The defenders at this field were stunned by two 2,000-lb pounds delivered by the F-117’s. The assault troops quickly followed in behind the air strike, parachuting in from only 500 feet up instead of the normal 800 feet, to reduce their exposure to enemy ground fire. This has been described as one of the sites of the hardest fighting during Just Cause.

The last major element in the operation was Task Force Pacific. This task force was comprised of the Airborne troops who landed at Torrijos, and was assigned three separate air assault missions. The first was to assault Cerro Tinajitas, home to the 1st Company, PDF. Fort Cimarron, to the northeast of the airfield, was the second objective. Fort Cimarron was the base for the vaunted Battalion 2000. Last, the airborne troopers were to secure Panama Viejo, on the coastline. It was the barracks for the UESAT, a specially trained antiterrorist unit, roughly 250 strong, considered to be fiercely loyal to Noriega. These objectives were
swiftly taken, despite some stiff but spotty resistance.  

Post Invasion Actions

Security operations continued throughout the next day, including the defense of the American embassy. Forces were dispatched to secure the rescue of American civilians and other foreign nationals at the Marriott Hotel. During this phase, an intramural firefight between American forces resulted in the deaths of two foreign photographers.

Forces moved to secondary objectives such as securing almost all government buildings, setting up roadblocks, and trying to find Noriega. There was little interference from either the general population or the Dignity Battalions. Several Special Forces officers were successful in convincing Panamanian units in outlying areas to surrender over the phone. Organized resistance was gone, but the hunt for Noriega continued unabated without success.

Four days later, Noriega slipped into the Papal Nuncio's residence and requested asylum. After a lengthy and public standoff, he surrendered to U.S. military authorities and was arrested and whisked away to Florida by the Drug Enforcement Administration.

In the aftermath of the conflict however, serious deficiencies in the planning and coordination of the operation became apparent. As the fighting wound down, the disorder of a small Third World nation without a government or without any services was apparent. Equally apparent was SOUTHCOM lack of preparedness to stabilize the rioting, looting, and public disorder occurring in the aftermath of the invasion. "In moving from combat operations to stability operations," writes a team of journalists, "the Army went from strength to weakness."

In the aftermath of the operation, attention initially focused on the brighter side of the
equation. The military was justifiably proud of the scope and speed of the intervention. From the President's approval on the 17th of December, to the initiation of combat early on the 20th, the responsiveness of the armed forces was a remarkable feat. Brilliantly conceived, from a purely military perspective, the plan was executed despite the friction of war and accomplished its major objectives with crushing firepower and shock action. General Powell called it the most complex and best executed operation he was involved in.  

task force commander responsible for executing the plan, Lieutenant General Carl Stiner called it so good there were no lessons to learn from it.  

Others have recognized that such an assertion is an overstretch and that there must be lessons learned from every conflict. Some reflect areas of improvement, while others just reinforce lessons learned earlier.

Clarity of Purpose

According to military sources, the Pentagon and SOUTHCOM received clear political objectives from the President in approving its final plans for Just Cause. The president also used the same political objectives in explaining to the American public and their Congressional leaders, why the U.S. was compelled to intervene in Panama. The express reasons offered were to:

- Protect American lives,
- Restore the democratic process,
- Protect the integrity of the Canal treaties, and
- Apprehend Noriega

Translating the political objectives into military tasks was theoretically accomplished by
General Powell and General Thurman during their planning sessions. Protecting American lives drove the planners to seek an overwhelming strike force to overcome any and all resistance quickly. Capturing Noriega was assigned as a specific task, and crushing the PDF was deemed necessary to ensure that a permanent solution could be sought. The military did not want to simply use a surgical strike to grab Noriega. As one participant put it, that would have just made a "promotion opportunity for another thug." The PDF was a center of gravity as well as a source of continued annoyance.

Restoring the democratic process was also an assigned political objective. How the proposed operation plan was to achieve this was not clear. "Bringing about democracy" is not the sort of mission that readily lends itself to a military objective. President Bush’s National Security Advisor, former Air Force Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft specifically asked how the plan served to achieve this explicit objective. He was informed that the plan was to secretly swear in President-elect Endara just before the invasion. This apparently was the extent of the military’s interpretation of what was necessary to restore the democratic process in Panama.

A Reserve officer on SOUTHCOM staff, a specialist in civil-military operations, was a participant in the development of the early combat and restoration plans called Blue Spoon and Blind Logle, had a different view. In a series of assessments after the campaign, this officer concluded that the strategic success of Just Cause was hampered by a planning process that never had a clear political objective. While acknowledging that the President did announce a series of objectives, none of these were provided during the extensive planning process that drove SOUTHCOM’s operational planning. They came after the plan.
While taking down Noriega was always planned, what was supposed to replace him and the PDF was only thought of internally by a handful of staff officers and never was reduced to a formal, coordinated plan.

Playing to Win

In Panama the military was finally allowed to plan and execute a military intervention consistent with every tenet of the American Way of War. The invasion was not a contest. It was a practice session on the application of overwhelming force—a scrimmage against an NCAA Division III opponent.

The senior officers were all Vietnam veterans—leery of piecemeal, tit-for-tat applications of force. Instead of incremental applications of force and firepower, Noriega and his hapless PDF got the full dose. According to an officer who was involved in the planning, "time and again during the planning process, the idea of applying overwhelming combat power was espoused." As the JTF commander stated to the press afterwards, "we came in here with the principle of overwhelming combat power." General Stiner stated his intention had been to crush the PDF and make any resistance useless, and that effect was largely successful.

The lesson was not lost on Congress either, including those scarred by their experience during Vietnam. Representative David McCurdy (D-Ok), a veteran of that conflict noted:

The one lesson from Vietnam is clear and absolute, and that is the issue of decisive force. It may be a sledgehammer, but if we are going to be in conflict and going in on the heavy side saves American lives, then we ought to lean that way. I think that's the most significant lesson from Vietnam, in the Gulf and Panama we played to win.

While instantly pointed to as a model for future interventions, some more objective
observers noted the uniqueness of the conflict. We had several months to plan, were allowed to rehearse portions of the battle plan unimpeded on the actual objectives in some cases, most of the PDF's communications had been thoroughly tapped and monitored for months, and the U.S. armed services had been present for the better part of 50 years in the country. More than half the forces involved in the fighting were already on location. Such preconditions will not occur with frequency.

Because of this initial advantage, SOUTHCOM massed more than 25,000 troops against as little as 4,000 combat effectives and several thousand Dignity Battalion members. The results were preordained. The force struck with both surprise and an awesome display of air and ground firepower to shock the PDF. In comparison to Beirut, the rules of engagement were simple. According to one Battalion operations officer "if you see anybody with a weapon, they are dead,"27 In execution, however, the young and untested Soldiers and Marines on the ground were much more disciplined and responsible than that sounds.28

A NATO ally captured the "playing to win" aspect of Just Cause better than anyone else. The lesson Panama will teach the American military is that if you're going to go in somewhere, go in with everything possible. This officer added

After Grenada people started thinking about rapid and selective low profile operations—all that low-intensity stuff. But the truth is that nobody in the brass was keen on it. And the success of Panama will reinforce their prejudice: go in big.29

Civil Military Relations

The inputs into the campaign planning, and the concept of operations, for Just Cause were almost exclusively from the Pentagon and military leaders. Accordingly, the military was satisfied with the plan, and feels that the relationship between civilians and military was
satisfactory during the build-up to the invasion of Panama. It was far different than Vietnam or Beirut, with little interaction and almost no political interference. The military developed a plan, pitched it to their superiors in general terms, and were authorized to execute it as designed. In the words of a retired military officer, Just Cause "showed what professional soldiers can accomplish when allowed to do their jobs without micro-management and second-guessing from on high."30

Relationships at the Pentagon were far from smooth however. Mr. Cheney and General Powell had not yet worked out their working routines since Powell's appointment. The Chairman strove to isolate the information that Cheney received regarding operational information from the Joint Staff, and ensured that he got his operational information only from General Powell.31 The personal interaction and trust level required for Huntington's subjective form of control had not yet matured.

The Chairman need not have been worried. Cheney felt that there was a tendency for people at the top to meddle needlessly and counter-productively in military matters.32 Thus, the meeting at the White House to review the proposed plan for Just Cause was conducted at a strategic level, with little details offered. Mr. Cheney made no comments during Powell's brief. The decision was made by the President, supported by a small circle of advisors including Secretary of State James Baker. General Powell only presented the Blue Spoon plan, no other options or alternatives were presented.33 Bush asked why they could not just get Noriega, and Powell explained that another corrupt thug from the PDF would merely rise to power, and the problem would not decisively resolved. The President had reached a frustration level with problems in Panama and approved the Pentagon's plan.
The support of the President was instrumental to easing the Chiefs mind about how Mr. Bush would react in crises. Army Chief of Staff Carl Vuono had "vivid memories of Vietnam, where the civilian leadership hadn't been willing to commit the force necessary to accomplish the military objectives." 34 Mr. Bush did not plan to interfere with operational details, and trusted his military experts to carry out their tasks.

Out of this experience, some generals concluded that the lack of involvement by civilian leadership in the detailed planning was instrumental to its success.35 "We planned it, rehearsed it, and briefed the leadership--no one fiddled with it," in the words of Lieutenant General Carl Stiner, commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps.36 Another Pentagon official reportedly told Newsweek that "Mr. Cheney’s biggest contribution to the invasion...was to get out of the way."37 Obviously, this is an oversimplification of what occurred. Mr. Cheney had allegedly come to the Pentagon convinced that greater civilian control was necessary.38 His lack of interference comes more from an assessment that the plan would meet the desired policy aim.

Had there been a willingness to bring in OSD policy experts or the State Department, and better civil-military relations, Mr. Cheney could have confirmed that assessment. Better relations would have allowed a more open exchange and analysis of the military’s proposed plan, and offered constructive recommendations to ensure that force was being used in such a manner to guarantee that the political goals were being served. This could have prevented the disorder and looting problems, and would have at least precluded the clumsy Endara installation.
Popular Support

In contrast to the Lebanon crisis, the War Powers Act (WPA) was not relevant in Panama since it was such a short and apparently successful operation. Congress was in recess for the Christmas holiday, and several members were already on record for more forceful actions. Despite his own inclinations towards a strong Executive in foreign policy matters, Mr. Bush did write letters to Congressional leaders, as required under the law, notifying them of his actions, but like all Presidents he did not request approval or invoke the WPA time clock.39

However, the issue of popular support did rear itself in this intervention. It was manifested by the military's conscious efforts to deny the media ready and uncontrolled access to the battlefield. The fallout from the resulting criticism proved that the relationship between the military as an institution and the media was a "troubled embrace" at best.40 It revealed the lingering antipathy between the media and the military, and the military's preferred solution to handling a meddlesome press. It also the adversarial relationship stemming from Vietnam was still very much alive and that "the clash of cultures between the press and the military is a constant."41

In many ways the problem was a repeat of Operation Urgent Fury. In this invasion of Grenada, reporters were denied access to the island by the task force commander. After that invasion, the Defense Department developed a compromise system to let the media send a pool of personnel to the next conflict. The Pentagon promised that they would notify media executives of pending operations and transport a group to the action if the media would designate reporters in advance and promise not to compromise military operations. The compromise offered access for first hand accounts in exchange for preserving operational...
security for the lives of our young Servicemen. DOD did not fulfill the compromise during Just Cause, notifying the news agencies just hours before departure time for the pool aircraft.

From the media’s perspective the pool was a "Keystone Kops operation" from the start. Several members of the pool found themselves literally locked up and isolated from the action for their own safety. The only real action and civil disorder they saw was when their driver got lost.

Fred Francis who conducted an assessment of media matters after Just Cause found, "The pool was repeatedly denied or ignored when it asked for access to frontline troops, wounded soldiers—simple interviews," he wrote later, "the pool was a failure." The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Peter Williams, called it a mistake and blamed it on "incompetence" of his office and the staff at SOUTHCOM. In essence, he confirmed allegations that the Pentagon had wanted pool coverage, the local commanders—Generals Thurman and LtGen Stiner did not.

Fred Hoffman, former deputy press secretary at the Pentagon, and a defense correspondent for the Associated Press, wrote a report for Williams that blamed Cheney for excessive concerns with security and the late activation of the pool. The report was also critical of Williams' naivety in not supervising the public affairs plan and for failing to ensure the media pool was supported upon arrival.

What the public got to see what the Pentagon's version of a sanitized war with no glitches, no collateral damage,—"a flawless feat of arms on an almost bloodless battlefield." Instead of generating popular support in advance, the U.S. military learned a new lesson out of Panama. It could avoid the negative aspects of diminished popular support and the intrusive
aspects of the media by executing a concise military victory where public support is secured by placing a veil over the execution of the operation, and presenting the American public with a limited perception of what actually occurred.

Some veteran military officers with press experience traced the entire problem back to Vietnam, including retired Marine Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor who later worked for the New York Times as their military correspondent.

Although most officers no longer say the media stabbed them in the back in Vietnam, the military still smart over the nation’s humiliation in the Indochina and still blames TV and the print media for loss of public support for the war. Today the hostility manifests itself in complaints that the press will not keep a secret and that it endangers lives by revealing details of sensitive operations. The myth of the media as an unpatriotic, left-wing anti-military establishment is thus perpetuated.

**Summing Up**

Operation Just Cause is difficult to evaluate. The conflict was short, clear cut, and decisive in military terms. There is no doubt that the military felt that it had accomplished everything it was asked to do. Clearly, the military was permitted to execute the operation consistent with the paradigm it preferred, and the model developing during the 1980’s. Just as clearly, the military walked away feeling vindicated that this paradigm was the proper way to conduct ourselves in future situations. The circumstances surrounding the contingency however, make the conflict a model only for that specific location, and may not be applicable in another scenario where force or the threat of force is required.

Furthermore, little has been done to record useful lessons learned about some of the few shortfalls that do exist. Most of the literature has been produced by retired military officers who lack the objectivity to analyze this operation purely on the merits. Recent attempts to
point out deficiencies in the operation by one Army officer who was present in Panama, have been met with sharp ripostes.48

The president purportedly established clear objectives. Yet these seem to have been for public consumption to justify the operation. Clearly established policy aims were not put forward early enough to drive elements of the plan as it was being developed. The military translated its perceived objectives into a strategy and campaign plan for the takedown of Panama in purely military terms based largely on its operational perspectives about "playing to win." "Restoring democracy" was seen in simplistic terms. SOUTHCOM felt that removing the dictator and swearing in the properly elected official was all that was required.

The failure to coordinate this element of the plan with the State Department and other political-military experts is alarming. The new Ambassador found later that the State Department had been shut out, and he was completely dissatisfied with the obvious lack of planning inputs from other than military sources. He was also highly critical of the damaging implications of having had Endara sworn in at a U.S. military base, with U.S. military personnel visibly present and the U.S. national color in the background.49 Equally troubling was Endara's first formal communication as President, a letter to the Organization of American States, being promulgated on SOUTHCOM stationary.50 Military expediency rather than policy drove many small details of the operation.

Not all observers feel that the scope and manner in which the operation was planned was consistent with the political objective or military necessity by all observers. It is one thing to agree with the conclusion that the overwhelming force approach ended the fighting as soon as possible with the least total amount of casualties to both sides. It is another thing to agree
with the assessment that "it was an elegant work of operational art."\textsuperscript{51}

The essence of the operational art is linking and phasing military actions that contribute to the desired strategic end state. It is hard to find evidence that the policy objective drove all aspects of the operation plan in Panama. In fact, the size of the plan came very close to precluding the surprise needed to shock the PDF and preclude any counteractions. If Noriega had managed to escape, or if the PDF had prepared a standing counter-plan to grab civilian hostages from the Embassy or any of several dozen military posts, a prolonged stand-off was possible. "A closer examination of the Panama attack indicates that its large scale," writes one retired Marine general, "increased the number of civilian casualties and possibly forfeited the opportunity to seize General Noriega.\textsuperscript{52} General Trainor, a former Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations for the Marine Corps, feels that the operation was just a virtual replay of the Army Concept. "The Army did what it knows how to do," he concludes, "It went in with heavy firepower and troops trained for a large-scale war on the plains of Europe, not the expeditionary wars of the Third World.\textsuperscript{53}

It is crystal clear that SOUTHCOM was not prepared for follow on actions which its own restoration plans and civil affairs experts had prepared for. The military found that policing the mess it created was just as complex a task as the military side of the problem. New unforeseen problems popped each for several weeks, that some planning and foresight could have prevented. One captain, tasked to regenerate a police force in a town, was reduced to have his wife read his college criminology textbook over the phone from Fort Ord, CA.\textsuperscript{54}

Actually, the disorder of the invasion had been anticipated by General Woerner whose plans included an additional phase to the operation that would help restore the government
This civil military operations plan was developed in isolation from the battle plans developed by SOUTHCOM, and suffered from the compartmentalization of the detailed planning effort undertaken at Quarry Heights. The planning was also handicapped by the lack of civil affairs expertise on the staff, augmented only by Reservists brought in on short tours. Their plan got short shrift until the invasion itself.

This shortfall has been attributed to numerous coordination problems. First was a coordination gap between SOUTHCOM and its Joint Task Force headquarters. Second, the plans were not coordinated with any civilian agencies such as the local embassy or the State Department. "Coordination with US Embassy was critical but prohibited" since plans were closely held by military. The last problem was the new CINC, "On restoration, he gave no guidance. His entire focus and attention was devoted to Blue Spoon," his warfighting plan.

So the military planned on the basis of "playing to win," which was fine from the purely military perspective, but could have been disastrous from a broader strategic level. The military should not have excluded political and civilian agencies from outside of the military. The strategic end state was of a very political nature, but the military planning focused solely on military aspects of the problem. The execution and follow up threatened public confidence in the government installed by U.S. forces, thus, seriously threatening the overall objective of restoring democracy. DoD officials and SOUTHCOM failed to prepare the battlefield by bifurcating the planning process into political and military cells that were never integrated.

The major complaint was that the military operation reflected a politically unsophisticated view of the strategic objective of restoring a democracy quickly and effectively. The
operation did not eliminate TV and radio stations that could have rallied support to Noriega. Planners failed to protect the Embassy soon enough. An attack there could have had major ramifications. In addition, the task force did little to protect another potential hostage site at the Marriott Hotel.

Other critics believed the operation used an inappropriate amount of firepower, which contributed to civilian casualties (more than 300 civilians died) and collateral damage. Others were critical of the lack of interaction with the State Department and pointed to the clumsy handling of the swearing in of Noriega's successor. SOUTHCOM did not think through the delicate aspects of installing the Endara government without too much overt Yankee baggage. More importantly, the planners failed to realize the economic costs of the disorder and looting would undercut the newly constituted government.²⁹

With respect to public support, once again the paradox of public support appears. The military wants public support for its actions but it brooks no interference and wants support to be unconditional at least while the operation is ongoing. The military's preoccupation with operational security is completely understandable. However, the actions of both the Pentagon and the local SOUTHCOM bureaucracy went well past security issues. Even after the battle was over the military controlled access to soldiers back in CONUS for several days,⁶⁰ refused to answer questions regarding civilian casualties, and refused access to military combat camera footage taken during the war.

This post-battle abuse reduces the credibility of the excuses offered during the midst of the crisis. They lend additional credence to criticisms of the antipathy between the media and the military and the dangers to democracy if it is not checked. As General Trainor, now
director of the National Security Program at the J.F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, notes, "the antimedia attitude that has been fostered in young officers must be exorcised if both the military and media are to serve well the republic for which they stand."61

The military must learn to balance its concerns for security with the needs of the media. An adversarial relationship could be very damaging for the U.S. military over the long run. For its part, the press makes too much of trying to get information quickly and without detailed analysis or objectivity. Two competitive cultures will eventually have to settle on some sort of medium to balance the needs of military security with those of a pluralistic society that must reluctantly rely upon a free press to balance the temptations of ambition.

Conclusion

In summary, the Pentagon’s preferred paradigm was tested in Panama and found satisfactory by the military. Despite the unique circumstances surrounding this operation, the U.S. military walked away feeling good about its planning and execution of this battle laboratory. On the whole, the operation was a huge tactical success, and achieved its major operational objectives. Yet, the professed claims to clear objectives, use of overwhelming force, and oversimplified civilian-military policy making reflect the limitations of relying upon force to achieve lasting political outcomes. They specifically highlight the shortcomings of the American military, and the need for continued interaction between policy makers and the military’s leadership in crisis situations.

Panama reinforced the predisposition towards short and decisive operations using all the firepower and technology available to the American military. Quick and violent engagements
results in minimal friendly casualties, wards off an inquisitive press, and precludes any seeds of doubt back at home. Short and conclusive military operations preclude opportunities for political oversight or civilian interference from either the White House on Capitol Hill. "Convinced that civilian micro-management ruined us in Vietnam, and that a willingness to give wide discretion to the military in Panama made that operation a success,...the officer corps fears that sound military logic will go by the board if politicians begin to take too close an interest in the conduct of operations."  

Many of the same decision makers from Just Cause are still in place during the next major U.S. military intervention.

2. Woodward, *The Commanders*, p. 143-145. General Powell visited Fort Bragg before being confirmed as Chairman, JCS. He was briefed on the plans developed for Panama and recommended increasing the force build-up rate, and the use of night operations.


7. Ibid.


13. Ibid., p. 10.


21. This remark is attributed to General Fred F. Woerner, former SOUTHCOM, in William C. Bennett, "Just Cause and the Principles of War," *Military Review*, March 1991, p. 3.


28. Robert R. Ropelewski, "Planning, Precision, and Surprise Led to Panama Success," *Armed Forces Journal*, Feb. 1990, p. 32. While firepower was restrained, the employment of air support against the Commandancia did set off fires in Chorilla. Several blocks of the ghetto area were burnt to the ground.


32. Ibid., pp. 175-176.

33. Ibid., p. 168.

34. Ibid., p. 163.


44. Cloud, p. 61.


46. Sloyan, p. 3.

47. Bernard E. Trainor, "The Military and the Media: A Troubled Embrace," pp. 2-3. Another journalist, Mossettig believes that the younger military officer is even more fervent with his hostility towards the press, even though such attitudes are not directly reinforced by experience in Vietnam, or any other conflict. See Mossettig, p. 187.


53. Ibid., p. 1.


57. Ibid., p. 63.


60. Sloyan, p. 3.


CHAPTER V

DESERT STORM: PREFERRED PARADIGM VALIDATED

Nothing would better serve the interests of future Third World challengers...than an American conclusion that, in the Gulf War, it had discovered a way of waging war without incurring war's traditional risks, pain and suffering.¹

Jeffrey Record

Despite sound advice that the "first lesson of the Gulf War is to be very wary about drawing any so-called lessons of the Gulf War," the U.S. military has "learned" from its vaunted victory over the Iraqi Army.² It is useful and necessary to try to learn and adapt based on operational experience like Desert Storm. Unfortunately, good data and a bit of distance are required to objectively analyze any war.

Regrettably, few of the serious analyses produced since the war have focused on the major strategic issues of why, where, when, and how U.S. military force should be applied. Internal to the military though is a distinct and incontrovertible conclusion that the Gulf War repudiated the revisionists of Vietnam and validated the internal efforts of the military to revive itself as an institution.

The Vietnam experience was the touchstone for the senior military officers in the Gulf. Their decisions and conclusions about the Gulf War cannot be grasped without a feel for the deeply rooted and emotive conclusions that they drew from Southeast Asia. As Colonel Summers has observed, "if you would understand America's victory in the Persian Gulf you must first understand America's defeat in Vietnam. Combat experience in the jungles of Vietnam was the common thread that bound all the senior U.S. commanders" in the Persian Gulf war from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the Theater Commander and his Division
While General Powell is frequently characterized as the "reluctant warrior" during the buildup, "in truth, they had all been reluctant warriors, badly scarred from Vietnam and wary of a fickle public that could cheer the armed forces off to war but turn venomous if things went badly." General Powell was characteristic of his peer group since he "remembered Vietnam and the forlorn commitment, with little public support, to a badly planned military campaign whose objectives seemed murky at best. There would never be another Vietnam as far as he was concerned."

Desert Storm and Vietnam

It is understandable, but perhaps ironic, that the Vietnam analogy was raised so often by the military, the media, and the Congress during the prelude to the Gulf war. In many ways the entire strategic, operational, and tactical situations between Vietnam and Desert Storm are starkly dissimilar. In fact, just a cursory review reveals far more dissimilarities than common elements.

Arguably both crises occurred a great distance from the shores of America, and were situated in a locale that the common American was hard pressed to find on a map. Just like Vietnam, the local governments were involved in a long standing feud. Likewise, the issues that generated the conflict were not entirely clear cut. Our own interests were not crystal clear, given the nature of the regimes we sought to defend. Our national interests in both conflicts were geopolitical in nature, and hard to define to the average American in concrete terms.

The similarities end at this point. What was different? Just about everything that counts
in military terms. The nature of the terrain was a sharp contrast from the Central Highlands or Mekong Delta of Southeast Asia. This war would be fought in open featureless terrain. This war would have fronts, and clearly defined rear areas. The "bad guys" wore uniforms and occupied military positions instead of hiding in villages. This was a playing field far more conducive to the American Way of War. It had goal posts and sidelines. The equipment that we brought to the arena could be used to maximum effect. The contest would be fought with jet aircraft, armor units up to Corps size, long-range reconnaissance and sensor systems, laser-designated weapons, sea-launched cruise missiles, and precision guided munitions. This war would have targets. The full panoply of American technology and resource base could be, and would be, brought to bear. In distinct contrast to the trauma of Vietnam, this war would be fought with our playbook and our rules.

At the strategic and operational levels, there are just as many dissimilarities. The major factor being that the nature of the war, the opponent, and the terrain combined to fit the American style of combat. The end of the Cold War is often overlooked as a major distinction. World opinion was far more united with the end of the superpower confrontation. The Soviet Union could not materially interfere, and the United Nations could actually serve its purpose for once. Iraq, again in a clear cut departure from Hanoi, found itself cut off from external support, isolated from the international community, and burdened with economic sanctions.

In the final analysis, despite the contrasts in analogy, the American military went to Southwest Asia with every intention of purging the Vietnam experience from its memory. Ironically, Hussein operated on every level as if the United States had learned nothing. He
saw the same "paper tiger" and gave too much credence to the "straw giant" criticisms of a few reformers. Hussein was incapable of understanding that the U.S. would field a different team, coached by the Battalion commanders and company-grade officers of the last big war. He could not imagine that American public opinion could be massed on such a united front against him, or that it could be sustained in the face of the projected casualties of a ground war. Hussein never understood he had purchased a ticket to the Super Bowl, and would face the 1960 Green Bay Packers.

Clarity of Purpose

Consistent with the identification of Vietnam as the antithesis of the manner in war was to be conducted, the American military sought to establish or receive clear guidance from their political masters. "If the Vietnam war had taught one ineluctable lesson," summarizes the staff of *U.S. News and World Report*, "it was that when the political objectives become muddy and politicians become generals, the cause is lost." Not only must the objectives have clarity, but they must also be achievable. It is not enough to be able to see the prize, it must be within reach with the forces and capabilities assigned to the task.

For the American military the overarching lesson from Vietnam and Korea was the need for clear, immutable combat objectives. The Joint Chiefs—through Powell’s oracular voice—insisted on a mission that both finite and within the means of the forces at hand.

The Administration did establish four major political goals relatively early in August, and stuck to them rather doggedly. The Bush policy circle seemed conscious of the need for consistency in political objectives. However, in trying to establish and maintain public support, the Administration struggled to find a sufficient rationale for the U.S. intervention, and hopped from rationale to rationale for five months. With the same problem that LBJ
had, Mr. Bush and his advisors employed a wide number of reasons, for a wide number of audiences. The definition of our vital interests changed from one press conference to the next, and the reasons for dispatching forces ranged from stopping aggression, enforcing international law, preparing for a "new world order," ensuring our economic stability, preventing Hussein from strangling or manipulating the world oil supply, and in more crass terms, the Secretary of State stated we were in the Gulf for "jobs."

The military does not seem to have noticed the lack of initial consistency. The Pentagon’s own after action report on the Gulf War emphasized the establishment of clear political goals to drive the composition, purpose, and actions of the U.S. military. The Defense Department even trotted out the questionable Kinnard results to support its report.

A post-Vietnam survey of key military leaders who commanded relatively large forces during that conflict revealed many were, at times, unsure of the war’s objectives. Those who commanded...during the Gulf crisis did not suffer the same misgivings. Little confusion existed within Coalition military establishments as to what military force was expected to accomplish. Clear statements of goals helped instill confidence and eased the formulation of military objectives.11

The Bush policy team laid out four major policy objectives eventually, and they stuck to them pretty consistently. They were

—Unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait
—Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government
—Securing the safety and protection of American citizens abroad.
—Enhancing the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf.12

The clarity of the last objective is not as pure as the others. As we will see later during the war termination phase of the conflict, this becomes a critical point. In his address to a Joint Session of Congress early in Desert Shield, the President stated that our goal was
"assuring" regional stability in the Gulf. Early on, "enhancing" security in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region was the objective. In its Title V post-conflict report to Congress, the Pentagon stated that our national policy objective was simply the security and stability of the region. Stability was not defined any further.

Following the establishment of clear national political objectives, the military could turn to defining a strategy and the means of achieving its military objectives. The detailing of clear military objectives is almost as important as finalizing the war's policy aim. The U.S. military believes that this was accomplished. "Clearly defined and articulated political objectives ensured development of equally clear military objectives and decisively contributed to success," according to DoD's report.

The final assessment as to whether the U.S. achieved its policy or military objectives is not a crucial determination in this study. However, it is relevant to the validity of the lessons learned about clarity of purpose. It is also relevant when looking at exactly what the theater commander defined as his objectives. The liberation of Kuwait is clearly defined, as well as numerous steps leading to that objective. The nebulous political objective of enhancing or securing regional stability was also translated into specific military objectives. "Securing regional stability" was eventually defined as destroying the Republican Guard, and eliminating Iraq's capacity for production or delivery of weapons of mass destruction. The theater commander's goals resist the larger prize of toppling Saddam. While it may have been hoped for, changing the government in Baghdad was never a formal war aim.

This becomes a critical element later in the assessment as to whether clear goals were really established, and as to whether a decisive victory was achieved or merely a "Pyrrhic
 Triumph." CENTCOM's objectives were:

1. Attack Iraqi political-military leadership
2. Gain and maintain air superiority
3. Sever Iraqi supply lines
4. Destroy known NBC production, storage, and delivery capability
5. Destroy the Republican Guard in the KTO
6. Liberate Kuwait City

The military is satisfied that they received explicit and clear policy aims, and that they were matched with equally clear military objectives.

Playing To Win

In defining both the force size and manner of employment, the U.S. military desired to repeat the performance level established in Operation Just Cause. Panama was the dress rehearsal for overwhelming force, and Desert Storm was the real show. The ghosts of Vietnam would be entirely exorcised in one gigantic clash. The military would present a requirement for an overwhelming force that was to be carefully built and resourced. Political constraints on the use of the force and its firepower were to be minimized, rules of engagement were to be kept sparse and crystal clear. The President reiterated repeatedly that it would not be "another Vietnam." This time the troops would have what they needed, "they will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back."

To accomplish its mission, the Joint Staff asked for and received nearly 500,000 American troops, in addition to the forces provided by 30 separate coalition partners. The force list authorized by the President exceeded the CINC's request considerably. This force
signalled U.S. resolve and commitment, but did not induce Iraq’s leadership to withdraw. The military saw the President’s rapid approval of its force request as a sign of decisive leadership and a commitment that the military would have the full support of the nation to carry out its assigned tasks. The good guys would be allowed to win this one.

In its own report, DoD noted that the President’s approval of the "enhanced option," in late October 1990, provided "an overwhelming offensive capability" to ensure that U.S. would possess a "decisive force" capable of seizing the initiative and "avoid getting bogged down in a long, inconclusive war." Desert Storm was not going to be another Vietnam.

Given the necessary tools and forces to accomplish its assigned objectives, the military turned to planning its war strategy. Vietnam remained the antithesis, firepower and mass would not be applied in a piecemeal fashion. "In order to achieve assigned goals quickly and with minimum coalition casualties," the DOD report notes, "U.S. defense planners applied the principle of decisive force. This contrasted with the incremental, attrition warfare which had characterized U.S. operations in Vietnam."

The principle of decisive and overwhelming force can be seen in the force sizing of both air and ground campaigns, as well as in the actual conduct of both the air and ground phases of the CINC’s campaign plan.

**Ground Phase**

The ground force buildup was a direct counterpoint to the lack of mass and decisive force established in Vietnam. The commander’s intent reinforced it. Firepower and attrition were employed to set up the battlefield not to signal or coerce but for a decisive blow. Mass, speed, and firepower were to be applied simultaneously. Gradual applications and
incrementalism were eschewed, centers of gravity were to be targeted relentlessly until the
enemy force was broken. There would be no pauses. The formal intent of CINCCENT can
be found in his Commander’s Intent statement:

Maximize friendly strength against Iraqi weakness and terminate offensive
operations with the Republican Guard Force Command destroyed and major U.S.
forces controlling critical lines of communication in the Kuwaiti Theater of
Operations.24

General Schwarzkopf was fond of referring at the Battle of Cannae as the classic battle
of annihilation. It was his favorite analogy before the war. He continued to emphasize that
the Republican Guard was a center of gravity to Hussein, and thus must be targeted for
decisive force and destruction. This is reflected in his campaign objective of "destroying"
the Republican Guard and his commander’s intent. The battle against the Guard was the main
effort in the ground phase of the campaign. The CINC’s intent was to initiate and complete
a climatic battle of die Schlacht—the slaughter.25 The CINC was “playing to win" in the
finest tradition of the American Way of War.

The Chairman also reinforced the concept of overwhelming force and decisive results.
In a much publicized (and apparently deliberately rehearsed) line, General Powell said “Our
strategy for going after this army is very simple. First we are going to cut it off. And then
we are going to kill it.”26 This may have been purposeful posturing for Iraq to show that
the U.S. had the will to engage in a ground offensive, at a time and manner of its own
choosing; but it also set up certain expectations.

Strategic Air Phase

The Air Force leadership, like its brethren on the ground, harbored great angst over
limitations and constraints reminiscent of the air war over North Vietnam. Aerospace
doctrine was built around technology, firepower, and overwhelming application just like the
ground forces. The haunting memory of Vietnam was omnipresent. In a statement that
could, and probably should be seen, as anti-Clausewitzian, the Air Force Component

C

ander in Southwest Asia, Lieutenant General Horner observed:

Many of us here who are in this position now were in Vietnam, and that war left
a profound impact on our feelings about how our nation ought to conduct its
business. We will carry out any particular policy but as individuals we think that
war is a very serious business and it should not be dragged out in an effort to
achieve some political objective. (emphasis added)

As a Vietnam veteran, General Horner was speaking for a generation of aviators who
remembered the frustrations of Rolling Thunder and the Linebacker campaigns. They also
remember the loss of over 3,000 aircraft without any decisive results. As then Air Force
Chief of Staff General Dugan stated before his relief, "Most Air Force officers believe to this
day that if they had been allowed to bomb North Vietnam without limits the U.S. would have
won the war."23

In direct contrast to the incrementalism of Vietnam, the chief air power strategists
designed a strategic aerial bombardment program called Instant Thunder. The title impugns
the many indignities dumped on air power proponents since the failures of Rolling Thunder.
Rolling Thunder was "a prolonged, gradualistic approach." DOD's report notes that instead
of "piecemeal attacks designed to send signals to enemy leaders, Instant Thunder was
designed to destroy 84 strategic targets in Iraq in a single week."29

The CINC provided general guidance and direction but avoided micro-managing the air
portion of the war. Some have accused him of providing insufficient direction, particularly
with the targeting priorities. After the war, General Schwarzkopf noted that the Air Force
was very sensitive to guidance and any controls that smacked of "straightjacket restrictions imposed during Vietnam." He eventually placed his Deputy in charge of resolving the prioritization of targets.

Air power proponents hold few inhibitions about the contributions the air phase made to the success of Desert Storm. The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Merrill A. McPeak briefed journalists that it was his personal conviction that the Gulf air war "was the first time in history that a field army has been defeated by air power." Air Force doctrinal experts and historians quickly added Desert Storm clearly proved that "air power now dominates land warfare" and that "simply (if boldly) stated, air power won the Gulf War."

In sum, the American military was successful in promoting the principle of decisive or overwhelming force in both its ground and air phases. More importantly, it was successful in advising its principal client. President Bush observed, "this will not be another Vietnam. This will not be a protracted, drawn out war... If one American soldier has to go into battle, that soldier will have enough force behind him to win and then get out." The principle of decisive force was established, tested, and validated in Desert Storm. "Playing to win" had become national military policy.

The U.S. military derived a sense of closure from Vietnam to the Gulf War. Many veterans from Vietnam enjoyed the victory parades and accolades given to those returning from the Gulf War. General Powell told these veterans their honor and valor were never questioned, and that they too could claim a share of the credit. It was as if a generation had come full circle. As one special operations officer from Vietnam and the Gulf war noted, "the lessons of Vietnam were good ones,...I didn’t break faith with those lost...they did not
Civil-Military Relations

As in the other categories, the U.S. military has come to see in both Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the epitome of proper civil-military relations. Simply stated, the civilians provided the policy aims, the commitment to the requisite resources, and then stayed out of the way. "Virtually to a man," notes one journalistic team that conducted extensive post-war interviews, "every American commander in the Gulf conflict expressed gratitude and satisfaction over the fact that their President and Commander-in-Chief had allowed them to fight the war as they saw fit."

Queried about his role in the initial formulation of U.S. policy objectives and the resulting decision to dispatch U.S. military forces, General Powell noted that the President and Secretary Cheney deliberately "...allowed the military to participate in the decision making process from the very beginning, and allowed me as chairman to be a part of the inner sanctum." He has since stressed that his input in the front end, not afterwards, was the key to properly integrating political issues and military considerations throughout the war.

It is clear from the record that the President was very hesitant to interfere with operational details. In addition, while there are situations during the crisis where it appears the President overruled General Powell’s recommendations, there is little evidence the NCA did not seek out military perspectives at each and every turn. This is obviously an improvement over the Johnson and McNamara days. There were no Tuesday targeting lunches. Civilians from DoD, CIA, and State were involved in the policy development stage and the planning process. Battle plans were made by those who would execute them. The
military as a whole had a seat at the table and a voice in all discussions. While General Powell’s input was not accepted on a few key policy decisions, it is apparent that at no time did the NCA disapprove military advice on military matters.

Popular Support

The establishment and maintenance of public support for U.S. policy objectives was critical to the overall success of Desert Storm. All three aspects of popular support; media policy, Reserve mobilization, and Congressional authorization, played a part in building and holding together an often tense equilibrium of Clausewitz’s "remarkable trinity."

The media presented a major challenge in this specific theater of operations. The host nation was a closed society, with extreme sensitivity to Western cultural norms. The theater was far from the Continental United States, and the vast desert environment mandated detailed planning for transportation and logistics for public affairs teams. The horde of media personnel from around the world exacerbated the situation further. A total of 1,600 media representatives flooded Saudi Arabia and nearby military facilities. Their demands for access and support overran the capability of CENTCOM Joint Information Bureau (JIB).

Because of these anticipated problems, DOD planned to employ the pool system employed in Panama and Grenada, and secured approval from the Saudis. The National Media Pool was notified on 10 August, and a pool flew to Riyadh that week.

After the war, the media was extremely dissatisfied with the guidelines and restrictions imposed by the military. Pool coverage was considered poor, media escorts frequently interrupted or intimidated interviewers, security reviews were capricious and time consuming, and finally inadequate transportation assets and support to get completed reports and imagery
to their editors. Probably the worst accusation was that several reporters were getting favorable treatment because they provided positive stories, while reporters who filed stories that the CINC found negative, would lose interviews and other privileges.

In their defense, DOD was really not obligated to provide the transportation, food, and logistics it did provide. CENTCOM made senior officers available for numerous public and private briefings. Division commanders took time out of pressing schedules to talk to the press, and their troops provided interviews for a multitude of human interest stories. Daily briefings were broadcast over the world. In many ways, in terms of quantity or volume, the war was extensively covered. Both the Secretary of Defense and his spokesperson, Assistant Secretary of Defense Pete Williams, would later defend DOD and describe the Gulf War as the best covered conflict of its kind.

The military did not completely exonerate themselves, the DOD report on the war acknowledges that command support for the media effort was uneven. This would seem to admit that some generals, particularly senior Army officers who had served in Vietnam, did not resist the opportunity to repay reporters for the perceived "stab in the back" in Vietnam. The Pentagon also admitted that several incidents of intimidation and inadvertent censorship had occurred through a lack of training and supervision. The Pentagon defended the security review process, but did admit transmission time must be greatly increased.

The major problem in the Gulf was retaining operational security in an age where technology permitted journalists to communicate live on a world-wide basis. Desert Storm was unique because it was the first modern war where news media personnel could broadcast instantaneously to the world, to include Baghdad. This was considered crucial in the
psychological war being waged against Hussein, described by General Powell as "a CNN junkie."

Security did not turn out to be a major problem. Only 5 of 1,300 pool stories were restricted for security matters, and upon appeal, only one story was ever censored. The CINC was concerned about one or two stories that apparently had correctly speculated about VII Corps pending sweep around the left flank.\(^4\) Apparently, Hussein got so much information and deliberate disinformation he never was able to discern just what CENTCOM would do.

The media was quite upset after the war, and the major issue among many news organizations was what to do about it. To many, the media was used to plant disinformation or doubt, and to shape U.S. domestic support for the war. The pools, censorship, and "superficial and numbingly statistical" daily briefings came under extensive criticism.\(^2\) The most cynical of the crowd believes that the "lessons learned" from Vietnam, Grenada and Panama focus solely on how to control the media.\(^4\) However, the American people awarded a lopsided victory to the brass. A poll taken during the war reported that 80% of those polled agreed with the media restrictions imposed by DOD. At the same time, over 78% reported great confidence in the U.S. military, but only 22% reported the same level in the press. Even the Saturday Night Live television show spoofed the self-righteous antics of the press.\(^4\)

After the war several major media representatives requested to meet with DOD officials and work towards constructive changes in meeting the conflicting requirements of operational security and informing the American people.\(^4\) This initiative will hopefully make several

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positive steps towards resolving the tensions and conflicts that occurred in Desert Storm. This is important, as General Powell reiterates in speeches to senior officers at the National Defense University about the importance of good media relationships. "Because you can win the battle but lose the war," he admonishes, "if you don't handle the story right." Exactly what General Powell means by "handling the story right" is the central point of difference between the media and the military.

The second issue relating to public support involves the activation of the Reserves. A major element in the Army's post-Vietnam force planning process was the deliberate modularization of its active forces with Reserve forces to force civilian leaders to mobilize the Total Force and generate the concern and commitment of the American people. In Desert Storm the use of the Reserves was needed to support the deployment requirements of Operation Desert Shield, as well as the combat phase of Desert Storm. A total of 245,000 Reservists were activated, and approximately 106,000 served in Southwest Asia.

More important than the capabilities these Reserve units brought to the theater, however, was the powerful signal that the Nation was committed. "One of the terrible mistakes we'd made during the Vietnam War was not mobilizing," noted CINCCENT, "Washington sent our soldiers into battle without calling on the American people to support them." While the National Guard experienced difficulty in getting some units to desired readiness levels, overall the Department is satisfied with the performance of the Reserves.

The third issue involved in generating popular support involves the Congressional authorization. The Congress was not adequately involved in major policy decisions during the early stages of the conflict. This sensitized key Congressional leaders early, and the Bush
Administration took few steps to mend fences.

Contrary to the Constitutional perspective that the Congress should be asked to declare war, the President took sole responsibility for both the initial deployment of 250,000 Americans to Southwest Asia, and the November decision to double it for offensive options. This was done on the basis of his executive authority and his statutory power as Commander-in-Chief. He did not invoke the provisions of the War Powers Resolution.

The Congress failed to take decisive action to rectify the situation. Numerous members made dutiful speeches referring to the Constitution and to the Vietnam war. Some members of the House of Representatives actually filed suit in Federal court to bar the President to prevent an offense in the Gulf without a formal declaration of war from Congress. Hearings were conducted by the Senate Armed Services Committee, chaired by the powerful Senator Sam Nunn from Georgia, but little action was taken. The Democratic Caucus overwhelmingly passed a non-binding resolution calling on the President not to initiate war without Congressional approval.

While his staff strongly recommended he not seek such support, the President overrode their recommendations to gain a last chance degree of support to force Hussein’s withdrawal. He requested Congressional authorization. The Administration also intervened to ensure the language of the resolution passed by the Hill would meet its requirements. Eventually, after several days of frequently eloquent and emotional debate, both Houses narrowly passed a resolution supporting "any means necessary" to liberate Kuwait.50

In the end, Congress could claim that it had not abdicated its Constitutional responsibilities. Second, George Bush could now claim he had asked Congress for their
support, and received it. Military observers would note that Congress had put their own Vietnam Syndrome behind them now.31

The lessons of Vietnam were heeded, and building a solid home front was a key objective for the President and the military. National support was developed and maintained, but not through Reserve mobilization or the Congress. Public support was more a product of the President’s and the military’s ability to deal with populace through modern media, and the ability to talk over the heads of the pundits. They played to win that game too.

ASSESSMENT

The preceding discussion has described the lessons perceived by the American military. The Defense Department is satisfied that it received clear political objectives and accomplished them very satisfactorily. Mission accomplishment was largely the result of the application of an overwhelming amount of force, applied decisively. Clear lines of authority existed from the President, through the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, and then to the warfighting theater commander. These clear lines and relationships clarified authority and represented the proper division of labor between civilian superiors responsible for political direction, and a military singularly qualified to manage the military end of the conflict. Civilian authorities did not overrule military advice, and thus civil-military relations were smooth. Lastly, public support was maintained effectively, not through mobilization or Congressional support, but mainly through the military’s ability to control the message put out through the mass media.

How do these lessons stack up? Are they valid, and can they serve as a useful template for future scenarios? Will we overlook the unique aspects of the contingency, and accept
without question these institutional conclusions. As Dr. Eliot Cohen has observed, "the greatest test of our strategic maturity will be our willingness to view critically our performance in this rout." Victory can excuse a multitude of sins.  

Clarity of Purpose

It is difficult to challenge the conclusion that President Bush established four clear objectives during the crisis. To make this conclusion though it is necessary to accept the fourth objective—the establishment of regional stability in the Middle East—in narrow terms. Victory was not to be complete, or unlimited in scale or time. It is clear that the removal of Saddam Hussein, an unlimited and ambitious goal, was never formally established. However, in his rhetoric the President escalated expectations beyond narrow constructions. Few observers could expect a limited war with limited objectives given both the President's Hitler analogy for Hussein, and the constant comparisons to Munich and appeasement.

Thus, Mr. Bush established a macro-level incongruity. Having identified Saddam as a Hitler, and massed an international army against him, victory was defined to a limited purpose. Having raised expectations that the military would not "fight with one hand tied behind its back," and after generating a level of international and domestic consensus not seen since the 1940's, Mr. Bush generated an implicit assumption that regional stability meant getting rid of the current leadership in Baghdad. As one Congressional defense expert writes "this disparity between more limited formal objectives and ambitious, undeclared aims continues to hamper efforts at judging the war's ultimate success or failure." This in turn has clouded efforts at evaluating whether or not the proper political objectives were established, and how clear they really were articulated.
In addition to clear objectives, strategic success mandates clear and consistent strategic guidance to the military in general and the theater commander in particular. Here the record is a little more murky, and less positive. CENTCOM was not satisfied it knew what was going on in Washington, and what planning efforts the Command should focus on. In October 1990, the CINC told the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia he was working "in the dark," and was assuming that a requirement for offensive operations would eventually be needed, but he no idea if it was limited to freeing Kuwait or otherwise.54

In his memoirs after the war, the CINC included a draft message that he had prepared for the Joint Staff complaining of the "total vacuum of guidance" he sensed in theater.55 The problem appears bigger than just the U.S. military. According to Schwarzkopf, even the British were unsure and asked for a written definition of coalition’s strategic and political war aims. CENTCOM drafted a proposal and forwarded it, but it "disappeared without a trace."56

However, much of this confusion appears to have occurred in the late 1990 time frame when the President and his counselors were concentrating on the international diplomatic front, and on approving a large force deployment to undertake offensive operations. In context, the theater commander received both the guidance and the forces he needed, when he needed it.

The third element in assessing clarity of purpose involves the clarity of the military objectives. The CINC promulgated an overall intent, and six specific military objectives.57 These military objectives reinforce the narrow interpretation of the policy aims established by the White House. Ejecting the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restoring its legitimate
government was the primary objective. Assuring regional stability was to be achieved through the destruction of the Republican Guard and the elimination of Hussein's offensive capabilities, particularly his NBC production and delivery potential. The military objectives appear consistent with the political objectives, although once again, the establishment of regional stability is defined narrowly. Whether or not these were achieved is a matter for the next phase of the assessment.

Playing To Win

General Schwarzkopf sought to achieve a decisive victory through the classic American Way of War. In this regard, he turned back to the most familiar icons of American military history for guidance. Perhaps indicative of the depth of mythology in the psyche of the American military, the CINC kept in his office a framed copy of Sherman's adage "War is the remedy our enemies have chose. And I say let us give them all they want."

The coalition gave Hussein all he could handle and more. Was a decisive victory achieved? Most observers readily accept that an overwhelming force was concentrated in the theater, and that it was employed with few restraints. The American military was "allowed" to win this war, unlike its interpretation from Vietnam or Beirut. But did it achieve a decisive victory, and was the force employed decisively? The ultimate criteria for this determination must be based on the achievement of the stated political and military objectives.

As discussed earlier, the elimination of Saddam Hussein was not explicitly directed. It remained a political objective beyond the scope of the coalition's framework, and the degree of risk that both the political and military wanted to assume. We could live with Saddam without an Army, or the Iraqi Army without Saddam. We chose the former, and in the
CINC's words "the option of going all the way to Baghdad was never considered." 40

Thus, the war plan called for the use of a massive overwhelming force in a measured manner to achieve a straightforward, albeit limited, victory over the invading army. The campaign plan was not designed for the overthrow of the Iraqi government, consistent with the stated policy aims given to CENTCOM. While the means appeared unlimited, the goals were prescribed to more limited ends. While a battle of annihilation like Cannae was feasible, a strategy of annihilation culminating in unconditional surrender was not sought. This was not to be a war of annihilation culminating in surrender ceremonies on the teak decks of the USS Missouri. Thus, in several critical factors, the traditional American Way of War was not sought nor achieved in the Gulf.

This has created numerous criticisms of the Gulf War. Several major assessments have decried the war as a hollow victory. One major book called it a "triumph without victory," which presumes that we achieved only a tactical victory, meaningless in its relation to either strategic goals or the opportunities available. According to this view:

For a military operation...prosecuted with such skill and vision, it was a tragic conclusion, one that no amount of post-war celebration could disguise. There could be no doubt America and its allies had triumphed over Iraq's army on the battlefield. But inasmuch as victory suggests the decisive defeat of an opponent, there was none. This triumph without victory was perhaps the most striking irony of the entire conflict. 41

This brings up the cognitive incongruity raised by the military in the aftermath of the conflict. President Bush raised expectations with references to appeasement and Hitler, the U.S. military raised expectations with references to Cannae, and with pithy sound bites about "cutting off and killing" the Iraqi Army. Given the provision of the clear objectives, the overwhelming force, the lack of constraints on the application of power, under such ideal
circumstances, much more was expected.

The argument about decisive victory relates back to the subject of war termination, and criticism regarding General Powell’s recommendations to unilaterally cease hostilities. These recommendations, in retrospect, seem consistent with the "reluctant warrior" image captured by Bob Woodward in *The Commanders*. Even after the President decided that Iraq would withdraw or be forcibly ejected, the CJCS sought to keep war aims limited. Other reports suggest General Powell was "the loudest proponent for limited and militarily expedient war aims. He wanted no part of a war that required an extended American occupation or a protracted hunt for Saddam." Some Pentagon officials questioned whether this view reflected his best advice based on a politically deft understanding of the geostrategic situation in the region or merely was "a convenient rationale for limited military involvement and entanglement in a messy situation."

General Powell has no regrets since the war. Even a year later he is not the least bit defensive about his role in limiting the gains that could have been achieved, and criticizes counterarguments as senseless Monday morning quarterbacking.

Like most conflicts, whether or not a truly decisive victory has been achieved cannot be determined immediately. The military’s insistence that a decisive victory was achieved is understandable. It does not denigrate the valor of the military to question whether or not their victory achieved the political objectives set forth. However, given the "tactical victory, strategic defeat" school of thought that emanated from Vietnam, the acceptance of a merely overwhelming tactical victory is surprising. Instead of acting defensively, the military should accept the fact that decisive victories are the product of numerous political and military
conditions, some beyond the control of the theater commander.

The sharp defensiveness points to the need to closely scrutinize the war termination aspects of this conflict. In fact, General Powell's advice at both the beginning and the end of the war bears far more analysis than given to date. His primary job was to ensure the match between assigned political aims and military objectives. He appeared reluctant to recommend offensive combat to achieve those aims, and then was very fast to stop the ground war, and remove American troops. According to some reports, General Powell was a "brakeman" to the propensity for higher goals sought by civilian advisers around the President. Other reports have General Powell looking to end ground combat early as G+1, the day after the ground war began.65

From the published record to date, it does not appear that the termination strategy had been thought out in detail. This undercuts the belief that clear objectives had been established. General Powell made an assessment that the political and military objectives had been accomplished, and the President accepted this conclusion. This view was based on limited information. The American military had not completed all of its assigned objectives, particularly the destruction of the Republican Guard. Some combination of poor communications, the fog of war, or faulty reporting permitted both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the theater commander to believe they held more land, had destroyed more tanks, and greater amounts of the Guard than they really had.

After the war, Saddam Hussein's continued truculence, and the brutal crushing of internal dissension leads many to think that the knockout victory of 1991 may being only temporary. The phoenix will be hard to crush, since the extremely favorable political conditions that
existed in 1991 may not exist again. Thus, many believe a truly decisive victory had slipped away. Others go so far as to count the Gulf war as a major American political defeat given the enormity of the political and military effort marshalled against Saddam during and after the Gulf War.\footnote{46}

Such assessments presume far too much about what could have been achieved politically in Iraq, and what the risks and costs of continued combat would have been. There is no credible evidence that killing 5,000 Iraqis or destroying 500 more tanks would have contributed to a better state of peace.

But the premature decision to halt the ground offensive bears detailed review for future conflicts. Why did General Powell recommend halting the war? In post-conflict interviews, visual imagery from the "Highway of Death" was cited as a problem and that we were creating the impression that American pilots were engaging in wanton killing. However, several analyses have shown that no such images were presented on American networks or CNN.\footnote{47} Even if such reports were seen, the recommendation for a unilateral cease fire does not follow. Air attacks on retreating convoys in the kill zones could have been stopped, and the enveloping force could have blocked and captured the rabble as it proceeded towards VII Corps.

In retrospect it seems apparent the Administration was concerned about a "crisp and clean ending." Reportedly, planning conferences at the National Security Council deputy level made numerous references to long term stalemates like Korea. The U.S. military wanted no part of any "ragged ending," nor did it desire a long term presence and quagmire.\footnote{48} It was not only the military that was willing to accept a sharp, short, decisive win. President Bush
stated “we are not going to permit this to drag on in terms of a significant U.S. presence a
la Korea.” The President’s team did not want “victory fever” to take hold and escalate
the stated policy aims like Truman’s crossing the 38th parallel after Inchon.

To summarize, the campaign was decisive in military terms only. The results, from both
the air and ground phases, were dramatically decisive at the tactical and operational levels
of warfare. Raised expectations due to the exaggerated rhetoric of the President, the
Chairman, and the CINC were not met. Furthermore, all military objectives were not
satisfied. Substantial amounts of Iraqi armor escaped. The Republican Guard was not
degraded during the air or ground phases to the degree specified before the war. Additionally, after the war it was determined that Iraq’s NBC capabilities were not degraded
as much as desired.

Civil Military Relations

The conclusion that the relationship between civilian policy makers and military experts
the Gulf War presents a model for future crisis management decisions should not be accepted
at face value. Given the military’s memory of LBJ on his hands and knees on the floor in
the Oval Office picking bombing targets, President Bush was a major improvement. It is true
that Mr. Bush religiously adhered to a strict chain of command running from Cheney to
Powell to Schwarzkopf. Likewise, Mr. Bush was disinclined to disagree with the military,
accepted the Pentagon’s proposals and approved their requests, and made no major decisions
that contradicted the military advice of his commanders. In the CINC’s words “his
confidence in the military’s ability to do its job was so unlike what we’d seen in Vietnam.”

However, even though the Oval Office refused to get down into operational minutia and
never forced the military "to fight with one hand tied behind its back," it is an oversimplification to suggest that the war was a model for the future.

Both the manner in which the war began and was concluded really raise grave doubts about the level of trust that existed between the President and his major policy advisers. While the military was afforded access to policy councils, for some reason General Powell felt constrained in putting forth his position regarding economic strangulation over a military solution. The suggestion that the principal advisor to the President on military matters felt any hesitancy about giving his best advice reveals problems.72

The Commanders also reveals the absence of direct communications between the political leader and principal military advisor at a major juncture in the decision making process. According to this report, General Powell was surprised when the President made the decision and public announcement that Iraq's aggression would not stand, and that it would be reversed. This was a major policy decision, and the failure to discuss and evaluate the costs of such a policy with one's principal military advisor is troubling.73

In addition to the problems in Washington, relations with the warfighting commander were tense. The CINC perceived a "lack of guidance," and at one point was relying on the text of UN resolutions to determine what actions he should be planning for.74 Other details from CENTCOM bely the simple picture put forward by the Pentagon. CENTCOM was frustrated with constant changes in guidance with enforcing the naval blockade, having gotten four changes in four hours when an Iraqi tanker challenged the Navy. It was a "classic illustration of what happens when Washington tries to direct combat operations from afar" according to General Schwarzkopf.75
Relations between the Secretary of Defense Cheney and the Joint Staff are also less than sanguine. Several reports lead to the conclusion that General Powell sought to control information getting to the SecDef, and that Cheney used back channel sources to “pulse the system” and not become dependent on just the Joint Staff for his information. Furthermore, Mr. Cheney felt forced to prod the Chairman to get the Joint Staff to prepare necessary military options for the President. Later, in frustration, he began developing his own offensive operations and directing members of Joint Staff while Powell was out of town. This resulted in a plan called Operation Scorpion, a design for a very wide westward swing into Iraq. The CENTCOM staff ripped the proposal apart.

Another indication of tension is seen in General Waller’s public dispute with the White House. General Waller, the Deputy at CENTCOM, publicly disagreed with the President's January 15 date for the initiation of offensive operations. General Waller specifically told reporters that forces would not be ready, which undercut the White House’s coercive diplomacy to make Saddam blink. The entire incident reflects unfavorably on the military’s acceptance of war as a political act. To make matters worse, on several occasions the CINC hinted he would resign rather than initiate the ground war early.

One should not make too much of the sort of conflicts that appeared during the Gulf War. Such tensions are one of the timeless dimensions of warfare, inherent to the integration of political considerations and military perspectives during times of stress. However, this should not whitewash the problem, particularly since the situation favored the military’s desired paradigm. Such problems could have been serious if several factors, such as the need for an early ground offensive, were changed.
Popular Support

Assessing the matter of popular support is a much clearer matter. With regard to Congressional support, the military relearned that Congress is of little help, and that partisan politics can play a stronger role than the Nation’s best interests. The Congressional hearings in the Fall of 1990 were insufficient and unbalanced, and Congress’s late authorization was more of a product of the President’s deft political maneuvering than Congressional leadership. Congress did not regain any respect or authority in regard to the ultimate decision of war.

The belief that the media must be controlled is counterproductive for both the military and the country as a whole. The media is now prepared to resist any restrictions, and will go off on its own in the next war. Unreasonable constraints raise deep suspicions that the military has something to hide. A backlash could occur during the next war that will seriously undercut popular support. An adverse situation could arise, like the Amariyah bomb shelter bombing in Baghdad that inadvertently killed 400 Iraqi civilians. Without any degree of mutual trust and credibility, the next incident could become a propaganda victory for our opponents. Competent military officers have nothing to hide from the press, and attempts to handcuff the media as in Saudi Arabia will be futile and counterproductive.

Summary

After the war, Mr. Bush effusively declared "By God, we’ve licked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all." Like the military, Mr. Bush exorcised his own ghosts and fulfilled his promises. He pledged the war would not be "another Vietnam," that it would not be a halfway effort, with a murky ending.
Implicit in this declaration, however, is the presumption that Desert Storm was a decisive victory. Such a conclusion remains debatable. However, the military has largely accepted it, despite the fact that indecisive wars are the rule rather than the exception. As Professor Weigley has shown, the history of warfare leans towards the conclusion of “recalcitrant indecisiveness” when assessing the utility of force as an instrument of statecraft.1

A "new" version of the American Way of War emerges in the aftermath of Desert Storm. Strategies of annihilation that seek the complete overthrow of an opponent and his government are now accepted as anomalies. The preference is now for the swift and massed application of overwhelming force for limited ends. The new preferred style acknowledges policy aims as the preceptor of strategy, but insists force is best employed for objectives that can be readily defined in military terms. Additionally, force should be used in those situations where it can be swift and decisive, where its use justifies the risks and resulting costs, and where the forces can be quickly withdrawn. Popular support is maintained by keeping conflict short, attainable, and by controlling the media message to the American taxpayer.

The New American Way of War retains the old preferences for absolutism and autonomy during the conduct of military operations. What is sharply different is that such instances are now employed for more limited ends, in situations where military means can be optimally employed, and when both the objectives and the means will be supported by general popular support vice national mobilization.
CHAPTER V ENDNOTES


10. Ibid., p. 193.


12. The objectives were detailed in Mr. Bush's State of the Union address January, 16 1991; quoted in Summers, *On Strategy II*, p. 162; and in the Pentagon's *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War* report, p. 31.


15. Ibid., p. 46.


17. Atkinson, Crusade, p. 298. Those who define the military achievements of CENTCOM and the Coalition as a "hollow victory" appear to jump to a conclusion that eliminating Hussein was an implicit political goal. For example, see Record, Hollow Victory, p. 8. and p. 156. Record believes that "American war aims manifestly encompassed Saddam Hussein's removal from power and the permanent elimination of Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors, especially with ballistic missiles and hyperlethal munitions."

18. Ibid., p. 155.


22. Ibid., p. xix.

23. Ibid., p. 70.

24. Ibid., p. 231.


29. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 92. See also Atkinson, Crusade, pp. 56-65 for an overview of the aerial campaign plan and its direct contrast to Rolling Thunder. Record, Hollow Victory, has a good overview of the air war, pp. 103-118.


33. Triumph Without Victory, p. 185.


35. Triumph Without Victory, p. 400.

36. Ibid., p. 95.

37. DOD acknowledges most of these complaints in their after action report. See Appendix S, Media Policy, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp. 651-655.


40. Fialka, Hotel Warriors, p. 11.

confirmed by Williams, p. 6.

42. Atkinson, Crusade, p. 160. Fialka's Hotel Warriors remains the best assessment to date. Triumph Without Victory is also critical of the "banality of antiseptic official briefings and the shackles of restrictive press pools," p. vi.


48. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 471.

49. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero, p. 323.


53. Record, Hollow Victory, p. 2.

54. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero, p. 355.

55. Ibid., p. 370.

56. Ibid., pp. 386-387.

57. See Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 74. The same six objectives are listed in the Air Force Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (hereafter referred to as the GWAPS

58. The destruction of the Republican Guard is listed in both the Commander's intent, and the theater objectives. The importance of this objective was also underscored in the GWAPS report, pp. 46-47, p. 106. Atkinson, Crusade, p. 299.

59. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero, p. 430.

60. Ibid., p. 497.

61. Triumph Without Victory, p. 400.


63. Ibid., p. 452.


65. Rick Atkinson, Crusade, p. 449. General Schwarzkopf states that General Powell called him on 27 February about a cease fire. He also refers to TV imagery appearing on Monday night back in the U.S., and that General Powell told him the White House was nervous about wanton killing. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, p. 468.


67. This issue is addressed in detail by the GWAPS report, p. 250. Several newspapers articles however did provide direct reports from pilots that they were "shooting fish in a barrel" and participating in a "turkey shoot." Richard Randall, "Like Fish in a Barrel US Pilots Say," Washington Post, February 27, 1991, p. A28.

68. Atkinson, Crusade, pp. 299-301, p. 491.

69. Ibid., p. 491.

70. CINCCENT wanted the RFGC to be reduced 50% prior to the start of the ground campaign, and the GWAPS indicates that only 24% of the armor assets were attrited. By the end of the war, these units were reduced to 50%. The CINC's definition of success also required the three elite Guard Divisions (Tawakalna, Madinah, and Hammurabi divisions) to be incapable of mounting organized brigade level operations. Judging from the reports from the GWAPS, and from the March 1 fight between the 24th Mechanized Division and the Hammurabi, this objective was not achieved. See Keaney and Cohen, GWAPS, p. 27-54; Atkinson, Crusade;
Record, *Hollow Victory*, p. 496.


75. Ibid., p. 322.


77. This incident is covered in three major post-war books, including Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn’t Take a Hero*, p. 368; *Triumph Without Victory*, p. 167; Atkinson, *Crusade*, p. 96.


82. Quoted in Atkinson, *Crusade*, p. 493.

CHAPTER VI

DECISIVE FORCE–THE NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR?

*The specter of Vietnam has been buried forever in the desert sands of the Arabian peninsula.*

President Bush

Contrary to Mr. Bush’s belief, the Vietnam Syndrome was not buried forever. It lives on, indelibly ingrained in the American military culture. One sharp 42-day campaign will not completely exorcise the trauma of Southeast Asia. Wars are significant contributors to strategic culture, but great failures are more apt to result in rapid or substantive change. The Gulf War was obviously not a failure. Instead Desert Storm served to reinforce the trends of the preceding two decades in the American military culture.

The preceding chapters have traced the development of what the military learned from its operational experiences in four very different situations. The conflicts were very diverse, but the instructional points reflect common themes. These lessons have now been absorbed into the military culture, a culture arguably “enshrouded in mythology.” In addition to the difficulty of drawing lessons from history, such lessons are influenced, for better or worse, by organizational interests and perceptions.

Along with the apparitions of Vietnam, the heady success of Desert Storm is now reflected in a ”new” American Way of War. The most distinctive element of this style of warfare is the principle of Decisive Force—the use of overwhelming force to achieve decisive military results without exposing American forces to protracted or indecisive
conflict. The concept succinctly sums up the military's perspective of a New American Way of War. The concept is a not too distant relative of the Weinberger Doctrine, and represents the distillation of the military's perspective from the four conflicts represented in this effort.

The operational success of CENTCOM's crushing victory has brought the U.S. military full circle from Maxwell Taylor's frustration with Eisenhower's New Look and its reliance on massive retaliation. That frustration prompted him to write the\textit{ Uncertain Trumpet}, the harbinger of "flexible response." Today, as a result of the Gulf campaign and the latent lessons from Vietnam, our military culture categorically rejects the limited war connotations of flexible response. The military insists on a more certain response for more clearly prescribed purposes. The U.S. military prefers the call of a certain trumpet.

This chapter will record the documentation of the New American Way of War and test the construct against postulated requirements for the use of military force. Criticisms of the Pentagon's approach will be matched against the requirements the Nation places on military power, and the efforts being made by the Defense Department to prepare for its role in the post-Cold War world. The remainder of this research project seeks answers to the following questions.

- What is Decisive Force?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of the concept?
- How does Decisive Force match our needs for military force in strategic terms?
- How does Decisive Force match up with future requirements and future scenarios requiring military force?
Decisive Force and the National Military Strategy

The military culture's interpretation about the proper employment of the military as an instrument of national policy has been reduced to the concept of Decisive Force. The concept was developed by the Joint Staff in the period immediately following the Gulf War. It was persistently articulated by General Colin Powell during his final year in office as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Numerous journalists and defense experts called it the Pentagon's post-Cold War warfighting doctrine.

The strategic principle of Decisive Force was included in the National Military Strategy in 1992. This was the first time the National Military Strategy was articulated in an open and unclassified format. A public document was seen as a unique opportunity to explain the strategic rationale and framework for the Defense Department's post-Cold War force structure and fiscal requirements. The strategy was produced in a top down process, unusual for Joint planning documents, and reflected the personal influence of General Powell.

The new military strategy outlined several principles that build on traditional U.S. military strengths. The purpose of detailing the principles was to capture the key lessons from Desert Storm and exploit weaknesses of those who might threaten U.S. interests. These strategic principles are recognizable as standard U.S. approaches including forward presence, collective security, and technological superiority. The only unique element was the concept of Decisive Force, defined as follows:

Once a decision for military action has been made, half-measures and confused objectives exact a severe price in the form of a protracted conflict which can cause needless waste of human lives and material resources, a divided nation at home, and defeat. Therefore one of the essential  

...
military strategy is the ability to rapidly assemble the forces needed to win—the concept of applying decisive force to overwhelm our adversaries and thereby terminate conflicts swiftly with minimum loss of life.9

According to one of the principal drafters of the NMS, the concept is directly derived from Desert Storm, but it also seems to reflect the lessons of Vietnam and Beirut. In the definition the haunting specter of Vietnam lingers in the references to "protracted conflict" and the "divided nation at home." The military's lessons learned from Vietnam and Beirut are just as clearly demonstrated in the phrase "half-measures and confused objectives." Like the Weinberger Doctrine, an implicit foundation of the concept was a belief that force should only be used with the commitment of the Nation. Also included is the Weinberger criteria of "winning." Last, force should only be applied in such a manner as to ensure success quickly and decisively.10

The concept does not address the political decisions of why or when military force is used. The focus of the principle is on how military force should be applied. However, the requirement for clear objectives, for permitting the military to apply decisive force to win by overwhelming opponents, and for quickly terminating battle with a minimum of casualties reflects the essence of the New American Way of War. The concentrated use of offensive means, employing both mass and technology, remains consistent with the traditional strategy of annihilation.

The New American Way of War though does not assume that mass will be used to grind down an opponent through exhaustion. That takes too much time, protracts conflicts, and could lead to media-induced perceptions that sap public support. The limits of time, sensitivity to casualties, and popular support that influence our strategic culture
no longer permit the older traditional approach. The emphasis has switched from slow and ponderous applications of resources in the tradition of U. S. Grant to a more focused and qualitatively improved style. As reflected in Decisive Force, the modern U.S. military seeks to use overwhelming force to rapidly overcome any opponent in as short a time period as possible, and with the least cost to us in terms of lives.

The Critics

The doctrine has been criticized in general for its insistence for the massive and unequivocal application of combat power. Critics of this approach include Mr. Les Aspin, then Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who sensed an "all or nothing" approach solidifying in the Nation's military leadership. Mr. Aspin identified a common but narrow understanding within the Officer corps on the use of military force. In a speech made in late 1992, he evaluated this "new" school of military thought. He was critical of what he saw as a checklist approach, and its inapplicability to the challenges of maintaining peace in the post-Cold War world.

Mr. Aspin found the emergence of this consensus among the Officer corps disturbing. He summarized his perception of this consensus in four propositions on when force is appropriate.

1. Only as a last resort. Diplomatic and economic sanctions should be tried first.

2. Only when there is a clear cut military objective. Forces should not be sent to achieve vague political goals.

3. Only when we can measure that the military objective can been achieved. We need to know when to bring the forces home.
4. Only in an overwhelming fashion. We should get it done quickly and with little loss of life, by the use of overwhelming force.\textsuperscript{12}

Mr. Aspin pejoratively termed this consensus with a bumper sticker slogan—the "all or nothing" school. From his view on the House Armed Services Committee, a "block of very expert opinion" existed which was unwilling to accept the wide variety of situations that exist where limited military force could be employed in the post-Cold War world. In essence, what he perceived was the return to an absolutist orientation in the U.S. military in the aftermath of Desert Storm. What he found unacceptable was the failure to accept that situations might exist where force be used prudently short of all out war. Mr. Aspin's view of the post-Cold War world reflected a Hobbesian world of fervent nationalism, terrorism, and ethnic conflict. An "all or nothing" absolutist school would be inconsistent with meeting challenges in this chaotic international security environment.

In direct contrast to the absolutist position, Mr. Aspin placed himself among a "limited objectives" school that finds the threat of military action, and limited military operations as useful tools for preserving peace in an unstable world. Mr. Aspin concluded that the pragmatic application of force, and the coercive threat of force, served U.S. policy goals best in the post-Cold War world. His position was predicated on two basic assumptions. The first was that the demise of Soviet Union permitted us to closely control the throttle and gear shift of any conflict without fear of escalation into a superpower Armageddon. Secondly, the American military technical revolution offered new tools in the form of precision munitions and advanced aerospace technology for compellence against rogue aggressors and challenges to the international community.
In Mr. Aspin's estimation, the end of the Cold War freed the United States from self-imposed limitations and from the fear of Third World conflicts escalating beyond control. Freed from the dangers of escalation, Mr. Aspin argued that we could opt for limited interventions without fear of sliding into quagmires and use force surgically with little risk to ourselves.\textsuperscript{13}

Mr. Aspin was not alone. Others were equally critical of the generation of a "Beirut syndrome" as a substitute for the Vietnam syndrome. This Lebanese version made the Pentagon uneasy about handling less than ideal situations and made it resist involvement in sticky situations that did not fit its preferred paradigm and doctrine of overwhelming force.\textsuperscript{14} The end result of this syndrome, the critics charged, was the failure to address serious challenges in Europe as the former Yugoslavia disintegrated.

The early criticisms of Decisive Force should be understood in the context of the domestic debate in the United States over intervention into Bosnia-Herzegovnia in 1992. In addition, the long suffering population of Somalia was ravaged by famine and its government had completely collapsed into anarchy. Many critics wanted to mobilize the Pentagon to resolve these crises, but found the military reluctant. The strategic backdrop to the entire debate was the role of America in the post-Cold War world. The options ranged from reverting to isolationism or mindless interventionism in the pursuit of idealistic humanitarian agendas.\textsuperscript{15}

Proponents of a U.S. military intervention into the maelstrom that once was Yugoslavia were critical of the Pentagon's active resistance to intervention in Bosnia. One writer called the Pentagon's new attitude the "Invincible Force Doctrine," perceiving
a reluctance to get involved in anything less than all out conventional conflicts where our comparative advantages in technology could be put to use to.\textsuperscript{14}

Some major newspapers were critical of what they saw as traditional absolutism from the Joint Chiefs of Staff stemming from Vietnam, noting "...the U.S. military continues to oppose limited intervention for limited goals."\textsuperscript{17} The criticism was sometimes directed personally at General Powell, including an historically inaccurate and unfavorable comparison with General McClellan.\textsuperscript{18} It was implied that the Pentagon was skewing policy choices with its professional advice, and that its doctrine was predicated on maintaining a larger than necessary defense budget.\textsuperscript{19} The \textit{New York Times} opined that for roughly $280 Billion the Pentagon should offer more than "no can do," and provide "a range of options more sophisticated than off or on, stay out completely or go in all the way to total victory."\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Counterpoints}

General Powell responded forthrightly to all his critics in numerous forums. Through these speeches, General Powell clarified and expanded the concept of Decisive Force. He admitted that he preferred decisive means instead of "surgical pin pricks" and limited bombings in situations like Bosnia. General Powell added:

Decisive means and results are always to be preferred, even if they are not always possible. We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. History has not been kind to this approach to war-making.\textsuperscript{21}

General Powell specifically responded to Mr. Aspin's speech in late 1992 in a major article that appeared in \textit{Foreign Affairs}. In this response, he rejected most of Mr. Aspin's distinctions between "limited war" and the "all-out war" schools as moot "academic
niceties.* Somewhat ironically, Mr. Aspin became General Powell’s immediate superior upon his confirmation as Secretary of Defense just a few months later.

However, in these rebuttals he further reinforced perceptions that the Pentagon was actively resisting involvement in limited conflicts. During an interview with The New York Times, General Powell purportedly stated, "As soon as they tell me it is limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not. As soon as they tell me its surgical, I head for the bunker."22

Such statements also fed directly into the perceptions of critics who believed that the "all or nothing" school was the principal school of thought in the Pentagon.

General Powell eventually responded to these critics with a detailed description of what Decisive Force meant in terms of a process or guidelines for the determination of how military combat forces should be employed. He had no qualms with the military being employed for nontraditional missions, and noted that Decisive Force was misinterpreted. Making a major distinction, he distinguished between humanitarian operations and combat, or what he called "violent means," which was when he acknowledged that views began to differ about the use of force.23

He specifically rejected the insinuation that he or any other element of the Pentagon was advocating an absolutist approach or an insistence on "winning" in military terms. "This is not to argue that the use of force is constrained to only those occurrences where the victory of American arms will resounding, swift and overwhelming," he wrote. But it does mean, he added, that force should be restricted to those situations where it can do some good, where the benefits outweigh the costs and risks that will accrue.24

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General Powell’s elucidations on the Decisive Force concept expanded it into a more
generic decision making process than the singular operational doctrine that appeared in the
National Military Strategy. As he expounded on this set of guidelines, the so-called
Powell Doctrine began to sound very much like the Weinberger Doctrine.

Force, according to General Powell, can be employed:

- When the objective is important and clearly defined,
- When all nonviolent means have failed,
- When military force can achieve the desired political objective,
- When the costs and risks are acceptable, in terms of expected gains, and;
- When the consequences have been thought out.  

These distinctions clarified the strategic concept, but at the same time, it extended his
views past the professional purview about how force should be employed to a broader
process or formula about when and where force is optimally used. As his retirement
approached in late 1993, General Powell’s popularity and effectiveness as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff was recognized, but the legacy of his doctrine was consistently noted
as a debatable issue born from the “indelible lessons from his generation’s seminal
conflict” in Vietnam as well as the failure of American policy in Lebanon. Even
extremely favorable assessments pointed to General Powell as the author of a post-Cold
War doctrine for American military force tied to the "deep emotional traditions of the
American military." The most vocal critics, advocates of limited intervention in Europe,
argued for a need for more flexibility from the Pentagon than "the reigning strategic
document of overwhelming force."  

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Even when the military was tasked to provide forces for Somalia in late 1992, the so-called "Powell Doctrine" was raised. Critics focused on the massive size of the task force dispatched to Mogadishu, and its limited mission. Several critics noted the composition of the force reflected "...the doctrine of decisive and overwhelming force championed by General Colin Powell," but wondered if the military acquiesced to the mission because it did not involve politics, there were few constraints, few risks, and a clear exit.27

The Somalia expedition demonstrably shows that the use of military force always incurs some risks and requires constant monitoring. The tragic debacle of October 3, 1993 when 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed and another 75 injured in a firefight in Mogadishu has served to reinforce the concept of Decisive Force and its applicability to humanitarian missions as well. The example of Somalia, one could argue, vindicates the Decisive Force concept.28 Both the senior envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Robert Oakley, and the Commanding General of the U.S. Central Command, Marine General Joseph Hoar, have concluded that Somalia supports the need for "overwhelming force" even in peacekeeping or humanitarian tasks.29 However, it could be argued that the use of firepower and overwhelming force in Somalia was inappropriate for the task at hand.

The principle of Decisive Force has outlived General Powell's tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It was reflected as a fundamental planning element in the Defense Department's final Persian Gulf conflict report to Congress in 1992, and has been retained as a basic strategic concept in draft revisions to the next iteration of the National Military Strategy.30 The principle of Decisive Force is now firmly rooted in the U.S. military
lexicon and culture. The remainder of this chapter will explore the advantages and disadvantages of this strategic concept.

The Strategic Use of Power

The evaluation of the utility of decisive force as a declaratory policy or strategic principle hinges on how well it serves the use of power as an instrument of policy. Ultimately, the concept must be measured against what do we want military power to do. The National Military Strategy is designed to address the "ways and means" that military force will contribute to desired ends. Decisive Force is a "way" of operating towards these ends or objectives. For analysis purposes, the Decisive Force concept will be matched and evaluated against four purposes served by military power. These are to deter, to defend, to decisively influence other states if deterrence fails, and to provide diplomatic support. These four functions are detailed below in Table II.

Table II

The Strategic Uses of Military Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deter</td>
<td>Strategic and conventional deterrence. Passive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defend</td>
<td>Defend CONUS and allies from external attack. Could include preventive war or preemptive employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisive Influence</td>
<td>Compellence via combat, or coercion via threat of force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Support</td>
<td>Diplomatic efforts, peacekeeping, security assistance, and humanitarian efforts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Deterrence is a difficult factor in defense theology. It cannot be predicted nor can one even claim credit for success. Causation for something that does not occur, like deterring aggression, cannot be proven. Nonetheless, the concept of deterrence is universally accepted, and exists largely as a function of a state's credibility. Deterrence in its broadest sense means persuading an opponent not to initiate an action because of the perceived benefits and costs of doing so. It presumes rationality on the part of the opposing state, since we are attempting to influence the antagonist to rationally compare the relative costs he will incur should he attempt to do something against us.

The credibility factor is a function of both a country's assessed capabilities and perceived will. For the past several decades, other nations recognized that the U.S. had an enormous capacity in terms of raw military power, but our willingness to employ it decisively to advance stated policy aims was questioned.

Deterrence failed at the outset in preventing the invasion of Kuwait, but our decisive response should increase our credibility for future scenarios. Future opponents now have a new data set to calculate the costs of opposing the U.S. in conventional military conflict. With Iraq vanquished so decisively, Desert Storm "adds a powerful dimension to the ability of the United States to deter war."

The concept of deterrence is enhanced with the adoption of Decisive Force as a declaratory policy. Deterrence hinges upon perceptions about capacity and will. Around the world, nations have strategic "balance sheets" reflecting their overall credibility. Our stated intention of employing force decisively, with the full range of U.S. military and technological capabilities, improves deterrence and might minimize the number of
opportunities whereby the U.S. strategic credit account is tapped. This remains true as long as the perceived strategic balance sheet is not mindlessly debited on marginal accounts and expenditures.

Defend. Likewise, military power is also used to defend ourselves, and our allies. The U.S. has numerous treaty obligations and collective defense arrangements. The credibility of these pacts is enhanced by the presumption that the U.S. government intends to and is fully capable of defending itself and its close friends. The defense literature normally includes the options of preventive war, or preemptive military operations, as legitimate means of maintaining a nation's defense. Such options are not consistent with the strategic culture or defense requirements of the U.S.

Decisive Force remains supportive of the defensive employment of combat forces. The principle, as defined, minimizes any potential presumptions that the U.S. will fail to fully defend alliance members or U.S. possessions with anything less than a full response. This will contribute to situations such as North Korea which threaten a U.S. ally.

Decisive Influence. The third purpose of military power is to achieve stated policy aims by decisively influencing another actor's policies and/or behaviors. This is accomplished by coercion or compellence. Coercion involves the active threat of force, as opposed to the more passive form of persuasion found in deterrence. Coercive diplomacy offers the possibility of achieving objectives economically, with little bloodshed, and fewer political costs and risk. When employing coercive diplomacy, one tries to persuade another State to cease something he is doing by signalling, bargaining, or negotiating through an admixture of threats and "carrots."
Decisive Force provides real credibility to coercive diplomacy. A successful coercing power must create an image of urgency and unacceptable damage, and Decisive Force generates sufficient urgency and sense of risk in the opposing government’s decision making process (assuming they are rational).

Coercive diplomacy is usually associated with crisis management and "brinkmanship." A fundamental component of coercive diplomacy is the perception that military force is a real and viable alternative. Diplomats can weaken this credibility by employing a "try and see" negotiating tactic or by bluffing. An antagonist can call a bluff. This forces a subsequent decision or reaction on the part of the coercing power. If the coercing power finds it lacks the necessary will or means to carry out its threat, its credibility is reduced. A state may decide, for the purpose of credibility or prestige, that it needs to follow through on its threat, even if the original objective was not worth the costs and risks of combat. Techniques such as "try and see" can result in policy disasters and reduced credibility. Equally disastrous are situations when either diplomats or military figures make public statements that weaken the perception that military "sticks" are under active consideration, and that the targeted power is not under the real risk of unacceptable damage. Thus, effective coercion requires the close coordination of diplomatic and military considerations before the fact.

The other form of decisive influence involves the active form of compellence. Compelling another government or group to change its goals or actions is normally accomplished by physically destroying its military capability or means to resist. This can also be done by the effective threat of force, when the target government changes its
policy aims prior to the initiation of combat. Obviously, this purpose is consistent with the primary purpose for which military forces are trained and maintained. Decisive Force is completely consistent with the requirements of effective compellence.

**Diplomatic Support.** The fourth and final purpose of military power is to provide necessary services, advice, and leverage to our diplomatic efforts. Military forces can provide a wide host of capabilities that enhance diplomacy or support international missions. International support in the form of security assistance, nation building, and peacekeeping are included in this category. Both the National Military Strategy and General Powell take support for such missions "as a given."37 The historical record of the past several years in the Philippines, Iraq, Russia, Los Angeles, Florida, Bangladesh, Somalia, strongly support the conclusion that the military is both capable and willing to execute these missions.

Decisive Force does not seem applicable here but it is actually quite relevant. Diplomatic support includes "military operations short of war," which by definition could involve peacekeeping and peace-enforcement tasks.38 Peacekeeping operations are defined as missions to separate two warring parties who have accepted the introduction of an interpositionary force, and a willingness to end the conflict. The peacekeeping force remains in place to assure both parties they are secure from the other side.

Peace-enforcement operations are fundamentally different. They lack the formal agreement by the parties regarding the introduction of the interpositionary force, and lack any mutual consensus on terminating hostile activities. Thus, the peace-enforcement
mission requires the introduction of an effective military force to physically separate and maintain the separation of two hostile parties.39

While both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations fall under the umbrella of operations other than war, they do involve circumstances where the use of deadly force may be warranted. Under both types of missions, a large and actively engaged presence consistent with the principle of Decisive Force is useful. Intimidation of the local antagonists is an effective deterrent and a byproduct of Decisive Force. This serves the overall mission by deterring factions from violating the peace, or by quickly establishing a peace where none existed. There is an historical tradition of employing lightly armed troops as peacekeepers, and limiting their role to passive observers. Experience in recent operations suggests that the traditional approach is breaking down. Peacekeeping forces must remain neutral to execute their role, but neutral does not have to mean neutered.

However, there are other situations under diplomatic support (security assistance, Foreign Internal Defense, or nation building) where an extensive U.S. presence or where the unrestrained employment of American maneuver forces, firepower, or technology is inappropriate. It is possible that Decisive Force is not always overwhelming force in a strictly conventional military sense. This would include many situations under the umbrella of "operations other than war" such as counter-insurgency where long term social, political, and economic problems in areas of interest to the U.S. may require interventions of a politico-military nature, for a protracted period of time. In such scenarios, (e.g., El Salvador), the introduction of Decisive Force to "overwhelm" the
adversary may have little meaning, or may be counterproductive. In such scenarios, the
meaning of decisive needs to be clarified and refined.

To summarize this section, the concept of Decisive Force supports the four purposes
of military power. There is a need to differentiate between Decisive Force as it applies to
warfighting or "violent means," and the sort of protracted and persistent involvement
required in some low-intensity situations where tightly integrated politico-military
operations are needed. The 1992 National Military Strategy does not adequately address
this distinction.

**Misinterpretations or Misapplication**

In assessing the utility and viability of the principle of Decisive Force, a number of
potential problems have been raised. These include problems associated with:

a. Prescriptive solutions
b. Precedents
c. Policy/Strategy Inversion

**Prescriptive Solutions.** Prescriptive approaches rarely fail to meet the tests of
history, particularly in dynamic time periods. We certainly live in interesting times,
disproving the overly simplistic notion of "endism." The very breadth of the
challenges facing the U.S. national security interests contradicts the simplistic notion that
a single doctrine will provide the necessary guidance to deal constructively with the range
of problems that might cause the introduction of U.S. military force.

The U.S. military discourages Jominian or Mahanian prescriptions in its military
schools. This does not mean that Decisive Force could not creep into operational
doctrines or exercises and be misapplied. There are indications its influence has been seen adversely in high-level wargames conducted at the National Defense University.41

Doctrine can be a convenient means of encapsulating history and lessons, but it can also be "the most frightful tyrants to which men ever are subject, because doctrines get inside of a man's own reason and betray him against himself."42 Doctrine is defined as the "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application."43 Military commanders must have the mental agility to recognize distinctions between situations, avoid overestimating likenesses, and ignoring key distinctions between scenarios. The U.S. military has not often demonstrated such strategic or doctrinal agility, and Vietnam reflects a relevant example.

General Powell is fully aware of the danger of prescriptive rules. He specifically noted that Decisive Force is not a fixed approach and that saying there was only one way to use force was similar to stating you should always use the elevator during a fire. Sure enough the next time there is a fire, the elevator is blocked. General Powell underscored his understanding that circumstances and the nature of a problem drive the response to it.44 All doctrine and all principles can be misapplied if used inappropriately or out of context. Dogmatic or prescriptive applications are rarely effective, but this does not rule out the utility of doctrine. The challenge is to refine the judgment of military leaders to use strategies and operational doctrine as guidelines.

Precedents. The second theoretical issue involves the precedents that lie under the concept of Decisive Force. Precedents and historical analogies are important benchmarks
in organizational cultures and learning. Great failures have historically been drivers of
dramatic organizational change in military institutions, and great successes have
contributed to complacency. We have reviewed the lessons that the U.S. military
garnered from Vietnam and Beirut, and the vindication drawn from the desert in Kuwait.
Yet, as Robert Jervis has warned, past success can be the cause of failure in future situations.45 A healthy measure of caution in accepting lessons and analogies is needed
when developing and applying strategic concepts.

One problem with Decisive Force is the reverse logic of the precedents it has been
drawn from. Because Decisive Force is described as the antithesis of Vietnam, the logical
reverse conclusion is that a massive and overwhelming application of ground forces and
unconstrained airpower would have resulted in Hanoi’s capitulation. Hopefully this would
be recognized by senior civilian and military leaders as an erroneous conclusion drawn
from faulty logic. As Professor Jay Luvaas from the U.S. Army War College notes
"there is a tendency not to appreciate that once removed from its unique context, a
specific lesson loses much of its usefulness."46 Analogies are useful historical and
analytical tools, but critical distinctions in analogies must be detailed. "Desert Storm
lessons do not automatically apply to Vietnam" should be a major conclusion to the
Pentagon’s Gulf War report.47

Equally unsettling is the application of the principle of overwhelming force to low
intensity situations such as El Salvador. El Salvador represented a situation that many in
the U.S. equated to a Vietnam-like quagmire. However, the Reagan administration
intervened in El Salvador with a long-term, low-cost (politically and in human lives),
protracted involvement. The strategy was limited by Congressional constraints which probably elongated our commitment, but forced us to draw on a cadre of core expertise left over from Vietnam. To Latin American specialists, the U.S. intervention is an unqualified success, although our experience could be "forgotten before its significance can be fully absorbed."48

The issue of how the principle of Decisive Force relates to situations requiring the delicate integration of various instruments of national power needs to be addressed. At this point it is merely noted that a potential conflict exists if the strategic concept evolves into a basic warfighting doctrine applied universally across the entire conflict spectrum as implied in the 1992 National Military Strategy. It may not be applicable in situations short of war. Decisive Force seems most relevant in those situations where the introduction of forces for combat is contemplated.

Policy/Strategy Inversion. The impetus behind some critics of Decisive Force has been a perception the doctrine constitutes a restraint on the effective use of military power as an instrument of policy. The same criticisms were thrown against the Weinberger Doctrine, because its criteria were seen by some as restrictive and only satisfied by a Soviet thrust through the Fulda Gap or another Pearl Harbor.49

Several critics have claimed that the purpose of the Decisive Force doctrine is to invert the subordination of military strategy to policy aims, by advocating a single and narrow strategic doctrine. These critics have read into the doctrine all the post World War II historical perspectives of American military culture—autonomy, apoliticism and absolutism. Under this interpretation, the doctrine limits the use of military means to
cases where political objectives that can be met with purely military means, in situations devoid of uncertainty, with little supervision and absolutely no restraints in terms of force size or firepower. Mr. Aspin's criticism's fall into this category.

Another pair of critics sees in the adoption of the New American Way of War an insistence that warfare "must follow a logic of its own, a logic in which all must be subordinated to complete military victory." Most critically, this "implies that government must effectively relinquish control over war's conduct in the name and for the sake of such victory." Obviously, this is the reverse of what Clausewitz offered as the normal priority for affairs of state.

Such a pejorative interpretation cannot be taken by the doctrine when seen in the context of the National Military Strategy in its entirety, or upon review of General Powell's amplifying remarks. Admittedly, the professional ethic of the first 85 years of this century earned the U.S. military a reputation for apoliticism and technocracy. U.S. military history during World War II and in Vietnam revealed our marked inability to comprehend the deeper context of specific conflict situations. The result

...is a lack of appreciation of the relationship between politics and war that makes the military a poor adviser to political authority on anything other than the technical side of military activity and fails to provide the base for dialogue between military and civilian authorities.51

Such a criticism of the U.S. military may no longer be valid. General Powell responds to such issues by pointing out that his statutory function as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is to serve as the principal military advisor to the President. This role requires providing the National Command Authorities with his expert opinion regarding decisions that commit the Armed Forces of the United States to combat. His biggest interest is in
defining what political outcome is desired, and matching military means to that end, when they are feasible. General Powell stresses that "this is not an abstract academic exercise." He did not apologize for being reluctant to send troops into harm's way without a clear purpose in mind. Matching political objectives to the use of force in advance, instead of on the fly, is a valid function for the Chairman in fulfilling his role. In describing his role within the national security policy process, General Powell did not constrain his role to a purely functional or technical task:

My responsibility is to lay out to my political leaders the full range of military options, to let them know what we can do, to let them know how we can solve a political problem, to let them know where I do not believe military force will solve a political problem, and to make them understand all of the consequences of the use of military force.

Instead of being blind to politics, or focusing purely on the technical aspects of military force, General Powell's input into policy matters reflects a greater degree of political sensitivity and "fusion" than seen in the past. This continues a trend evident since the mid-1980's to ensure that the decision making process includes a frank assessment of alternatives, costs and risks. Such assessments are a part of the properly balanced pattern of civil-military relations that Dr. Huntington. The last two decades has made the senior military leadership wary about civilian decision makers and the perspectives and opinions they bring to the table. Thus, the military insists on stronger representation, and a greater consideration given to the consequences and limitations of military force. This should not be taken as a desire on the part of the U.S. military to break the linkage between policy goals and the tools of policy, or to make the application of force into something autonomous.
The concept of Decisive Force should be seen as the military's expert opinion on how military means can best contribute to meeting a policy objective. If it is seen as cautious, it accurately reflects the understanding of the military culture that not all situations can be satisfactorily met by military means. Such caution is not an attack on the primacy of civilian control in our political culture. Under any form of civil-military relations, such advice is proper and consistent with effective policy. It is only when such advice skews options, estimates, and recommendations that alarm is justified. Effective strategy is the product of retaining a degree of proportionality between ends and means. Decisive Force is designed, not to warp that relationship, but to ensure the risks and costs of intervention are kept in line with the value of the policy aim.

Future Conflict

Another useful test of the Decisive Force concept is comparing it against the projected employment requirements of the next decade. What kind of conflicts does the Pentagon anticipate facing and what sort of preparations in terms of doctrine, force structure, or resources is the Defense Department making? Is the military planning to refight the last war by Decisive Force?

The U.S. military has conducted a thorough lessons learned effort from the Gulf War. Most of these assessments have consistently underscored the unique aspects of the conflict, including political considerations, that contributed to the success of the coalition. The professional literature is replete with indications that the military is aware of the potential for overlearning the lessons of Desert Storm, and the need to prepare for a wide range of threats and missions in the near term.
As might be expected, the cultural orientation remains focused on the upper end of the conflict spectrum, and the ability to rapidly project overwhelming combat power from the United States for a regional conflict. The fundamental aspects of the Pentagon's warfighting strategy, although reoriented from a global strategy to a regional level, remain fixed on the application of firepower and technology against a conventional opponent in a major regional contingency. This should be seen in a broader context. The primary purpose of the Nation's armed forces remains deterring or winning wars. Regional scenarios as defined in the National Military Strategy and the Pentagon's follow up reviews represent an appropriate planning focus for the Pentagon.

The U.S. military is mindful of the criticism about refighting the last war. Fully aware that potential antagonists will conduct their own "lessons learned" effort from the Gulf War, the Pentagon recognizes that future opponents and future wars will be different. The rest of the world now realizes that "pulling Uncle Sam's beard" can be hazardous to one's health. Third World countries, particularly potential aggressor states, have concluded they cannot compete with American military capabilities in the conventional sense, and that weapons of mass destruction offer a means of avoiding American intervention. To some regional powers, the conclusion from the Gulf War is summed up by the Indian Defense Chief of Staff, who when asked what was the most important lesson of the Gulf War, replied "Never fight the U.S. without nuclear weapons."

The alternative approach could be a return to the employment of asymmetrical approaches to obviate areas of operational and technological superiority of the United
States. This would result in the adoption of more ambiguous situations and the use of terrorism, insurgency and forms of low-intensity conflict. This is also supported by assessments indicating that ethnic conflict and cultural wars represent a growing trend in international conflicts. In *The Transformation of War*, noted Israeli historian Martin van Creveld, points out that the trend in conflicts around the world leans not toward Desert Storm conflicts but towards non-conventional or paramilitary affairs, including terrorism, drug cartels, or insurgencies. Such a trend would suggest that future situations will not be clear cut opportunities for the American Way of War.

The pattern of conflict, and the international lessons of Desert Storm, have combined to ensure that a strong probability exists that the U.S. military will be faced with future conflicts far more murky and frustrating. The nature of the U.S. military’s style of warfare, reinforced by Decisive Force, will place us at a disadvantage since we "historically had difficulty with prosecuting less conventional types of conflicts" Yet this may be a premature as well as a pessimistic conclusion. Critics tend to focus on the past historical record of the U.S. military and its cultural predispositions, and ignore the recent efforts by all the Services, and by the Department as a whole, to enhance the Pentagon’s approach to low intensity conflict situations—or as they are now called, "operations other than war." Many still believe the Pentagon is institutionally unprepared or predisposed against effective involvement in LIC situations. As an example of a recent assessment by one pair of instructors:

The current preference of the U.S. military is captured in the Powell corollary to the Weinberger doctrine: the fast, overwhelming and decisive application of maximum force in the minimum time. Such an approach may produce effective, short-term results. It is irrelevant, probably even counterproductive,
when matched against the very difficult internal problems that form the underlying problems in target countries.\textsuperscript{64}

However, accepting this point of view requires one to ignore a large body of evidence of steps taken by DOD to ensure that force is used appropriately depending upon the contingent circumstances faced in each unique situation. The military has been numerous steps towards preparing for threats less challenging than the Soviets or another Gulf War.

The military fully recognizes the complexity of the future, the ambiguity of the challenges that might prompt military actions, and has crafted a military strategy and supporting capabilities to provide a range of deterrent options to support crisis management actions.\textsuperscript{65} These actions are reflected in the development of the Adaptive Planning process articulated in the National Military Strategy, as well as the Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO's) that the Joint Staff and each Unified Command have prepared for each theater. FDO's provide a menu of preplanned options, including troop movements and demonstrations, keyed to anticipated crisis and contingencies. The FDO's include a wide array of responses that integrate all instruments of national power to deter aggression, resolve conflict, position or deploy needed forces, or decisively fight and win.\textsuperscript{66}

The wide range of potential missions for the Armed Services can also be seen in the Defense Department's latest strategic assessment, the Bottom Up Review (BUR). The BUR addresses regional dangers, including proliferation of means of mass destruction, and opportunities where the use of military force can constructively contribute to reducing instability in situations short of armed combat. The options range from forward presence to deter conflicts, providing regional stability through visits and exercises, and conducting
smaller scale intervention operations, such as peace-enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief to further U.S. interests and objectives.6 The new strategy acknowledges that deterring regional aggression remains the most demanding scenario of the strategy, but that "our emphasis on engagement, prevention, and partnership, means that, in this new era, U.S. military forces are more likely to be involved in operations short of declared or intense warfare."44

If the military is adopting an "all or nothing" attitude, it is not apparent in doctrine published since Desert Storm. The Joint Staff, the U.S. Army, and the Air Force have all recently published major new doctrinal publications. None of these documents can be accused of advocating an "all or nothing" school. Quite to the contrary, each doctrinal document being developed includes a new chapter covering "operations other than war." These describe such missions as key operational environments requiring special skills and approaches that the U.S. military must be prepared for. In the past, the issue of small or unconventional conflicts was relegated to separate and secondary publications.

While it has not published any major doctrinal publications, the Navy and Marine Corps have published a major policy White Paper called "...From the Sea" which indicates a reorientation from large-scale operations at sea against a global threat and a refocusing towards smaller operations along the littorals and coastlines. The Navy has a long standing history as an element of diplomacy and crisis response.70

Likewise, the Marine Corps has a long standing reputation for service in expeditionary environments and in low intensity conflicts. Building on its experience in Latin America in the first few decades of this century, the Marines published the Small Wars Manual in
1940. The protracted and political nature of small wars is understood by the Marines, who republished the manual in 1987 anticipating the rise of instabilities around the world. The Marines recognize that small wars are “conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders, lacking specific instructions.”71 In fact, of all the Services, the Marine Corps is the one service most culturally predisposed towards small-scale conflicts requiring politico-military interaction.72 The performance of the Marines in Somalia in late 1992 and early 1993 would reinforce this assessment.

There is one potential problem with Decisive Force and the pattern of conflict. The U.S. military acknowledges that the use of force must be tailored to its intended purpose, and can be limited by the nature of the conflict or the desired policy aim. There are situations where the literal application of Decisive Force is inapplicable or counterproductive. The military’s existing low-intensity conflict doctrine includes several supporting principles including “restraint” and “persistence.”73 In many low intensity situations, the concepts of restraint and persistence are very applicable and in direct opposition to the concept of Decisive Force with its swift and overwhelming application of force and rapid withdrawal. When do the principles of resist and persistence apply, and when is overwhelming force more applicable?

Thus, all the Services seem prepared strategically and doctrinally for a wider and more variegated range of problems. Publishing policy and doctrine though is not the same as being able to execute. Changes in personnel policy, training and education, and equipment will have to follow if the U.S. military is serious. The decline in budget
resources will result in competing interests for fewer resources. There have been debates about the costs of nontraditional and peacekeeping missions in the professional literature, and the degradation of capabilities and readiness of if too much emphasis is placed on such tasks. Given the uncertainty of the DOD budget and the sharp decline in available forces as the U.S. military downsizes, such concerns are very legitimate.

What remains to be seen is how the Service's execute their respective doctrines and if "overwhelming" or Decisive Force supersedes the contingent assessment that each scenario warrants. "Playing to win" in such conflicts will require a more sophisticated understanding of political conditions on the part of the U.S. Armed Forces than it has historically shown.

Conclusions

Sir Michael Howard was once very pessimistic about the institutional ability of the military to draw upon history between periods of conflict to adapt its strategy, doctrine, and force structure to meet the next threat effectively. The U.S. military is in such a period today, and could fail to properly adapt itself appropriately for the twenty-first century. Still, he said,

…it is the task of military science to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong. All scientific thought is a sustained attempt to separate out the constants in any situation from the variable, to explain what is of continuing validity and to discard what is ephemeral, to establish certain abiding principles and to reduce them to their briefest most elegant formulation.75

Overall, the principle of Decisive Force does not appear "too badly wrong" if accepted at face value. It is an abiding principle of continuing validity, but one that is not reduced yet to its most elegant formulation. It satisfies most, but not all, of the expected
strategic uses of military power. As presently worded, it could lead to misinterpretations or misapplication. Issues such as the application of Decisive Force across the conflict spectrum must be addressed. The relationship between Decisive Force and political objectives should be delineated in greater detail. Military victory for the sake of military victory is not consistent with Clausewitz or sound policy. What is decisive in one conflict may not be applicable in another. In fact, "yesterday’s solutions, no matter how dramatically executed, rarely address tomorrow’s problems." Finally, a warning about prescriptive applications and the contingent nature of warfare must be made. Future conflicts will most likely resemble Beirut, Panama, and Somalia. It would behoove the Pentagon to dust off the lessons learned files on these case histories. Better yet, it may need to rewrite them.

Sir Michael had good reason to be pessimistic about military organizations and their ability to adapt. The lessons learned by the four conflicts reviewed in this project would reinforce a pessimistic assessment. Strategic concepts cannot be accepted or evaluated at face value. They are the product of historical development, institutional interpretation, and bias. Subject to competing pressures in the 1990’s, the U.S. military will be hard pressed to analyze conflicts and their political context with professional detachment. Failure to do so and render appropriate advice would return civil-military relations in the United States to the early 1960’s and early 1980’s, when inflexibility or absolutism excluded a proper voice to military considerations in policy councils.
CHAPTER VI END NOTES


2. Snow and Drew, From Lexington to Desert Storm, p. 327.


5. The concept of sending sufficient forces to win "and win overwhelmingly" is consistent with the Weinberger doctrine. Mr. Weinberger used the same language himself in his memoirs. Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, New York: Warner, pp. 159-160.


9. Ibid., p. 10. Original drafts of the strategy employed the phrase "overwhelming force" vice decisive which was the subject of debate between the Joint Staff and various Pentagon departments. Eventually, the term "decisive force" was selected to avoid negative connotations. The present author was an action officer at the Pentagon at this time and involved in preparing Service comments for the Marine Corps. Confirmed by General Powell in an interview January 11, 1994. The terms overwhelming and decisive continue to be used. See Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, pp. 32-45.


13. Ibid., p. 6.


24. Ibid., p. 40.

25. Ibid., p. 38.


C7. Kissinger remarked that Operation Restore Hope reflected "the new Pentagon approach toward military intervention, which says that never again must American military power be vitiated by political restraint," and that "once employed American force must be overwhelming." Along the same lines is Sidney Blumenthal, "Why Are We in Somalia?" *The New Yorker*, October 25, 1993, pp. 48-54.

28. General Powell made this same point when interviewed and asked to evaluate the application of Decisive Force to both interventions in Somalia. The principle "did not apply" in the first intervention because "it was not a war," but that it was actually implemented and successful in the sense that the size and disposition of the original 28,000 Marine contingent was able to maintain control. Author's interview with General C. Powell, January 11, 1994.


38. U.S. Army Field Manual FM 100-5 Operations, Washington DC, GPO, June 1993, pp. 2-0 and G-6, defines Military Operations Short of War as "military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces."

39. These definitions are drawn from Donald M. Snow, *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace-enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order*, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, February 1993, pp. 15-30. Snow believes that effective involvement in various humanitarian and U.N. operations will require that the U.S. military, and particularly the U.S. Army, abandon "post-Vietnam dogma." In particular Dr. Snow points to the Weinberger Doctrine and "General Powell's principle of massive and rapid application of overwhelming force" as inappropriate for peace-enforcement situations.

40. "Endism" is the moniker applied to Francis Fukuyama's thesis that we have arrived at the end of history, and that liberal democracy's and free market economies are predominant. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest*, No. 16, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18.

41. Sam Gardiner, "Overwhelming Force: A Guide For Policy or a Strategic Principle for Historians?" unpublished article, dated January 5, 1994, pp. 1-5. Mr. Gardiner is a retired Air Force officer who has worked with wargaming and studies for RAND and the National Defense University. Gardiner's article indicates that a crisis management scenario escalated faster and farther than intended as players rapidly brought in forces seeking to establish an overwhelming force capability.


44. Powell, "Challenges Ahead," p. 36.


50. Tucker and Hendrickson, *The Imperial Temptation*, p. 159.


52. Quote from General Powell's speech before the National Press Club, September 28, 1993, Reuter Transcript Service, p. 5.


54. See Dick Cheney's comments in the Defense Department's *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War* report completed in April 1992, pp. xvi-xviii.


59. Mahnken, pp. 175-180. Another foreign officer warned that "...Saddam Hussein and the Third World also has lessons learned. They learned not to take on the United States or any other major power in conventional warfare." Santoli, Leading the Way, p. 410.


63. Joint publications and the Army's doctrinal publications have redefined the conflict spectrum into three areas, peacetime, operations other than war, and war. Under the area of operations other than war are missions that involve combat, and other tasks that are fulfilled short of the use of violent means. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Washington DC, Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1993, p. 1-3; U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Washington DC, June 1993, p. 2-1.

64. Snow and Drew, From Lexington to Desert Storm, pp. 325-326


66. See the National Military Strategy, p. 12; U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, Joint Officer Guide, Armed Forces Staff College, 1993, pp. 6-11 to 6-16.


72. This point was suggested by General Trainor, Director, National Security Programs, Harvard University. Interview with the author, 11 January 1994.

73. The principles of low-intensity conflict include: objective, unity of effort, security, legitimacy, persistence, and restraint. The latter two are in direct contrast with the concept of Decisive Force. These principles were originally contained in FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict. The principles have now been included in the Joint Staff and Army principal operational doctrines. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, Washington DC: GPO, September 1993, pp. V-2 to V-4; and U. S. Army FM 100-5 Operations, pp. 13-3 to 13-4.


CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

It has been written that an army’s doctrine is inseparable from its past, and therefore, rigorous study of the past is crucial to evaluating any given doctrine. Likewise, strategies are the product of the accretion of experience and the interpretations of that experience. Understanding a given strategy requires an equally rigorous study of its strategic culture and the history within it. "To understand a strategy," one scholar has observed, "it is not sufficient simply to understand the facts on which it ostensibly is based...One must also understand the origins of the guiding principles and opinions that rendered the strategy..." To really understand a military strategy one must dig below the hidden assumptions, the institutional interpretations, and into the sources of the strategy. The foregoing project has dug below the assumptions and organizational views underlying a new strategic concept.

The strategic concept of Decisive Force is consistent with the past experiences of the U.S. military and the American Way of War. It also consistent with the subjective lessons that institution has taken from recent conflicts. An appreciation of its antecedents helps to assess its potential utility and its liabilities. An inescapable concern from this review is the historical resistance and institutional inadequacy of the U.S. military in limited or unconventional conflict. Additionally, the U.S. military’s separation of politics from military operations remains troubling despite what appears to have been a very tight correspondence during Desert Storm. A distinct preference for limited civilian oversight and control, and cynical views about maintaining public support are equally alarming.
More alarming is the dangerous oversimplification of the complexity of war to a group of shibboleths. Calls to "set clear political objectives" and "don’t tie the military hands behind their back" make both the decision to go to war and the conduct of war appear far easier than it really is. Similarly, other reductionisms abound. "Get out of the military’s way," "protracted wars lose public support," and now use "overwhelming force" are similar examples.

Such attitudes represent the inherent tensions of our strategic culture and the American Way of War. Our strategic culture does not fully accept the cold Clausewitzian rationalization of war as an instrument of policy. Yet the primacy of civilian control, and the subordination of the military to policy remains a part of our political culture.

Clarity of Purpose

While a credible strategy and doctrine must meet the tests of "strategic acceptability" within the strategic culture, it must also ultimately serve the interests of that culture by being prepared to adequately counter expected threats. A pattern of smaller scale operations in future conflicts is fairly certain. The U.S. military must be prepared for engagements in situations of uncertainty and ambiguity for such are the conditions of small wars.\(^3\) In armed conflict, warns Dr. van Creveld, "no success is possible—or even conceivable—which is not grounded in an ability to tolerate uncertainty, cope with it, and make use of it."\(^4\)

This does not excuse civilian leaders from seeking clarity of purpose when employing military force. The fog of war on the battlefield is bad enough and need not be worsened by confusion in the war council. Political goals and direction are required to ensure that military force serves the ends they are unleashed for. There is nothing heretical for military leaders
to ask for, and insist on, such guidance. Nor is this guidance the sole purview of civilian policy makers. Under the form of civil-military relations operative in this country, the military should and must participate in an interaction to develop policy goals and strategies.

Playing to Win

The U.S. military must guard against prescriptive approaches to the use of force. Our sense of professionalism must continue to include the proper integration of politics and military viewpoints. We cannot return to the faults of Vietnam, where a "disproportionate fascination with means at the expense of ends" produced a strategy at odds with the desired consequences.5 Our inputs at the highest level of decision making must always focus on producing a strategy designed to produce a very precise correspondence between means and ends.

I am not arguing that force should be subject to the notion of "calibration." The history behind this concept is not very heartening.6 We are the world's sole superpower and our use of military power should reflect this fact. We should pick our spots carefully, and then act decisively. We are a large, industrially advanced, technologically sophisticated, and often violent society. "Our military strategy," wrote Samuel Huntington, "should be, and indeed, must be built upon these facts. The way we fight necessarily will reflect the way we live."7

Still, this does not preclude ensuring that the means serve the desired end. The meaning of "decisive" and "victory" contain some degree of variation or imprecision. Defining success purely in terms of military victory will not always insure the desired outcome. "Playing to win" will require greater elasticity in concept and execution. The alternative is "the emergence of war not as the servant but as the master of politics."8 The danger of
military expediency evident in "overwhelming force" cannot be underscored enough.

Civil-Military Relations

In establishing a proper equilibrium in the relationship with civilian policy makers who are ultimately responsible for the decision to employ force to pursue political goals, the U.S. military must remain faithful to the "sacred trust" with the American people that General Marshall so jealously protected. There is no demand for a political military or one that substantially influences political decisions beyond its own expert advice.

That does not mean that the military must avoid any role in the political process or that the relationship is totally amicable. That would be an erroneous conclusion. The military has a legitimate role in providing advice and representing the military to both the Executive and Legislative branches of government, as well as to the American public. The primary role, however, is to provide clear and unequivocal estimates and recommendations to civilian policy makers when the use of force is considered. There will always be differences and dichotomies between the requirements of policy and the brutal realities of the battlefield. There is no way around this tension. General Matthew Ridgway once defined the ideal form of effective relations between civilian leaders and military professionals.

The statesman says to the soldier, "This is our national policy. What military means are required to support it?" The soldier studies the problem and replies with the means and costs...If the civilian authority finds the cost to be greater than the country can bear, then either the objectives themselves should be modified, or the responsibility for the risks involved should be forthrightly accepted. Under no circumstances,...should the professional military man yield, or compromise his judgement. To do otherwise would be to destroy his usefulness."

This should remain the ideal form, although it may be rarely attained.
Popular Support

Keeping wars short and decisive will assuredly preclude the media from meddling in military affairs or reducing operational security. Trying to block out the media from access to future battlefields, however, is probably impossible, and could prove counterproductive. Pluralism, diversity, and public opinion are also all a part of our strategic culture, and thus, a part of the American Way of War too. Our political culture is fraught with tension, and the role of the media is an inherent and constant element of that friction. The American military might consider giving the American citizen greater credit for his or her ability to evaluate news information. Popular support remains more a product of success than a prerequisite for the effective conduct of military operations.

Research Conclusions

The foregoing project has rigorously tested the principle of Decisive Force. The historical roots, development and refinement of the concept over the past two decades have been documented. The concept has been tested against the requirements for military force, to include expected scenarios where military force might be employed in the decade ahead.

Based on the study effort, the following conclusions have been drawn:

1. *Decisive Force is derived from the military’s perceived lessons learned from the past two decades, particularly Vietnam, Lebanon, and Desert Storm.* While the lessons are not altogether accurate, they have served to focus attention on the principal considerations to be evaluated before employing violent force.

2. *Decisive Force is consistent with our strategic culture and the American Way of War.* While it appears well matched to the military’s operational preference, it also
reflects the limits of our political culture. In particular, it reflects the need to maintain popular support and preclude casualties endemic to the American political culture.

3. **Decisive Force is a very useful declaratory policy and enhances the use of military force as an instrument of diplomacy.** Decisive Force as a national strategic concept supports deterrence, defense, decisive influence and diplomacy. The military does not support Schellingesque negotiating tactics or coercive diplomacy unless the ramifications have been thought through.

4. **Decisive Force, while stated as an overarching strategic concept, is not universally applicable across the conflict spectrum.** It is applicable to almost all uses of force for violent means. Some situations, such as counterinsurgency, may require greater restraint and persistence, and less violent means. The pattern of conflict for the next decade or two will seriously challenge our capacity to handle ambiguous and hybrid forms of political warfare.

5. **Decisive Force does not represent a direct challenge to effective civil-military relations.** It does represent the considered judgment of the military about how combat forces should be employed, which must be noted. Ultimately, the judgment of when and how military forces are employed remains the purview of constituted civilian authority. Political leaders need to be aware of the nature of military affairs, and the military as a subset of the American strategic culture.

**Summary**

In the foregoing project, the development, advantages and limitations of a strategic concept have been documented. Ultimately, the existence, benefits, and potential
misapplication of this concept were shown. The major concern that motivated this endeavor was a perception about a trend in absolutism among the Officer corps stemming from the success of Desert Storm. Mr. Aspin obviously perceived the same trend. These attitudes could become insidiously inculcated into the institutional culture of the U.S. military and corrupt its professionalism and usefulness. Such attitudes would seriously impair the alloy of military and policy perspectives that produce effective strategic decisions.

These same attitudes could also ruin the proper balance between the roles of senior military officers and their civilian superiors in a democratic government. Our country has a limited conception of the proper relationships involved in civil-military relations in a democracy. Dr. Huntington has emphasized that civil-military relations is the principal institutional component of national security policy. However, the relationship is precarious and the principle of civilian control is too often taken for granted.¹⁰

Those who wield a sword in the service of the State must have a keen appreciation for the political and social context in which force is applied, domestically and externally. This mandates their interactive involvement in policy matters involving the use of the military instrument. Military leaders must be willing to tell their superiors what they need to hear, not what they want to tell them, or what the civilian leader would like to hear.¹¹ The historical record to date suggests that General Powell met this test, but misinterpretation of Decisive Force puts this legacy at risk.

Military advice must be unvarnished, and it must not be colored by institutional preferences or biases. The most significant aspect of the professional ethos of the U.S. military is the obligation to the principle of civilian control. The opportunity to influence
policy by the provision of sound professional military assessments is consistent with that obligation. Using opportunities when military intervention is under consideration to execute cultural predispositions is not. To compromise on the military advice they give would destroy their usefulness as General Ridgway warned. To compromise on professional obligations would be even more destructive.

Civilian officials have obligations too. The attitudes and culture of the military must be fully understood by those elected to make policy decisions. Without such an understanding it is very doubtful that the "ultimate decision," the decision to send America’s sons and daughters into armed conflict, will be wisely made.

The sword is drawn for a specific political objective which controls the aim, magnitude, and duration of the effort. Political leaders are ultimately responsible for meshing the military and political considerations and controlling this effort. They define the aim and approve the means sought to procure it. This requires listening to the professional advice of those who understand the limitations and blunt capabilities of military power. Clausewitz warned that Statesmen need a grasp of military affairs so that the sword is not be used in a manner foreign to its nature. A grasp of military affairs should include a feel for the military culture, and its relationship to our strategic culture as well. Those who forge the sword need to have a far keener appreciation for both the temper and edge of that instrument before drawing it.
CHAPTER VII ENDNOTES


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