



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# East European Security After the



# Cold War



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BY STEPHEN LARRABEE

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# Cold War

F. STEPHEN LARRABEE

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
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
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Eastern Europe



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## **PREFACE**

**This report was prepared as part of the project "Emerging Issues in the Debate over a European Security Identity and Implications for U.S. Policy" sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The project is being conducted in the International Security and Defense Strategy Program within RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.**

**In addition to the sources cited in this report, the author conducted extensive interviews with government officials and nongovernmental experts in Eastern and Western Europe during 1992 and 1993. The cutoff point for information on which this report is based is October 1993.**

**The study should be of interest to government officials and specialists dealing with European and NATO affairs.**

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## **SUMMARY**

**Eastern Europe's security environment has become increasingly uncertain and unstable since 1989. Three developments in particular have contributed to the emergence of a more uncertain and unstable security environment:**

- **The disintegration of the former USSR**
- **The crisis in Yugoslavia**
- **The breakup of Czechoslovakia.**

**In effect, what has transpired in Eastern Europe is not simply the breakdown of the bipolar system that emerged after Yalta in 1945, but the unraveling of the political arrangements established after World War I. This unraveling has opened up a host of new ethnic and territorial issues that could seriously destabilize Eastern Europe and undermine efforts to create a stable, new security order in Europe.**

**At the same time, new uncertainties have arisen in the West. On the one hand, progress toward the creation of the European Union set out in the Maastricht Treaty signed in December 1991 has been slowed. On the other, the recession in Western Europe has created stronger protectionist pressures, complicating Eastern Europe's trade relations with the European Community (EC); and German politics are in a state of great flux, exacerbated by the mounting costs of unification, growing economic recession, and an upsurge of right-wing violence. Finally, the end of the Cold War has raised new doubts about the United States' commitment to Europe.**

The growing instability has led to fears of the emergence of a security vacuum in Eastern Europe and has increased the attempts of the countries of Eastern Europe to join Western security organizations such as NATO and the Western European Union (WEU)—attempts that have run into strong obstacles. As a result, more than three years after the collapse of communism, Eastern Europe's place in the post-Cold War security order remains unclear.

## **EAST EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS**

Eastern Europe comprises six countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic (Slovakia), Bulgaria, and Romania. Although these countries face many common challenges and security threats, there are also important nuances of approach to those challenges among the various countries of the region.

### **Poland**

Poland has reacted to the changes since 1989 by conducting a dual policy. On the one hand, it has sought to increase ties to Western security institutions and integrate itself more tightly into the West. On the other hand, it has pursued an active *Ostpolitik* to reduce tensions with its eastern neighbors in the ex-USSR.

Relations with Russia have significantly improved since 1991. However, Polish officials continue to worry about the long-term prospects for stability in Russia and the possibility that Yeltsin may be overthrown and replaced by an authoritarian leader backed by the military, a leader who could pursue more traditional Russian imperial goals.

A related Polish concern is the future of Kaliningrad, formerly Königsberg, an area in which Russia maintains armed forces equal to half of all Polish forces. Most of those forces are in a high state of combat readiness. Moreover, the current level of forces is being augmented with the forces being withdrawn from the Baltic states and Germany. The Russians are also upgrading and modernizing the infrastructure (e.g., airfields) around Kaliningrad.

Poland's relations with Ukraine and Belarus have improved significantly since 1990. However, Warsaw has been careful to pursue a



balanced policy and avoid actions that would directly antagonize Russia.

The one exception to Poland's successful effort to improve relations with its former Soviet neighbors has been Lithuania. Lithuanian independence has rekindled traditional Lithuanian sensitivities toward Poland. Tensions recently have flared up over the Lithuanian treatment of its Polish minority. The two countries signed a Joint Declaration in January 1992 to lay the basis for better relations. Nevertheless, relations continue to be marred by considerable mistrust and suspicion.

### **Hungary**

Hungary's security environment has also become more uncertain and unstable. Today, Hungary finds itself surrounded by a number of potential trouble spots: Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia. Only Austria, Slovenia, and Croatia, with whom Hungary has good relations, pose no security threat, real or potential, to Hungary.

Relations with Ukraine at the moment are good. In May 1991, the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which provides a comprehensive framework for future relations. However, the Hungarian government has shown strong concern about the rights of the almost 200,000 Hungarians living in Ukraine. Any effort by Ukraine to restrict their rights could undermine the current harmony and lead to tensions between the two states.

The treatment of the Hungarian minority has also become a source of tension in relations with Slovakia. Hungary has made it clear that future relations will depend on the Slovak treatment of the Hungarian minority. Relations have also been damaged by differences over the construction of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Dam.

Relations with Romania are strained over the question of the Hungarian minority. The two countries are currently working on the conclusion of a bilateral treaty regulating relations. Progress on the treaty, however, has been delayed as a result of differences over two issues: the Romanian desire for a declaration regarding the integrity of the borders, and the Hungarian demand that the treaty contain a statement regarding minority rights. To date, neither side has shown

much willingness to compromise—and until both sides do, relations are likely to remain tense.

Relations with Serbia have deteriorated as a result of the war in Yugoslavia and the Serb curtailment of the political rights of the Hungarian minority, most of whom are located in Vojvodina, a province in Serbia that belonged to Hungary before World War I. The situation in Vojvodina is highly explosive. Hungarian officials fear that Serbia could undertake a policy of "ethnic cleansing" in Vojvodina, similar to the campaign it conducted in Bosnia. Such a development could further heighten tensions and might even provoke Hungary to raise the border issue with Serbia.

The war in Yugoslavia has increased Hungary's sense of vulnerability and shaken many initially sanguine assumptions about its security and defense problems. Hungarian officials worry in particular that a Slovakian-Serbian-Romanian "anti-Hungarian" alliance could emerge. All three countries have large Hungarian minorities and are ruled by leaders who have sought to increase their own legitimacy through appeals to nationalism.

Recent shifts in Hungary's security environment illustrate how much the minority question has moved to center stage in Hungarian foreign-policy calculations—and in Eastern Europe more generally. To date, the government of Prime Minister Jozsef Antall has been careful not to challenge the current borders. However, if nationalist forces were to gain strength, a future Hungarian government could see the unraveling of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia as an opportunity to redress historic grievances and recover territories ceded to its neighbors after World War I.

### **The Czech and Slovak Republics**

The dissolution of Czechoslovakia is likely to lead to an increasing differentiation of security concerns between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The Czech Republic is likely to concentrate increasingly on intensifying security links with the West, especially the EC and NATO. Cooperation with the Visegrad Group (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) is likely to diminish.

Slovakia also would like to join the EC and NATO. Slovakia's chances of joining these organizations, however, are considerably poorer than those of the Czech Republic. Slovakia's arms sales policy could be an obstacle, as could Slovakia's differences with Hungary over the treatment of the Hungarian minority. These differences, however, are not likely to lead to open conflict.

### **Bulgaria**

Bulgaria has two major security concerns: Serbia and Turkey. Bulgaria's chief concern is that the conflict in Yugoslavia will spill over into Macedonia, possibly provoking a Serbian invasion of the former Yugoslav republic. If the war does spread to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bulgaria would probably try to avoid becoming involved militarily in the conflict. However, given Bulgaria's close cultural and historical ties to Macedonia, the pressures for Bulgaria to take some military action would be strong.

Relations with Turkey have significantly improved, especially in the military field. In May 1992, the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that foresees a broad expansion of ties across the board. As part of this general rapprochement, Turkey also recently agreed to thin out its forces along the Bulgarian-Turkish border. These developments have helped to reduce Bulgarian security concerns about Turkey. The rapprochement with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, however, has led to a cooling of relations with Greece.

### **Romania**

Romania sees the main threat to its security coming from possible Hungarian irredentism, even though the Antall government has affirmed its acceptance of the current borders with Romania. However, relations are strained as a result of differences over the issue of the Hungarian minority, which Romania fears will be prompted to call for greater autonomy—and even independence—as a prelude to unification with Hungary. Certain ambiguous statements by Hungarian leaders have reinforced such fears.

Romania's other major concern is Moldova, which was part of the Bessarabian territory seized from Romania by Stalin in 1940. Romania's long-term goal is to reunite with Moldova. At the moment, however, the majority of Moldovans do not want unification. Instead, Moldovan President Mircha Snegur has called for intensified cultural and practical ties but has insisted that the two countries should remain separate states.

Unification with Moldova is a two-edged sword for Romania. On the one edge, it would allow Romania to regain territory seized by Stalin in 1940. On the other edge, it could spark calls by the Hungarian minority for unification with Hungary. It also risks straining relations with Russia—and Ukraine, since part of Bessarabia was given to Ukraine by Stalin after the 1940 annexation.

## **NATO AND EASTERN EUROPE**

The resurgence of nationalism and ethnic conflict over the past two years has contributed to a shift in the attitude of the East European countries toward various security organizations—CSCE, NACC, and, particularly, NATO.

Originally, most of the East European countries saw the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as the main pillar of European security for the future. However, the inability of the CSCE to halt the Yugoslav conflict as well as other conflicts in the former USSR has dampened those countries' enthusiasm for the CSCE and intensified their desire for closer ties to NATO. The Visegrad countries see NATO as the only militarily significant security organization in Europe. They also favor a strong U.S. political and military presence in Europe, which they regard as an indispensable element of stability in Europe.

The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in November 1991 has tended to defuse the membership issue and has made its resolution less urgent. The Visegrad countries now recognize that full membership is unlikely in the immediate future. As a result, they have adopted a more gradual, step-by-step approach to the achievement of membership. They appear to hope that, as a result of their participation in various working groups, NATO will grad-

ually come to consider Eastern Europe as an area that directly affects its security interests, even if they are not alliance members.

However, NACC remains essentially a holding operation. It has bought some time, but it has not resolved the broader membership issue. This issue is likely to resurface as the countries of Eastern Europe become more fully integrated into the European Community. Moreover, with 37 members, NACC is too large to be an effective forum for serious dialogue and planning. Finally, there is confusion over the relationship between NACC and the CSCE, given the highly overlapping memberships.

In the next few years, NATO is likely to face an increasing debate over its future, particularly whether it should open its ranks to Eastern Europe. This debate will be driven by several factors:

- East European fears of a security vacuum in their countries
- German concerns about the impact of instability in Eastern Europe
- The implications of EC expansion.

The last issue will be extremely important. Once the East European countries enter the EC, they will automatically be invited to join the WEU, and they will almost certainly accept. On entering the WEU, they will receive security guarantees more iron-clad than those in NATO. If they are not already members of NATO, their entry will open the prospect that the United States could obtain security commitments "through the back door." Such "back-door commitments" could become a sensitive issue with the Congress, which would have to approve the extension of any new security commitments by the United States.

## **THE EC AND WEU**

Integration into the European Community is a top priority for all six countries in Eastern Europe. The most likely candidates for full membership in the future are three of the Visegrad countries—Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. In December 1991, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia signed association agreements

with the EC. The agreements envision a gradual reduction of tariff barriers over ten years, with the EC making the most important adjustments first. They also contain provisions for political consultation—provisions not contained in the Greek and Turkish association agreements in the early 1960s—thus giving the three countries a political anchor to the Community. In fall 1992, similar agreements were signed with Romania and Bulgaria.

The EC has refused to set a specific timetable for membership. However, at the EC summit in Copenhagen in late June 1993, the EC political leaders formally invited the six East European countries to become members of the Community as soon as they have met the economic and political requirements for membership. In addition, the leaders endorsed a package of trade concessions intended to speed up the reduction of tariffs and quotas that have blocked Eastern Europe's most competitive exports. Although such measures do not go as far as many East European officials would like, they represent a significant improvement over the terms of the association agreements concluded in 1991. The formal offer of membership once the economic and political conditions have been met represents a particularly important signal and demonstrates the EC's commitment to include the East European countries over the long run.

The Visegrad countries have expressed an interest in strengthening ties to the WEU. In deference to these pressures, the WEU decided, at its meeting in Bonn on June 19, 1992, to create a special Forum of Consultation similar to NACC. In contrast to NACC, however, the WEU Council will include only the six East European members and the three Baltic countries (Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania), not members of the former Soviet Union.

For the time being, the WEU appears to have reached the outer limits of its expansion and relationship to the East European countries. There is strong resistance within the WEU to expanding membership further or creating an "associate status," as some of the East European countries would like. However, entry into the EC would open the possibility—indeed probability—of WEU membership, which, in turn, would raise the problem of possible back-door commitments to these countries by the United States.

## REGIONAL COOPERATION

The attempt by the countries of Eastern Europe to strengthen ties to Western political and security organizations has been accompanied by a trend toward greater regional cooperation. The most successful of these efforts has been the cooperation among the Visegrad Group. The cooperation began as an attempt to coordinate the members' integration into the EC, but it has broadened to include other issues, including migration and trade. There has also been some limited cooperation on security issues.

However, cooperation has slowed since late 1992 as a result of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The Czech commitment to cooperation has diminished under Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus; Slovakia has proven a difficult partner because of differences with Hungary and the very different nature of its economic problems and policies. Moreover, as the date of entry into the EC approaches, each country is likely to give greater priority to purely national interests, thereby possibly further diminishing the degree of cooperation and harmony witnessed to date.

## THE GERMAN ROLE

The development of Eastern Europe's ties to the West and its integration into Europe will depend critically on Germany's relations with Eastern Europe. Today, Germany is strongly integrated into the West, but its influence in Eastern Europe has increased significantly over the last two decades, especially its economic influence. Even before the revolution in Eastern Europe, Bonn was the main Western trading partner for *every* country in Eastern Europe.

Germany's economic influence in Eastern Europe is likely to increase in the future. In the next decade, the Federal Republic will be in the best position to exploit the new opportunities in Eastern Europe: Over the next decade, the Federal Republic is likely to regain the dominant position in Eastern Europe that it had in the interwar period. It is already the largest investor in Czechoslovakia and the second largest in Hungary and Poland.

Politically, moreover, the Federal Republic has a strong stake in East European stability. Any large-scale unrest in Eastern Europe could

have major implications for domestic stability in Germany, because it will increase pressure for emigration on the part of tens of thousands of Eastern European citizens, accentuating Germany's growing immigration and refugee problems.

These developments are forcing Germany to redefine its foreign policy interests and priorities. Today, an increasing number of Germans see Eastern Europe as a "vital interest." Consequently, the old *Drang nach Osten* (drive eastward) is being replaced by a new *Zwang nach Osten*—an imperative to become more involved in the East to prevent instability on its eastern border from spilling over and destabilizing Germany itself. This *Zwang nach Osten* is likely to increasingly define and drive the German foreign-policy agenda in the future.

## FRENCH POLICY

In contrast to Germany, Eastern Europe has not traditionally been a high priority for France. However, the Yugoslav crisis has heightened the French government's awareness of the dangers of instability in Eastern Europe and the need to project security into the region.

The most visible manifestation of this new concern has been the Balladur government's proposal for a "Pact on Stability in Europe," which is designed to resolve border and minority issues prior to East European membership in the EC. But this concern has also been reflected in France's more forthcoming attitude toward cooperation with NATO, especially on Bosnia.

## RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe has resulted in a significant reduction of Russian influence in those countries. At present, Russia does not appear to have a coherent, long-term strategy toward the region. Russian policy under Yeltsin has largely consisted of efforts to resolve outstanding issues left over from the Soviet period. Little effort has been put toward developing an overarching policy toward the region as a whole.

At the same time, there has been a visible hardening of Russian policy toward the "near abroad," the former republics of the USSR, es-



pecially Ukraine. Such hardening has largely reflected the shift in the domestic balance of forces in Moscow, as Yeltsin has come under increasing pressure from nationalists and conservatives in parliament. The critical issue is whether policy hardening toward the near abroad will lead to policy hardening toward Eastern Europe, as well.

At present, it is too early to answer this question. Much will depend on domestic developments in Russia, particularly Yeltsin's ability to contain the growing strength of the nationalist forces. But even a more nationalistic, authoritarian regime in Russia would be unlikely to try to retake Eastern Europe by force. It might, however, use the East European countries' dependence on raw materials from Russia to increase economic pressure on the countries of Eastern Europe, especially Poland, which is the most important country in Eastern Europe in Moscow's eyes. Such a policy, in turn, would increase pressure by the countries of Eastern Europe to join NATO.

The emergence of an independent Ukraine is a factor of major strategic importance, especially for the countries of Eastern Europe: An independent Ukraine acts as an important strategic buffer between Russia and Eastern Europe. A reincorporation of Ukraine into a Russia-dominated confederation would have serious consequences for the security of the countries of Eastern Europe, especially Poland. To ensure an independent, democratic Ukraine, they have lobbied hard for the West to do more to help stabilize Ukraine.

## IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The changes in Eastern Europe since 1989 pose a fundamental challenge to U.S. policy. For 40 years, U.S. policy in Europe was oriented around two strategic goals: (1) preventing the expansion of communism westward and (2) deterring a Soviet military threat to Europe.

The end of the Cold War has rendered these goals obsolete and has made the crafting of a new security framework an urgent necessity. At the same time, new security challenges have emerged. With the end of the Cold War, the old distinction between center and periphery is breaking down. New and future strategic challenges are arising, and are likely to continue to arise, along Europe's periphery, especially in the zone of instability between Germany and Russia. The conflicts in this zone, however, are not peripheral: *They repre-*

*sent the main strategic challenges facing the United States and its allies in Europe in the coming decade.* To meet the new challenges posed by the end of the Cold War, the United States needs to develop a comprehensive strategy.

## Transforming NATO

The comprehensive strategy must begin with a redefinition of NATO's mission and purpose. NATO needs to be transformed from an alliance intended mainly for collective defense against an outside attack into one designed for crisis management. In practice, this means that greater emphasis should be put on Article 4 of the Washington Treaty rather than on Article 5, which would also facilitate integration of the East Europeans more fully into alliance structures.

Such a transformation is essential for two reasons:

- *First, the nature of the threat has changed.* Today, the greatest threat to European security is not a Russian military invasion but the proliferation of Yugoslav-like conflicts.
- *Second, the distinction in Europe between "out of area" and "in area" is becoming increasingly blurred.* Many of the most serious security threats in the coming decade are likely to occur on NATO's periphery rather than in areas within NATO's geographic confines. Yet, as the Yugoslav crisis has shown, such threats may directly impinge on important alliance interests.

Containing and managing new threats will require a change not only in NATO's mission but also in its force posture. Instead of heavily mechanized forces, NATO will need lighter, more flexible, and more mobile forces. In short, the United States needs not only to reduce its forces in Europe, but also to *restructure* them.

## NATO and Eastern Europe

The United States needs to develop a coherent and coordinated strategy for integrating the countries of Eastern Europe, beginning with the three Visegrad countries—Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic—into NATO. This policy is strongly in the U.S. interest: All

three countries are staunch Atlanticists, and their views on security issues closely coincide with those of the United States and other Atlanticist members of the alliance, such as Britain, Portugal, and the Netherlands. Thus, including them in NATO would strengthen the Atlanticist orientation of the alliance and provide greater internal support for U.S. views on key security issues.

The interim period should be used to harmonize force structures and planning procedures in a step-by-step manner, so that East European force structures and operational planning procedures are compatible with those of NATO. Such compatibility would facilitate increased cooperation and lay the groundwork for NATO membership at a later date. In addition, NATO should begin to include the Visegrad countries in some of its exercises.

It may also be useful to give more serious thought to the idea of "associate membership." Associate membership could be based on the first four articles of the NATO treaty but would not provide explicit security guarantees (Article 5). Such an arrangement would give the countries of Eastern Europe the clear perspective they are looking for. It would also provide time for them to adapt their military and defense establishments to NATO standards.

### **Security Partnership with Russia**

The timing and modalities of any eventual expansion will be important. As NATO strengthens ties to Eastern Europe, it needs to develop an expanded security partnership with Russia. The core of this security partnership should be a new "Charter of Security and Cooperation," which lays down the basic principles guiding the new security partnership between NATO and Russia and spells out specific areas for expanding and deepening cooperation, including peacekeeping. The purpose of such a new charter would be twofold: (1) to demonstrate that Russia is an integral element of a new European security order and (2) to reassure Russia that expanded membership is not aimed at isolating Russia or damaging its security interests. This charter should be concluded *prior* to extending NATO membership to Eastern Europe. It could help defuse Russian anxieties about expansion and pave the way for it.

### **Stabilizing an Independent, Democratic Ukraine**

The next element of the new comprehensive strategy should be an intensified effort to encourage and actively support the development of a stable, democratic, and independent Ukraine. An independent Ukraine acts as a strategic buffer between Eastern Europe and Russia. The reincorporation of Ukraine into a Russia-dominated confederation would remove that buffer and have serious consequences for the security of Eastern Europe, especially Poland.

The United States should continue to press Ukraine to sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START I) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, the United States needs to broaden the dialogue with Ukraine and deemphasize the nuclear issue. Too much attention to the nuclear issue will only reinforce pro-nuclear sentiment in Ukraine and increase the strains in U.S.-Ukrainian relations.

The United States also should encourage Ukraine's integration into European structures and closer ties to the countries of Eastern Europe. If Ukraine is not integrated more tightly into European and other regional structures, there is a danger that it will move in a more radical and nationalist direction and retain nuclear weapons. A highly nationalist, insecure Ukraine armed with nuclear weapons would be a source of instability in Eastern Europe and could pose a threat to its neighbors, especially Poland.

### **Bilateral Defense and Security Ties with Eastern Europe**

Bilateral security relations with Eastern Europe are part of the comprehensive strategy. The main U.S. priority should be to help the countries of Eastern Europe *strengthen civilian control over the military*. What is really needed is a large-scale, well-funded program to train *civilian experts* who understand defense issues and who can provide alternative assessments and judgments to those given by the military. One possibility would be to establish a special exchange program to train defense analysts at U.S. universities and research institutes—a type of Fulbright Program for East European civilian defense experts.

The United States also needs to develop a comprehensive and integrated program for providing military assistance to the countries of Eastern Europe. At the same time, however, the United States should be careful to avoid fueling local rivalries and conflicts—of which there are all too many in Eastern Europe. To the extent possible, the United States and NATO should encourage East European countries to buy equipment that will strengthen these countries' ability to *defend themselves against outside attack*, rather than conduct offensive military operations against their neighbors.

### Regional Cooperation

The United States should also encourage continued regional cooperation, especially within the Visegrad Group. Although regional cooperation is no substitute for membership in Western security organizations, as the members of the Visegrad Group themselves fully realize, it can complement it in important areas. Moreover, given the constraints on defense budgets in all three countries, cooperation in areas such as airspace management and air defense, as well as weapons procurement, would make sense. Continued strong U.S. support for cooperation within the Visegrad Group is particularly important because the harmony during 1991–1992 has begun to erode since the breakup of Czechoslovakia.

### U.S.–German Cooperation in Eastern Europe

The German role in Eastern Europe in the coming decade is likely to be critical. Germany's growing ties to, and interests in, Eastern Europe will increasingly drive it to become more involved in the East. The real question, therefore, is whether the United States wants to see Germany go it alone or whether the United States acts together with Germany and helps shape the process. A German *Alleingang* (go-it-alone strategy) would cause not only anxiety in Eastern Europe but also resentment in parts of Western Europe, especially France. It would also have a corrosive effect on cooperation within NATO, making a restructuring of the alliance more difficult. These considerations argue for a close coordination of U.S. and German policy toward Eastern Europe.

## THE NEED FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP

The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War have created a new set of strategic challenges, most of which lie along the periphery in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. To address these new threats successfully, the United States needs to be engaged—and *perceived to be engaged*—in European affairs. At present, however, there is widespread uncertainty about what role the United States intends to play in Europe in the future. The Clinton Administration, therefore, needs to spell out a clearer vision of the United States' role in the post-Cold War security order. Otherwise, Europe and the United States are likely to drift farther apart and the United States could find itself increasingly marginalized in Europe.

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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AWACS</b>	<b>Advanced Warning and Control System</b>
<b>CEI</b>	<b>Central European Initiative</b>
<b>CFE</b>	<b>Conventional Forces in Europe</b>
<b>CIS</b>	<b><i>Commonwealth of Independent States</i></b>
<b>Comecon</b>	<b>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</b>
<b>CSCE</b>	<b>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</b>
<b>CTK</b>	<b><i>Ceska Tiskova Kancelar (Czech News Agency; formerly Ceskoslovenska Tiskova Kancelar)</i></b>
<b>DLP</b>	<b>Democratic Labor Party (Lithuania)</b>
<b>DM</b>	<b>Deutsche mark</b>
<b>DPC</b>	<b>Defense Planning Committee</b>
<b>DPG</b>	<b>Defense Policy Guidelines (Germany)</b>
<b>EBRD</b>	<b>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</b>
<b>EC</b>	<b>European Community</b>
<b>ECU</b>	<b>European Currency Unit</b>
<b>EFTA</b>	<b>European Free Trade Association</b>
<b>EMS</b>	<b>European Monetary System</b>



<b>FBIS-EEU</b>	<b>Foreign Broadcast Information Service— Eastern Europe</b>
<b>FDP</b>	<b>Congress of the Free Democrats (Germany)</b>
<b>FRG</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>
<b>G-7</b>	<b>Group of seven industrialized countries</b>
<b>G-24</b>	<b>Group of 24 industrialized countries</b>
<b>GDP</b>	<b>Gross domestic product</b>
<b>GDR</b>	<b>German Democratic Republic</b>
<b>GMT</b>	<b>Greenwich Mean Time</b>
<b>GRP</b>	<b>Greater Romania Party</b>
<b>HZDS</b>	<b>Movement for a Democratic Slovakia</b>
<b>IADS</b>	<b>Integrated air defense system</b>
<b>IMF</b>	<b>International Monetary Fund</b>
<b>INF</b>	<b>Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces</b>
<b>JPRS</b>	<b>Joint Publication Research Service</b>
<b>KPN</b>	<b>Confederation for an Independent Poland</b>
<b>MDF</b>	<b>Hungarian Democratic Forum</b>
<b>MTI</b>	<b><i>Magyar Távírási Iroda</i> (Hungarian News Agency)</b>
<b>NACC</b>	<b>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</b>
<b>NPT</b>	<b>Non-Proliferation Treaty</b>
<b>NVA</b>	<b><i>Nationale Volksarmee</i> (East Germany)</b>
<b>PAP</b>	<b>Polish Press Agency</b>
<b>PHARE</b>	<b>Poland and Hungary: Aid for Economic Reconstruction</b>
<b>PRNU</b>	<b>Party of Romanian National Unity</b>
<b>PSL</b>	<b>Polish Peasant Party</b>
<b>RPR</b>	<b><i>Rassemblement pour la République</i> (France)</b>

<b>SACEUR</b>	<b>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</b>
<b>SEA</b>	<b>Single European Act</b>
<b>SHAPE</b>	<b>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe</b>
<b>SLD</b>	<b>Democratic Left Alliance (Poland)</b>
<b>SLP</b>	<b>Socialist Labor Party</b>
<b>SPD</b>	<b><i>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i></b>
<b>START</b>	<b>Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty</b>
<b>UDF</b>	<b>Union of Democratic Forces (Bulgaria); <i>Union pour la Démocratie Française</i> (France)</b>
<b>WEU</b>	<b>Western European Union</b>
<b>ZChN</b>	<b>Christian National Union (Poland)</b>
<b>ZPL</b>	<b>League of Poles in Lithuania</b>

Chapter One

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INTRODUCTION

More than two decades ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski published a small book entitled *Between Two Ages*, in which he sought to examine the effect of the scientific-technical revolution on world politics and America's international role.<sup>1</sup> The title of his book was taken from a passage from *Steppenwolf* by Hermann Hesse:

Human life is reduced to real suffering, to hell, only when two ages, two cultures and religions overlap. . . . There are times when a whole generation is caught in this way between two ages, two modes of life, with the consequence that it loses all power to understand itself and has no standard, no security, no simple acquiescence.

The scope of this study is narrower and far less grandiose than Brzezinski's was: It is to examine the impact of the end of the Cold War on Eastern Europe's security.<sup>2</sup> But the passage from *Steppenwolf* from which Brzezinski drew inspiration captures even more aptly and poignantly Eastern Europe's current security dilemma. Eastern Europe today is literally caught "between two ages, two modes of life." It has moved out of the communist era, but it has not yet fully become part of the West.

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<sup>1</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (New York: Viking Press, 1970).

<sup>2</sup> For the purposes of this study, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic (Slovakia), Bulgaria, and Romania are defined as constituting Eastern Europe. No attempt is made to deal with the former Yugoslavia or Albania, except as they bear on the security policies of the above countries.

To say that Eastern Europe today has no security would, of course, be an exaggeration. With the disintegration of the former USSR, the Soviet military threat has been eliminated and Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe has ended. In this sense, Eastern Europe's security environment has significantly improved. At the same time, however, new risks and security concerns have emerged that have contributed to a sense of growing vulnerability and unease in Eastern Europe.

## THE COLLAPSE OF THE VERSAILLES ORDER

Three developments in particular have contributed to this more uncertain security environment:

- *The disintegration of the former Soviet Union.* Although the collapse of the USSR has eliminated the military threat posed by a monolithic Soviet empire, it has by no means led to the emergence of a benign security environment. The countries of Eastern Europe are faced with a highly unstable and uncertain situation on or near their borders. Economic chaos and political turmoil in the former USSR could spill over into Eastern Europe, sending large numbers of refugees westward. Moreover, the emergence of a highly nationalistic, authoritarian regime in Russia—one with possible neo-imperialist ambitions—can by no means be excluded. Such a development could directly affect the security of the countries of Eastern Europe.
- *The crisis in Yugoslavia.* The conflict in Yugoslavia has demonstrated both the dangers of resurgent nationalism and the inability of the Western community, especially the European Community and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (EC and CSCE), to deal effectively with such threats. The East European elite fear that Yugoslavia could set a precedent that could further destabilize the region. Having seen that "ethnic cleansing" works, other nationalist groups may be tempted to employ such tactics elsewhere, with grave consequences for regional stability. Moreover, a danger remains that the conflict could spill over into Kosovo or Macedonia, possibly sparking a wider war.

Perhaps equally important, the crisis in Yugoslavia has undermined the credibility of Western security institutions, which have

proven unable or unwilling to stop the violence in Yugoslavia. Their inability has raised troubling questions in Eastern Europe about the value of those institutions and how much they can be relied upon in the future to provide meaningful security. At the same time, it has brought into sharper focus the existential crisis that has afflicted NATO since the collapse of the Berlin Wall: What is NATO's role now that the Soviet threat has disappeared?

- *The dissolution of Czechoslovakia.* Although Czechoslovakia's dissolution (in contrast to that of Yugoslavia) has transpired peacefully, the split has underscored the dangers of nationalism in Eastern Europe and could give new impetus to disintegrative trends throughout the region. In addition, it has weakened progress toward regional cooperation, especially within the Visegrad Group (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia). Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has made clear that he attaches little importance to such regional cooperation. At the same time, Slovak-Hungarian differences have intensified, fueled particularly by the dispute over the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Dam.

Taken together, these three developments have contributed to the emergence of a more uncertain, unstable security environment in Eastern Europe. In effect, what has transpired is not simply the breakdown of the bipolar system that emerged after Yalta (1945), *but the collapse of the political arrangements established after World War I at Versailles*. The collapse has opened a host of ethnic and territorial issues that threaten to seriously destabilize Eastern Europe and hinder efforts to create a stable, new security order in Europe.

## THE NEW TRIBALISM

What we are witnessing in Eastern Europe is not the end of history but the *return* of history. Communist rule did not resolve many of the historical grievances and ethnic tensions that existed in Eastern Europe during the interwar period; it simply froze them. With the end of the Cold War, they have reemerged—in many cases, such as Yugoslavia, with new-found fury.

The effort to create democratic systems in Eastern Europe has been accompanied by the emergence of what Ivan Volgyes has aptly termed the "New Tribalism."<sup>3</sup> This New Tribalism is characterized by provincialism, extreme nationalism based on ethnicity, intolerance, and a sense of ethnic superiority. This phenomenon has been most pronounced in the Balkans, particularly in Serbia and Croatia, but it has also been visible in Slovakia and parts of the political spectrum in Hungary.

In short, the end of the Cold War has radically changed the security problem in Europe. Today, the main threat to European security comes not from a possible military threat from Russia or a reconstituted Soviet Union, but from the proliferation of ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Such conflicts represent the main threat to European security today.

In addition, the old distinction between center and periphery has become blurred. Whereas during the Cold War the potential locus of conflict was along the West German–East German border, today it is on Europe's periphery, particularly in the zone of instability between Germany and Russia. But although the conflicts are on the periphery, they are not *peripheral*. On the contrary, they are the core of Europe's security dilemma today. Managing such conflicts will be the main strategic challenge for the United States and its allies in the coming decade.

The end of the Cold War has also led to the emergence of a host of new threats, such as migration, drugs, violent crime, that directly impinge on the security of the countries of Eastern Europe. Such threats are less amenable to traditional security solutions. They underscore the *close connection between internal and external security* in the post–Cold War period. However, without a stable external security framework, the countries of Eastern Europe may be unable to deal effectively with the new threats.

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<sup>3</sup>Ivan Volgyes, "Military Security in the Post-Communist Age: Reflections on Myths and Misperceptions," *European Security*, Winter 1992, p. 59.

## NEW UNCERTAINTIES IN THE WEST

These new challenges have arisen, moreover, at a time when the security outlook in Western Europe has become more uncertain. In early 1992, Europe seemed well on its way to creating the European Union as promised by the Maastricht Treaty (signed in December 1991; see Chapter Four for a detailed discussion). Since then, the implementation of the Maastricht vision has become increasingly uncertain. On the one hand, the European Monetary System (EMS) has become more unstable and could collapse, leading to a renationalization of European monetary policy. On the other hand, the recession in Western Europe has created stronger protectionist pressures, complicating trade relations with Eastern Europe, especially in such "sensitive" areas as steel, textiles, and agriculture, in which Eastern European countries have a comparative advantage.

To these complications must be added new uncertainties about Germany's future. German politics today are in a state of great flux, exacerbated by the mounting costs of unification, growing economic recession, and an upsurge of right-wing violence. All these problems have raised serious questions of whether Germany will play the role others initially expected after unification—that of the locomotive of European integration—and how much energy and resources Bonn will be able to devote to helping the countries of Eastern Europe rebuild their dilapidated economies. If Germany lapses into a serious crisis, not only could East European recovery be threatened but the whole movement toward European integration could be slowed, possibly even derailed.

At the same time, the end of the Cold War has raised new questions about the U.S. role and the American commitment to Europe. Despite efforts by both the Bush and Clinton administrations to reassure America's allies that the United States remains committed to Europe, many of America's allies remain unsure. The Clinton Administration's hesitant handling of the Bosnian crisis and its preoccupation with domestic affairs have reinforced European concerns and added to the uncertainty. To many Europeans, America seems adrift, unsure of its role and unable—or unwilling—to lead.

All this is transpiring, moreover, at a time when the arms control regimes that have provided the essential framework for Western and Eastern security are in danger of collapsing. It can no longer be ensured that the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaties (START I and START II) will be ratified; both treaties have come under strong attack lately, not only in Ukraine but in Russia as well. The future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which comes up for review in 1995, also remains uncertain.

In short, it is no longer possible to see the current crisis simply as a crisis in Eastern Europe. It has much broader dimensions. The basic framework of the postwar security order is eroding—and much more rapidly than many observers in the West realize.

### **INTEGRATION—OR DISINTEGRATION?**

This growing instability, both real and potential, has increased the desire of the countries of Eastern Europe for closer ties with Western security organizations. This interest has taken place along several axes: ties with the European Community and the Western European Union (WEU); with NATO; and among the East European countries, especially among the Visegrad Group.

But in each of these areas, the East Europeans have encountered uncertainties associated with the still-evolving European security landscape. NATO is still in the process of redefining its role in European security and its relations to Eastern Europe. Although the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC; see Chapter Three) offers a new forum for dialogue and consultation, it does not provide security guarantees for the countries of Eastern Europe. Similarly, both the EC and WEU have strengthened ties with the countries of Eastern Europe but have put off the granting of full membership while the West European members continue to struggle with the shape and role of a possible European security identity.

The end of the Cold War has also spawned a new emphasis on regional cooperation. But with the exception of the Visegrad Group, none of the regional groups has a security dimension. And even for the Visegrad Group, the security dimension is weak—and likely to grow weaker, for reasons that are discussed in detail in Chapter Five. Thus, at best, such groups can serve as a complement to, but not a



substitute for, integration into Western political and security organizations.

In short, three years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Eastern Europe's place in the post-Cold War security order remains unclear. Although important steps have been taken toward tying Eastern Europe more closely to the West, there is still strong resistance in many quarters in the West to fully integrating Eastern Europe into Western security organizations. Yet without integration into a stable security framework, the political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe may fail, leading to growing unrest and conflict. Such unrest could, in turn, spill over into Western Europe, slowing down and possibly derailing the process of European integration.

The real issue, then, is whether Europe's future will be characterized by greater integration or disintegration. This issue will, in large part, be decided by how the West deals with the security problems in Eastern Europe. A failure to manage these problems adequately could significantly accelerate the trend toward disintegration already under way in parts of Eastern Europe and lead to a renationalization of security policy in Western Europe as various West European countries, especially Germany, feel compelled to deal with these problems on their own.

This study focuses on the external dimensions of security in Eastern Europe. It is divided into nine main chapters. Chapter Two focuses on current East European security and threat perceptions. Chapter Three examines East European attitudes and policy toward NATO and East European prospects for NATO membership. Chapter Four looks at Eastern Europe's evolving relations with the EC and the WEU. Chapter Five examines efforts at regional and subregional cooperation. Chapter Six focuses on Germany's role in Eastern Europe, and Chapter Seven looks at France's policy toward Eastern Europe. Chapter Eight focuses on Russia's policy and future role in the region. Chapter Nine examines the implications for U.S. policy. Chapter Ten addresses the issue of U.S. leadership.

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## **EASTERN EUROPE'S CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

Eastern Europe's security environment has dramatically changed since 1989. The collapse of the Soviet Union has ended Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, but it has not led to the emergence of a more stable and benign security environment. The former Soviet Union remains a boiling cauldron of ethnic tensions that threaten to spill over into Eastern Europe. Moreover, in the background a still-powerful but increasingly unstable Russia presents an uncertain and unpredictable risk to Eastern Europe.

Within Eastern Europe itself, the collapse of communism has resulted not in the triumph of liberalism but, rather, in the resurgence of old nationalistic tensions and ethnic disputes throughout the region. Nationalism has replaced communism as the main ideological force in Eastern Europe, reviving many of the long-suppressed conflicts of the past. In addition, in Western Europe the process of integration has slowed since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (December 1991), and protectionist pressures have grown.

Taken together, these developments have contributed to the emergence of a highly fluid and unstable security environment in Eastern Europe. The countries of Eastern Europe have to cope with new threats and challenges and develop new security policies from scratch. At the same time, they face serious domestic challenges—above all, in the economic arena—that put serious constraints on the resources available for developing strong and reliable military forces to cope with these new threats.

This chapter examines the new security environment facing the individual countries in the region—Poland, Hungary, the Czech

Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania—as a result of the end of the Cold War. In particular, it focuses on threat perceptions of the various countries and their security and defense policies. What are each country's chief security concerns? What policies has each adopted to deal with those concerns? What threats to its security is each country likely to face in the future?

## POLAND

Poland's security environment has radically changed since 1989. Whereas in 1989 Poland had only three countries on its borders, today it has seven.<sup>1</sup> With five of the seven—Lithuania, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Germany—Warsaw has, or had, long-standing differences. Yet if many things have changed, some have not. Poland continues to face an enduring dilemma: how to guard against an assertive Russia on one side and a powerful Germany on the other.<sup>2</sup>

Relative to the period before 1989, Poland's security environment is much more ambiguous and differentiated. The collapse of the former Soviet Union removed a major military threat and established a series of buffer states between Poland and Russia—a tremendous boon to Polish security. At the same time, it created new uncertainties and risks. As then-Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski noted in an address to the Polish Parliament (Sejm) in May 1992:

The external situation, also with our participation, has become such that we are not threatened by armed aggression or armed intervention from any side. Poland is not a target of conquest. We are not under threat of being turned into an old style satellite, and if we are able to put our own house in order there will be no other negative dependencies. In any case, the state's foreign policy has created and continues to create premises which effectively protect against turning us into satellites in that or any other form. Moreover, none of our neighbors is inclined toward a revision of our borders. These

<sup>1</sup>The seven countries are Russia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Germany.

<sup>2</sup>For a good discussion of Poland's past and present efforts to manage this dilemma, see Joshua Spero, "Déjà Vu All Over Again? Poland's Attempt to Avoid Entrapment Between Two Belligerents," *European Security*, Winter 1992, pp. 92-117.

are exceptionally favorable facts, as I have said, especially if we compare them with Poland's history in the years 1919-1989.

On the other hand, however, the collapse of the USSR and with it the elimination of some traditional threats, is linked with a certain destabilization to the East of our borders, and the development of the whole eastern situation has become hard to predict. The international community and its main members show a large degree of helplessness here. While acknowledging that there is no threat of war or no hostile attitude toward Poland from any state, we must be aware of various possible dangers. The rapid rate of changes taking place in Poland's direct neighborhood, in the whole of Europe, and the world, demands that efforts be focused on long-term strategic goals. Poland's place among other nations depends on their implementation.<sup>3</sup>

Poland has tried to hedge against these uncertainties by strengthening ties to the West, especially NATO, the EC, and the WEU.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, Warsaw has pursued an active *Ostpolitik* (Eastern policy) to reduce potential sources of tension with its eastern neighbors. This policy was initiated before the collapse of the USSR and was closely associated with Foreign Minister Skubiszewski. It had two "tracks": On one track, Poland sought to regulate its relations with the "center," that is, with the Soviet Union; on the other track, it attempted to develop good ties with the neighboring republics of the USSR, especially Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).

Since the dissolution of the USSR, Poland has continued this dual-track policy and has tried to maintain an uneasy balance between relations with Russia and the successor states of the former USSR, especially Ukraine. This carefully calibrated policy has led to a substantial improvement in Poland's relations with the successor states

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<sup>3</sup>Warsaw Television Second Program Network, 07:33 GMT (Greenwich Mean Time), May 8, 1992, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU)-92-092, May 12, 1992, p. 16.

<sup>4</sup>Poland has also carried out a far-reaching policy of rapprochement with Germany, thus removing a potential threat to its western border. This policy is treated in detail in Chapter Six and thus will not be discussed here.

and has contributed to a significant improvement in its overall security environment.

## Russia

A normalization of relations with Russia has been a central feature of Poland's *Ostpolitik*. The effort to regulate relations with Russia began even prior to the collapse of the USSR, and was part of the dual-track policy of expanding relations with the republics while simultaneously trying to improve relations with the center. In October 1990, Poland signed a Declaration of Friendship with the Russian Federation,<sup>5</sup> which stressed each side's acceptance of the other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Each side also pledged not to interfere in the other's internal affairs. The declaration also included a commitment to improve economic and cultural ties.

The Declaration of Friendship signed in Moscow in October 1990 lay the foundation for gradually improving ties with Russia, a process that continued after the USSR collapsed and Russia became the main successor to the old Soviet Union. During President Lech Walesa's visit to Moscow in May 1992, the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness. The treaty ended the last vestiges of Soviet domination in Polish security affairs and provides a comprehensive framework for relations between the two countries based on the principles of sovereignty and equal partnership.<sup>6</sup>

During Walesa's visit, the two sides also signed an agreement on withdrawing the approximately 40,000 Soviet and/or Russian troops still stationed in Poland. The agreement stipulated that all combat troops would leave Poland by November 15, 1992, and that the remaining 6,000 noncombat troops would depart by the end of 1993. This deadline was announced in October 1991,<sup>7</sup> but continuing disputes over the costs of the withdrawal slowed its implementation.

<sup>5</sup>For background, see Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Friendship Declarations Signed with Ukraine and Russia," *Report on Eastern Europe*, November 2, 1990, pp. 25-27.

<sup>6</sup>For details, see Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Poland and Russia Open New Chapter in Their Relations," *RFE/RL Research Report*, June 19, 1992, pp. 47-48.

<sup>7</sup>Poland and Russia initially agreed on the 1993 deadline in June 1991. The deadline was not formally announced, however, until October 1991. (Private discussions with Polish officials involved in the negotiations, December 1992.)

These disputes were finally resolved during Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar's visit to Warsaw in October 1992. During the visit, the two sides agreed to settle their debt claims on the basis of a "zero-sum" settlement of no payments or compensation by either side—long a Polish demand—thereby removing a vestigial bone of contention from the Soviet period. At the end of October 1992 the last former Soviet combat troops left Poland, some two weeks ahead of schedule.<sup>8</sup>

In addition, in October 1992, Boris Yeltsin gave Soviet documents to Poland confirming that 15,000 Polish officers killed at Katyn Forest had been executed on Stalin's orders—not by the Germans, as the Soviets had for decades claimed.<sup>9</sup> And during his visit to Warsaw in August 1993, in an important gesture of reconciliation, he laid a wreath at the monument to the officers killed at Katyn.<sup>10</sup> The Katyn issue had long been a sore spot in Polish-Soviet relations. Poland had made clear that an admission of Soviet responsibility for the execution of the Polish officers was an important prerequisite for beginning a new relationship with Russia.

Taken together, these developments have put Polish-Russian relations on a much firmer footing and have significantly reduced the sense of immediate threat from Russia. However, Polish officials continue to worry about the long-term prospects for stability in Russia and the possibility that Yeltsin may be overthrown and replaced by an authoritarian leader backed by the military, a leader who could pursue more traditional Russian imperial goals. They also fear that increasing economic chaos and political turmoil could

<sup>8</sup>Six thousand noncombat troops remained behind to aid with the logistical requirements for withdrawing the former Soviet troops from Germany. See "Poles Celebrate Russian Pullout," *New York Times*, October 29, 1992. During his visit to Warsaw in August 1993, Yeltsin agreed to withdraw the remaining noncombat troops by October 1, 1993—three months ahead of schedule.

<sup>9</sup>The release of the documents also appears to have had a domestic motive: to embarrass and discredit Mikhail Gorbachev and harm his prospects for a political comeback. A spokesman for Yeltsin said the documents had been found in Gorbachev's presidential archive and claimed that Gorbachev had known of their existence but had kept quiet about it. See Michael Dobbs, "Gorbachev's Veracity Challenged," *Washington Post*, January 22, 1993. Also "Übergabe von Dokumenten zu Katyn an Polen," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, October 16, 1992.

<sup>10</sup>Christopher Bobinski, "Yeltsin Seeks to Heal Katyn Wounds," *Financial Times*, August 26, 1993.

prompt a massive migration of former Soviet citizens into Poland, creating major economic and social problems for Warsaw.<sup>11</sup>

Perhaps most disconcerting from the Polish point of view has been the hardening of Russian policy toward the successor states of the former USSR (the "near abroad"), reflected in particular in Yeltsin's speech to the Civic Union in late February 1993, in which the Russian president requested "special powers" for Russia to ensure stability in the former USSR. Polish officials see strong elements of "neo-imperialist thinking" in Yeltsin's speech, which appears aimed, in the Polish view, at re-creating the old Soviet Union under Russian leadership.<sup>12</sup> In particular, they worry that Moscow may try to use its economic leverage to curtail Ukraine's independence. Reincorporation of Ukraine into a Russia-dominated confederation would remove an important strategic buffer between Poland and Russia, leaving Poland in a much more exposed position.

Polish officials have also been concerned by Russian policy in the Baltics, particularly Moscow's slowdown of its troop withdrawal from that region. Poland's geographic proximity to the Baltic region means that any instability or conflict there would have direct implications for Polish security. Hence, Poland has strongly supported the Baltic countries' demands for a complete withdrawal of all former Soviet troops from their soil. At the same time it has also sought to improve bilateral relations with all the Baltic countries, particularly Lithuania.

### **The Problem of Kaliningrad**

Another potential source of friction is Kaliningrad (Krolewiec in Polish), formerly the German city of Königsberg. The area around Kaliningrad was partitioned between the USSR and Poland in 1945, with two-thirds of the territory going to Poland and the other one-third to the USSR. The Soviets turned Kaliningrad into a huge military base, closed to all foreigners and with restricted access even for Soviet citizens. Today the area remains highly militarized. In the

<sup>11</sup>For a detailed discussion of Polish concerns, see F. Stephen Larrabee, "Down and Out in Warsaw and Budapest," *International Security*, Spring 1992, pp. 12-16.

<sup>12</sup>Discussions in Warsaw, February and March 1993.

Kaliningrad *oblast* (region), Russia maintains armed forces equal to half of all Polish forces. Most of them are in a high state of combat readiness. Moreover, Russia is augmenting the current level of forces with troops withdrawn from the Baltic states and Germany and is upgrading and modernizing the infrastructure (e.g., airfields) around Kaliningrad.<sup>13</sup>

Polish officials regard the large concentration of highly ready Russian forces so close to the Polish border as a potential threat to Polish security and to be far in excess of what Russia needs for defensive purposes.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, they fear that the breakup of the Soviet Union could cause central control over these troops to erode, leaving many under the control of local commanders. Hence, Poland would like to see the Kaliningrad region demilitarized or, that failing, at least see a reduction of the number and combat readiness of Russian troops there.

Russia has shown some sensitivity to Polish concerns. However, the reduction of Russian troops in the region is closely tied to the overall process of Russian military reform and the need to find suitable housing for the large number of forces Russia is withdrawing from Eastern Europe and the Baltic area. Russia has recently signaled its potential willingness to reduce its forces in the region,<sup>15</sup> but with the loss of air and naval facilities in the Baltic states, Kaliningrad's military significance has increased. Hence, the Russian military is

<sup>13</sup>For details, see Philip A. Petersen and Shane C. Petersen, "The Kaliningrad Garrison State," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1993, pp. 59-62; also, Peer H. Lange, "Das Gebiet Kaliningrad—Wegscheide für Russlands politische Strategie," *Europa Archiv*, No. 10, pp. 289-298.

<sup>14</sup>The Russians claim they have only about 90,000-100,000 troops in the Kaliningrad region. However, Polish officials estimate that the figure is closer to 200,000. Poland currently has only two motorized infantry divisions stationed in the northeast, opposite the Russian concentration of forces. It eventually plans to station two full divisions there. However, these divisions have not yet been created. See Roger Boyes, "Kaliningrad Stirs Fear Among Poles," *The Times* (London), May 15, 1992.

<sup>15</sup>During the visit to Moscow by Polish Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz in July 1993, the Russians reportedly indicated that some measures would be taken to reduce the concentration of troops. However, no date for the reduction was given. See M. W., "Minister Onyszkiewicz on Relations with Russia," *Rzeczpospolita*, July 13, 1993, p. 17, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-133, July 14, 1993, p. 25. See also Onyszkiewicz's interview with Włodzimierz Kalicki, "When Russian Generals Applaud," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, July 24-25, 1993, pp. 8-9, translated in Joint Publication Research Service (JPRS)-EER-93-099-S, September 15, 1993, p. 23.



likely to insist on maintaining a sizable military presence in the Kaliningrad area.

The larger question regarding Kaliningrad is its future political status. In July 1990, the Russian Supreme Soviet decided to establish a free-trade zone in Kaliningrad. Such a zone would give the region an autonomous status, although formally it would still be under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. An autonomous, or possibly even independent, Kaliningrad would be well placed to attract foreign (especially German) capital.

Polish officials, however, oppose a major shift in Kaliningrad's status. They would like to see the region gradually demilitarized but remain a part of Russia: An autonomous or independent enclave might spark a destabilizing competition for influence among the major powers in the region. Polish officials worry, in particular, that Kaliningrad's Baltic Sea access and its historical ties to Germany could lead to the "re-Germanization" of Kaliningrad.

Rumors that large numbers of Germans from Kazakhstan intend to settle in Kaliningrad have intensified these fears. Although the number of ethnic Germans who have actually resettled in Kaliningrad remains small,<sup>16</sup> the rumors have fueled Polish long-term security concerns. In part to counter the prospect of re-Germanization, Poland has sought to strengthen its own political and economic links to Kaliningrad, increasing the number of border crossings (there were virtually none before 1990) and opening a consulate in Kaliningrad.

Aware of these fears, the German government has adopted a very low profile regarding Kaliningrad. Germany gave up all claims to Kaliningrad in the treaty signed with Moscow in 1970, and any effort to reopen a claim would have serious consequences, not only for Germany's relations with Poland but also with Russia—a fact that is well understood in Bonn. Some German business leaders, such as Friedrich Christians, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bank, have taken an interest in the area, but the German government

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<sup>16</sup>It is estimated that some 5,000–10,000 ethnic Germans have emigrated to the Kaliningrad area since 1989. See Gerhard Gnauck, "Anlehnung an Mütterchen Russland," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 29, 1992.

has not encouraged massive investment in Kaliningrad, fearing that doing so would raise suspicions that Germany eventually wanted to reopen the question of Kaliningrad's political status. Rather than viewing Kaliningrad as a German problem, Bonn has tended to see it as a *European* problem and has encouraged the EC to take a stronger interest in the region.

However, efforts to promote investment in the area and to create the preconditions for turning the region into an "economic free zone" have met stiff resistance, not only from conservatives in Moscow but also from local authorities. Many reformist laws have become mired down in bureaucracy and have never been implemented. Others have been consciously blocked or delayed for fear that they might upset local structures and patron-client relations. As a result, the attempt to revitalize Kaliningrad has made only slight progress.<sup>17</sup> However, if the trend toward greater regionalization continues in Russia, pressures for greater autonomy could grow and the issue of Kaliningrad's political status could become a source of regional tension.

## Ukraine

For Poland, the emergence of a stable, independent Ukraine is a factor of enormous geostrategic significance. An independent Ukraine serves as an important buffer between Russia and Poland, shielding Poland from Russian encroachments and strengthening Poland's freedom of action. Poland thus has a strong stake in the preservation of an independent, sovereign, and friendly Ukraine. Were Ukraine to fall back under Russian influence or be reincorporated into a confederation dominated by Russia, this buffer would be removed.

Poland, therefore, has made a concerted effort to establish friendly relations with Ukraine and to support Ukraine's independence and sovereignty. This effort was part of the dual-track policy that began even before Ukraine declared independence in December 1991. In October 1990, the two countries signed a Declaration of Friendship, which defined a "community of interests" between the two countries

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<sup>17</sup>See Magdalene Hoff and Heinz Timmerman, "Kaliningrad: Russia's Future Gateway to Europe," *RFE/RL Research Report*, September 10, 1993, pp. 37-43.

and also contained an important provision guaranteeing respect for the minorities' rights.<sup>18</sup> Poland placed special importance on that provision because Ukraine has a large Polish minority (300,000).

Bilateral relations have since developed rapidly. On December 1, 1991, Poland became the first country to recognize Ukraine's independence. In May 1992, the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which provides a comprehensive framework for future bilateral relations. The treaty calls for relations between the two countries to be based on the principles of equality and sovereignty; it is intended to ensure that the countries conform to European norms and Helsinki Final Act principles. In particular, both sides affirmed the inviolability of frontiers and renounced all territorial claims against the other.<sup>19</sup>

Poland and Ukraine have also strengthened military cooperation. In February 1993, the two countries signed a military agreement that envisions an expansion of information exchanges and military training. The accord also calls for conducting joint exercises and developing joint activities in rear and technical supply of troops.<sup>20</sup> However, both countries have emphasized that such cooperation does not constitute a security alliance and is not directed against other countries.

Walesa and Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk have also strengthened their personal ties. In late 1992, at Walesa's suggestion, the two presidents set up a special Consulting Committee of Presidents. The committee is chaired on the Polish side by Jerzy Milewski, the head of the Bureau of National Security in Walesa's office and one of the strongest advocates of close cooperation with Ukraine within Walesa's circle of advisers. The committee has been viewed with suspicion by the Foreign Ministry, however, which fears it could become a

<sup>18</sup>Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Friendship Declarations Signed with Ukraine and Russia," *Report on Eastern Europe*, November 2, 1990, pp. 25-27. Poland signed similar agreements with Russia in October 1990, with Belarus in October 1991, and with Lithuania in January 1992.

<sup>19</sup>See Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Polish-Ukrainian Rapprochement," *RFE/RL Research Report*, February 28, 1992, p. 25.

<sup>20</sup>Interfax, February 3, 1993.

special back channel for Walesa and Milewski to conduct their own separate foreign policy.

At the same time, Poland has been careful not to take actions that might openly antagonize Russia or give the impression that Warsaw was trying to forge an anti-Russian alliance. Polish officials, for instance, reacted coolly to the Ukrainian proposal, launched at the CSCE meeting in Vienna in April 1993, to create a special "Central European security zone." Their reserved attitude was not only because participation in such a zone would complicate Poland's effort to join NATO, but also because they feared that Moscow would perceive it as an attempt to isolate Russia. Poland has opposed Ukraine's joining the Visegrad Group for the same reasons.

Some nationalist forces in Poland, especially the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), advocate forging closer ties with Ukraine and Belarus against Russia. The majority of the Polish elite, however, sees integration into Western political and security organizations, especially NATO, as the best way to ensure Poland's security. Moreover, anti-Ukrainian feeling among large parts of the population is still strong.<sup>21</sup> Hence, unless there is a major shift in Russia toward an openly neo-imperialistic policy, Poland is likely to continue to pursue a balanced policy and avoid openly taking sides in the dispute between Russia and Ukraine.

Somewhat surprisingly, the nuclear issue has not caused as much concern as might have been expected. Over the long run, Polish officials would like to see Ukraine denuclearized, but many of them show understanding for Ukraine's desire to retain nuclear weapons in the short term as a hedge against any Russian efforts to curtail Ukrainian sovereignty. They think that the United States has concentrated too heavily on the nuclear issue while not doing enough to assist Ukraine economically.

At the same time, Poland's own ability to affect developments in Ukraine is limited. Given current economic difficulties, Poland does

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<sup>21</sup> According to a poll taken in January 1992, 38 percent of those Polish citizens who responded said that Ukraine was Poland's most dangerous neighbor; 28 percent said Germany was the greatest threat; 16 percent identified Russia; and 17 percent saw no threat at all. Polish Press Agency (PAP), 15:24 GMT, February 24, 1992, translated in FBIS-EEU-92-032, February 18, 1992, p. 31.

not have the resources or capital to help Ukraine stabilize its economy. Moreover, Poland needs to be careful not to give the impression that it is seeking to build an anti-Russian alliance or axis with Kiev. Both these factors place objective limits on the degree of collaboration and cooperation that is likely to develop between Kiev and Warsaw in the future, especially in the security field.

The Friendship and Cooperation Treaty signed with Ukraine in May 1992, which contained important provisions for minority rights, has served to defuse any potential minority tensions, as has Ukraine's relatively tolerant minority policy. However, anti-Polish feeling remains strong in western Ukraine, especially in those areas around Lvov that once were a part of Poland. If central control in Ukraine were to significantly weaken, as has happened in Russia, or Ukraine were to split, the minority issue could reemerge as a source of friction between the two countries.

## **Belarus**

Polish policy toward Belarus has been similar in its basic tenets to that toward Ukraine. The main goal has been to try to bolster Belarus's sovereignty and independence from Russia. In particular, Poland has sought to support the pro-Western forces centered around President Stanislaw Shushkevich in his struggle with the pro-communist forces in the parliament and military, who advocate closer ties to Russia. From the Polish perspective, Shushkevich represents the best hope for maintaining Belarus's sovereignty and independence over the long run.

At the same time, Polish officials recognize that the chances of preserving a sovereign, independent, and neutral Belarus are much lower than those for Ukraine. Belorussian national consciousness is relatively weak (only about 10 percent of the population speaks Belorussian). Moreover, in contrast to Ukraine, nationalist and pro-Western sentiment is much weaker in Belarus. Pro-Russian feeling is strong, particularly within the military and parliament, which is dominated by old-line communists.

Belarus's economic dependence on Russia, especially for energy supplies, also makes it difficult for Belarus to pursue an independent policy. These economic difficulties have strengthened the voices of

those, especially in parliament, who would like to see Belarus abandon its policy of neutrality and pursue closer ties to Russia. In spring 1993, the parliament voted to join a collective defense system of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, Shushkevich refused to ratify the move because it would have meant an abandonment of Belarus's officially proclaimed policy of neutrality.

Nevertheless, within its limited means, Poland has tried hard to bolster the pro-Western forces around Shushkevich and strengthen ties to Belarus. Differences between the two countries initially prevented the signing of a Declaration of Friendship during Foreign Minister Skubiszewski's visit to Minsk in October 1990.<sup>22</sup> However, they were later resolved and, after some delay, the Declaration of Friendship was finally signed in October 1991. In addition, in June 1992, the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, updating the declaration signed in October 1991. The treaty obliges both countries to respect existing borders and to renounce any territorial claims on the other. It also contains important provisions protecting minority rights.<sup>23</sup>

The two countries have also strengthened military cooperation. In April 1993 Poland and Belarus signed an agreement expanding bilateral military contacts. The agreement, similar to the one signed with Ukraine in February 1993, calls for an expansion of training and official visits in the defense field.<sup>24</sup>

Polish officials, however, have viewed with concern recent signs that Belarus may abandon its policy of neutrality and join a CIS collective security arrangement. Militarily, Belarus represents a "strategic corridor" to Lithuania and Poland. Poland does not want to see Belarus tightly integrated into a Russia-dominated CIS. Such integration not

<sup>22</sup>The differences were related to treatment of the Belorussian minority in Poland and Belorussian objections to references to the Polish-Soviet border treaty of 1945, to which Belorussia had not been a party. For background, see Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Friendship Declarations Signed with Ukraine and Russia," *Report on Eastern Europe*, November 2, 1990, pp. 25-27.

<sup>23</sup>"Erfolg polnischer Aussenpolitik," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 25, 1992. There are about 400,000 Poles living in Belarus and about 200,000 Belorussians living in Poland, most of them in the area around Bialystok.

<sup>24</sup>For the text of the agreement, see *Vo Slavu Rodiny* May 4, 1993, p. 2, translated in FBIS-SOV-93-094, May 13, 1993, p. 45.

only would allow Russia to station its troops close to the Polish border but would increase Ukraine's isolation, making it easier for Moscow to reincorporate Ukraine into a Russia-dominated confederation.

### Lithuania

Lithuania is the one exception to Poland's otherwise successful Eastern policy. Relations between the two countries have a long history of tensions and disputes.<sup>25</sup> Between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries, the two countries formed a single state, but Poland has traditionally been the dominant partner, a fact that has tended to give Lithuanian nationalism an anti-Polish tinge. Moreover, between World War I and World War II, Vilnius, the current capital of Lithuania, was part of Poland, a fact that has reinforced traditional animosities.

The drive for Lithuanian independence rekindled traditional anti-Polish sentiments, in particular because the Polish minority (about 260,000) had tended to ally itself with the Soviet central authorities prior to independence. Tensions resurfaced in the wake of the August 1991 coup, when the Lithuanian authorities disbanded the local councils in the heavily populated Polish areas around Vilnius and Salcininkai, ostensibly because the Polish leadership of the councils had supported the coup.<sup>26</sup>

After considerable delay, in January 1992, the two countries signed a Joint Declaration similar to the Poland-Ukraine and Poland-Belarus agreements. The declaration stresses that neither side has territorial aspirations against the other and contains provisions for protecting

<sup>25</sup>For a comprehensive discussion of current Polish-Lithuanian relations, see Stephan B. Burant, "Polish-Lithuanian Relations: Past, Present and Future," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1991, pp. 67-84. Also see Saulius Girnius and Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Current Issues in Polish-Lithuanian Relations," *Report on Eastern Europe*, January 12, 1990, pp. 39-50.

<sup>26</sup>For details, see Jan de Weydenthal, "The Polish-Lithuanian Dispute," *Report on Eastern Europe*, October 11, 1991, pp. 20-23. Also see Edward Lucas, "Lithuania Dispute with Poles Worsens," *The Independent*, September 19, 1991; Christopher Bobinski, "Lithuania Warned on Polish Minority," *Financial Times*, September 16, 1991; and Thomas Urban, "Warschau über Wilna verärgert," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, September 17, 1991.

minority rights.<sup>27</sup> A Treaty of Friendship is in preparation but has yet to be signed, largely because of Lithuanian demands that the treaty contain a controversial clause condemning the Polish "aggression" of 1920—a demand that is unacceptable to Poland. However, there are signs that Lithuania may agree to relegate "historical questions" to a separate declaration, which would allow the Friendship Treaty to be signed before the end of 1993 or soon thereafter.<sup>28</sup>

Ironically, the victory of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), headed by former communist leader Algirdas Brazauskas, in the parliamentary elections in November 1992, has contributed to easing some of the previous friction. The DLP has pursued a less nationalist policy than the Sajudis government under Prime Minister Vytautas Landsbergis and has been less inclined to exploit anti-Polish sentiments to bolster its domestic support.<sup>29</sup> Since becoming president in February 1993, Brazauskas has taken a number of steps to reverse the discriminatory policies of the Landsbergis government and improve the lot of the Polish minority, including restoring the self-governing councils in Vilnius and Salcininkai and introducing Polish-language instruction in school in districts with a large Polish-speaking population.<sup>30</sup> Such actions have helped to defuse the minority issue and have contributed to improved bilateral relations.

### **Military Reform and Defense Policy**

Since 1990, Poland gradually has begun to reorient its defense policy to meet the new challenges posed by its changed security environment. This effort centers around the elaboration of a new defense doctrine, which was originally proclaimed in February 1990 and

<sup>27</sup>For the text of the declaration, see *Ekho Litvy*, translated in FBIS-SOV-92-019, January 29, 1992, pp. 85–86.

<sup>28</sup>RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 141, July 27, 1993.

<sup>29</sup>Many members of the Polish minority, in fact, appear to have voted for the DLP rather than the League of Poles in Lithuania (ZPL) because they felt that the DLP had a much better chance than the relatively weak ZPL of constraining the Sajudis nationalist excesses.

<sup>30</sup>Discussions in Warsaw, February 1993.



modified in June 1991.<sup>31</sup> However, the June 1991 version was never implemented because of differences between President Walesa and Prime Minister Jan Olszewski and his defense minister, Jan Parys. After the dismissal of Olszewski's government in June 1992, a new draft doctrine, prepared by the National Security Bureau attached to the president's office, was announced in July 1992.

The new doctrine sees no immediate threat of invasion or outside attack, although it points to other dangers, such as ethnic conflict and massive migration of refugees. It calls for creating a relatively small military force—about 200,000 troops (0.5 percent of the population)—and National Guard units.<sup>32</sup> The doctrine also reiterates Poland's determination to seek membership in NATO and the WEU.<sup>33</sup>

In connection with its reoriented defense doctrine, Poland has expanded the number of military districts from three to four (two in the east and two in the west) and has begun to redeploy its forces, stationing more troops in the east.<sup>34</sup> However, this process is costly because a new infrastructure must be built and Poland faces a severe budgetary crunch. Thus, Poland can only implement these changes gradually. In addition, the new doctrine emphasizes creating lighter, more mobile forces that can react quickly to local conflicts, especially with Poland's immediate neighbors.

Poland is also upgrading its air defense. However, the limited progress in force redeployment, combined with the legacy of the Warsaw Pact's unified air defense structure, has weakened Poland's air defense and left it unbalanced, especially in eastern Poland, where the potential for conflict is greatest. This is an area where Poland hopes to obtain assistance from the West.

<sup>31</sup>For details, see Thomas S. Szayna, *The Military in a Postcommunist Poland* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, N-3309-USDP, 1991).

<sup>32</sup>See Jan de Weydenthal, "Poland Prepares a New Military Doctrine," *RFE/RL Research Report*, August 21, 1992, pp. 45–48.

<sup>33</sup>Office of the President, July 1992, *Security and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (Warsaw: National Security Bureau), p. 13.

<sup>34</sup>Previously, the majority of Polish forces had been located near the northern and western borders. In the east were mainly logistical bases and units in a low state of readiness.

For ground forces, Poland wants to build a semiprofessional army, gradually increasing the proportion of professionals from the current 35 percent to about 50 percent. Conscription has been reduced from 24 to 18 months. However, Poland does not intend to abandon universal conscription, nor to move to an all-volunteer army.


The reform process has been inhibited, however, by strong economic constraints. Polish defense spending has declined by 38 percent in real terms since 1986. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), it fell from 3.2 percent in 1986 to 1.9 percent in 1993.<sup>35</sup> As a result, little money has been allocated for procuring new weapons (only 11 percent of the defense budget went for procurement in 1993). Civilian control also remains weak. Although Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz, a former spokesman for Solidarity, earned the Polish military's respect, he was not entirely successful in establishing strong civilian control over the uniformed military, largely owing to the military's virtual monopoly over the sources of information and the lack of civilian experts in key policymaking positions in the Defense Ministry—a problem inhibiting military reform efforts elsewhere in Eastern Europe, as well.

The victory of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) in the September 1993 parliamentary elections is not likely to lead to a major shift in defense policy. The new Defense Minister, Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk, has close ties to President Walesa and was Defense Minister in the Mazowiecki government (1990–1991). Moreover, Jerzy Milewski, head of the National Security Bureau in the President's Office and a close Walesa aide, has been appointed Deputy Defense Minister, ensuring that Walesa will be able to keep a close eye on defense policy and the process of military reform.

## HUNGARY

Hungary's security situation has significantly deteriorated over the past two years. The collapse of the USSR, breakup of Yugoslavia, and dissolution of Czechoslovakia have led to the emergence of a number of new states with which Hungary has potential or real conflicts (Figure 1). To the north, Hungary faces an increasingly nationalistic,

<sup>35</sup> Figures provided by the Polish Ministry of Defense, March 1993.



SOURCE: George Schoplin, *Hungary and its Neighbours* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Chailot Paper No. 7, May 1993); and RAND's "Twin Arcs of Crisis" project.

Figure 1—Ethnic Hungarian Minorities Outside of Hungary

independent Slovakia; to the east, a newly independent Ukraine whose future security orientation remains uncertain; and to the southeast, Romania and Serbia, with which relations are poor. Only with Austria, Slovenia, and Croatia does Hungary have no serious security problems.

## Romania

The most serious differences are with Romania over the treatment of its Hungarian minority. Relations between the two countries, which had deteriorated badly in the latter years of the Ceausescu period, improved briefly after Nicolae Ceausescu's execution. However, the outbreak of anti-Hungarian demonstrations in Tirgu-Mures in March 1990, which resulted in eight deaths and nearly 300 injuries, led to new tensions.<sup>36</sup> Since then, relations have remained strained.

The two countries are currently working on a bilateral treaty regulating relations. Most major issues have been resolved. However, the negotiations on the treaty are deadlocked over two outstanding issues: (1) Romania's desire for a declaration regarding the integrity of the borders; (2) Hungary's demand that the treaty contain a statement regarding minority rights. To date, neither side has shown much willingness to compromise—and until they do, the prospects for a major improvement in relations are slim.<sup>37</sup>

Domestic developments in Romania, moreover, make any radical improvement in relations unlikely. The Romanian national elections

<sup>36</sup>For a detailed discussion, see Vladimir Socor, "Forces of Old Resurface in Romania: The Ethnic Clashes in Tirgu-Mures," *Report on Eastern Europe*, April 13, 1990, pp. 36-42.

<sup>37</sup>There have, however, been small signs of improvement in relations lately. In March 1993, Romania agreed to set up a Council for National Minorities to deal with minority issues. And in July 1993, representatives of the two countries signed an agreement calling for the training of 300 more teachers at the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj, the teaching of more elementary classes in history and geography in minority languages, and the placing of multilingual street signs in areas where a minority represents 30 percent or more of the population. All these are changes that have long been sought by the Hungarians, and they have contributed to a general improvement in the atmosphere between the two countries. However, differences still remain on major issues of substance.

in September 1992 strengthened the nationalist forces in Romania.<sup>38</sup> Particularly worrying from the Hungarian point of view was the strong showing of Gheorghe Funar, the Mayor of Cluj and head of the extreme nationalist Party of Romanian National Unity (PRNU), who won 12 percent of the vote in the first round of the presidential election. The PRNU has increased its support nearly fourfold since 1990, and its appeal is no longer confined to Transylvania, its original stronghold. In addition, two other parties, the nationalistic-oriented Greater Romania Party (GRP) and the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), also entered the legislature.<sup>39</sup>

Ironically, military relations are the exception to this pattern of tension. In November 1990, the two countries' defense ministers signed a bilateral agreement on military cooperation, which called for wide-ranging contacts and cooperation in the military field. In addition, in May 1991, the two countries signed an "Open Skies" agreement, which provided each side four annual unarmed surveillance flights over the other's territory.

## Ukraine

The emergence of an independent Ukraine has added to Hungarian security concerns. Although Hungary does not see a serious military threat from Ukraine, it remains concerned about the Hungarian minority's situation in Ukraine. The Antall government has made clear that it considers the minority's treatment a key element of future relations and that curtailing their rights would harm bilateral ties.

Relations between Hungary and Ukraine have improved significantly since Ukraine declared its sovereignty in 1990. In May 1991 the two countries concluded nine bilateral agreements, expanding cooperation in a variety of fields, such as health, environment, and educa-

<sup>38</sup>See Michael Shafir, "Romania's Elections: More Change Than Meets the Eye," *RFE/RL Research Report*, November 6, 1992, pp. 1-8.

<sup>39</sup>The GRP won 16 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (out of 341) and 6 seats in the Senate (out of 143), whereas the SLP won 13 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 5 seats in the Senate. The PRNU won 30 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 14 seats in the Senate.

tion.<sup>40</sup> They also signed a declaration on minority rights guaranteeing minorities' collective and individual rights. The declaration is based on the principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act. Hungary sees the agreement both as an important guarantee that the rights of the Hungarian minority will be respected and as a possible model for other neighboring countries.

In addition, in March 1992 the two countries signed an agreement on military cooperation. The agreement is similar to agreements that Hungary has signed with other neighbors, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, in calling for regular consultations between military leaders and experts, and exchanges of visits and educational material. It does not contain any security guarantees or pledges of mutual assistance.

The Hungarian minority in Ukraine is relatively well treated—certainly far better treated than in Romania, Slovakia or Serbia—a fact that has contributed to cordial Hungarian-Ukrainian relations. The main differences between Kiev and Budapest revolve around the autonomy demands of the Transcarpathian *oblast*, an area heavily populated by ethnic Hungarians (Subcarpathian Ruthenia in Figure 1).<sup>41</sup> The Budapest government has backed those demands. The Ukrainian government, however, has resisted granting autonomy because it fears that doing so would encourage separatist tendencies elsewhere in Ukraine, especially in Crimea.

The relatively good treatment of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine and the cordial state of Hungarian-Ukrainian relations make Ukraine the one bright spot in an otherwise troubled environment on Hungary's northern, eastern, and southern borders. However, the political situation in Ukraine is highly unstable. If centrifugal ten-

<sup>40</sup>See Alfred Reisch, "Agreements Signed with Ukraine to Upgrade Bilateral Relations," *Report on Eastern Europe*, June 21, 1991, pp. 4–17.

<sup>41</sup>In a referendum on December 1, 1991, the residents of Transcarpathian *oblast* voted to become a "special self-governing administrative district." Moreover, the Beregszasz (Dereгово) *raion* (district), where almost half the Hungarian minority lives, voted to create a "Magyar national district," which could later be joined by neighboring Hungarian settlements. For details, see Alfred A. Reisch, "Transcarpathia's Hungarian Minority and the Autonomy Issue," *RFE/RL Research Report*, February 7, 1992, pp. 17–23. Also see Alfred A. Reisch, "Transcarpathia and Its Neighbors," *RFE/RL Research Report*, February 14, 1992, pp. 43–47; and Carl-Gustav Ströhm, "Karpato-Ukraine gibt sich selbst-bewusst," *Die Welt*, February 25, 1992.

dencies in Ukraine grow, the government in Kiev could begin to take a tougher stand on the Hungarian minority's calls for autonomy, increasing strains with Budapest. A sharp decline in the Ukrainian economy could also stimulate migration pressures, as happened in Romania in the late 1980s, increasing the influx of refugees into Hungary at a time when Hungary already faces a severe refugee problem caused by the war in the former Yugoslavia.

## Serbia

The crisis in Yugoslavia has led to a serious deterioration of relations with Serbia. On several occasions, Serbian aircraft have violated Hungarian airspace.<sup>42</sup> In addition, since 1987 the Serbs have progressively curtailed the rights of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, a province of Serbia that belonged to Hungary before World War I. A disproportionately large number of Hungarians from Vojvodina (for their share of the total population in the province) have been conscripted by Serbia to fight in the conflict against Croatia. The conflict has also led to an influx of over 50,000 refugees into Hungary.<sup>43</sup> Caring for those refugees has created serious economic and social problems at a time when the Hungarian economy is in a recession.

The situation in Vojvodina is potentially explosive.<sup>44</sup> As more and more Serb refugees pour into Serbia from other parts of the former Yugoslavia, Hungarian officials fear that Serbia may be tempted to engage in a policy of "ethnic cleansing" in Vojvodina to make room for the new Serb refugees. Serbia also could "punish" Hungary with even more repressive policies against the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina for supporting the UN-imposed sanctions against Serbia and for granting NATO permission to fly over Hungarian territory to monitor the "no-fly ban" in Bosnia. Such punishment could prompt

<sup>42</sup>The most serious incident took place when a Serbian aircraft bombed the village of Barcs just over the Serbian-Hungarian border in November 1991. No one was hurt, but Hungarian officials are convinced that the action was deliberate.

<sup>43</sup>See Judith Pataki, "Refugee Wave from Croatia Puts Strain on Relief Efforts," *Report on Eastern Europe*, September 27, 1991, p. 12; Peter Maas, "Refugees from Croatia Flood Hungary," *Washington Post*, October 7, 1991.

<sup>44</sup>For a detailed discussion, see Hugh Poulton, "Rising Ethnic Tension in Vojvodina," *RFE/RL Research Report*, December 18, 1992, pp. 21-27.

many members of the minority to seek refuge in Hungary, increasing the already-serious refugee problem that Hungary faces. The de facto partition of Bosnia has also increased Hungarian concerns that Serbia will engage in a policy of "ethnic cleansing" elsewhere, especially Vojvodina.

Hungarian officials have also been concerned about signs of growing military cooperation between Serbia and Iraq, particularly the possibility that Serbia might obtain Scud missiles from Baghdad<sup>45</sup>—which would increase the potential military threat to Hungary and accentuate Hungary's already-acute air defense problems.

All told, the war in Yugoslavia has increased Hungary's sense of vulnerability and has highlighted the need to strengthen its defense capability. Hungary's recent efforts to sound out NATO about obtaining security guarantees and anti-air missiles should be seen against this background.<sup>46</sup> Although NATO rebuffed such efforts, they underscore Hungary's growing sense of vulnerability and fear that the war in Yugoslavia could spread and directly impinge on important Hungarian interests. At the same time, Hungary has declined to take part in any peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia for fear of provoking Serb retaliation against the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina.

## **Slovakia**

The dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the emergence of an independent Slovak state have added to Hungarian security concerns. Hungarian officials worry that Slovakia may seek to curtail the rights of the Hungarian minority. They have made clear that future relations between the two countries will depend on the Slovak treatment

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<sup>45</sup>Hungarian officials were particularly alarmed by a secret visit to Baghdad in March 1993 by General Zivota Panic, Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army. Panic reportedly met with top Iraqi military strategists, including Iraqi Defense Minister Ali Hassan Majid. The main purpose of his visit appears to have been to obtain Iraqi oil and military spare parts and to obtain Iraqi advice on how to survive a possible U.S. military attack. See Mark Fineman, "When Two Outcasts Join Forces," *Los Angeles Times*, June 15, 1993. Also discussions with Hungarian officials in the Prime Minister's Office and Foreign Ministry, March 1993.

<sup>46</sup>See Michael Binyon, "Hungary Fails to Get Missile Protection," *The Times* (London), May 15, 1993; also, Andrew Marshall, "Hungary Seeks NATO Protection from Foes," *The Independent*, May 18, 1993.



of the Hungarian minority and have called on Slovakia to grant the Hungarian minority greater cultural autonomy.<sup>47</sup> Slovakia, however, has rejected such calls, fearing that they will lead to growing separatist pressures and even efforts to revise the borders at some point.

In addition, relations with Slovakia have been strained by differences over the construction of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Dam project. The agreement for the project was signed in 1977. However, in May 1989, the Nemeth government was forced by environmental protests to stop work on the project. Then, in May 1992, the Hungarian government unilaterally canceled the bilateral agreement with Czechoslovakia on the construction of the dam.<sup>48</sup>

More than an environmental dispute, issues of national sovereignty are involved in the cancellation. The Danube forms the border between Slovakia and Hungary above and below Gabčíkovo, and Hungary claims that diverting shipping along the 24-kilometer-long canal feeding the Gabčíkovo works constitutes a unilateral revision of the border. Slovakia rejects these charges, arguing that the border remains intact along the main flow of the river. It also insists that the dam is necessary to ensure its future power supplies.

The issue was temporarily defused through the mediation of the EC at the London summit of the Visegrad Group at the end of October 1992. Czechoslovakia agreed to halt work on the dam while a tripartite commission composed of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the European Commission examined the issue. In the meantime, both countries agreed to put the issue before the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

Slovakia, however, does not pose a significant military threat to Hungary. Its 45,000-man army is half the size of Hungary's and poorly equipped. Although Slovakia does have some Soviet MiG-29s, many of the airfields in Slovakia are ill-suited to handle the combat

<sup>47</sup>See, in particular, Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky's interview, "Europa soll Protektor der Minderheit sein," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, June 25, 1992.

<sup>48</sup>Karoly Okolicsanyi, "Hungary Cancels Treaty on Danube Dam Construction," *RFE/RL Research Report*, June 26, 1992, pp. 46-50; "Ungarn kündigt Staudamm Vertrag," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 9, 1992.

aircraft it received when the Czechoslovak armed forces were divided up. Moreover, relations between the militaries of the two countries are quite good. General Imrich Andrejcek, the Slovak defense minister, is highly regarded in Budapest and is considered a moderate. In contrast to Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, he has tended to play down the danger from Hungary and has maintained close relations with his counterpart, Hungarian Defense Minister Lajos Für. These close ties have added an important element of stability to bilateral relations.

By contrast, Prime Minister Meciar has sought to play up the "threat" from Hungary to bolster his own domestic position. However, Meciar's popularity has declined significantly since the separation from the Czech Republic on January 1, 1993, and his party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), has been wracked by growing factionalism. As a result, there is a likelihood that the current HZDS-led coalition may collapse. If a new, less nationalistic government were to come to power in Bratislava, Hungarian officials believe that many of the current bilateral problems with Slovakia could be resolved. Hence, they have consciously sought to cultivate close contacts to liberal and centrist forces among the opposition as well as within Meciar's own party.

### **The Hungarian-Minority Issue as a Security Problem**

The foregoing discussion highlights the degree to which the question of the Hungarian minority abroad has become a central issue in Hungary's relations with its neighbors. The Antall government has made minority rights one of the main pillars of its foreign policy, even creating a special secretariat in the Prime Minister's Office tasked with maintaining contacts with Hungarians abroad. In addition, Hungary has pressed for the adoption of a European "code of conduct" safeguarding the rights of minorities—including the collective rights of minorities—within the various international fora.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>49</sup>See, in particular, the article by Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, "Nothing Quiet on the Eastern Front," *NATO Review*, June 1992, reprinted in *Current Policy*, No. 15 (Budapest: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 24, 1992), p. 6.

However, Hungary has been careful to distinguish between advocating respect for minority rights and altering any changing borders. Antall and other leading Hungarian politicians have repeatedly stressed their adherence to the Helsinki Final Act. In an address to the Third World Meeting of Hungarians in Budapest in August 1992, for instance, Antall stated that the Treaty of Trianon (1920), by which Hungary lost over two-thirds of its territory,

... should be approached not from the angle of pain but from that of *today's realities*, which means *we have renounced the policy of altering borders by force in the Helsinki agreement*, and with the signing of the Paris Charter we have accepted this principle along with other peoples of Europe [emphasis added].<sup>50</sup>

However, other statements by leading Hungarian political figures, including Antall himself, have been more ambiguous and have created doubts about Hungary's long-term objectives. In July 1991, for instance, Antall caused a stir by saying that Vojvodina had been given to Yugoslavia after World War I, not to Serbia. This seemed to imply that if Yugoslavia collapsed as an integral state, Hungary might reopen the question of Vojvodina's status.

Similarly, in March 1992, Defense Minister Lajos Für, at the time the second-ranking member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum and a possible successor to Antall, stated that Hungary had an obligation to "defend" the Hungarian minority abroad. While he later claimed he was misquoted and that he had only meant by diplomatic means, his remarks caused a furor in Romania and Slovakia, where political leaders quickly pounced upon them as proof of Hungary's revisionist intentions.

At present, Hungary is firmly committed to maintaining its current borders. The key question is whether this commitment will change in the future. Over the last several years the post-World War I Versailles settlements (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) have begun to unravel. As they do, the issue of the Treaty of Trianon (1920) could

<sup>50</sup>See Antall's speech to the Third World Congress of Hungarians, *Current Policy*, No. 20 (Budapest: Hungarian Foreign Ministry, September 10, 1992), p. 4; also, his speech at the Statue of Saint Stephen, August 20, 1992, *Current Policy*, No. 21 (Budapest: Hungarian Foreign Ministry, September 9, 1992), p. 4.

become a more important issue in the Hungarian domestic debate, especially if neighboring states curtail the rights of the Hungarian minority. If other parts of the World War I order are being revised, many Hungarians may ask, Why not Trianon?

### The Nationalist Challenge

The rise of a right-wing group of nationalists led by Istvan Csurka has enhanced the public profile of the minority issue. Csurka, a well-known populist writer and a deputy chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) until January 1993, has emerged as one of the most outspoken champions of the cause of the Hungarian minority abroad. In August 1992, he published a manifesto openly critical of Antall's domestic and foreign policy. The manifesto caused a furor primarily because of its anti-Semitic tone.<sup>51</sup> But it also indirectly raised the issue of Trianon. Noting that the Yalta agreement would end in 1995 [sic] and that every "post-Trianon" state bordering on Hungary would be different, Csurka argued that this difference would present "new opportunities and dangers" for Hungary and explicitly raised the possibility of creating "a new Hungarian Lebensraum."<sup>52</sup>

Csurka's critique seriously embarrassed the Antall government, and Antall quickly sought to distance himself from Csurka's statement.<sup>53</sup> At the MDF Congress in January 1993, he sharply condemned Csurka's views and succeeded in largely isolating Csurka, who failed

<sup>51</sup>For a detailed discussion of the "Csurka Affair" and its repercussions, see Judith Patacki, "Istvan Csurka's Tract: Summary and Reactions," *RFE/RL Research Report*, October 9, 1992, pp. 15-22; J. F. Brown, "A Challenge to Political Values," *RFE/RL Research Report*, October 9, 1992, pp. 23-25; Bela Weyer, "Ein populistisches Manifest," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, September 5, 1992; Paul Hefty, "Csurkas Kampfansage an Antall," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 9, 1992; and Bela Weyer, "Rüge für Kritik an Csurkas Thesen," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 19, 1992.

<sup>52</sup>*Nepszabadsag*, August 27, 1992, p. 6, translated in FBIS-EEU-92-172, September 3, 1992, p. 12.

<sup>53</sup>In a statement to parliament, Antall went out of his way to separate himself from Csurka's views, stating that "Csurka identifies problems and describes the constraints to their solution. In my view, he misinterprets a number of issues and gives politically harmful and incorrect answers, with which I cannot identify, either in my own name or on behalf of the HDF Board of Presidium." (A copy of Antall's remarks was provided by the Hungarian Consulate in Los Angeles.)

to be re-elected as Deputy Chairman of the MDF and also later lost his position as a member of the eight-member parliamentary presidium of the MDF, which is composed mostly of moderates and advocates of Antall's centrist policies. Finally, in early June, he and three of his followers were expelled from the MDF altogether.

However, Csurka remains an important political force and articulate spokesman for the discontented nationalist right. He has founded his own movement, *Magyar Ut* (Hungarian way).<sup>54</sup> The movement has some 60,000 followers, organized in 350 to 400 local groups throughout Hungary. Its goal is to create a special "Hungarian way" between capitalism and socialism and pressure the MDF to return to its "Hungarian" origins. Since his expulsion from the MDF, Csurka has sought to transform the movement into a new right-wing political party, Hungarian Justice, similar to Jean-Marie Le Pen's ultra-nationalist party in France.

Moreover, Csurka has not limited his criticism to domestic issues. During the parliamentary debate over the Hungarian-Ukrainian state treaty in May 1993, a number of deputies, including Csurka, sharply attacked the treaty and demanded amendments to it because the treaty contained a clause accepting the current borders between Hungary and Ukraine.<sup>55</sup> Inclusion of that clause, they argued, was tantamount to abandoning the Hungarian minority in Ukraine and set a precedent for treaties with other neighboring states such as Romania and Slovakia—a charge the government heatedly rejected. Although the treaty was eventually ratified by a substantial margin (222 for, 39 against, and 17 abstentions), a number of MDF members voted against it, thereby underscoring the deep ideological divisions within the MDF on the minority and border issues.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>54</sup>For details, see Edith Olty, "Hungary Csurka Launches National Movement," *RFE/RL Research Report*, March 26, 1993, pp. 25–31. *Magyar Ut* was the name of a popular journal published between 1941 and 1944. The journal was close to writers Dezso Szabo and Laszlo Nemeth, who rejected both communism and capitalism, advocating instead a "third road" for Hungary.

<sup>55</sup>See Tibor Fenyi, "Aufstand gegen Ungarns Premier," *Die Presse*, May 13, 1993; "Kritik an Vertrag mit der Ukraine," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 6, 1993; and Boris Kalnoky, "Ungarns Verzichtspolitik führt zur Zerreißprobe," *Die Welt*, May 8, 1993.

<sup>56</sup>Some MDF deputies reportedly even demanded the resignation of Foreign Minister Jeszenszky, a close confidant of Prime Minister Antall. See Yves-Michel Riols,

One should not, however, exaggerate the nationalist threat. Csurka and his followers represent a vocal minority, but a minority nevertheless. Most Hungarians regard Trianon as unjust, but they accept the current borders of Hungary and recognize that any effort to reincorporate the "lost lands" would create more problems than it would resolve. Indeed, reincorporation of Transylvania and other territories lost under Trianon would be the surest means to destabilize Hungary: Hungary would not only acquire 4 to 5 million new Hungarian nationals overnight, but a large number of Romanians, Slovaks, Ruthenians, and Ukrainians, as well, creating major social and economic problems at a time when the Hungarian economy is in recession and its social-welfare services are overburdened and being cut back. Thus, future Hungarian governments will continue to show concern for the rights of the Hungarian minority abroad, but they are unlikely to raise major territorial claims against their neighbors. Moreover, if a new left-liberal coalition emerges from the next parliamentary elections in 1994—as is widely expected—it is likely to attach a lower priority to the minority issue. This could help to defuse the issue as a source of tension with Hungary's neighbors.

### **Security and Defense Policy**

The numerous changes and long delays in working out Hungary's new security concept, finally adopted by parliament on March 2, 1993, underscore the recent shift in Hungarian attitudes toward the country's security since 1990. The security concept went through several drafts and reformations before its final adoption. The original security concept rested on four pillars:

- The CSCE and pan-European cooperation
- Integration with West European political and security organizations
- Ties to regional security institutions
- Bilateral relations with its neighbors.

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"Polémique sur la signature d'un traité entre Budapest et Kiev excluant toute revendication territoriale," *Le Monde*, May 7, 1993.

Military means (the army) were regarded as a "last resort" in safeguarding Hungary's security.<sup>57</sup>

The government sent the draft security concept to the parliament for debate in late 1991. However, Hungary's deteriorating security environment had by then rendered much of the concept obsolete, and the draft was sent back to the Foreign Ministry for revision. A new draft was completed in spring 1992 and discussed in parliament in May 1992. The new draft put primary emphasis on ties to Western political and security organizations, downgrading the pan-European elements.<sup>58</sup>

That draft was also found to be inadequate and sent back for revisions. The new draft, adopted in March 1993, adheres to the basic principles laid down in the 1992 draft.<sup>59</sup> It stresses that Hungary has no "established enemy image" and puts primary emphasis on Hungary's integration into Western economic and security institutions. However, it is much less explicit about the nature of the security threats Hungary faces, especially those presented by Hungary's immediate neighbors.

Along with the security concept, the government submitted a new defense doctrine in March 1993. The new doctrine—or "defense principles"—attempts to bring Hungary's military force structure and tasks into harmony with Hungarian national interests. It emphasizes that Hungary has no "main enemy" and that the task of Hungary's military forces is solely defensive. The doctrine identifies small-scale incursions, provocations, and violation of airspace as the most likely threat. In case of general war or large-scale aggression

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<sup>57</sup>See the interview with David Meiszter, Deputy State Secretary in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, "The Army Is Only the Final Means," *Nepszabadsag*, April 14, 1991, translated in FBIS-EEU-91-160, August 19, 1991. Also private discussions with Hungarian officials in the Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs in Budapest, April 1991.

<sup>58</sup>Discussions with Hungarian officials, May 1992 and March 1993. See also the remarks by State Secretary Tamas Katona before the joint session of the Foreign Affairs and Defense committees, Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 16:00 GMT, May 13, 1992, translated in FBIS-EEU-92-095, May 15, 1992, pp. 18–19.

<sup>59</sup>For the text of the concept, see *Magyar Kozlony*, March 12, 1993, pp. 1565–1567, translated in JPRS-EER-93-031-S, April 14, 1993, pp. 65–68.

against Hungary, the principles leave open the possibility of outside assistance by friendly states.

To handle possible small-scale excursions by neighboring states, Hungary is developing a rapid-reaction force. The border guards under the Ministry of the Interior are also being augmented,<sup>60</sup> and Hungary plans to develop a special center for training peacekeeping forces.

The army has also been reorganized into three regional commands. Hungarian forces, deployed primarily in the west under the old Warsaw Pact system, will now be distributed more or less equally over Hungarian territory, with highest readiness forces in areas where Hungary is most likely to face attack (south). The army has also been reduced by about 30 percent since 1989, from a high of 150,000 troops in 1989 to about 100,000 at the end of 1992. During the same period, the number of conscripts dropped from 91,900 to 51,100 and civilian employees from 33,300 to 26,000.<sup>61</sup>

Hungary hopes to gradually move toward a more professional army. At present, 20 to 25 percent of the army is professional; the goal is to reach 40 to 45 percent by 1995 and 60 percent by the year 2000. According to the air defense concept, the armed forces will be divided into two services: army and air defense.

The recent changes, however, have been undertaken in a conceptual and legal vacuum. They were made before the defense principles were agreed upon and finally adopted. The changes have thus primarily involved reductions and redeployment of units rather than a coherent and far-reaching restructuring designed to adapt the armed forces to a radically changed security environment. The current force structure does not differ significantly from the pre-1989 force.

<sup>60</sup>After the Yugoslav conflict broke out, the Hungarian government decided to set up 28 rapid-reaction border guard companies equipped with such modern arms as anti-tank weapons. By the end of 1992, 19 such companies had been set up, 6 of them along the Yugoslav border. Opposition parties view the creation of the border guards with suspicion; they fear that the troops might be used to quell domestic disturbances. See Alfred Reisch, "The Hungarian Army in Transition," *RFE/RL Research Report*, March 5, 1993, p. 45.

<sup>61</sup>*Magyar Távirati Iroda* (MTI; Hungarian News Agency), 12:32 GMT, January 5, 1993, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-003, January 6, 1993, p. 21.



It remains heavily dominated by mechanized and tank brigades of uncertain readiness. The air force is in even worse shape. It lacks an effective, long-range air surveillance system, is deficient and poorly integrated, and has interceptors and air-defense missile systems that are antiquated.<sup>62</sup> Upgrading these systems is a top priority for the Hungarian military. However, tight budgetary constraints preclude any large-scale modernization before the end of the century.<sup>63</sup>

The lack of hard currency was one of the prime motivations behind Hungary's decision to obtain a squadron of MiG-29s in partial payment of the Soviet Union's foreign debt to Hungary.<sup>64</sup> Hungary would have preferred to buy Western equipment, but the alternatives, such as the Swedish Draken JAS-35 or the U.S. F-16, were either found to be unsuitable or too expensive. The deal will help Hungary to upgrade its antiquated air force; however, it keeps Hungary wedded to Russian equipment, thereby slowing the process of standardization with NATO weaponry—one of Hungary's main mid-term goals.

## THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA

Prior to the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Federation at the end of 1992, Czechoslovak security policy largely reflected Czech security concerns. It was formulated by a small group of former dissidents headed by President Vaclav Havel and Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier. Slovak interests played only a minor role. The implicit assumption was that Czech and Slovak interests were largely identical.

<sup>62</sup>The deficiencies and ineffectiveness of the Hungarian air defense system were underscored by the numerous violations of Hungarian airspace by the Serbian air forces during the early stages of the Yugoslav crisis.

<sup>63</sup>The General Staff prepared a development concept for modernization of the Hungarian Armed Forces. Their concept assumes that the new development program will start sometime between 1995 and 1996. According to Defense Minister Lajos Für, however, the period when Hungary will really be able to replace obsolete technology with Western technology will begin only in the following two five-year cycles between 2001-2005 and 2006-2010. See his interview in *Koztarsasag*, January 15, 1993, translated in FBIS-EFU-93-103, January 22, 1993.

<sup>64</sup>For details, see Alfred A. Reisch, "Hungary, Russian MiG-29s and Regional Balance of Power," *RFE/RL Research Report*, July 7, 1993, pp. 3-14.

In reality, however, there were subtle but important differences between the interests of the two republics. The Slovaks did not share Dienstbier's enthusiasm for integration into NATO and the EC—at least not to the same degree. Their geographic proximity to the USSR also made the Slovaks more sensitive to Soviet and Russian concerns. These divergences led to the creation of a separate Slovak Foreign Ministry in fall 1991. The Czech Republic, however, did not set up its own foreign ministry until April 1992, when it became clear that the federation was heading toward a split.

During the initial transition period (i.e., until early 1992), Czechoslovak security concerns centered primarily on the consequences of the collapse of the USSR. Czechoslovak officials saw no direct military threat to Czechoslovakia. Rather, they were concerned that the disintegration of the USSR would lead to growing ethnic conflict and political turmoil that could spill over into Eastern Europe.<sup>65</sup> Havel and Dienstbier argued forcefully against any attempt to isolate the USSR. Such an attempt, Dienstbier warned, could lead to a "new dictatorship" based on nationalism and backed by the Soviet military.

The Czechoslovak leadership's concern about the potentially destabilizing impact of the USSR's disintegration contributed to a visible shift in Czechoslovak security policy in the latter half of 1990. Initially, Havel and Dienstbier strongly advocated making pan-European institutions, especially the CSCE, the main pillar of the new European security architecture. By contrast, they downplayed NATO's role. However, by the latter half of 1990, Czechoslovak policy had shifted markedly and Havel and Dienstbier had become the staunchest East European supporters of NATO. Czechoslovak officials began to inquire privately about the possibility of joining NATO.

The Czechoslovak Federation's dissolution is likely to lead to increasingly different security concerns between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The Czech Republic is likely to focus even more strongly on

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<sup>65</sup>See, in particular, Havel's speech at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, March 21, 1991, translated in FBIS-WEU-91-056, March 22, 1991, pp. 1-4; also Jiri Dienstbier, "The Preconditions for Peace in Central and Eastern Europe," *Aspen Quarterly*, Autumn 1991, p. 35, and *The Prague Conference on the Future European Security* (Brussels: NATO Press and Information Office, 1991), p. 47.

security links with the West, especially Germany, with which it has historically strong ties. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus is a strong proponent of Western integration. Hence, the Czech government is likely to intensify efforts to join the EC and NATO while diminishing cooperation with the Visegrad Group—for which Klaus has little enthusiasm—which could lead to a weakening of the group's vitality and sense of purpose.

The Czech government's defense posture reflects a relatively benign view of its security environment, as well as severe budgetary constraints. The two republics divided the former Czechoslovak army (both personnel and equipment) on a 2:1 basis as part of the separation agreement. The new Czech army is being radically reduced and reorganized. It will drop from a force of 106,477 men at the time of the split on January 1, 1993, to about 65,000 by 1995—a 40-percent reduction.<sup>66</sup> About half of these are expected to be professionals.

The ground troops, which numbered about 43,000 men in June 1993, will be cut by one-third, to about 28,000 men by 1995. The old system based on divisions will be replaced by a brigade-based system. The new structure will consist of the following:

- A Territorial Defense Force of 15 brigades, with each brigade operated in peacetime by only a skeletal garrison
- An Expeditionary Force, composed of seven mechanized brigades (four in Bohemia and three in Moravia)
- A Rapid Deployment Force, made up of one brigade of 3,000 men, which will be compatible with NATO units.

The two army commands are expected to be set up by March 1994; the Rapid Reaction Force is expected to be ready by June 1994; and the deadlines for the formation of mechanized brigades are spread out until the end of 1995.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>66</sup>Ferdinand Peroutka, "One Problem Less," *Telegraf*, June 12, 1993, p. 3, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-115, June 17, 1993, p. 13.

<sup>67</sup>Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Karel Holub, Commander in Chief of the Czech ground forces' central headquarters, *Ceska Tiskova Kancelar* (CTK; Czech News Agency), 16:04 GMT, June 1, 1993, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-104, June 2, 1992, pp. 10-11.

The military restructuring process, however, will have to be implemented in an atmosphere of economic austerity, which puts severe constraints on resources that can be devoted to defense. Senior military officials have warned, for instance, that if the defense budget is not increased in future years, the Czech forces could suffer a significant drop in combat readiness and that some equipment could become inoperable.<sup>68</sup>

In the near term, the Czech Republic's most pressing concern will be to work out an amicable relationship with Slovakia. The division of property will be a difficult process and is likely to lead to considerable tension between the two states. Many Czechs, moreover, are bitter about the Slovak role in forcing the dissolution of the federation to which they, more than the Slovaks, were strongly attached.

However, the Czech Republic has strong reasons for trying to maintain good relations with Slovakia. Economically, the two republics are closely linked. About 25 percent of total Czech exports go to Slovakia, and 40 percent of Slovak exports go to the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic will thus want to maintain close economic ties to Slovakia. Politically, the Czech leadership has a strong interest in preventing the emergence of a highly nationalistic and unstable state on its borders.<sup>69</sup>

Slovakia's future security orientation is much less clear than that of the Czech Republic. The Slovak elite is divided between those, like Prime Minister Meciar, who lean toward neutrality and those, like Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik, who advocate closer ties to the West. However, the dominant tendency is toward Western integra-

<sup>68</sup>See the interview with Czech Minister of Defense Antonin Baudys in *A Report*, May 18, 1993, p. 3, translated in JPRS-EER-93-057-S, June 22, 1993, pp. 7-8.

<sup>69</sup>The separation, however, has proven more painful than was initially expected. Bilateral relations have deteriorated significantly since the split on January 1, 1993, and especially since the two countries introduced their own currencies in early February 1993. In the first five months of 1993, bilateral trade virtually collapsed. Czech exports to Slovakia could drop to as low as 30 percent of what they were prior to the split, significantly affecting the Czech economy: For the Czechs, each 10-percent fall in exports to Slovakia translates into a 1-percent drop in GDP and a 0.5-percent fall in tax revenue. Such drops threaten one of the main achievements of the Klaus government—macroeconomic stability through monetary and fiscal restraint. See Jiri Pehe, "Czech-Slovak Relations Deteriorate," *RFE/RL Research Report*, April 30, 1993, pp. 1-5; "Not So Amicable," *The Economist*, April 17, 1993, p. 50.

tion. The new Slovak security concept, for instance, explicitly calls for Slovakia's integration into both the EC and NATO.

However, Slovakia has a considerably poorer chance of joining NATO and the EC than the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland. Slovakia's economy is dominated by obsolete heavy industry—80 percent of the former Czech Republic's arms industry is in Slovakia—and Slovakia is experiencing an unemployment rate four times higher than that of the Czech Republic. Nearly 10 percent of the Slovak workforce is employed in the defense industry. A radical restructuring of the Slovak economy along market lines, needed for EC integration, would significantly increase the unemployment rate and cause major social dislocations that most Slovak governments are likely to regard as politically unacceptable.

The split, moreover, has tended to exacerbate Slovakia's isolation. In size, economy, and ethnic heterogeneity, Slovakia has more in common with the transition problems faced by Bulgaria and Romania than with those of its Visegrad neighbors: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. In addition, the willingness of Poland and the Czech Republic to act as a filter for potential emigrants to Germany has had the effect of turning the Czech-Slovak border into a new East-West dividing line, cutting off Slovakia, politically and psychologically, even further from Europe.

Finally, Slovakia's minority policy creates problems with its neighbors, especially Hungary, and could inhibit its overall integration into Western institutions. The new Slovak constitution emphasizes national rights rather than citizens' rights, a fact that has caused considerable anxiety among the country's minorities, especially the 600,000 to 700,000 Hungarians who constitute the largest minority. At the same time, the Hungarian government's strong support for minority rights and its effort to internationalize the minority issue have fueled Slovak fears that Hungary's real long-term goal is a revision of the Trianon Treaty (1920), by which Slovakia (then part of Czechoslovakia) was granted the territory on which most of the Hungarian minority now resides.

These differences have been further exacerbated by the attempts of some Slovak politicians to exploit Slovak fears of Hungarian revisionism for their own political purposes. In July 1992, for instance, Prime

Minister Meciar claimed that Hungary was conducting maneuvers along the Slovak border—a claim that was denied not only by Hungarian Defense Minister Lajos Für but by Slovak Defense Minister General Imrich Andrejčák. More recently, Meciar charged that Hungary's goal was to create a "Greater Hungary."<sup>70</sup> Such irresponsible charges have only added fuel to the fire, making a resolution of bilateral differences with Hungary more difficult.

As noted earlier, however, there is little danger that current differences with Hungary will lead to military conflict. Slovakia is just beginning to create its own armed forces and develop its own military concept. The new Slovak army is expected to comprise about 45,000 men—roughly half the size of the current Hungarian army. As a part of the division of military assets when the Czechoslovak Federation split, Slovakia received ten MiG-29s, and there are plans to acquire five more from Russia as an offset against Russia's debt to Slovakia. However, the Slovak airfields are incapable of handling these and other combat aircraft received as part of the division of military assets when the split with the federation took place. Slovakia also lacks a viable air defense system.

To avoid isolation and find markets for its products, many of which are uncompetitive on Western markets, Slovakia could be tempted to turn east, especially to Russia. Prime Minister Meciar has at times seemed to be inclined in this direction. During Russian President Yeltsin's visit to Bratislava at the end of August 1993, the two countries signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, replacing the treaty signed with the Czechoslovak Federation in April 1992, before Czechoslovakia split in two. The treaty calls for a broad expansion of relations, especially in the economic area.<sup>71</sup> The two countries also

<sup>70</sup>Jozsef Kirchengast, "Dann kommt es zu Spannungen," *Der Standard*, October 5, 1993.

<sup>71</sup>The treaty sparked a highly emotional internal debate and was approved by representatives of the political parties only after the dropping of a controversial article stipulating that neither country would assist in a military attack on the other by allowing the attacking country's troops on its territory, under strong pressure from the Christian Democratic Movement, which charged that the article would prejudice Slovakia's entry into NATO. Meciar also opposed the inclusion of a formal apology for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the preamble of the treaty—a clause favored by all other parties—on the grounds that such a clause would unnecessarily complicate the signing of the treaty. However, the treaty did include a statement condemn-

signed a military agreement that provides for closer cooperation in training, technical assistance, and intelligence. (A similar treaty was not signed with the Czech Republic.) Meciar has also expressed interest in obtaining MiG-29s from Russia, ostensibly to balance a similar recent Hungarian purchase of MiG-29s from Russia.

If it is successful in integrating into the West, Slovakia might also try to form a tacit alliance with Romania and Serbia—in effect recreating a modern-day version of the interwar “Little Entente” (Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia). All three countries have large Hungarian minorities and share a common fear of Hungarian irredentism. In September 1993, during Romanian President Ion Iliescu’s visit to Bratislava, Slovakia and Romania agreed to coordinate their minority policies, a move that provoked concern in Budapest and could foreshadow closer cooperation in other areas.

## BULGARIA

As a Balkan country, Bulgaria’s security concerns are conditioned more by the situation in Southeastern Europe than by that in Central Europe. The conflict in Yugoslavia has been of particular concern to Bulgarian officials because of the danger that it could spread to Macedonia and possibly spill over into Bulgaria. Bulgaria has refrained from deploying troops close to the Macedonian border to avoid giving Serbia a pretext for intervention. It has also requested the UN to dispatch peacekeeping forces to Macedonia.

Bulgaria’s other main security concern is Turkey. Bulgarian fear of Turkey is conditioned in part by nearly 500 years of Turkish rule and in part by the disproportionately large size of the Turkish army that is deployed along the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Many Bulgarian officials worry that Turkey could encourage the growth of separatism among the Turkish minority—which comprises about 10 percent of the Bulgarian population—and use the treatment of the Turkish minority as a pretext to intervene to “protect” the Turkish minority, as it did in Cyprus in 1974.

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ing the 1968 invasion as a violation of international law and human rights, similar to the one included in the treaty between Russia and the Czech Republic. See “Slowakische Diskussion um den Prager Frühling,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, August 19, 1993.

Since the ouster of communist party leader Todor Zhivkov in November 1989, however, relations between Ankara and Sofia have significantly improved, especially in the military area.<sup>72</sup> Military exchanges, virtually nonexistent prior to 1991, are now frequent. In December 1991, the two countries signed an agreement to strengthen security and confidence along the Bulgarian-Turkish border.<sup>73</sup> The agreement calls for an increase in military contacts as well as a number of concrete confidence-building measures, such as prior notification of maneuvers and inspections beyond those contained in the Paris Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement. In keeping with the spirit of this agreement, in July 1992 Turkey unilaterally withdrew several battalions from the Bulgarian-Turkish border. In May 1992, the two countries also signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which provides for expanded ties across the board.

The rapprochement with Ankara, however, has contributed to a cooling of Greek-Bulgarian relations. Greek officials fear that Bulgaria could become economically and politically dependent on Ankara. Bulgaria's rapid recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in January 1992 also damaged relations with Athens. Greek officials were incensed that Bulgaria recognized Macedonia rather than waiting to follow the EC's lead.

Since then, however, Greek-Bulgarian relations have improved. The two countries signed a military cooperation agreement at the end of 1992 similar to one Bulgaria concluded with Turkey in 1991. In addition, the Berov government has adopted a more cautious attitude toward Macedonia than that of the government led by Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) leader Filip Dimitrov. These developments have contributed to improving the overall climate of relations with Athens. Nevertheless, Greek suspicions of Bulgaria's long-term goals regarding Macedonia remain strong and Greece is likely to continue to react sharply to any effort by Bulgaria to draw too close to either Skopje or Ankara.

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<sup>72</sup>See Kjell Engelbrekt, "Relations with Turkey: A Review of Post-Zhivkov Developments," *Report on Eastern Europe*, April 26, 1991, pp. 7-10.

<sup>73</sup>For the text of the agreement, see *Bulgarska Armiya*, December 23, 1991, translated in FBIS-EEU-92-001, January 2, 1992, pp. 5-6.



Over the long term, however, Bulgaria's chief security concern is likely to be Serbia. Bulgarian officials fear that the war in Bosnia could spread to Kosovo or Macedonia, possibly provoking a Serb invasion of Macedonia.<sup>74</sup> Under such conditions, Bulgaria might find it difficult to remain aloof from the conflict, especially if Macedonia were to appeal to Sofia for military assistance. Bulgarian involvement could, in turn, draw in other outside powers and risk a wider regional war.

## ROMANIA

During the Ceausescu era, Romania pursued an independent policy often at odds with Soviet policy, which earned it a reputation as a maverick within the Warsaw Pact. Following Ceausescu's execution at the end of December 1989, Romania initially charted a course that differed from the path taken by other East European allies. Rather than seeking close ties to the West, Bucharest pursued a policy based on neutrality and independence.

The most important example of Romania's maverick approach was the conclusion of a controversial bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in April 1991. The treaty was the first of its kind to be signed by the Soviet Union with the countries of Eastern Europe. It contained "negative security guarantees," forbidding either side to join an alliance directed against the other and prohibiting the stationing of foreign troops on the soil of either party.<sup>75</sup>

The Soviet Union clearly saw the treaty as a model and hoped that it would set a precedent for relations with other East European countries. Romania's former Warsaw Pact allies, however, refused to sign such a treaty, because it would have precluded their joining NATO and arguably the EC, as well, and the disputed clauses were eventually dropped after the attempted coup in Moscow in August 1991.

<sup>74</sup>For details, see Kjell Engelbrekt, "A Vulnerable Bulgaria Fears a Wider War," *RFE/RL Research Report*, March 19, 1993, pp. 7-12.

<sup>75</sup>For a detailed discussion, see Vladimir Socor, "The Romanian-Soviet Friendship Treaty and Its Regional Implications," *Report on Eastern Europe*, May 3, 1991, pp. 25-33.

However, Romania's acceptance of the controversial clauses compromised it in the eyes of both its former Warsaw Pact allies and many countries in the West, contributing to Bucharest's diplomatic isolation.

Since mid-1991, Romania's approach to security has undergone a noticeable shift. Bucharest has gradually abandoned its initial effort to go it alone and has begun to intensify its contacts with Western security institutions, especially the WEU and NATO. This shift was prompted largely by the deterioration of Romania's security environment and a related desire to avoid increasing diplomatic isolation.

Three factors in particular have contributed to the shift. The first has been the conflict in Yugoslavia. The subsequent disintegration of Yugoslavia has deprived Bucharest of an important ally and has put significant strains on Romania's traditionally good relations with Serbia. The UN sanctions against Serbia have seriously affected Romania's economy. Nevertheless, under Western pressure, Romania has tightened the embargo against Serbia, although remaining unenthusiastic about the continued imposition of the sanctions.

Second, Romania's relations with Hungary remain marred by differences over the treatment of the Hungarian minority. This problem was a major source of tension in bilateral relations during the latter part of Ceausescu's rule. However, it has taken on new dimensions recently as a result of three developments: (1) the tendency of the Antall government in Hungary to see itself as the spokesman for all Hungarians, including the minority abroad; (2) the general revival of ethnic nationalism throughout the Balkans since the collapse of communism; and (3) the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Romania does not really fear a military attack by Hungary. However, it objects to the Hungarian government's effort to put pressure on Romania to improve the Hungarian minority's treatment—an issue Romania considers a purely internal affair. Moreover, it fears that Yugoslavia's disintegration could lead to growing separatist tendencies among the Hungarian minority and reopen the border arrangements established after World War I, especially those related to the Treaty of Trianon, by which Romania acquired Transylvania.

For several years, Romania and Hungary have been negotiating a bilateral treaty to regulate their relations. However, as noted above, the negotiations remain deadlocked over two issues: (1) Romania's desire that Hungary explicitly guarantee current borders and (2) Hungary's wish that Romania explicitly guarantee the rights of the Hungarian minority. Until these issues are resolved, there is little chance of a fundamental improvement in relations.<sup>76</sup>

The third issue has been the problem of Moldova. Most of present-day Moldova belonged to Romania prior to World War II but was annexed by Stalin in 1940. The Romanian government has adopted a relatively moderate stance toward unification, seeing it largely as a long-term objective rather than an immediate goal. Some opposition groups, however, have pushed for unification as soon as possible.

The problem is complicated by the tensions between Russia and Moldova over Transdnistria, the eastern strip of Moldova near the Russian border, which is predominantly populated by Russian-speaking inhabitants. Transdnistria declared its independence in late 1991 and wants to secede from Moldova. The move to secede has led to a series of armed clashes between the Russian-speaking minority and the Romanian majority in Moldova. Romania has diplomatically supported Moldova, and shipped some weapons to it; but Romania has refrained from direct military involvement. However, if the conflict intensifies, pressure could grow for Romania to more actively assist Moldova militarily, which could bring Romania into a direct clash with Russia. Moreover, Romanian officials have been concerned by signs that Moldova may be moving back toward closer cooperation with Russia and by indications of stepped-up Russian support for the insurgents in Transdnistria, especially by the 14th Army, commanded by Russian General Alexander Lebed, who has made no effort to hide his desire to see Transdnistria joined to Russia.

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<sup>76</sup>There have, however, been small signs of improvement. In April 1993, Romania signaled its intention for the first time to take concrete steps to ease tensions, agreeing to allow town, street, and other public signs to be written in Hungarian in regions with large Hungarian minorities. It also agreed to set up a National Minorities Consultative Committee to advise the government. See David B. Ottaway, "Romania Makes Overtures to Ethnic Hungarian Minority," *Washington Post*, April 3, 1993.

Unification with Moldova, however, is a double-edged sword for Romania: On one side, unification would allow Romania to regain most of the territory annexed by Stalin in 1940; on the other side, calls for unification with Moldova could prompt the Hungarian minority to demand unification of Transylvania with Hungary. Unification would also raise the Transdnistrian problem, thereby creating a potential long-term source of conflict with Russia. Finally—and perhaps most important—the majority of Moldovans do not want unification. Although they feel close ethnic ties to Romania, they prefer two separate Romanian states and see little to be gained by joining an economic basket case in which they would clearly play a secondary political role. Thus, in the near future, unification does not seem likely. If, however, Romania's economy improves and Romania eventually succeeds in integrating itself more closely into Europe, the idea of unification could become more attractive to many Moldovans.

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## NATO AND EASTERN EUROPE

East European attitudes toward NATO have evolved significantly since 1989. In the period immediately following the revolutions of 1989, most of the countries in Eastern Europe put their main hopes for security in pan-European institutions, particularly the CSCE. They assumed that, as the Warsaw Pact dissolved, NATO's role would also decline and that the CSCE would eventually replace NATO as the *primary security organization in Europe*. Thus, initially, most of the leaders in Eastern Europe expressed little desire to join NATO.

Today, the countries of Eastern Europe see NATO as the most important security organization in Europe. All hope at some point to become members. Indeed, in the next few years, NATO is likely to face a major debate whether to open its ranks to Eastern Europe. The outcome of this debate could have a profound impact on NATO's overall evolution and orientation.

Four factors in particular have contributed to the evolution of East European attitudes toward NATO:

- *The disintegration of the USSR.* Whereas the disintegration of the USSR reduced the threat from a monolithic Soviet state, it also made clear that the security environment on the Visegrad countries' borders was likely to remain unstable for a long time. East European officials worried that conflicts between Russia and its neighbors, especially Ukraine, could spill over into Eastern Europe. At the same time, the growing strength of nationalist forces in Russia since 1991 raised fears that a conservative backlash in Russia could lead to the emergence of a more nationalis-

tic Russian regime and a revival of Russian hegemonic ambitions.

- *The Yugoslav crisis.* The EC's failure in Yugoslavia was a sobering experience for East Europeans. It underscored the EC's institutional weakness and made clear how far the EC had to go before it developed a meaningful security and defense identity.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, the American success in the Persian Gulf War increased NATO's stature in East European eyes and reinforced their perception that NATO was the only real functioning security organization in Europe.
- *U.S. lobbying.* Throughout spring and summer 1990, the United States stressed to the East European elite the importance and continued relevance of NATO. By fall 1991, this effort began to pay off, and the initial idealism about the CSCE was replaced by a more hard-headed, realistic approach to both NATO and the CSCE.
- *The uncertainties surrounding the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty.* These uncertainties have underscored the difficulties of forging a common European security and defense policy. Harmonizing these differences, it is now clear, will be much more difficult than was originally anticipated. These difficulties have led to a much more sober view in Eastern Europe about the long-term prospects for creating a serious European defense identity outside the framework of NATO and have increased NATO's stature in East European eyes.

## EVOLVING NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

Taken together, these four developments contributed to a gradual reassessment of NATO's role and importance by all the East European elite during 1991-1992. This reassessment was most noticeable within the Visegrad countries, but it was also evident in Bulgaria and Romania. At the same time, each country has exhibited important nuances in its attitude and approach to NATO.

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<sup>1</sup>For a detailed discussion, see James B. Steinberg, *The Role of European Institutions in Security After the Cold War: Some Lessons from Yugoslavia* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, N-3445-FF, 1992), pp. 30-35.

## Poland

Poland's position was somewhat unique in that, unlike Czechoslovakia and Hungary, it still had Soviet troops stationed on its soil, and Soviet leaders initially dragged their feet about setting a firm date for troop withdrawal.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, until Lech Walesa's election as president in December 1990, the communists still controlled the presidency, which constrained how far and how fast Poland could move in strengthening ties to the West, especially to NATO.

As a result, Poland did not initially express a strong desire to expand ties to NATO. Defense Minister Vice-Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk suggested that Poland would pursue a policy of military neutrality and act as a bridgehead between East and West.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, Deputy Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz, a former spokesman for Solidarity, argued that "Poland will remain neutral. It does not plan to join NATO or to get into some sort of military alliance with the Soviet Union that would make it impossible for Poland to keep close both to the West and the East."<sup>4</sup>

Beginning in early 1991, however, Polish attitudes began to shift. In January 1991, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski stated in a speech in London that NATO could play a stabilizing role in Eastern Europe.<sup>5</sup> During his visit to Brussels several months later, Walesa did not press the issue of NATO membership—perhaps because of the relatively reserved response by NATO to Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel's call in his speech the previous month for associate member-

<sup>2</sup>The Soviets did not formally agree to a date for withdrawal until October 1991—that is, more than three months after they had completed the withdrawal of their troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. A detailed discussion of the problems in negotiations is given in F. Stephen Larrabee, "Retreat from Empire: The Gorbachev Revolution in Eastern Europe and Its Consequences" (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, unpublished draft), pp. 30–35.

<sup>3</sup>See Kolodziejczyk's interview in *Rzeczpospolita*, March 2, 1991, translated in FBIS-EEU-91-064, April 3, 1991, pp. 27–28. See also his press conference, PAP, 17:03 GMT, November 15, 1990, translated in FBIS-EEU-90-223, November 19, 1990, p. 53.

<sup>4</sup>Cited in Vladimir Kusin, "Security Concerns in Central Europe," *Report on Eastern Europe*, March 8, 1991, p. 35.

<sup>5</sup>Michael Simmons, "Poles Want More Power for NATO," *The Guardian*, January 10, 1991.

ship. However, since early 1992, Polish officials have become more outspoken regarding their desire for membership in NATO.

The greater emphasis placed on formal NATO membership in early 1992 was in large part a result of the shift in the leadership of the Defense Ministry from Kolodziejczyk, who had served in several high posts under the communists, to Jan Parys, who replaced Piotr Kolodziejczyk in December 1991. A strong anti-communist, Parys lobbied hard for early Polish membership in NATO. His stridency and tendency to pursue his own separate defense policy, however, eventually brought him into conflict with Walesa and cost him his job.<sup>6</sup>

Parys was replaced by former Deputy Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz, one of Poland's top defense specialists. A strong proponent of closer ties to NATO, Onyszkiewicz adopted a more pragmatic, less strident approach to NATO membership than Parys. As he put it in an interview in August 1992, "There is no point in kicking at a door that is firmly closed for the time being."<sup>7</sup> Instead, he and other Polish officials favored a policy of gradual steps to strengthen ties to NATO in concrete areas and prepare Poland for eventual membership.

At the same time, Polish defense officials feel the need for greater clarity about the prospects and timetable for Polish membership in NATO. What is important in their view is not setting an exact date for membership—they recognize that early membership is unrealistic—but NATO's *acceptance of the general principle of enlargement*, much in the way that EC has committed itself to expansion without setting a specific date for East European entry:

For many practical reasons the inclusion of the East European states into NATO. EC, WEU is not a matter of immediate decision. All states involved have a rather long way, psychologically and technically to go before the decision shall be imminent. What mat-

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<sup>6</sup>Parys was dismissed as defense minister in May 1992, after publicly charging that the President's Office was conspiring behind his back with high-ranking military officers to introduce martial law.

<sup>7</sup>See "A Time of Dizzying Change," *Polityka*, August 8, 1992, p. 3, translated in FBIS-EU-92-152, August 6, 1992, pp. 24-29.



ters, however, is not the date of this decision but the acceptance of this eventuality on the part of some of the reluctant Western states and acting in full accordance with such a political commitment. Once such a commitment is made, and its consequences accepted by all contracting partners, a new guiding and organizing principle would be established in the political and economic domains both within and among the states of Europe.<sup>8</sup>

The prospect of NATO membership has a direct bearing on resource allocation and defense planning. Polish planners see the main threat to their security coming from *local conflicts*. They feel relatively confident that they can deal with these contingencies by relying on their own resources. A large-scale attack by Russia, however, would be a different matter. In such a case, Poland would need Western assistance to prevent being overrun.<sup>9</sup>

President Walesa has proposed creating a regional alliance of East European states ("NATO Bis" or "NATO 2") to provide an interim security framework for the countries of Eastern Europe until they can enter NATO. Walesa's proposal was made without close consultation with the Foreign or Defense Ministry and does not have much support within the Polish government or in Eastern Europe as a whole. Indeed, many Polish and East European officials oppose the idea, fearing that it could slow the process of integration into NATO. Former Foreign Minister Skubiszewski, in particular, lobbied hard against the scheme behind the scenes and appears to have succeeded in getting Walesa to quietly drop the idea.<sup>10</sup>

During summer 1993, Poland began to press more forcefully for membership in NATO. The Polish bid for membership was given a temporary boost during President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Warsaw at the end of August, when Yeltsin, under apparent pressure from Walesa, seemed to drop Russia's previous objections to Polish mem-

<sup>8</sup>Premyslaw Grudzinski, "U.S. and European Security: Objectives and Priorities," speech given at the conference "Towards a New Trans-Atlantic Bargain," Wilton Park, Steyning, England, April 19-23, 1993, p. 10 (author's copy).

<sup>9</sup>In such a situation, Western air power, especially air interdiction, would be critically important.

<sup>10</sup>See Akradiusz Prusinowski, "Lech Walesa in Ukraine: Partners, Not Allies," *Polityka*, June 5, 1993, p. 14, translated in JPRS-EER-93-063-S, July 2, 1993, p. 11.

bership in NATO.<sup>11</sup> In the aftermath of the visit, Polish officials sought to press NATO to make a clear decision about Polish membership at the upcoming NATO summit in January 1994.<sup>12</sup> However, Yeltsin's statement does not appear to have been coordinated with the Foreign and Defense ministries.<sup>13</sup> Soon after returning to Moscow, he reversed himself in a letter to the heads of government of the United States, Britain, France, and Germany, warning against any expansion of NATO.<sup>14</sup>

Yeltsin's letter, together with the victory of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), the successor to the former communist party of Poland, in the September 1993 national elections has cast the issue of Polish membership in a new and different light. The new coalition government formed by the SLD and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) has vowed to continue Poland's pro-Western foreign policy, including support for membership in NATO. However, NATO is likely to adopt a cautious attitude toward possible Polish membership until the directions of the new government's foreign and domestic policies become clearer.

## Hungary

Hungarian attitudes toward NATO have also undergone a significant evolution since 1990. Initially, Hungarian officials rejected the idea of NATO membership. In February 1991, Defense Minister Lajos Für

<sup>11</sup>Jane Perlez, "Yeltsin Seems to Accept Polish Bid for Role in NATO," *New York Times*, August 26, 1993.

<sup>12</sup>"Poland Asks NATO to Promise Entry," *Washington Post*, August 27, 1993. Also see "Polen fordert Zeitplan für NATO-Beitritt," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 27, 1993, and Martin S. Lambeck, "Polens Aussenminister dringt auf schnellen NATO-Beitritt," *Die Welt*, September 11, 1993.

<sup>13</sup>Yeltsin's concession caught many observers, including members of his own delegation, by surprise. It appears to have been made under strong pressure from Walesa during their one-on-one meeting. Having agreed to the concession in private, Yeltsin apparently felt he could not go back on his word without causing a diplomatic incident, despite efforts by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to do so.

<sup>14</sup>Roger Cohen, "Yeltsin Opposes Expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe," *New York Times*, October 2, 1993. Yeltsin's letter was not entirely surprising, because it had been clear all along that there were strong objections to East European membership in NATO within the Foreign Ministry and the Russian military.

stated that Hungary had no plans to join NATO.<sup>15</sup> But as Hungary's security environment has deteriorated, Hungarian officials have begun to reassess their attitude. In a speech at NATO Headquarters in Brussels in October 1991, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall termed NATO "the only effective organization to ensure European stability," and called on NATO to extend its security umbrella to Eastern Europe.<sup>16</sup>

Since then, Hungary has sought to intensify its ties to NATO by strengthening cooperation in concrete areas.<sup>17</sup> Hungarian officials hope that intensifying cooperation step by step in specific areas will lead to a process of de facto integration, and that over time NATO will come to regard any threat to Eastern Europe as a threat to stability in Europe to which it must respond, regardless of whether a formal security guarantee exists.<sup>18</sup> As one high-ranking Hungarian official has put it,

According to our ideas, practical and pragmatic relations have to be developed with NATO by means of several links, the closer the better, from education to strategic planning and political cooperation, and from this many-faceted practical cooperation we should in time reach de jure membership.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>15</sup>See his interview in *Profil*, February 18, 1991.

<sup>16</sup>"Themes of the Speech of H. E. Jozsef Antall Delivered at the Atlantic Council," October 28, 1991 (mimeographed), p. 1. See also Antall's interview, Kossuth Radio Network, 17:00 GMT, October 29, 1991, translated in FBIS-EEU-91-210, October 30, 1991, pp. 18-23, especially p. 21. In the interview, Antall expressed a desire for NATO to become a "certain kind of security umbrella" for Eastern Europe.

<sup>17</sup>See the speech by Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky to the North Atlantic Assembly's annual session, "European Integration and Transatlantic Partnership," *Current Policy*, No. 40, pp. 1-9. See also "Wunsch Ungarns nach engeren Beziehungen zur NATO," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, October 30, 1991; and Bela Weyer, "Ungarn will Beziehungen zur NATO," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 16, 1991.

<sup>18</sup>Gyula Kodolyani, foreign policy adviser to Prime Minister Antall, has made an explicit analogy between Hungary's security relationship to NATO and that of Sweden, arguing that Hungary, like Sweden, is de facto a "part of the Atlantic zone's system of political and economic interests." See his interview in *Magyar Nemzet*, May 27, 1992, p. 2, translated in FBIS-EEU-088, July 10, 1992, p. 9.

<sup>19</sup>Interview with Ivan Baba, Deputy State Secretary in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 07:05 GMT, May 3, 1992, translated in FBIS-EEU-92-086, May 4, 1992, p. 18.

Hungarian officials recognize, however, that the achievement of formal membership is a gradual process that will probably take years.

The Antall government has been afraid that an early push for NATO membership might hurt Hungary's chance of membership over the long run. In April 1992, former Foreign Minister Gyula Horn, head of the Socialist Party, introduced a motion in parliament calling on the Hungarian government to seek immediate NATO membership. Prime Minister Antall, however, urged the parliament not to put the issue on the agenda, arguing that a formal application for NATO membership would be premature and inopportune.<sup>20</sup> Horn's motion was later defeated.

However, Hungary has taken a number of practical steps to expand and strengthen its ties to NATO. In March 1992, the Hungarian government authorized NATO to use the Advanced Warning and Control System (AWACS) to patrol Hungarian airspace in order to monitor the airspace over Bosnia and later to enforce the no-fly zone over the region. These flights represented the first joint NATO operation outside its territory over Europe. Hungary has also offered to put training facilities for peacekeeping forces at NATO's disposal.

In addition, Hungary has sought guarantees that NATO would come to its aid if Serbia should retaliate against Hungary for allowing NATO to use its airspace to monitor the no-fly zone in Bosnia.<sup>21</sup> NATO has declined to give formal guarantees, although Secretary General Manfred Wörner reassured Hungary that the international community "would not remain passive" if Hungary suffered aggressive action as a result of its support for UN-mandated actions.<sup>22</sup>

These reassurances have been welcome but fall considerably short of what Hungary would like. Hungarian officials recognize that they cannot expect permanent guarantees since Hungary is not a full

<sup>20</sup>For Antall's speech, see Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, '3:00 GMT, April 13, 1992, translated in FBIS-EEU-92-072, April 19, 1992, pp. 9-10.

<sup>21</sup>Hungary was particularly alarmed by signs of collusion between Serbia and Iraq in spring 1993 and the possibility that Serbia might obtain Iraqi Scud missiles. See Chapter One.

<sup>22</sup>Michael Binyon, "Hungary Fails to Get Missile Protection," *The Times* (London), May 15, 1993; also, Andrew Marshall, "Hungary Seeks NATO Protection from Foes," *The Independent*, May 18, 1993.

member of NATO, but they would like some stronger reassurance that Hungary would fall under NATO's "protective umbrella" as long as the war in Yugoslavia continues.

Hungary's long-term strategic goal, however, remains the gaining of full NATO membership. The Antall government is looking to the NATO summit in January 1994 to formulate a clear position about NATO's transformation, especially the conditions that prospective members have to fulfill to become members. The government also hopes that NATO will create the possibility for "interim solutions," such as associate membership, and intensify military cooperation in such areas as peacekeeping and joint exercises.<sup>23</sup> In contrast to Poland and the Czech Republic, however, Hungary would prefer to see all the Visegrad members—including Slovakia—enter NATO simultaneously. Hungarian officials believe that the inclusion of Slovakia would make it easier for Hungary to solve its bilateral problems with Slovakia. It would also make the military defense of Hungary easier, since other NATO forces would have to go through neutral Austria to get to Hungary.

### **The Czech and Slovak Republics**

The most radical shift in thinking about NATO occurred in Czechoslovakia. Initially, Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel and his Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier saw the CSCE as the main mechanism for ensuring European security. They initially regarded NATO, by contrast, as playing a relatively minor and declining role in ensuring security on the Continent.<sup>24</sup> "Replacing previous membership in the Soviet sphere of influence with integration into another sphere"

<sup>23</sup>Hungarian officials have been among the strongest supporters of associate membership based on Articles 1-4 of the Washington Treaty. See, for instance, "A New Security Architecture: Reflections on Bosnia, Russia and the Hungarian Case for Membership in NATO," the special draft report to the North Atlantic Assembly, by Tamas Wachsler, a member of the Defense Committee in the Hungarian parliament (mimeographed, author's copy).

<sup>24</sup>This view was reflected in the proposal put forward by Prague in April 1990 for a new pan-European security structure that would take over the functions of NATO. The proposal called for the 53 members of the CSCE to give military assistance to any signatory under attack and for the establishment of a "permanent Commission on Security in Europe." See Edward Mortimer, "Prague Suggests New Security Set-Up," *Financial Times*, April 4, 1990.

Dienstbier argued, "would hardly improve the security situation in Eastern Europe." Traditional spheres of influence, he asserted, "should be retired" and replaced by a broad pan-European network of relationships.<sup>25</sup>

Beginning in mid-1990, however, Czechoslovak attitudes toward NATO began to shift. Havel, in fact, came full circle, changing from an advocate of NATO's gradual dissolution to one of its most fervent East European champions. In his speech to NATO Headquarters in March 1991, he argued that the door to NATO membership should be kept open, even if the countries of Eastern Europe could not join immediately.<sup>26</sup> Another important indication of the shift in Czechoslovak attitudes was the Prague government's initiative to co-host with NATO, in April 1991, an international conference on security problems in Europe. The conference, the first of its kind to be held in Eastern Europe, attracted considerable international attention and underscored just how much Czechoslovak attitudes toward NATO had changed.<sup>27</sup>

The dissolution of Czechoslovakia as an integral state is not likely to diminish the Czech Republic's interest in joining NATO. Both President Havel and Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus are strong proponents of Western integration. However, Czech officials express less of a sense of urgency about NATO membership than do many officials in Budapest or Warsaw. They recognize that the process of harmonizing their military forces with those of NATO will take a long time. Moreover, unlike officials in Budapest, they would prefer that the Visegrad countries enter Western structures when they are ready, rather than waiting for each other.

Slovakia's future security orientation is less clear. Slovak attitudes are sharply divided between those who, like Foreign Minister Moravcik, want close ties to NATO, and those who, like Prime Minister Meciar, favor some form of neutrality. Moreover, Slovakia's differences with Hungary over the treatment of the Hungarian mi-

<sup>25</sup>Jiri Dienstbier, "Central Europe's Security," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1991, p. 21.

<sup>26</sup>For the text of Havel's speech, see FBIS-WEU-91-056, March 22, 1991, pp. 1-4.

<sup>27</sup>For the speeches and statements at the conference, see *The Prague Conference on the Future of European Security* (Brussels: NATO Press and Information Office, 1991), p. 45.

nority as well as the Meciar government's uncertain commitment to genuine democratic pluralism could pose obstacles to Slovakia's joining NATO in the near future.

Slovakia's arms sales policy could also pose problems for NATO membership. Eighty percent of the former Czechoslovak arms industry is located in Slovakia. Arms exports are an important source of hard-currency earnings. Given the deterioration of the Slovak economy—which has worsened since the split on January 1, 1993—Slovakia could be tempted to step up its arms sales to sensitive areas, especially such radical Arab countries as Libya and Syria.<sup>28</sup>

### **Bulgaria and Romania**

Of the two former members of the Warsaw Pact in the Balkans, Bulgaria has shown the strongest interest in close ties to NATO. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact has left Sofia feeling isolated and vulnerable. This vulnerability, in turn, has increased its desire to forge stronger ties to NATO. In January 1991, 135 (out of 400) members of the Grand National Assembly signed a petition urging the government to join NATO.<sup>29</sup> In particular, Bulgarian officials see close ties to NATO as an important means of providing protection against a residual threat from Turkey.

Bulgarian leaders also see NATO as a means of maintaining a strong transatlantic connection. President Zhelyu Zhelev is a strong advocate of close ties to NATO and the United States. Indeed, pro-U.S. feeling is remarkably strong in Bulgaria, both within the government and among the population at large, partly because the United States had few contacts with the communist regime under Todor Zhivkov and thus was not "compromised" in the view of many Bulgarians. In

<sup>28</sup>The issue of arms sales to the third world was a problem even before the split. In May 1991, the United States and Israel sought to block the sale of T-72 tanks to Syria by Czechoslovakia. Vaclav Havel eventually went ahead with the sale, despite the strong U.S. pressure, largely because he feared that cancellation of the sale would accentuate Slovakia's economic problems and fuel Slovak separatism. Since then, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia have liberalized their arms export policies. For details, see Pauline Bren, "Conversion Slows Down as Czechs and Slovaks Part," *RFEIRL Research Report*, August 14, 1992, pp. 38-42.

<sup>29</sup>*Narodnaya Armiya*, January 23, 1991, translated in FBIS-EEU-981-020, January 30, 1991, p. 10.

addition, they see the United States as the only superpower and the country most able to exert influence on Turkey.

Romania's case is somewhat different. Initially, Romania showed little interest in ties to NATO. This was in part due to Romania's traditional emphasis on pursuing an independent policy and avoiding the constraints imposed by alliances; it also reflected the neo-communist orientation of the National Salvation Front leadership, especially that of President Ion Iliescu. However, Romania's attitude has shifted since early 1991, and Romania has shown a stronger interest in closer ties to NATO.

Romania would eventually like to become a full member of NATO. It opposes limiting enlargement of NATO only to the Visegrad countries. Such a limitation not only would give Hungary an important strategic advantage but would create a new fault line in Europe, leaving Romania cut off politically and militarily from the West.

#### **WISEGRAD GROUP VIEWS OF THE U.S. ROLE IN EUROPE**

One of NATO's primary advantages in the eyes of Visegrad Group officials is the fact that it binds the United States to Europe and provides a means of maintaining a strong transatlantic connection. Those leaders favor a strong U.S. military presence in Europe, which they see as playing an important stabilizing function. The communiqué issued by Antall, Walesa, and Havel at the meeting of the Visegrad countries in Prague on May 6, 1992, for instance, expressed the conviction that NATO's continuing existence and the continued North American presence in Europe "are of fundamental importance for the stability and security of the Continent."<sup>30</sup>

Czech President Vaclav Havel and former Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier have been particularly strong advocates of close transatlantic links.<sup>31</sup> For instance, Havel staunchly rebuffed

<sup>30</sup>Declaration of the highest representatives of the Triangle countries adopted at their Prague meeting on May 6, 1992," *Press Release*, Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 8, 1992, p. 2.

<sup>31</sup>See Jiri Dienstbier, "The Preconditions for Peace in Central and Eastern Europe," *Aspen Quarterly*, Autumn 1991, p. 35. See also Dienstbier's statement to the Federal



French President François Mitterrand's efforts to exclude the United States from the "Conference on European Confederation," co-hosted by Czechoslovakia with France, in Prague in June 1991. As a result of Havel's determined stance, Mitterrand backed down and allowed American participation. In addition, in his speech to the conference, Havel went out of his way to emphasize the importance of European ties to the United States, calling such ties "inevitable, logical, and legitimate on the historical and geopolitical level."<sup>32</sup>

As president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel has continued to call for an active American engagement in Europe, arguing that a policy of isolationism has historically ended up costing the United States more in terms of lives and money than a policy of active engagement in Europe:

I am convinced that the American presence in Europe is still necessary. In the 20th Century, it was not just Europe that paid the price for American isolationism; America itself paid a price. The less it committed itself at the beginning of European conflagrations, the greater sacrifices it had to make at the end of the conflicts.<sup>33</sup>

Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall has been an equally strong advocate of close transatlantic links. In his speech to the NATO Council in October 1991, he underscored the importance of strong transatlantic cooperation:

An essential lesson to be drawn from 20th century European history is this: European security and European integration are inconceivable without transatlantic cooperation. We continue to count on the marked presence of the U.S. and Canada.<sup>34</sup>

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Assembly, April 9, 1991 (mimeographed), and the "Prague Theses on European Security" signed with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in April 1991. Point six of the Prague Theses stresses that close cooperation with the United States and Canada "will be essential for the future security of Europe." See "Aussenminister Genscher und Dienstbier formulieren 'Prager Thesen' zu Europa," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 13, 1991.

<sup>32</sup>Henry Kamm, "Rebuffing Mitterrand, Havel Affirms U.S.-European Ties," *New York Times*, June 13, 1991.

<sup>33</sup>Vaclav Havel, "New Democracies for Old Europe," *New York Times*, October 17, 1993.

<sup>34</sup>"Themes of the Speech of H. E. Jozsef Antall," p. 1.

And in a speech in June 1992, Antall made the same point even more forcefully:

Under no circumstances would we consider it right to pursue a policy that could shed any doubt on the legitimacy of America's presence in Europe, or worse still, reinforce the tendency toward isolationism in America. We are well aware that the lack of foreign political awareness in America has caused the isolationist trend to strengthen them on more than one occasion. We Europeans must take special care that this does not occur, and that the international commitment of an American presence in Europe meets with understanding from the American people and sympathy from the Europeans.<sup>35</sup>

Polish officials have also stressed the critical significance of the U.S. role in Europe. During his visit to NATO Headquarters in Brussels in July 1991, for instance, Polish President Lech Walesa went out of his way to emphasize the "special importance" of the military presence of the United States and Canada in Europe.<sup>36</sup> This military presence, former Foreign Minister Skubiszewski has emphasized, "is clearly conducive to the security of our continent."<sup>37</sup> Polish officials have explicitly warned that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe will pose a danger to European stability:

Historically, two world wars have confirmed that there is a need for an American presence in Europe. We would not like to repeat the experiment of the United States withdrawing from Europe, only to

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<sup>35</sup>Jozsef Antall, "The Transformation of the East-Central European Region, *Current Policy*, November 9, 1992 (Budapest: Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 22, 1992), p. 4. See also Antall's speech at the Vienna Conference of the Central European Initiative, *Current Policy*, No. 14, 1992 (Budapest: Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 21, 1992), p. 3.

<sup>36</sup>"President Lech Walesa Visits NATO Headquarters," *NATO Review*, No. 4, August 1991, p. 33.

<sup>37</sup>See his speech to the Sejm on April 29, 1993, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-084, May 4, 1993, p. 17. The need for strong ties to the United States has been a persistent theme in Skubiszewski's statements. See his article, "Neue Probleme der Sicherheit in Mittel- und Osteuropa," *Europa Archiv*, Folge 12, 1991, p. 356. See also his speech to the Sejm on February 14, 1991, translated in FBIS-FEU-91-032, February 15, 1991, p. 28; address to the Sejm, Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network, 07:33 GMT, May 8, 1992, translated in FBIS-FEU-92-092, May 12, 1992, p. 17; and his interview in *Zycie Warszawy*, May 18, 1992, p. 2, translated in FBIS-EEU-92-057, March 24, 1992, p. 29.

quickly return at some later date. Each time the United States returned, it involved great sacrifices. One has to learn the lessons of history.<sup>38</sup>

In short, the leaders of the Visegrad countries are strong Atlanticists. They favor not only close ties to NATO but also a strong U.S. political and military presence in Europe. In their eyes, a strong NATO is the best means of ensuring that the United States remains committed to Europe. While they wish to strengthen ties to the WEU, they oppose any steps that would weaken NATO or the U.S. presence in Europe.

### **NATO AND EASTERN EUROPE: FROM LIAISON TO SECURITY PARTNERSHIP**

Just as East European attitudes toward NATO have shifted over the past several years, NATO's approach to Eastern Europe has also evolved. At the London summit in July 1990, NATO offered to establish direct ties to the former members of the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union, through exchanges of visits and accrediting Eastern ambassadors to NATO.<sup>39</sup> At the time, however, NATO leaders were reluctant to go beyond these steps for fear that closer ties—and especially membership—would antagonize the Soviet Union and possibly undercut Gorbachev's reform program. Some NATO members also worried that East European membership in NATO would embroil NATO in ethnic conflicts in the East. Others felt that the reforms in Eastern Europe had not proceeded far enough to make a definitive judgment about the commitment of many of these countries to democracy and market reform.

The Copenhagen summit in June 1991 expanded NATO's interest in Eastern Europe. In the communiqué issued at the end of the summit, leaders of NATO, responding to concerns about a growing security vacuum in Eastern Europe, stated that NATO's security was "inseparably linked" to the security of all states and warned that "any intimidation or coercion" of the states in Eastern Europe would be

<sup>38</sup>Interview with Deputy Defense Minister Przemyslaw Grudzinski in *Polska Zbrojna*, September 24, 1992, pp. 1–2, translated in FBIS-EEU-92-192, October 2, 1992, p. 22.

<sup>39</sup>For the text of the communiqué, see *Survival*, September–October 1990, pp. 469–472.

regarded as a matter of "direct and natural concern to NATO."<sup>40</sup> While this statement fell short of offering actual membership or formal security guarantees to the countries of Eastern Europe, it did provide an important degree of psychological reassurance and made clear that NATO would not be indifferent to developments in the region—leaving open exactly how NATO would respond.

By fall 1991, however, a growing sense in NATO circles, and especially within the United States, was that the liaison function had run its course and that new initiatives were needed to help the countries of Eastern Europe complete their transformation. This view was shared by the German government in particular. In October 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher put forward a new "Transatlantic Charter," which made a number of concrete suggestions for increasing ties to Eastern Europe, including establishing a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) comprising the former members of the Warsaw Pact.<sup>41</sup>

### THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL

Many of the points in the Transatlantic Charter, including the proposed NACC, were adopted at the NATO summit in Rome in November 1991. In addition to announcing the creation of NACC, the leaders issued a declaration spelling out several areas in which cooperation could be increased, including defense conversion; development of a civil air-traffic-management system; environment, disaster, and refugee relief; and exchanges on civil-military relations.<sup>42</sup> Membership in NACC was open not only to the countries of

<sup>40</sup>Thomas Friedman, "NATO Tries to Ease Military Concern in Eastern Europe," *New York Times*, June 7, 1991; John Goshko, "NATO Pledges Increased Cooperation with Countries of Eastern Europe," *Washington Post*, June 7, 1991.

<sup>41</sup>"Joint Statement by Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, October 2, 1991).

<sup>42</sup>"Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation" (Brussels: NATO Press and Information Office, November 8, 1991), pp. 4–5. For a good discussion, see Stephen J. Flanagan, "NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: From Liaison to Security Partnership," *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1992, pp. 141–152.

Eastern Europe, but also to the Baltic countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union.<sup>43</sup>

Since the Rome summit, NACC has expanded its role and activities. At their meeting in April 1992, the defense ministers of the Cooperation Partners decided to concentrate on cooperation in a number of specific areas:<sup>44</sup>

- Military strategies
- Defense management
- The legal framework for military forces
- Harmonization of defense planning and arms control
- Exercises and training
- Defense education
- Reserve forces
- Environmental protection
- Air traffic control
- Search and rescues
- Military contribution to humanitarian aid
- Military medicine.

At the NACC meeting in December 1992, peacekeeping operations were added to this list and a special Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping was established. The aim of the group is to develop a common understanding on the political principles of, and the tools for, peacekeeping and to develop common practical approaches to peacekeeping. The NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping elaborated conceptual guidelines and a program for future

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<sup>43</sup>The offer of membership was later extended to all the republics of the former Soviet Union after the union was dissolved at the end of December 1991.

<sup>44</sup>"Statement Issued at the Meeting of Defense Ministers at NATO Headquarters, Brussels on 1 April 1992," *Press Communiqué M-DMCP-1(92)27*, April 1, 1992.

cooperation in its Report to the Ministers at the NATO Summit in Athens in June 1993.<sup>45</sup>

The program presented to the ministers in Athens is intended to develop a common understanding of operational concepts and requirements for peacekeeping; to identify principal planning issues; to harmonize planning methods and procedures; to develop a common understanding of the technical aspects of peacekeeping; to develop practical cooperation in the fields of training and education in order to develop common training standards and enhance interoperability and operational effectiveness; and to identify specific logistic issues that have a bearing on peacekeeping operations.

The initial focus is largely on sharing experiences and developing common concepts through discussions and seminars. These seminars are to lay the groundwork for joint planning and, eventually, even joint operations. The exact relationship of these peacekeeping exercises to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, however, remains to be worked out. It is unclear, for instance, whether these activities will be directly subordinated to SHAPE or whether a NACC peacekeeping structure, supported by and separate from SHAPE, will be set up. Also left unclear is how Russia—which is likely to be involved in future European peacekeeping missions—will relate to NACC peacekeeping efforts.

Involving the East European countries in NATO peacekeeping activities offers new possibilities for gradually integrating these countries into NATO. Poland, for instance, has extensive peacekeeping experience and has offered to allow NATO to use some of its facilities for peacekeeping training. Poland is also creating new units specifically trained and equipped to engage in peacekeeping activities. However, owing to financial constraints, these units will not be ready for at least two to three years. Hungary faces similar financial constraints. Thus, in the final analysis, the participation of many East European countries in peacekeeping activities is likely to depend on their ability to overcome current economic difficulties and develop healthy economies.

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<sup>45</sup>Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping," *Press Release M-NACC-1(93)40*, June 11, 1993, pp. 1-11.

## THE FUTURE OF NACC

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council has helped defuse temporarily the issue of NATO membership. Most of the East European countries now accept that membership is not an immediate prospect and can come about only as the result of a gradual process of adaptation and cooperation. They seem prepared to concentrate on strengthening ties through participation in specific working groups rather than pressing for immediate membership. All continue, however, to regard membership as a long- or medium-term goal.

NACC also provides a useful forum for discussing security issues with the countries of Eastern Europe and acquainting these countries with NATO procedures and plans. At the same time, however, NACC has four weaknesses.

First, expanding NACC's membership to include the republics of the former Soviet Union, especially those of Central Asia, has reduced the utility of the organization as a forum for serious discussion and planning. With 37 members, NACC is simply too big and unwieldy to be an effective forum for serious defense planning.

Second, including the Central Asians in NACC has tended to lump all the former countries of the East into one "pot" and has given NACC an Asian focus. Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, where progress toward democratization and market reform is much more advanced than that for the other members, have been placed in the same category with the Central Asian countries, which have yet to initiate real reforms and which are for the most part still dominated by communist leaders associated with the previous regime. Such a grouping has diluted NACC's importance in the eyes of many Visegrad Group officials, who feel that it does not sufficiently recognize the rather substantial progress their countries have made toward democratization and market reform.

Third, NACC excludes the neutrals, many of whom, such as Sweden and Finland, have extensive peacekeeping experience and are stable democracies. Moreover, with the end of the Cold War, the whole concept of "neutrality" has lost its meaning, forcing many of the neutrals to rethink their traditional attitudes toward neutrality and security. Some of them may even eventually apply for NATO membership, especially if they become members of the EC. Finland has

already been granted observer status in NACC; Sweden and Austria are participating in NACC peacekeeping activities.

Fourth, with 37 members there is a danger of overlap or duplication with the 53-member CSCE. This problem will become more acute if more of the neutrals eventually join NACC or are closely associated with it. There is thus a need to work out a rational division of labor and ensure that NACC does not duplicate tasks performed by the CSCE. One possibility would be for NACC to become the peacekeeping—and even peacemaking—arm of CSCE.

### **EAST EUROPEAN MEMBERSHIP: THE EMERGING DEBATE**

In short, NACC is essentially a holding operation. It has bought some time, but it does not address the East European countries' most important concern: their desire for full membership in NATO, which still remains an open question. However, as the East European countries gradually become more closely integrated into the EC, the issue of their security integration and NATO membership will take on greater urgency.

NATO expansion is likely to be one of the key issues at the NATO Summit in January 1994. At the moment, however, there is no firm consensus within the alliance on the issue of enlargement. Britain favors parallel entry of East European countries into the WEU and NATO. British officials are opposed to having countries in the WEU who are not members of NATO, and they are likely to insist that prospective WEU members also be accepted into NATO as a condition for their entry into the WEU.

The German security elite are divided. Defense Minister Volker Rühe has openly advocated including the Visegrad countries in NATO. In his Alistair Buchan Memorial Lecture at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in March 1993, he warned that NATO should not become a "closed shop" and questioned whether membership in the European Union must necessarily precede membership in NATO.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>Volker Rühe, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era," *Survival*, Summer 1993, p. 135.



Since then, he has continued to push vigorously for integrating the countries of Eastern Europe into NATO.<sup>47</sup>

The German Foreign Ministry, however, is more cautious and advocates a position much closer to that of the British government, i.e., parallel membership. Many in the Chancellor's Office also share the views of the Foreign Office. Since the violent confrontation between Yeltsin and the Russian parliament in October 1993, moreover, Kohl has become more concerned about the impact of any eastward expansion on developments in Russia. The situation has forced R  he to become somewhat more cautious as well.

France has not expressed an official position. However, in general, it has taken a rather cautious and reserved approach to the idea of expansion (see below). Many of the smaller West European members of NATO either oppose expansion or are lukewarm about it, fearing that any enlargement will further dilute their influence or drag NATO into messy, Yugoslav-like conflicts.

The question of East European membership, however, is part of a larger debate on NATO's future. That debate is being driven by four factors in particular:

- East European fears of a resurgent Russia
- German concerns about the effect of growing instability in the East on its own domestic stability
- Western concerns about the effect of the failure of Western policy in Bosnia
- The implications of the expansion of the EC for the WEU and NATO.

These four factors have interacted to spark a wide-ranging debate on NATO's future. In general, four broad schools can be identified in the current debate:

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<sup>47</sup>See "R  he offen f  r neue NATO-Mitglieder," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 22, 1993. See also R  he's speech, "The Euro-Atlantic Relationship in a Changing World," to the 12th German-American Roundtable of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Washington, D.C., June 10, 1993, pp. 17-21.

- **School 1: *Status quo* NATO.** This school believes that NATO should essentially retain its current membership and functions (including some limited peacekeeping). East European participation should be confined to NACC, whose functions should be expanded and strengthened. Adherents of this school worry that expansion to include Eastern Europe will isolate Russia and lead to new entangling commitments that could erode NATO's cohesion and drag it into conflicts it is ill-equipped to handle.
- **School 2: *Crisis management ("Euro-cop")* NATO.** In contrast to school 1, this school believes that NATO must be transformed to deal with crises beyond its current borders, especially in Europe. However, it does not advocate extending full membership to Eastern Europe, for many of the same reasons that school 1 opposes expansion (Russia, entangling commitments, etc.). Instead, it favors an association with Eastern Europe based on the first four articles of the Washington Treaty (i.e., up to but not including security guarantees).
- **School 3: *Expanded and revitalized* NATO.** Like school 2, this school believes that NATO must be restructured significantly to deal with conflicts along Europe's periphery. In addition, members of this school argue that NATO should provide political reassurance and help stabilize democracy and reform in the East. They favor *extending NATO membership at least to Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic*, in order to help consolidate democracy in these countries. The leading exponents of this view are German Defense Minister Volker Rühe and U.S. Senator Richard Lugar.<sup>48</sup>
- **School 4: *Europeanized* NATO.** This school believes that NATO should expand its crisis-management functions. However, adherents of this school argue that the Europeans should handle most of the crises themselves, with the United States limited to a strategic backup role against a resurgent Russia. The main advocate of this position is France, although the French position is shifting (see below). The school also has strong support among

<sup>48</sup>See Lugar's speech "NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business," before The Overseas Writers Club, Washington D.C., June 24, 1993.

some NATO traditionalists in the United States, especially within the Pentagon.

Each of these models has implications for types and levels of U.S. troops in Europe. Schools 1 and 4 would focus priority on maintaining a reconstitution base to allow U.S. reinforcements in the event of a major crisis, with limited, ready combat forces. Schools 3 and 4, by contrast, would require a much greater emphasis on lighter, highly ready, mobile forces, extensively trained in multinational operations, to make them capable of participating more effectively in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations.

At present, schools 1 and 4 are the dominant schools in this debate. However, the debate is rapidly shifting, as more and more Western officials are beginning to conclude that NATO is unlikely to survive over the long term unless it takes on more crisis-management functions and helps stabilize the East. Thus, in the future, the real debate is increasingly likely to be between schools 2 and 3 (i.e., crisis-management NATO versus revitalized and expanded NATO).

## **RUSSIA AND UKRAINE**

Russia's attitude toward NATO's expansion is an important factor in the current debate. Many Western officials oppose expansion of membership for fear that it will isolate Russia and strengthen the hands of hardliners in Moscow, especially within the Russian military. They thus advocate limiting membership to the current members or postponing any decision about expansion until after Russia's foreign policy and internal politics have become clearer. The insurrection against Yeltsin by members of the Russian parliament in early October 1993 is likely to reinforce Western caution. Many Western leaders will be reluctant to take major steps to expand NATO when the political situation in Moscow is so unstable.

A second important consideration will be the effect of expansion on Ukraine. Many Western officials fear that expansion of NATO membership to Eastern Europe might intensify Ukrainian fears of isolation and vulnerability to Russian pressure. Many Ukrainian officials fear that expansion of NATO to include the Visegrad countries would create a new division of Europe along the Polish-Ukrainian border, a division that would be perceived as a signal that Ukraine had been

consigned to the Russian sphere of influence. Given the slow progress toward reform, however, it will be a long time before Ukraine could be considered for NATO membership, if ever. Moreover, incorporating Ukraine into NATO would intensify Russian fears of isolation even more than would East European membership.

## THE FRENCH FACTOR

France also poses an important obstacle to expanding NATO's ties to the East. It initially sought to block the creation of NACC. Then, when that strategy failed, it tried to weaken NACC's role as much as possible. France also expressed strong reservations about expanding NACC's role in peacekeeping, although it eventually acceded to the Oslo Declaration, accepting the idea of NATO peacekeeping at the request of the CSCE on a case-by-case basis.

However, French thinking about NATO and NACC has evolved considerably, especially within the French military and Ministry of Defense. This evolution began even before the change of government in March 1993. Former French Defense Minister Pierre Joxe was known to be unhappy with France's "empty chair" policy, and, shortly before leaving office, he openly called for greater French participation in NATO's military activities and discussions.<sup>49</sup> France also agreed to put the "Euro-Corps" under the operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), in case of conflict—a major break with French policy since de Gaulle, which has emphasized France's independence.

In addition, attitudes toward NATO within the *Union pour la Démocratie Française* (UDF) and the *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR) have evolved in recent years.<sup>50</sup> A number of key figures within the two parties, such as Jacques Chirac, the leader of the RPR and a likely candidate to replace Mitterrand in the next presidential election (1995), Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, and

<sup>49</sup>See David Buchan and David White, "Joxe Urges Bigger French Role in NATO," *Financial Times*, October 30, 1992.

<sup>50</sup>For a detailed discussion, see Philip H. Gordon, *French Security Policy After the Cold War: Continuity, Change, and Implications for the United States* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4229-A, 1992), especially pp. 47–51.

Foreign Minister Alain Juppé had already begun to call for a more active French role in NATO and for an expansion of some of the alliance's roles even before the March 1993 election.<sup>51</sup>

The signs of change have become more evident since the change of government in March 1993. Many leaders within the RPR and UDF are beginning to realize that key tenets of Gaullist foreign policy are obsolete and need to be abandoned or revised if France is to play a leading role in the new Europe.<sup>52</sup> As French Defense Minister François Léotard noted in an interview in May 1993:

We must draw certain conclusions from the vast geostrategic upheaval going on around us. The threats are not disappearing. They are changing in terms of their character, their origin and sometimes their location. New tasks are emerging for the Alliance. France must understand this change and not leave it to others to perform these tasks.<sup>53</sup>

The Bosnian crisis in particular has sensitized French officials to the need for closer cooperation between France and NATO, especially on out-of-area issues. As a result of the crisis, France has been forced to coordinate its policy more closely with NATO's and has softened some of its earlier objections to participating in NATO military activities, especially those for peacekeeping. France is not a member of the Defense Planning Committee or of NATO's Military Committee. However, France has directly participated in the discussions and planning for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia within the Military Committee of NATO. French planes have also taken part in the enforcement by NATO of the no-fly zone over Bosnia. And, since June 15, 1993, French ships have been operating under NATO command in the Adriatic rather than under separate WEU command.

These moves do not mean that France intends to return to the military structure of NATO or that French differences with the United

<sup>51</sup>See "Un entretien avec M. Alain Juppé," *Le Monde*, March 6, 1993.

<sup>52</sup>See, in particular, Pierre Lellouche, "France in Search of Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1993, pp. 122-131. An adviser to Jacques Chirac at the time the article was written, Lellouche was elected to the National Assembly in the March 1993 elections and is likely to play an influential role in the formulation of the RPR's foreign policy.

<sup>53</sup>*Le Monde*, May 13, 1993.

States on many matters related to NATO are likely to be eliminated.<sup>54</sup> But they do suggest that some rethinking is beginning to take place among the French elite on security matters and France's policy toward NATO. As the effect of the end of the Cold War becomes stronger, such pressures for change could grow and open new opportunities for reducing some of the tensions that have hindered closer cooperation between France and NATO in the past. Indeed, the transformation of NATO toward a looser, less U.S.-dominated alliance should reduce French fears of U.S. dominance and make closer cooperation with France easier.

### PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

NATO is approaching a crossroads. The old consensus reached at the Rome and Oslo summits is rapidly being overtaken by events. The Yugoslav crisis has intensified calls for a radical transformation of NATO to deal more resolutely with crises on its periphery, especially in Eastern Europe. Increasingly, critics have begun to argue that NATO must go "out of area or out of business."<sup>55</sup> Such calls, together with NATO's own growing involvement in the Yugoslav crises, are likely to lead to an expanded role for NATO in managing crises on its periphery, especially in Eastern Europe. At the same time, pressures for expanding NATO to include at least the Visegrad countries seem likely to grow for the following three reasons:

<sup>54</sup>France still has strong reservations about many aspects of NATO policy, especially NATO's highly centralized integrated command structure, which it believes is ill-suited to deal with the type of conflicts that the Alliance is likely to face in the future. In the French view, such conflicts are likely to resemble the Bosnian crisis rather than a massive, tank-dominated attack on the Central Front, which the current command system was designed to thwart. Paris wants a looser, more flexible command structure, one in which SACEUR's role is reduced. It also wants to see the role of the North Atlantic Council, in which France is represented in military planning, strengthened and the role of the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), on which France is not represented, reduced. For a useful discussion of French concerns, see G. Trangis, "Ni splendide isolement, ni réintégration," *Le Monde*, July 14, 1993. G. Trangis is a pseudonym for a French official.

<sup>55</sup>See Ronald D. Asmus, Richard Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 1993, pp. 2-14. See also Frederick Kempe, "NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business," August 11, 1993, and William Tuohy, "NATO After the Cold War. It's 'Out of Area or Out of Business,'" *Los Angeles Times*, August 13, 1993.

- *First, the East Europeans will continue to push for full membership.* They regard NACC as a temporary "way station" along the road to full membership, not an end in itself. Moreover, they see NATO membership as a prerequisite to their full integration into the West.
- *Second, as a result of growing instability in Eastern Europe, Germany is likely increasingly to press for an expansion of NATO membership to include at least the Visegrad countries.* This pressure could, in turn, accelerate the debate within NATO. The United States, France, and Britain will be forced to decide whether to support these calls or risk some strain in relations with Bonn.
- *Third, the enlargement of the EC will create new pressures for NATO's enlargement.* Once they enter the EC, the countries of Eastern Europe will be invited to join the WEU—an invitation they are certain to accept. Under Article 5 of the WEU Treaty, they would then acquire a security guarantee from other WEU members, all of whom are also NATO members. Thus, in effect, the United States will acquire a security guarantee to these countries "through the back door."

The question of back-door commitments could have an important impact on congressional attitudes toward NATO expansion—and to NATO more generally. At the moment, many United States legislators are only vaguely aware of the EC-WEU connection and its implications for NATO. When they do recognize the implications of the connection, they may conclude that it is preferable to allow the East European countries, or at least the three key Visegrad countries, into NATO before they join the WEU to avoid the risk of back-door commitments that could drag the United States unwillingly into some future conflict in Eastern Europe.

In October 1993, to address some of the East European concerns, the United States announced a new program, "Partnership for Peace," which is expected to be approved at the NATO summit in January 1994. The Partnership for Peace Initiative provides a framework for expanded defense cooperation in a number of technical areas, but it does not offer a security guarantee or membership. It is open not

only to the countries of Eastern Europe but also to Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic countries, and the neutrals.<sup>56</sup>

The Partnership for Peace has a number of advantages. It expands cooperation with the East, without "drawing lines," thus not isolating Russia (or Ukraine)—one of the primary Western concerns in the aftermath of the upheaval in Russia in October 1993. It also forces those who join the program to develop standard operating procedures and habits of cooperation that are the lifeblood of an effective alliance. But it does not address the larger strategic issue of where Eastern Europe fits into the broader security framework. Thus, it buys time but is not likely to lessen East European pressures for membership. Such pressures will continue to grow. Sooner or later, therefore, NATO will have to address the larger strategic issues. The longer it waits, the greater is the danger that Western publics will increasingly begin to question the rationale for maintaining an organization that seems neither willing nor capable of addressing the new security challenges in post-Cold War Europe, and public support for NATO will erode.

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<sup>56</sup>Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. to Offer Plan on a Role in NATO for Ex-Soviet Bloc," *New York Times*, October 21, 1993.



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**THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND EASTERN EUROPE**

The European Community has emerged as one of the major pillars of the post-Cold War political order in Europe. Prior to 1989, the Community seemed well on its way to achieving a new stage of integration through the implementation of the Single European Act (SEA). The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, however, has forced the Community to rethink many previous assumptions about its role and has presented it with a major new dilemma: how to support the process of democratization and reform in Eastern Europe without disrupting the considerable progress toward integration that had already been achieved in Western Europe.

This dilemma has been compounded by several other developments:

- The application of a number of other prospective members, among them Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Norway
- The need to deal with the consequences of German unification
- The desire of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia for full membership
- Second thoughts about parts of the Maastricht Treaty by public opinion in a number of West European countries
- The deepening recession in Europe.

Taken together, these developments have created new strains within the Community and have complicated the effort to define the relationship between the EC and the countries of Eastern Europe.

## THE EC'S EVOLVING *OSTPOLITIK*

Even prior to 1989, the EC had begun to give greater attention to Eastern Europe. The establishment of formal relations between the EC and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) in June 1988 led to intensified relations with the various countries in Eastern Europe. After establishing relations between the two organizations, the EC concluded a series of bilateral cooperation agreements with individual members of Comecon.<sup>1</sup> At the G-7 economic summit in Paris in July 1989, the European Community was given the task of coordinating the various assistance programs to Poland and Hungary (PHARE, or Poland and Hungary: Aid for Economic Reconstruction). This decision was a clear signal of the growing role that the EC was beginning to play in European affairs and East-West relations more generally.

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe a few months later dramatically changed the dynamics of the EC's role. The Community's move toward a new policy was given a tremendous boost by the liberalization in East Germany. To create a favorable context for German unification, the Federal Republic became a strong advocate of aiding the attempt by the countries of Eastern Europe to create market economies and develop democratic political systems. This effort was supported by France, Britain, and Italy, thereby opening the way for the elaboration of a comprehensive Eastern policy in which trade and economic assistance were key elements.

The PHARE program was gradually extended to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania (after some delay), and Yugoslavia, as these countries liberalized and began to undertake market reforms. Emergency food assistance was given to Poland in the winter of 1989-1990 and has also been given to Bulgaria, Romania, and the former Soviet Union. The main aim of the PHARE program, however, has been to support the process of reform. The Community, in fact, has explicitly made aid conditional on progress toward market and democratic reforms.

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<sup>1</sup>On the development of EC policy during this period, see Werner Ungerer, "The Development of the EC and Its Relationship to Central and Eastern Europe," *Aussenpolitik*, No. 3, 1990, pp. 225-235.

The lion's share of the PHARE money has come from Community institutions, together with that from the member states. Most of the initial grants from the Community's budget were concentrated in five main areas: emergency aid (food and medical supplies); agriculture; environment; training and education; and banking trade and tourism. For the future, the Community has chosen a small number of core areas on which assistance will be focused: (1) privatization and restructuring of enterprises; (2) restructuring and modernization of banking and financial services; (3) promotion of small- and medium-sized enterprises and of the private sector generally; and (4) employment, training, and social-security arrangements.<sup>2</sup>

#### **THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT**

The Community also took the initiative in helping to set up the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which has the specific task of helping to develop the private sector in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The EBRD was the brainchild of French President François Mitterrand, who first proposed establishing the bank in October 1989. The initial discussions to set up the bank were marked by conflicting perspectives. The United States, the largest individual shareholder, argued strongly that the bank should direct most of its attention toward aiding the private sector. The French government, on the other hand, advocated that more attention be paid to the state sector.

The Founding Agreement of the EBRD explicitly commits the bank to promoting the political and economic transformation of the countries to which it lends and puts strong emphasis on developing multiparty democracy and market reform. Sixty percent of all loans must go to the private sector; the capital amounts to 10 billion European Currency Units (ECU). The EC (individual members plus the Commission and European Investment Bank) is the largest shareholder with 51 percent. The participants entitled to borrow from it—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the former

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<sup>2</sup>For a detailed discussion of the Community's efforts in these areas, see John Pinder, *The European Community and Eastern Europe* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Books, 1991), pp. 89–91.

Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union—hold 13.45 percent of the shares.

In the first year, the EBRD approved 15 loans and five equity investments, totaling 621 million ECU. The projects ranged from telecommunications, computer systems, and electric power to food processing.<sup>3</sup> However, the East European countries have criticized the bank for failing to meet their needs. At the bank's first annual meeting in Budapest in April 1992, several East European representatives complained that the bank had had a marginal impact and that it was too slow in approving loans.<sup>4</sup> The bank was also criticized for supporting too many state-owned enterprises instead of promoting private-sector projects, as its charter called for.

In spring 1993 the bank came under heavy criticism for lavish spending and the slowness of the loan-granting process.<sup>5</sup> These charges and the controversy they engendered led to the resignation of Jacques Attali, the bank's president, at the end of June 1993. Attali, a former adviser to French President Mitterrand, did much to promote economic cooperation between East and West. However, he was a visionary with no experience in managing a bank or a public-sector institution, and his flamboyant management style did not sit well with many members of the bank's board of directors.

Attali's successor, Jacques De Larosière, a former governor of the Bank of France and head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has impressive banking credentials. His more subdued management style is also likely to appeal to the bank's board of directors. However, De Larosière has no experience in promoting entrepreneurs. One of De Larosière's most important tasks as head of the EBRD will be to reassess the bank's mission and infuse the bank with a new sense of purpose. A key question is whether the bank

<sup>3</sup>For a useful review of the bank's activities in its first year, see Karoly Okolicsanyi, "The EBRD's First Year," *RFE/RL Research Report*, June 5, 1992, pp. 41–46.

<sup>4</sup>Nicholas Denton, "East Europeans Attack EBRD for Failing to Meet Their Needs," *Financial Times*, April 15, 1992; Okolicsanyi, "The EBRD's First Year," 1992, pp. 45–46.

<sup>5</sup>In April 1993, it was revealed that the bank had spent \$300 million on its own building—more than the bank had channeled into loans and other aid to the emerging free-market economies of Eastern Europe. See Richard W. Stevenson, "European Bank Chief Quits Amid Criticism of Spending," *New York Times*, June 26, 1993.

should continue to give priority to the private sector (as the United States favors) or whether it should shift resources to the public sector. Some officials believe that spending more on public infrastructure, such as transport and telecommunications, would help the private sector later. However, this strategy risks turning the bank into little more than the European arm of the World Bank.


## **TRADE**

To facilitate the transition of the Visegrad countries toward market economies and their possible entry into the EC, the Community initiated negotiations on association agreements at the end of 1990. Those negotiations were accelerated after the failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and culminated in the signing of association agreements with all three countries in December 1991. Similar agreements were signed with Romania and Bulgaria in fall 1992.

Such agreements are the "second generation" of agreements with Eastern Europe. The first generation consisted of trade and cooperation agreements concluded with the former members of Comecon after Comecon and the EC established formal ties in June 1988. The new agreements, which went into effect in March 1992 but still must be formally ratified by EC member states' parliaments, are the first step toward the creation of a free-trade area. They call for an asymmetrical reduction of tariff barriers, with the EC making the main concessions first over a period of two to five years.

The association accords provide important economic benefits for the Visegrad countries, which need to reorient their trade toward the West because trade with the former Soviet Union has collapsed. Opening up Western markets is critical if Eastern Europe is to avoid a decline in trade and production, particularly in such areas as steel and textiles, which played a large role in exports to the former Soviet Union. Lowered trade barriers should also help encourage badly needed Western investment. (See Figure 2.)

The association agreements, however, do not eliminate all barriers to East European goods. Reduction of imports on sensitive industrial goods is to be slower than with other nonsensitive goods: Duties on coal are to be abolished everywhere by the end of 1995, on steel by




SOURCE: *Financial Times*, April 13, 1992. Reprinted with permission.

Figure 2—Barriers to East European Trade

1996, and on textiles by 1998. The reduction of tariffs on agricultural products is to begin only in 1995 and is expected to be completed by 1999. In addition, the agreements contain a number of "safeguard clauses" that allow the EC to re-erect barriers on certain industries if there are major disturbances that could have a serious effect on regional trade.

The association agreements have helped the countries of Eastern Europe, especially the Visegrad countries, to orient their trade away from the former Soviet Union and toward the EC. (See Figure 3.) However, the total value of the region's trade turnover with the EC in 1992 was about \$54 billion—less than Sweden's trade with the EC.



SOURCE: *The Economist*, May 1, 1993. Reprinted with permission.

Figure 3—EC Trade with Eastern Europe

Moreover, the EC had a \$3.2 billion trade surplus with the East European countries in 1992 and continued to maintain a large surplus in the first half of 1993.<sup>6</sup>

One reason for the surplus is the overvaluation of the East European currencies, which makes the region's exports more expensive and the EC's imports cheaper. Another reason has been the EC's protectionist trade policies. The recession in Western Europe, moreover, has intensified protectionist pressures within the EC, particularly in such "sensitive" areas as textiles, agriculture, and steel, where the Visegrad countries enjoy an important comparative advantage. In November 1992, the EC raised import duties on Croatian, Hungarian, Polish, and Czechoslovak seamless steel tubes,<sup>7</sup> and in April 1993 it limited imports of Czech steel for two years. These decisions have been part of an effort by the EC to protect Western Europe's struggling steel industry from an influx of cheap East European imports.<sup>8</sup>

The complaints of the West European steel producers about the influx of East European products, however, seem exaggerated. East European steel imports make up only a small share of the EC market—about 3 percent. For the East European countries, however, the Western market is critical, especially at a time when demand for steel products in their own countries has dropped sharply. Moreover, the exports to the EC have generated cash that has been reinvested in those countries' nascent modernization efforts, which, in the end, saves the West money.

Agriculture has witnessed similar protectionist pressures. The EC's decision in April 1993 to temporarily ban the imports of East European dairy and meat products, ostensibly out of concern for an outbreak of hoof and mouth disease in beef shipped to Italy, sparked

<sup>6</sup>See Karoly Okolicsanyi, "Trade Between East-Central Europe and the EC Moving Forward," *RFE/RL Research Report*, September 3, 1993, p. 44.

<sup>7</sup>See Andrew Baxter, "EC Victory in Steel Tube Dumping Fight," *Financial Times*, November 18, 1992.

<sup>8</sup>The main cause of the steel industry's problems, however, is not cheap East European imports, which are still tiny in comparison with total EC steel output. It is subsidies to inefficient steel companies in Spain, Italy, and elsewhere, which have kept these companies alive, aggravating the problem of overcapacity and hindering the restructuring of the industry.



a particular outcry in Eastern Europe.<sup>9</sup> Although the ban was rescinded after a few weeks, it was seen by many East European leaders as a further example of the growing protectionist trend within the EC that belied the Community's professed desire to help stabilize the reform process in Eastern Europe.

These protectionist pressures undercut the long-term prospects for East European recovery. For the East European countries, trade in the sensitive areas (textiles, agriculture, and steel) represents between 25 and 40 percent of their exports to the EC. (See Figure 2.) Those areas are where the short-term competitive advantage lies. The protectionist restrictions stymie the export potential of new industries and freeze the structure of industry. Neither aid nor private capital flows are likely to provide the foreign exchange necessary to fund foreign capital goods needed to retool industry. Only increased exports and domestic savings can do that. Moreover, without increased access to West European markets, the countries of Eastern Europe will not be able to pay back Western loans or attract Western capital.

After considerable delay, the EC has recently begun to liberalize its trade policy to address some of the East European concerns. At the EC summit in Copenhagen in late June 1993, the EC leaders endorsed a package of trade concessions designed to speed up the reduction of tariffs and quotas that have blocked Eastern Europe's most competitive exports. Under the trade package, duties in industrial products will be eliminated two years earlier than planned. Tariffs on textiles, previously scheduled to end in 1998, and steel, expected to disappear in 1997, will be dropped one year earlier.<sup>10</sup>

Although these measures do not go as far as many East European officials would like, they represent a significant improvement over the terms of the association agreements concluded in 1991. They also reflect a new attitude toward the low labor costs in Eastern Europe. Rather than seeing the countries of Eastern Europe as a threat to Western Europe's manufacturing industries, many EC officials now

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<sup>9</sup>See "Empörung in Osteuropa über die EG," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 23, 1993; also, "Ost-West Streit in Agrarhandel," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, April 15, 1993.

<sup>10</sup>Tom Redburn, "EC Opens Doors to East European Nations," *International Herald Tribune*, June 23, 1993.

appear to see Eastern Europe as an important resource in the EC's broader struggle with Asia for global markets.

## **ROMANIA AND BULGARIA**

While Bulgaria and Romania have not advanced as far along the path to reform as have the Visegrad countries, both countries hope eventually to join the EC. Soon after the abortive coup in Moscow in August 1991, the Community agreed to initiate negotiations with both for association agreements similar to those signed with Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in December 1991. Negotiations with Romania began in early 1992 and were successfully concluded in November of that year, making Romania the fourth East European country to become an associate member of the EC. The association agreement is intended to lead to the gradual elimination of most trade barriers between Romania and the EC over a period of ten years.

Negotiations with Bulgaria proved more contentious. The negotiations stalled in autumn 1992 because of disagreements over quotas for textiles, ferrous metals, and agriculture. Bulgaria wanted greater access to EC markets than the EC was willing to offer. Because Bulgaria was highly dependent on trade with the former Soviet Union, it argued that it needed greater access to West European markets to make up for the shortfalls created by the collapse of the Soviet market. After tough bargaining, the negotiations were finally concluded in December 1992. Like the association agreement with Romania, the agreement with Bulgaria provides for a gradual opening of markets in both directions, financial and technical assistance for the Bulgarian economy, and political consultation.

Unlike Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, however, neither Bulgaria nor Romania is in a position to enter the EC in the foreseeable future. Indeed, it may be well into the second decade of the twenty-first century before either is ready to apply for membership. Nevertheless, the association agreements should help bolster economic reform and democracy in both countries. They also provide an important means of linking both countries more closely to Europe.

## POLITICAL TIES TO THE EC

The association agreements signed with the countries of Eastern Europe did not explicitly commit the EC to offer membership to those countries. However, the preamble did note that the "ultimate aim" of the three countries was membership. The agreements also stated that the EC could help to create the conditions that would make the realization of that goal possible.

The question of East European membership, has intensified the debate within the Community over "widening vs. deepening" that has raged since Turkey's application in 1987.<sup>11</sup> Since then, a number of new candidates have come knocking at the door: most recently, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway.

Including new members will have profound implications for the nature of the Community and the way it operates. Thus the debate over widening versus deepening (*widening* is inclusion of more countries; *deepening* is strengthening of institutions) is, in effect, a surrogate debate about the future political order in Europe, pitting countries (such as the United Kingdom) that want a loose, confederal EC focused on free trade against those (led by France) who seek a tight political union, including foreign policy and defense. But even among the advocates of a more integrated Europe, there are differences over the question of how to approach the issue of enlargement.

While strongly supporting the need to deepen the Community, Germany has been a champion of a broadening over the long term. German leaders have argued persistently that the Community must remain open to new members, especially those from Eastern Europe. As Chancellor Kohl put it in a speech in March 1991:

A new . . . all European . . . chance has been opened through the political, societal and economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and the abolition of the Warsaw Pact. . . . This does not mean . . . and here I have no illusions . . . that we can take in all of these countries tomorrow. But it does mean that we cannot exclude anyone when the conditions for membership have been fulfilled. It

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<sup>11</sup>For a comprehensive analysis of the widening vs. deepening debate and its implications, see Helen Wallace, *Widening vs. Deepening: The European Community and the New European Agenda* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1989).

is in part our responsibility not to block the path to membership for the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. We want to help the new democracies in making a "return to Europe."<sup>12</sup>

He reiterated this same message in a speech to the Industry and Trade Chamber of Palatinate in May 1993:

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is one of the great challenges to bring the Central, East and Southeast European states closer to the EC. It would be an inconceivable and unacceptable development for German policy if the Oder-Neisse border were to remain the eastern external border of the unifying Europe also in the future. We need Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary in the common Europe just like the Northern countries.<sup>13</sup>

German leaders feel a moral and political responsibility to help the countries of Eastern Europe attain membership in the EC. In the new treaties of Friendship and Cooperation signed with each in 1991, Germany has formally committed to assist Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in achieving this goal.

France, on the other hand, has taken a much more reserved and cautious approach toward East European membership. In a speech in early June 1991, which irritated many East Europeans, Mitterrand stated that membership was "decades and decades" away, and he insisted that the countries of Eastern Europe must first resolve their own internal problems as well as modernize their economies before they could become members.<sup>14</sup> Mitterrand's remarks reflect France's concern that prematurely including Eastern Europe in the EC could dilute the EC's cohesiveness and paralyze its decisionmaking capacity. Including the Visegrad countries could also increase Germany's influence at France's expense, because Germany has much closer ties with the prospective new members.

Economic interests tend to reinforce these political perspectives. France produces nearly one-quarter of the EC's agricultural output.

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<sup>12</sup>*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes*, No. 45, 29 May 1993, pp. 333-335.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 481-485.

<sup>14</sup>In a speech on Radio France Internationale, June 12, 1991. See *Le Monde*, June 14, 1991.

It thus stands to lose most from a lowering of tariffs on agricultural imports from the East. At the same time, relative to German firms, French firms have not been very successful in penetrating East European markets (the decision by the Czechoslovak government to sell Skoda to Volkswagen rather than Renault is a notable example of this tendency). Hence, France has a smaller economic stake in integrating Eastern Europe than does Germany, which is more deeply engaged in the region.

Britain has strongly favored widening over deepening. Admitting neutral countries like Austria or Sweden makes particular sense from the British point of view: They are prosperous and thus will reduce the burden on other wealthy states. At the same time, they are likely to share Britain's reservations about extending the Community's competence in defense. Similarly, the East European countries are broadly Atlanticist in their outlook and thus can be counted on to support British positions on many defense and security issues.

The poorer countries of Southern Europe and Ireland, on the other hand, could pose obstacles to East European membership. They fear that the entry of East European countries will divert scarce resources and funds away from the South. Some also have special concerns about a reduction in tariffs in specific sensitive areas, such as textiles (Greece and Portugal) and steel (Spain).

## DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MAASTRICHT

Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (December 1991), resistance to enlargement has softened. At the Lisbon summit in June 1992, the EC decided to move forward on the membership applications of the four European Free Trade Association (EFTA) neutrals (Austria, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland), but postponed initiating negotiations until after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and an agreement on a new five-year budget (Delors II). At the Edinburgh summit in December 1992, the EC leaders agreed to speed up the timetable. Negotiations with Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Norway began in early 1993. Thus, it is likely that by 1995-1996, the EC will be enlarged by three to five members.

The question of further expansion beyond the EFTA countries, however, has largely been deferred while the EC struggles with the prob-

lems associated with implementing the Maastricht Treaty.<sup>15</sup> The Community's preoccupation with the future of Maastricht has tended to deflect attention from Eastern Europe and has prevented the Community from elaborating a coherent strategy toward the region. In effect, relations with Eastern Europe have been put on hold as the Community seeks to sort out its internal problems and figure out how to proceed with the implementation of the Maastricht blueprint.

The Visegrad countries would like the Community to set a timetable for membership. At the EC foreign ministers' meeting in Luxembourg in early October 1992, they presented a formal request to begin negotiations for entry into the Community by 1996.<sup>16</sup> The memorandum asked for an explicit calendar and statement of criteria for admission. At the EC summit in Dublin in December 1992, the EC leaders were preoccupied with trying to find a compromise that would allow Denmark to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. They thus postponed any major decisions about Eastern Europe until the June 1993 summit in Copenhagen.

The summit in Copenhagen represented a small victory for the East European countries. The EC political leaders formally invited the six East European countries to become members of the Community as soon as they have met the economic and political requirements for membership.<sup>17</sup> As noted earlier, they also endorsed a package of trade concessions to speed up the reduction of tariffs and quotas blocking Eastern Europe's most competitive exports.

Although these measures do not go as far as many East European officials would like, they represent a significant improvement over the terms of the association agreement concluded in 1991. The formal

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<sup>15</sup>For a detailed discussion of the debate leading up to Maastricht, see James E. Steinberg, *"An Ever Closer Union": European Integration and Its Implications for the Future of U.S.-European Relations* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4711-A, 1993), pp. 109-120. See also Marten van Heuven, *Adjustment for the European Community: Consolidation and Fragmentation in the Coming Decade* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, N-3543-JS, 1992).

<sup>16</sup>Lionel Barber, "East European States Put Case for EC Entry," *Financial Times*, October 6, 1992.

<sup>17</sup>Tom Redburn, "EC Opens Doors to East European Nations," *International Herald Tribune*, June 23, 1993.

offer of membership once the economic and political conditions have been met represents a particularly important signal and demonstrates the EC's commitment to including the East European countries over the long run.

Further decisions about enlargement, however, are likely to be postponed until the 1996 intergovernmental summit. By then the Community should have completed its negotiations with the EFTA neutral countries and sorted out many of the problems associated with Maastricht. In addition, the relationship between the EC and WEU should be clearer.

## SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

The effort to create a European Union has focused greater attention on the question of the Community's role in foreign and security policy and the relationship of the WEU to the European Union.<sup>18</sup> In effect, two conflicting views—or visions—have emerged. The first, supported by the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, and Portugal, sees a strengthened WEU as the "European pillar" of NATO; the second, supported by France, Italy, Spain, and some of the smaller European countries, wants the WEU to become the defense arm of the EC. Germany is inclined to the latter position but is still hampered by its constitutional difficulties in sending troops outside the NATO area.

The East European countries' views on this issue are quite close to those of the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands. They see NATO as the main security organization in Europe and the only one capable of providing meaningful security. They favor making the WEU the European pillar of NATO and are opposed to the develop-

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<sup>18</sup>The relevant protocol of the Maastricht Treaty hedged the issue of the WEU's role. It identified the WEU as "an integral part of the development of the Union" and stated that the Union could request the WEU "to implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications." However, it postponed any definitive decision about the WEU's defense role and made it subject to review by the European Council in 1993. In a parallel declaration, the nine members of the WEU straddled the divide between Atlanticists and Europeanists, stating that the WEU would be developed "as the defense component of the Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance." For a detailed discussion, see Steinberg, "An Ever Closer Union," 1993, pp. 50-67.

ment of a European security and defense identity not closely tied to NATO, for fear that such an identity could lead to a decoupling of the United States from European security.

At the same time, as the WEU has expanded its role and mission, the countries of Eastern Europe have sought to strengthen institutional ties to the WEU, with the ultimate goal of full membership.<sup>19</sup> As a first step, East European officials have called for regular participation of experts and representatives from the Visegrad countries in WEU working groups. Hungarian officials have also expressed a desire for observer status as a step toward associate membership and eventual full membership.<sup>20</sup>

The WEU, in turn, has shown increasing interest in promoting closer ties to Eastern Europe. Until late 1991 the main focus of the WEU's activities with Eastern Europe was on expanding contacts and dialogue. However, at the ministerial meeting in Bonn in June 1992, the WEU Council decided to institutionalize ties by establishing a special "Forum of Consultation" similar to NACC in NATO, which would meet twice a year.<sup>21</sup> In contrast to NACC, however, the WEU Forum of Consultation will include only the five East European countries and three Baltic states—but not representatives from the former Soviet Union.

The creation of the Forum of Consultation is intended to provide a degree of psychological reassurance and strengthen the WEU's formal links with the countries of Eastern Europe. However, many WEU members are reluctant to go beyond this purpose. In the words of Willem van Eekelen, General Secretary of the WEU:

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<sup>19</sup>See the "Declaration of the highest representatives of the Triangle countries adopted at their Prague meeting on May 6, 1992," *Press Release*, Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 8, 1992, p. 2.

<sup>20</sup>See the statement by Deputy State Secretary in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, Dr. Rudolf Joo, "The Security Problems of Central Europe," presented at the WEU colloquium "A New Order of Security in Europe," Berlin, April 1-3, 1992, pp. 6-7, mimeograph copy.

<sup>21</sup>Point seven of the "Extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with States of Central Europe," June 19, 1992, reprinted in *Letter from the Assembly*, No. 12, July 1992, p. 16.



For the time being, WEU has reached the outer limits of its circle of relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Geographic extension would not be consonant with WEU's European perspective and at the same time would duplicate what NACC has set to achieve.<sup>22</sup>

In particular, there has been strong opposition within the WEU to granting the countries of Eastern Europe associate status or extending security guarantees to them. Many members fear that doing so would run the risk of diluting the current homogeneity of the group and weaken its capacity to agree on a common policy. However, the idea of associate membership for Eastern Europe has begun to gain greater support lately. The proposal for a "Pact on Stability in Europe," presented by the French government to the EC summit in Copenhagen in June 1993, calls on the WEU members to "study the possibility" of admitting the East European countries as associate members of the WEU if they adhere to the proposed pact and have the possibility of eventually entering the European Union.<sup>23</sup> German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel has also suggested that the East European countries should be offered associate membership in the WEU.<sup>24</sup> Support for associate membership for Eastern Europe also is growing in France.

Much will depend on the timing and sequence of institutional developments in Europe. If European Union moves forward as planned and the Visegrad countries continue unhindered along their current reform course, they may be able to enter the EC toward the end of the decade or shortly thereafter. Entry would open the way to WEU membership.<sup>25</sup> But if momentum toward European Union stalls or

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<sup>22</sup>Willem van Eekelen, "European Union and the Security of Central Europe: The Role of the West European Union," paper presented at the WEU colloquium "A New Order of Security in Europe," Berlin, April 1-3, 1992, p. 12.

<sup>23</sup>"For a Pact on Stability in Europe," *Europe*, No. 1846, June 26, 1993, p. 3.

<sup>24</sup>In a speech to the Congress of the Free Democrats (FDP). See "Kinkel für neue atlantische Charta," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 11, 1993. See also Bernt Conrad, "Kinkel legt aussenpolitisches Programm vor—Absage an deutsche Grossmannssacht," *Die Welt*, September 11, 1993.

<sup>25</sup>At Maastricht, the nine EC members of the WEU issued a special declaration, which is attached to the Maastricht Treaty, inviting all EC states to join the WEU while limiting all non-EC states to associate membership. This procedure would allow all EC members to become members of the WEU once they have joined the EC.

progress toward reform in one or more of the four Visegrad countries falters, then WEU membership may not be possible until well after the turn of the century. The timetable for Bulgaria and Romania is likely to be even longer.

The prospect that some East European countries may enter the WEU in the foreseeable future has direct implications not only for the WEU but for the United States and NATO as well. The security guarantee under Article 5 of the Brussels (WEU) Treaty is even more explicit than that under Article 5 of the Washington (NATO) Treaty. Under the Brussels Treaty, the West European members of the WEU—who are also members of NATO—will be required to come to the aid of East European members in a conflict. The United States, therefore, will acquire a security commitment “through the back door.” Unless carefully handled, this back-door commitment could potentially become a problem in the Congress, which would have to approve the extension of any new security commitments by the United States.

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## REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL COOPERATION

Cooperation among the countries of Eastern Europe does not have a strong tradition. Historically, the countries of Eastern Europe have had stronger ties with their West European neighbors than within the region. Soviet rule tended to reinforce this isolation by encouraging vertical ties (i.e., with Moscow) rather than horizontal ties among the countries of the region, particularly in the economic area.

Nevertheless, since 1989 a number of groups and organizations have emerged specifically to promote greater regional and subregional cooperation. Among the most important are

- The Visegrad Triangle (later Quadrangle)
- The Central European Initiative
- The Ukrainian proposal for a Central European security zone
- The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone
- The Baltic Council.

This trend toward greater regional cooperation represents an important new development and raises a number of critical questions: How significant are these groups? Do they represent alternatives to Western integration? What contribution can they make to enhancing regional security in Eastern Europe?

### THE VISEGRAD GROUP

The most important effort at regional cooperation in Eastern Europe has been the Visegrad Group. Originally composed of Hungary,

Poland, and Czechoslovakia, the group was expanded to include the Czech Republic and Slovakia after the two republics became independent states on January 1, 1993. Cooperation within the group has largely been ad hoc and informal; with time, it has expanded and has taken on certain limited security dimensions.<sup>1</sup> The four countries have made clear, however, that they do not want to form a new military bloc or alliance.

The initial impetus for creating the Visegrad Group can be traced to a one-day meeting in Bratislava on April 9, 1990, convoked by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel to coordinate the return to Europe of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The foreign ministers of Italy, Austria, and Yugoslavia also attended. The Bratislava meeting produced few tangible results and was marred by a lack of careful preparation.<sup>2</sup> The various attendees had very different expectations and agendas for the meeting, which inhibited the emergence of a common line or policy. Nevertheless, the meeting was an important first step and laid the groundwork for later cooperation among members of the group.

The Bratislava meeting was followed by a meeting of the deputy foreign ministers of the three countries in Warsaw on October 17, 1991. The Warsaw meeting was the real birthplace of triangular cooperation.<sup>3</sup> Its purpose was to facilitate "the solution of common problems in the region." At the Warsaw meeting, working groups were set up to backstop future meetings of the three, which were to be held on a regular basis.

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet crackdown in the Baltics in early January 1991 gave this cooperation new momentum. Alarmed by the crackdown and the general hardening of Soviet policy, the foreign ministers of the three countries met in Budapest

<sup>1</sup>For a comprehensive discussion of the origins and evolution of the Visegrad Group, see Rudolf Tökes, "From Visegrad to Krakow: Cooperation, Competition and Coexistence in Central Europe," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1991, pp. 102-103. On the security dimensions, see Joshua Spero, "Central European Security," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1991, pp. 141-151.

<sup>2</sup>For details, see Patrick Moore, "Bratislava and Bonn: Two Conferences on Europe's Future," *Report on Eastern Europe*, May 11, 1990, pp. 42-45; Henry Kamm, "3 East European Nations Seek Better Ties with West," *New York Times*, April 10, 1990.

<sup>3</sup>Private discussions in Budapest with Polish and Hungarian officials, June 1992.

on January 11, 1991, to discuss issues of common concern. The meeting represented the first effort by the three countries to formally coordinate policy and set the stage for a summit between the leaders of the three countries in Visegrad, Hungary, on February 15, 1991.

The Visegrad summit, was an important milestone. It provided the basic framework for expanded cooperation among the three countries in a variety of areas, including security. In the communiqué issued at the end of the summit, the leaders pledged to:

- Harmonize their efforts to foster cooperation and close relations with European institutions
- Consult on questions of security
- Promote economic cooperation and mutually advantageous trade
- Improve cooperation in other spheres such as ecology, transportation, and information.<sup>4</sup>

They emphasized, however, that their cooperation was not aimed against any one country and that they did not want to create a new bloc or military alliance. Rather, their main goal was to coordinate and harmonize their approach to Western institutions, especially the EC.<sup>5</sup>

In the aftermath of the summit, the three countries closely coordinated their position on the bilateral treaties being worked out with Moscow and firmly rejected Moscow's effort to include controversial security clauses that would have constrained their future security options. The three countries also consulted closely at the time of the attempted coup in Moscow.<sup>6</sup> They set up several new working groups, including one on migration. They also established a Standing Committee to Coordinate Trilateral Cooperation.

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<sup>4</sup>For the text of the communiqué issued at the summit, see Jan B. de Weydenthal, "The Visegrad Summit," *Report on Eastern Europe*, March 1, 1991, pp. 31-32.

<sup>5</sup>Stephen Engelberg, "3 East European Nations Confer, Gingerly," *New York Times*, February 16, 1991. See also Havel and Antall's remarks, MTI, 17:30 GMT, February 15, 1991, translated in FBIS-EEU-91-033, February 19, 1991, pp. 9-11.

<sup>6</sup>Mary Battista, "3 East European Nations Discuss Soviet Crises," *Washington Post*, August 21, 1991.

Although this cooperation has focused on coordinating their approach to the EC, the members have also sought to increase economic cooperation among themselves. In December 1992 they decided to set up a free-trade zone. The zone officially went into effect on March 1, 1993, and is to gradually eliminate tariff barriers by the end of the century. Tariffs on industrial and agricultural goods are to be reduced between 1995 and 1997; barriers to trade in more sensitive areas, such as cars, textiles, and steel, are to be dropped by 2001. The zone is intended to halt the deterioration in mutual trade that has occurred in the last few years.

Some limited cooperation in the defense and security area has also taken place. The practical results of this cooperation, however, have been rather modest. They include a prototype military reconnaissance plane built with a Czechoslovak airframe and engine and a Hungarian ground control system.<sup>7</sup> There has also been some discussion of creating an integrated air defense system (IADS). However, these discussions do not appear to have advanced very far.

In addition, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (at the time it still existed as a federal state) signed bilateral military cooperation agreements with one another. The agreements are aimed at creating greater transparency and provide for exchanging information about doctrine, training, and troop deployment. They do not involve specific defense or mutual assistance commitments.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, the countries have explicitly ruled out creating a new military alliance.

In short, the cooperation has remained largely ad hoc and informal. The four countries have expressly opposed any "institutionalization" of cooperation, fearing that it could prejudice their chances for joining the EC, WEU, and NATO. This proscription has placed significant limits on the degree and depth of possible cooperation.

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<sup>7</sup>Douglas L. Clarke, "Central Europe: Military Cooperation in the Triangle," *RFE/RL Research Report*, January 10, 1992, p. 44.

<sup>8</sup>Hungary has signed similar agreements with Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania, and Austria. For details, see Alfred A. Reich, "New Bilateral Military Agreements," *Report on Eastern Europe*, November 8, 1991, pp. 4-10.

### Potential Expansion of Membership

Such limits have not prevented other countries from expressing an interest in joining. In early 1991 Romania signaled its interest in membership. However, its bid was politely rejected, and, as long as relations between Hungary and Romania remain marred by differences over the Romanian treatment of the Hungarian minority, there is little chance that Romania will be invited to join.

Ukraine has also expressed an interest in becoming a member.<sup>9</sup> But the prospects for Kiev's joining the group—at least at the moment—also seem slim. Ukrainian membership would destroy the homogeneity and cohesiveness of the group. As then-Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel noted in March 1992:

I am not sure that it would be a sensible thing to expand such a small regional formation because this cooperation might lose its framework, its clear content, and its efficiency later. The three members of the Visegrad Three are in a largely identical phase of development, and we have concrete subjects that connect us and in which we cooperate. Other countries, like Ukraine, are in a slightly different situation, and they are in a different development phase. The expansion of the Visegrad Three with such countries would necessarily lead to the reduced efficiency of our existing cooperation.<sup>10</sup>

In addition, Russia might see expanding the group to include Ukraine as an attempt to create an "anti-Russian bloc" and complicate relations with Moscow. Expansion could also make it harder for the Visegrad Group to gain membership in the EC, WEU, and NATO, since Ukraine is not at the same economic or political level of development as the others. However, Ukraine may be invited to participate in certain projects on an ad hoc basis.

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<sup>9</sup>See Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine and the Visegrad Triangle," *RFE/RL Research Report*, June 5, 1992, pp. 28-29.

<sup>10</sup>See "Twelve Questions for the Visegrad Three," *Uj Magyarorsag*, March 14, 1992, pp. 3-5, translated in FBIS-EEU-92-C58, March 25, 1992, p. 10. Poland has taken a similar view. See the interview with Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, "Let Us Lean on What Brings Us Closer Rather Than What Separates Us," *Holos Ukrayiny*, October 24, 1992, p. 7, translated in FBIS-USR-92-147, November 15, 1992, pp. 80-81.

Slovenia is another potential candidate for membership in the group. Given its modest size, commitment to market reform, and relatively good economic performance since attaining independence in June 1991, Slovenia's prospects for membership are much better than those of Romania or Ukraine. Moreover, historically and culturally, it has closer ties to Central Europe than it does to the Balkan states. Thus, it would not be surprising if Slovenia is eventually invited to join the group, especially since it is already a member of the Central European Initiative, discussed below.

### **The Future of the Visegrad Group**

Since mid-1992, cooperation within the Visegrad Group has lost momentum and it seems likely to diminish for several reasons. The most important reason is the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. In contrast to President Havel, who strongly supported Visegrad cooperation, Vaclav Klaus, Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, has repeatedly expressed reservations about the value of the Visegrad Group<sup>11</sup> and has been unwilling to give cooperation with the Visegrad Group the same high priority that it received under Havel.

The Czech Republic's diminished interest in regional cooperation is already evident, particularly in the security area. The Czech Republic does not feel a strong sense of external threat and is planning substantial cuts in its military forces over the next few years. The Czech Republic's tendency to downplay military security issues will limit the degree of practical military cooperation within the group. Some cooperation—sharing of information and officer exchanges—is likely to continue, but, in practice, few new common projects are likely to develop.

The inclusion of Slovakia could also impede cooperation within the group. Slovakia's economic problems are quite different from those of the other three members: Its economy is more backward and more dependent on outmoded state industries, especially arms production; it is less committed to rapid market reform; and it has a much higher rate of unemployment than the others. In addition, Slovakia has serious differences with Hungary over the treatment of

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<sup>11</sup>See, in particular, his interview in *Le Figaro*, January 8, 1993.



the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Dam. The differences have seriously strained relations between the two countries and could pose important obstacles to future cooperation within the group.

Moreover, as the date of entry into the EC approaches, each country is likely to give greater priority to its own national interests and concerns. The Czech Republic in particular seems determined to move as rapidly as possible to enter the EC, without waiting for the others. This tendency to give greater priority to national interests could provoke fissures in the common front that the four countries have presented vis-à-vis the EC so far and diminish the degree of future cooperation within the group.

### THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN INITIATIVE (HEXAGONALE)

A second important regional organization is the Central European Initiative (formerly the Pentagone and Hexagonale). The Central European Initiative grew out of the Alpen-Adria Cooperation established in 1978 to coordinate cooperation between bordering regions in Yugoslavia, Italy, Germany (Bavaria), Austria, and, later, Hungary.<sup>12</sup> This cooperation led to the formation of the Danube-Adria Group in November 1989, which included Austria, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Hungary proper.

The Quadrangular Initiative, as it was first called, was designed to fill the void created by Comecon's collapse in 1990-1991 until a new European architecture could be devised. Its purpose was to facilitate the integration of Hungary and Yugoslavia into the wider political and economic framework of Europe. At the same time, it was intended to encourage the nascent reforms in Eastern Europe. When Czechoslovakia joined the group in May 1990, the group's name was changed to the Pentagone. With the addition of Poland in summer 1991, the group became known as the Hexagonale.

At the meeting of foreign ministers in Venice in December 1991, the group decided to rename itself the Central European Initiative (CEI).

<sup>12</sup>See Rudolf Stamm, "Die Pentagone als Beitrag zur Annäherung in Europa," *Europäische Rundschau*, No. 2, 1991, pp. 35-41, and Ernst Sucharipa, "Die Pentagone," *Europäische Rundschau*, No. 3, 1990, pp. 25-34.

In July 1992 Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina became full members, replacing the former Yugoslavia. The Czech and Slovak republics, as the two successor states of the former Czechoslovakia, were admitted as full members in March 1993, and Macedonia became a member in July 1993.

The main impetus for establishing the group came from Italy, especially from Foreign Minister Gianni di Michelis. Italy saw the initiative as a means to extend its economic and political influence in the Visegrad countries and counterbalance German influence. The German preoccupation with unification and the reconstruction of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) provided both an incentive and an opportunity for Italy in this regard. At the same time, it increased the group's importance in the eyes of most Visegrad countries, which were worried that a powerful united Germany might dominate the region.

Italy viewed the initiative as *supplementing* EC efforts to assist the Visegrad countries, not replacing them. Italian officials saw it as part of a broad effort to create a network of interlocking and overlapping institutions that would help to integrate the countries of the East more quickly into Europe.<sup>13</sup> Initially, the CEI was viewed as a transitional arrangement. As the political landscape and architecture evolved, Italian officials envisaged that some agreements and cooperation worked out within the Pentagonale and/or Hexagonale could be integrated into the EC or a wider regional framework.

A rotating presidency has the responsibility for coordinating the work of the initiative. The foreign ministers meet twice a year and hold one summit meeting of political leaders annually. Working groups have been set up in a number of areas, including environment, information, energy, culture, small- and medium-sized enterprises, immigration, telecommunications, tourism, transport, and research. Outside regions and states can participate in individual working groups even if they are not formal members of the group.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>See Gianni di Michelis, "Reaching Out to the East," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1990, pp. 49-52.

<sup>14</sup>For instance, at the meeting of foreign ministers in March 1993, Ukraine, Belarus, Romania, and Bulgaria were invited to participate in working groups even though they are not officially members of the CEI.

In January 1993 a special secretariat was set up by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to provide technical assistance for CEI projects.

All together, some 115 projects have been developed. The most important are the construction of a Trieste-Budapest-Kiev highway and railway; construction of a Baltic Sea-Adriatic Sea highway; the modernization of the transportation links between Vienna, Budapest, and Belgrade; modernization of the Prague-Budapest Rijeka railroad; a telecommunications system in the Balkans; and improvement of the efficiency of the energy system connecting member states. These links are viewed as particularly important for the integration of West and East European markets.

The group does not have its own sources of financing. Rather, it must rely on private capital and loans from international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and EBRD in London. The EBRD, for instance, is the main source of financing for the Trieste-Budapest-Kiev railway and Baltic Sea-Adriatic Sea highway projects.

Regional cooperation within the CEI has been hindered, however, by the continued conflict in former Yugoslavia. In addition, the interests of the various actors are quite diverse. Italy sees the initiative as a means of promoting its influence in the region and preventing German domination, while Austria views it as a vehicle for enhancing its influence in a region where it traditionally has had strong cultural, political, and economic ties. Moreover, the interests of some of the members have shifted. Poland's main motivation for joining was to avoid isolation and exclusion from a club to which its two "triangular" neighbors belonged. Today, it is much more interested in Baltic cooperation. With the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic's interest in regional cooperation has waned, and Slovakia and Hungary are increasingly at odds over the Hungarian-minority issue.

The departure of Foreign Minister Gianni di Michelis has also had an impact on Italy's commitment. Di Michelis was one of the main architects of the CEI, and his departure has deprived the organization of one of its most important driving forces. As a result, Italy's interest has languished somewhat. The current political crisis, unleashed by

corruption scandals involving scores of high-level Italian politicians and business leaders, has also reduced Italy's ability to play the type of leading role within the CEI that it played in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

In short, the effectiveness and viability of the CEI over the long-term remain uncertain. The diversity of its membership is likely to inhibit cooperation on all but the most basic issues. Moreover, such countries as the Czech Republic and Poland are likely to lose interest altogether the closer they come to membership in the EC. Perhaps the most useful function the CEI may perform is to provide a means of fostering closer regional cooperation with such countries as Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania, which have fewer regional ties and may otherwise feel increasingly isolated.

### UKRAINIAN PROPOSAL FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN SECURITY ZONE

At a CSCE meeting in Prague on April 28, 1993, Ukraine put forward a proposal to create a collective security zone for Eastern Europe. The proposed zone would include Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, Austria, and the former East European states of the Warsaw Pact—but not Russia. It would supplement the existing CSCE framework and would be introduced in stages. A key element of the zone would be the renunciation by members of all territorial claims and the recognition of current borders.<sup>15</sup>

The Ukrainian proposal represents an attempt by Ukraine to counterbalance the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and to offset its own diplomatic isolation. The proposal has found little support in Eastern Europe because it smacks too much of an anti-Russian alliance and could hinder Eastern Europe's integration into NATO. These countries are looking west, not east, and few find the idea of a regional alliance with an increasingly unstable Ukraine an attractive prospect.

<sup>15</sup>See Chrystia Freeland, "Ukraine Seeks Area Security Zone," *Financial Times*, April 22, 1993. For the text of the proposal, see *Gazeta Wyborcza*, May 24, 1993, translated in FBIS-SOV-93-101, May 27, 1993, pp. 46-47.

The East European reserve toward its proposal, however, has heightened Ukraine's isolation. Isolation taken together with the increased sense of threat from Russia have reinforced the desire of many political forces in Ukraine to retain nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil. Indeed, the two sentiments feed and reinforce one another.

The emergence of a nuclear Ukraine would significantly change the security situation in Eastern Europe. For one thing, it would open up the possibility of a Ukrainian "nuclear umbrella" for East Central Europe.<sup>16</sup> While at the moment such a prospect seems fanciful, it could become more plausible if NATO fails to open its doors to Eastern Europe and if East European security concerns are not adequately addressed.

## BALKAN COOPERATION

Within the Balkans there have also been efforts to foster greater regional cooperation. Indeed, such efforts have a long—and not very successful—history.<sup>17</sup> During the interwar period, Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia formed the Balkan Entente in an effort to counter German and Italian power. In the early years after World War II, there was short-lived talk of creating a Balkan Federation, which would have included Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. But the idea was scotched by Stalin because he did not want to see the formation of a bloc he could not control. And in the early 1950s, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey formed the Balkan Pact in an attempt to block the expansion of Soviet power in the Balkans. However, after the reconciliation between Yugoslavia and the USSR in 1955, the pact largely became a dead letter.

With the onset of détente in the 1970s, efforts were revived to promote greater cooperation in the Balkans. Greece provided the main initiative, but such cooperation found support among other Balkan countries, especially Romania and Yugoslavia. These efforts culmi-

<sup>16</sup>Some Ukrainian nationalists have openly advocated such a Ukrainian nuclear umbrella for Eastern Europe. See R. Koval, "Contemporary Geopolitical Doctrines," *Vecherniy Kiyev*, November 12, 1992, p. 2, translated in JPRS-TAC-92-035, December 5, 1992, p. 34.

<sup>17</sup>For a detailed discussion, see F. Stephen Larrabee, *Balkan Security* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 135, 1976).

nated in the Athens summit in February 1976. The Athens meeting dealt primarily with economic, technological, and cultural cooperation and was attended by senior ministry officials and experts from all the Balkan countries except Albania.<sup>18</sup> However, the meeting produced few concrete results and was not followed up on, largely because of opposition from Bulgaria (and the USSR).

The intensification of détente in the late 1980s sparked new efforts to foster closer regional cooperation in the Balkans. This time, the initiative came from Yugoslavia, which invited the foreign ministers of all Balkan nations, including Albania, to send representatives to a meeting in Belgrade in February 1988. The Belgrade conference was a modest success—in large part because the foreign ministers from the six Balkan countries attending the conference (Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania) agreed in advance not to air grievances but to concentrate on establishing a framework for fostering greater multilateral cooperation in a number of well-defined and uncontroversial areas, such as trade, tourism, industrial cooperation, and environmental protection. Controversial issues, such as minorities, were purposely treated bilaterally to avoid issues that could spoil the generally positive atmosphere at the conference.

The most noteworthy aspect of the conference was the participation of Albania, which had previously refused to take part in such regional meetings. This was a clear signal of Tirana's desire, after the death of Stalinist leader Enver Hoxha in 1985, to break out of its self-imposed isolation and to forge closer ties with its Balkan neighbors. The Belgrade conference was followed by a conference of Balkan deputy foreign ministers in Tirana in January 1989—the first time that such a meeting had taken place on Albanian soil since the end of World War II—and a meeting on confidence-building measures in Bucharest in May 1989, in which Albania also participated.

The "new spirit" in the Balkans produced by the Belgrade conference was short-lived. A follow-up conference in Tirana in October 1990 produced few concrete results.<sup>19</sup> Many of the proposals made at the

<sup>18</sup>See Robert R. King, "The Athens Conference and the Balkans—Old Variations on an Old Theme," *RFE Background Report*, No. 55, March 1, 1976.

<sup>19</sup>See Louis Zanga, "The Balkan Foreign Ministers Conference in Tirana," *Report on Eastern Europe*, December 7, 1990, pp. 1–4. Also see "Konferenz der sechs Balkan-

conference were not followed up or implemented. Since then, the drive for greater regional cooperation has languished and has been superseded by a trend toward growing nationalism and regional conflict.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, instability in the Balkans represents one of the main threats to stability in post-Cold War Europe.

The war in Bosnia presents the most serious challenge to regional cooperation. As long as the war rages, meaningful regional cooperation is impossible. The Yugoslav conflict, however, is not the only obstacle to regional stability and cooperation. A number of other ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes exist—the Macedonian issue; the Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus and the Aegean; the Romanian-Hungarian conflict over the Hungarian minority; the Kosovo problem; and the Albanian-Greek dispute over the status of the Greek minority in Albania—that could erupt to undermine regional stability and cooperation.<sup>21</sup> The disintegration of Yugoslavia, moreover, is likely to accentuate the trend toward fragmentation within the region.

Several new regional constellations, in fact, may emerge during the next decade. Slovenia and Croatia are likely to gravitate increasingly toward Central Europe, forging closer ties to Austria and Hungary (Slovenia has already done so). Greece may intensify its ties to Serbia in order to counterbalance Turkey; Turkey may seek to strengthen ties to Albania, Macedonia, and what is left of Bosnia, all of which have large Muslim populations.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, there is a danger that the end of the Cold War and the breakup of Yugoslavia could intensify the traditional Muslim-Christian split within the Balkans, leading to new fault lines within the region.

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Staaten in Albanien," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 24, 1990, and Viktor Meier, "Nur kosmetische Reformen für Albanien," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 27, 1990.

<sup>20</sup>See F. Stephen Larrabee, "Instability and Change in the Balkans," *Survival*, Summer 1992, pp. 13-39.

<sup>21</sup>For a detailed discussion, see F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans," *International Security*, Winter 1990/91, pp. 38-91.

<sup>22</sup>Turkey has recently "rediscovered" the Balkans and has begun to play a more active role in the region. In particular, Ankara has sought to expand cooperation with Albania, including military cooperation. See Louis Zanga, "Albania and Turkey Forge Closer Ties," *RFE/RL Research Report*, March 12, 1993, pp. 30-33.

In short, the appeal and effectiveness of regional security arrangements in the Balkans are likely to remain limited. At best, such regional security schemes can complement broader security arrangements and ties to Western security organizations, but they cannot realistically replace them. Hence, in the near future, most Balkan countries—including Bulgaria and Romania—are likely to continue to see ties to Western security organizations, especially NATO, as the best means of assuring their security.

### BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION ZONE

Another recent effort to foster regional cooperation is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone. Launched by the late Turkish President Turgut Özal in 1989, the project is intended to promote private-sector activity and stimulate the free movement of goods and services among the member states. In addition to Turkey, the group includes Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Albania, and six member states of the former Soviet Union: Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, and Georgia.

The first meeting to discuss the project was held in Ankara in December 1990, with the participation of Soviet, Turkish, Romanian, and Bulgarian representatives. Subsequent meetings were held in Bucharest, Sofia, and Moscow, to flesh out the project. After the collapse of the USSR, six former Soviet republics, as well as Greece and Albania, expressed interest in joining, bringing the number of members to 11.

In June 1992 the 11 nations formally signed an agreement in Istanbul to promote cooperation in the fields of energy, transportation, communications, information, and ecology, and to establish a joint investment bank.<sup>23</sup> The leaders also pledged to end regional conflicts that threaten cooperation among them.<sup>24</sup> However, they rejected as

<sup>23</sup>"11 Nations on Black Sea Sign Alliance on Economy," *International Herald Tribune*, June 26, 1992; "Schwarzmeer-Länder für Zone des Friedens," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 26, 1992.

<sup>24</sup>The presidents of Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, and Romania used the conference in Istanbul to call for a truce in the fighting in Moldova. The communiqué issued at the end of the meeting called for the opening of corridors for humanitarian aid and the free movement of civilians, supervised by a parliamentary committee from both sides



premature Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze's proposal to create a system of regional collective security. For the moment the group has decided to concentrate primarily on fostering regional economic cooperation, leaving the more difficult security issues for later.

Romania and Bulgaria have expressed considerable interest in the project. For both, Turkey, with its expanding market economy, represents an important source of investment capital and credit. However, because of its large Turkish minority,<sup>25</sup> Bulgaria has taken a somewhat more cautious approach to the project than Romania. Bulgaria prefers a gradual process, expanding cooperation in specific areas, such as energy, communications, tourism, and transportation, rather than creating a free-trade zone immediately. It also opposes any attempt to institutionalize cooperation, fearing that doing so could inhibit its chances for integration into the European Community, which remains its top foreign-policy priority.

The Black Sea initiative is part of Ankara's broader effort to develop a more active foreign policy and exploit opportunities created by the end of the Cold War. To some extent, it also represents a hedge against Turkey's current difficulties with Western Europe and the possible rejection of its membership bid by the EC. It is unlikely, however, that the initiative will lead to the formation of a powerful, cohesive trading bloc. With the exception of Greece and Turkey—themselves no economic giants—all the members are poor and have just begun the process of creating market economies. Moreover, the group is highly heterogeneous and beset by numerous ethnic and territorial disputes, which are likely to make meaningful cooperation difficult.

## BALTIC COOPERATION

The Baltic Sea states, including Poland, have also initiated efforts to foster closer cooperation. On March 5–6, 1992, the foreign ministers of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway,

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and observers from the four governments. See "Four Leaders Concur on Steps in Moldova," *Washington Post*, June 26, 1992.

<sup>25</sup>About 1 million Muslims live in Bulgaria, most of them ethnic Turks. They represent about 10 percent of the Bulgarian population.

Poland, Russia, and Sweden met in Copenhagen and decided to establish a Council of Baltic Sea States. The council convenes once a year and serves as the overall body for coordinating cooperation among the Baltic states. Cooperation is intergovernmental. The members have no plans, however, to establish a permanent secretariat. They have set up a committee of senior officials to manage and supervise the council's work between council sessions. Decisions of the council and its auxiliary organs are by consensus.<sup>26</sup>

The main areas of cooperation on which the council will focus are as follows:

- Assistance to democratic institutions
- Economic and technical assistance and cooperation
- Humanitarian matters and health care
- Environmental protection and cooperation in the area of energy
- Cooperation in the areas of culture, education, tourism, and information
- Transportation and communications.

The council intends to set up working groups in many of these areas; the groups would be tasked with drafting recommendations for review and approval by the council.

It is too early to judge the Baltic council's likely success in promoting regional cooperation in the Baltic area, because the council was established only in March 1992. Like the Black Sea Cooperation project, the Baltic council is composed of a diverse group of countries at varying levels of development. Unlike the Black Sea project, however, the council is not a "poor man's club"; it includes some important economic heavyweights, such as Germany and Sweden, as well as the other Scandinavian countries. If they take an active interest in the council, the council could serve as a useful mechanism for promoting and coordinating economic assistance to the three Baltic countries of the former Soviet Union—Latvia, Lithuania, and

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<sup>26</sup>"Resolution on the Council of Baltic States," *Diplomatichesky Vestnik*, No. 7, April 15, 1992, pp. 255-256, translated in FBIS-ISR-92-007-6, July 22, 1992, pp. 3-4.

Estonia—and for integrating them into a broader regional framework, thus helping to prevent their diplomatic isolation. It could also play a useful role in promoting economic cooperation in the Kaliningrad area.

Russia's role—it is a member of the council—will be important. Russia could seek to use the council as a forum for expressing grievances about the treatment of the Russian minority in the Baltic states or to block economic cooperation with the Kaliningrad *oblast*.<sup>27</sup> Much will depend on domestic developments in Russia itself. If the democratic forces in Russia strengthen their position over the next decade, the council could play a modest but useful role in enhancing security and economic growth in the Baltic region. But if Russia moves in a more nationalistic direction, meaningful cooperation is likely to prove difficult.

### SUBREGIONAL COOPERATION: THE CARPATHIAN EURO-REGION

In addition to the regional cooperation schemes discussed above, a number of efforts at subregional cooperation have emerged. In February 1993, the foreign ministers of Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine signed a declaration announcing their intent to create a Carpathian "Euro-region" in the Eastern Carpathians to promote cross-border cooperation in the Carpathian mountains and areas along the Tisa River.<sup>28</sup> It will serve as a framework for long-term regional and border cooperation. The plan envisions cooperation of local governments from several Hungarian provinces, the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine, two provinces in Poland, and

<sup>27</sup>These dangers were evident at the meeting of the council in Helsinki in March 1993, at which Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev complained about the treatment of the Russian minority in Latvia and Estonia and formally proposed creating a special Commissioner on Minorities. The proposal was eventually adopted by the council, largely to strengthen Kozyrev's position at home. Kozyrev also charged that Russia needed a strong military presence in Kaliningrad because revanchist forces in Germany and elsewhere had claims on the region. See "Begrenztes Entgegenkommen an Russland bei dem Treffen in Helsinki," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 18, 1993.

<sup>28</sup>"Erklärung über Euroregion Ostkarpaten unterzeichnet," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 16, 1993.

seven Slovak districts.<sup>29</sup> A 12-member regional council will coordinate activities. The council will elect a general secretary, who will have a small, permanent office. The general secretary will be rotated annually among representatives of the participating countries.

Romania was invited to join the Carpathian Euro-region but declined to do so. Romanian President Ion Iliescu sharply criticized the plan, saying that it raised certain "suspensions."<sup>30</sup> Romania has traditionally opposed such subregional cooperation, fearing that it could lead to c... for autonomy on the part of the Hungarian minority in ylvania, where most of the Transcarpathian district in Romania lies.

Nationalist groups in Poland have strongly criticized the plan, fearing that the scheme compromises Polish territorial integrity.<sup>31</sup> Their attacks reflect a larger division in Polish society over Poland's basic foreign-policy orientation. The nationalists fear that Poland's effort to integrate into Western institutions and promote greater regional cooperation will weaken Polish cultural and spiritual values in society. Such views, however, do not have widespread support and are unlikely to diminish Poland's interest in regional and subregional cooperation, which has expanded significantly since 1990.

## THE CSCE

The countries of Eastern Europe have been among the strongest supporters of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). At the same time, their attitude toward the CSCE has evolved significantly.

In the period immediately following the collapse of communism, the countries of Eastern Europe saw the CSCE as the main guarantor of European security. NATO was initially expected to play a diminish-

<sup>29</sup>Slovakia opted to be an associate member rather than a full member. However, this distinction does not have much meaning, because cooperation is ad hoc and voluntary.

<sup>30</sup>RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 37, February 24, 1993.

<sup>31</sup>For details, see Jan de Weydenthal, "Controversy in Poland over Euro-regions," RFE/RL Research Report, April 16, 1993, pp. 6-8. See also Klaus Bachmann, "Polens Nationalisten attackieren Euroregionen," *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, February 24, 1993.

ing and secondary role. This view was particularly characteristic of the leadership in Czechoslovakia.

President Havel and Foreign Minister Dienstbier were among the strongest proponents of CSCE.<sup>32</sup> Czechoslovakia lobbied hard—and ultimately successfully—to get the CSCE secretariat established in Prague. Dienstbier also played an important role in early stages of the CSCE effort to mediate the Nagorno-Karabach conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Since then, East European attitudes have changed. The Yugoslav crisis, in particular, dramatized the limitations of the CSCE. In the initial phases of the conflict, the CSCE did little more than endorse EC actions. As a result, the initial East European enthusiasm for the CSCE diminished and was replaced by a more sober, realistic attitude.

This is not to imply that the East European countries no longer have an interest in the CSCE. On the contrary, they remain among its strongest supporters. But their support is tempered by much greater realism about what the CSCE can—and cannot—do. Today, they expect far less from it in terms of providing “hard” (i.e., military) security. For that they increasingly see NATO as the main provider.

Rather, they see the CSCE's main role as a mechanism for mediation and conflict prevention. In particular, they have actively lobbied for a strengthening of the CSCE's capability for conflict prevention and crisis management. Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, for instance, has called for the creation of an “early warning” system, including a conciliation and arbitration commission, whose purpose is to head off crises before they lead to an outbreak of violence.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>32</sup>This strong pan-European bias was reflected, in particular, in the Czechoslovak proposal in April 1990 to establish a new European Security Commission, with a permanent secretariat in Prague. See Jonathan C. Randel, “Czechoslovakia Offers Plan for New Security System,” *Washington Post*, April 7, 1990. Also see Edward Mortimer, “Prague Suggests New European Security Set Up,” *Financial Times*, April 4, 1990. For further background, see Jan Obrman, “Foreign Policy: Sources, Concepts, Problems,” *Report on Eastern Europe*, September 14, 1990, pp. 12–13.

<sup>33</sup>See Jeszenszky's speech “What We Need Under the Present Circumstances Is a Completely Different CSCE,” *Current Policy*, No. 4, 1992 (Budapest: Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 30, 1992), p. 3. See also the statement by former Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, “Europe in Transition and the

Both Poland and Hungary also strongly supported the creation of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, which they hope will help to dampen ethnic conflicts and prevent their escalation to armed violence. Hungary has also advocated strengthening CSCE peacekeeping capabilities.<sup>34</sup>

Whereas Hungary has tended to use the CSCE as a vehicle to promote improved minority rights, especially for the Hungarian minority, Poland has concentrated more on the security dimension. On November 11, 1992, Poland introduced a proposal for a "CSCE Code of Conduct in the Field of Security." The proposal sought to build on and expand the obligations undertaken by member states under the UN Charter and Helsinki Final Act by establishing norms guiding defense policies and postures, norms for cooperative international security, and principles guiding the conduct and use of force.<sup>35</sup>

## PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The evolution of East European attitudes toward the CSCE highlights the East European countries' basic security dilemma. The CSCE remains an important forum for mediation and conflict prevention, but it cannot provide hard security. For such security, the East European countries are likely to continue to look to NATO. Thus, for the foreseeable future, the countries of Eastern Europe are likely to regard the CSCE and other forms of regional cooperation as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, integration in Western political and security institutions.

Over the longer term, the evolution of regional cooperation in Eastern Europe will depend to a large extent on developments within the EC and NATO. If the EC and NATO open their ranks to the countries of Eastern Europe—or at least the Visegrad countries—regional

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Role of the CSCE," at the Third Meeting of the CSCE Council, Stockholm, December 14, 1992, p. 3 (mimeographed).

<sup>34</sup>See the keynote speech by Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky at the CSCE Council of Ministers Meeting in Stockholm, December 14, 1992, *Current Policy*, No. 29, 1992 (Budapest: Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 19, 1992), p. 3.

<sup>35</sup>"Proposal by the Delegation of Poland: CSCE Code of Conduct in the Field of Security," November 1992 (mimeographed) (copy courtesy of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

cooperation in Eastern Europe is likely to remain modest and limited primarily to the economic sphere. But, if the EC and NATO (particularly the latter) remain "closed shops," some countries in Eastern Europe may begin to look around for other alternatives and new regional constellations could emerge. In such a case, a Central European security zone—or some version of one—might begin to look more attractive.

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## GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE

Of all the countries in Western Europe, Germany has the strongest interest in Eastern Europe. Historically, Germany has looked east as much as west. Its ties to Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, and Moscow were often much stronger than those to London, Paris, or Brussels.<sup>1</sup> Those cities were strongholds of German culture and influence. Indeed, many prominent East European intellectuals, such as Franz Kafka and György Lukács, wrote their most important works in German rather than in their native languages.

Germany's close integration into the West after World War II was a *break* with German history—not the norm. Konrad Adenauer, Germany's first chancellor, was convinced that Germany's past attempt to act as a bridge between Western and Eastern Europe had been the main cause of Germany's ruin. He was determined to ensure that this mistake was not repeated a third time. He thus consciously strove to bind Germany tightly to the West—even at the expense of accepting the (temporary, in his mind) division of the country.

Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* was, in part, an effort to redress the imbalance.<sup>2</sup> Its main purpose was to foster a reconciliation with

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<sup>1</sup>On Germany's strong historical and cultural ties to Eastern Europe, in particular, see Karl Schlögel, *Die Mitte liegt ostwärts* (Berlin: Corso bei Siedler, 1986).

<sup>2</sup>A detailed discussion of Germany's *Ostpolitik* cannot be undertaken here. For useful background, see Lawrence Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), and William E. Griffith, *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1978). The best concise work in German is Peter Bender's *Neue Ostpolitik* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1986).



Germany's Eastern neighbors. In effect, it represented an important reversal of German priorities. Adenauer had made reunification a prerequisite for détente; under Brandt, détente became a prerequisite for reunification.

*Ostpolitik*, however, was not a German *Alleingang* or an effort to get out in front, but rather a *response* to a shift in Western policy and, above all, U.S. policy from confrontation to détente. Once U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union began to shift to a more conciliatory path in the Kennedy era, the Federal Republic had little choice but to follow suit or risk diplomatic isolation. As Josef Joffe has pointed out, for a country as sensitive to the specter of diplomatic isolation as the Federal Republic, *Ostpolitik* was a matter of staying in the Western mainstream rather than of leaving it, of "following rather than leading."<sup>3</sup>

Germany's initial détente efforts focused primarily on Eastern Europe. By the mid-1960s, Germany had made significant progress in improving relations with several East European countries, especially Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. However, Moscow strongly opposed Bonn's *Ostpolitik*, which Russia saw as a calculated effort to undermine its hegemony in Eastern Europe. Moscow feared that *Ostpolitik* might induce its East European allies to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn before Bonn agreed to recognize the post-war borders—Moscow's prime foreign-policy goal in Europe. In response, the Soviet leadership intensified its efforts to isolate the Federal Republic and portray Germany as a hotbed of revanchism and neo-Nazism.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was an important watershed. Although it did not end Bonn's efforts at détente with the East, it made clear that "the road to Prague led through Moscow"—that is, any meaningful effort at détente with Eastern Europe would require Moscow's blessing. It thus forced an important reversal of Bonn's priorities: Prior to 1968, the Federal Republic mainly focused its détente efforts on Eastern Europe; after 1968, Bonn concentrated primarily on the Soviet Union. Once Germany had settled its outstanding differences with Moscow, with the signing of the

<sup>3</sup>Josef Joffe, "All Quiet on the Eastern Front," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1984-85, p. 304.

Renunciation of Force Agreement in August 1970, the way was opened for normalizing relations with Eastern Europe, including the GDR.

The Eastern treaties essentially represented a *modus vivendi*: an acknowledgment that, to change the territorial status quo in the long run, Bonn had to accept it in the short run. However, Bonn never relinquished its goal of reunification. It simply agreed not to change the borders by force—which it had no intention of doing in any event. In return, Moscow halted its effort to isolate Bonn and to block its access to Eastern Europe including the GDR.

At the time, many observers, especially West Germans, thought that the Soviet Union had obtained the better deal. After all, Moscow had achieved the main goal of its postwar European diplomacy: Bonn's acceptance of the postwar territorial status quo. But it had paid a price, agreeing that borders could be changed by "peaceful means"—a point that was also included, at German insistence, in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The Federal Republic thus kept open the legal possibility of reunification.

Moreover, *Ostpolitik* initiated important processes of social and political change in Eastern Europe, including the GDR. It would be an exaggeration to say that Bonn's *Ostpolitik* caused the collapse of the GDR. Other factors, especially Gorbachev's *perestroika*, played a critical role. But *Ostpolitik* was an important contributing factor. *Ostpolitik* brought closer contacts, which weakened the East German government's legitimacy and its ability to maintain tight control over society.

It was Gorbachev's policy, however, that finally brought the system crashing down.<sup>4</sup> Gorbachev's refusal to use force to stop the growing unrest in the GDR in fall 1989 sounded the death knell for the East German leadership—and the existence of the GDR as a separate state. It would be wrong, however, to believe that Gorbachev actually sought the collapse of the GDR. On the contrary, he wanted to "reform socialism" in order to strengthen it, not destroy it. But his

<sup>4</sup>For a detailed discussion of the impact of Gorbachev's policy on the GDR, see F. Stephen Larrabee, "Moscow and German Unification," *The Harriman Forum*, May 1991, pp. 1–9.

reform efforts unleashed political forces that he could not control and that eventually led to the collapse of the system and to German unification.

### GERMANY'S NEW *ZWANG NACH OSTEN*

The unification of Germany put to rest the old German question. At the same time, it raised a new, and equally important, German question: How will the new Germany define its role in the "new Europe," especially vis-à-vis Eastern Europe? With the completion of unification and the end of the Cold War, this question is likely to loom increasingly larger on Germany's foreign-policy agenda. How it is answered will have an important impact on Europe's future.

Germany was in many ways the big winner of the Cold War. The collapse of communism paved the way for German unification and created new opportunities for expanding German influence in Eastern Europe. The irony is that Germany could prove to be the great loser in post-Cold War Europe.<sup>5</sup> The revolutions of 1989 not only produced German unity, they also unraveled the peace orders established at Yalta and Versailles, spawning, in turn, growing ethnic conflict and nationalism on Germany's eastern borders, which pose a direct threat to Germany's own political stability.

These developments are forcing Germany to redefine its foreign-policy interests and priorities.<sup>6</sup> As a result of the end of the Cold War and unification, German attitudes toward security and Germany's own national interests are changing. An increasing number of Germans today see Eastern Europe as a "vital interest."<sup>7</sup> As Ronald

<sup>5</sup>This point is developed further in Ronald D. Asmus, "Germany's Geopolitical Normalization" (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, unpublished draft).

<sup>6</sup>The question of what impact unification will have on Germany's future politics and foreign policy has unleashed a wide-ranging—and sometimes heated—discussion in Germany. For example, Margarita Mathiopoulos argues that unification has significantly altered the orientation and value system not only in the eastern part of Germany but in the western part, as well, and that the new Germany created by unification will be significantly different from the pre-unification Federal Republic. See Margarita Mathiopoulos, *Das Ende der Bonner Republik* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1993).

<sup>7</sup>See the data in Ronald D. Asmus, *Germany's Geopolitical Maturation* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, IP-105, February 1993), p. 2.

Asmus has pointed out, the old *Drang nach Osten* (drive eastward) is being replaced by a new *Zwang nach Osten*,<sup>8</sup> an imperative to become more involved in the East to prevent instability on its eastern border from spilling over and destabilizing Germany itself.

This new *Zwang nach Osten* has both economic and political roots. Economically, Germany is the leading Western trading partner for all the countries in Eastern Europe. It is the largest investor in the Czech Republic and the second largest in Hungary and Poland. Some economists, in fact, believe that Eastern Europe will become part of a larger deutsche mark (DM) zone.

Politically, as well, the Federal Republic has a strong stake in stability in Eastern Europe. Any large-scale unrest in Eastern Europe could have major implications for domestic stability in Germany, increasing pressure for emigration on tens of thousands of East European citizens and accentuating Germany's growing immigration and refugee problems. Germany is today the largest recipient of refugees within the EC. In 1992, over 430,000 persons applied for political asylum in Germany—nearly double the number that applied in 1991 and representing over half of all asylum seekers in the EC in 1992. The highest number of those seeking asylum came from Eastern Europe—particularly Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria.<sup>9</sup>

In short, the Federal Republic's domestic stability is intimately tied to the fate of the reform process in Eastern Europe. The failure of the reforms will directly affect Germany's own social stability and economic prosperity, much more than those of other countries within the EC. Hence, Germany has emerged as the main proponent of integrating Eastern Europe into Western political and economic organizations, especially the EC. Germany is also the single-largest contributor of financial assistance to the East. In 1992 it provided 32 percent of Western assistance to Eastern Europe and 56 percent of the aid to the former Soviet Union.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup>See Ronald D. Asmus, *German Unification and Its Ramifications* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4021-A, 1991), p. 70.

<sup>9</sup>For a comprehensive discussion, see F. Stephen Larrabee, "Down and Out in Warsaw and Budapest," *International Security*, Spring 1992, pp. 5-33.

<sup>10</sup>See Kohl's Tanner Lecture at Berkeley, *Press Release* (Los Angeles: Consulate General of Germany, September 13, 1992), p. 6.

Bonn's growing economic and political interests in Eastern Europe have increased its stake in the emergence of a stable Eastern Europe and in tying the security of the countries of the region more tightly to Western security structures. Together with the United States, Germany has been the strongest proponent of strengthening Eastern Europe's ties to NATO and preventing the emergence of a security vacuum in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, for instance, was largely a U.S.-German initiative. More recently German politicians, especially Defense Minister Volker Rühe, have begun to call openly for NATO membership for the countries of Eastern Europe.<sup>11</sup> These efforts underscore the degree to which Germany is beginning to take a leading role in defining the security agenda for the post-Cold War era.

The Yugoslav crisis has reinforced German concerns about the dangers of instability in Eastern Europe. The German political elite increasingly see such conflicts as the main threats to European—and especially German—security. Rühe's outspoken advocacy for including the East European countries in NATO has in large part been prompted by his perception of the growing dangers of instability in Eastern Europe for Germany and Europe as a whole. His concerns are shared by a wide spectrum of the German elite, even if they do not necessarily agree with all his specific proposals for dealing with the instability.

### EVOLVING EAST EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF GERMANY

Germany's new *Zwang nach Osten* has coincided with an important shift in East European attitudes toward Germany. West Germany's *Ostpolitik* served largely to defuse the fear of the German bogey exploited by Moscow for many years to maintain its hegemony in Eastern Europe. And Germany has been the leading proponent of East-West détente and arms control within the Atlantic Alliance. As a

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<sup>11</sup>Volker Rühe, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era," *Survival*, Summer 1993, p. 135. See also his keynote speech, "The European-Atlantic Relationship in a Changing World," to the 12th German-American Round Table of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Washington, D.C., June 10, 1993, especially pp. 17, 21 (mimeographed).

result, fear and mistrust of Germany have significantly declined, especially among the younger generation, which did not experience the horrors of World War II and Nazi atrocities.

The shift in attitudes toward Germany was evident as the process of German unification gathered momentum in early 1990. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland all favored membership of a united Germany in NATO, and Romania and Bulgaria did not oppose it. They viewed German membership in NATO as the best means to contain a powerful Germany and to hedge against a revival of German hegemonic ambitions in the east. The Soviet Union was now left isolated, the sole Warsaw Pact member actively opposed to German membership in NATO.

Fear of Germany has not completely disappeared in Eastern Europe. But the motivations behind East European concerns have changed. Two decades ago, many East Europeans feared (largely as a result of communist authorities' propaganda) that Germany might seek to regain lost territories by force. Today, East European concerns center around the fear of economic domination. On the whole, however, such fears are outweighed by the desire to attract German trade and investment capital.

At the same time, East European elite do not want their countries to become "German colonies." They prefer to see a flow of investment capital from other Western countries, especially the United States, to counterbalance German capital. Many particularly lament the lack of strong American economic interest in Eastern Europe. They see such investment not only as a counterweight to German economic influence but as a way of insuring continued U.S. political interest in the region.

## **BILATERAL RELATIONS**

### **Poland**

As far as bilateral ties are concerned, Poland's relations with Germany remain the most complicated of all those of the former East European members of the Warsaw Pact. Fear of Germany has centuries-old roots, reinforced by the atrocities and destruction that occurred under Nazi occupation and by 45 years of communist propa-

ganda. *Ostpolitik* and the signing of the Bonn-Warsaw Treaty in 1970, which normalized relations between the two countries, did much to reduce that mistrust and suspicion, but it did not remove it entirely. Many Poles continued to harbor fears that Germany might try to reclaim territories in Eastern Prussia that it was forced to cede to Poland at the end of World War II.

Chancellor Kohl's unwillingness to recognize unequivocally the Oder-Neisse Line in spring 1990 rekindled many of these fears and was the main reason for the Mazowiecki government's initial delay in negotiating a Soviet troop withdrawal from its territory. Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki saw the continued deployment of Soviet troops on Polish soil as an "insurance policy" against the emergence of a powerful, and possibly expansionist, Germany on its western border as well as a means of potential leverage in Poland's negotiations with Bonn.

The conclusion of the German-Polish border treaty in November 1990, however, has contributed to an important positive shift in Polish attitudes toward Germany. The Mazowiecki government regarded the treaty as a litmus test of German intentions and desire for reconciliation. Since the signing of the agreement, public opinion polls show a marked reduction in Polish fear of Germany. Today, Poles see Ukraine as a greater threat than Germany.<sup>12</sup>

The border treaty has great political significance, not just for Poland but for European security as a whole. First, it removes the main source of tension in Polish-German relations and lays the basis for a far-reaching rapprochement between the two countries over the long term. Second, it provides Poland with a secure western border, relieving Warsaw of the need to rely on Russia as a protector and counterweight to German power.

In addition, in June 1991, Poland and Germany signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty provides the basis for a

<sup>12</sup>According to a poll taken in January 1992, 38 percent of those Polish citizens polled said that Ukraine was Poland's most dangerous neighbor; 28 percent said Germany was the greatest threat; 16 percent identified Russia; and 17 percent saw no threat at all. PAP, 15:24 GMT, February 24, 1992, translated in FBIS-EEU-92-032, February 18, 1992, p. 31.

broad expansion of ties.<sup>13</sup> It also contains important guarantees for the rights of the German minority in Poland—one of Bonn's prime concerns. It thus removes an important irritant in bilateral relations. In return, Bonn committed to support Poland's full membership in the EC and to help develop Poland's market economy.

Military cooperation has also expanded significantly in the past several years. In January 1993, Germany and Poland signed a military cooperation agreement. The agreement calls for closer cooperation in a number of areas, such as security policy, arms control, and humanitarian assistance.<sup>14</sup> Training seminars and information exchanges are also to be expanded, and the number of Polish officers studying at German military academies and institutions of higher learning is to be increased.

Equipment and weapons purchases, however, have remained quite limited. Poland has also expressed an interest in receiving East German weapons and more modern Western equipment.<sup>15</sup> To date, Bonn has been reluctant to sell stocks from the former East German Nationale Volksarmee (NVA) to East European countries. However, in November 1992, it agreed to sell some East German spare parts to Hungary, which could open the door for a similar deal with Poland.

Economic relations, however, have lagged behind political and military relations. There are strong fears among parts of the Polish population that Poland will become dependent on German capital.<sup>16</sup> These fears, together with continued bureaucratic obstacles, have

<sup>13</sup>For the text of the treaty, see *Deutschland Archiv*, August 1991, pp. 868–876. For a comprehensive discussion, see Dieter Bingen, *Deutschland und Polen in Europa: Probleme, Verträge und Perspektiven* (Cologne: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1991), pp. 24–43.

<sup>14</sup>"Militärische Zusammenarbeit mit Polen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 26, 1993. Also see "Polens Suche nach Rückhalt im Westen," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 27, 1993.

<sup>15</sup>A package was presented to Bonn by the Polish government in summer 1991 that proposed the purchase of three MI-14 rescue helicopters, two Tarantul patrol boats, two SU 22 fighter aircraft, 12 MI-24 attack helicopters, 36 rocket launchers, 24 grenade launchers, and 21 anti-tank missiles. Poland would also like to obtain MiG-29s and T-72s from the former East German army inventory. See "Stoltenberg sieht sich in Polen grossen Erwartungen gegenüber," *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, March 24, 1992.

<sup>16</sup>These fears are particularly strong within the Christian National Union (ZChN), which is critical of Poland's pro-Western policy and close ties with Germany.



discouraged German industry from investing heavily in Poland. In 1991, German investment in Poland only amounted to 300–400 million DM, which is about 20 percent of all foreign investment in Poland.<sup>17</sup> In Czechoslovakia, by contrast, German investment in 1991 made up close to 80 percent of all foreign investment in the country.

The relatively modest level of German investment is a major source of concern to the Polish leadership. During his visit to Bonn in April 1992, for instance, Walesa expressed disappointment in the low level of German investment in Poland and called for intensifying economic relations.<sup>18</sup> Former Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka made a similar pitch during her visit to Bonn in November 1992.<sup>19</sup> However, German industry is likely to remain reluctant to invest heavily in Poland until the climate for investment improves.

Several other issues could complicate relations in the future. The most serious is the growth of right-wing extremism and anti-foreigner sentiment in Germany. Turks, Gypsies, and Third World refugees are the main targets of this violence; however, the number of attacks against Poles traveling to Germany has also increased. Anti-Polish sentiment remains strong among parts of the German population, especially in the former East German states.<sup>20</sup> Several hundred thousand Poles are working in Germany, many of them illegally. If the German economy plunges deeper into recession, there is a danger that they could become targets of neo-Nazi violence.

<sup>17</sup> "Angst vor zu starker Abhängigkeit von deutschen Investoren," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, February 4, 1992. See also Stephen Engelberg, "Eager if Uneasy, East Europe Accepts German Investment," *New York Times*, January 23, 1992.

<sup>18</sup> Martin Winter, "Der erste Staatsbesuch," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, March 28, 1992; "Walesa wirbt um deutsche Investoren," *Die Welt*, March 28, 1992; "Werben Polens um deutsche Investitionen," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, April 1, 1992. See also Walesa's interview, "A Bridgehead to Good Neighborliness," *Zygie Warszawy*, March 22, 1992, p. 3, translated in FBIS-EEU-92-063, April 1, 1992, p. 19.

<sup>19</sup> "Deutsche Unterstützung für Polens EG-Pläne," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, November 7, 1992.

<sup>20</sup> Many Polish intellectuals believe that it is the former GDR that constitutes the main obstacle to reconciliation. In contrast to the Federal Republic, the GDR never went through a far-reaching process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (overcoming the past). For a detailed discussion of this point, see, in particular, Anna Wolff-Poweska, "Polen und Deutsche in einem sich vereinigenden Europa," *Europa Archiv*, Folge 22, November 25, 1990, pp. 679–684.

The German minority in Poland presents a second potential irritant. In general, the situation of the German minority has improved as a result of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in June 1991, which, as noted earlier, contained important provisions for minority rights. However, the question of the German minority continues to be a sensitive issue in bilateral relations. Relations were strained in November 1992, for instance, when the German minority attempted to erect unauthorized war memorials to members of the Wehrmacht killed in Silesia.<sup>21</sup> However, both sides appear determined not to allow the issue to escalate and disrupt the recent rapprochement.

In short, Germany and Poland have made significant progress in laying the foundation for a long-term improvement in relations, but the foundations for this rapprochement remain fragile. Growing internal instability in Germany, particularly a continued upsurge of right-wing violence, would raise deep concern in Poland and could disturb the recent rapprochement. Moreover, public opinion polls show that there is still a good deal of mistrust between the two sides.<sup>22</sup> Thus, the process of reconciliation is likely to take some time.

### The Czech and Slovak Republics

Relations with Czechoslovakia improved significantly after 1990. Germany signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Czechoslovakia at the end of February 1992, updating the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty signed in 1973. In the 1992 treaty, Bonn explicitly committed itself to support Czechoslovakia's entry into the EC.

<sup>21</sup>See "Deutsche Unterstützung für Polens EG-Pläne," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, November 7, 1992, and "Kohl will Polen in die E.G. helfen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 6, 1992.

<sup>22</sup>See the extensive public opinion data in *Der Spiegel*, No. 36, September 2, 1991, pp. 48-57. According to the opinion data, only 51 percent of the Poles think that Germany will remain democratic. German attitudes toward Poles, however, are more negative than Polish attitudes toward Germans. See also "Schon Freund oder noch Feind?" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 31, 1991.

Much of the credit for the rapprochement belongs to (then) Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel. From the outset, Havel made reconciliation with Germany a top priority, calling upon his countrymen to recognize the injustice of the expulsion of several million Sudeten Germans after World War II—long a taboo subject in Czechoslovakia. While his call did not sit well with many Czechs, it laid the political and moral foundations for the improvement in relations that has taken place since 1990.

That improvement has been most visible in the economic area. Germany was Czechoslovakia's biggest export market, accounting for 25 percent of its total exports in 1991.<sup>23</sup> Germany was also the largest foreign investor in Czechoslovakia by a wide margin. In 1991 German investment constituted nearly 80 percent of all foreign investment in the country. This large infusion of German capital has created some concern in the Czech lands, however, that the country could become a "German colony."<sup>24</sup>

German firms, such as Volkswagen, Siemens, and Mercedes, have been attracted by the relatively high educational level and engineering skills of the Czech and Slovak workforce, as well as by the low labor costs and access to the Eastern markets. Moreover, the Czech Republic and Germany share common historical and economic ties: Bohemia was the industrial heartland of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and much of the pre-war industrial infrastructure is German. German firms have thus been willing to take a long-term approach to economic cooperation and invest heavily in upgrading production to Western standards, which has given them an edge over other foreign competitors.

The breakup of the Czechoslovak Federation is likely to lead to even closer cooperation between the Czech Republic and Germany over

<sup>23</sup> RFF/RL Daily Report, No. 68, April 7, 1992.

<sup>24</sup> These concerns were reflected, in particular, in a letter sent by the head of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service to President Havel and other key Czechoslovak government officials in early February 1992, warning of the "growing influence of German capital in Bohemia," and of an effort by Germany to "achieve complete economic dominance in the Bohemian lands." See "In Prag Warnung vor deutschen Kapital," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 5, 1992, and Jaroslav Spurny, "The Head of Intelligence Writes to the Government," *Respekt*, No. 7, February 17-23, 1992, p. 4, translated in FBIS-EEU-92-037, February 25, 1992, pp. 9-10.

the long run. Most of the German investment in the former Czechoslovakia is in the Czech Republic. Over the next decade, the Czech Republic is likely to become increasingly linked economically with Germany, particularly Bavaria. Bavaria, Saxony, Thuringen, and the Czech Republic have also formed a "Euro-region" in an effort to stimulate cross-border trade.

Slovakia, on the other hand, is likely to have a harder time attracting German capital because of its outmoded state enterprises and its weaker commitment to rapid market reform. Bonn, however, is unlikely to neglect Slovakia entirely, in part because Slovakia is an important transit point for asylum seekers who enter the Czech Republic and then go on to Germany. Germany has thus strongly supported efforts to integrate Slovakia into Western institutions, particularly the European Community.

One issue that could become relatively more important in the future is the question of the Sudeten Germans. This issue surfaced during the negotiations over the Czechoslovak-German Friendship Treaty in 1991 and led to a delay in the signing of the treaty. Sudeten German exile groups, many of them located in southern Bavaria, demanded compensation for their property and/or a right to get their property back. The Czechoslovak government refused to consider claims originating before February 1948 (the date when the communists took power). The Czech government has adopted the same approach. However, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has offered to begin an informal dialogue with representatives of the Sudeten Germans through the establishment of a working group set up by the coalition partners in the Czech government.

The reemergence of the Sudeten issue illustrates how sensitive the subject of the expulsion of Sudeten Germans remains even after 50 years. The controversy is part of the more deep-seated problem, first raised by Havel in early 1990, of the need for the Czechs to come to terms with their own past and with an issue that has long been considered taboo. It also reflects Czech sensitivity about relations with a larger and more powerful Germany: Many Czechs fear that a restitution of property to the Sudeten Germans would lead to a large influx of Sudeten Germans into the Czech lands, increasing the prospect of German domination.

## Hungary

Of the four Visegrad countries, Hungary's attitude toward Germany is the most positive. The two countries fought on the same side in two world wars, and German cultural influence in Hungary has traditionally been strong. Moreover, Hungary's decision to open its borders in September 1989, which paved the way for German unification, has given Hungary a special status in German eyes. At the same time, from Budapest's perspective, good relations with Bonn are seen as a critical element in its strategy to become a full member of the EC as rapidly as possible.

Relations between Hungary and Germany have improved significantly since 1989. The two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on February 6, 1992. The treaty marked a substantial upgrading of bilateral relations and sets the framework for future long-term cooperation between the two countries.<sup>25</sup> In the treaty, Germany committed to help Hungary gain early entry into the EC—Hungary's top foreign-policy goal. The treaty is part of a series of similar treaties signed by Hungary with key European countries (including France, Italy, and Spain), and is intended to underscore the "European" character of Hungary's foreign-policy orientation.

Economically, Bonn is Budapest's most important foreign trading partner, accounting for about 25 percent of Hungary's foreign trade, and the second-largest source of foreign investment (the United States is first). Unlike Poland and Czechoslovakia, however, there is relatively little fear of "Germanization" in Hungary or concern that Hungary will be "bought up" by the Germans, partly because foreign investment in Hungary is more balanced and less dominated by German capital.

Politically, Germany is regarded as the most important actor in the new Europe. Its role in promoting recognition of Slovenia and Croatia—a move strongly favored by Hungary—has added to its prestige in Hungarian eyes. In addition, there are strong personal and party ties between Kohl and Antall. Both are leaders of Christian Democratic parties and share similar views on many issues. These

<sup>25</sup>For details, see Alfred A. Reisch, "Hungarian-German Treaty Cements Close Relations," *RFE/RL Research Report*, March 6, 1992, pp. 26-31.

personal-party ties have significantly contributed to strengthened bonds between the two countries.

Military cooperation has also expanded. Defense Minister Volker R  he signed a military cooperation agreement with Hungary during his visit to Budapest in March 1993. The agreement is similar to the one signed between Germany and Poland in January 1993 and provides for increased exchanges of information, and training for Hungarian officers at German military academies and institutions of higher learning.

Bonn has also begun to help the Hungarian government modernize its armed forces. Hungary has frequently expressed interest in buying some of the excess East German military equipment from Germany as part of Hungary's effort to modernize its military forces. For a long while, Germany refused to approve such sales, arguing that sales of the equipment were impossible as long the Yugoslav conflict was in progress. However, in November 1992 Bonn agreed to supply Hungary with some spare parts from the GDR arsenal.<sup>26</sup>

### **Bulgaria and Romania**

Germany has no serious bilateral problems with Bulgaria. In October 1991, the two countries signed a Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship to provide the framework for long-term cooperation. Bulgaria is looking to Germany in particular for assistance in modernizing its economy. In that bilateral treaty, Germany agreed to help Bulgaria strengthen its ties to the EC.<sup>27</sup> Military ties have also expanded.

Romania has been a low priority for Bonn. Relations during the latter part of the Ceausescu era were strained, primarily as a result of Ceausescu's restrictive emigration policy toward the German minority in Romania. Ceausescu's ouster, however, removed the minority issue as a stumbling block and opened the way to an improvement in relations. The two countries signed a new bilateral treaty in early

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<sup>26</sup> *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 222, November 18, 1992.

<sup>27</sup> "Partnerschaftsvertrag mit Bulgarien," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 10, 1992. For the text of the treaty, see FBIS-WEU-91-198, October 11, 1991, pp. 2-3.

1992, which provides strong guarantees for the rights of the German minority. The Romanian government has also allowed their unrestricted emigration. Indeed, if current levels of emigration continue, in a few years there will be virtually no ethnic Germans left in Romania.<sup>28</sup>

Bulgaria and Romania are likely to remain low priorities on Bonn's agenda relative to the Visegrad countries. However, Bonn cannot afford to ignore the two countries altogether. Both countries (especially Romania) are a major source of refugees applying for asylum in Germany, which gives Bonn a strong stake in the success of the reforms and democratization process in both countries. Bonn's interest is reinforced by its concern for stability in the Balkans as a whole. Both countries play an important role in the overall Balkan security equation and have generally supported greater Balkan cooperation—a trend Bonn would like to encourage.

## THE RUSSIAN FACTOR

Germany will have to balance its increased profile in Eastern Europe with its desire to maintain good relations with Moscow. This tension in its policy has been a traditional dilemma for Bonn. Soviet concerns about the influence of Bonn's policy toward Eastern Europe on Soviet interests in the region was one of the prime impediments to the success of its *Ostpolitik* in the late 1960s. The Russian factor was also a major consideration in former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's détente policy in the 1980s.

The weight of the Russian factor in German policy, however, is likely gradually to decline in the future. With the completion of unification and the withdrawal of Russian troops from German soil by 1994, Germany need no longer be as sensitive to Russian concerns. Moreover, Germany's economic clout has increased as a result of unification, whereas Russia's economic position has declined, making Moscow even more of a supplicant than in the past.

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<sup>28</sup>Roughly half of the estimated 200,000–220,000 Germans living in Romania in 1989 emigrated to Germany in 1990. For a comprehensive discussion, see Dan Ionescu, "Countdown for the German Minority?" *Report on Eastern Europe*, September 13, 1991, pp. 32–41.

The retirement of Hans-Dietrich Genscher as foreign minister has also removed an important advocate of a "Russia first" policy from the German political lineup. His successor, Klaus Kinkel, holds a more balanced view and has quietly sought to reshape the Foreign Ministry, removing top Genscher protégés and putting his own people into key positions of responsibility. As a result, the Foreign Ministry today is far less dominated by Genscherists, and "Genscherism," than was previously the case.

A debate has already begun in elite circles on whether German policy should give priority to Russia or Eastern Europe. Some conservative critics have argued that the end of the Cold War has made obsolete the traditional—from Bismarck to Genscher—German preoccupation with Russia. They have called for Germany to "liberate itself from the perspective of the defeat of 1945 and traditional clichés." As one leading critic has put it:

The Germans must get used to the fact that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been moved far to the East. Russia's western border today is 1000 to 1500 kilometers from Germany's eastern border. Russia is no longer our big eastern neighbor, but rather a distant state bordering Asia.

This has made obsolete the tradition of Bismarck's Russian policy as well as that of the Weimar Republic. Neither Tauroggen nor Rapallo—to name the two most famous myths of Germany's Russian policy—are practical today. Economically and politically, states such as Ukraine, the Baltic countries, or even the new states currently emerging in the Caucasus, are of greater importance. . . .<sup>29</sup>

To be sure, these critics are in the minority. Nevertheless, their critique underscores an important geopolitical truth: With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the emergence of an independent Ukraine, and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany, Russia's overall importance to Germany has declined while that of Eastern Europe has increased. German policy is increasingly likely to

<sup>29</sup>Carl-Gustav Ströhm, "Mythen und Phantome," *Die Welt*, April 23, 1993. I am indebted to my RAND colleague Ronald D. Asmus for calling my attention to this quotation.



reflect this shift in the future, especially once all Russian troops have left German soil (1994).

### GERMANY'S FUTURE ROLE

The growth of German investment and economic ties with Eastern Europe is likely to lead to a gradual increase in Germany's stake in and commitment to the emergence of a stable security order in Eastern Europe. This does not mean that Bonn's ties to the West will weaken or that Bonn will pay less attention to Western integration. But it does mean that the weight of the East European factor in German policy is likely to grow and that Bonn will be compelled to give greater attention to ensuring stability in Eastern Europe.

Changes in German defense policy could give these trends greater impetus. Although in the past Germany has been unwilling to use its troops outside its territory, pressures are building for Germany to change its defense orientation to allow for such troop deployment. The Gulf War has reinforced these pressures and given them greater momentum, and it is likely that many of the past restrictions on the ability of German armed forces to operate outside German soil will be removed.<sup>30</sup>

The senior leadership in the Bundeswehr has increasingly emphasized the need to develop a broader political and strategic rationale for the German armed forces that goes beyond the traditional defense of German territory. The new German Defense Policy Guidelines (DPG) issued in late 1992, for instance, explicitly call attention to the dangers of proliferation and regional conflict on the periphery of Europe and argue that such threats must be met with preventive action before they have a chance to escalate. At the same time, the Bundeswehr is rapidly moving away from heavy forces toward lighter forces that can be moved quickly to areas of crisis.<sup>31</sup>

These changes will have a major impact on German defense planning. Once the constitutional issues are resolved, the German army

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<sup>30</sup>See Ronald D. Asmus, *Germany After the Gulf War* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, N-3391-AF, 1992).

<sup>31</sup>See Dieter Mahnke, "Wandel im Wandel: Bundeswehr und europäische Sicherheit," *Das Parlament. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, No. B15-16, April 9, 1993, pp. 40-46.

will be able to operate out of area, including on East European territory.<sup>32</sup> This change could have significant long-term implications for Germany's ties to Eastern Europe, especially in the security area, possibly leading to closer coordination between German and East European security policy and pressures for some sort of German security guarantee to Eastern Europe. At present, there is little enthusiasm in Bonn for giving such guarantees; but this situation could change if Eastern Europe is not more tightly integrated into Western defense structures.

At the same time, there are important limits on German engagement in Eastern Europe. Bonn's prime preoccupation in the next decade will be reconstructing the GDR—a task that is proving much more costly than was initially anticipated and one that will put significant constraints on the financial resources available for investment elsewhere. Bonn's commitment to help rebuild the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, will further constrain the funds available for assistance to Eastern Europe.

Bonn has made clear that, for both economic and political reasons, it does not want to undertake prime responsibility for reconstructing Eastern Europe. German officials have repeatedly emphasized that they believe that this should be a multilateral task carried out primarily through such organizations as the EC and G-24. Hence, in the future, Bonn is likely to press its Western allies, especially the United States and Japan, to pick up more of the burden.

Nevertheless, Germany's geographic proximity to, and deepening ties with, Eastern Europe will compel it increasingly to look east. In the decade ahead, Germany is likely to see its interests tied closely to Eastern Europe and to push more vigorously for incorporating Eastern Europe into Western security institutions, especially NATO. Defense Minister Volker Rühe's advocacy of East European member-

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<sup>32</sup>There has been some discussion of possible joint Polish-German maneuvers. However, the idea remains a sensitive issue in Poland. Plans to hold joint Danish-Polish-German naval exercises in September 1993 were canceled for fear they would spark a backlash among nationalist groups during the Polish election campaign. But the idea of joint maneuvers continues to have support in some Polish and German circles, particularly in the German Defense Ministry. See Klaus Bachmann, "Keine deutsch-polnischen Manöver," *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, September 8, 1993.

ship in NATO represents the "opening shot" in a widening debate over the alliance's overall evolution and transformation.

On this, as on such issues as the participation of German troops in humanitarian assistance missions in Somalia, R  he is out in front of the German government. But his views reflect the German political class's growing recognition that stabilizing the East is a necessity and must be a major German priority. Increasingly this *Zwang nach Osten* is likely to define and dominate the German foreign-policy agenda in the coming decade.

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**FRANCE AND EASTERN EUROPE**

After Germany, France is probably the most important European actor from an East European point of view. France is important not because it is so deeply or actively engaged in Eastern Europe—economically, its engagement is rather limited—but because its vision of Europe differs in many ways from those of Germany and the United States. Eastern Europe plays a distinctive role in that vision.

Despite the radical changes in Europe, especially in Eastern Europe, since 1989, French policy has retained a strong element of continuity. For France—at least until very recently—Eastern Europe has not been an object of interest in itself, but rather part of a grand strategy toward the United States, the Soviet Union, and Germany. Most of the time, France has needed Eastern Europe for realization of that strategy.<sup>1</sup>

For Charles de Gaulle, Eastern Europe was important as an instrument to achieve his broader vision of a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" in which France would play a prominent role. This vision could not be achieved, however, without emancipating Western Europe from U.S. tutelage and Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. Hence, the logic of de Gaulle's vision required him to encourage East European aspirations for greater autonomy.

In pursuing this vision, de Gaulle concentrated on Poland and Romania, two countries with which France had traditionally close

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<sup>1</sup>See Pierre Hassner, "The View from Paris," in Lincoln Gordon, ed., *Western Relations with Eastern Europe* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 189.

ties. These were also the two countries in Eastern Europe that had shown the most interest in seeking greater foreign-policy independence, i.e., were the most "Gaullist." Moreover, with Poland, France shared a common interest in stable borders and constraining German power: hence, de Gaulle's willingness to recognize the Oder-Neisse Line as early as 1958.

De Gaulle's policy failed, largely because it ran contrary to Soviet interests. Moscow was unwilling to ease its control of Eastern Europe—a point underscored by its invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The invasion, however, proved to be an "accident on the road to détente," to use Michel Debré's famous phrase at the time. It did not end East-West détente nor France's effort to promote it, but it did lead to a shift of emphasis in French policy. The new French détente policy that emerged in 1969–1970 was based on recognizing the status quo. De Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, encouraged the idea of a "special Franco-Soviet relationship." Eastern Europe hardly played a role in his policy. Instead, the focus was almost entirely on relations with Moscow.

Under President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, as well, policy toward the East was almost entirely focused on the Soviet Union. Eastern Europe played almost no role, as was reflected in France's initial, rather tepid, reaction to the crackdown on Solidarity, as well as in Giscard's ill-conceived meeting with Leonid Brezhnev in Warsaw in March 1979, when the French president sought to mediate a resolution of the Afghanistan crisis, which proved an abysmal failure and was widely criticized both at home and abroad.

François Mitterrand's policy also reflects this strong sense of continuity. For Mitterrand, as for de Gaulle and his successors, Eastern Europe has essentially been a pawn in the larger game vis-à-vis the USSR and Germany. Mitterrand did take a strong stance against the Soviet Union during the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) debate—witness his speech in the Bundestag during his visit to Bonn in 1983, urging West German deployment of Pershing II missiles. At the same time, however, concern for France's economic ties to the USSR prompted him to oppose tough sanctions against Moscow in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and he blocked any real attempt to coordinate Western credit policy. In December 1985, he became the first Western head of state to invite

Polish President General Wojciech Jaruzelski for an official state visit, a major diplomatic blunder that caused an outcry in France and that severely damaged France's carefully cultivated image as a champion of human rights.

The invitation underscored Mitterrand's fixation with the status quo. Although Mitterrand constantly paid lip service to the need to move "beyond Yalta" (*sortir de Yalta*), when the old bipolar world began to crumble in 1989, he proved one of the staunchest supporters of the status quo. His trip to the GDR in December 1989 seemed consciously designed to lend legitimacy to the Modrow government and to slow down the process of unification. Similarly, during his trip to Kiev in the same month, he, together with Gorbachev, warned against the dangers of artificially accelerating the process of German unification.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps the most clear-cut example of his innate caution and opposition to change, however, was his initial unwillingness to condemn the attempted coup in Moscow in August 1991, as well as his initial reluctance to embrace Yeltsin.<sup>3</sup> Only when it was clear that the coup would not succeed did Mitterrand fully come out against the plot.

## THE BILATERAL DIMENSION

Under Mitterrand, however, France has not entirely neglected Eastern Europe. On the contrary, France has sought to strengthen its ties to Eastern Europe since 1989. The main motivation behind this more active Eastern policy has been to prevent Eastern Europe from becoming an exclusively German sphere of influence. As in the past, France has focused special attention on Romania, taking the lead in supplying economic and humanitarian assistance to Romania in the period after Ceausescu's fall. Mitterrand was also the first Western

<sup>2</sup>See "Mitterrand in Kiev, Warns Bonn not to Press Reunification Issue," *New York Times*, December 7, 1989, and Jacques Almaric, "La réunification au centre des entretiens de M. Mitterrand avec M. Gorbachev," *Le Monde*, December 7, 1989.

<sup>3</sup>This caution was particularly evident during Yeltsin's visit to France in April 1991. He was treated coolly by Mitterrand and attacked by Jean Pierre Cot, head of the Socialist group in the European Parliament. Cot called Yeltsin a "provocateur" to his face during a heated debate in the Parliament. See Joanna Coles, "Yeltsin Gets Rough Treatment from Socialists in Unannounced Visit to Strasbourg," *The Guardian*, April 16, 1991.

leader to visit Romania (April 1991) after Ceausescu's overthrow, a time when other Western countries continued to hold Romania at arms length because of its neo-communist government and President Iliescu's uncertain commitment to pluralistic democracy. France has also been the main champion of Romania's cause in European institutions, such as the Council of Europe and the European Parliament.

To some extent, this preference for Romania is attributable to the strong historical ties between the two countries and Romania's Gaullist (i.e., independent) foreign policy under Ceausescu. Both countries played somewhat similar roles within their respective alliances, a fact that enhanced Romania's attraction for the French. But France's courtship of Romania also reflects its desire to prevent German domination of Eastern Europe. Romania is the one country in Eastern Europe where France has a political and cultural edge over Germany. Moreover, Germany has taken a rather cautious attitude toward expanding ties with Romania because of the ruling Party of Social Democracy of Romania's (formerly Democratic National Salvation Front) neo-communist image.

As part of its effort to make inroads in Eastern Europe, France has signed a series of bilateral Friendship and Cooperation treaties with the countries of Eastern Europe. The first was signed with Poland during Walesa's visit to Paris in April 1991. The treaty calls for expanding relations in a number of areas, especially culture and the economy, and stresses French support for Poland's entry into the EC "when conditions for entry have been met."

France signed similar treaties with Hungary (September 1991), Czechoslovakia (October 1991), and Romania (November 1991). More recently, Paris has sought to court Slovakia, offering its services as "Slovakia's lawyer" in international negotiations.<sup>4</sup> Here, again, France is mainly motivated by a desire to counterbalance Germany, which has a strong economic presence in the Czech Republic.

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<sup>4</sup>Sylvie Kauffmann, "M. Roland Dumas apporte le soutien de la France à la Roumanie et la Slovaquie," *Le Monde*, January 14, 1993. Former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas was the first Western foreign minister to visit Slovakia after that state achieved independence on January 1, 1993.

Slovakia, on the other hand, has been largely neglected by the West, a fact that France has sought to exploit to its political advantage.

France was also instrumental in establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Mitterrand first proposed the idea for the bank in October 1989 at a meeting of the G-7 industrialized countries. France strongly lobbied for establishing the bank, and the idea was eventually endorsed by the United States and Japan. The selection of Jacques Attali, a former adviser to Mitterrand, as the first president of the EBRD was due in large part to Mitterrand's influence and the critical role played by France in creating the bank.

However, France opposed an early widening of the European Community to include Eastern Europe. Instead, France favored first "deepening" the Community by strengthening its institutions. An early widening of the Community, France feared, could weaken the Community as well as reduce France's influence in it, since Paris sees the Visegrad countries as a de facto German sphere of influence.

As an alternative to rapid entry into the EC for Eastern Europe, Mitterrand pushed the idea of a "European confederation," the exact purpose of which remained vague. According to Mitterrand, the confederation would serve as a framework for Eastern Europe to interact with the West on an equal footing while the East European countries reform and modernize their economies.<sup>5</sup>

The East European countries, however, showed little enthusiasm for the confederation idea. They feared that it was meant to serve as a substitute for their rapid integration into the EC: "a political dog-house," as former Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel termed it, "where the EC puts those countries it does not want."<sup>6</sup> They also objected to the excluding of the United States, a point that became a major bone of contention between Havel and Mitterrand during the preparations for the jointly sponsored Conference on European

<sup>5</sup>Ibid. See also "Mitterrand zur Idee einer Europa-Konföderation," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, June 14, 1991; "Mitterrand Clarifies Scheme for Grand European Confederation," *Financial Times*, June 13, 1991; and Ian Davidson, "Ambiguity Clouds Idea of Pan-Europe Confederation," *Financial Times*, June 12, 1991.

<sup>6</sup>See his interview in *Le Figaro*, October 2, 1991.



Confederation in June 1991.<sup>7</sup> Finally, the East Europeans were concerned that the proposed confederation could duplicate the CSCE and weaken it.

Despite these objections, Mitterrand continued to promote the idea of a confederation in major speeches during the course of 1992.<sup>8</sup> However, the idea has largely become a dead letter with the Balladur government's proposal for a "Conference on Stability in Europe" (discussed below), submitted to the EC leaders at the Copenhagen summit in June 1993.

## THE SECURITY DIMENSION

In the security area, as well, there have been significant differences between France and the countries of Eastern Europe. France has led the effort to create an independent European defense identity within the EC.<sup>9</sup> At the same time, it has opposed most efforts to strengthen NATO or to expand its responsibilities eastward. It initially opposed the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council on the grounds that it would usurp the CSCE's role, agreeing to its establishment only after NACC's responsibilities were scaled back.<sup>10</sup> And it also initially opposed expanding NATO's role into the area of peacekeeping, although it ultimately accepted the Oslo declaration, which sanctioned a new role for NATO in peacekeeping operations under CSCE auspices on a case-by-case basis.

The East European countries, on the other hand, regard NATO as the main instrument for ensuring security in Europe and want to see NATO's responsibilities expanded and strengthened. They also want

<sup>7</sup>See Henry Kamm, "Rebuffing Mitterrand, Havel Affirms U.S. Ties," *New York Times*, June 13, 1991.

<sup>8</sup>He raised the idea, for instance, at a major East-West symposium in Paris in early March 1992 and again in a speech before the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in early May. See "Je plaide pour une structure permanente de l'Europe toute entière," *Le Monde*, March 3, 1992; "Mitterrand für europäische Konföderation," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 2, 1992; and "M. Mitterrand a défendu sa 'théorie des ensembles' pour l'Europe de demain," *Le Monde*, May 6, 1992.

<sup>9</sup>For a comprehensive discussion of the French position, see David S. Yost, "France and West European Defence Identity," *Survival*, July-August 1991, pp. 327-351.

<sup>10</sup>"France Questions U.S./German Plan," *Financial Times*, October 9, 1991, and David Buchan, "France Yields in NATO Wrangle," *Financial Times*, November 1, 1991.

the United States to maintain a strong presence in Europe. While they desire closer ties to the WEU, they do not want to take any actions that would weaken NATO; they therefore favor the WEU's becoming the "European pillar" of NATO. Their position, in other words, is much closer to the approach of the Netherlands or Britain than to that of France or Spain.

The French reservations about NACC are related to Paris's larger concerns about NATO. France wants the EC to develop a strong security identity independent of NATO and to see the EC become the main European security and defense organization in post-Cold War Europe. Closer ties to Eastern Europe would not only give NATO a new function, French officials fear, but could lead to France's increased isolation within the alliance, since the East Europeans (except for Romania) are strong Atlanticists.

### THE WINDS OF CHANGE

Since the beginning of 1993, however, there have been signs of an evolution in French thinking on security issues, including those related to Eastern Europe. The Yugoslav crisis has heightened the French government's awareness of the dangers of instability in Eastern Europe and the need to project security into the region. As a result, the French government has begun to pursue a more active policy toward Eastern Europe, especially the Visegrad countries, and to give the issue of ensuring greater stability in Eastern Europe higher priority in its foreign-policy agenda.

The Balladur government's proposal for a "Pact on Stability in Europe" is the clearest evidence of this new approach. First broached by Prime Minister Edouard Balladur in a speech to the National Assembly in April 1993, the plan was formally presented to the EC 12 at the Copenhagen summit at the end of June 1993. The proposal calls for a "Conference on Stability in Europe," to be held under EC auspices sometime in mid-1994. The conference would focus on minority rights and stabilizing borders and is intended to result in a "European Pact made up of several agreements between countries concerned which would create with each other a process of

entente and cooperation likely to encourage European stability."<sup>11</sup> This pact would be similar to the Paris Charter signed by the countries of the CSCE in November 1990. In addition to the 12 members of the EC and EFTA, the invitees include the United States, Canada, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Albania, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the countries of the former Yugoslavia—Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia/Montenegro, and Macedonia.

The French proposal has both domestic- and foreign-policy motivations. On the domestic side, it represents the Balladur government's effort to make a mark in foreign policy by launching a new initiative. Balladur, however, was careful to respect President Mitterrand's constitutional prerogatives in foreign policy. The proposal was closely coordinated with the Elysée to ensure Mitterrand's support.<sup>12</sup>

At the same time the proposal reflects a growing French recognition of the need to address the problem of instability in Eastern Europe and help stabilize the region before the countries in the region enter the EC. In effect, the countries of Eastern Europe will be asked to try to settle their major differences before they enter the EC—hence, the focus on safeguarding minority rights and stabilizing borders. These conflicts are seen by France as the greatest threats to European stability in the future.

The proposal builds on Mitterrand's confederation idea, but it also includes a number of important departures from it. In contrast to the Mitterrand proposal, the United States is invited to take part in the Balladur stability conference, which represents an explicit recognition that the United States has an important role to play in ensuring stability in Europe.<sup>13</sup> Inclusion of the United States is likely to make the plan more palatable not only to the United States but to

<sup>11</sup>"For A Pact on Stability in Europe," *Europe*, No. 1846, June 26, 1993, p. 2. On the background to the plan, see Claire Trean, "Comment assuré la stabilité en Europe?" *Le Monde*, June 20/21, 1993.

<sup>12</sup>Discussions with officials in the French Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry in Paris, July 1993.

<sup>13</sup>Discussions with officials in the French Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry in Paris, July 1993.

many of the East European countries, which objected to excluding the United States from Mitterrand's confederation proposal.

In addition, the limited participation—some 40 countries—reflects a shift in the French approach to the CSCE, which has been the main focus of French security efforts in the past few years. The conference would be linked to the CSCE, but not all CSCE members would be invited. The main mediator would be the EC. Thus, the proposal strengthens the role of the EC at the expense of the CSCE and is in line with France's general desire to put the European Union in the forefront of ensuring security in Europe.

The proposal has met with a mixed response in Eastern Europe. As might be expected, the Hungarian response has been positive, since the proposal dovetails with Budapest's efforts to internationalize the Hungarian-minority issue. Romania and Slovakia have reacted coolly to the proposal, both fearing that it could be used to pressure them on the treatment of their minorities. The Czech reaction has also been quite cool. Poland has not given the proposal great attention.

The Balladur government has also stepped up its bilateral diplomacy in Eastern Europe. In summer 1993, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé visited Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The visits were intended primarily to drum up support for the Balladur plan. But they were also aimed at strengthening bilateral ties with the four Visegrad countries and demonstrating France's increased interest in stability in the region.<sup>14</sup> They thus reflect a shift in emphasis in French policy away from its traditional focus on the Balkans toward the Visegrad countries. In part, the new discovery of this region is prompted by a desire to counterbalance German influence in the area. But it also indicates Paris's broader recognition—stimulated in particular by the Yugoslav crisis—of the dangers to European security posed by instability in Eastern Europe more generally.

The Yugoslav crisis has had a major effect on French thinking, particularly regarding NATO. French officials see the Yugoslav crisis as a

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<sup>14</sup>See "M. Juppé assure la Hongrie du soutien de la France à son intégration dans le CEE," *Le Monde*, July 15, 1993.

major watershed and failure of European diplomacy.<sup>15</sup> At the same time, they realize that France acting alone cannot resolve Yugoslav-type conflicts. This realization has driven France toward closer cooperation with NATO and has prompted Paris to revise its approach to U.S. involvement in Europe, a fact reflected in the inclusion of the United States in the Balladur plan.<sup>16</sup>

France's attitude toward East European membership in the EC has also evolved. The French recognize that the Copenhagen summit has launched the EC on a process of expansion that will lead to the eventual incorporation of at least three of the four Visegrad countries (Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic) into the Community sooner rather than later. This recognition has prompted a shift in French policy: Rather than seeking to delay the process, as Mitterrand had initially tried to do (in June 1991, he argued that it would be "decades and decades" before the East European countries would be ready to enter the EC), France now seems more interested in trying to shape the process to ensure that it will transpire smoothly and strengthen rather than weaken the Community.

The Balladur plan should be seen in this light. By ensuring that some of the main potential sources of conflict are alleviated *prior* to entry, it is meant to reduce the prospects that incorporating the East European countries into the EC will weaken the Community. In effect, the East European countries will be forced to make a "down payment" by signing bilateral treaties settling outstanding differences before they enter the EC. These treaties will then be sanctified on a multilateral level at a conference held under EC auspices.

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<sup>15</sup>The Balladur plan, for instance, explicitly mentions the need to avoid a "second Yugoslavia" as one of the main rationales for the French proposal. See also the toughly worded article by François Heisbourg and Pierre Lellouche, "Maastricht ou Sarajevo?" *Le Monde*, June 17, 1993.

<sup>16</sup>There is, however, considerable doubt in the minds of many French observers whether the United States intends to play a major role in European affairs in the future. Indeed, many French observers see the Clinton Administration's handling of the Bosnian crisis as an indication that the United States will involve itself in European conflicts only when its vital interests are at stake. See, for instance, the two-part series by Alain Franchon, "Les Etats Unis, 'Gulliver' méditatif," *Le Monde*, July 3, 1993, and July 4/5, 1993. See also Heisbourg and Lellouche, "Maastricht ou Sarajevo?" *Le Monde*, June 17, 1993.

To some extent, the shift in the French attitude also can be seen as a response to broader trends in Europe, particularly the slowdown in European integration since Maastricht and the stagnation of Franco-German cooperation. The failure of Germany (more accurately, the failure of the Bundesbank) to help France stabilize the franc by lowering interest rates could deal a serious blow to future Franco-German cooperation and to the hopes of creating a common currency in the near future. Franco-German cooperation has been the cornerstone of the effort to build a stronger European identity. If this cooperation stagnates—or collapses—a renationalization of economic policy could ensue, imperiling the broader process toward European integration.

These developments underscore the degree to which French policy is beginning to shift as a result of the end of the Cold War.<sup>17</sup> Like other countries in Western Europe, France has begun to recognize that Western Europe's own security is closely linked to that of Eastern Europe and that creating stability in Western Europe requires a more active effort to extend security into Eastern Europe as well. This recognition is driving French policy toward a more active engagement in Eastern Europe as well as toward closer cooperation with NATO. This dynamic, in turn, could open up new possibilities for reshaping the alliance to deal with the new challenges facing post-Cold War Europe and ending, or at least attenuating, many of the old quarrels that have inhibited closer cooperation in the past.

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<sup>17</sup>For a cogent French argument on the obsolescence of many tenets of Gaullism and the need to rethink French security policy in light of the new realities created by the end of the Cold War, see Pierre Lellouche, "France in Search of Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1993, pp. 122-131.

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## RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND EASTERN EUROPE

Historically, Russia has maintained a strong interest in Eastern Europe, both in the Czarist and Soviet periods. The power vacuum created by World War II allowed Stalin to extend Soviet influence into Eastern Europe and bring the region under direct Soviet control. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe has resulted in a significant loss of Russian influence in the region. The critical question, however, is whether the Russian withdrawal from Eastern Europe represents a permanent shift in the balance of power in the center of Europe or simply a temporary retreat. In other words, what role will Russia play in Eastern Europe in the future?

### GORBACHEV AND EASTERN EUROPE

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe occurred on Mikhail Gorbachev's watch. It would be unfair, however, to lay all the blame at Gorbachev's feet. When Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, he inherited a system that was already in deep crisis.<sup>1</sup> His policies did not "cause" the collapse of the system; the root causes lay in the growing internal pressures and contradictions in the system itself. But they did accelerate the process of change within the bloc and thus hasten the collapse of the communist system.<sup>2</sup> His emphasis on

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<sup>1</sup>See Charles Gati, "The Soviet Empire: Alive but Not Well," *Problems of Communism*, March/April 1985, pp. 73-86.

<sup>2</sup>A detailed discussion of Gorbachev's influence on Eastern Europe is beyond the scope of this study. For two good recent analyses, see Charles Gati, *The Bloc That Failed* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990), and James F. Brown, *Surge to Freedom* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991), especially Chapter 2.

reform emboldened the reformers in Hungary and Poland to accelerate the pace of reforms in their own countries. At the same time, his policies created serious strains in relations with the other, more orthodox members of the bloc.

This is not to suggest that Gorbachev actually sought or foresaw the collapse of the communist systems in Eastern Europe. On the contrary, he wanted to reform the systems in order to strengthen them—not overthrow them. However, in trying to reform the systems, he unleashed social and political forces that he was unable to control and that ultimately brought about their collapse.

The collapse of the communist systems in Eastern Europe forced the Soviet leadership to craft a new policy toward Eastern Europe, a process that did not take place all at once. Indeed, initially the Soviet leadership thought that it could retain some influence in the region by transforming the Warsaw Pact into a “political” alliance as part of an overall “demilitarization” of East-West relations. These hopes proved illusory. Led by Hungary, the East European members began to press for a total dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, which was officially disbanded in July 1991.<sup>3</sup>

Gorbachev’s policy toward Eastern Europe, however, faced strong opposition within the Soviet political elite, especially from the military, and unleashed a bitter debate about “Who Lost Eastern Europe?”<sup>4</sup> This debate reached its climax at the 28th Party Congress in July 1990. At the Congress, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was accused of having “lost” Eastern Europe and Germany and weakening Soviet security. As Shevardnadze recalled in his memoirs, “the Congress gave vivid testimony to the growth of opposition to our policy . . . my personal fate was on the line.”<sup>5</sup>

The debate on “Who Lost Eastern Europe?” was part of the larger debate over *perestroika*. However, although Gorbachev strongly en-

<sup>3</sup>A detailed discussion is given in F. Stephen Larrabee, “Retreat from Empire: The Gorbachev Revolution in Eastern Europe and Its Consequences” (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, unpublished draft).

<sup>4</sup>Suzanne Crow, “Who Lost Eastern Europe?” *Report on the USSR*, April 12, 1991, pp. 1–5, and Larrabee, “Retreat from Empire” (unpublished draft).

<sup>5</sup>See Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (London: Sinclair Stevenson Ltd., 1991), p. 141.



gaged personally in defending *perestroika*, he remained generally aloof from the debate on foreign policy, leaving the defense of policy toward Eastern Europe to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Gorbachev's unwillingness to defend Shevardnadze openly against such charges was one of the major factors contributing to Shevardnadze's decision to resign on December 20, 1990.

Shevardnadze's resignation initiated a new phase in Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. In the aftermath of his resignation, the terms of the debate shifted. The issue was no longer who "lost" Eastern Europe but what the basis should be for a new Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe.

During early 1991, two schools of thought gradually emerged. The first, promoted by followers of Shevardnadze in the Foreign Ministry and in certain Soviet think tanks, argued that the changes in Eastern Europe enhanced Soviet security by ridding Moscow of the need to prop up unstable, inefficient governments in the region. Moscow should seek to establish a new relationship with Eastern Europe based on full equality, sovereignty, and independence. Close ties between Eastern Europe and the West were not inimical to Soviet interests because the West was interested in stability in Eastern Europe.

A second school, centered primarily in the Soviet military and International Department of the Central Committee, argued that the USSR should adopt a more active policy toward Eastern Europe and use its "reserves of influence," including economic leverage, to preserve Soviet interests in the region and neutralize "anti-Soviet tendencies" there. Moscow's main goal in Eastern Europe, this group argued, should be to establish a buffer zone in Eastern Europe between the West and the Soviet Union and to prevent the emergence of close security ties between Eastern Europe and the West.<sup>6</sup>

After Shevardnadze's resignation, the advocates of the second view gradually gained the upper hand. Their thoughts were reflected in the drafts of the bilateral treaties that were sent to the East

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<sup>6</sup>This view was put forward at the end of January 1991 in a special report to the Soviet leadership written under the direction of Valentin Falin, head of the Central Committee's International Department. It became known as the "Falin Doctrine."

Europeans in early 1991. The drafts contained security clauses that prevented either party from entering an alliance directed against the other and prohibited stationing of foreign troops on the soil of either party. If accepted, these clauses would have given Moscow a *droit de regard* over the security options of the East European countries and could have prevented them not only from joining NATO but also the WEU and the EC. However, the East Europeans (with the exception of Romania) refused to sign treaties including the controversial clauses, leading to a deadlock in the negotiations.

The failed coup in August 1991 broke the deadlock and led to an important shift in Soviet policy. In essence, the coup changed the internal balance of forces within the Soviet Union, giving the upper hand to those who favored the "Shevardnadze line" and the establishment of relations with Eastern Europe on the basis of full sovereignty, equality, and independence. Shortly after the coup, the Soviet Union dropped its insistence on including the controversial clauses in the treaties, which paved the way for the signing of new bilateral treaties with Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria in autumn 1991.

### **POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE UNDER YELTSIN**

The collapse of the USSR at the end of December 1991 further accelerated the shift in relations with the countries of Eastern Europe that were initiated in the wake of the August coup. The current Russian leadership, however, does not appear to have a coherent long-term strategy toward the region. Yeltsin's policy has largely consisted of ad hoc initiatives to settle outstanding issues left over from the Soviet period, especially those related to the withdrawal of former Soviet troops. There has been little effort to develop an overarching policy toward the region as a whole.

Russia's relative lack of attention to Eastern Europe is partly due to its need to deal with the pressing problems posed by the breakup of the USSR that bear directly on Russian security, particularly the question of the division of nuclear and economic assets. For Russia, these are the most critical issues. Hence it has given priority to rela-

tions with the ex-Soviet republics (the "near abroad"). Relations with Eastern Europe, by contrast, have been of secondary interest.

Indeed, there does not appear to be a coherent view within the Russian elite about what priority to give the relations with Eastern Europe. Some members of the elite argue that Eastern Europe is no longer as important for Russia as it was in the past. For instance, the Foreign and Defense Council, an independent nongovernmental body composed of leading politicians, businessmen, diplomats, military representatives, and academic specialists, published a report in August 1992 on Russia's foreign and security policies. The report explicitly downplayed the importance of ties to Eastern Europe, noting that while it was important to "energize" Russia's relations with Eastern Europe, "these countries will not assume any priority status in Russian politics," having neither the funds nor the technology that would ensure their participation in Russia's survival. "Therefore," the report concluded, "any effort to include such countries in the list of Russian priorities would be unrealistic."<sup>7</sup>

By contrast, the "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation," worked out by the Russian Foreign Ministry, which lays down the basic principles of Russia's future foreign policy, states that Eastern Europe not only "retains its significance for Russia as an historically formulated sphere of influence" but stresses that the importance of maintaining good relations with the countries of the area "*has become immeasurably greater*" with the formation of an independent Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the Baltic states.<sup>8</sup> According to the document, the key strategic task at present is "to prevent Eastern Europe from becoming a kind of buffer zone," isolating Russia from the West. At the same time, the document emphasizes that Moscow "cannot allow the Western powers to force Russia out of the East Europe region, which is already becoming a reality."

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<sup>7</sup> *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, August 19, 1992, pp. 4-5, translated in FBIS-USR-92-115, September 8, 1992, p. 61. The document singles out Poland and Bulgaria (as well as Slovakia) as being the most important countries for Russia.

<sup>8</sup> "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation," translated in FBIS-USR-93-037, March 25, 1993, pp. 10-11, emphasis added. An abbreviated version of the concept appeared in *International Affairs*, January 1993, pp. 14-16.

## EAST EUROPEAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO

The disunity within the Russian elite has been particularly evident over the issue of East European membership in NATO. Prior to Yeltsin's visit to Warsaw at the end of August 1993, many high-ranking Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, had warned that East European membership in NATO would lead to Russia's isolation and "reactivate 'neo-imperialist, nationalist forces' in Russia itself," who are suspicious of NATO.<sup>9</sup>

However, during his meeting with Polish President Lech Walesa in Warsaw several days later, Yeltsin implicitly accepted Poland's entry into NATO. Noting that Russia "respected" Poland's desire to enter NATO, he went on to say that "the times when Polish leaders sought advice in Moscow or when Russian leaders came to Warsaw to tell them what [to] do are over. . . . Times have changed. We must respect this."<sup>10</sup> In Prague several days later, he made a similar statement, saying that Russia had no right to hinder the Czech Republic's joining any organization.<sup>11</sup> Like his statement in Warsaw, his remarks in Prague suggested that Russia would not actively try to block the Czech Republic's entry into NATO.

However, Yeltsin's remarks in Warsaw and Prague appear to have been a spontaneous reaction to the strong pressure exerted on him by Walesa rather than a carefully calculated shift in Russian policy.<sup>12</sup> In the aftermath of the Yeltsin visit, Russian officials engaged in a massive spin-control effort in an attempt to "clarify" Yeltsin's remarks and make clear that Moscow was in no way in favor of East

<sup>9</sup>See Kozyrev's interview with *Polityka*, translated in FBIS-SOV-93-172, September 8, 1993, p. 21.

<sup>10</sup>See Jane Perlez, "Yeltsin Seems to Accept Polish Bid for NATO," *New York Times*, August 26, 1993.

<sup>11</sup>*RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 164, August 27, 1993.

<sup>12</sup>Members of Yeltsin's delegation appear to have been caught off guard by his remarks, suggesting that those remarks had not been coordinated ahead of time with Foreign and Defense ministries. Walesa appears to have put strong pressure on Yeltsin in their one-on-one meeting to accede to Polish membership in NATO and, after a heated discussion, Yeltsin finally agreed. Having agreed in private, Yeltsin then apparently found it difficult to go back on his word in public, despite efforts by both Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to persuade him otherwise.

European membership in NATO. In an interview in *Moscow News* at the end of September, Foreign Minister Kozyrev warned against NATO expansion, saying that it could jeopardize partnership with Russia. Instead, he suggested trying to solve Europe's security problems by relying more heavily on the CSCE, NACC, and collective peacekeeping.<sup>13</sup> Defense Minister Pavel Grachev also expressed opposition to an expansion of NATO unless Russia too becomes a member.<sup>14</sup>

To leave no doubt about Russia's position in September, Yeltsin sent a letter to the heads of government of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany. While conceding that Poland and other East European countries had the right as sovereign countries to choose their own alliances, he warned that East European entry into NATO without simultaneous entry of Russia would isolate Russia and violate the 2 + 4 agreement on German unity signed in September 1990.<sup>15</sup> Instead of an expansion of NATO, he suggested that Russia and NATO should jointly guarantee Eastern Europe's security.

Yeltsin's letter and the spate of attacks against NATO expansion in the wake of his visit to Warsaw suggest that opposition within the Russian security elite, especially the Russian military, to East European membership in NATO remains strong. Despite the rather substantial changes in NATO's mission and force posture since 1990, the Russian military still regards NATO in Cold War terms—as an alliance directed against Russia. Any expansion of NATO, therefore, is seen as a direct threat to Russian security.

The main Russian concern, however, appears to be that expansion of NATO to include Eastern Europe will lead to Russia's isolation or

<sup>13</sup>Andrei Kozyrev, "What Is to Be Done with NATO?" *Moscow News*, No. 39, September 24, 1993. See also his interview, "Westen ohne Konzept," *Der Stern*, No. 40, September 30, 1993, pp. 250–251.

<sup>14</sup>See the interview with Hungarian Defense Minister Lajos Für regarding his talks with Grachev at the end of September, *Pesti Hírlap*, October 2, 1993, p. 5, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-193, October 7, 1993, p. 13.

<sup>15</sup>Roger Cohen, "Yeltsin Opposes Expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe," *New York Times*, October 2, 1993.

push it out of Europe.<sup>16</sup> As an alternative to NATO expansion, Russian officials advocate strengthening the CSCE or other forms of collective security, which would ensure a large role for Russia in European affairs. Indeed, the idea of joint NATO and Russian security guarantees to Eastern Europe, proposed in Yeltsin's letter, seemed to revive the old Soviet idea of a condominium in which Russia and the United States—through NATO—would jointly share responsibility for Europe's security.

Such an idea is unlikely to be acceptable to leaderships in Eastern Europe (or in the West) because it would formally legitimize Russia's responsibility for Eastern Europe's security—something all East European leaders wish to avoid. Thus, the question of NATO enlargement is likely to remain a contentious issue between Russia and its former East European allies, as well as between Russia and the West.

### THE DEBATE ON RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS

The debate over Eastern Europe has been part of a larger debate over Russian foreign policy and Russian national interests more generally. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been forced to define a new foreign policy and to articulate its own national interests more clearly. Such demands have provoked a wide-ranging debate within the Russian political elite since early 1992.<sup>17</sup> How this debate evolves will have important consequences for Eastern Europe.

In effect, three major schools of thought have emerged. The first is a "Euro-Atlantic" school, which essentially advocates a continuation of Shevardnadze's policy. Adherents of this school favor close ties to, and cooperation with, the West, especially the United States. They

<sup>16</sup>See Sergei Karaganov, "Rashirenie NATO vedet k isolyatsii Rossii," *Moskovskie Novosti*, No. 38, September 19, 1993; also, Alexei Pushkov, "Building a New NATO at Russia's Expense," *Moscow News*, No. 39, September 24, 1993.

<sup>17</sup>See Suzanne Crow, "Russia Debates Its National Interests," *RFE/RL Research Report*, July 10, 1992, pp. 43–46. Also see Jeff Checkel, "Russian Foreign Policy: Back to the Future?" *RFE/RL Research Report*, October 16, 1992.

also tend to accept more readily the loss of the Soviet empire and to take a more accommodating position toward relations with the near abroad. The most important advocate of this orientation is Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who earned a reputation as one of the most outspoken advocates of "New Thinking" as a young member of Shevardnadze's team in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The group also has strong, although diminishing, support within parts of the liberal intelligentsia.

The second major school is represented by the "Eur-Asianists," whose members tend to stress Russia's "distinctiveness." They reject a pro-Western course and call instead for an "independent" foreign policy. In their view, Russia is not only a European power but also an Asian one. Hence, it must pursue an independent policy more in tune with Russia's distinctive history and geography.

This group encompasses a wide spectrum of opinion. Its most important spokesman is Vice President Alexander Rutskoi. It includes many nationalists but also moderates and former liberals such as Evgeni Ambartsumov, head of the Committee on Foreign Relations and International Economic Affairs of the Russian Supreme Soviet, and Sergei Stankevich, councillor to President Yeltsin. Many members of the Civic Union also adhere to this path, as well as many members of the council on Foreign and Defense Policy.

The third major group might be termed the "neo-imperialists." Members of this group essentially want to reconstruct the old Soviet Union, but under a Russian nationalist banner. The most notable exponents of this view are Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, and Colonel Victor Alksnis, a former member of the USSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies and currently a leading member of the conservative National Salvation Front.

In the period immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Euro-Atlanticists, led by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, tended to dominate Russian foreign policy. However, Kozyrev's policy has come under increasing attack since spring 1992 as being little more than a carbon copy of Western policy. His critics have charged that Russia does not really have a foreign policy and that Russian foreign policy is "made in Washington." In addition, they criticize Kozyrev

for not paying sufficient attention to Russia's relations with the near abroad.<sup>18</sup>

What is striking is that this criticism comes not just from the Right, but also from such members of the Moscow intelligentsia as Ambartsumov<sup>19</sup> and Stankevich, who had distinguished themselves as outspoken liberals during the late Brezhnev period. Their criticism underscores the degree to which the constellation of forces in Moscow has shifted since early 1992 in favor of a tougher, more nationalistic policy. In effect, they have taken over the rhetoric and agenda of the Right to the point where the two have become virtually indistinguishable.

Yeltsin has tried to steer a middle course between these two orientations. However, since mid-1992 his policy has increasingly tilted toward a more independent, Eur-Asian orientation. In an important speech to the Civic Union in February 1993, for instance, he called for Russia to be given "special responsibilities" for ensuring stability on the territory of the former USSR, a call that was sharply criticized by many in Eastern Europe and Ukraine.<sup>20</sup> Yeltsin's remarks seemed designed to disarm his domestic critics, especially those within the Civic Union, who had accused him of not doing enough to defend Russian interests abroad.<sup>21</sup>

Since mid-1992, the elements of a new "Russian" foreign policy have begun to emerge. This policy has three basic elements:

1. Russia will pursue a more independent, less pro-Western policy in the future.

<sup>18</sup>See, in particular, Sergei Stankevich's article in *Izvestia*, July 8, 1992. Also see his articles in *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, June 3 and July 28, 1992.

<sup>19</sup>See, in particular, Ambartsumov's article in *Izvestia*, July 29, 1992. On Ambartsumov's role and influence more generally, see Suzanne Crow, "Ambartsumov's Influence on Russian Foreign Policy," *RFE/RL Research Report*, May 7, 1993, pp. 36-41.

<sup>20</sup>See Russia TV, February 28, 1993, Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) SU/1626 B/1, March 2, 1993. See also Sergei Schmemmann, "Yeltsin Suggests a Role for Russia to Keep Peace in Ex-Soviet Lands," *New York Times*, March 1, 1993.

<sup>21</sup>One can see Ambartsumov's hand writ large in Yeltsin's speech. Ambartsumov has often spoken of the need to recognize Russia's "special interests" in the near abroad. See Crow, "Ambartsumov's Influence on Russian Foreign Policy," *RFE/RL Research Report*, May 7, 1993, pp. 39-40.



2. Russia has legitimate interests in the former USSR, which is a zone of special interest for Russia.
3. Russia will protect the Russian minority living outside Russia, with force if necessary.

The long-term goal of this new policy is to create a belt of friendly states—what Foreign Minister Kozyrev has termed “a zone of good neighborliness”—along Russia’s periphery. Hence, Russia has given top priority in its foreign policy to relations with the near abroad, an area regarded by Moscow, especially the Eur-Asianists, as a region of special Russian influence. What Moscow appears to want, in effect, is a “Monroe Doctrine for the near abroad,” that is, that the international community accept the territory of the former USSR as a special sphere of influence in which Moscow has certain acknowledged rights and interests.

In line with this approach, Russia has insisted on differentiating peacekeeping in the former USSR from peacekeeping elsewhere, on the grounds that Russia has a special role to play in guaranteeing peace and stability on its borders. At the June 28, 1993, NACC meeting, for instance, Russia presented a paper, “Russian Participation in Peace-Keeping Operations in the Countries of the Former USSR.” While not going as far as Yeltsin’s February 1993 speech to the Civic Union, the paper referred to Russia’s special responsibility in the former USSR and the need to guarantee its own security.<sup>22</sup>

In short, Moscow seeks to establish a belt of friendly states along its border and gain international recognition of its right to “special responsibilities” in this area to ensure “stability.” Over the longer term, Russia hopes to set up a confederation of former states of the USSR in which it would play the leading role. This “Russian geographic space,” many Russian officials hope, will ultimately include Belarus

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<sup>22</sup>Theresa Hitchens, “Russians Rile NATO Over Peace-Keeping,” *Defense News*, July 19–25, 1993, p. 1. The paper also referred to Russian military involvement in South Ossetia, Transdniestria, and Tajikistan as “peacekeeping” despite the fact that these operations have not been authorized by the UN or CSCE and have been criticized by the governments concerned as unwarranted interference in their internal affairs. For a broader discussion of Russia’s peacekeeping role, see Suzanne Crow, “Russia Seeks Leadership in Regional Peacekeeping,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, April 9, 1993, pp. 28–32.

and Ukraine. They recognize that the process cannot happen overnight; nevertheless, they are hopeful that Ukraine's heavy economic dependence on Russia will eventually force it back into closer association with Russia.

### **UKRAINE: THE CRITICAL SWING FACTOR**

Any change in Ukraine's policy would significantly affect the security of Eastern Europe. An independent Ukraine acts as a geostrategic buffer between Russia and those countries, shielding them from Russian encroachments and expanding their freedom of action. Were Ukraine to fall back under Russia's influence, this buffer would be lost and Russia's shadow would loom much larger over Eastern Europe. Hence, those countries have a strong stake in the continued survival of an independent, stable, and democratic Ukraine.

If Ukrainian independence were curtailed and Ukraine were reincorporated into a "Russian geographic space," both Poland and, to a lesser extent, Hungary would find their political room for maneuver constrained. Hence, both have made an improvement in relations with Ukraine a key element of their foreign policy and have sought to encourage Ukraine's integration into European institutions to the maximum extent possible. Ukraine, for instance, has been invited to participate in some working groups of the Central European Initiative and may at some point become a full member.

Such token gestures, however, have done little to assuage Ukrainian security concerns or to decrease Ukraine's sense of isolation. As an alternative, Kiev has pushed the idea of a "Central European security zone" (for details, see Chapter Five). However, the proposal has found little support in Eastern Europe because it would delay the integration of these countries into Western security structures, especially NATO, as well as risk antagonizing Russia, which views it as an attempt to establish an anti-Russian alliance. The negative East European reaction has virtually killed the proposal and left Ukraine feeling increasingly vulnerable.

This growing sense of vulnerability has been reinforced by continued Russian pressures on one side and accelerating economic decline on the other. Ukraine has the dubious distinction of having the only currency that has actually declined vis-à-vis the ruble. The miners'

strike in June 1993 has exacerbated Ukraine's economic problems. The wage increases granted to the miners to induce them to end their strike are likely to result in skyrocketing inflation, increasing the prospects for social unrest.

At the same time, the deterioration of the economy has fueled pro-nuclear sentiment. Indeed, there is a close link between the two: The more vulnerable the Ukrainian population and elite have come to feel, the more determined they have become to hang on to nuclear weapons.<sup>23</sup> As a result, there is a growing chance that Ukraine will become, at least temporarily, a nuclear weapons state.

Over the long term this status could change the security dynamics in the Visegrad countries (Central Europe). On the one side, it could fuel new security anxieties in those countries, especially in Poland. On the other, it raises the theoretical possibility of a Ukrainian nuclear umbrella for those countries. Indeed, this may have been part of the hidden agenda—at least in the minds of some Ukrainians—behind the Ukrainian proposal to create a Central European security zone. At the moment there is little support for such an idea in Eastern Europe. But if the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is up for review in 1995, unravels and NATO and the EC/WEU turn their backs on the countries of Eastern Europe, the idea might become more attractive to some of the East European elite.

## PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Russian policy toward Eastern Europe in the future will be strongly influenced by the balance of domestic forces in Moscow. For the moment, Moscow's main priority is relations with the near abroad, especially Ukraine. Eastern Europe is a secondary priority. President Yeltsin appears intent on putting relations with Eastern Europe on a new footing. However, as noted earlier, many members of the Russian elite, especially the military, oppose East European membership in NATO. They would like Eastern Europe to remain a neutral buffer, and if that cannot be achieved, at least to delay the region's

<sup>23</sup>For a detailed discussion of Ukrainian attitudes on the nuclear issue, see Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes Toward Nuclear Arms," *RFE/RL Research Report*, February 19, 1993, pp. 21-45.

integration into Western security institutions until Russia has succeeded in reasserting its influence over the near abroad. That delay would help ensure that Eastern Europe's economic and military potential would be denied to the West for the next few years.

For Moscow, Poland is the key, and largest, country in Eastern Europe. Warsaw's integration into the West would significantly change the geostrategic balance in the Visegrad countries. It would extend NATO's borders considerably eastward and deny Moscow an important buffer with the West. It would also be an attractive magnet for Ukraine, making Ukraine's reintegration into a Russia-dominated confederation of former Soviet states much harder.

From a strategic point of view, Hungary and the Czech Republic are less important. Both are likely to move to integrate themselves into Western institutions as rapidly as possible. Slovakia's future security orientation, however, is less clear. Although Slovakia would like to join NATO and the EC, doing so is likely to prove to be more difficult than for the other Visegrad countries, because of Slovakia's economic structure and minority problems. To avoid isolation, Slovakia might be tempted to seek closer ties to Russia, giving Moscow a foothold in Central Europe. Indeed, Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar has at times seemed to flirt with this possibility.

Moscow's policy in the former Yugoslavia, moreover, suggests that Russia has by no means written off the Balkans. Friendship with Serbia has strong historical roots, and Russia's support for Serbia in the Yugoslav conflict could pay important political dividends over the longer term, especially since Serbia is likely to remain isolated and have few other places to turn. Moscow has also recently begun to mend fences with Greece, another indication that it intends to be a player in the Balkans.

It is within this context that Bulgaria becomes important. As with Serbia, Russia's ties to Bulgaria have a long tradition. Pro-Russian feeling has deep roots in Bulgaria, in part because of the Russian role in liberating Bulgaria from Turkish rule in 1878. The collapse of communism has led to a sharp decline in Russian influence in Bulgaria. But the situation in Bulgaria is highly unstable, and Bulgaria's chances for integration into the West are considerably poorer than those of the Visegrad countries, with the possible excep-

tion of Slovakia. If Bulgaria's effort to join Europe falters, as well it could, closer ties to Russia, especially a democratically oriented Russia, would be a logical alternative and counterweight to Turkish influence in the region. Indeed, Russian-Turkish rivalry in the Caucasus and Central Asia could be extended into the Balkans.

Relations with Romania are hindered by Russian policy in Moldova, especially the support given to the self-proclaimed "Republic of Transdniestria"—whose population is predominately Russian—by the Russian 14th Army.<sup>24</sup> While some of these moves have been criticized by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, they appear to have had the tacit support of important Russian politicians, especially former Vice President Alexander Rutskoi and Ruslan Khasbulatov, former Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. Moreover, Yeltsin has come under pressure from conservative forces to take a stronger stand on the rights of the Russian minority abroad. Thus, if anything, differences with Romania over Moldova seem likely to increase rather than diminish in the future.

In short, Russian influence in Eastern Europe has significantly declined, but it is too soon to write Russia off entirely. Much will depend on internal developments within Russia, particularly the degree to which Yeltsin can consolidate his power and continue on his reform course. If the economic and political reforms initiated take root and Russia becomes a strongly democratic society, relations with Eastern Europe can be expected to gradually normalize. However, if the conservative, patriotic forces gain strength, Eastern Europe could be faced with a more authoritarian, more nationalist, and more aggressive Russia, which could be inclined to pursue more traditional Russian imperial goals. Such an imperial policy would be directed first and foremost toward the near abroad, the former republics of the USSR, especially Ukraine and the Baltic states. However, it would also have repercussions for Eastern Europe. Although such a Russia would be unlikely to try to retake Eastern Europe by force, it would be more inclined to throw its political weight around and use economic pressure to achieve its political

<sup>24</sup>On the 14th Army's support for the insurgents, see Vladimir Socor, "Russia's Fourteenth Army and the Insurgency in Eastern Moldova," *RFE/RL Research Report*, September 11, 1992, pp. 41-46.

goals in Eastern Europe. The overall impact would be to retard Eastern Europe's transition and integration into Western political, economic, and security structures.

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## IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The changes in Eastern Europe since 1989 pose a fundamental challenge to U.S. policy in Europe, which, for 40 years was oriented around two strategic goals: (1) preventing the expansion of communism westward and (2) deterring a Soviet military threat to Europe. The end of the Cold War has rendered these goals obsolete and made the crafting of a new security framework an urgent necessity. Communism has collapsed, and the Soviet military threat has vanished. As a result, containment is no longer a relevant rationale for U.S. policy.

### THE NEED FOR A NEW SECURITY FRAMEWORK

At the same time, new security challenges have emerged. With the end of the Cold War the old distinction between center and periphery is breaking down. *The new strategic challenges in the future are likely to arise along Europe's periphery, especially in the zone of instability between Germany and Russia.* These new challenges are on the periphery, but they are not peripheral. They represent the main strategic challenges facing the United States and its allies in Europe in the coming decade.

The United States needs to craft a new security framework to deal with these new challenges. Creating this new security framework is all the more urgent because the conflicts and sources of instability in Eastern Europe are increasing and threaten to spill over into Western Europe. *It is not just the bipolar order worked out at the end of World War II that has collapsed. The post-World War I settlements at Versailles are also unraveling.* As a result, long-dormant ethnic

conflicts and territorial disputes have reemerged, posing new threats to European security.

The unraveling of the post-World War I security order in Eastern Europe has coincided with, and to some extent been reinforced by, the failure of Western policy toward Yugoslavia. The inability of the West to deal effectively with the Bosnian crisis has significantly undermined the credibility of Western security institutions, especially in Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union. Western governments and security institutions have proven powerless to stop "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia and halt the dismemberment of an internationally recognized state. This failure is likely to send a powerful signal throughout Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union and could give a new impetus to efforts to create "ethnically pure" states in these regions.

The Bosnian crisis has also brought into sharper focus the existential crisis that has afflicted NATO since the collapse of the Berlin Wall: What is NATO's role now that the Soviet threat has disappeared? NATO has made important efforts to adapt to the new security environment, but those efforts have not gone far enough. Unless NATO is seen to be relevant to the new threats to European security in the post-Cold War era, it is unlikely to survive. Most of these threats, however, lie outside the NATO area as defined in the Washington Treaty. Thus NATO needs to be restructured to deal more effectively with these new conflicts.

### **U.S. INTERESTS IN EASTERN EUROPE**

These conflicts pose new challenges for U.S. policy. Growing instability could not only disrupt the reform process in Eastern Europe, but could also derail the efforts to create a stable post-Cold War security order in Europe more broadly. In and of themselves, many of the conflicts in Eastern Europe are not likely to spark a major war. But the cumulative effect of several of these conflicts boiling over at once could be highly destabilizing.

Moreover, there is a serious danger that increased unrest in Eastern Europe will spill over into Germany, thereby affecting core U.S. interests. The refugee problem has already emerged as a major political and social problem and has contributed to a right-wing backlash



in the Federal Republic. If violence and unrest in the East intensify, and if such unrest is accompanied by economic decline, the refugee problem will get worse, further threatening political and social stability in Germany.

Given Germany's critical position in the EC and the Atlantic Alliance, increased instability in Germany would have serious repercussions for European integration and alliance cohesion. Moreover, it could prompt Germany to take action alone, creating new fissures within the alliance and contributing to a renationalization of security policy, not just in Germany but in other European countries as well.

Finally, a failure of the reform process in Eastern Europe could impede the consolidation of democracy and reform in Russia and Ukraine. If the reform process in Eastern Europe succeeds, it is likely to have a positive impact on developments in Russia and Ukraine over the long run. Conversely, if the reform process in Eastern Europe fails, the chances for the successful transformation of Russia and Ukraine—particularly the latter—will be sharply decreased.

In short, the United States has a strong stake in ensuring the consolidation of the reform process in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the East Europeans themselves want a strong U.S. role in Europe. They see the United States as an important counterweight to Germany and Russia, as well as an indispensable bulwark against the reemergence of centrifugal trends and jockeying for power by individual European states that could undermine European stability.

## **DEMOCRATIC REFORM AND SECURITY**

To consolidate the democratic process in Eastern Europe, the United States needs to develop a comprehensive strategy that encompasses political, economic, and security dimensions. The United States should put primary emphasis on the economic and political aspects. But it cannot neglect the security dimension. Economic investment will not flow to Eastern Europe if the region remains unstable and is threatened by conflict.

Indeed, there is a need to rethink the relationship between economic reform and security. Western and U.S. policy is largely governed by the premise that the East European countries should concentrate on

economic reform. Successful economic reforms will, so the theory goes, more or less automatically resolve political and security problems.

Yet there is reason to question whether this premise is correct. Germany after World War II provides an instructive example. It is unlikely that Germany would have attained the present degree of economic prosperity and political stability if the Federal Republic had not been a member of NATO: NATO provided the essential security framework that allowed an economically prosperous and politically stable Germany to develop.

Similarly, for the economic and political reforms initiated in the last several years to succeed, Eastern Europe needs a stable security framework. The CSCE cannot provide it. With 53 members it is simply too large and unwieldy a body to achieve consensus on sensitive security issues during crises. The European Union may be able to provide such a framework at some point, but this will take time. Moreover, developments since Maastricht give reason to doubt that the Maastricht process will ever create a strong defense identity. Indeed, if anything, that prospect seems further off today than it did a year ago.

But even if the European Union does prove capable of creating a strong and cohesive defense identity, it is in the U.S. interest that the countries of Eastern Europe, particularly the Visegrad countries, be integrated into a *transatlantic framework*. The United States will want to maintain some influence over, and say in, the overall transformation of the security order in Europe and developments in Eastern Europe. It can best do so through NATO. Moreover, the East European countries want the United States to be heavily involved in Eastern Europe. They see such involvement as the best guarantee of the emergence of a stable security order in post-Cold War Europe—and of their own security.

## TRANSFORMING NATO

To meet the new challenges posed by the end of the Cold War, the United States needs to develop a comprehensive strategy. This strategy must begin with a redefinition of NATO's mission and purpose. NATO needs to be transformed from an alliance structured mainly

for collective defense against an outside attack into one designed primarily for crisis management. In practice, this means that greater emphasis should be put on Article 4 rather than Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—a change that would also make it easier to integrate the East Europeans more fully into alliance structures.

Such a transformation is essential for two reasons:

- *First, the nature of the threat has changed.* Today the greatest threat to European security is not a Russian military invasion but the proliferation of Yugoslav-like conflicts.
- *Second, the distinction in Europe between "out of area" and "in area" is becoming increasingly blurred.* Many of the most serious security threats in the coming decade are likely to occur on NATO's periphery rather than in areas within NATO's geographic confines. Yet, as the Yugoslav crisis has shown, such threats may directly impinge on important alliance interests.

Containing and managing these new threats will require a change not only in NATO's mission but also in its force posture. Instead of heavily mechanized forces, NATO will need lighter, more flexible, and more mobile forces. With the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force, a start has been made in building such forces, but U.S. forces in Europe still remain heavily mechanized. Thus, as the United States draws down its forces in Europe, it is important that the *right mix of forces* is created to deal with the new challenges along Europe's periphery. In short, the United States needs not only to reduce its forces but also to *restructure* them.

In many instances, dealing with such conflicts may require ad hoc coalitions that do not always involve all members of NATO. There may also be some conflicts in which the United States may not want to play the "leading role." In such cases, some more flexible arrangements than the current highly centralized NATO command structure may be more appropriate. Such flexible command arrangements would also make it politically easier for France to cooperate more closely with NATO to deal with such conflicts.

However, "ad hocism" should not be seen as a panacea for managing all the new challenges the United States and its allies are likely to face in post-Cold War Europe. Some U.S. officials are attracted to

the idea of ad hoc arrangements because it gives the United States flexibility and would allow Washington to "pick and choose" which conflicts it would get involved in. Others see it as a means for the United States to avoid major risks and let the Europeans do the dirty work; i.e., the United States provides the strategic backup (lift, logistics, and intelligence) and air power, and the Europeans provide the ground troops.<sup>1</sup>

Both approaches are flawed and could lead to the unraveling of the alliance. The idea of "shared risks and shared responsibilities" has been a fundamental principle of NATO since its inception—a principle that would be destroyed if members are completely free to pick and choose which conflicts they will become involved in. Moreover, Europe will increasingly see the United States as unreliable and unwilling to take risks for the common good, which will erode transatlantic solidarity and lead to the increasing marginalization of the United States within the alliance.

If NATO is to meet effectively the new security challenges in post-Cold War Europe, then the United States will also have to share the military and political risks and costs. What is needed is a new transatlantic bargain.<sup>2</sup> Ultimately, NATO should be restructured into a "Euro-Atlantic Alliance." This new Euro-Atlantic Alliance would involve a new division of labor and responsibilities between Europe and the United States and would respond to the Europeans' desire to create a stronger European defense identity. It would allow the United States to gradually reduce its own commitments while still retaining a strong voice in shaping the new security order in Europe. The key is to ensure that the development of the European defense identity is closely harmonized with NATO's own transformation and that there is a rational division of labor.

Over the next few years, economic realities in the United States are likely to force a restructuring and reduction of the U.S. troop pres-

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<sup>1</sup>The Clinton Administration's refusal to put ground troops in Bosnia has reinforced this impression in many quarters in Europe, especially in France. See, for instance, François Heisbourg and Pierre Lellouche, "Maastricht ou Sarajevo?" *Le Monde*, June 17, 1993.

<sup>2</sup>See Ronald D. Asmus, Richard Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, September–October 1993, pp. 2–14.

ence—and thus of the U.S. role in NATO. It would be far preferable for the Clinton Administration to take the lead in initiating this process as part of a long-term strategic design for restructuring transatlantic relations than to have the process forced upon it in a haphazard way by an assertive Congress responding to mounting economic pressures and domestic concerns. By taking the initiative, the administration could more easily shape the process. Seizing the initiative would also make it easier for the Clinton Administration to develop a bipartisan and allied consensus.

The upcoming NATO summit in January 1994 provides a convenient starting point for initiating such a process. It should be used as a springboard to launch a far-reaching transformation of the alliance into an alliance more capable of meeting the new security challenges posed by the end of the Cold War. Most of these challenges lie outside the traditional NATO area. Hence, NATO will have little choice but to “go out of area or go out of business.”

## NATO AND EASTERN EUROPE

At the same time, NATO needs to rethink its attitude toward expansion. For democracy to be consolidated, the countries of Eastern Europe need to have a stable security framework; otherwise, they will eventually be tempted to look for alternative security arrangements. From the U.S. point of view, it is far preferable that these countries be integrated into a *transatlantic framework* than that they seek alternative regional arrangements meant to “balance” other powers or groups of powers. Creation of regional arrangements would risk a return to the unstable situation that led to the outbreak of World War I.

The strategic concept adopted at the Rome summit in November 1991 has become obsolete. It was worked out prior to the disintegration of the USSR and before the full escalation of the Yugoslav conflict. Since then, the EC has deepened its commitment to expansion, first by opening negotiations for accession with some of the EFTA countries (Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Norway) and, second, by officially inviting the East European countries at the Copenhagen summit (June 1993) to become members once they have met the conditions of membership.

Both these developments have changed the overall context in which membership needs to be viewed. On one hand, the dangers of destabilization in Eastern Europe have increased; on the other, the East European countries will eventually become members of the EC and, by extension, of the WEU. Moreover, with the expansion of the EC to include the EFTA countries in 1995–1996, some of those countries, such as Finland or Sweden, may decide to apply for membership in NATO. Thus, NATO is likely to have to face the expansion issue fairly soon anyway. It needs to develop a coherent approach to the expansion issue well in advance of such applications.

That approach should provide for the eventual integration of at least the three key Visegrad countries into NATO.<sup>3</sup> The integration of those countries into NATO is strongly in the U.S. interest. All three are staunch Atlanticists. Their views on security issues closely coincide with those of the United States and other Atlanticist members of the alliance, such as Britain, Portugal, and the Netherlands. Thus, including them in NATO would strengthen the Atlanticist orientation of the alliance and provide greater internal support for U.S. views on key security issues.

Moreover, once the East Europeans enter the EC, they will be eligible for membership in the WEU, which confers with it an explicit security guarantee. France, Germany, and other members of WEU—who are also members of NATO—will be obligated to come to defend Poland or any East European WEU member should it be attacked. Such an obligation opens up the prospect that the United States would acquire security commitments “through the back door,” which could raise problems in Congress. It would be better for the Western allies to spell out jointly, and in advance, their obligations to Eastern Europe and, in the context of NATO, where the commitments will have greater credibility and where the U.S. influence will be greatest.

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<sup>3</sup>Slovakia is a separate case because its commitment to economic and political reforms is less clear at the moment. However, if Slovakia does intensify its commitment to such reforms—and demonstrates a clear commitment to respect minority rights—it should be offered the prospect of membership together with the other members of the Visegrad Group. Inclusion of Slovakia in NATO at the same time would also make the military defense of Hungary easier—an important concern to the U.S. military—because, otherwise, NATO troops would have no direct access to Hungary.

Membership should be made conditional on the meeting of specific criteria, which should include commitment to democratic rule; renunciation of all territorial claims; respect for the rights of minorities; willingness to offer mutual assistance to other member states; and willingness to participate in military and peacekeeping actions. By conditioning membership on these criteria, NATO can help solidify a zone of stability in Eastern Europe without creating an undue risk of embroiling NATO's existing members in ethnic or intraregional conflicts.

These criteria would apply not only to the Visegrad countries but also to others, such as Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, and Romania. Indeed, it is important to leave the door open to Russia and Ukraine. Although, in both cases, membership may be unrealistic at the moment, it should not be explicitly excluded. It is important that neither country view enlargement as being intended to draw new lines in Europe nor to isolate them.

Membership could occur either simultaneously or consecutively, depending on how fast the countries move to reform their military structures and meet the other criteria outlined above. Some countries, Poland, for example, may be ready for membership sooner than others, for example, the Czech Republic. It may thus make more sense to bring Poland into the alliance earlier than the others. (The reverse may be true in the case of the EC, for which the Czech Republic may be ready for accession sooner than Poland.) The main point is that the alliance should do what makes political and military sense and not be wedded to a rigid concept of simultaneous entry.

None of the countries of Eastern Europe will be ready for membership for some years. *What is important is that NATO begin the transformation process and that it send a clear signal soon—as the EC has recently done—that it is prepared to open its ranks to Eastern Europe and other countries once they meet the conditions for membership.*

The interim period should be used to harmonize force structures and planning procedures. The goal should be to make East European force structures and operational planning procedures compatible with those of NATO. Such compatibility would facilitate increased cooperation and lay the groundwork for membership at a later date.

In addition, NATO should begin to include the Visegrad countries in some of its exercises. The Polish participation in the "Baltops 1993" naval exercise in the Baltic Sea in June 1993 provides a good precedent and could serve as a useful model for the future.

Finally, NATO should expand and operationalize the peacekeeping agenda set out at the NATO summit in Athens in June 1993. Poland and Hungary have both offered to allow NATO to use their territories for peacekeeping training and are creating peacekeeping units, as is the Czech Republic. Such cooperation can be expanded even before the countries become full members. Moreover, it would create incentives for closer harmonization of their force structures with those of NATO countries—an important prerequisite for their eventual incorporation into NATO as full members.

It may also be useful to give more serious thought to the idea of "associate membership." Associate membership could be based on the first four articles of the NATO treaty but would not provide explicit security guarantees (Article 5). Such an arrangement would give the countries of Eastern Europe the clear perspective they are looking for. It would also provide time for them to adapt their military and defense establishments to meet NATO standards.

## BUILDING CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT

Any expansion of NATO will need to be carefully coordinated with Congress, especially if it involves the extension of Article 5-type security guarantees to new countries. Achieving congressional support for extending new guarantees to Eastern Europe will require presidential leadership and involvement. There will undoubtedly be some concern about extending security guarantees to new countries. The president, therefore, will have to *build a consensus* for his policy in Congress and consult closely with key congressional leaders well before serious consideration of new members begins. However, with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR, many members of Congress may increasingly begin to question the utility of an organization, and an American contribution, that is primarily oriented against a residual Russian threat, especially one that is less and less credible. Thus, expansion should be portrayed as part of the larger effort of transforming NATO to make it more capable of deal-



ing with the new security challenges in Europe, most of which today lie on NATO's eastern periphery.

### **THE ROLE OF NACC**

To date, NACC has been the main vehicle of NATO's outreach to Eastern Europe and the successor states of the former Soviet Union. It has played a valuable role in forging closer ties between NATO and the countries of Eastern Europe and in acquainting those countries with NATO plans and procedures. However, NACC is essentially a holding action. It provides a certain degree of psychological reassurance, but it does not really address the East Europeans' main security concerns. Moreover, the inclusion of the Central Asian countries, most of which are still run by anti-democratic and pro-communist forces, has reduced the significance of NACC in the eyes of many East European officials.

NACC should not be seen as a substitute for membership in NATO but, rather, as a vehicle that can facilitate that process. Its role should be strengthened to serve three purposes. First, NATO should build upon the peacekeeping agenda set out at the Athens summit and use NACC as the vehicle for expanding defense cooperation with the East European countries. A stronger NACC could help to strengthen defense cooperation with these countries and better prepare them for the full range of peacekeeping activities, possible inclusion in future NATO Article 4 missions, and eventual alliance membership at the appropriate moment.

Second, NACC should be expanded to include the neutral countries, some of which may become NATO members at some point. Moreover, some of them, Austria, Finland, and Sweden, have extensive peacekeeping experience and are already participating in NACC peacekeeping activities. Thus, it makes sense to make them full members. Moreover, their inclusion would make it easier to make NACC the "peacekeeping arm of the CSCE."

Third, the Russian role in NACC should be strengthened, especially in regard to peacekeeping. Giving Russia a bigger role in NACC would help to defuse Russian concerns that it is being excluded or isolated. Moreover, it is far preferable that Russia's peacekeeping activities be conducted within the framework of NACC than that they

be carried out independently. The NACC ensures a degree of coordination with U.S. and NATO objectives and also legitimizes NACC involvement in helping to resolve or contain conflicts in other parts of the former Soviet Union, where Russia has been demanding a "special role."

### **PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE**

The Clinton Administration's Partnership for Peace Initiative provides a useful framework for expanding defense cooperation in specific areas with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Since it is open to Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic countries, and the neutrals, it has the advantage of not "drawing lines" and of managing the Russian problem. However, like NACC, it is essentially a stopgap measure designed to buy time. It does not address the larger strategic issue of where Eastern Europe fits into the broader security framework. Thus, it is unlikely to lessen East European pressures for membership.

Ultimately, the success of Partnership for Peace will be determined by how it contributes to the larger process of NATO revitalization, of which enlargement should be an integral part. NATO needs to signal that it is ready to open its ranks to new members, preferably at the NATO summit in January 1994. The timing of actual entry is less important than making the basic commitment to enlarge. Such a commitment would allow the countries of Eastern Europe to use Partnership for Peace as a means to prepare for membership. Without such a commitment, the initiative is in danger of being seen as just another technical gimmick designed to keep them in the antechamber but out of the house.

### **SECURITY PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA**

As Yeltsin's backpedaling since his trip to Warsaw underscores, East European membership in NATO remains a sensitive issue, particularly within the Russian military. Any effort to integrate Eastern Europe into NATO, therefore, must be managed carefully and coordinated with Western policy toward Russia to avoid giving Russia the feeling that it is being isolated or marginalized. Indeed, policy to-

ward each East European country should be pursued along separate but parallel tracks.

Russian membership in NATO is not a question that needs to be addressed specifically in the near future. Russia is unlikely to be able to meet the requirements for membership for a long time—perhaps several decades. Nevertheless, the door for entry should be left open to Russia. Russia should not be given the feeling that it is automatically excluded or that the alliance is drawing new lines or divisions in Europe. Moreover, keeping the door open to Russia can provide an incentive for continuing economic and political reform.

In the meantime, NATO should deepen its ties to Russia by developing a new, expanded security partnership with Moscow. The core of this security partnership should be a new "Charter of Security and Cooperation," which lays down the basic principles guiding the new security partnership between NATO and Russia and spells out specific areas for expanding and deepening relations, including peacekeeping. The purpose of such a new charter would be twofold: to demonstrate that Russia is an integral element of a new European security order and to reassure Russia that incorporating new members into NATO (another key element of the new order) is not aimed at isolating Russia or damaging its security interests.

This charter should be concluded *prior* to extending NATO membership to countries of East Europe. It could help defuse Russian anxieties about expansion and pave the way for such expansion. Joint peacekeeping efforts, such as those proposed by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin during his meeting with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev in Garmisch, Germany, in May 1993, should be an integral part of the new Strategic Partnership and may also contribute to defusing Russian anxieties about isolation. Moreover, as NATO is transformed into an alliance designed more to deal with crisis management than with collective defense against outside attack, it should also become less threatening in Russia, which may also help to ease Russian anxieties about East European membership.

Some Russians—and some "Russia firsters" in the West—will undoubtedly still oppose extending membership to Eastern Europe, arguing that it is aimed at Russia or at least will be perceived as such. This view fails to understand the new post-Cold War realities and

changed security environment in Europe. Expanding NATO eastward is necessary, not primarily because there is a threat from Russia—although one cannot totally be excluded, given the uncertain nature of Russia's transition—but because there is a dangerous security vacuum in Eastern Europe. Unless a more substantial security framework is provided for Eastern Europe, the reform process in Eastern Europe is likely to remain incomplete, and, possibly, may even be derailed, creating new instabilities that will spill over into Western Europe, especially Germany. Neither of these developments is in Russia's interest. If Russia's transformation is to be successful, Russia needs a stable Eastern Europe and a strong and stable Western Europe as a partner. Such needs can be achieved only if a meaningful security framework for Eastern Europe is created.

Russia's transition, moreover, is likely to take a long time, perhaps several decades. NATO must be sensitive to Russian security concerns, but it cannot make its policy hostage to the uncertain outcome of Russia's transition. The alliance needs to get on with its own restructuring, including enlargement. This restructuring process has its own internal logic independent of developments in Russia.

### **STABILIZING AN INDEPENDENT, DEMOCRATIC UKRAINE**

The United States also needs to develop a coherent strategy to support actively the development of a stable, democratic, and independent Ukraine. The emergence of an independent Ukraine is a factor of major geopolitical significance. An independent Ukraine acts as an important strategic buffer between Eastern Europe and Russia, whereas the reincorporation of Ukraine into a Russia-dominated confederation would remove that buffer and have serious consequences for the security of Eastern Europe, especially Poland. Hence, supporting an independent, democratic Ukraine also contributes to enhancing stability and security in Eastern Europe over the long term.

The United States, however, has failed to sufficiently appreciate Ukraine's critical importance for stability in the Visegrad countries. Rather than developing a comprehensive policy toward Ukraine on its own merit, the United States has, at least until spring 1993, tended to see policy toward Ukraine as an appendage of its policy toward

Russia. This approach has led to a growing sense of frustration and disillusionment with U.S. policy among broad segments of the Ukrainian elite and has created damaging strains in U.S.-Ukrainian bilateral relations.

In addition, the United States has focused almost exclusively on the nuclear issue. Its policy has been primarily driven by arms control and non-proliferation concerns. The United States has approached Ukraine essentially as a non-proliferation problem rather than as a state with legitimate security concerns.

This single-minded preoccupation with the nuclear issue has been shortsighted and counterproductive. Instead of making the Ukrainians more willing to give up nuclear weapons, it has strengthened pro-nuclear sentiment in Ukraine. Many Ukrainian officials believe the only reason that the United States pays attention to them is because they have nuclear weapons. They fear that, if they give these weapons up, the United States will pay even less attention to Ukraine. Thus, U.S. policy has hardened their resolve to maintain the weapons as long as possible or to use them as a bargaining chip to obtain economic assistance and security guarantees.

In effect, a vicious cycle has developed: On one hand, the United States has tended to see Ukraine as a maverick and "spoiler," threatening to upset its non-proliferation policy. On the other hand, the Ukrainian elite have come to see Washington as indifferent to their security concerns and as primarily concerned with Russia at the expense of Ukraine. These misperceptions reinforce each other and have led to growing mutual suspicion and irritation in bilateral relations.

This vicious cycle needs to be broken. The United States needs to develop a broad, comprehensive, and balanced policy to stabilize democratic and economic reform in Ukraine. The United States should continue to press Ukraine to ratify the START I Treaty and the NPT. However, it also needs to broaden the dialogue with Ukraine and deemphasize the nuclear issue. Too much attention to the nuclear issue will only reinforce pro-nuclear sentiment in Ukraine and increase the strains in U.S.-Ukrainian relations.

In addition, the United States should encourage Ukraine's integration into European structures as well as closer ties to the countries of

Eastern Europe. If Ukraine is not integrated more tightly into European and other regional structures, there is a danger that it will move in a more radical and nationalist direction, and be more inclined to retain nuclear weapons. A highly nationalist, insecure Ukraine armed with nuclear weapons would be a source of instability in Eastern Europe and could pose a threat to its neighbors, especially Poland.

Finally, the United States needs to carefully manage the issue of NATO enlargement with a view to its effect on Ukraine. The Ukrainian leadership is very nervous about the prospect of NATO expansion eastward. They fear that such expansion will lead to a new division of Europe that will implicitly or explicitly leave Ukraine in the Russian sphere of influence, thereby significantly weakening Ukraine's chances to maintain its independence over the long run. Thus, any effort to expand NATO should be accompanied by a strong statement supporting Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity and an offer of increased economic assistance once Ukraine has worked out a coherent reform program (which it has yet to do). At the same time, the United States should encourage Russia and Ukraine to resolve their bilateral differences. A resolution of those differences would not only contribute to greater stability in Eastern Europe but to European security more broadly.

## **BILATERAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY TIES WITH EASTERN EUROPE**

As far as bilateral security relations with Eastern Europe are concerned, the main U.S. priority should be to help the countries of Eastern Europe *strengthen civilian control over the military*. This has been a major U.S. policy goal. But efforts to date have had only modest success.

Except for Romania, all countries in Eastern Europe have civilian defense ministers. However, civilian control remains superficial. The number of civilians in key defense positions is too small to establish effective civilian control. Moreover, most of the civilians appointed to such positions do not have a deep knowledge of defense issues. Thus, they are heavily dependent on the military, whose analysis or judgment they are rarely in a position to contest.

In addition, the increased military-to-military contacts have intensified the preference of the military to deal with each other, inhibiting the goal of strengthening civilian control of the military.

What is needed is a large-scale, well-funded program to train *civilian defense experts* who understand defense issues and who can provide alternative assessments and judgments to those given by the military. A major effort should be made to train such a cadre of East European defense experts. One possibility would be to establish a special exchange program to train civilian defense analysts at U.S. universities and research institutes—a type of Fulbright Program for East European civilian defense experts. Unless greater effort and resources are devoted to training such civilian specialists, attempts to promote civilian control over the military in Eastern Europe will have only limited success.

There is also a need to rethink the training of East European military officers. The current efforts to train military officers often have little impact. Few officers are sent abroad for training. Although the training they receive is quite useful, these officers return to largely unstructured defense establishments in which their new skills and training are ignored or are not adequately utilized. The impact of the training is thus lost or marginal. For the current programs to be effective, they need to be expanded, and innovative ways need to be found to reach a larger number of the officer corps. One way may be to bring them to the United States in larger numbers for shorter periods and have them “shadow” an American counterpart to see how he performs his duties.

Another problem relates to modernization and procurement. Over the next decade the countries of Eastern Europe face a massive effort to restructure their military forces. For both military and political reasons, many East European countries want to diversify their source of supply away from the former Soviet Union. However, they face significant financial constraints that make it impossible for most East European countries to afford to purchase major new equipment before the end of the decade. By then, they hope that economic reforms that have been initiated will have taken root sufficiently to allow them to begin to diversify their source of supply.

It is in American and overall Western interest to help these countries reduce their dependency on Russian equipment. Although economic constraints preclude large-scale modernization efforts in the next few years, the United States should begin *now* to work with the East European military elite to identify future needs and to explore with them the type of equipment that makes sense for their defense needs. Many in the East European military establishments would like to acquire flashy, high-tech weapons (especially Patriots and F-16s) that they may not need and cannot afford. The goal of U.S. policy should not be to "build up" the East European militaries, but to *encourage the East Europeans to buy weapons that make sense and to help them make rational choices.*

One such military area where help is needed is air defense. The withdrawal of Soviet air defense has left a gaping hole in East European air defense systems. Much of the East European equipment is obsolete and maldeployed. But before considering the sale of sophisticated new weapons and technology, the United States needs to obtain a better sense of East European needs and priorities. Moreover, the United States needs to be careful to avoid fueling local rivalries and conflicts. To the extent possible, the United States and NATO should encourage East European countries to buy equipment that is designed to strengthen those countries' ability to *defend themselves against outside attack*, rather than conduct offensive military operations against their neighbors.

Finally, the United States should encourage the East European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian equipment and encourage them to buy weapons that are compatible with NATO systems, thereby facilitating their integration into NATO over the long run. Given the economic difficulties those countries will face in the coming five to ten years, however, their ability to purchase Western equipment will be extremely limited. Unless the United States and its Western allies find ways to make Western equipment more affordable, Eastern Europe will have little choice but to continue to rely on Russia for spare parts and equipment.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>The recent Hungarian purchase of MiG-29s from Russia highlights this problem. The Hungarians would have preferred to buy Western equipment, but it was either too expensive or unsuitable for Hungarian needs. They were forced to accept the Russian offer, even though it increases their dependence on Russian equipment and slows



The United States therefore needs to develop a comprehensive and integrated program for providing military assistance to the East European countries to help them modernize their militaries. Sales under the program should be based on explicit criteria, including the effect of any weapons sales on the overall regional balance. Military assistance in the form of grant aid and purchase of equipment at low interest rates should also be an integral part of the program.

## REGIONAL COOPERATION

The United States should also encourage continued regional cooperation, especially within the Visegrad Group. Regional cooperation is no substitute for membership in Western security organizations—as the members of the Visegrad Group themselves fully realize—but it can complement it in important areas. Moreover, given the constraints on defense budgets in all four countries, cooperation in, for example, airspace management and air defense, as well as weapons procurement, would make sense. Continued strong U.S. support for cooperation within the Visegrad Group is particularly important because the harmony during 1991–1992 has begun to erode since the breakup of Czechoslovakia.

Slovakia presents a special problem because of its small size, uncertain commitment to economic reform and democratic pluralism, and treatment of minorities. Slovakia could prove to be the “spoiler” in the Visegrad Group. A highly nationalistic Slovakia would be a source of instability, especially if it began to curtail significantly the rights of the Hungarian minority. Moreover, given its economic weakness, there is a danger that Slovakia could become a client of some larger power, such as either Russia or Ukraine. It is important, therefore, to encourage Slovakia’s integration into Western and European institutions, including NATO.

Whether Slovakia enters NATO along with the other Visegrad members will depend to a large degree on the pace of internal reform in Slovakia itself. It would be preferable, however, to try to bring Slovakia into NATO more or less at the same time as the other

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their ability to make their armed forces more compatible with NATO’s. For background on the sales, see Alfred A. Reisch, “Hungary, Russian MiG-29s and Regional Balance,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, July 7, 1993, pp. 3–14.

Visegrad countries for several reasons. First, Slovak membership in NATO would make the military defense of Hungary much easier: Without Slovak membership, NATO has no direct land access to Hungary. Hungarian officials also believe Slovak membership would facilitate the resolution of Hungarian-Slovak differences. Moreover, if Slovakia is left out of NATO, it may feel increasingly isolated and be tempted to look elsewhere—either to Russia or Ukraine—to satisfy its security needs. Finally, leaving Slovakia out would doom Visegrad cooperation. Bringing Slovakia in more or less simultaneously with the other Visegrad countries, on the other hand, would preserve regional unity and could encourage continued regional cooperation.

At the moment, prospects for economic and democratic reform in Slovakia are not very bright. However, the current coalition headed by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar is unlikely to last. Popular support for Meciar and his party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), has declined significantly since early 1993. At the same time, the centrist and liberal forces have begun to organize themselves. Thus, a new coalition more committed to economic and political reform could emerge in the not-too-distant future. The United States should seek to strengthen these political forces and make clear that it is ready to support them if they come to power.<sup>5</sup>

The United States should make its assistance and support to Slovakia conditional on (1) maintaining a pluralistic democratic political system; (2) developing a market economy; (3) respect for minority rights; and (4) Slovakia's willingness not to sell arms to radical regimes, such as Syria and Libya. The fourth condition is particularly important, because arms sales are one of Slovakia's chief sources of foreign-currency earnings. There is thus a danger that Slovakia could seek to compensate for its growing economic problems by stepping up arms sales, especially to the developing countries.

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<sup>5</sup>Many of these forces are centered around President Michael Kovac and Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik, both of whom favor strong ties to Western institutions. They also include such people as Rudolf Chimel, Frantisek Miklosko, Miroslav Kusy, Milan Simecka, and Jan Carnogursky, leader of the Christian Democratic Movement.

## **SECURITY TIES TO THE BALKANS**

While the United States should give top priority to the Visegrad countries, because they have advanced the furthest along the path to democracy and economic reform, the United States should not neglect the Balkan countries (Bulgaria and Romania). It is in the U.S. interest to encourage the reform process in both countries and help stabilize their transitions as much as possible. This can contribute to enhancing regional stability in an area that has traditionally been—and continues to be—highly unstable.

Bulgaria is the real "sleeping" in Eastern Europe. Bulgaria's transition to democracy has been much more successful so far than many anticipated. Moreover, it occupies an important strategic position in the Balkans, which has become even more important as a result of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the emergence of an independent Macedonia. A stable, democratic Bulgaria could be an important factor of stability in the "post-Yugoslavia" Balkans. Thus, it is important for the United States to continue to encourage and support Bulgaria's democratic transition.

At the same time, the United States should continue to encourage Bulgaria's recent rapprochement with Turkey. This is one of the most important and encouraging developments in the Balkans lately, and it deserves strong U.S. support.

Romania's transition to democracy has been slower and less complete than the transitions of the other East European members of the former Warsaw Pact. It would be unwise, however, to seek consciously to isolate Romania. Rather, the United States should continue to nudge Romania along the path to democratic reform, encouraging it to take bolder steps and rewarding it when it does. Such a policy is likely to have a bigger payoff over the long run than a policy of isolation. The latter will strengthen the hand of the extremists and xenophobic forces in Romanian society and drive Romania in a more nationalist direction.

## **U.S.-GERMAN COOPERATION**

The German role in Eastern Europe in the coming decade is likely to be critical. At present, Germany is seeking to handle its security con-

cerns through NATO. However, if the United States and NATO fail to respond to these concerns, there is danger that Germany will seek other alternatives, either by joining with France to build a strong European defense identity independent of NATO or by moving in a more nationalist direction. The first course is more likely than the second, but the second cannot entirely be excluded.

The United States and its allies have grown accustomed to a Germany that seeks to achieve its interests through multilateral institutions, primarily the EC and NATO. During the Cold War, the Germans were the best "Europeans" and, to a large extent, still remain so. But the Cold War has reduced Germany's dependence on the United States and NATO. As a result, Germany is freer to pursue its own *national* interests more assertively. Two recent examples highlight this trend: (1) the decision in December 1991 to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, despite initial U.S. and EC objections, and (2) the refusal of the Bundesbank to lower its interest rates in summer 1993 to save the French government from having to devalue the franc. In each case, Germany put *national* interests ahead of those of its allies.

Neither of these actions suggests that Germany is about to turn in a more nationalist direction. But the United States needs to recognize that the old Federal Republic with which it was so accustomed to dealing no longer exists. Unification and the end of the Cold War have changed the internal and external dynamics of German politics. The new Germany is not simply the old Federal Republic writ large. In this sense, Margarita Mathiopoulos is right to speak of "the end of the Bonn Republic."<sup>6</sup>

Germany's growing ties to and interests in Eastern Europe will increasingly drive it to become more involved in the East. The real question, therefore, is whether the United States wants to see Germany go it alone (*Alleingang*) or whether the United States acts together with Germany and helps shape the process. A German *Alleingang* would not only cause anxiety in Eastern Europe but also

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<sup>6</sup>See Margarita Mathiopoulos, *Das Ende der Bonner Republik* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1993). For a thoughtful discussion of the impact of unification on future German foreign policy, see also Ronald D. Asmus, *German Unification and Its Ramifications* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4021-A, 1991).

resentment in parts of Western Europe, especially France. It would also have a corrosive effect on cooperation within NATO, making a restructuring of the alliance more difficult.

These considerations argue for a close coordination of U.S. and German policy toward Eastern Europe. German and U.S. interests in Eastern Europe overlap in many areas: On the one hand, both countries want to see Eastern Europe closely integrated into the West. On the other hand, both want to avoid a German *Alleingang*—a view shared by the East Europeans as well. There is thus a natural coincidence of interests in Eastern Europe between the two countries.

In particular, the United States and Germany should take the lead in pushing for integrating Eastern Europe into NATO. Such a joint effort would be welcomed by the East Europeans and would stand a better chance of success than if it were launched by the United States or Germany alone. At the same time, a joint initiative would give concrete content to recent calls for the two countries to become "partners in leadership."<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>For a comprehensive discussion, see Ronald D. Asmus, "Germany and America: Partners in Leadership?" *Survival*, November–December 1991, pp. 546–566.

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THE NEED FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP

The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War have created a new set of strategic challenges, most of which lie along the periphery in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. To address these new threats successfully, the United States needs to be engaged—and *perceived to be engaged*—in European affairs. At present, however, there is widespread uncertainty about what role the United States intends to play in Europe in the future. Despite efforts by both the Bush and Clinton administrations to assure America's European allies that the United States intends to remain involved in European affairs, many remain unconvinced.

The Clinton Administration's handling of the Bosnian crisis and its preoccupation with domestic affairs have reinforced these doubts. Many Europeans see the administration's vacillation on Bosnia and its unwillingness to commit ground troops there as an indication that the United States is unlikely to engage itself in European conflicts in the future, except in extreme cases when its vital interests are directly threatened.<sup>1</sup> Statements by some high-ranking U.S. officials, such as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff, that, in the future, the United States intends to play a reduced role in world affairs, have strengthened this impression.<sup>2</sup> Despite the administration efforts to distance itself from such statements, the "Tarnoff Doctrine"—as this reduced U.S. international role has been dubbed

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<sup>1</sup>See François Heisbourg and Pierre Lellouche, "Maastricht ou Sarajevo?" *Le Monde*, June 17, 1993.

<sup>2</sup>See Daniel Williams and John M. Goshko, "Administration Rushes to 'Clarify' Policy Remarks by 'Brand X' Official," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1993.

by journalists and European officials—is viewed by many Western governments as reflecting the administration's *real* policy. As one German commentator has warned: "The European central powers, including Germany, must get used to the fact that they can no longer follow a superpower which does not want to lead anymore."<sup>3</sup>

This impression may be wrong, but, in international politics, perceptions are often more important than reality. Indeed, they create their own reality. If European governments come to believe that the United States does not intend to play a major role in European affairs, they will formulate their policies on that premise, and the U.S. ability to help shape transatlantic relations in a constructive direction will rapidly diminish. The Clinton Administration, therefore, needs to spell out a clearer vision of the U.S. role in the post-Cold War security order. Otherwise, Europe and the United States are likely to drift farther apart and the United States will find itself increasingly marginalized in Europe.

The United States and its European allies must work together to create a new security framework to replace the old one shattered by the end of the Cold War. This new security framework cannot be confined solely to Western Europe. It must be extended to Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union as well, for *it is here that the future threats to European security lie*. If those threats are not contained, there is a danger that they will spill over into Western Europe, eroding and possibly derailing the process of European integration and eventually touching on core U.S. security interests in Europe.

Indeed, if there is a lesson to be learned from the Yugoslav crisis, it is that such "local crises" in Eastern Europe seldom remain localized. They often have unforeseen consequences with much broader strategic implications. Out of enlightened self-interest, therefore, the

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<sup>3</sup>See Jochen Siemens, "Washington Amateurs," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, June 2, 1993, p. 3, translated in FBIS-WEU-93-104, June 2, 1993, p. 10. For similar views, see Leo Wieland, "Führungsmacht mit beschränkter Führungskraft," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 23, 1993, and Alain Franchon, "Les Etats-Unis, 'Gulliver' méditatif," *Le Monde*, July 3, 1993.

**United States needs to remain heavily engaged in managing the new security challenges posed by the end of the Cold War—and especially in extending democracy and security to Eastern Europe.**