A RAND NOTE

International Military Student Training: Beyond Tactics

Jennifer Morrison Taw, William H. McCoy, Jr.

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Prepared for the
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PREFACE

This Note was prepared as part of a larger project entitled "The Effectiveness of U.S. Military Training Activities in Promoting Internal Defense and Development in the Third World." The purpose of this project is to assess the effectiveness of programs to train U.S. and foreign military personnel in foreign internal defense (FID) and internal defense and development (IDAD), respectively; to examine the benefits that the United States derives from these programs; and to consider how future efforts can be improved and strengthened.

This Note summarizes the results of the project's first phase, which surveys current U.S. international military student (IMS) training in IDAD, as well as the training of the U.S. military in this and related areas. In addition, this Note examines the broader social, political, and military issues related to U.S. FID and IDAD training and makes some preliminary recommendations regarding U.S. FID and IDAD training.

The second phase of the project was completed in July 1992 and examined, through select key-country case studies, the effectiveness of U.S. military training of international military students in promoting human rights, professionalism, democratic values, national development, and appropriate civil-military relations. Specifically, it considered whether training within the United States and in the host countries themselves attains these objectives. These regional case studies focused on U.S. efforts in El Salvador and Honduras, the Philippines and Thailand, and Liberia and Senegal and will be published shortly.

The project's final phase was completed in November 1992 and provides general recommendations for improving the organization, dispensation, doctrine, and focus of future U.S. FID and IDAD training efforts, along with specific recommendations for the key countries identified in the case studies. This document is also forthcoming.

The research presented here was conducted for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, ASD (SO/LIC). It was carried out within the International Security and Defense Strategy Program of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.

SUMMARY

As the United States scales back its military on the one hand, and increasingly perceives its own security to be linked with broader international stability and security on the other, the United States' need for low-cost, effective means of international influence and leverage will expand commensurately. In this new, post-Cold War environment, U.S. training programs are likely to assume greater importance. This Note examines the role that U.S. foreign military training in internal defense and development (IDAD) skills can play in improving friendly and allied countries' stability and security. Specifically, this Note

- Assesses the current status of Department of Defense foreign internal defense (FID) and IDAD training
- Determines the issues that need to be addressed in making this training adequate
- Begins to answer the question of whether or not the United States provides the most appropriate training possible to developing countries' militaries.

International military students train alongside U.S. military students at military training institutions in the continental United States. Yet, U.S. training is designed to meet the demands of a large, technologically sophisticated armed force on a conventional—ostensibly European—battlefield and does not address the needs of many foreign militaries. Indeed, the preponderance of U.S. courses focuses on logistical, tactical, and support operations for conventional battlefield warfare, while many developing countries have less-conventional training requirements, often for internal rather than external security. Nonetheless, there are U.S. courses—both advanced courses and basic training in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)—that are applicable to the unique requirements of many developing countries. As part of its training in low intensity conflict, for example, the U.S. military includes tactical and theoretical training in counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, internal defense and development, area studies, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, contingency operations, and peacekeeping. Moreover, conventional training in engineering, medical, constabulary, transportation, and communications skills is clearly applicable to the requirements of developing countries. Such courses not only help prepare U.S. military personnel for deployments to developing countries but are also directly

applicable to the needs and interests of many international military students training at U.S. Service schools and other training institutions.

The United States has a long history of training international military students in precisely these kinds of IDAD missions. As early as the 1950s, the United States was training foreign militaries in counterinsurgency. Under President Kennedy in the 1960s, the United States linked "nation-building" training to counterinsurgency training in an attempt to guide foreign militaries into constructive roles in their countries' infrastructural development and to offset any potentially counterdemocratic effects of training militaries in internal defense skills.

Training in IDAD skills was controversial. Members of the U.S. Congress, for example, expressed concern that training foreign militaries in such skills might tacitly encourage some militaries to compete with both police and civilian industries in their home countries. They referred to studies indicating that, unless a foreign country has already developed a broad IDAD strategy with a clearly defined role for the military, training the military in IDAD-related skills can create a situation in which the military takes the initiative (and often the advantage) and assumes responsibilities that traditionally reside in the civilian sector. In such countries as El Salvador, Honduras, and Thailand, for example, where the militaries have in some cases competed directly with civilian industries, providing further training in IDAD skills seems irresponsible.

Some members of Congress are therefore actively discouraging IDAD training. Congress, in a new attempt to compensate for the possible counterdemocratic effects of training foreign militaries—particularly in IDAD skills—has legislated that the focus of IMS training must be extended to include mandatory coursework in

- Human rights
- Democratic values
- Civil control over the military
- Reforms of military justice systems.

Under a program known as expanded IMET (IMET-E), existing courses are being revised, and course modules are being developed to meet the congressional mandate. Moreover, Congress has further mandated that U.S. military courses be opened to foreign government officials, who will be trained either within the United States or by U.S. military Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) in their home countries. Such training is intended to help

civilian officials maintain—or regain—control over their countries' militaries by familiarizing them with the military establishment and training them in defense-resource management.

IMET-E may facilitate training in the more theoretical aspects of internal defense and development. Currently, although many U.S. courses address the practical aspect of internal defense and development, few are dedicated to instruction on its more theoretical aspects, including area studies, the nature of society, the nature of insurgents, and the various roles of government in internal defense and development (including psychological operations [PSYOPs] and human rights initiatives). The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFK SWCS) at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, offers a FID-IDAD course that deals specifically with such subjects, but the course cannot be run because not enough students are registering for it. The Command and General Staff College offers elective FID and IDAD courses at each of its schools, but the IDAD courses focus on the role of U.S. support for host-nation military forces engaged in IDAD missions. An introductory theoretical IDAD course is also offered by correspondence through Ft. Eustis, Virginia, but few international military students take U.S. courses by correspondence.

The U.S. Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Florida, is in the process of developing a new two-week course on "civil-military strategies for internal development (CMSID),"[1] specifically intended to address issues of institutional development and appropriate military involvement in such activities. The Air Force intends the classes for the course to consist of two-thirds foreign students and one-third U.S. students, including representatives from military assistance groups (MILGRPs) and foreign civilian institutions. The course will consist of a series of seminars and may be held in both Spanish and English. The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) is considering funding foreign military and civilian attendance at the Air Force's CMSID course through IMET-E.[2]

Theoretical training in IDAD issues has broad utility, benefiting foreign and U.S. civilian and military personnel. A theoretical FID and IDAD course can help prepare U.S. Special Operations Forces for actions abroad and is directly applicable to the responsibilities of U.S. security assistance officers, foreign area officers, foreign service officers, defense attachés, J-5 planners, intelligence analysts, and nonmilitary governmental personnel

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[1]This course was originally conceived as an IDAD course. When the Air Force asked the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) to qualify the course as an IMET-E course, DSAA insisted that the name and content of the course be changed to reflect congressional concerns about the link between IDAD and counterinsurgency. The planned internal defense aspects of the course were therefore discarded. Phone interview with Hank Garza, 1 February 1992.

[2]Although at one point DSAA personnel discussed the possibility of funding theoretical IDAD training through the IMET-E program, they have since determined that expanded IMET will not promote IDAD because of the linkage between IDAD and counterinsurgency.

involved in U.S. foreign assistance efforts as well. Such instruction can help ensure that both U.S. and international military students properly use the technical and tactical IDAD skills they accrue as part of their U.S. training.

Even with the establishment of IMET-E and the development of theoretical IDAD courses, the bulk of IMS training in democratic ideals, values, and institutions will primarily continue to be the result of incidental exposure. Not all international military students will take IMET-E or theoretical IDAD courses, but they will all be exposed to U.S. trainers, doctrine, and culture, whether in courses taken in the continental United States or through some form of MTTs. The extent to which such exposure influences any given international military student depends mostly on that student's English-language skills and the U.S. students and instructors with whom he interacts. This exposure has been somewhat formalized in the form of the DoD Informational Program through which international military students are offered the opportunity to participate in activities sponsored by the International Military Student Office at each U.S. training facility. Such activities expose international military students to the U.S. media, public school system, justice system, labor organizations, etc., yet remain completely voluntary. Because such extracurricular exposure is a key goal of U.S. training, any shortcomings associated with the Informational Program and the ability of U.S. students and instructors to provide useful, enlightening relationships with international military students must be addressed.

All of these issues regarding IMS training may become purely hypothetical, however, as U.S. defense budgets are reduced. As the U.S. military declines, the number of courses offered by the U.S. military declines as well. That, combined with the Services' limit on the acceptable ratio of international to U.S. military students (1:5 or 1:10) in any given classroom, means that the decline in available spaces for foreign students will continue. Already, international military student waiting lists exist for courses that in the past have been easily accessible.[3]

Finally, the kinds of training Congress mandated through its IMET-E legislation do not conform to the traditional combat role and conventional orientation of the U.S. military. Systematic U.S. military training of foreign civilian officials will be an even greater departure. A key question is whether or not such training can or should be undertaken under the auspices of the U.S. military—especially in this time of shrinking budgets, changing missions, and reorganization—or should instead be pursued through other, nonmilitary, U.S. agencies or organizations.

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[3]This ratio does not apply to courses at the School of the Americas, at the Inter-American Defense College, or at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Florida.

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CONTENTS

LIST OF SYMBOLS

CINC	Commander in chief
DRMC	Defense Resource Management Center
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FMF	Foreign military financing
FMS	Foreign military sales
IDAD	Internal defense and development
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMET-E	Expanded IMET
IMS	International military student
IMSO	International Military Student Office
JFKSWCS	John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
LIC	Low intensity conflict
MTT	Mobile training team
PSYOP	Psychological operations
SAO	Security Assistance Officer
SATFA	Security Assistance Training and Field Activity
SATMO	Security Assistance Training Management Office
SOA	School of the Americas
TRADOC	Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command
TTP	Tactics, techniques, and procedures
USASAC	United States Army Security Assistance Center

1. INTRODUCTION

U.S. foreign policy has long held U.S. training, advice, and assistance to developing countries' militaries to be critical instruments of our national security policy. It is assumed that U.S. training, advice, and assistance advance U.S. foreign policy goals by providing political influence in recipient countries; encouraging attitudinal changes in host nation militaries and the development of democratic institutions; and promoting greater internal, regional, and, therefore, international stability. This assistance is a cost-effective means of achieving these goals, since it does not involve large U.S. military forces or the need to maintain overseas installations.

In theory, these programs enable the United States to effect changes in host countries across a broad spectrum of issues, ranging from training in small-unit tactics to encouraging concern for human rights, and from the provision of technical support for sophisticated weapons to the host military's role in national politics. Moreover, in the current international environment—in which rapid changes are resulting in a dramatic reappraisal of U.S. military expenditures, force structures, basing, etc.—U.S. training of international military students (IMSs) assumes new importance as a relatively inexpensive, yet potentially crucial, means of projecting national interests. However, if training is to be an effective instrument of U.S. influence and leverage, we need to ensure that it meets both the needs of the international students and the goals of the United States.

This Note assesses the current status of U.S. Department of Defense training in internal defense and development (IDAD). It outlines the process through which international military students receive training by the U.S. military and specifically examines training in practical and theoretical IDAD matters. Finally, the authors begin to answer the question of whether or not the United States provides the best possible training to developing countries' militaries by focusing on three basic issues:

- Are international military students trained in the United States more capable and professional than their counterparts?
- Are such students more sensitive to human rights, civil-military relations, and related issues?
- Do such students have a better understanding as to how an effective IDAD plan is supposed to preempt conflict, lead to democratization and spur economic growth?

METHODOLOGY

As a basis for their analysis and recommendations, the authors surveyed:

- Relevant congressional legislation
- Department of State presentations to Congress
- Security Assistance Agency printed materials
- The *ACDA World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*
- U.S. military course curricula and materials
- *Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management* articles
- U.S. military doctrine on FID, IDAD, and IMS training issues
- British Ministry of Defense literature.

The authors also interviewed key congressional staffers responsible for extended IMET legislation, as well as personnel at the School of the Americas, the Security Assistance Training Field Activity (SATFA), the Security Assistance Training Management Office (SATMO), JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the Defense Resource Management Center at Monterey, and the Defense Security Assistance Agency.

ORGANIZATION

This Note is divided into four sections. The first describes the Security Assistance Training Program, through which most international military students are selected and funded. The second section assesses the state of IDAD training. The third section describes the expanded International Military Education and Training program (IMET-E), the congressional response to some of the problems of practical IDAD-related training. The final section offers some conclusions and recommendations regarding the role of U.S. IMS training in the broader context of U.S. assistance to host-nations' internal defense and development.

2. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TRAINING PROGRAMS: IMET AND FMS

The Security Assistance Training Program includes two channels for providing training: the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and training associated with Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or Foreign Military Financing (FMF).

IMET is a grant program, established in 1976 to provide professional, leadership, and management training for senior military leaders and selected junior and middle-grade officers with evident leadership potential. In recent years, Congress has appropriated approximately $47 million annually for IMET to be distributed among more than 100 countries.

Countries also receive U.S. training as part of weapons and materiel purchases made through the FMS or FMF programs. Such training includes maintenance and the operation and management of U.S.-provided equipment, as well as technical and procedural training. This common training facilitates joint and combined operations throughout the world. Nearly 60 percent of international military students trained by the U.S. Army were trained through the FMS program in the last 10 years. Training purchased under the FMS program totals more than $200 million annually. The Army alone accounted for about $63 million in FMS training in FY 1990.

PROGRAM GOALS

The goals of the Security Assistance Training Program are to:

- Promote self-sufficiency
- Encourage the training of future leaders
- Support enhanced relations between the United States and foreign countries
- Expand foreign understanding of the United States and its culture and values
- Participate in International Narcotics Matters (INM) training.[1]

These goals represent ideals which are met to a greater or lesser extent on a case-by-case basis.

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[1]Headquarters TRADOC/SATD, *SATFA Training*, briefing at SATFA, 3 December 1991.

Self-Sufficiency

Some countries, for example, allow the United States to "train the trainers," promoting self-sufficiency. Others, however, for reasons ranging from inadequate manpower to national educational deficiencies, are unable to develop their own training programs and continue to rely on the United States. Still others could perhaps develop sufficient training capabilities but prefer to continue sending military students to the United States for the exposure they receive to state-of-the-art technologies and techniques.

Identification and Training of Leaders

The identification and training of leaders has been a U.S. goal since 1949, when the original Military Assistance Program (MAP) and FMS were initiated. Although each country uses different criteria to determine who will be sent to study in the United States, students selected for the advanced courses are, for the most part, on the leadership/advancement track. Students trained outside the continental United States or attending technical, maintenance, operations, and/or enlisted training within the continental United States, however, are less likely to be destined for leadership positions.

Enhanced Relations

Enhanced relations between the United States and foreign countries are closely related to the training of leaders. In some countries, a much higher percentage of the military's leadership has received U.S. training than have military personnel in general.[2] This translates into improved communication with the United States and often into greater openness to U.S. needs and interests. Training also contributes to interoperability with allies and friends and further enhances relations by guaranteeing the utility of weapon sales to the purchasing country in exchange for base rights, ports of call, use of airspace during emergencies, etc. Good relations are also derived directly from the sales of equipment and the attendant leverage and good will such sales engender.

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[2]This is true in Thailand, for example. In June 1992, seven out of 13 of the top posts in the Royal Thai Army (RTA) were held by U.S.-trained Thais. The Commandant of the RTA Command and General Staff College was also U.S.-trained, as were the RTA Director of Intelligence and the Deputy Superintendent of the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy. Nine percent of the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) personnel listed on the protocol list were U.S.-trained, but a full 12 percent of the RTN headquarters staff received U.S. training. Twenty-five percent of those listed on the Royal Thai Air Force's *Commanding and Staff Officer's List* were trained in the United States. Of the October 1991 roster of senior officers in the Ministry of Defense, 54 percent were U.S.-trained; 29 percent of the senior officers in the Supreme Command received U.S. training. Of the top 8 senior officers in the Supreme Command in October 1991, 7 trained in the United States. Given that at most 5 percent of the total RTARF are U.S.-trained, these numbers are significant. They indicate that U.S.-training and RTARF leadership are indeed related.

Expansion of Foreign Understanding

Expansion of foreign understanding of the United States and its culture and values is a by-product of IMS enrollment in CONUS-based courses. While the courses themselves are not in any way geared specifically to this objective, foreign-student interaction with U.S. military students and instructors, as well as general exposure to U.S. culture, is nonetheless a primary goal of IMS training.[3]

Participation in INM Training

The recently developed INM training, targeted specifically at South and Central American countries engaged in the struggle against drug-trafficking, is supported through the same organizations developed to organize security assistance training in general, though the source of funding is different.

ARMY SECURITY ASSISTANCE TRAINING ORGANIZATIONS

Security Assistance Training and Field Activity

The Security Assistance Training and Field Activity (SATFA) is the pivc organization in the U.S. Army for Security Assistance training matters involving Army equipment or subjects (i.e. FMS and IMET).[4] SATFA is responsible for the coordination of all foreign training conducted either in or outside of the continental United States—either as a component of FMF or of IMET programs. In addition, it has recently assumed training management responsibility for INM. SATFA determines available training for various countries formulaically, using course costs, travel and living expenses (TLA), medical costs, burden carried by foreign country, and congressional allocations of funds as inputs. It also takes into account equipment configuration, releasability, and quantity; each international military student's language requirements; school schedules; and appropriate training schedules for equipment sales.

SATFA is responsible for nearly half of the total DoD IMET program (49 percent), managing approximately 3,300 students a year. In addition, approximately 4,700 FMS

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[3]Indeed, one of the issues regarding the School of the Americas (SOA)—where the majority of students are Latin American and classes are held in Spanish—is the extent to which foreign students can glean the deeper lessons of appropriate behavior and professional demeanor if they are not surrounded by Americans and taught in the English language. A concern voiced by some in the military is that courses at SOA, out of deference to the more relaxed pace of Latin American culture, may themselves be slower paced and less challenging than other U.S. military courses. This is denied, however, by staff at SOA, who argue that SOA's courses are of equal caliber to any U.S. military course and that learning in Spanish allows Latin American students to achieve even clearer understanding of U.S. values and mores.

[4]SATFA's counterparts in the Navy and Air Force are, respectively, the Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity and Air Force Security Assistance Training (AFSAT).

students attended classes at U.S. Army schools in the 1992 fiscal year. This represents a case-load of approximately 8,000 international military students each year in the United States.

SATFA receives policy, guidance, and direction from various higher-level organizations including Headquarters U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). The Director, SATFA, executes TRADOC staff responsibility for all security assistance training. SATFA coordinates directly with Security Assistance Officers and Combatant Commands worldwide, the Army Materiel Command's U.S. Army Security Assistance Center and the Security Assistance Training Management Office (SATMO) at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina.

SATFA functions are also affected in a number of ways by organizations outside the official chain of command. The programs they run are funded through Congress, controlled by the Department of State, taught in the military training institutions, frequently related to arms sales, and driven by the wishes and interests of foreign nations. SATFA is functionally organized around each Theater Command. It provides the coordination between these various entities. Security Assistance Officers (SAOs) in each foreign country help determine that country's needs and wishes regarding training. The SAOs then work with SATFA desk officers to determine what kinds of training are available, advisable, and affordable. In theory, this should fulfill both the strategic training objectives of the Unified Commands and the intent of the Congress for this program. In practice, however, this is neither always the case nor so easily achieved.

Security Assistance Training Management Office

Although all IMS training within the continental United States is organized by SATFA, IMS training outside of the continental United States is routed through SATFA to SATMO, where the formation and deployment of mobile training teams (MTTs), Technical Assistance Teams, Extended Service Training Teams, and Technical Assistance Field Teams takes place. SATMO has responsibility for the organization, preparation, and deployment of more than 140 separate training teams, varying in size from one to 54 members, that respond to all requests for materiel or training. SATMO deploys MTTs for missions of 179 days or less and deploys various other technical assistance and training teams for missions of 180 days or more. The principal difference between MTTs and other kinds of training teams is their status: MTTs deploy in temporary duty status, while other teams deploy as a permanent change of station.

The decision to deploy teams to foreign countries occurs either as a result of a formal request from that country or as a component of an equipment-fielding package to a foreign nation. In either case, the foreign nation must request and approve the U.S. team's deployment. Generally, this occurs as a result of negotiations between the Ambassador or SAO and that nation's minister of defense. After a requirement has been identified and a request made, the SAO sends the training plan to SATFA. SATMO calculates the costs of the plan and begins preliminary coordination with the affected Force Command, if the training team is to be on temporary duty, or Personnel Command, if the team is to be permanent. After approval, the team is sent to Ft. Bragg for preparation and country orientation prior to deployment.

3. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT TRAINING

Very little of the training provided to foreign militaries is undertaken in deliberate support of host nations' internal defense and development (IDAD) strategies. Indeed, of the more than 2,000 courses offered through the U.S. military services, only two are specifically IDAD courses,[1] although a block of IDAD instruction is included in most U.S. SOA courses. A number of other military courses—on low intensity conflict (LIC), counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and civil-military relations—are clearly related to the subject of IDAD.[2] A theoretical IDAD course is currently in development at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School.

In addition to these, which expose students to the theoretical issues involved in IDAD, the U.S. military also provides training in relevant skills. Engineering, communications, medicine, and transportation, for example, are clearly applicable to internal development strategies, just as training in counterinsurgency is clearly relevant to internal defense.[3] Such skills can be taught to foreign militaries in deliberate support of their nations' IDAD strategies. More often, however, such skills, particularly internal development skills, are taught in the context of conventional operations.

Training in IDAD capabilities, regardless of the context in which it is conducted, has been controversial from the outset. Academics and members of the U.S. Congress have long expressed concern that training foreign militaries in IDAD skills tacitly encourages some host-nation military forces to compete with police and civilian industries in their home countries. They fear that training a foreign military in IDAD-related skills could create a

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[1]One of the courses is offered at all Command and General Staff College (CGSC) schools. The other is a correspondence course. However, for a variety of reasons, including simple problems with mailing course materials to foreign students, it is very unusual for an international military student to take a correspondence course. Telephone interview with SATFA personnel, November 1992; Zelms (1988); and telephone interviews, November 1992, with staff of the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict and at Fort Leavenworth, verifying that the information referred to in the 1988 compilation is up-to-date.

[2]For example, the Command and General Staff Officer's Course includes 45 hours on LIC in the core curriculum, plus seventeen elective courses related to the subject. The School of Advanced Military Studies includes 18 hours of formal instruction in LIC as well as a six-day exercise. All of the TRADOC schools teach low intensity conflict. Many of these courses include attention to the role and means of U.S. support for host nations' IDAD strategies.

[3]The U.S. Department of Defense defines *internal defense* as "the full range of measures taken by a government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." DoD defines *internal development* as "actions taken by a nation to promote its growth by building viable institutions (political, military, economic, and social) that respond to the needs of its society." *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Pub 1-02, 1 December 1989, p. 188.

situation in which the military would take the initiative (and often the advantage) and assume responsibilities that traditionally reside in the civilian sector.[4] Such has been the case in El Salvador, Honduras, and Thailand, where the militaries have in some cases competed directly with civilian industries.[5]

INFORMATIONAL PROGRAM

In an early response to these concerns about the effects of U.S. training on host nations' civil-military relations and progress toward democratization and development, the U.S. Department of Defense established the Informational Program (IP) in the 1960s. The IP was intended to help expose foreign military students to U.S. democratic ideals and to help them develop increased respect for human rights. Prior to the IP, IMS training in democratic ideals, values, and institutions had been accomplished primarily as the result of incidental exposure and depended a great deal on the international military student's English-language

[4]A 1990 GAO study on IMET training, for example, found that the efficacy of training militaries in nation-building had to be determined on a case-by-case basis. *Security Assistance: Observations on the International Military Education and Training Program*, GAO/NSIAD: GAO Briefing Report to Congressional Requestors, Washington, D.C., June 1990, p. 26. See also Einaudi and Stepan (1971), pp. 1–57; Fitch (1981), p. 77. Fitch also cites the following on this topic (footnote, p. 77): himself, *The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process: Ecuador 1948–1966*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977, pp. 136–145, 162–164; Alfred C. Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 153–187, and "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1973, pp. 47–68; Richard Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1973, pp. 111–118; Caesar Sereseres, "The Guatemalan Armed Forces: Military Development and National Politics," paper presented to the Latin American Studies Association convention, Atlanta, March 1976, pp. 32–34; Brian Jenkins and Caesar Sereseres, "U.S. Military Assistance and the Guatemalan Armed Forces," *Armed Forces and Society* 3, Summer 1977, pp. 575–594; David Ronfeldt and Caesar Sereseres, *Arms Transfers, Diplomacy, and Security in Latin America and Beyond*, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 1977, pp. 20–28; Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*, Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, 1973, pp. 154–165; Abraham Lowenthal, "Armies and Politics in Latin America," *World Politics*, 27, October 1974, pp. 129–130; Charles Corbett, "Politics and Professionalism: The South American Military," in Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies (eds.), *The Politics of Anti-Politics: The Military in Latin America*, Lincoln, NB, University of Nebraska Press, 1978, pp. 20–21; John Samuel Fitch, "The Political Consequences of U.S. Military Assistance to Latin America," *Armed Forces and Society*, 5, Spring 1979, pp. 380–386.

[5]Discussion with Cresencio Arcos, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, April 1991; interview with LTC Robert Leicht, Commander, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, Okinawa, Japan, May 1992; Benjamin C. Schwarz, "Peacetime Engagement and the Underdeveloped World: The U.S. Military's 'Nation Assistance' Mission," unpublished paper, 1991, p. 24. Schwarz describes the economic power of many Third World, especially Latin American, militaries: "The armed forces of Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala have created their own banks . . . engage in large-scale investment in real estate and other business ventures, carry out private construction projects for profit, own farms and resorts, and control lucrative government agencies." In a May 1991 interview with Ambassador Arcos, Schwarz was told that the Honduran military at one point requested American military engineering equipment to expand private, for-profit construction projects. In June 1992 interviews with American and Thai military and diplomatic personnel in Bangkok, the author was told about Thai involvement in a variety of civilian industrial and commercial undertakings. In particular, Class 5 of the Chulachomklao Military Academy purchased a construction company and has been able to divert military construction contracts to that company for profit. Indeed, the Thai military is increasing its role in internal development, and some argue that it is doing so in part for financial profit.

skills and the U.S. students and instructors to whom he was exposed. It had been assumed that simply by training alongside U.S. personnel, international military students would be effectively exposed to U.S. culture and behavior. By being held to U.S. standards, they would better understand the U.S. work ethic. By learning in English, they would be more likely to learn the subtle rationale underlying given behaviors.

Through the IP, the U.S. Department of Defense somewhat formalized foreign military students' exposure to democratic ideals and institutions by requiring each U.S. military training facility to have an International Military Student Officer (IMSO) as liaison for the foreign military students. Each IMSO was then charged with organizing and implementing the IP at the training facility where he or she works.[6]

The purpose of the IP is defined in the *Joint Security Assistance (JSAT) Training Regulation*, Chapter 11.[7] It is intended to expose international military students to U.S. governmental institutions, the media, minority problems, the purpose and scope of labor unions, the U.S. economic system, and U.S. public-education institutions. There are few guidelines, however, about how IP should actually be implemented and its objectives attained. The IP is entirely the responsibility of the individual IMSO; the program can simply consist of courses in a classroom or, closer to the DoD ideal, can be a hands-on experience involving field trips to local public schools, newspapers, courthouses, etc. There are also different policies governing the release of foreign students from their primary coursework to attend IP instruction or tours. Some training institutions, for example, allow foreign students to miss class to go on IP tours, while others do not.

The IMSO is different at every post: the position may be full time or its responsibilities may be imposed as an "additional duty."[8] The lack of uniformity across the IMSOs suggests the overall lack of priority given to the IP and the IMSO tasked to implement it within the Army. There have been four IMSOs at Ft. Bragg since 1989, for example. The continuity in that program is provided by the assistant IMSO and her aides. Since IMSO is not considered a prime assignment, lower-ranking officers on short tours of duty are frequently placed in the position.

The IMSO's approach is a function of regulation and personality. While specific actions must be accomplished, such as ensuring the comfort and education of the foreign students, personality plays an unusually large part in the impression that the student carries away from the United States. One assistant IMSO, for example, believes that female

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[6]Department of Defense (1985).

[7]Headquarters, Department of the Army (1990).

[8]At Ft. Bragg, the IMSO is also the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment Commander.

IMSOs provide a different approach, which is culturally attractive to foreign students. She has several anecdotes to support her hypothesis and cites instances in which students responded more favorably to female IMSOs than to male IMSOs.[9]

The Army's IP is funded at approximately $3 million a year. The consensus within the Army and within the DoD seems to be that IP is the most cost-effective program available. As a direct result of their participation, many international military students return home with positive impressions of the United States and a strong motivation to work toward developing institutions in their own countries similar to those in the United States. Yet, there is no proven means of evaluating the effectiveness of the IP program in terms of inculcating respect for human rights and democratic institutions among foreign students—much less for measuring what effect this instruction will actually have on foreign countries. While transgressions by U.S.-trained foreign military personnel are often glaring (such as the 1989 murder of Jesuit priests and two women by the Atlacatl battalion in El Salvador), the opposite—positive actions and non-actions—is virtually impossible to assess.

THEORETICAL IDAD COURSES

Theoretical training in IDAD issues is another way to sensitize foreign military students to U.S. concerns regarding foreign militaries' potential abuse of IDAD skills. As mentioned above, there are very few such courses. Although a number of courses deal with issues related to internal defense and development, such as courses in LIC, unconventional warfare, and counterinsurgency, these do not tend to examine the preemptive role of IDAD strategies. Instead, they focus on the prescriptive role of IDAD strategies once internal unrest or insurgency has arisen. One of the two specific IDAD courses offered, moreover, is a correspondence course offered through the U.S. Army Institute for Professional Development, Army Correspondence Course Program, Ft. Eustis, Virginia. Foreign military students rarely take such correspondence courses. The other IDAD course is offered at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, and particularly addresses the role of U.S. assistance for host-nation military forces engaged in IDAD missions, but it is part of the overall Command and General Staff Officer's course and cannot be taken alone.

The kind of course in development at Hurlburt Field offers a somewhat broader theoretical introduction to IDAD strategies. By examining such issues as civil-military relations and human rights, this course specifically addresses the potential problems involved in training foreign militaries to assume what the United States has traditionally considered civilian roles in internal defense and development. This course will introduce

[9]This is simply one person's observation and is completely unscientific.

foreign students to the concepts and questions involved in IDAD strategies and will familiarize them with the U.S. point of view. The course will only be two weeks long, however. This may be problematic, because it is not cost-effective for many countries to pay their students' travel and living expenses for just two weeks. Moreover, because the Air Forces' FID effort is still small and cannot bear the costs of a larger program, the course will only be available to Latin Americans.[10] Finally, the course will understandably focus on potential roles of air forces in internal defense and development. Although such training is useful, it is not likely that air forces will take the lead in internal defense and development. Thus, though this course will provide a unique opportunity for some military students to examine the theoretical issues involved in IDAD strategies, it simply will not meet the broader potential for such training.

A similar IDAD course was held once at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, but has since lain dormant because the requisite number of students is not being met. This five-week course is open to all international military students and has a more comprehensive program of instruction than the Air Force course will have. The course is not cost-effective for host nations, however, which cannot afford to pay their students' travel expenses for a course lasting just five weeks. U.S. military personnel, on the other hand, argue that the course is too long. The course also suffers from a lack of command emphasis within the U.S. Army itself, leading to scheduling problems, underenrollment of U.S. students in the course, and enrollment of lower-ranking American officers than foreign officers.[11] The course is also poorly "advertised" by U.S. SAOs, who are responsible for making foreign militaries aware of their training options. Nor is the course effectively lobbied to foreign civilians, who would arguably benefit even more than their military counterparts.

Yet, theoretical IDAD courses have a far broader utility than the U.S. military and government appear to credit them with. Such courses are ideal preparation for U.S. special operations forces deploying for actions abroad. U.S. SAOs, foreign area officers, foreign service officers, defense attachés, J-5 planners, intelligence analysts, and even nonmilitary

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[10]Telephone interview with Captain Lisa Mazur, USAF Special Operations School, Revolutionary Warfare Branch, 5 October 1992.

[11]The course provides a broad introduction to the concepts of FID and IDAD, ranging from tactical lessons on equipment, ammunition, support, etc., to instruction on the nature of society, the nature of insurgents, and the various roles of government in internal defense and development (PSYOP, human rights initiatives, etc.). The course also offers U.S. students—military and non-military—the opportunity to learn about the supporting role a country takes in another's internal defense and development. *Program of Instruction*, "Foreign Internal Defense/Internal Defense and Development Course 3A-F59," United States Army, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, June 1990.

governmental personnel involved in U.S. foreign assistance efforts would also benefit immensely from the course. Indeed, any U.S. military or governmental official deployed to a developing country would benefit from exposure to the theoretical and practical issues broached in the kind of FID/IDAD course that Ft. Bragg tries to make available. Nonetheless, the Army is unwilling to place emphasis on the Ft. Bragg course, and the Air Force does not have the means to broaden and generalize the theoretical IDAD course it is currently developing.

4. EXPANDED IMET: IMET-E

Some members of Congress regard the IP and existing courses as inadequate to the task of creating respect for democratization and human rights in international military students. These legislators are still concerned that training in IDAD skills promotes precisely the opposite effect by encouraging international military students to take on traditionally civilian responsibilities. These members of Congress are actively discouraging training in IDAD skills,[1] while mandating that training beyond traditional tactics, techniques, and procedures include such issues as

- Human rights
- Democratic values
- Civil control over the military
- Reforms of military judicial reform.

In the FY 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 101-513), the U.S. Congress thus mandated that not less than $1,000,000.00 of IMET funds shall be set aside for

> developing, initiating, conducting and evaluating courses and other programs for training foreign civilian and military officials in managing and administering foreign military establishments and budgets, and for training foreign military and civilian officials in creating and maintaining effective military judicial systems and military codes of conduct, including observance of internationally recognized human rights . . . [civilian personnel] shall include foreign government personnel of ministries other than ministries of defense if the military education and training would (i) contribute to responsible defense resource management, (ii) foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military, or (iii) improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights. (P.L. 101-513)

IMET-E is thus specifically intended to address shortcomings in civil-military relations in developing countries by training foreign civilian officials in defense management and by persuading foreign militaries of the importance of human rights, democratic institutions, and fair military judiciaries.

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[1]In some cases, legislators confuse training in IDAD skills with training in IDAD theory and reject IDAD training altogether. Telephone interview with congressional staffers, January 1992.

Personnel at the Security Assistance Training Field Activity, however, have argued that IMET-E is redundant. They maintain that advanced military courses fulfill the IMET-E requirements mandated by Congress and that attendance by international military students in these courses is now simply reported as IMET-E. Moreover, they argue that there is little foreign civilian interest in U.S. training. Foreign government officials have neither the time nor the inclination to receive training in U.S. values and methods.

In response to congressional concerns about regular IMS attendance in existing courses being reported as IMET-E, the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) has attempted to make IMET-E a more distinctive program. Thus, although 60 existing military courses were initially determined to meet the congressional IMET-E mandate, that list was first pared back to 45 and, more recently, back to six or seven. DSAA is also overseeing the Naval Justice School's development of a specific IMET-E military justice/human rights course. The Defense Resource Management Institute (DRMI) at Monterey, California, also under the supervision of DSAA, offers its defense resource management course for civilian as well as military students. It is available to foreign military and civilian personnel either in Monterey (as an eleven-week course) or in their home countries (as a two-week course). The course has already become popular among international civilian officials. Whether the military justice/human rights course in development at the Naval Justice School or the Air Force Special Operations School's new civil-military strategy for internal development course will draw similar foreign interest is uncertain. Such courses may meet more resistance than DRMI's practical training, but DSAA intends to promote the new courses in a manner that attracts foreign officials by avoiding any appearance of undue U.S. meddling or potential interference.

IMET-E, though still evolving, is a positive step toward solving some of the broader political and social problems associated with U.S. IMS training, including the challenge of maintaining a balance between imparting IDAD skills on the one hand, while not facilitating or encouraging foreign militaries to dominate the civil sectors in their home countries on the other. Although the issue is still before Congress,[2] the adoption by DSAA of IMET-E represents a formalization within the military of the new training criteria.

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[2]Some senators favor eliminating IMET altogether, while others favor modifying IMET along the lines of IMET-E. *Congressional Record*, Proceedings and Debates of the 102d Congress, First Session, No. 9, Part II, Washington, D.C., Monday, January 14, 1991, pp. S847–S852.

5. CONCLUSIONS

This Note offers observations and preliminary conclusions based on the completion of the first phase of this project. In general, we consider funds expended in FMF and IMET a relatively low cost to pay for training foreign students in U.S. doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. This will be important in future coalition contingencies; moreover, there is a wealth of anecdotes regarding the aid and support that U.S.-trained international military students have provided the United States in sometimes difficult situations. For funding reasons, however, the United States will be training fewer IMET students than in the past, a situation that is exacerbated by the U.S. tendency to cut IMET funding as a form of sanction.

Specifically, tension remains between the need to improve foreign militaries' IDAD skills yet assure that these skills are not abused at the expense of civilian government or industry. This tension can in part be alleviated through improved theoretical training in IDAD strategies. The new IMET-E courses' emphasis on democratization, civil authority and human rights, alongside the U.S. military's continuing efforts to expose international military students to U.S. values and ideals through extracurricular activities, may also eventually help to ensure that IDAD skills are appropriately employed in host nations.

Currently, although many U.S. courses address the practical aspects of internal defense and development, few are dedicated to instruction on the more theoretical aspects of IDAD strategies. No course provides the type of instruction that the dormant Ft. Bragg FID/IDAD course does. The Air Force's course simply will not be as comprehensive or as accessible as the Ft. Bragg course is. IMET-E courses are applicable to internal defense and development, but as yet do not specifically address the issue. Other IDAD courses or course-segments offered by the U.S. military focus specifically on the U.S.'s potential support for host nations' IDAD strategies.

Yet, theoretical training in IDAD issues has broad utility, benefiting foreign and U.S. civilian and military personnel. We therefore recommend not only that the CMSID course in development at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field be sufficiently supported within the military, but also that the course at Ft. Bragg be resurrected. The development, promotion, and maintenance of such valuable courses must receive command emphasis if they are to avoid the problems that plague the Ft. Bragg course and succeed.

Theoretical FID/IDAD courses should be offered as follow-on courses to other CONUS-based courses or training opportunities, so that international students are committed to longer periods of training in the United States, making travel and living costs more efficient.

The courses could, for example, be conducted as follow-ons to the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) course, the Special Forces officers 18A qualification course, the Civil Affairs course, and/or the PSYOP course.

The courses should become required for all U.S. special operations forces, SAOs, foreign area officers, foreign service officers, defense attaches, J-5 planners, intelligence analysts, and nonmilitary governmental personnel involved in U.S. foreign assistance efforts. Such instruction can help ensure that international and U.S. military students properly use the technical and tactical IDAD skills they accrue as part of their U.S. training.

U.S. SAOs—who act as liaisons between U.S. training institutions and host nations—should, if they do not attend the courses themselves, at least be made more aware of the courses and their benefits. An export briefing should be prepared on the subject, detailing how such courses benefit not only the SAOs themselves but host nation military students. The briefing should be presented at all SAO training workshops, and SAOs should be encouraged to promote such theoretical FID/IDAD courses within their respective countries. In addition, because theoretical IDAD courses are of special relevance to foreign civilian students, U.S. diplomats should also be encouraged to promote such courses, not only to defense ministries, but to other departments as well.

Finally, the curricula of any theoretical IDAD course should include advice on which U.S. military courses can best prepare foreign military and civilian students for the practical aspects of institutional and infrastructural development, thus providing some linkage between training in IDAD theory and IDAD skills.

A FID/IDAD course can present the U.S. military with a unique opportunity to teach the dynamics of the cause and effect of instability, as well as to provide instruction on how to approach the problem. Without command emphasis and sufficient promotion at home and abroad, however, such courses are bound either to fail, like the one at Ft. Bragg, or to be very limited in both scope and attendance, like the courses in development at Hurlburt Field.

Even with the establishment of IMET-E and the development of theoretical IDAD courses, the bulk of IMS training in democratic ideals, values, and institutions will continue to be accomplished primarily as the result of incidental exposure. Relatively few international military students will take IMET-E or theoretical IDAD courses, but they will all be exposed to U.S. trainers, doctrine, and culture, whether in CONUS-based courses or through some form of MTTs. This exposure has been somewhat formalized via DoD's IP. Because such extracurricular exposure is a key goal of U.S. training, any shortcomings associated with the IP and the ability of U.S. students and instructors to provide useful, enlightening relationships with international military students must be addressed.

For example, because the quality of a student's exposure to U.S. culture and values is strongly influenced by the personalities of the people with whom he interacts, military instructors, SAOs, and IMSOs should receive special training for dealing with the needs and interests of international military students. Standard qualifications for IMSOs should also be set. The IP should be standardized as well, and uniform guidelines should be created. A consistent, formal policy also needs to be developed that ensures that international military students maximize their class time while simultaneously being introduced to U.S. culture and values through the IP. Options include increasing course lengths and inserting IP tours, field trips, and other activities throughout the curricula, as well as increasing precourse orientation to include IP activities. Unfortunately, there is no proven means of evaluating the effectiveness of the IP in terms of promoting respect for human rights and democratic institutions among foreign students. Nor is there any objective means by which to measure what effect this training has had on students once they return to their own countries. While transgressions by U.S.-trained personnel are glaring, the opposite—positive actions and nonactions—is virtually impossible to assess.[1]

Finally, each time the United States cuts off IMET funds as a form of sanction, it severs the U.S.-host nation relationships developed through training international military students and reduces its own potential leverage and influence. More critically, where IMET training is not taking place, the United States will not be laying the seeds for future relationships or exposing future leaders to U.S. doctrine, ideals, and values. As a report for the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy determined,

> The irony of such sanctions on IMET, is that they often cut off communication with precisely those countries and those categories of individuals we wish most to influence. . . . It seems arguable that instead of cutting IMET in such instances, Congress might usefully increae it, since most U.S. Ambassadors and CINCs agree that they would prefer to deal on such issues with officials who have been advantaged by education in the United States. The sanctions against IMET isolate the officer corps of countries who clearly need enlightened leadership, and thus achieve the opposite of what Congress intends.[2]

Simply put, reducing or suspending IMET as a form of sanction is counterproductive in both the short and the long term.

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[1]Indeed, many countries resent U.S. attempts to track foreign students and therefore classify their activities as secret.

[2]*Commitment to Freedom: Security Assistance as a U.S. Policy Instrument in the Third World*, A Report for the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Publication Draft 4/10/88, pp. 23, 44–45.

All of these issues regarding IMS training may become purely hypothetical, however, as U.S. defense budgets are reduced. Overall cuts in the number of courses offered at the Service schools have already resulted in fewer seats being available to foreign students; indeed, foreign demand for places in many courses has already outstripped supply. This problem is compounded by the 1:10 to 1:5 ceiling on the ratio of international to U.S. military students in the classroom (except at the SOA). The ratio is held to be necessary because higher percentages of international military students (for whom English is a second language) degrade the quality of the courses. This policy will have to be reconsidered, however, if the United States is to continue to train any significant number of international military students. Options include opening specific classes to higher international to U.S. student ratios, increasing the ratio for all courses with advanced competency in the English language required, and offering more courses along the lines of those at the SOA and the much smaller Inter-American Defense College, which, although open to U.S. students, are geared directly to the needs of non-English-speaking Latin American students.

In sum, the United States trains international military students effectively in many of the individual skills required for internal defense and development, although such training is often undertaken in the context of conventional operations. Concerns have long been expressed both by government officials and academics, however, that such skills are inappropriately used by foreign militaries, undermining host nations' civilian government and private sectors. These concerns can be partially addressed through improved training in the theoretical aspects of internal defense and development, the IMET-E courses on civil-military relations, etc., and the continued exposure of international military students to U.S. culture and democratic values both in the classroom and through extracurricular activities.

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