

AD-A282 360



0

RAND

*The Effectiveness of
Training International
Military Students in
Internal Defense and
Development*

Executive Summary

Jennifer Morrison Taw


**DTIC
ELECTE
JUL 26 1994
S G D**

National Defense Research Institute

94-22936



3710



DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

94 7 21 064

The research described in this report was sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, Contract MDA903-90-C-0004.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Taw, Jennifer M., 1964—

The effectiveness of training international military students in
internal defense and development : executive summary /
Jennifer Morrison Taw.

p. cm

"Prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy."
"MR-172-USDP."

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 0-8330-1346-7

1. Military education—United States. 2. Students, Foreign—
United States. 3. Internal security. I. RAND. II. United
States. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

III Title.

U408.3.T37 1993

355'.007'073—dc20

93-12639

CIP

RAND is a nonprofit institution that seeks to improve public policy through research and analysis. Publications of RAND do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of RAND research.

Published 1993 by RAND

1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
To obtain information about RAND studies or to order documents,
call Distribution Services, (310) 393-0411, extension 6686

Accession For	
NTIS	CRA&I <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC	TAB <input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced <input type="checkbox"/>	
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and / or Special
A-1	

RAND

*The Effectiveness of
Training International
Military Students in
Internal Defense and
Development*

Executive Summary

Jennifer Morrison Taw

*Prepared for the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy*

National Defense Research Institute

Preface

This monograph was prepared as part of a project entitled "The Effectiveness of U.S. Military Training Activities in Promoting Internal Defense and Development in the Third World." The purpose of this project is to assess the effectiveness of programs to train U.S. and foreign military personnel in foreign internal defense (FID) and internal defense and development (IDAD), respectively, to examine the benefits that the United States derives from these programs, and to consider how future efforts can be improved and strengthened.

The first phase of the project is summarized in Jennifer Morrison Taw and William H. McCoy, *International Military Student Training: Beyond Tactics*, RAND, N-3634-USDP, 1993. It surveys current U.S. international military student (IMS) training in internal defense and development as well as the training of the U.S. military in FID and related areas. The Note also examines the broader social, political, and military issues related to U.S. FID/IDAD training and makes some preliminary recommendations regarding U.S. FID/IDAD training.

The second phase of the project is summarized in three RAND studies that present the results of six comparative case studies: Jennifer Morrison Taw, *Thailand and the Philippines: Case Studies in U.S. IMET Training and Its Role in Internal Defense and Development*, RAND, MR-159-USDP, 1993; a similar piece on Senegal and Liberia; and a third document on U.S. international military education and training (IMET) in Honduras and El Salvador. These regional case studies examine whether U.S. training provided to international military students promotes human rights, professionalism, democratic values, national development, and appropriate civil-military relations, as well as meeting the general goals of the IMET program.

This monograph represents the project's final phase. It assesses the effectiveness of U.S. training of foreign militaries in IDAD skills. It also looks to the future of training in IDAD skills. Finally, it offers general recommendations for future U.S. FID/IDAD training efforts and presents observations on the value of U.S. foreign military training and, more specifically, on the utility and advisability of training foreign militaries in IDAD skills.

The research presented here was conducted for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. It was carried out within

the International Security and Defense Strategy program of RAND's National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.

Contents

Preface	iii
Summary	vii
Acknowledgments	xi
Acronyms and Abbreviations	xiii
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. ASSESSING SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN U.S. EFFORTS TO TRAIN FOREIGN MILITARIES IN IDAD SKILLS	3
The Controversy Surrounding Training in IDAD Skills	3
The Two Components of IDAD Training	3
Criticism of IDAD Training	5
Limits of Training in IDAD Skills	7
Case Studies	9
What Future for IDAD Training?	15
3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	18
Achieving the Goals of Training: IDAD Versus Expanded IMET	20
Concluding Observations	21
Bibliography	23

Summary

The IDAD strategy is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The strategy focuses on building viable political, economic, military and social institutions that respond to the needs of society. Its fundamental goal is to prevent insurgency by forestalling and defeating the threat insurgent organizations pose and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. The government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, IDAD is ideally a preemptive strategy against insurgency; however, if an insurgency develops, it is a strategy for counterinsurgency activities.

—*Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*

Training foreign militaries continues to be considered one of the most cost-effective and successful means of achieving a broad range of American political and military goals in the developing world. In some host nations, U.S. military training places particular emphasis on those skills that are relevant to internal defense and development (IDAD), either as a means of countering insurgency—as in Honduras and El Salvador—or simply to foster economic development, as in Senegal. There is no “IDAD package” of courses offered by the U.S. military, however; there is no “IDAD skills training” per se. There are simply courses—such as engineering, communications, transportation, and medical courses—that may be relevant to a foreign nation’s IDAD strategy and that may or may not be provided in deliberate support of such a strategy.

Training foreign militaries in IDAD skills is much like training in any other military skills insofar as the objective is simply to improve the host nation military’s tactical and technical capabilities. Yet IDAD skills training differs from training in other military skills insofar as such skills are focused on internal rather than external threats. Although this difference is not considered problematic by many host nations, whose militaries have long histories of involvement in internal security, it has proven controversial within the United States itself, where internal defense and development have long been responsibilities of the civilian sector—police, government, and private enterprise. Detractors of training foreign militaries in IDAD skills thus argue that such training encourages foreign militaries to compete with, or even dominate, the civil sectors in their societies. Supporters of training in IDAD skills refute such contentions by arguing that U.S. military training not only improves foreign

militaries' capabilities, but professionalizes them, making them more respectful of human rights and civilian authority.

In truth, however, IDAD skills training is so limited and so ad hoc that any effect it has on foreign militaries' behavior—positive or negative—can be marginal at best. The little training that the United States performs cannot compete with the powerful historical, political, cultural, and economic influences on foreign militaries' behavior and development. Indeed, in each of the six countries for which case studies were performed for this project, training in IDAD skills accounted for less than 30 percent of the total training performed. Moreover, most of the IDAD skills training was a by-product of conventional military training in skills such as engineering, medicine, communications, and transportation, which are relevant both in peacetime and conflict. Total U.S. training, furthermore, is itself very limited. Of the case-study countries, with the exception of El Salvador, only a small percentage of each military's personnel had ever received training by the United States.

The case studies themselves clearly illustrated the dominance of broader social and political factors over training in IDAD skills—indeed, over U.S. training in general. Although the technical and tactical capabilities of the case-study countries' militaries generally improved with U.S. training, with the possible exception of the Liberian military, the application of IDAD skills by each military depended on the unique circumstances in each country. Thus, although criticisms that training in IDAD skills can corrupt a military are far-fetched, criticisms that deliberately training a military in IDAD skills under some circumstances may imply support for a corrupt military are more telling.

Yet in those countries where IDAD skills were most abused by the militaries—El Salvador and Honduras—the U.S. continued to provide IDAD-relevant training because of a broader political agenda: combating communist insurgencies worldwide. Statistics indicate that U.S. training in general may in fact have curbed some of the worst abuses by the two militaries, but events such as the highly publicized murders of the priests in El Salvador by the U.S.-trained Atlacatl battalion nonetheless brought disapprobation upon the entire U.S. training program and particularly upon training in IDAD skills. Furthermore, although the United States tried to exert pressure on the two militaries to improve their behavior, the Cold War robbed it of its leverage. Both the Salvadorans and the Hondurans knew that the United States would continue to support their militaries as long as the communist insurgencies continued; they therefore had no incentive to capitulate to American demands for more professional conduct.

The Cold War is over, however, and circumstances have changed. The United States, freed from its competition with the former Soviet Union, can now apply more leverage in its dealings with host nations. Indeed, withdrawal of most U.S. support helped force the Salvadoran government to negotiate with the rebels (who also lost the bulk of their support from the former Soviet Union). As to continued training in IDAD skills, not only will there presumably be less call for such training as the remaining communist insurgencies wane, but it is less likely that the United States will compromise its declared democratic values by providing IDAD skills to corrupt militaries in the absence of a worldwide communist threat.

What is the future, then, for training in IDAD skills? Some have suggested that training in internal defense and development need not be limited to preempting or combating insurgencies or other forms of internal unrest, but can be used proactively to aid in host-nation development. Yet even if such assistance is provided only to foreign militaries with proven records of respect for human rights and civil authority, the question of why the military, rather than civilians, should be trained in such skills nonetheless remains. If deliberate training in IDAD skills is not expanded to promote such nation-building, however, training in IDAD skills will continue to account for less and less total foreign training. The effects of this decrease will be further intensified as the total amount of training that the United States can offer host nations declines and the U.S. military itself scales down. Furthermore, host nations already tend to prefer U.S. military training in the sophisticated conventional skills at which the United States excels, and frequently perform most deliberate IDAD training at home rather than spending limited security assistance funds on U.S. training in IDAD skills. As IMET funding continues to decline, as is projected, host nations will become even less willing to spend precious funds on deliberate training in IDAD skills.

Even so, as long as the United States is providing training in IDAD skills—including training in IDAD-relevant skills in the context of conventional operations—it should do so judiciously, to avoid all appearances of supporting foreign militaries' abuse of internal defense and development. Training foreign militaries in the more theoretical aspects of internal defense and development is one means by which to prevent abuse of IDAD skills. Instructing U.S. military trainers and security assistance personnel in the theoretical aspects of internal defense and development is also important. Just such a course emphasizing the theoretical aspects of civilian and military roles in internal development is being put together by the Air Force Special Operations School, and it will fall within the realm of expanded IMET (IMET-E), but its scope will be very limited. The

course's predecessor at the Army's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, has failed for lack of Army support.

Other courses in development for the IMET-E program are intended specifically to support host nations' internal development strategies. Such courses will address not the skills involved in institutional or infrastructural development, but the values and practical rationales underlying military respect for civilian authority, military respect for human rights, and effective defense resource management. Such courses are intended not only for military students but for foreign civilian students, as well. Although they can no more promise to affect the behavior or development of foreign militaries than can any other courses, they at the very least expose students to the ideas and issues involved in democratization and institutional development. Moreover, they send a much different message from that of training in IDAD skills during the Cold War: They represent the post-Cold War United States' dedication to democratization.

Acknowledgments

The author gratefully acknowledges Bruce Hoffman, LTC William H. McCoy, and Michael Childress for their excellent work in earlier phases of this project: Their extensive research provided a solid foundation on which to base this monograph. The author also owes thanks to Margaret Cecchine and MAJ Paul McCarthy for their careful reviews of—and constructive comments on—earlier drafts. Others too numerous to name have contributed generously to the research and analyses conducted through all phases of this project. Any errors are, of course, the author's own.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
CMSID	Civil-military strategies for internal development
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DISAM	Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
ESAF	El Salvadoran Armed Forces
FID	Foreign internal defense
FMLN	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
GAO	General Accounting Office (U.S.)
H/CA	Humanitarian and civic assistance
HOAF	Honduran Armed Forces
IDAD	Internal defense and development
IMET	International military education and training
IMET-E	Expanded IMET
IMS	International military student
JUSMAGTHAI	Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Thailand
MILGRP	Military assistance group
P.L.	Public Law
RTARF	Royal Thai Armed Forces
SAO	Security Assistance Office, security assistance officer
SATFA	Security Assistance Training Field Activity
SFG	Special forces group
SO/LIC	Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

1. Introduction

Training is a significant and vital method of furnishing military assistance to most of the less developed countries. This training, carried out both in the United States . . . and in recipient countries can do far more than merely teach recipients to use military equipment and materials. It brings foreign nationals into close contact with United States citizens under conditions which tend to promote an appreciation of the values of our civilization and way of life.

—*Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program*

Thirty-three years after this statement was made, training foreign militaries continues to be considered one of the most cost-effective and successful means of achieving a broad range of American political and military goals in the developing world. Indeed, the primary goal of training funded through the international military education and training (IMET) program¹ is to encourage mutually beneficial relationships and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries.² At the same time, U.S. training is designed to increase competence and professionalism in host-nations' militaries to enhance their own, as well as broader international, security.

In some developing countries, U.S. military training places particular emphasis on those skills that are relevant to internal defense and development (IDAD), either as a means of countering insurgency—as in Honduras and El Salvador—or of fostering economic development, as in Senegal.³ Yet there is no overall U.S. strategy for training foreign militaries in such skills, nor for training U.S. military

¹Training funded through IMET accounts for almost half of all foreign military training conducted by the United States each year, with nearly all other training funded through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in support of arms and materiel sales.

²Manolas, Spiro C., and Louis J. Samelson, "IMET: International Military Education and Training," *The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring 1990, p. 2.

³The IDAD strategy is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The strategy focuses on building viable political, economic, military and social institutions that respond to the needs of society. Its fundamental goal is to prevent insurgency by forestalling and defeating the threat insurgent organizations pose and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. The government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, IDAD is ideally a preemptive strategy against insurgency; however, if an insurgency develops, it is a strategy for counterinsurgency activities." *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, FM 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, December 1990, pp. 2-7.

personnel in the related mission of foreign internal defense (FID).⁴ Frequently, so-called FID/IDAD training is simply a by-product of conventional military training in skills such as engineering, medicine, communications, and transportation, which are relevant both in peacetime and conflict.

The next two sections of this monograph address these issues in detail. Section 2 uses six case studies on past and present U.S. military training and advisory efforts in the developing world as the basis for assessing the effects of U.S. training on foreign countries' internal defense and development and looks to the future of training in IDAD skills. Section 3 offers recommendations for the future provision of IDAD training and general conclusions on the utility and advisability of such training.

⁴*Foreign internal defense* is defined as "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Joint Publication 1-02, December 1989.

2. Assessing Success and Failure in U.S. Efforts to Train Foreign Militaries in IDAD Skills

The Controversy Surrounding Training in IDAD Skills

The Two Components of IDAD Training

Internal Defense. The United States began training foreign militaries in counterinsurgency in the 1950s, when it seemed a necessary means of blocking communist expansion into developing countries. There was also an American effort to train foreign police forces in the 1960s through the U.S. Department of State's Public Safety Program; however, that program was deemed too politically sensitive and was dissolved in 1973.¹ The insertion of Section 660D into the Foreign Assistance Act in July 1975 prohibited the United States from further training of foreign police forces.² Accordingly, U.S. military training assumed increasing importance as the primary means to achieve this goal.³

Yet, while perhaps less controversial, counterinsurgency (COIN) training was also politically sensitive, in that the United States feared that its policy of supporting counterinsurgencies could be seen in some cases as tacit support for authoritarian governments. Instruction in so-called nation-building skills (i.e.,

¹Training foreign police forces became problematic when, for example, such forces became politicized. The fear was that the United States would train police forces of authoritarian regimes and that such forces would exploit their skills to coerce and intimidate the populace. *Stopping U.S. Assistance to Foreign Police and Prisons*, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States, 19 February 1976; Lobe, Thomas, "The Rise and Demise of the Office of Public Safety," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 9, No. 2, Winter 1983; Lefever, Ernest, *U.S. Public Safety Assistance: An Assessment*, The Brookings Institution, 1973; *U.S. Code*, Congressional and Administrative News, P.L. 93-559, 93rd Congress, 2d Session, 1974, pp. 6706-6707.

²Powell, John Duncan, "Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Part 1, June 1965, pp. 390-392. Powell stresses that internal defense is a political, not a military, issue and suggests that the United States provide more training and equipment to constabularies. He argues that if U.S. foreign policy is to foster civilian government, it must direct internal security assistance to civilian, not military, security agencies. His point was supported by events in Argentina, where the internal situation improved markedly when internal security responsibilities were returned to the police, who were better equipped and trained to work with the public and meet its needs. *Congressional Record*, 102d Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 137, No. 77, 21 May 1991, pp. S6257-S6258.

³The rationale behind the enactment of this legislation and the related debate on aid to foreign police forces is clearly summarized in McHugh, Matthew F., et al., *Police Aid to Central America: Yesterday's Lessons, Today's Choices*, Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, Washington, D.C., August 1986.

skills required for infrastructural development) was therefore incorporated into military training plans in hopes of offsetting the potentially counterdemocratic effects of counterinsurgency training.⁴

Internal Development (Nation-Building). In 1962, the Kennedy administration began inserting civic action programs into military assistance plans for host nations, the assumption being that training their militaries to provide public services would enhance host-nation development efforts, thereby leading to stability, economic and infrastructural growth, and, eventually, democratization.⁵

Foreign militaries, with their rigorous organization and large pools of manpower, appeared to be ideally suited to such tasks: and such tasks would not only help build a nation's infrastructure, but would also improve the militaries' public images.⁶ Such a role for indigenous militaries seemed natural to the United States, which had extensively used its own armed forces—particularly the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—in the nineteenth century development of the western frontier.⁷

Furthermore, the United States has long held to the belief that training foreign militaries in any skills, whether conventional or nonconventional, creates professional militaries that recognize and accept their place in society and their subservience to civilian rule. The United States axiomatically assumed that the combined positive effects of internal development efforts and foreign military professionalization would outweigh any potentially negative effects of counterinsurgency training, such as the encouragement COIN training may give

⁴In *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, December 1990, pp. 2-7, IDAD is described as "ideally a preemptive strategy against insurgency; however, if an insurgency develops, it is a strategy for counterinsurgency activities. . . Military actions provide a level of internal security which permits and supports growth through balanced development." In an interview on 26 May 1992, the civilian Low Intensity Conflict expert at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, discussed IDAD and COIN interchangeably.

⁵There is an extensive body of academic literature on national development, within which a clear distinction is made between democratic, economic, and infrastructural development. I cite just a few works: Lopez, George A., and Michael Stohl, "Liberalization and Redemocratization in Latin America," *Political Science*, No. 178, pp. 231-262; Huntington, Samuel, "Will More Countries Be Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 99, No. 2, Summer 1984, pp. 193-218, "How Countries Democratize," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 106, No. 4, 1991-92, pp. 579-616, and *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1968; Hoselitz, Bert, and Myron Weiner, "Economic Development and Political Stability," *Dissent*, Spring 1961; Dahl, Robert, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1971; Linz, Juan, Larry Diamond, and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*, Vol. 4, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989; Powell, John Duncan, "Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Part 1, June 1965, p. 382.

⁶Bienen, Henry, "Armed Forces and National Modernization," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 1, October 1983, p. 4.

⁷Willer, Clinton, "Engineer Challenges in Nation Building," *Military Review*, February 1989, p. 32.

foreign militaries to take increased control over the political and economic sectors of their societies.

Criticism of IDAD Training

Nonetheless, IDAD training has itself been controversial. The melange of concerns about training in IDAD skills is leveled not only at training deliberately intended to support host nations' IDAD strategies, but at training in skills that can be used inappropriately by a host nation's military for internal defense and development regardless of the context in which they are taught. Thus, training in such skills as engineering, transportation, policing, and communications—which are equally applicable to internal defense and development or to conventional warfare—can also be controversial when the military receiving the training has a history of human-rights abuses and/or corruption.

Critics of IDAD⁸ submit that both components of IDAD, internal defense and internal development, are civilian, not military, responsibilities, and that training foreign militaries in such skills, far from improving civil-military relations, weakens militaries' respect for civilian authority.

Opponents of the nation-building aspect of IDAD argue that training foreign militaries in internal development skills simply gives them the edge in the persistent competition between developing countries' militaries and private sectors for profitable domestic contracts.⁹ In both Honduras and Thailand, for example, engineering battalions have allegedly been reconfigured specifically to

⁸IDAD has been criticized by scholars and politicians, both in the United States and internationally. The Argentine National Chamber of Deputies, for example, wrote a resolution in 1991 supporting Senate bill S156, an initiative to reform IMET proposed by U.S. Senators Cranston and Kennedy. In their resolution, the deputies specifically supported that aspect of the senators' initiative that stated "that the military training known as 'Nation Building' (training of militaries in the construction of public works and other social and economic development activities, i.e.: civic action) be offered exclusively to those countries lacking in civilian agencies capable of undertaking such tasks, and at the request of freely elected democratic governments." *Congressional Record*, 102d Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 137, No. 77, 21 May 1991, p. S6258. *Congressional Record*, 102d Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 137, No. 9, Part II, 14 January 1991, pp. S847-S852.

⁹Indeed, nation-building activities have not produced the economic development that was anticipated. Nation-building cannot be successful unless—as is rarely the case—long-standing social, cultural, and political attitudes and infrastructures are amenable to such efforts. See Harrison, Lawrence, *Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985. Harrison cites other social scientists who have addressed this subject: Myrdal, Gunnar, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, New York: Pantheon, 1968; Lewis, W. Arthur W., *The Theory of Economic Growth*, Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955; Weber, Max, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950; Schumpeter, Joseph A., *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 3rd ed., New York: Harper Bros., 1950; McClelland, David C., *The Achieving Society*, Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1961; Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Boston and Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1963; Banfield, Edward C., *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958; Rangel, Carlos, *The Latin Americans: Their Love-Hate Relationship with the United States*, New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.

compete with private engineering firms.¹⁰ Such undertakings enrich the military at the expense of the private sector, impeding general economic development and further centralizing economic power in the hands of the military. Holding both military and economic power, a country's armed forces are unlikely to completely cede political power to any civilian government.¹¹

A General Accounting Office (GAO) study published in June 1990 cites official U.S. concern regarding the further development of nation-building or IDAD skills in one country's military because of the "tenuous" civil-military relationship in that country.¹² Moreover, as long ago as 1971, a RAND study¹³ contended that such concern is quite reasonable, stating that

logic . . . suggests that to the extent that military expertise, or professionalism, is increased in areas of counterinsurgency, nation-

¹⁰Interview with Cresencio (Chris) Arcos, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, April 1991; interview with LTC Robert Leicht, Commander, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, Okinawa, Japan, May 1992; Schwarz, Benjamin C., "Peacetime Engagement and the Underdeveloped World: The U.S. Military's 'Nation Assistance' Mission," unpublished paper, p. 24. Schwarz describes the economic power of the militaries of many developing countries, especially Latin American: "The armed forces of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala have created their own banks . . . engage in large-scale investment in real estate and other business ventures, carry out private construction projects for profit, own farms and resorts, and control lucrative government agencies." In a May 1991 interview with Ambassador Arcos, Schwarz was told that the Honduran military at one point requested American military engineering equipment to expand private, for-profit construction projects.

¹¹This is the case in Thailand and is increasingly true of the Philippines. For more discussion of this subject, see Schwarz, "Peacetime Engagement," pp. 18-39.

¹²*Security Assistance: Observations on the International Military Education and Training Program*, GAO Briefing Report to Congressional Requestors, Washington, D.C.: GAO/National Security and International Affairs Division, June 1990, p. 26. There was consensus that the efficacy of training militaries in nation-building had to be determined on a case-by-case basis. U.S. officials appeared to believe that such training would be appropriate in Peru and Haiti, for example, although that may no longer be the case given political developments in those two countries since 1990. Criteria for making such assessments would presumably include the host-nation military's human-rights record and/or the level of military control over domestic political institutions.

¹³Einaudi, Luigi, and Alfred Stepan III, *Latin American Institutional Development. Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-586-DOS, 1971, pp. 1-57; Fitch, John Samuel, "Human Rights and the U.S. Military Training Program: Alternatives for Latin America," *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 4, Fall 1981, p. 77. Fitch also cites the following on this topic (footnote, p. 77): Fitch, John Samuel, *The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process: Ecuador 1948-1966*, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977, pp. 136-145, 162-164; Stepan, Alfred C., *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 153-187, and "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973, pp. 47-68; Maullin, Richard, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia*, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973, pp. 111-118; Sereseres, Caesar, "The Guatemalan Armed Forces: Military Development and National Politics," paper presented to the Latin American Studies Association Convention, Atlanta, Georgia, March 1976, pp. 32-34; Jenkins, Brian, and Caesar Sereseres, "U.S. Military Assistance and the Guatemalan Armed Forces," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 3, Summer 1977, pp. 575-594; Ronfeldt, David, and Caesar Sereseres, *U.S. Arms Transfers, Diplomacy, and Security in Latin America and Beyond*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, P-6005, October 1977, pp. 20-28; O'Donnell, Guillermo, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*, Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1973, pp. 154-165; Lowenthal, Abraham, "Armies and Politics in Latin America," *World Politics*, Vol. 27, October 1974, pp. 129-130; Corbett, Charles, "Politics and Professionalism: The South American Military," in Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies, eds., *The Politics of Anti-Politics: The Military in Latin America*, Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1978, pp. 20-21; Fitch, John Samuel, "The Political Consequences of U.S. Military Assistance to Latin America," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 5, Spring 1979, pp. 380-386.

building and multi-sector development planning, the military would tend to become more rather than less involved in politics.

Critics also argue that because internal security is a political, not a military, problem it is better handled by civilian police organizations than by armed forces. In contrast with the military, the police constantly interact with—and therefore have the opportunity to build working relationships with—the public, resulting in better human intelligence, among other things. Moreover, in contrast with the military, the police are trained to respond to conflict situations with minimum, not maximum, force: Situations are thus resolved with less violence and less long-term acrimony.¹⁴

Finally, other studies have also indicated that far from leading to improved civil-military relations, military professionalization leads to greater military involvement in politics as militaries perceive their own skills and abilities to surpass those of the civilian governments.¹⁵

Limits of Training in IDAD Skills

Yet, in fact, training in IDAD skills—whether it is undertaken deliberately or occurs incidentally as part of conventional training—has almost no influence over host-nation development or civil-military relations. Indeed, very little actual training in IDAD skills takes place, partly because of the low levels of funding such training receives. In 1992, for example, the international military education and training (IMET) program accounted for less than 1 percent of the

¹⁴*Congressional Record*, 102d Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 137, No. 77, 21 May 1991, pp. S6257–S6258. Former Senator Alan Cranston compares the effects of military and police approaches to internal defense in Argentina. See also Hoffman, Bruce, Jennifer M. Taw, David Arnold, *Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-3998-A, 1991, pp. 44–46 and 50.

¹⁵As early as 1965, scholars were making this argument. John Duncan Powell argued that “the shift in emphasis from hemispheric security to internal security capabilities [pursued by the Kennedy administration] will make the Latin American military better trained and equipped than ever to intervene in the political systems of their nations.” “Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America,” *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Part 1, June 1965, p. 388. Powell goes on to demonstrate how unpopular his view was within the U.S. government at the time, pp. 388–389. See also Fitch, John Samuel, “Human Rights and the U.S. Military Training Program: Alternatives for Latin America,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 4, Fall 1981, p. 78. For more on the effects of professionalization, see the following: Abrahamsson, Bengt, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972; Finer, Samuel, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962; Bienen, Henry, “Armed Forces and National Modernization,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 1, October 1983, p. 10; Lefever, Ernest W., “Arms Transfers, Military Training, and Domestic Politics,” in *Arms Transfers in the Modern World*, Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, eds., New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979, p. 284. Bienen argues that we cannot assume that militaries are the most organized or modernity-oriented societal institutions, nor even that they are most concerned with the preservation of the state. Ernest Lefever suggests that, although professionalization leads to orderliness and moderation, some orderly governments are repressive.

total U.S. security assistance budget,¹⁶ and foreign military training financed through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program tends annually to cost approximately five times that, but still only totals about 3 percent of total U.S. security assistance (which also includes foreign military sales, economic support funds, and funding for U.N. peacekeeping operations). Training in IDAD skills, deliberate or not, accounts for only a small portion of this already-limited training. IDAD skills training, for example, represented less than 30 percent of all U.S. training in any of the six case-study countries used in this project (El Salvador, Honduras, Thailand, the Philippines, Liberia, and Senegal), even where training in counterinsurgency and/or nation-building was heavily emphasized, as in the African and Central American case-study countries. In those cases, moreover, most training in IDAD-relevant skills was not undertaken in deliberate support of a host nation's IDAD strategy and was really only loosely related to internal defense and development.¹⁷

The very limited amount of training in IDAD skills that takes place cannot compete with more fundamental influences—such as host-nation traditions, politics, and economics—on host-nation development and civil-military relations. This situation became clear in the course of this project's six case studies, which indicated that training in IDAD skills is so limited that it is simply not influential. Whether applied appropriately or inappropriately by the host nation's military, U.S. training in IDAD skills is simply too limited to have much effect on recipient nations' internal development or civil-military relations.¹⁸ At the same time, however, training host nations in IDAD skills can be problematic

¹⁶U.S. Congress, *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs FY 1992*, p. 10. The percentage of security assistance funds dedicated to IMET varied dramatically between regions, however, with a full 14 percent of U.S. security assistance received by Africa dedicated to IMET and less than 1 percent of U.S. security assistance to either Europe or the Near East and South Asia regions dedicated to IMET. On the other hand, less than 1 percent of total security assistance funds went to Africa, whereas 81 percent went to Europe and the Near East and South Asia regions. IMET therefore plays a much larger role in U.S. security assistance to Africa (partly because few large weapons systems are sold to African nations and partly because economic assistance is disproportionately allocated to Egypt and Israel, offsetting the role of IMET assistance to the Near East), but U.S. security assistance to the African continent nonetheless remains miniscule compared with security assistance provided to other regions.

¹⁷For example, courses in journalism, maintenance, and medical skills were considered relevant to IDAD, but the case studies found that most such skills are neither taught in the context of a host nation's IDAD strategy nor used in that context, rather, such skills are usually taught in the context of conventional warfighting against external enemies.

¹⁸A 1965 study on military aid and defense programs came to similar conclusions, finding that military aid and defense programs in general had little to do with either authoritarianism or the erosion of democracy. The study found that influences such as history, social structure, and political tradition have more to do with the nature of government and the role of the military than any kind of U.S. military assistance could. Wolf, Charles, Jr., "The Political Effects of Military Programs: Some Indications from Latin America," *Orbis*, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 1965, p. 890.

insofar as it may give the impression in some cases that the United States supports certain inappropriate host-nation IDAD policies.¹⁹

Case Studies

The six case studies undertaken for this project demonstrated the limits of training in IDAD skills. The case studies were organized into three sets of comparisons within three geographical regions: Senegal and Liberia, Honduras and El Salvador, and Thailand and the Philippines. The regional and historical similarities of the case-study countries made measurements of the effectiveness of IDAD training appear to be possible. Indeed, the case studies were initially chosen on the assumption that, in each set of comparisons, there was a relative success and a relative failure. Thailand, Senegal, and Honduras were hypothesized to be countries for which U.S. training in IDAD skills was successful; the Philippines, Liberia, and El Salvador were considered failures for U.S. training in IDAD skills. It was anticipated that the reasons for the success or failure of U.S. IDAD training could be identified and isolated precisely because of the similarities between the two countries in each comparative case study.

In truth, however, success and failure of U.S. training in IDAD skills were not so easily measured. The technical and tactical capabilities of each of the case-study countries' militaries, with the possible exception of Liberia, increased significantly with U.S. training. Where IDAD skills were included as part of the overall training, they, too, were effectively taught. Moreover, the more general benefits of training apply equally or more to training in IDAD skills: International military students become familiar with U.S. values and interests, allowing them to communicate and interact more effectively with U.S. government and military staff.

Yet, whereas U.S. training in IDAD skills was generally quite effective, the advisability and utility of IDAD training varied from country to country. On the one hand, training in internal development skills in Senegal arguably helps create a solid civilian foundation for development as personnel serve their country first through the military and then, in retirement, through civilian careers. On the other hand, training in IDAD skills arguably would not be advisable for a country like Thailand, where the military uses internal defense and development to increase its own political and economic power.

¹⁹Inappropriate host-nation IDAD policies could include, for example, for-profit development projects by military-owned construction companies, and military abuse of human rights in the pursuit of internal security.

Philippine military personnel trained by the United States in internal development skills frequently emigrate to countries such as Saudi Arabia, preventing the accrual of an indigenous skilled-labor pool. Training the Liberian military in IDAD skills proved to be completely ineffective: Not only was the military kept deliberately incompetent by President Doe, but military personnel were also given few opportunities to undertake IDAD operations.

The Salvadoran and Honduran armed forces' counterinsurgency capabilities increased substantially with U.S. training in internal defense, but problems getting the armed forces to apply their new counterinsurgency skills arose alongside other problems in coordinating internal development activities with counterinsurgency operations. Moreover, although human-rights abuses reportedly decreased in both countries, continued corruption and violence made training the Honduran and Salvadoran armed forces in internal defense and development extremely controversial among congressional and public sectors within the United States. Thus, the internal political, social, and economic situations in each country far outweighed the U.S. training in IDAD skills in determining the way in which—and to what purpose—internal defense and development was undertaken in each country.

Although comparisons of the case-study countries did not isolate and identify the influence of U.S. IDAD training on host-nation development and civil-military relations, they did nonetheless prove useful and revealed some interesting contrasts. For example, in neither Thailand nor the Philippines does the United States train many military students in IDAD-related skills; training in such skills is more heavily emphasized in the four other case-study countries. Both the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) have overtly rejected U.S. COIN—internal defense—doctrine and have independently developed their own COIN strategies, making U.S. training in internal defense unnecessary.

Nor has the United States provided considerable internal development training to either country. Although the Philippines have in the past received substantial economic assistance for rural and agricultural development, civic action training was mostly limited to joint-combined exercises. Training in those technical skills appropriate to nation-building was not a priority. In Thailand, as well, most civic action training takes place as part of joint exercises, and the Thais have developed adequate in-country training capabilities in internal development skills such as engineering and communications. Moreover, both countries prefer to use the limited IMET funds they receive for financing mostly conventional

training in skills, concepts, and capabilities that they can receive only through the United States.²⁰

The nature of internal defense and development in each of the case-study countries thus clearly has little to do with American training practices. Indeed, circumstances in each country determine the role of internal defense and development in its internal politics. On the one hand, the Thai military arguably abuses its IDAD mission, claiming that the fight against communist insurgents is still in its last stages despite the virtual end of the insurgency in the mid-1980s. By continuing to "fight communism," the RTARF can justify involvement in domestic politics, maintain a high nationwide profile, and continue to expand its nation-building role for its own specific ends. The Thai military is thus capable not only of maintaining the status quo but of broadening its mission at a time when Thailand is facing neither internal nor external threats.

The Philippine military, on the other hand, is combating ongoing insurgencies and, because of the withdrawal of American bases, is suddenly responsible for defining and preparing for the Philippines' external defense, as well. Internal defense and development are not merely a justification for forces in the Philippines but a means of defending the republic and preventing further spread of both the communist insurgency prosecuted by the New Peoples Army and the separatist campaign of the Moros. Under new Philippine President Fidel Ramos, a West Point graduate, internal defense and development are taking on a new importance. As Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed Forces in 1986, Ramos clearly enunciated his vision of the military's role in democratization and development:

A major responsibility of the New Armed Forces is to assist the national government in creating the conditions and in strengthening the foundations for the development of democratic institutions. One important foundation is civilian supremacy over the military. Another is respect for law and order by the people. Another is professionalization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. [The New AFP] shall intensify civic action and other forms of public service like assisting in the building of infrastructures—roads, bridges—helping to bring medical assistance and technical support to the rural areas. . . . The solution to the country's problems consists of a coordinated series of immediate, short-term, and long-range actions which integrates the political, economic, social, and military capabilities and resources of the government, the concerned private sector, and the public at large.²¹

²⁰IMET funds are more often used to support training in IDAD skills than are FMS funds. FMS training is almost solely undertaken in support of Foreign Military Sales of equipment or materials.

²¹Ramos, Fidel, "A Role for the Armed Forces in Democracy-Building," *Democratization of the Philippines*, publication of the proceedings of the Seminar on the Transition of Authoritarian Regimes

Here Ramos has articulated the ideal of an IDAD strategy: military support for a coordinated civilian effort to promote internal security and infrastructural development. Whether such a strategy is undertaken, however, will depend not on U.S. training, but on the AFP and the Philippine government.²² One principal obstacle is the loss of Philippine military personnel trained in IDAD skills to foreign companies. Companies in Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states, for example, woo Philippine workers by paying skilled labor higher wages than either the AFP or most Philippine private enterprises can afford. Until both the military and the country can retain the personnel trained in IDAD skills, neither will be able to implement development strategies effectively.

In contrast to the limited IDAD training it conducts in Thailand and the Philippines, the United States specifically emphasized training in internal development skills in both Senegal and Liberia. Yet, U.S. training in IDAD skills seemed to have no more effect on how an IDAD strategy was approached or applied in these two countries than it did in Thailand and the Philippines. Political, economic, and social situations in both Senegal and Liberia again proved to be the determining factors in how IDAD skills were used and their effect on development and civil-military relations. Indeed, the African case studies most clearly demonstrate that the effects of training in IDAD skills, if any, are determined by the politics and traditions in a given country.

Most of the training provided by the United States to Liberia during the Doe regime, for example, was applicable to internal development. Despite such training, the military remained incapable of undertaking even simple infrastructural operations. For example, after the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers designed enlisted housing for the Liberian military, Liberian civilian and military engineers were unable to control the construction of the project, although it was a primary mission of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). Even after the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ultimately constructed the barracks, the AFL was unable to maintain the buildings, which quickly fell into disrepair.²³ For this reason, the AFL was tasked with few nation-building missions.

to Democracy, Manila, 13-14 December 1986 (DC INFO Documents, No. 41 [1], February 1992, pp. 16-17).

²²Ramos, a West Point graduate, may himself most clearly demonstrate the benefits of U.S. training. The training in IDAD skills per se is less important than the capacity to influence foreign military officers' attitudes and actions through advanced training. Although Ramos may well have believed in civil control of the military and a supporting role for the military in internal defense and development prior to his studies at West Point, his U.S. training could only have substantiated such beliefs and solidified his resolve. Given the large numbers of officers in the Philippine military who demonstrated a clear lack of such values during the coup attempts against the Aquino administration, this is not an insignificant contribution.

²³McCoy, William H., Jr., *Senegal and Liberia: Case Studies in U.S. IMET Training and Its Impact on Internal Defense and Development*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, forthcoming report, p. 31.

The Senegalese military, in comparison, uses the scant aid it receives from the U.S. government (approximately \$5 million since 1987) to augment its already-extensive involvement in infrastructural development. Engineers build roads, medical and dental clinics, and schools around the country; they do so either independently or with the assistance of U.S. military engineers who deploy to Senegal to train with the Senegalese engineers. Military doctors provide much-needed medical attention to people throughout the country.

Indeed, perhaps the greatest benefit Senegal accrues from U.S. training in IDAD skills—in direct contrast with the situation in the Philippines—is the long-term buildup of skilled labor in the country. As they leave the service, many former military engineers become contractors; medics and doctors leave the military to become private practitioners; most Air Senegal pilots are former Air Force pilots; aviation mechanics also frequently work for Air Senegal after retiring from the military; and many senior officers, schooled by France and the United States in national planning and strategy, become important participants in national and local governments.²⁴ This progressive aggregation of skills in the civilian sector is a major contributor to Senegal's development.

Finally, Honduras and El Salvador, of all the six case-study countries, best demonstrate the validity of concerns about training in IDAD skills. The United States, choosing what was considered by some to be the lesser of two evils,²⁵ consciously supported foreign militaries' (such as those in El Salvador and Honduras) efforts to suppress communist insurgencies despite those militaries' poor human-rights records and lack of respect for civilian authority. In El Salvador, the United States spent unprecedented resources preparing the Salvadoran armed forces (ESAF) to launch an effective counterinsurgency campaign against the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgents and emphasized training in counterinsurgency tactics and civic action. It should be emphasized, however, that such training still only accounted for a small percentage of total training.²⁶ Although there is no indication that the training in IDAD skills caused the ESAF's abuse of internal defense and development²⁷—which predated heavy U.S. involvement in El Salvador and

²⁴Interviews conducted by LTC William H. McCoy, Jr., with the Director of Operations for the Senegalese Armed Forces and a representative from the Senegalese Engineer School, July 1992.

²⁵See Kirkpatrick, Jeane J., "Dictatorships and Doublestandards," *Commentary*, Vol. 68, November 1979, p. 34.

²⁶Childress, Michael T., *El Salvador and Honduras: Case-Studies in U.S. IMET Training and Its Role in Internal Defense and Development*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, forthcoming report, pp. 20–23.

²⁷Gifts and sales of U.S. military and construction equipment, on the other hand, have in some cases contributed to the Salvadoran military's abuse of IDAD to enrich itself and further entrench its domestic economic and political power. Comments by U.S. military officials, Pentagon, August 1992.

perhaps even improved after U.S. training began²⁸—such training generated heated criticism from within the United States for supporting and legitimizing a force that had a history of human-rights abuse and corruption.

The situation was much the same in Honduras, where, as in El Salvador, the military has little respect for civilian government or enterprise, and corruption permeates both civil and military leadership. Although the United States did less counterinsurgency training in Honduras than in El Salvador, on the assumption that the greatest threat to Honduras was the external, conventional military threat posed by the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, concerns about the FMLN moving freely between Honduras and El Salvador led the United States to provide the Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF) with counterinsurgency training in the context of several joint-combined exercises with U.S. forces. By all indications, the HOAF's capabilities were significantly improved. Nonetheless, the United States had again supported and legitimized a military with a history of corruption and human-rights abuses, leading again to criticisms within the United States of such a policy.

The six case studies reemphasize that each country's approach to internal defense and development is entirely unique and is indeed predicated on that country's specific security needs and its particular domestic political, social, and economic environment. The very limited amount of training in IDAD skills that the United States provides can offer limited support to constructive IDAD strategies such as Senegal has developed and the Philippine president has discussed, but it can also have disproportionately negative effects on public opinion both in the United States and the host nation when it seems to represent U.S. support for foreign militaries' abuse of internal defense and development, such as that which occurred in El Salvador and Honduras. Indeed, the effectiveness of training foreign militaries is less in question than is the efficacy and utility of such training. The United States undoubtedly improves the skills of those international military students it trains. Whether that improvement is in the interests of either the United States or the host nation, however, can only be determined on a case-by-case basis.

²⁸On the other hand, while U.S. training clearly helped the ESAC in internal defense, it is unclear whether U.S. training in general helped or hindered internal infrastructural development or democratization. Although there are those who argue that U.S. training led to dramatic decreases in human-rights abuses and far greater military respect for civilian government, others counter that U.S. training cannot be credited with such changes and, moreover, that such changes were more superficial than they appeared. See Schwarz, Benjamin C., *American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4042-USDP, 1991, pp. 19-22, and "Peacetime Engagement and the Underdeveloped World: The U.S. Military's 'Nation Assistance' Mission," unpublished paper, p. 24. See footnote 10, this section

What Future for IDAD Training?

Thus, although training in IDAD skills can have only a marginal effect—either positive or negative—on actual host-nation internal defense and development, such training is nonetheless significant in terms of U.S.–host-nation relations and internal U.S. politics. Depending on the existing civil-military situation in the host country, U.S. provision of training in IDAD skills can either be a powerful demonstration of U.S. commitment to host-nation internal defense and development or an indication that the United States is willing to support repressive militaries or governments if such action is in its own political or military interests.²⁹

During the Cold War, the United States supported a number of authoritarian regimes and organizations, rationalizing that realpolitik demanded such compromises³⁰ and that U.S. training in general would influence foreign militaries to become more professional and cognizant of human-rights issues. Yet, the United States had little leverage to force changes in foreign military behavior. Host nations combating communist insurgencies realized that the Cold War constrained the United States to continue providing support for host nations' militaries regardless of their actions. U.S. demands for improved human rights and increased professionalization were therefore often ignored or only marginally addressed.³¹

²⁹Some make the case that the latter would be an unfair characterization because U.S. training encourages militaries to become more professional and accepting of civilian control and is therefore equally productive for both progressive and repressive regimes. A number of studies indicate, however, that U.S. training is not adequate to change the nature or values of a military. Ernest W. Lefever makes a good point when he writes that "this does not mean that military aid has not had influence on domestic politics, but it does mean that its influence may be felt in several directions at the same time," "Arms Transfers, Military Training, and Domestic Politics," p. 279.

³⁰Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Doublestandards," 1979; Pipes, Daniel, and Adam Garfinkle, eds., *Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991; Garfinkle, Adam, ed., *The Devil and Uncle Sam: A User's Guide to the Friendly Tyrants Dilemma*, London: Transaction Publishers, 1992. For other analyses of authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and American foreign policy, see Wiarda, Howard J., *Dictatorship and Development*, Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1968; Friedrich, Carl J., and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962; von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, E. M., "Four Generals: Western Attitudes of Left and Right Wing Dictators," *National Review*, 14 November 1980; Iakovlev, A. N., *On the Edge of an Abyss*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985.

³¹Even during the Carter administration, when human rights were first made a priority and the U.S. attempted to use security assistance as a means of leverage, host nations did not respond uniformly, and most responses were only marginal. In *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance: Experiences and Issues in Policy Implementation (1977–1978)*, A Report Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, November 1979, security assistance was concluded to make a poor form of leverage in any case: "Aid processes are too inflexible to be optimal instruments of human rights policy, and human rights imperatives can disrupt the continuity of development processes."

In the aftermath of the Cold War, however, the United States is no longer constrained by its competition with the Soviet Union and no longer has to make the kinds of concessions that it has made for the past 40 years. These new circumstances have already given the United States increased freedom and leverage internationally. For example, the United States has refused to capitulate to the Philippine Senate's demands for inflated rent on the one hand and cut aid to the Salvadoran military on the other, thus helping to force resolution of the 10-year conflict in that country—two decisions that would not have been made during the Cold War.

This new latitude is particularly relevant to training in IDAD skills. For one thing, with the end of Soviet-supported communist insurgencies, the United States is free to offer such training more judiciously; because insurgencies and unrest in foreign countries are no longer linked to a larger global agenda, they are no longer seen as directly threatening U.S. interests. Accordingly, the United States can now assess whether foreign militaries should be given training in IDAD skills on a case-by-case basis. Yet there is no indication that such an assessment will be made. The United States has no overall strategy for training foreign militaries in IDAD skills, nor are there standards by which to determine whether a country should receive such training. For example, for IMET funding, through which most deliberate training in IDAD skills is performed, foreign militaries' behavior may partially determine whether Congress will allocate training funds to a given country; once funds are allocated, other factors, such as the country's training requirements, determine what types of training those funds will cover.

Also, the decision regarding what types of training are appropriate for a given country is made jointly by the country and by members of the U.S. Security Assistance Office in that country. However, very few security assistance officers receive training in the theories behind internal defense and development. Most would regard such training in terms of its components: specifically, counterinsurgency tactics and techniques, civic action, psychological operations, etc. There is no IDAD package of courses offered by the U.S. military. There are simply courses that may be relevant to a foreign nation's IDAD strategy and that may or may not be provided in deliberate support of such a strategy.

Indeed, most training in internal development skills is not offered in deliberate support of host-nation IDAD strategies; rather, it is undertaken in the context of conventional operations. This type of training is frequently paid for through Foreign Military Sales rather than through IMET, and the criteria for providing such assistance are much different from those used for determining which countries should receive IMET funds.

Even if it were feasible to guarantee that training in IDAD skills be given only to foreign militaries with clean human-rights records and demonstrated respect for civilian authority, such training would remain problematic. Training foreign militaries rather than foreign civilians in internal development skills still has the potential to create or maintain competition between the military and the civilian sector in areas such as engineering, construction, and transportation.³² For example, in Senegal—which, of the six case studies for this project, best demonstrated the benefits of training in IDAD skills—soldiers provide President Diouf with a unique capability to restore services that are often disrupted by strikes. Military personnel, trained by Americans, French, and Germans to drive and maintain military vehicles, are capable of operating any of the different types of transportation assets in the country—buses, trucks, ferries, boats, planes, and even trains. As effective as this training is in maintaining smooth operation of the country's infrastructure, however, it also weakens the leverage of the civilian sector in labor disputes.

Training in internal defense remains problematic, as well. Banned by Section 660D of the Foreign Assistance Act from training foreign police forces in internal security skills, the U.S. military can impart such training only to foreign military forces. Questions remain, however, about the efficacy of training militaries rather than police in internal defense. Although in many cases the most appropriate and useful training would be in the skills and techniques needed for military support of civil police operations, such training is not included among the 2,000 military courses offered by the United States.

In summary, neither hopes for molding future foreign development nor fears about promoting authoritarianism in host nations can realistically be pinned to U.S. training in IDAD skills, because such training is so limited. The training in IDAD skills that does occur, nonetheless, sends a strong message about the United States' priorities and interests, and should therefore be provided judiciously. The practical implementation of a policy limiting IDAD training to host nations meeting certain criteria will be difficult to achieve, however, despite the United States' new latitude in the aftermath of the Cold War.

³²Again, such skills are often trained not in the context of IDAD but in the context of conventional operations. Moreover, in that context, such skills are basic and uncontroversial (and often related to U.S. Foreign Military Sales). While deliberate training in such skills for internal development purposes may be protested, such skills will continue to be transferred in the context of conventional operations and can still be used for internal development purposes once the host nation has acquired them.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

Questions about the appropriate provision of training in IDAD skills may soon become academic. Overall U.S. training of foreign militaries is decreasing as the U.S. military itself is reduced, and U.S. military command and general staff colleges and other training facilities consequently run progressively smaller classes. Because most international military students are trained alongside U.S. military students at U.S. service schools, as U.S. training decreases, fewer places will be available for foreign students. Moreover, although foreign demand for training is high, so that courses could hypothetically be filled with foreign rather than U.S. military students, most U.S. military courses limit foreign-student enrollment to 10–20 percent of the total class, because higher percentages of foreign students (with varying degrees of English-language skills) in the classroom tend to inhibit the progress of the class as a whole. Total U.S. foreign military training is therefore declining inevitably.

Furthermore, host nations tend to prefer the state-of-the-art technical and tactical conventional training that the United States can provide over training in the less-sophisticated skills required for internal defense and development.¹ With fewer seats available in U.S. courses and lower levels of IMET funding per country anticipated,² it is even less likely that host nations will choose training in IDAD skills over more advanced training in conventional combat operations. The incidental training in IDAD skills already performed as part of joint-combined exercises³ may soon represent the greater part of training in IDAD skills received by foreign militaries.

Thus, although there is no overall U.S. strategy for training foreign militaries in IDAD skills,⁴ nor for training U.S. military personnel in the related mission of

¹Taw, Jennifer Morrison, and Robert C. Leicht, *The New World Order and Army Doctrine: The Doctrinal Renaissance of Operations Short of War?* Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4201-A, 1992.

²Interviews with personnel at the Security Assistance Training Field Activity (SATFA), Norfolk, Virginia, December 1991.

³Joint-combined exercises "complement security assistance goals by testing and evaluating capabilities that security assistance recipients have expressed a desire to improve. In addition, they include certain types of training and construction, and humanitarian assistance and civic action projects within the host nation. . . . Joint-combined exercises are an important means of achieving the objectives of the IDAD strategy." *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Departments of the Army and Air Force, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, 5 December 1990, pp. 2-21 and 2-22.

⁴Foreign militaries receive limited training in IDAD skills, both incidentally and deliberately, at U.S. training facilities and through mobile training teams and joint-combined exercises, depending on

foreign internal defense,⁵ such a lack is not necessarily a shortcoming of U.S. training policy. Not only will training in IDAD skills decline in the future, but, as discussed above, such training is burdened with considerations of civil-military issues and will remain controversial. Indeed, some members of Congress have suggested cancelling the IMET program altogether; others, like Senator Kennedy and former Senator Cranston, have supported IMET training but have called for reforms limiting training in IDAD skills. Given congressional control over IMET funding, it would be detrimental to the IMET training program as a whole to antagonize such concerned members of Congress by creating a high-profile strategy for providing what limited training there is in IDAD skills.

Nonetheless, precisely because of the sensitivity of training in IDAD skills, it remains important to ensure that whatever deliberate IDAD training is provided be provided prudently. One means by which to do so is to increase the capabilities of U.S. security assistance officers (SAOs): in-country military personnel tasked, in part, with helping their host nations select appropriate U.S. courses. Because internal defense and development is such a low priority, many SAOs are unfamiliar with it. When asked whether support for an IDAD strategy is or was ever a U.S. priority in Thailand, for example, the Chief of the Joint Training Branch of the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Thailand, (JUSMAGTHAI)—who, with other members of his office, acts as a SAO—acknowledged that he was not familiar with the concept of internal defense and development.⁶

Improving SAOs' awareness of IDAD strategies could be accomplished, in part, by supplementing the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM) course that SAOs attend with the civil-military strategies for internal development (CMSID) course currently being developed by the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Florida. The new two-week course is specifically intended to address issues of institutional development and appropriate military involvement in such activities. The Air Force's intent is to have an enrollment of two-thirds foreign students and one-third American students for the course, including representatives from military assistance groups

what the host nation requests and what the United States considers appropriate. As mentioned above, such training is not part of an IDAD package, nor is it necessarily defined as IDAD training; it is simply relevant to the host-nation IDAD strategy.

⁵Each host nation should develop its own IDAD strategy, which focuses not only on internal security but on infrastructural development and winning hearts and minds; foreign internal defense is the United States' own strategy for coming to the aid of a host nation. Aid can include the transfer of defense equipment, the training of foreign soldiers, advisory assistance, or even the commitment of combat forces. See *Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, 5 May 1988, p. 4.

⁶Interview, Bangkok, Thailand, June 1992.

(MILGRPs) and foreign civilian institutions. The course will consist of a series of seminars, and may be held in Spanish as well as English.⁷ In addition to fulfilling its primary goal of educating foreign military personnel in the theoretical aspects of internal development, this kind of course should be used to provide U.S. SAOs—and, potentially, U.S. Foreign Service officers, U.S. Army foreign area officers, J-5 planners, defense attachés, and nonmilitary governmental personnel involved in U.S. foreign assistance efforts, as well—with a better understanding of the appropriate role of the United States in the provision of security assistance and training in IDAD skills.⁸

Support for the Air Force course and the development of others like it would benefit not only SAOs and other U.S. personnel but international military students. If such a theoretical course became a required complement to training in IDAD skills, it could help ensure that foreign military personnel recognize the appropriate role of the military in internal defense and development and the long-term political benefits of adhering to such a role.

As mentioned above, another course that would be of immense benefit would be training in the theoretical issues involved in military support of civil police operations. Such a course would benefit not only foreign militaries, but the U.S. military, which has become involved in supporting civil police operations not only as part of the “war on drugs” but in its role in quelling the recent civil unrest in Los Angeles.

Achieving the Goals of Training: IDAD Versus Expanded IMET

As previously noted, concern has been expressed in Congress and by academics that U.S. foreign military training does not adequately address issues related to

⁷The CMSID course will target Latin American host nations. The Air Force’s FID effort is still small and cannot bear the costs of a larger program. The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) has determined that the course meets the requirements of the IMET-E (expanded IMET) program. At this point, this course is not linked to other courses, so there may be problems with the two-week duration. Many countries cannot afford the expense of sending students to the United States for just two weeks. Nor does the curriculum (which is still in development) include advice on which U.S. courses can best support a foreign military’s role in institutional development. Phone interview with Capt Lisa Mazur, USAF Special Operations School, Revolutionary Warfare Branch, Hurlburt Field, Florida, 5 October 1992.

⁸The CMSID course at Hurlburt Field was originally intended to be an IDAD course. The Defense Security Assistance Agency, however, consulted with the USAF Special Operations School and they decided to focus the course on internal development to the exclusion of internal defense, in large part because of the congressional concerns about U.S. support for other countries’ internal defense policies. Because the course has been redesigned in this way, it will fulfill the requirements of expanded IMET, and both foreign civilians and military students will be able to take the course for IMET-E credit.

democratization: human rights, civil-military relations, defense resource management, and military justice. Congress therefore passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 101-513) in FY 1991, mandating that not less than \$1 million of IMET funds shall be set aside for

developing, initiating, conducting and evaluating courses and other programs for training foreign civilian and military officials in managing and administering foreign military establishments and budgets, and for training foreign military and civilian officials in creating and maintaining effective military judicial systems and military codes of conduct, including observance of internationally recognized human rights . . . [Civilian personnel] shall include foreign government personnel of ministries other than ministries of defense if the military education and training would (i) contribute to responsible defense resource management, (ii) foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military, or (iii) improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.

The Defense Security Assistance Agency is the lead agent in developing and assigning appropriate courses for this expanded IMET (IMET-E) program, and security assistance officers in host nations are responsible for promoting foreign military and civilian attendance.⁹

It is this program, more than training in IDAD skills, that will expand the training of host-nation civilians in the oversight and control of military matters and expand the training of host nations' militaries in the support of civilian democracies. Courses are being developed that specifically address civil-military relations and other issues related to democratization. Although such courses can do no more than inform host nations' military personnel and civilians—they are not guaranteed to create appreciation for democratic values, for example—they should provide practical advice and suggestions as well as exposure to the various issues and viewpoints. As mentioned above, the new CMSID course at Hurlburt Field will fall under this program.

Concluding Observations

In summary, training in IDAD skills remains controversial and limited, and is likely to decrease in the post-Cold War era. Training foreign militaries in IDAD skills does not go further in meeting the general objectives of foreign military training than training in any other skills—and it threatens to bring down disapprobation on the entire foreign training program because of the concerns

⁹The act's emphasis on training civilians is also new and is intended to familiarize foreign civilian officials with their militaries' functions and budgets, thereby further helping to promote foreign militaries' subordination to civilian control.

surrounding it. Thus, although training foreign militaries in IDAD skills is very limited, and can therefore do little harm, it can also do little real good. In the meantime, it can, in some cases, create the impression that the United States supports military domination over the civilian sector in host nations.

Of course, incidental training in IDAD skills, in the context of conventional operations, will continue and can be applied to internal defense and development by the host nation's military, but such training is less controversial in part precisely because it is not deliberate and therefore does not give the impression that the United States is supporting military domination over traditionally civilian responsibilities.

Training in the theoretical underpinnings of internal defense and development can help dissipate some of the concerns expressed within the United States that training in IDAD skills is irresponsible and of questionable value. But the course in development at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School is very humble and its predecessor at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg has not been successful.¹⁰

Finally, some of the goals of IDAD training can be addressed through the IMET-E program with less controversy. Improved civil-military relations and human rights, for example, can go a long way toward preventing internal unrest and can demonstrate, as effectively as building a road, that the government and military respect and respond to the needs of the population. How effective IMET-E training will be, of course, remains in question. As with all U.S. training, it is unlikely that IMET-E training can have anything more than a marginal effect, given the balance of social, political, economic, and historical factors in any given country. Nonetheless, just as training authoritarian regimes' militaries in IDAD skills during the Cold War seemed to indicate that the United States cared more about fighting communism than about democratization, U.S. emphasis on IMET-E training sends the message that the United States is serious about democratization.

¹⁰The IDAD course offered at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is intended to give international students—whether military or civilian—formal training in the broad range of issues involved in internal defense and development, including lessons on the nature of society, the nature of insurgents, and the various roles of government in internal defense and development (including psychological operations and human-rights initiatives). United States Army, *Program of Instruction*, "Foreign Internal Defense/Internal Defense and Development Course 3A-f59," John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, June 1990. Unfortunately, because of a lack of interest within the Army, the course has failed to draw adequate numbers of U.S. military students. Moreover, although some foreign interest in the course has been expressed, U.S. security assistance officers put little emphasis on the course—indeed, they were often unaware of its existence. Interviews with instructor, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, December 1991, February 1993.

Bibliography

- Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Boston and Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1963.
- Banfield, Edward C., *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958.
- Childress, Michael T., *El Salvador and Honduras: Case-Studies in U.S. IMET Training and Its Role in Internal Defense and Development*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, forthcoming report.
- Civil Affairs Initiatives Briefing, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), Okinawa, Japan, 1992.
- Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Volume I*, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959, p. 167.
- Congressional Record*, 102d Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 137, No. 77, 21 May 1991, pp. S6257-S6258.
- Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Joint Publication 1-02, December 1989.
- Friedrich, Carl, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962.
- Garfinkle, Adam, ed., *The Devil and Uncle Sam: A User's Guide to the Friendly Tyrant's Dilemma*, London: Transaction Publishers, 1992.
- Harrison, Lawrence, *Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985.
- Hoffman, Bruce, Jennifer M. Taw, and David Arnold, *Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-3998-A, 1991.
- Iakovlev, A. N., *On the Edge of an Abyss*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985.
- Kirkpatrick Jeane J., "Dictatorships and Doublestandards," *Commentary*, Vol. 68, November 1979, p. 34.
- Lefever, Ernest W., "Arms Transfers, Military Training, and Domestic Politics," Chapter 16 in Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, eds., *Arms Transfers in the Modern World*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979.
- Lewis, W. Arthur W., *The Theory of Economic Growth*, Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955.

- Lobe, Thomas, "The Rise and Demise of the Office of Public Safety," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 9, No. 2, Winter 1983.
- Manolas, Spiro C., and Louis J. Samelson, "IMET: International Military Education and Training," *The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring 1990.
- McClelland, David. C., *The Achieving Society*, Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1961.
- McCoy, William H., Jr., *Senegal and Liberia: Case Studies in U.S. IMET Training and Its Impact on Internal Defense and Development*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, forthcoming report.
- Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, December 1990.
- Myrdal, Gunnar, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, New York: Pantheon, 1968.
- Pipes, Daniel, and Adam Garfinkle, eds., *Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991.
- Ramos, Fidel, "A Role for the Armed Forces in Democracy-Building," *Democratization of the Philippines*, published report from the Seminar on the Transition of Authoritarian Regimes to Democracy, Manila, 13-14 December 1986 (DC INFO Documents, No. 41 [1], February 1992).
- Rangel, Carlos, *The Latin Americans: Their Love-Hate Relationship with the United States*, New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.
- Schumpeter, Joseph A., *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 3rd ed., New York: Harper Bros., 1950.
- Schwarz, Benjamin C., "Peacetime Engagement and the Underdeveloped World: The U.S. Military's 'Nation Assistance' Mission," unpublished paper.
- , *American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4042-USDP, 1991.
- Security Assistance Management Manual*, DoD 5105.38-M, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988.
- Security Assistance Observations on the International Military Education and Training Program*, GAO Briefing Report to Congressional Requestors, Washington, D.C.: GAO/NSIAD-90-215BR, June 1990.
- Stopping U.S. Assistance to Foreign Police and Prisons*, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States, Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 19 February 1976.

- Taw, Jennifer Morrison, and Robert C. Leicht, *The New World Order and Army Doctrine: The Doctrinal Renaissance of Operations Short of War?* Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4201-A, 1992.
- The United States International Military Education and Training Program*, A Report Submitted by the Defense Security Assistance Agency and the Department of State to the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, February 1990.
- U.S. Congress, *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs FY 1992*.
- U.S. Senate, *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance: Experiences and Issues in Policy Implementation (1977-1978)*, A Report Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, November 1979.
- Weber, Max, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950.
- Wiarda, Howard J., *Dictatorship and Development*, Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1968.
- Willer, Clinton, "Engineer Challenges in Nation Building," *Military Review*, February 1989.
- Wolf, Charles, Jr., "The Political Effects of Military Programs: Some Indications from Latin America," *Orbis*, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 1965.