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*The Army's Role in  
Domestic Disaster  
Support*


*An Assessment of Policy  
Choices*

*John Y. Schrader*

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## Preface

This report explores issues for the Army leadership as it considers the implications of Army participation in domestic civil disaster response. It is part of a larger effort in the Arroyo Center's Strategy and Doctrine program to examine possible new noncombat initiatives for the U.S. Army. As the military threat to the United States changes and defense resources are reduced, one possible new organizational concept is an Army as the nation's general military servant—an Army that performs more than its traditional warfighting missions and provides a range of noncombat services at home and abroad.<sup>1</sup>

The Army is already heavily involved in military support planning and operations. This research discusses whether that role should be maintained or expanded. Many federal departments and agencies are involved in emergency response planning, and any Army decisions must be based on both existing commitments and the expectations of state and local officials and the general public of how the Army will contribute to alleviating suffering at home. This report and related RAND research<sup>2</sup> should be of interest to those inside and outside the Army who are thinking about new strategies, approaches, and visions for the future Army. Forthcoming publications emanating from this project will examine the potential applications of existing Army capabilities in assisting the former Soviet republics and Army support for youth development.

## The Arroyo Center

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<sup>1</sup>See Elizabeth Ondaatje, *New Army Noncombat Initiatives*, RAND, IP-106-A, 1993, and John K. Setear, Carl H. Builder, M. D. Baccus, and Wayne Madewell, *The Army in a Changing World: The Role of Organizational Vision*, RAND, R-3882-A, June 1990.

<sup>2</sup>See John Y. Schrader, J. E. Scholz, Dana J. Johnson, and K. V. Saunders, *Toward a New Damage Assessment Architecture: Adapting Nuclear Effects Reporting for Comprehensive Disaster Support*, RAND, R-4176-DNA, 1993.

Army Regulation 5-21 contains basic policy for the conduct of the Arroyo Center. The Army provides continuing guidance and oversight through the Arroyo Center Policy Committee (ACPC), which is co-chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff and by the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition. Arroyo Center work is performed under contract MDA903-91-C-0006.

The Arroyo Center is housed in RAND's Army Research Division. RAND is a private, nonprofit institution that conducts analytic research on a wide range of public policy matters affecting the nation's security and welfare.

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## Summary

The military has often been summoned to support natural-disaster relief operations. Although recently the military role in civil emergencies has been somewhat broadened by policy changes, relief efforts have never been considered a primary mission for the military and have seldom conflicted with principal military missions. Recent events, however, suggest that it may be useful to rethink the military role in civil emergencies. First, the end of the Cold War has triggered discussion about the opportunity for new roles and missions for the military. Second, the sequence of natural disasters in 1992—notably, the hurricane devastation in Florida and Hawaii—revealed that the public clearly expects the military, especially the Army, to involve itself in disaster response. Furthermore, the military participation in fact generally validated these expectations. Given today's budget constraints and the likelihood of continuing force reductions, it is timely for the Army to consider policy options concerning its role in disaster relief operations and to explore the implications of expanding its current role.

This report is intended as a first step in identifying the central issues for determining the appropriate role in disaster relief for the Army of the Future. It addresses four questions:

- What is the current structure of federal disaster response and how do the military, and the Army in particular, fit within it?
- What are current civilian needs for disaster response and how can the Army meet them?
- What are the chief implications of expanding the Army's role in jointly managed disaster support?
- What are the options for expanding the Army's role and what steps should the Army support regarding these options?

## Federal Disaster Response: Where the Military and Army Fit

The current organization of federal disaster response is cumbersome and confusing. The salient points are these:



- State governments are responsible for managing disaster relief operations and for requesting federal assistance.
- Twelve federal agencies (ten civilian, two military) have lead responsibility for assisting states in specific emergency functions. Their involvement is coordinated by a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO).
- All military response is assigned to the Department of Defense (DoD); the Secretary of the Army is the executive agent.
- The scale of military activity varies. It may be at the national level, regional level, or confined to the disaster area. Likewise, the various activities are categorized according to whether they are federal-civil, federal-military, or state operations. Distinct Army activities are divided among the active, reserve, and National Guard components.
- The Army plays the preeminent role in military disaster response.

## **Civilian Disaster Response Needs and Army Capabilities**

### ***Post-Disaster Relief***

The need for military support in disaster response is proportional to the size of the disaster. Small problems can be handled with local resources. Larger disasters may require some specialized assistance, but the need is generally limited. Only the largest regional disasters are likely to lay claim to the full spectrum of military support. In these major disasters, almost any kind of help will be welcome. The governors in affected states must deal with problems in the same way that military commanders must deal with a new tactical situation on the battlefield. They must determine what has happened, identify options for action that can be accomplished with assigned forces, identify requirements for outside assistance, and then select an appropriate course of action. States' principal needs for outside assistance are likely to include:

- **Situation assessment:** (1) Determine the size and extent of damaged areas; (2) determine the availability and readiness of National Guard units for state call-up; and (3) determine the need for medical personnel and supplies, food, water, and other critical resources.
- **Communications:** (1) Discuss requirements and the condition of the local population with local officials; and (2) discuss the situation with governors of adjacent states.

- **Response management:** (1) Redeploy state resources to support on-scene responders; (2) request assistance from adjacent states; (3) request federal assistance; and (4) establish an Emergency Operations Center for the State Coordinating Officer and Federal Response Plan operations.

Missions during disasters could involve three kinds of support: those requiring special skills, communications, and organized forces (see Table S.1).

## ***Planning***

Major disasters cannot be handled without adequate preparation. Forces providing relief at the scene are too busy to explain how state or national resources should have been organized. There is not enough time to reorganize and conduct training at the site of a disaster. Potential helpers will be ill-prepared if untrained. Effective response requires a commitment of time and resources by Army leadership *before* a disaster occurs. This commitment is part of reorienting the Army's institutional vision to include both combat and noncombat service to the nation.

Considerable planning is already being done. Local Army commanders routinely interact with civilian leaders. At the state level, the National Guard is an important part of the governor's resources. In Washington, federal emergency planners routinely participate in military command post exercises and military officers participate in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-sponsored exercises. More could be done to enhance the image of the Army as supporting emergency requirements that exceed the capability of local resources.

**Table S.1**

### **Army Capabilities for Disaster Response**

---

Special skills
Transportation (helicopters, off-road vehicles)
Urban search and rescue
Mobile hospitals
Surveillance and reconnaissance
Radiation monitoring
Situation assessment
Damage assessment
Communications
Equipment and trained personnel
Organized forces
Equipment and disciplined personnel

---

Pre-disaster activities could include participating in planning (which the Army currently does at both the federal and state level), conducting training, and earmarking specific types of equipment for support operations.

## Training Issues

The kinds of activities the Army might be asked to perform vary according to the amount of training they require (see Table S.2).

Understanding the training implications of these requirements is only a first step. The Army must also review the cost and feasibility of providing support for them. The Army must further consider which of the force components is best suited to support which kinds of requirements.

Finally, the Army needs to decide which requirements should be supported. The answer lies in examining the relative capabilities of Army forces and civilian agencies. Only if there is considerable comparative advantage for the Army are the costs likely to be acceptable.

## Other Issues

Three other issues enter into determining an appropriate role for the Army in disaster support.

**Availability.** First, rapid deployment forces that may be particularly desirable for use in emergencies may be unavailable because of overseas deployment. Second, National Guard forces usually live and work in the areas affected by

**Table S.2**  
**Training Required for Potential Disaster**  
**Response Requirements**

---

Category I—No training required
Medical
Transportation
Communications
Category II—En route training sufficient
Firefighting
Area search
Damage assessment
Category III—Formal training and exercises required
Urban search and rescue
Mass care
Emergency operations management

---

disasters, and therefore these units may be unable to respond effectively to call-ups during disasters.

**Legality.** There are legal constraints on the use of military forces for certain tasks during certain kinds of activities. Army authorities and local commanders at disaster sites need to have a clear sense of these legal limits and procedures for satisfying the various legal requirements.

**Cost.** New cost-sharing arrangements will need to be determined if the Army accepts an expanded role in civilian disasters.

## **Conclusions**

Authority to determine the Army's role in disaster response does not rest solely with the Army even though Army forces form the bulk of the military response. Nonetheless, it is important for the Army to have a clear sense of the options for aiding in civil disasters and to support measures to improve its ability to do so. Only after a comprehensive Army review of costs and benefits can the Army influence DoD decisions.

## **Options**

The range of options for Army participation in civil emergency response includes:

1. **Maintaining the status quo.** The Army would continue to support FEMA's leadership of disaster response planning. Billets in support of disaster planning will need to be protected as force levels are reduced.
2. **Minor expansion of the Army's role to include more direct support to states.** This option could entail expanding the Director of Military Support office to include formal state liaison offices. These offices would emphasize understanding the steps necessary to expand military support whenever state resources are overwhelmed.
3. **Major expansion of the Army's role.** This option could imply designating civil disaster response as a fifth pillar of the national defense strategy and incorporate disaster response missions into the Army's repertoire of primary missions.

The latter two options would require actions outside the Army in addition to internal changes. All options should result in a clear redefinition from the Army leadership of the preferred course of action to avoid misperceptions of intent.

### ***Recommendations***

As a prelude to formulating and assessing specific policy options, the Army should support four measures to clarify the current policy environment and generally to improve federal disaster response operations regardless of the Army's ultimate level of participation.

1. **Support formal acceptance of civil disaster response as a mission for both active and reserve forces.** Commanders cannot be expected to devote time to civil emergency preparedness if combat readiness is their exclusive focus.
2. **Support thorough review of the entire arrangement for disaster response.** The current setup is confusing.
3. **Transfer executive authority for military support from the Secretary of the Army to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** This will allow the military to function according to normal chains of command during civil emergencies.
4. **Review legal constraints on military participation in civil disaster relief.** The complex tangle of restrictions governing the use of forces under various circumstances should be reviewed by planners and lawyers. It is likely that the legal guidelines will need to be redefined and streamlined if an expanded Army role is to be effective during future disasters.

Actions to restructure or eliminate units or functions because they lack relevance to combat missions could lead to unanticipated and adverse effects on civil emergency support capabilities. Reduced capabilities may be a necessary consequence of changes in the military threat, but the Army should recognize that it has built expectations that it will be there when needed in domestic emergencies. Failure to meet expectations without preparing state and local officials could be disastrous for the Army's image.

## Acknowledgments

This research builds on a previous RAND study in the National Defense Research Institute that developed a new architecture for damage reporting. That effort was funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA). It provided an opportunity to understand the complex relationships among federal, state, and local officials that are necessary to provide support for decisionmakers after major emergencies. Maxwell Alston in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Security Policy) was a constant source of guidance and information in both this research and the earlier project.

I am particularly grateful to the Army officers involved in day-to-day military support planning who contributed their time and insights to the development of the issues considered in this report. They include COL Ross Nagy (DOMS), COL Peter Dabrowski (FEMA), and LTC H. E. Mayhew (National Guard Bureau). Robert Fletcher (FEMA-State and Local Programs) provided a user's perspective on the Army's participation in planning and development of the Federal Response Plan.

At RAND, David Adamson provided valuable organizational and editorial assistance. Warren Walker's thoughtful review helped to focus the research results into a clearer plan of action. The RAND research team investigating Army noncombat initiatives was headed by Elizabeth Ondaatje, who offered helpful advice and comment on early drafts and briefings along the way.

Within the office of the sponsor of this study, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army Robert Emmerichs and his staff were particularly helpful.

The author retains responsibility for the findings and any shortcomings of the analysis.

## Acronyms

AOR	Area of Responsibility
CDRG	Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (Washington area coordination under the Federal Response Plan)
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CINCFOR	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Forces Command
CINCLANTCOM	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (old)
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
CINCUSACOM	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (new)
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CONUSA	Continental U.S. Army
DCO	Defense Coordinating Officer (military officer working for FCO in support of SCO)
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DoDRMS	Department of Defense Resource Management System (portable computer database for emergency support)
DOMS	Director of Military Support
ERT	Emergency Response Team (federal personnel at disaster scene)
ESF	Emergency Support Function (category of response activities in Federal Response Plan)
FCO	Federal Coordinating Officer (appointed by the President)
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FM	Field Manual
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee (Army Reserve)
MACA	Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (old term for civil emergency support activities)
MSCA	Military Support to Civil Authorities (new term for all military response activities)
MSCD	Military Support to Civil Defense (old term for attack-related civil emergency support)
RMEC	Regional Military Emergency Coordinator
SCO	State Coordinating Officer (appointed by the Governor)
STARC	State Area Command (National Guard)
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

# 1. Introduction

This report examines the Army's role in the overall structure of federal civil disaster response and explores implications of expanding that role. It is intended as a first step in identifying the central issues for determining the appropriate role of the Army in disaster support.

## Background

The collapse of the former Soviet Union has removed the central pillar of broad support for a large peacetime military force. There is no longer an "evil empire" with global ambitions and the means to destroy the United States in a single massive nuclear strike. Nor is there a modern, effective Army deployed near the borders of our European allies and capable of blitzkrieg operations. U.S. forward deployments and the need for ready reinforcements from the United States are being perceived as less necessary. In addition, there are domestic expectations of a "peace dividend." The National Military Strategy reflects these realities:

For most of the past 45 years the primary focus of our national military strategy has been containment of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology—we met that challenge successfully. . . .

Future threats to US interests are inherent in the uncertainty and instability of a rapidly changing world. We can meet the challenges of the foreseeable future with a much smaller force than we have had in recent years.<sup>1</sup>

Military forces are not an end in themselves and their ultimate size and composition should be based on threat-based requirements analysis. There will be considerable debate over which threats and regions are most important. In particular, there will be a range of opinion regarding those areas and crises that sufficiently endanger U.S. national interests that they require military operations. The immediate consequence of these changes is the projected 37 percent reduction in real defense spending between 1985 and 1997<sup>2</sup> and the return of some forward-based units to the United States. A secondary consequence will be

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<sup>1</sup>Introductory statement of General Colin L. Powell, *The National Military Strategy of the United States*, January 1992.

<sup>2</sup>Message of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, February 1992.



the questioning of the need for forces as large as those deemed essential by the President and his military advisors.

One possibility for maintaining strong public support is greater military involvement in community issues.<sup>3</sup> In the past, our military forces, especially the Army, have provided some support for domestic emergencies, specifically natural disasters and civil disturbances, without affecting primary military missions. In 1989, Hurricane Hugo caused \$10 billion in direct damage to South Carolina, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Even more costly damage resulted from the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in California.<sup>4</sup> In both these disasters, military forces played a major role in disaster response. There was no controversy, at the time of each disaster, about the desirability of using military forces, and their limited contributions were well received.

In fact, the public appears to expect the Army to respond to civil disasters.<sup>5</sup> When Hurricane Andrew left Dade County, Florida, without basic life-support services, the military came under public criticism for not responding quickly enough.<sup>6</sup> The *New York Times* front page headline, "Bush Sending Army to Florida Amid Criticism of Relief Effort," linked the Army with unsatisfactory relief efforts, even though the poor performance had nothing to do with Army actions.<sup>7</sup> Edmund L. Andrews reported:

The announcement came after local officials and disaster relief experts said that Federal efforts had been inadequate and often confused, and that four days after the hurricane had struck, uncounted thousands of residents still lacked food, water and shelter.

...

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<sup>3</sup>Senator Sam Nunn addressed the Senate on June 23, 1992, on "Forging Civil-Military Cooperation for Community Regeneration." The Nunn proposals go well beyond disaster support, but he acknowledges the need for building ties with the domestic community while the debate on the overall national security threat continues. The priority of military missions remains preeminent:

"As we restructure our Armed Forces over the next decade, the attention of DoD's civilian and military leadership must remain focused on training the Armed Forces for their primary mission, which is the military mission. That goal, in my view, is compatible with enhancing the military's ability to assist in meeting domestic needs."

<sup>4</sup>*Principal Threats Facing Communities and Local Emergency Management Coordinators, a Report to the United States Senate Committee on Appropriations, Office of Civil Defense, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), March 6, 1991.*

<sup>5</sup>Responding to disasters is alternatively called disaster response or disaster relief. No technical distinction is implied here, although different organizations prefer one form or the other. One distinction is important—recovery is an activity that includes major rebuilding and is not a part of the more immediate disaster response or relief activities.

<sup>6</sup>Much of the criticism was actually directed at federal disaster management and the adequacy of FEMA's planning efforts. Because both active and reserve Army units were involved in the federal response and were readily identifiable in their uniforms, there was a presumption by the press and the public of Army responsibility.

<sup>7</sup>Several articles on Hurricane Andrew relief efforts appeared on page 1 in the August 28, 1992, edition of the *New York Times*.

Mr. Bush said he was mobilizing the military at the request of Florida's Governor, Lawton Chiles, who had earlier said food distribution had become hopelessly tangled in bureaucracy and general confusion. A spokesman for the Governor said this evening that state officials had been deeply disappointed on Monday when their request for an engineering battalion was denied, but were pleased that the President had responded positively to their new request for military support.

...

Emergency deliveries of food and water were still tangled in distribution problems, officials said earlier today.

#### **Governor Is Angry**

"We've got 120,000 C-ration meals that are here somewhere, but we don't know where the hell they are," Governor Chiles said. "Right now, a truckload of food gets there, 200 people show up, 50 people get food and 150 people are angry. We've got to find a way to solve that."

...

Defense Department officials acknowledged that they have military units that can do the job, but said that they are normally required by law to avoid competing with private business whenever possible. It was not clear whether the soldiers now heading for Florida would be authorized to do this job [emergency roofing].

In the hurricane's aftermath, standard procedures were followed. The Federal Response Plan was invoked and the Secretary of Transportation was appointed by the President to serve as the Federal Coordinating Officer to work with the governor in providing immediate response support. Unfortunately, the cumbersome regulatory environment—governors must request specific assistance, federal response is only supplementary, and military support activities are limited by statute—left needs unmet, although Army forces were ready to respond.

This was a case where the people and local leaders expected more from the Army than was immediately provided. If the requests were unreasonable because the Army could not legally take action, that needs to be made clear. If response was delayed for organizational reasons, procedures and policies need to be reviewed. If funding was the problem, new sources need to be sought.

The Army leadership—civilian and military—needs to have a clear understanding of what the Army is doing to support governors and the coordinated federal emergency response activities under the Federal Response Plan. Restructuring or eliminating units or functions for lack of relevance to combat missions could lead to unanticipated effects on civil emergency support capabilities. Reduced capabilities may be a necessary consequence of changes in the military threat, but the Army must recognize that its capabilities have built

expectations that it will be there when needed. Failure to meet expectations without forewarning state and local officials could be disastrous for the Army's image. If the Army role in disaster response is not explicitly defined, uncertainties will remain (What should the Army provide? What should governors expect?). It is time to clarify the Army's future role in disaster support. Should its role increase because of public or congressional demand, the resulting implications should be clearly understood.

## Report Purpose, Scope, and Organization

This report's purposes are, first, to review the current structure of federal civil disaster response efforts, focusing on the military's, and particularly the Army's, roles within that structure,<sup>8</sup> and, second, to identify expanded disaster response roles for the Army and how these might be most effectively carried out.

The report is not intended to describe or critique the current U.S. architecture for coping with civil disasters. Readers interested in a more thorough discussion of this architecture should see John Y. Schrader, J. E. Scholz, Dana J. Johnson, and K. V. Saunders, *Toward a New Damage Assessment Architecture: Adapting Nuclear Effects Reporting for Comprehensive Disaster Support*, RAND, R-4176-DNA, 1993.

Section 2 describes the current structure of federal disaster response and reviews the military's, and specifically the Army's, roles within that structure. Section 3 explores issues raised by possible expansion of the Army's role in civil emergencies. These include civilian post-disaster response needs, current Army capabilities, and the match between the two, as well as training and organizational issues. It assumes the Army will at least continue to provide disaster support within available resources and the existing organization and may take on more disaster relief roles. Therefore, decisions on how Army personnel are trained to respond to civil emergencies and how civil emergency planning functions are split among active, reserve, and National Guard forces are particularly relevant. Section 4 concludes the report by discussing in the current policy context the prospects for expanding the Army's disaster response role and recommending positions the Army should adopt on this issue.

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<sup>8</sup> A minimal understanding of the wide range of nonmilitary resources is necessary lest military planners overstate the role they might play.

## 2. Current Structure of Federal Disaster Response

Although the military currently participates in civil disaster response, the existing command relationships are cumbersome and confusing. The primary responsibility for planning and response resides with state and local officials in the affected area. Federal involvement must be requested by state governors. The federal response is coordinated by an appointed official, called the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and selected by the President, who oversees the various agencies involved, including the military. The military may take the lead in providing particular kinds of assistance or be asked to support other agencies.

To help describe the structure of the federal effort and the roles of the military, and particularly the Army, within it, let us use a hypothetical example. Assume that a major earthquake has occurred along the New Madrid fault near Memphis, Tennessee (see Figure 2.1). The Governor of Tennessee receives initial reports of major fires, thousands of deaths and injuries, and a near-total collapse of communications with surrounding rural areas. In order to respond, the governor needs to develop a clear picture of what has happened, from that picture develop a list of requirements for assistance, and match requirements with available resources. Developing an action plan will involve information sharing with governors of other affected states and with the President.

### Federal Participation in Disaster Response

The doctrine underlying federal civil disaster response is the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended. Although initially designed to respond to a massive nuclear attack, it is now considered appropriate for a wide range of disasters. President Bush's revised policy was transmitted to Congress in March 1992:<sup>1</sup>

The United States will have a civil defense capability as an element of our overall national security posture. The objective of the civil defense program is to develop the required capabilities common to all catastrophic emergencies and those unique to attack emergencies in order to protect the population and vital infrastructure.

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<sup>1</sup>*Civil Defense: A Report to Congress on National Disaster Preparedness*, Federal Emergency Management Agency, March 1992.




Figure 2.1—New Madrid Fault Region

The civil defense program will support all-hazard integrated emergency management at State and local levels. In so doing, the civil defense program will:

- Recognize and respect the primary responsibility of State and local governments to provide for the safety and well-being of their citizens in emergencies other than national security emergencies.
- Utilize to the maximum extent the existing capabilities, facilities and resources of all appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government, in accordance with Executive Order 126556 and, with their consent, those of States and political subdivisions thereof, and of private sector organizations and agencies.

"The Federal Response Plan (for Public Law 93-288, as amended) establishes the basis for Federal assistance to a State and its affected local governments impacted by a catastrophic or significant disaster or emergency which results in a requirement for Federal response assistance."<sup>2</sup> The Federal Response Plan, based on the assumption that state and local capabilities will be overwhelmed, divides

<sup>2</sup>See draft, "The Federal Response Plan (for Public Law 93-288, as amended)," Federal Emergency Management Agency, December 1991. The law, known as the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, provides a basis for intergovernmental planning and funding of response activities. A coordinated final version of the Federal Response Plan was published in the *Federal Register* in 1992.

response activities into 12 groups called Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). A Federal Coordinating Officer is appointed by the President to work with the governor's State Coordinating Officer (SCO). The FCO determines, in conjunction with the SCO, which ESFs need to be activated. Table 2.1 lists the ESFs and the department or agency responsible for planning federal response.

In our example, the Governor of Tennessee would request a federal disaster declaration. The President would respond by declaring a disaster and appointing an FCO. All ESFs would be activated, with particular emphasis on augmenting medical capabilities (ESF #8) and assisting in finding survivors (ESF #9). Parallel actions would be taken for other affected states. A national Catastrophic Disaster Response Group would be convened in Washington to coordinate support to the FCO in the affected states. Federal response would be supported at the regional level at a FEMA regional office by an interagency Regional Operations Center (ROC). All federal activities are concentrated on supporting the FCO and his staff, the Emergency Response Team (ERT), near the site of the disaster.

## Military Participation in Disaster Response

Where does the military fit within this structure? As Table 2.1 shows, military organizations have the lead responsibility for two of the ESFs: "Public Works and Engineering" (the Army Corps of Engineers) and "Urban Search and

**Table 2.1**  
**Emergency Support Functions**

ESF	Lead Agency
1. Transportation	Department of Transportation
2. Communications	National Communications System
3. Public Works and Engineering	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
4. Firefighting	Department of Agriculture, Forest Service
5. Information and Planning	Federal Emergency Management Agency
6. Mass Care	American Red Cross
7. Resource Support	General Services Administration
8. Health and Medical Services	Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Public Health Service
9. Urban Search and Rescue	Department of Defense
10. Hazardous Materials	Environmental Protection Agency
11. Food	Department of Agriculture
12. Energy	Department of Energy

Rescue" (the Department of Defense [DoD]). The military is also charged with supporting the other 10 ESFs should the lead agency request assistance.

### ***Post-Disaster Response***

Military response in the event of a civil disaster is a mission of the DoD. Two DoD directives historically have governed military response. DoD Directive 3025.1, "Use of Military Resources During Peacetime Civil Emergencies Within the United States, Its Territories, and Possessions," May 23, 1980, and DoD Directive 3025.10, "Military Support of Civil Defense," July 22, 1981.

Responsibility for DoD response during a peacetime civil emergency was delegated to the Secretary of the Army (SecArmy) serving as the Executive Agent for the entire Department of Defense. DoDD 3025.1 pertained to major disasters not considered to be a "national security emergency." DoDD 3025.10 covered actions pursuant to national security emergencies where the normal military chain of command led from the Secretary of Defense through the affected regional commanders-in-chief (CINCs). Executive Order 12656 of November 18, 1988, defines a national security emergency as "any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, technological emergency, or other emergency, that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the United States." The dividing line between civil emergencies and national security emergencies is not clear; however, in the new version of DoDD 3025.1, the Department of Defense has taken steps to consolidate both directives into a single response structure. (It is noted that neither of these DoD Directives addresses police actions such as the Los Angeles riots of 1992; a separate directive, DoDD 3025.12, "Employment of Military Resources in the Event of Civil Disturbances," August 19, 1971, applies, although a new version of that Directive is in final coordination at this writing.)<sup>3</sup> Figure 2.2 illustrates the relationship between existing and proposed DoD guidance.<sup>4</sup>

To return to our example, once the federal response to the earthquake in Tennessee is under way, any operations involving military support are coordinated by a Defense Coordinating Officer, who serves as a point of contact for the FCO and the ESFs regarding requests for military assistance. How those forces are actually employed is determined by the state and federal response

<sup>3</sup>The long history of concerns about military forces being used for law enforcement dates to the Declaration of Independence and the drafting of the Constitution. Separate implementing directives for restoring law and order currently parallel the organizational structure of military support to civil authorities, but they require further analysis.

<sup>4</sup>Secretary Cheney approved new DoDD 3025.1 in January 1993.




Figure 2.2—Military Support Directives

leaders (SCO and FCO), but actual command of the military units is never relinquished.

### ***Disaster Response Planning***

In addition to engaging in disaster-relief operations, the military participates in planning for disasters at the national, state, regional, and local levels. The organizational structure for planning activities is separate from the structure for relief operations. The principal planning mechanism is the Regional Military Emergency Coordinator (RMEC) team. A team is created for each of FEMA's ten regions under Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM) and the commanders of the affected Continental U.S. Army (CONUSA).<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup>The February 1993 *Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff resulted in a Secretary of Defense decision to implement organizational changes, including additional responsibilities for the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, now designated USACOM to emphasize its new role. These new responsibilities include joint force integration of air and ground forces based in the continental United States that provide military support to U.S. civil authorities (MSCA). The reorganization of USACOM will include a J5MSCA billet, with a complete transition to new procedures scheduled for completion by 1 October 1995. The present report was prepared before the Secretary's decision to expand the role of USACOM; however, decisions regarding the nature and extent of Army involvement in domestic disaster support remain to be made.



Members are selected from all services and selected defense agencies.<sup>6</sup> Although the organizational structure is difficult to follow because it has overlapping definitions and responsibilities, FEMA sources report that the Federal Response Plan has functioned well in recent disasters.<sup>7</sup> In fact, National Guard force reductions are being resisted by those who cite the Guard's useful role in disaster response.<sup>8</sup>

The three planning hierarchies involved in disaster response are federal civil, state, and federal military. Their relevant components for action under the Federal Response Plan are shown in Figure 2.3.<sup>9</sup> The figure emphasizes three mostly autonomous, vertical groupings of organizations, in which up and down reporting is common but horizontal interaction is more difficult. National-level support in Washington is important both to keep the President informed and to facilitate responses deemed necessary by the SCO and FCO. The role of national-level participants, however, is to *assist* the states, not to *manage* the response.




Figure 2.3—Principal Participants in Disaster Response Planning

<sup>6</sup>See Maxwell Alston, "Military Support to Civil Authorities: New Dimensions for the 1990s," *The Officer*, ROA [Reserve Officers Association] National Security Report, October 1991.

<sup>7</sup>Most of this research was conducted prior to Hurricane Andrew. The question of whether the federal response in Florida was delayed because a state request for assistance had not been received to trigger the Federal Response Plan was not examined.

<sup>8</sup>Indiana Governor Evan Bayh commented that reductions "would seriously damage the Guard's ability to resist a major civil disorder or give aid and shelter when tornadoes, floods and other national disasters strike." Reported on July 14, 1992, by Joe Fahy in the *Indianapolis News*.

<sup>9</sup>State military forces are not explicitly addressed in this and subsequent figures. In many states, the Adjutant General heads the state militia as well as the state emergency management agency.

## The Army's Unique Role

The Army is the service most closely tied to military response operations. The Secretary of the Army is the DoD executive agent for all disasters that fall short of national security emergencies, and will be in charge of all disasters under the new DoD Directive 3025.1 dated January 15, 1993.<sup>10</sup> The Secretary of the Army has designated a general officer on the Army Staff as the Director of Military Support (DOMS), with Air Force and Navy deputies for planning. In the event of a disaster, the DOMS can direct CINCUSACOM or the responsible operational commander to provide forces to assist in disaster response, if such activities do not degrade military readiness or interfere with military missions.<sup>11</sup>

In addition to the planning and operational role of the DOMS, many Army personnel—active, reserve, and National Guard—participate in civil disaster response. An active-duty Army colonel serves as a DoD liaison officer to the FEMA director in FEMA headquarters. Active-duty Army officers are designated by the CONUSA commanders to serve as Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs) for disasters in the continental United States. Active Army participation, shown in *italics* in Figure 2.4, is available at all levels from the Director of Military Support in the Pentagon down to Army units on the scene directed by the DCO after having been tasked and deployed by the CONUSA commander.

Reserve officers from all services (including the Coast Guard) form the RMEC teams in the FEMA regions. In addition, several hundred Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) are assigned at all levels of the response hierarchy. Approximately 350 from all services represent DoD as liaison and planning officers with FEMA and the states. Additionally, 600 Army and Air Force reservists are assigned to FEMA to work with state and local agencies. The latter are Category D reservists who are paid for only 12 days a year, although they contribute many more days as volunteers.<sup>12</sup> A third category of reserve support is communications for FEMA regional directors through organized reserve units called Civil Preparedness Support Detachments. These units are also funded by FEMA. Reserve activities are shown in small caps in Figure 2.5.

<sup>10</sup>The question of whether the Secretary of the Army is the appropriate executive agent is being reevaluated in light of recent experiences in Los Angeles and Miami. See the recommendations in Section 4.

<sup>11</sup>Costs for fuel and salaries are reimbursable expenses with FEMA funds that flow through the DOMS to the supporting military commands.

<sup>12</sup>FEMA reimbursed DoD \$1.5 million in 1991 for the 600 IMAs assigned to FEMA billets.




Figure 2.4—Active Army Participation in Disaster Response




Figure 2.5—Army Reserve Participation in Disaster Response

The National Guard provides the most visible emergency response because governors can call them to state active duty to perform almost any function they desire. National Guard units are coordinated through State Area Commands (STARCs) located in state capitals. "STARCs are Reserve Component headquarters of about 300 people. Yet, some key individuals are employed in each STARC as full-time federal technicians, and guardsmen assigned to the STARC often work as civilians in the state military department or other state agencies."<sup>13</sup> CINCFORSCOM coordinates planning with the STARCs for easy transition of control should the Guard be federalized. A more complete picture of military participation is shown in Figure 2.6.

National Guard forces participate in two ways. Under the governor's authority, they are paid with state funds and function as part of the state emergency response. If nationalized, they are paid by DoD and function like active Army units assigned through CONUSAs to work for the DCO in support of the SCO. Since different laws govern state and federal activities, some actions permitted when serving on state active duty may be proscribed when federalized.




Figure 2.6—National Guard Participation in Disaster Response

<sup>13</sup>See Alston, p. 39.

### **3. Expanding the Army's Role: The Main Issues**

This section explores the main issues that must be addressed in considering expanded Army participation in disaster response. These issues include civilian needs during disaster response and Army capabilities for responding, as well as other topics.

#### **Post-Disaster Response**

The need for military support in disaster response is proportional to the size of the disaster. Small problems can be handled with local resources. Larger disasters may require some limited specialized assistance. Only the largest regional disasters are likely to lay claim to the full spectrum of military support. In these major disasters, almost any kind of help will be acceptable. The governors in affected states must deal with problems in the same way that military commanders must deal with new tactical situations on the battlefield. They must determine what has happened, identify options that can be accomplished with assigned forces, identify requirements for outside assistance, and then select an appropriate course of action. Table 3.1 lists some of the decisions and actions faced by regional governors after our example major earthquake on the New Madrid fault. Each state governor will face a different situation. States with little damage will be able to provide support to more seriously affected neighbors. Others may be able to meet their needs without outside assistance. This section addresses the requirements of those states that need outside assistance.

During the early stages after a disaster, basic military training and readiness should provide military commanders with communications and transportation resources that are comparatively much more effective than those of the civil sector. Again, this is a situation in which the Army should not think in terms of taking charge, but rather providing patches to a damaged network of response capabilities. The real value-added consists of helping state and local officials with situation assessment and providing selected communications or data. In some cases, organized military units may be the first reinforcements for local responders. However, rapidly deployable forces may not be involved for long.

**Table 3.1**  
**Potential Decisions and Actions After a Major Earthquake**

Item	TN	AR	MO	IL	KY
States with direct damage effects	X	X	X		
<b>Situation assessment</b>					
1. Determine the size and extent of damaged areas.	X	X	X	X	X
2. Determine the availability and readiness of National Guard units for state call-up.	X	X	X	X	X
3. Determine the need for medical personnel and supplies, food, water, and other critical resources.	X	X	X		
<b>Communications</b>					
1. Discuss requirements and condition of local population with local officials.	X	X	X		
2. Discuss situation with governors of adjacent states.	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Response management</b>					
1. Order redeployment of state resources to support on-scene responders.	X	X	X		
2. Request assistance from adjacent states.	X				
3. Request federal assistance.	X	X			
4. Establish Emergency Operations Center for the State Coordinating Officer and Federal Response Plan operations.	X	X			

They should be replaced by state and local personnel who take longer to mobilize and organize. Table 3.2 lists some of the Army's capabilities for disaster support. These capabilities fall into three categories: special functional skills that support specific response operations, communications that permit disaster command and control to function, and organized forces that can be employed as units providing general support.

**Table 3.2**  
**Army Capabilities for Disaster Response**

<b>Special skills</b>
Transportation (helicopters, off-road vehicles)
Urban search and rescue
Mobile hospitals
Observation and reconnaissance
Radiation monitoring
Situation assessment
Damage assessment
<b>Communications</b>
Equipment and trained personnel
<b>Organized forces</b>
Equipment and disciplined personnel

If a disaster is widespread and unprecedented, the military support role will evolve and may be more extensive than originally planned. Although the military role is supplemental, it is possible that state and local resources may be completely exhausted and military forces the resources of last resort. In our example of an earthquake on the New Madrid fault, mass casualties would certainly overload local medical and security personnel. In that event, military forces, even without specialized training, could free state and local police from routine operations so they could concentrate on assisting medical teams. The governor will want to know how widespread the devastation is and would welcome military assistance at his command post if it could help collect information and reports from isolated areas. Since thousands of people will be homeless, the military experience in mobilization and deployment operations should be particularly helpful to emergency planners by constructing temporary housing and restoring a minimal essential infrastructure (water, sanitation, and communications). There is a support role for military forces in almost every aspect of immediate response, if the needs are understood and the affected forces are prepared to respond.

Which disaster response requirements should be supported? The answer lies again in examining the relative capabilities of military forces and the civil agencies that can perform the same functions. Only if there is considerable comparative advantage are the military costs likely to be acceptable. In almost every case—medical, transportation, communications, and management—the civil sector's considerable capability is routinely exercised in the course of fires, floods, and hurricanes. Military capabilities are frequently assumed to be greater than they are, and the cost of using military forces is often not considered. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers manages large construction projects through Civil Works and Military Construction programs, but the actual work is performed by local companies under contract with the Army. The manpower and equipment used in this construction can be tasked directly by governors and local communities without Army intervention. Similarly, commercial ground and air transportation can provide the same services as military trucks and helicopters at considerably less cost to the affected states, unless there are special funding arrangements to relieve states of cost-sharing requirements.

Some military capabilities for disaster response are unique, and their value in civil disaster support is reflected in the readiness of governors to ask for assistance in crises. These selected capabilities of military forces could be enhanced by a small amount of specialized training and increased awareness by Army personnel of the importance of participation in civil emergency support activities.

In addition, some current Army equipment is already well-suited to disaster response capabilities. Military construction equipment and transport vehicles could provide disaster support and be used with little preparation. Communications equipment could augment limited survivable local communications but cannot be expected to provide more than essential communications for key leaders. Specialized equipment procured for civil disaster support is not authorized under current law and regulations and is unlikely to become available in the future. The principal requirement for pre-disaster activity would be to catalog existing resources and provide information to on-scene support personnel. CINCFORSCOM is developing a Department of Defense Resource Management System (DoDRMS) that resides in a laptop computer. Prototype versions in the field provide locations of selected military equipment throughout the country and phone numbers of local commanders and command centers. Simple systems like the DoDRMS should be available to military officers who interact with civil emergency planners.

## Planning

Major disasters cannot be handled without adequate preparation. Forces providing relief at the scene are too busy to explain how state or national resources should have been organized. There is not enough time to reorganize and conduct training at the site of a disaster. Potential helpers will be ill-prepared if untrained. Effective response requires a commitment of time and resources *before* a disaster occurs, which in turn requires a commitment by Army leadership to the disaster relief mission within the emerging vision of the Army of the future. This commitment will ensure that individuals and units receive adequate training, resources, and recognition for their disaster response role.

Considerable planning is already being done. Local commanders routinely interact with civilian leaders. At the state level, the National Guard is an important part of the governor's resources. In Washington, federal emergency planners routinely participate in military command post exercises and military officers participate in FEMA-sponsored exercises. More could be done to enhance the image of the Army as supporting emergency requirements that exceed the capability of local resources.

To be more effective, the Army needs to make clear both that it is ready to help and that its resources are limited. The Army should (1) show a readiness to



attend planning meetings without trying to take charge,<sup>1</sup> (2) adequately train and prepare an officer before meeting with local experts rather than selecting someone randomly, (3) ensure that senior officers appreciate the necessity for Army participation in emergency response planning even though it is not directly linked to a specific combat mission, and (4) ensure that the officers interacting with state and local governments understand the capabilities and limitations of military forces of all services that could be involved in local support operations.

## Matching Needs with Capabilities

Unfortunately, many of the needs of state and local emergency forces do not match the capabilities of combat units. Firefighting, mass care, food, and energy requirements are more likely to be satisfied by civil departments and agencies. Nevertheless, there are many capabilities beyond simply providing manpower that reside in combat support and combat service support units that could help reduce suffering in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. As previously noted, long-term recovery actions are outside the scope of this analysis, since they clearly can draw on a wide range of civil capabilities and fall outside the definition of emergency response.

The military frequently prepares "after-action reports" for operations and major training activities. A systematic review of military participation in disasters over the past several years, based on after-action reports, would provide examples of military capabilities well-matched with needs along with cases where military forces were poorly employed. Unutilized (or underutilized) military resources could be identified as well. After military leaders have a clearer picture of potential matches and mismatches, state and federal emergency planners could convene for a broader review. The results of these reviews could form the basis for an Army road map to improve preparation and support after disasters.

## Training and Organizational Implications

What are the training and organizational implications of a broader Army disaster role? At least two oversimplified approaches, at the ends of the spectrum of possible responses, can be taken to Army support for peacetime missions: "Come

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<sup>1</sup> Although no single instance can be cited, there is a perception that arises during conversations with civil emergency planners that military officers want to take over meetings they attend. Military leadership training fosters a goal-oriented approach to problem solving, but civil-military interactions require sensitivity to the problems of coordination among participants who are not part of a well-defined chain of command.

as you are" and "Come only if fully prepared." The first case is the easiest. If a governor requires augmentation because communications are inadequate or police forces are exhausted, an Army unit of the appropriate size could be dispatched to the scene. If the designated unit is unprepared, it is likely to disappoint the governor because the unit is ready to accomplish military objectives and may not understand the complexities of operating with civil emergency forces.<sup>2</sup> The second approach would involve asking a governor what specific requirements existed, assessing the capabilities of available forces, and turning down requests because there are no adequately trained units. Both cases would cause the Army to be perceived as irrelevant for domestic problems. In recent disasters, an intermediate path was taken with mixed success because there was little Army guidance on how commanders should view their responsibilities for civil disaster response.

If the Army accepted an expanded role, what kinds of training would be necessary? A small number of officers involved in emergency planning could be trained in a relatively short time through classes or self-study courses. Training the responders themselves is harder. Every year during the late summer and early fall, active military personnel assist the Department of Agriculture in fighting forest fires. Assigned units receive a few hours of training en route sufficient to successfully support this limited mission. Training personnel to search for victims in collapsed buildings is not as simple. Inappropriate actions could actually make the situation worse (e.g., aggressive actions to find victims in weakened buildings could cause more serious injuries to victims and to the searchers). Active forces have more opportunities to conduct training, although finding adequate training time is always a problem. Guard and reserve forces have fewer opportunities to train, and a few days dedicated to training for emergency response represent a significant fraction of the total training time available. Regardless of which force provides the manpower, instructors must be trained and facilities provided for training.

Medical units would require the least special training, and airlift units similarly would provide services not unlike their normal operations unless it became necessary to transport specialized nonmilitary equipment, in which case some training might be required. Training nonmedical personnel to assist in transporting mass casualties or conducting surveillance for widespread contaminants would be quite different from general military training.

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<sup>2</sup>Unfortunately, they may make the problem worse. During a severe snowstorm, Army engineers were asked to help clear roads with their bulldozers. The appropriate unit responded but had not been trained in urban snow-clearing procedures. The roads were cleared, but because curbs were not identifiable, fire hydrants were sheared off by the blades and the recovery problem was made more difficult.

Training is a major part of the Army's mission, and it is beyond the scope of this analysis to comprehensively inventory existing training relevant to emergency support or to identify the impact (cost and readiness) of increased preparedness for disaster support operations.

Training resources are limited and commanders, whose success is measured by combat readiness, will protect time and funds from claimants that do not directly contribute to combat readiness. As noted in Section 2, many of the currently assigned disaster support personnel come from reserve component forces that have little opportunity for training. Some combat support forces such as signal companies or combat service support medical units could be assigned to disaster support with no additional training. Other units that could assist in damage surveillance or search operations for survivors would require only limited en route training. The most difficult activities are those such as finding and removing survivors from collapsed buildings, for which both training and special-purpose equipment are required. Training considerations lead to the taxonomy of military support missions shown in Table 3.3. The enumeration of missions is only illustrative to motivate an understanding of the training implications of Army participation in disaster response. Subsequent analysis is required to ensure all anticipated military support functions are mapped into this structure.

Understanding the training implications of Army acceptance of disaster support missions is only the first step. It must be followed by a review of the cost and feasibility of providing support that should consider other domestic resources that can be brought to bear. Civil law enforcement agencies greatly outnumber military police and augmentation can often be accomplished by deploying civil

**Table 3.3**  
**Training Required for Potential Disaster**  
**Response Requirements**

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Category I—No training required
Medical
Transportation
Communications
Category II—En route training sufficient
Firefighting
Area search
Damage assessment
Category III—Formal training and exercises required
Urban search and rescue
Mass care
Emergency operations management

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forces from unaffected areas. Similarly, civilian fire and rescue personnel provide the bulk of the nation's capability for urban search and rescue and need only to be transported, with their equipment, to the site of the disaster. The American Red Cross is the lead agency under the Federal Response Plan for mass care and has an extensive network of organized personnel across the country. Only in cases where there is a comparative advantage to using military forces are the direct and indirect costs of training military forces likely to be justified.

The final element of the issue of Army training for disaster support operations is the determination of which of the Total Army forces are most appropriate for the specific missions. In some cases, the choice is clear because almost all of the capability exists in the National Guard and Army reserve components. Table 3.4 contains extracts from the DoD *Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board* for Fiscal Year 1991. More than three-quarters of the medical units are outside the active Army. National Guard units are part of state militias, and although they have some special capabilities, they cannot be used for disaster support outside their own state unless they have been federalized or there are formal agreements among states for mutual support in the event of a major disaster.

Examination of the allocation of activities among active, reserve, and National Guard forces makes it clear that the Army's capabilities for disaster support are spread throughout the Total Force. Some activities will of necessity be met by reserve component forces and others are best suited to active forces. Using the breakdown in Table 3.3, it appears that Category I activities would be served by a mixture of active and reserve component forces. Category II activities can probably best be performed by active ready deployment forces that are trained and ready for rapid response. Category III activities, requiring formal training

**Table 3.4**  
**Army National Guard and Army Reserve Contributions to the Total Army**

Unit Type	Army National Guard (Number Units)	Army Reserve (Number Units)	Combined Percentage of Total Army
Heavy helicopter units	5	0	100
Chemical brigades	1	3	100
Water supply battalions	2	3	100
Medical brigades	3	4	88
Medical groups	3	13	80
Hospitals	23	88	74
Motor battalions	13	14	71
Engineer battalions (combat)	42	16	64
Military police brigades	3	2	50
Medium helicopter battalions	2	22	50
Signal battalions	33	4	37

and exercising, are probably too hard to accommodate in the austere funding environment of the next few years except for the emergency management functions already being performed by liaison officers and emergency action officers throughout the civil-military emergency planning structure. If this conclusion about Category III activities is accepted after further review, it will be necessary to ensure that governors and federal civil planners know which activities cannot be supported. (The Federal Response Plan assumes DoD will provide support for all emergency functions.)

## Other Issues

Identifying civilian needs, Army capabilities, and potential training requirements for effective or expanded participation in civil disaster response is the most important issue addressed in this analysis. The perceptions of governors and civil emergency planners regarding the support they can expect from the Army do not necessarily match the ability of the Army's forces to meet those expectations. These and additional issues associated with an expanded Army role must be examined.<sup>3</sup> Are forces trained for civil emergency support going to be available when they are needed? Do current laws permit the Secretary of Defense, governors, and the CINCs to use military forces for civil emergency support? Who will pay for military support and is the cost that must be paid reasonable? Each of these topics could be the subject of a separate analysis. Some of the factors that must be considered follow.

## Availability

Two issues emerged regarding the availability of forces assigned to civil emergency support missions. First, rapid deployment of CONUS-based forces is becoming a more important part of our National Military Strategy. Relying on these forces for civil emergency support may mean that they may be outside the United States when a disaster occurs. Second, National Guard forces are often the best choice for disaster response, but if they live and work in the region where the disaster occurred, they may be unable to respond because they and their families were affected by the disaster.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> An example of this mismatch occurred during Hurricane Andrew. The *New York Times* reported on August 28, 1992, "A spokesman for the Governor said this evening that state [Florida] officials had been deeply disappointed on Monday when their request for an engineering battalion was denied, but they were pleased that the President had responded to their new request for military support." (p. A4)

<sup>4</sup> In the case of Hurricane Andrew, this was also true for local active-duty forces at Homestead Air Force Base. For Hurricane Iniki, a lucky last minute change in storm direction caused the military

The first issue—forces are not available because of deployment for military missions outside CONUS—is not likely to concern governors and the public. Future deployments will take place only with strong public support and a clear rationale for deployment. Non-availability is a consideration in determining which forces are committed to emergency response planning, but most of the disasters envisioned in the Federal Response Plan are unlikely to be linked to wars. As a result, rapid deployment forces may be a good choice for emergency support activities because these operations will increase force visibility with the public and reduce the view of them as global policemen or mercenaries.

The second issue—National Guard availability—could be a problem for the governor of the directly affected state, particularly as the scope of the disaster increases. This points out the need for agreements or compacts among states for mutual support.<sup>5</sup> National Guard units in other, less-affected states have similar levels of training and similar capabilities and may be the best choice for augmentation. This sharing of resources with the affected state responsible for costs can work only if the agreements and protocols are worked out in advance of the disaster. The Army could facilitate the development of the necessary mechanisms.

### *Legality*

Title 10 U.S. Code contains the principal legal authority for maintaining and employing military forces. It includes authority for calling the National Guard "to active duty other than during war or national emergency." It also covers the use of the military to suppress domestic violence. When federalized (called to active duty by the President), National Guard activities are restricted consistent with federal law. If National Guard forces are called to state active duty and not federalized, they are permitted to perform a wider variety of tasks. State active-duty limitations vary from state to state depending on each state's laws. The Los Angeles riots of 1992 involved first the calling of the California National Guard to state active duty, where they assisted local police forces in restoring and maintaining order. They were subsequently federalized and could no longer be

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facilities to be spared (they had been right in the path of the hurricane, as they were in Florida), which meant they were fully operational for disaster response. Coincidentally, a National Guard exercise was planned for the weekend the storm hit.

<sup>5</sup>Interstate compacts between states exist in several forms but they are not uniform. Examples are the National Guard Mutual Assistance Compact (Alaska, Kansas, Maryland, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Virginia), the Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia), and the Interstate Civil Defense Compact (District of Columbia, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Utah, and Vermont). Specific separate agreements for forest fire protection and environmental protection also exist in regional groupings.

used to maintain order but only to restore order. After a few days, they were returned to state active-duty status.<sup>6</sup>

Military liaison personnel representing the Army on Regional Military Emergency Coordinator (RMEC) teams and those serving Defense Coordinating Officers (DCO) at the scene of disasters need to understand the implications of legal constraints on the employment of military forces and the steps necessary to invoke their use. In almost all cases, local commanders have sufficient authority to employ active forces to respond immediately in providing life-saving support. Employment of reserve component forces may require requests by governors for disaster declarations and agreements between affected states and the federal government on the nature of support desired. Because of these complexities, it is necessary to train or otherwise prepare any Army personnel detailed to military support operations for operating within the legal framework.

### *Cost*

Even when legal requirements for employment of Army forces for civil disaster response have been settled, cost-sharing arrangements must be determined. Disaster funds, appropriated annually by Congress to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, are frequently augmented after major disasters. They can be used to reimburse DoD for some of the costs incurred in disaster support operations. In general, there is a 75/25 percent cost sharing between federal and state support of activities under the Federal Response Plan.<sup>7</sup> As a result, state governors may be reluctant to ask for some kinds of federal assistance if even 25 percent of the cost is deemed unaffordable or not cost-effective. If National Guard troops are called to state active duty, their salaries are paid entirely by the state and they can be employed as the governor wishes. However, if federalized, salaries and operating costs are paid through cost-sharing arrangements but, as previously noted, the kinds of activities that can be performed are limited.

Other federal department and agency budgets may well be expected to decline along with defense budgets. The result will be less flexibility in "absorbing" costs of activities that enhance the Army's image but are not directly related to combat missions or in finding money in non-DoD accounts for reimbursement. If the Army is to take a more active role in civil disaster support, either DoD or

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<sup>6</sup>Reported in interviews with LTC H. E. Mayhew, USAR, Military Support Division, National Guard Bureau.

<sup>7</sup>Cost-sharing requirements were eventually waived by the President during recovery from Hurricane Andrew. Nevertheless, many lesser disasters will provide opportunities for military support operations and state officials may be reluctant to ask for help because of the potential cost.

FEMA budgets will need to be specifically funded and the impact on affected states' budgets reduced. The rules regarding reimbursement of marginal costs (salary, fuel, entitlements) may also need to be examined to determine if they are consistent with the benefit to the Army of participating in civil disaster response.



## 4. Conclusions

The environment for defense planning is changing at home and abroad. The role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the supporting CINCs is increasingly consistent with the Goldwater-Nichols Act.<sup>1</sup> However, the reduced size of the "Base Force" compared with Cold War levels will probably lead to more adjustments to the remaining CINCs' Areas of Responsibility (AOR). Regardless of the eventual realignment, a CINC will be responsible for forces in the United States and the requirement to support civil authorities will remain.

As the perceived military threat, and thus DoD funding, is reduced, the need for prioritization will increase. The primary functions of the Army are: "To organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land—specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas." Additional functions include similar activities for air and missile defense; amphibious, airborne, and space operations; special operations; psychological operations; occupation of territories abroad; and developing doctrines and procedures for organizing, equipping, training, and employing forces operating on land.<sup>2</sup> Current regulations contain no requirement to maintain specific forces to support civil authorities in the event of major disasters. Any Army role in disaster response is clearly secondary to warfighting missions.

### Options for Expanding the Army's Role

There is a range of options for defining the Army's role in civil emergencies. As presented here, this range is not meant as a set of specific alternatives but rather as an illustration of possibilities for further refinement and more formal assessment. The options include:

1. Continue to support FEMA's leadership of disaster response planning. Billets in support of disaster planning will need to be protected as force levels are reduced.

<sup>1</sup>The Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986 among other things clarified military lines of authority from the Secretary of Defense through the CJCS to the operating CINCs.

<sup>2</sup>See Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, September 25, 1987.

2. Provide more direct support to states. The DOMS office would expand to include formal state liaison offices. The new offices would emphasize understanding the steps necessary to expand military support as state resources are progressively overwhelmed. DoD support through the Federal Coordinating Officer and the Federal Response Plan would continue, but the emphasis would be on direct state-military planning.
3. Designate civil disaster support as a fifth pillar of the National Military Strategy along with strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. Place the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the head of the military support organization. Transfer the DOMS office to the Joint Staff or a CINC with responsibility for operations in the United States. Prepare Army units, both active and reserve, to participate in disaster support operations.

Only the second and third options significantly expand the Army's role in disaster response. If the advantages of civilian leadership and continuity are deemed most important, the second option would require the greatest effort on the part of the Army. FEMA would be expected to resist actions perceived as reducing its role. This problem could be alleviated by emphasizing the "special relationship" between the Army National Guard and the states. FEMA regional planners are seen as outsiders, raising the specter of federal control, whereas guardsmen are members of the governor's team. The biggest real problem is that the DOMS organization, as an Army entity, is not consistent with Goldwater-Nichols reforms that emphasize the role of the Chairman and the CINCs. Air Force and Navy units are now tasked under the DOMS umbrella, but the command relationships are unusual. (The Air Force and Navy DOMS deputies are not located with the DOMS director because the office is part of the Army Staff and non-Army officers cannot be assigned there for duty.)

The third option shown above is a comprehensive approach to meeting perceived requirements on military forces. However, all the pieces are not necessary. The essential part is acknowledging that military support is a valid function that is planned and operated by the Chairman with support from the CINCs. This change cannot be implemented by the Army, but the Army can serve as the catalyst to raise the issue and to provide assessments of the effects of changes. The Army will continue to provide trained forces to support joint disaster operations. The Army will also support CINCUSACOM in determining the requirements of a command center to operate in place of the Army operations center in day-to-day monitoring and tasking of military support operations.

## Prospects for an Expanded Role

Organizational and fiscal changes currently under way will affect any decisions to redefine the Army's role in civil emergencies.

### *Organizational Changes*

Current changes are streamlining the Army's role in civil disasters and should clarify the Army's place in the federal structure. The new DoD Directive 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*, has consolidated functions over the past two years. Prior to the Los Angeles riots, the thrust of changes was to consolidate civil emergency response under the Secretary of the Army as Executive Agent. This was motivated in part because the DOMS functions have been under the Secretary of the Army for many years, although his role as having operational control of these forces was not widely recognized. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is perceived to be responsible for all military operations, and the press and public turn to him when military forces are employed in the United States. Units participating in military support remain under the command of the appropriate CINC (CINCUSACOM for CONUS, and CINCPAC for specified non-CONUS areas), but planning and assignments are made through the Secretary of the Army's authority as DoD Executive Agent. Both existing and new draft directives would maintain that authority. Since the 1992 riots, these directives are receiving a more detailed review.

Nevertheless, there are some good reasons for the Secretary of the Army to maintain direction of military support planning, including the clear civilian leadership of these activities to augment civil capabilities. There is less of a perception of the military arriving to "take charge." Funding military support operations (through reimbursements and interdepartmental transfers) is quite distinct from normal DoD budgeting activities. The Army already has Public Works projects funded outside the DoD budget. Additionally, the DOMS office could easily be expanded. The Joint Staff has a mandatory cap, and adding a DOMS office could be constrained by law or regulation.

There are also reasons why the Chairman would be a better choice than the Secretary of the Army to direct military support. The Chairman serves as the single spokesman for military operations and would be in the best position to explain total military capabilities. Air Force and Navy deputies can be assigned to support the Secretary of the Army DOMS, but joint direction is more consistent with the overall military approach. Field commanders clearly understand their role in support of the Chairman, while their responsibility to

support DOMS and the Secretary of the Army may need explanation. Moreover, since the Chairman appears to be ultimately accountable, it may be best to place responsibility there.

This analysis will not prejudge the outcome of discussions of who will ultimately be in charge of military support planning and operations. However, the Army leadership should understand the implications for the Army of each possible outcome. Even if DOMS leadership and planning shift to the Chairman and the Joint Staff, the Army will still be required to provide trained and equipped forces. We believe that CJCS leadership will best serve the nation because it is more efficient and likely to be more effective. Leadership by the Chairman and the CINCs should be accepted by the public and the other services participating in disaster response. The role of CINCUSACOM will need to be developed, and the transfer of DOMS functions will certainly generate some problems not anticipated in this analysis. Additional study will elicit the implications of proposed alternatives.

### ***Fiscal Trends***

Declining forces and declining budgets will make it difficult to maintain even the limited capabilities now provided in support of civil emergency response. Enhanced capabilities or greater involvement may be desirable because they help to build public acceptance of a peacetime Army and they provide a service in time of domestic crisis. However, their costs must be acknowledged and integrated into the planning and budgeting process. Guidance from Title 10 is clear: no units or equipment are to be specifically for nonmilitary missions. Nevertheless, civil disaster response can and should be an acknowledged mission of most Army units, with training and doctrine established and promulgated. In addition, planning is widely perceived as a strength of military officers, and since effective disaster response requires integration and planning among many civil agencies, the greatest contribution may be a low-cost option—get heavily involved in disaster response planning. Planning will ensure that expected contributions of military units match their capabilities. Actual demands may be acceptable and innovative solutions, within existing capabilities, may unfold in the course of planning.

### **Recommendations**

As we have noted, this work is intended to identify key issues likely to affect a decision to expand the Army's role in civil emergencies. Further analysis is

required to formulate and assess specific options for such an expansion. Nonetheless, the Army can support several interim steps. These steps will accomplish two goals: (1) They will clarify the policy environment surrounding Army involvement in civil emergencies and (2) they will improve federal disaster response efforts regardless of the Army's ultimate level of participation.

***Recommendation 1: Support Thorough Review of Current Organizational Responsibilities for Federal Disaster Response***

The current organization of federal disaster response is confusing and awkward. The Army should support a programmatic review of these arrangements with an eye toward streamlining and rationalizing them. This review will affect, and be informed by, the Army's own review of its combat and noncombat responsibilities, including disaster relief.

***Recommendation 2: Transfer Secretary of the Army Executive Agency for Military Support to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff***

Consistent with an emerging vision of a general military servant, the Army should support the transfer of the Secretary of the Army role as the DoD Executive Agent for military support to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This can be accomplished through the ongoing review of the new DoD Directive 3025.1 and subsequent reviews of related directives. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs speaks for the military and is its accepted leader. Maintaining the Secretary of the Army as a director of military operations while responsible for planning military operations in a selected subset of circumstances is counterproductive. In time of disaster the military needs normal chains of command and responsibility as far as possible.

***Recommendation 3: Specify Civil Disaster Response Mission***

Consistent with an emerging vision of a general military servant, the Army should support formal acceptance of civil disaster response as a mission for both active and reserve component forces. Further study can determine whether it is sufficient for the Chief of Staff to incorporate these requirements in internal doctrinal publications such as FM 100-1, *The Army*, or whether DoD Directives need also be changed. In any event, guidance must be provided to operational commanders through the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) so that the Army can meet its responsibilities to prepare forces. Obviously, combat

readiness is foremost, but commanders cannot be expected to devote any time to readiness for civil disaster response operations if their individual success is measured only against warfighting standards.

To be more effective, the Army needs to clearly communicate that it is ready to help within its capabilities. This requires that it (1) show a readiness to attend planning meetings without trying to take charge, (2) adequately train and prepare an officer before meeting with local experts rather than selecting someone randomly, (3) ensure that senior officers appreciate the necessity for Army participation in emergency response planning even though it is not directly linked to a specific combat mission, and (4) ensure that the officers interacting with state and local governments understand the capabilities and limitations of military forces of all services that could be involved in local support operations.

Implementing this recommendation will require further study of costs and benefits, culminating in a decision on the most appropriate Army role. As indicated earlier, this role may be the low-cost option of a heavy commitment to disaster response planning at all levels with little increase in actual response capabilities.

#### ***Recommendation 4: Review Legal Constraints on Military Participation in Civil Disaster Response***

The complex tangle of state laws governing the use of National Guard forces on state active duty, permitted missions when the Guard is federalized after a governor requests a disaster declaration, and limitations on the use of active forces in the United States needs to be reviewed by both lawyers and military operations planners. The focus of this review should be the needs of a military commander working at the disaster scene with the state governor to identify resources and task military forces to supplement state disaster response activities. It is likely that a comprehensive approach to redefining permissible activities will be necessary if the Army is to be ready when the next major disaster occurs. Dealing with constraints in a piecemeal fashion will only delay improvements in readiness and undermine the serious coordinated effort that is needed.

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