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AMERICA'S NEW CENTURIONS

by

Charles R. Lucy

Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Col Bryant Shaw

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

8 April 1994

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ABSTRACT

TITLE: THE AMERICAN CENTURIONS

AUTHOR: Charles R. Lucy, Colonel, USAF

In light of the dramatically altered national security landscape following the end of the Cold War, the United States must reorient its use of the military instrument of power toward nontraditional roles and missions such as democratization programs and nationbuilding. There are many useful historic precedents for this new role, especially America's post-World War II occupation of Japan. America's military should play a major role in democratization efforts based upon a sliding scale of employment that weighs such factors as the security situation in the host government, in order to determine the most efficient use of the various instruments of national power. Where the situation favors overall DOD operational control, it should be assigned lead agency responsibilities using a model similar to the Military Support Group program employed in Panama following Operation Just Cause. Command relationships should be established by Presidential directive, and a "Democracy Czar" created at the National Security Council level to ensure interagency coordination and cooperation. The proper employment of military resources under the suggested model retains civilian oversight and anticipates a transition phase to civilian operational control in the field. This plan would maximize US economy of effort for its national grand strategy of support for market based democracies without any fundamental danger to the balance of civil-military relations.

BIOGRAPHY

COLONEL CHARLES R. LUCY

Col Lucy is currently attending the Air War College resident program at the Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Col Lucy was born on 22 June 1949 in Brooklyn, New York, but grew up in Baldwinsville, New York, near Syracuse. Upon graduation from high school in 1967, he attended the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado. He graduated with the class of 1971 as a Distinguished Graduate with a Bachelor of Science Degree and Major in Political Science/International Affairs. He then attended the New York University School of Law on a Root-Tilden Scholarship, and received his Juris Doctor Degree in 1974. While studying at NYU, Col Lucy received the AmJur Award for Conflict of Laws, and was invited to write for the Annual Survey of American Law.

Upon graduation from law school, Col Lucy reported to his initial duty assignment at Dover AFB, Delaware, where he served first as an Assistant Staff Judge Advocate and then as Area Defense Counsel. In June of 1977, Col Lucy was reassigned overseas to Spangdahlem AB, Germany, where he became the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate and Chief of Military Justice. Col Lucy's next assignment was to the Office of The Judge Advocate General, HQ USAF, Washington, DC, where he served in three successive positions as Deputy Chief, Personnel Claims Branch, Claims and Tort Litigation Division; Chief, Government Recovery Branch, Claims and Tort Litigation Division; and Staff Attorney, Military Justice Division, from 1980 to 1984. In July 1984, Col Lucy began his next assignment as the Staff Judge Advocate, Whiteman AFB, Missouri, where he served until 1987. He was transferred to Homestead AFB, Florida, in July 1987, where he served as the Staff Judge Advocate until July 1989. He was next assigned to Rhein-Main AB, Germany, as the Chief Circuit Defense Counsel, HQ USAF Judiciary Sixth Circuit, responsible for all USAF criminal defense services in USAFE. Upon his return to CONUS in July 1991, Col Lucy became the Deputy Commandant, Air Force Judge Advocate General School, Maxwell AFB, AL. Col Lucy assumed his current duties on 2 August 1993. His DOR is 1 July 1992.

Col Lucy is admitted to practice before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York and the Court of Military Appeals. He was designated as a judge advocate and certified as a trial and defense counsel in 1975.

Col Lucy's decorations include the Air Force Meritorious Service Medal with five Oak Leaf Clusters; the National Defense Service Medal with One Device; the Air Force Overseas Long Tour Ribbon with one Oak Leaf Cluster; the Air Force Longevity Service Award with five Oak Leaf Clusters; the Small Arms Marksmanship Ribbon; and the Air Force Training Ribbon.

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I.

INTRODUCTION

> "[America] goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own."
>
> John Quincy Adams 1821

In the 173 years since President Adams cautioned against an activist, pro-democracy foreign policy, fundamental changes have taken place with respect to America's role in international relations. America's emergence as one of two major superpowers at the end of World War II, and its Cold War triumph over the Soviet Union, have brought it to the brink of a potentially more challenging international role. As President George Bush stated shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, "The decades-old division of Europe is ending - and the era of democracy - democracy-building - has begun." (14:677) That theme was echoed more recently by President Clinton during a major foreign policy speech before the United Nations where he emphasized that America's "overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world's community of market-based democracies." (22:650)

Indeed, there has been a veritable explosion of democratic states in the recent past: 30 nations since 1974 (42:5)! One international democracy index published by Freedom House estimates that 65% of the world's population now lives in free or partly free countries (54:22). Morton Halperin, President Clinton's unsuccessful nominee for the now defunct position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping (OASD(D&P)), estimates that 110 governments worldwide now permit free elections

(37:107). Unfortunately, the democratization process is not a one-way street (72:73), and the tide of democratization appears to have ebbed in recent months as the percentage of persons living in undemocratic nations has climbed (11:11A). While it is dangerous to make too much of democracy statistics, it appears that every historical period in which democratization has occurred has been followed by a "reverse wave" of anti-democratic activity, which succeeded in negating some but not all democratic gains (42:15). This historical pattern is of great significance to U.S. security policy, since some of the nations which are struggling to make the transition to democracy, such as those in the former Soviet Union, are of pivotal importance to the future stability of the world (12:48).

Given these challenges, America is at a policy crossroads, and must decide whether to remain engaged in the world or heed President Adams' admonition. Such decisions are rarely "either/or", and if recent administration calls for continued engagement in the world remain as a foreign policy focal point (56:658), then several related issues present themselves. One such issue is the degree of engagement necessary to protect American security interests, and whether the nation has the resources to sustain it. Another issue is the type or form of engagement best suited to advance those interests. If democratization is the ideal or desired form of engagement, and administration pronouncements on the subject indicate that it is (17:394;56:659), then the selection of the appropriate instrument(s) of national power to achieve it is of the utmost importance. Regardless of the means selected, a national strategy which links resources and means to achieve clearly articulated objectives will have to be devised (15:29), including a clear cut

set of rationally based priorities to guide employment.

One instrument of national power which merits careful consideration in this ongoing democratization debate must be the military. This option is frequently overlooked or deemed irrelevant, since after all, what could be more threatening to democratic ideals than the coercive arm of state policy? Having won the Cold War, many feel that the only contribution the military can now make is in the form of a peace dividend to finance more pressing domestic and international priorities. However, if the most likely military challenges of the future will be at the low intensity end of the conflict spectrum (89:224), in a potentially fragmented world (31:21), divided along cultural fault lines (40:22), then the role of the military instrument of power will be key to maintaining and even extending democracy's recent gains. This will be the case because in an unstable world, the ability to guarantee security while promoting a benign role for the military estate must be the starting point of democratic reform. The U.S. armed forces are in the best position to demonstrate their unique role to the rest of the world, while providing U.S. policy makers with an infinite variety of options to promote further democratization and reform. This paper will address the military's proper role as the "new centurions" of American national security policy into the 21st century.

II.

PAST AS PROLOGUE

Throughout the centuries, the military instrument of power has been used not only to conquer and hold territory, but to spread cultural influence as well (47:22). Alexander recognized the importance of cultural assimilation in the success of empire. The Romans built roads, aquaducts and public buildings, which served

as a cultural pipeline. The Moors advanced art and science to new heights, while presiding over their conquests. In more modern times, the colonial powers of France, Britain and Spain imposed not only an economic system of national power, but also a system of law, education and order that has prompted some to talk wistfully of its return through a U.N. sponsored system of trusteeships (47:44). Admittedly, some conquerors were more enlightened than others, but the central point remains that in each case the power of the hoplite, centurian, saracen and conquistador transformed civilizations through force of example and cultural transfer.

The American military has had its own history of cultural activism that rivals that of its historical predecessors. Thus, for example, U.S. Army soldiers built infrastructure, fought disease, illiteracy and hunger, ran elections and encouraged democracy in Cuba, Haiti and Nicaragua (39:39). Following the defeat of the Spanish navy at Manilla, they created and ran a colonial government in the Philippines which had as its goal the establishment of a democratic government for the islands (72:114; 58:9). In the aftermath of World War II, the United States successfully exported democracy through military occupation to Japan, Germany, Austria, Italy and South Korea, helping to write democratic constitutions and implement corresponding reforms (72:91-115). More recently, that precedent was extended to Grenada following Urgent Fury and Panama following Just Cause (72:116-117). Significantly, the central purpose behind many of these operations was the restoration of stability through the creation of democratic systems of government, and not the extension of American empire.

Of all of the preceding examples, perhaps none is more

instructive than the transformation of Japan from an imperial dynasty to the economic and democratic powerhouse of Asia. As the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur presided over a multi-faceted program that was conceived and meticulously planned by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SNWCC), the forerunner of today's National Security Council (23:33;32:30). Despite this centralized, coordinated planning approach, however, SCAP was given enormous latitude for decentralized execution of a program that encompassed all facets of Japanese life. The decision to maintain the emperor as a figurehead, rather than to try him as a war criminal was very much MacArthur's (48:58-59), and side-stepped a potential minefield for American policy. An extensive program of land reform, women's suffrage and political decentralization were also his initiatives (32:29). However, it was the new constitution that was the linchpin of democratic reform in Japan, and although SNWCC provided broad guidance (93:667), the final document was heavily influenced by SCAP and his military staff in Japan (93:675). Its subsequent longevity was based upon several factors, including previous democratic experience, pluralism, and an educated and politically aware population (72:101-108). It was also due to the political insight of the American centurions who inspired it.

While the preceding examples might be easily discounted as the involuntary byproduct of American arms, the reality is that democratic institutions survived (72:118), even in cultures very alien to our own. In fact, in the case of the Philippines and South Korea, democratic institutions created by the United States were sufficiently resilient to be reborn after suffering a relapse under more repressive forms of government (72:115). Clearly, military occupations teach important lessons for any future

democratization efforts (72:118). These include the need to promote democratically minded leadership within the host nation, the importance of stabilizing new democracies with economic aid, the need to encourage constitutional reform, pluralism and education, and the desirability of continued relations with the United States (72:118). An equally important historic lesson for the new centurions and their civilian commanders, however, is the precedent of successful military leadership of democratic reform programs. How that precedent may be applied to the ongoing process of worldwide democratic reform and America's evolving policy of support for emergent market democracies is of vital importance to national security strategy and the proper role for America's new centurions within that strategy.

III.

THE DEMOCRATIC IMPERATIVE

Despite the ascendance of democratic governments described above, debate rages as to what should be done about it, or more accurately, what the United States should do about it. There are those who would agree with John Quincy Adams that America has done too much and needs to disengage: "...the promotion of democracy is a worthwhile but not essential objective, and America's role should be confined to the power of example." (15:37) Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger put the point more bluntly, observing that democratization is a "tenuous guide to policy." (83:21) Such observations urge caution in the chaotic world of post-Cold War disorder. They also reflect a healthy skepticism that democratization is nothing more than a thinly disguised attempt to return to the discredited human rights agenda of prior administrations.

Be that as it may, democratization has other problems as well.

Taken to its logical extreme, democracy as the ultimate expression of individual freedom can result in tribalism and fragmentation, destroying the very institutions and principles it attempts to foster (31:21,31). This is especially true where minority rights are not protected (6:29), resulting in civil disorder and war. Clearly, democracy does not always produce prosperity or stability (6:28,29; 8:A16). In addition, a democratic form of government does not automatically equate with democratic substance (15:36,37). Reflecting on the voided election in Algeria, one writer commented, "...free elections do not necessarily produce open governments or human rights." (6:28) In a thought provoking article entitled "The Clash of Civilizations?" Samuel Huntington was equally negative, noting that western ideas have little resonance in other cultures and that any attempt by the West to promote democracy will meet resistance from other civilizations (40:29,40). While his thesis has attracted considerable debate (4:2-9;9:15-18;10:19-21;52:22-24 62:10-14) it still raises troubling questions about the inevitable power of ideas and ideals, especially democracy.

Even the exuberant claims of the pro-democratization advocates about a third wave of democracy (42:1) must be tempered somewhat by the observation that the new crop of democracies has shallow roots (28:26). Many new democracies have only rudimentary democratic systems in place, their militaries remain a threat to elected officials, legislatures lack strength and adequate financing, legal systems lack authority, and political parties are disorganized (28:26). Most significant is the absence of pluralistic structures committed to democratic norms (28:26). These factors argue for a flexible approach to democratization, rather than a "one size fits all" policy. Such an approach must

consider all policy options with particular emphasis on those that can quickly respond, since time may well be of the essence in many of these newly formed and fragile democratic states.

Despite these perils, or perhaps because of them, President Clinton is committed to the support of democratization efforts around the world (33:4;36:1). In this regard, his views are consistent with those of the preceding Bush administration, which identified the successful transition of the emerging democracies of Eastern and Central Europe, as well as the former Soviet Union as, "...vital to world stability." (73:1) Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell echoed the same theme: "The reversal of democratic reforms in the world could be detrimental to US security. Therefore, we must continue our efforts to promote democracy and strengthen our bilateral and multilateral ties abroad." (49:2)

President Clinton's draft National Security Strategy of the United States, which is pending publication, will presumably expand on the consistent foreign policy theme of his administration, as enunciated in four key foreign policy speeches last Fall (63:3), which call for the expansion of market-based democracies abroad (5:665-668;16:654-657;22:649-653;56:658-664). According to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, that policy will continue to have a strong economic component (18:718;19:797). As interpreted by Mr. Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, this strategy will include the concept of "enlargement," comprised of the following four elements: (1) strengthening the community of existing major market democracies as the cornerstone of reform worldwide; (2) fostering and consolidating new democracies, especially those of strategic significance; (3) opposing countries hostile to democratic

reforms; and (4) pursuing humanitarian concerns through the active support of democratic reform in areas of greatest need (56:660; 55:45-55). He adds several caveats to this foreign policy strategy, however, including the need for patience in the face of reversal, a pragmatic orientation toward non-democratic states, a comprehensive view of the elements of democracy and a respect for the many faces of democratic reform (56:660). He also interjects a healthy dose of realpolitik regarding the appropriate interpretation of American interest: "The simple question in each instance is this: What works best?" (56:663) Such a candid approach to foreign policy cannot help but undermine the more structured philosophy embodied in the concept of enlargement, and creates the impression that not all facets of this brave new policy world have been or can be precisely defined. Such uncertainty would indicate the need to preserve all foreign policy options, including the military instrument of power.

Interestingly, Ms. Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Representative to the U.N., added a military component to the quartet of policy pronouncements emanating from the Clinton administration. She underscored the fact that while diplomacy was America's "first choice" there would always be times "when words are not enough, when sanctions are not enough, when diplomacy is not enough," and when America must have both the capacity and the will to respond unilaterally with military force when necessary (5:666). Although her remarks clearly contemplated the employment of military force at the more violent end of the conflict spectrum, they would not preclude a more measured response. The draft National Security Strategy of the United States may include reference to a more flexible range of military options short of force employment for the foreign policy planner (85:iii). Such nonviolent options

could well result in dramatic changes in the traditional roles and missions of the US armed forces (85:iii;68:14).

Given this potential for radically different military involvement, it is important to understand the philosophical basis for America's evolving foreign policy of democratization, which is firmly rooted in national security concerns. Obviously, the importance of America's engagement in the world - the ability to maintain one's seat at the table of world affairs - is one. Another widely accepted byproduct of democratic systems is that they are relatively peaceful in nature and less prone to attack one another (42:29; 37:105; 40:39; 72:8; 82:305). As President Clinton himself has said, "Democracy is rooted in compromise, not conquest." (22:650) In addition, there is a close correlation between democracy and individual freedom, democracies are less prone to civil violence against their own populations, and democracies are more likely to support nonproliferation goals, free trade and environmental conservation (37:105; 42:28-30; 28:29-30;22:650). Furthermore, while democracy may not lead to economic growth, that growth can result in democracy, which in turn will foster the climate for continued economic well-being (78:84,88). Finally, in an era of fiscally constrained foreign policy alternatives, there is a very pragmatic reason for a program of democratization: "Democracy promotion is one of the cheapest, most cost effective ways of advancing the national interest." (28:46) This latter point has not been lost on congressional and military leaders who could not afford to pay the tab for Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and will be unable to defray the expense of even smaller operations in the future (24:5).

Considering the risks and benefits of democratization outlined

above, America should focus her efforts on those countries that want to establish/preserve democracy and request support (37:106), establishing a priority which realistically reflects national interests. This priority was emphasized by Ms. Sue Ford Patrick when she was the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Human Rights. In a recent speech, she established three criteria as a focal point for DoD democratization efforts: "a) those countries that have taken concrete steps in transition to democracy such as selection by civilian leaders in competitive elections, and seek US help; b) countries where the US has a strategic interest; c) countries judged by the US Country Team to be amenable to US influence." (76:8) Clearly, not all situations will require the same types of response, which means that a multi-disciplined approach of "proactive engagement" will be necessary (72:82; 81:49).

In addition, the criteria suggested by Ms. Patrick do not elaborate on the types of considerations that will enter into her calculus. For example, what other indicia of a democratic state will constitute "concrete steps"? In this regard, the recent cancellation of elections in Algeria in the face of certain victory by the Islamic party poses special problems for policy makers. Further, what US strategic interests will trigger support for democratic reform? For example, what were those interests in Somalia? Also, how will the US Country Team decide if a particular country is "amenable" to US influence or democracy reforms? China is a case in point. Finally, where will the US focus its democratization efforts first among each of these competing categories? Should that focus hinge on the probability of success of US efforts? Perhaps the cost of the operation or the length of potential US commitment should guide

decision-makers. While some elements of Ms. Patrick's proposal require more elaboration, they at least represent an attempt to address the democratic imperative by setting criteria with which to evaluate competing requirements. Clearly, they will demand a new sophistication in execution, particularly with respect to the use of the military instrument of national power and the role of the new centurions.

IV.

THE MILITARY ROLE

While the forte of America's military must remain the projection of combat power, the new sophistication in roles and missions alluded to above will place new demands on the armed forces in the interests of democratization. Such missions as nationbuilding or peacekeeping spring readily to mind. Samuel Huntington calls them nontraditional, or nonmilitary roles, distinguishing them from core combat functions (39:39), and forsees a "fifth phase" of American defense policy in which these roles will become more prevalent (39:38). There are those who worry, however, that a nontraditional orientation will overextend American resources (87:166), divert attention from other defense priorities (39:43) and domestic concerns (87:178), detract from readiness, suboptimize training, and pose a clear and present danger to the very nations we were trying to save (35:A28). Morris Janowitz, in particular, has noted a reluctance on the part of military professionals to get involved in nontraditional roles, even when they are secondary to their primary mission (46:xlix). Others believe that the deterrence of conflict with nontraditional military power provides a positive and proactive role (81:49; 79:96), that military forces performing nontraditional roles can demonstrate commitment through forward presence, that the military

has a "broad portfolio" of capabilities (79:96) and is capable of rapid response in a crisis, that our soldiers are exactly the ones who should be teaching military subordination to civil authority to the armed forces of new democracies (1:81), and that armed forces may be the only option when local security is in doubt. This latter point is especially important since without a secure base upon which to build democratic principles, all other concerns become secondary to state survival. To paraphrase Joseph Stalin, "How many divisions does the World Bank have?"

Some democratization proponents are even strong supporters of direct action and tend to overlook traditional principles of noninterference in the domestic affairs of nations when the enforcement of a larger principle, i.e., minority rights, is at stake (37:108). In this regard, Morton Halperin has expressed the opinion that, "An international guarantee clause [for democracy] will be credible only if key countries, including the United States, commit to using force if necessary to restore or establish constitutional democracy." (37:121) These comments were made prior to America's withdrawal from Somalia, and such an interventionist approach to international affairs seems less likely now given the Clinton administration's more selective foreign policy posture in recent months. In addition, Mr. Halperin seems to overlook the fact that once the US is committed to UN or multilateral "peacekeeping" efforts, it will be placed in a position of political neutrality where proselytizing on behalf of democracy will be dependent upon multilateral consensus. While there may well be situations which will call for the unilateral employment of combat power in support of democratization, such instances will likely be the exception rather than the rule. This will call for a different emphasis in the use of US armed forces

in their new role.

In light of the above, DOD has already begun to position itself for more low intensity, nontraditional involvement. Thus, in March of 1993, all US PSYOP and Civil Affairs (CA) units were placed under the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) (51:1-7). This was a significant addition, since Civil Affairs units operate at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations (80:138). Strategic functions include nationbuilding activities upon request of the National Command Authority (80:138), and extend to every facet of civil administration and government (51:A-42,A-43). Although Civil Affairs units suffer from several deficiencies, including a 96% reserve force structure (80:139,202), they have been used in numerous operations, from Grenada (20:1; 72:117) to Panama (84:70; 72:117) to Operations Desert Shield/Storm (80:624), and are viewed as real "force multipliers" by theatre commanders (81:48). CA are also integrated into Foreign Internal Defense (FID) Operations (2:14), which involve a wide variety of military assistance options available to local governments that are unstable or could become unstable in the future (2:3).

FID has sparked some criticism from those who see an inherent conflict between CA and FID, claiming that FID's identification with counterinsurgency overshadows the humanitarian dimensions of CA (34:37). This criticism has led to calls for a complete separation between the two missions, and the inauguration of a new unified military command to be called the "US Development Corps" (34:40). Unfortunately, this view ignores the lessons of history, especially in Vietnam, where the Marine's Combined Action Platoon program proved especially effective in promoting stability (30:36). It also overlooks the fact that the two missions would

still be linked in the field, as well as the obvious objection by other federal agencies that the program duplicated their efforts. A final problem with this concept is that it would split the military into a professional (traditional) sector and civilianized (nontraditional) sector which would result in the creation of two military institutions with opposing missions, philosophies and constituencies (57:70).

One purpose behind the inclusion of CA units in SOCOM was underscored recently in a National Defense Research study (61). That study examined CA's proper role and concluded that it was a "critical ... instrument of national policy..." (61:1). By pulling Civil Affairs into SOCOM, this specialized mission has gained increased visibility and an advocate for an expanded role in military operations. In this regard, every regional CINC has a SOF component (60:B-5), and its CA capabilities could be an important focal point for regional DoD democratization efforts.

Congress has also shown great interest in the area of military democratization and nationbuilding, legislating several programs which involve the military directly in foreign affairs. The largest is the Security Assistance (SA) Program, administered by the Department of State (DOS) in six major components, three of which are run by DOD: International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing, and Foreign Military Sales (86:37; 3:A-13; 27:1-8). At present, this program consumes approximately 38% of the annual foreign aid budget (59:A8) and has drawn considerable attention during recent budget discussions (38:14). Congress has also approved humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations, 10 United States Code (USC) 401, Latin American training funds, 10 USC 1051, funding for military to military contacts with the

former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 22 USC 590, and CINC initiative funds, 10 USC 166a. Taken together, these programs provide a powerful tool for military involvement in democracy initiatives and nationbuilding activity supporting them in locations around the world.

Regional CINCs can be especially effective in promoting democracy within their commands. One such program, the Joint Contact Program, highlights military to military and defense to defense contact with countries showing promise of democratic reform, and was pioneered by USEUCOM with 10 (now 11) former Warsaw Pact countries (76:6;77). The USEUCOM effort involves the creation of Military Liaison Teams in each host nation which work closely with the US Country Team while reporting directly to the CINC (29). Traveling Contact Teams provide specific subject matter expertise upon request (29). In addition, Familiarization Tours and Annual Conferences bring selected officers and civilians to Europe and the US to increase understanding and cooperation (13:1-5;29). A related initiative involves Guard and Reserve personnel with "Partnership States" in Eastern and Central Europe (77;29). A final development of great significance is the creation of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies as a focal point for ongoing democratization training programs in the region. While the USEUCOM effort has concentrated primarily on operational military programs, there have been some significant efforts in other areas, with active duty and reserve personnel helping to draft model military penal codes and define the proper scope of civil military controls (29). Unfortunately, manpower shortages, fiscal constraints and a lack of coordination with other federal agencies are unresolved issues (77). In addition, Eastern Europe and the CIS are obviously getting the

bulk of the attention under this program, detracting from emphasis elsewhere. While this can be attributed to national priorities, the amounts of money involved are not so great that other priorities should suffer.

As previously mentioned, IMET is another arena in which military forces play a vital role in the democratization process. The importance of IMET was underscored recently when Congress created the expanded IMET program to specifically target military education and training programs toward civilians, focused on resource management, civil-military relations and military justice programs under human rights principles (86:41). This program, which is clearly directed toward democratization efforts, is run by DOD. Funding for these initiatives is considered a congressional priority (25:28). Although there are some who believe that US training does not turn foreign soldiers into democrats (90:32; 43:16), that criticism overlooks the large number of IMET graduates (25:27) and the longterm nature of the democratization process. As one author commented in the aftermath of Just Cause: "If the US is to be involved in such postconflict transitions [from dictatorship to democracy], it will require DOD advisory teams and programs whose concepts of operations include assisting in the institutionalization of the civil-military ethos of democracy in host countries' military organizations." (84:72). This is the clear intent of the Expanded IMET initiative. Unfortunately, DOD efforts are plagued by a shortage of personnel and a backlog of training requirements that is exacerbated by an inability to use IMET funds to create training positions. In other words, manpower is "out of hide." The services have responded to this situation in at least one instance by signing a Memorandum of Understanding to ensure a coordinated approach to

legal education and training in Expanded IMET and related statutory programs (66). Such joint cooperative agreements will become a necessity in the absence of a greater commitment of resources.

While an expanded military role in the promotion of civil-military relations may seem unusual, there are in fact many reasons why such an approach makes sense. Chief among these is the fact that there is at least some commonality of experience between the soldiers of different nations that translates into trust. Credibility does in fact make a difference. Secondly, the positive example of American military members demonstrating their own subordination to civilian control is incredibly powerful, especially in societies that have never experienced it before. Finally, the possibility of military intervention in civilian government can be particularly acute in emerging democracies. However, as Samuel Huntington points out: "Between 1974 and 1990, ..., except for the ambiguous cases of Nigeria and Sudan, no democratizing government was overthrown by a military coup d'etat." (42:233-34) This does not mean that coups were not attempted, but that when they were, the coup leaders were unable to attract support from the middle class and other groups that sponsored democratization (42:235). This latter factor is also one among many that may cause a military regime in power to withdraw from power (67:248)

Although Huntington's assessment is certainly optimistic, the fact remains that weak civilian political institutions encourage an assertive military role, especially in new nations (45:4). This is exacerbated by a lack of "... mutual trust between politicians and the military profession." (45:104) Huntington is not blind to these dangers, and has developed five rules for the

normalization of civil-military relations which are particularly relevant to US military democratization efforts: reinforcing military professionalism with nonpolitical ideals, reorienting the military mission from internal to external security, promoting loyalty to democratic reform and the appointment of civilians, downsizing military equipment and manpower, and maintaining a high degree of sensitivity to the status of the military, especially as it begins to decline (42:243). Every one of these guidelines involve military roles and missions which the US armed forces are uniquely qualified to provide under existing federal law. They should become the key objectives of any future US military democratization initiatives.

Implicit in this statement of key US military democratization objectives is the assumption that DOD's role will be greatest where local military control over the "host" government is strongest or where the threat to state security is acute. A closely analogous, although more sensitive role would involve DOD forces as an occupying power following an operation like Just Cause. Under such circumstances, DOD is in the best position to interact with its counterparts to bring about an improved climate of civil-military relations while ensuring a stable environment in which they can grow. Interagency offices will have an immediate role to play in all cases, but that involvement will expand or contract depending upon the situation on the ground (84:34). Such a relationship suggests a sliding scale of DOD involvement in democratization programs which would optimize the efficient use of national instruments of power by giving DOD greatest operational (as opposed to strategic) control in cases of least stability. This is the role for which they have been trained, and where they could be most effective.

The Military Support Group used in Panama following Operation Just Cause provides a model of how the military can step in and function as a Country Team when required (84:40). In that case, all civil order and public services had broken down in country, and US Embassy personnel were unable to effectively direct restoration activities (84:28-29,34). USSOCOM proposed the creation of a Military Support Group to restore order and function as a liaison with the properly elected President of Panama and other government leaders to restore normal government function (84:34). The team actually developed a long range plan of operations through 1999 under the general direction of the Ambassador, including the assignment of responsibilities to other government agencies (84:40-41). Such a flexible model of DOD involvement in democracy programs provides a workable solution to the types of future contingencies which are likely to occur in any national strategy of democratization. It is also significant to note that Military Support Group planners gave priority to interagency unity of effort in their plan (84:40). This is a subject which the new centurions and their civilian leadership can ill afford to ignore, especially since it has proven to be the biggest stumbling block to an effective overall democratization strategy.

V.

THE INTERAGENCY DIMENSION

From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the US armed forces can and do have a role to play in the democratization process. However, that role is dependent upon the complementary and in some cases conflicting roles which are played by other federal agencies, particularly DOS. How those roles are reconciled will influence the success of the entire US

democratization effort.

Any evaluation of the interagency process and democratization programs must start with DOS since it is, "...the customary operational arm of the U.S. government in the conduct of foreign affairs." (50:95) This includes representing the interests of the United States abroad and acting as the principle presidential advisor on foreign affairs, to include national security policy. (50:95) Unfortunately, it has not always fulfilled these responsibilities adequately, leading various presidents of both parties to voice numerous complaints about the poor quality of analysis, an inability to promptly respond to problems, lack of innovation, inability to properly carry out presidential decisions, a failure to provide foreign policy leadership, and an inability to control its own bureaucracy (50:97). DOS has also exhibited a crisis management orientation and resultant inability to plan which has shifted the balance of power for policy planning to the National Security Council and DOD (50:97). Several "inherent" advantages also account for the peculiar tilt in this relationship, including DOD's sheer size and resources; its sensitivity to and alliance with domestic issues, especially the economy and local congressional districts; its ability to plan and act on those plans through superior command and control; and its efficient resource management system which generates resource constrained options for action by national decision makers (94:226-227, 230-232).

A lack of planning and management capability is reflected in other DOS agencies as well, with potential problems over "turf, duplication and effectiveness." (54:24). As the primary arm for foreign aid within DOS, USAID is also the major source of funds for democratization efforts under its "Democracy Initiative"

established in 1990 (28:36). However, its dense bureaucratic structure, slow decision-making, laborious review procedures and multiple responsibilities make it a poor choice to rapidly respond to crisis or advocate democratic initiatives (28:36-37;54:23). Recent efforts to reform AID's structure will require congressional action, and in the interim valuable opportunities may be lost (92:529-530). The U.S. Information Agency (USIA), which has initiated its own "Building Democratic Institutions Program" (28:35), has published some very good pamphlets, including one on civil-military relations entitled, "Democracy and Defense." (88) However, it has also been criticized by GAO recently for failing to plan or coordinate judicial reform efforts in Central and Eastern Europe within DOS (65:3) and for failing to provide coordination and oversight as executive agent for government funded informational and exchange activities (64:2). This failure to coordinate is a consistent theme throughout all interagency democratization efforts.

Similar problems afflict SA programs, which also suffer from a lack of coordination exacerbated by the fact that funds are appropriated by the Foreign Relations Committees of Congress, controlled by DOS, but administered in several areas by DOD (71:12). In this regard, the foreign assistance budget is very unresponsive, and can take two years to address new programs (3:A-12). In addition, SA is underfunded, micromanaged and subject to fencing of funds which further restricts freedom of action (71:11). In the field, while the "Country Team" approach has been an effective unifying force, there has been a tendency on the part of other departments to resist it (50:97,99). The potential for jurisdictional disputes is particularly acute with DOD, where the regional CINCs maintain control over military

operations despite a responsibility to coordinate (50:97; 3:A-10). Problems inherent in this division of labor are further reflected by the Security Assistant Organization Chief who works for the ambassador, but is also responsible to the CINC and the Defense Security Assistance Agency (3:A-5). Finally, the Country Team is not staffed adequately in many countries to handle the new demands which would be imposed by a serious democratization effort.

In the words of one author, "...if the US is to develop a policy to support a particular model of democracy in another country, an interagency process has to be devised and expertise will be required. At present, neither of these exists in any organized way in the bureaucracy." (84:42) Clearly, what is needed most is a carefully planned, and consistent policy toward democratization based upon carefully articulated global priorities (54:23; 28:42,44). Such a policy does not happen randomly. As indicated, it must be developed through a cooperative effort of all interested federal agencies under centralized direction.

One such effort was DOD Directive 5111.4, dated 6 July 1993, which purported to create within DOD the office of ASD(D&P) in charge of overall "policy and planning for the promotion of democracy and the defense of human rights throughout the world, ..." (26:1) Among other things, this directive would have tasked implementation of policy and plans to promote democracy and democratic values, and directed "The use of DOD resources to encourage the strengthening and development of democracy and respect for human rights throughout the world." (26:2) The authority of this Directive is now somewhat dubious, however, since the individual nominated to become the new ASD(D&P), Mortin Halperin, was withdrawn, and subsequently appointed to the National Security Council (74). The functions of his office were

assumed by Mr. Frank Wisner OASD(ISA) who is presumably coordinating a new Presidential Decision Directive on the subject of peacekeeping that will hopefully touch on related topics in the nontraditional roles and missions arena (70:5). What this directive may say about interagency coordination remains to be seen, but it must begin to address solutions. In a similar vein, DOS has also created a special position for Democratization and Peacekeeping issues under Mr. Timothy Wirth (35:A28).

Despite these moves to centralize democratization oversight within DOS and DOD, however, the implementation of several suggestions calling for an Interagency Working Group (IWG) within NSC to coordinate such matters will be a long overdue improvement(61:9,47;76:7). However, such efforts will not be enough. An overall "Democracy Czar" must also be empowered to act as a single manager to resolve disputes, provide planning, and act as an advocate for democracy issues. This individual should be a senior advisor to the President on the NSC who can provide Presidential priority, day to day oversight, and a safety valve for the inevitable bureaucratic infighting which would otherwise hamper an effective democratization program. This individual should also draft a Presidential Directive which clarifies "command" relationships and the rules of engagement in this important area, especially since there is no single document which sets out how DOD and other federal agencies should interact in the pursuit of civil-military operations (61:9). Such a document is long overdue, and will eliminate much of the confusion, lack of coordination and overlap that currently exists. Since each democracy initiative may require a different "mix" of national power elements, the "Democracy Czar" and his IWG should establish guidance on a country by country or region by region basis,

spelling out which agency will have "lead" responsibility. In this regard, while DOS should always maintain oversight responsibility, there may well be situations, discussed above, which require DOD operational control and execution. In those cases, a "Democracy CINC" should have clear guidance and then receive the authority to accomplish the mission until a decision is made to transition to civilian operational control based upon that guidance. The Democracy Czar should also direct DOD to develop a clear doctrinal statement in this area to guide CINC actions (61:9).

What other roles could DOD fulfill in such a coordinated democratization effort? Clearly, it must do more than it is doing now: "In the ongoing national debate, the armed forces must be clearly seen as a valuable and integral component of our national strategy of promoting peace and supporting emergent democracies." (87:13) How this may be done while preserving core military competencies is a challenge of no small proportion. However, it is a challenge which must be accepted if the military is to maintain its relevance in the years ahead. As previously discussed, suggestions to create a separate "peacekeeper command" are not workable and would only create another layer of bureaucracy to encumber the democratization process. SOCOM is already positioned to perform this role for the armed forces, and should be given the resources to do so in coordination with the warfighting CINCs, each of whom already have a SOF component on their staff. CA units should also be expanded, especially active duty units. This could be done by having reserve civil affairs units train their active duty counterparts, thereby multiplying the effectiveness of their perishable skills. The armed forces should also form a training nucleus for what one author has called a civilian "democracy corps" of trained professionals targeted at

emerging democracies (28:34). The military has the infrastructure, the training expertise and the language skills to make such a proposal a reality in the near term. Such an effort would provide an invaluable link in those cases where an initial DOD democracy program transitioned into a civilian program following the restoration of stability in a host government. Once such transitions take place, the military should never forget its more customary tools of influence, to include joint exercises, as a necessary element of ongoing democratic support mechanisms (72:118) in support of national strategy. In the final analysis, the military must engage in a fundamental rethinking of its roles and missions, reorienting itself toward low technology, long term, regionally based CA missions.

VI.

TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM

The preceding discussion obviously raises fundamental questions about the balance of civil-military relations in the United States today. If the military becomes more involved in democratization efforts, that involvement could arguably create strains in the very system of civil-military relations it is modeling to the world. The basic issue is how to reconcile the military's historic antipathy toward political involvement and a political mistrust of military motives with the greater political role which is implicit in democratization efforts around the world. An underlying assumption in this regard is that if a democratic army cannot be trusted to teach the principles of democracy, then it has failed in its most basic mission of securing the public trust and confidence of its own people, which is the most basic security objective of all.

How to strike the proper balance between civilian control and

military obedience is no mere idle debate. Recent articles by respected experts in the field of civil-military relations have sounded the alarm over what they perceive to be a dangerous slide toward the military side of the scale (7:36-39;53:3-17;91:27-58). They point to such "proofs" as General Colin Powell's opposition to Bosnian intervention and gays in the military as tantamount to insubordinate conduct from a military leader whose only job is to accept the orders of his duly elected Commander in Chief and civilian chain of command (53:9-13;91:27-30). They also highlight a recent military article which discusses the possibility of a military coup as further evidence that things are getting out of hand (53:3). Every time a new military role is proposed, the century old Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC 1385, is wheeled out as a talisman to ward off the supposed evils of civil involvement. Occasionally, Congress has signaled an impatience with this tactic, i.e., in the war on drugs, but has hesitated to undertake a sweeping review of the military role. Such a review, however, may not be far off (75:pp. 1-24).

Obviously, this is not a new debate, and is at least as old as the Republic itself. On one extreme is the school of thought represented by Samuel Huntington which favors an apolitical military, controlled through the objective contraints of military professionalism (41:83-84;57:57). On the other, Morris Janowitz sees a more proactive military as a vital contributor to society (57:57), committed to the collective success of the nation and transformed into a "constabulary force" to provide flexible options in the international arena (46:418;57:57). In the current debate, both models offer insight into the proper role of the military in the "new world order." Huntington himself forsees more nontraditional, or nonmilitary, roles (39:38-42), although he

insists that the military must maintain its core proficiencies (39:43). In this regard, he seems to be preempting the inevitable tide toward more involvement in civilian missions by saying that these so-called nontraditional roles are really traditional - we've been doing them all along - and so the essence of military professionalism will not be threatened as long as we don't lose sight of our basic mission: to maintain combat capability.

Despite Huntington's effort to preempt the high ground, his analysis fails to adequately distinguish between domestic and international military involvement insofar as a realistic threat to civil-military relations is concerned. Morris Janowitz also fails to make this distinction, and would embrace military activism in both spheres (46:xlix-l), despite paying lip service to the military's nonpartisan role in domestic politics (44:115). Clearly, the effects of domestic involvement are more corrosive to military professionalism than foreign involvement, placing the armed forces in positions of authority over its own civilian population which may require various military controls including the use of deadly force. However, for the international peacekeeper and nationbuilder, the impact is much less, which translates into minimal interference with traditional civil-military relations.

Another oversight in the Huntington model stems from the historical context in which the US military profession finds itself today. This is not a chastened interwar force ready to resume its previous mission of manning obscure frontier outposts. Rather, this is a force which has stood at center stage of world affairs for 50 years and will be reluctant, if not disappointed, if it is ordered to return to the barracks. By this I do not wish to imply that the US military will flinch from the necessary belt

tightening of the post-Cold War era, but simply that it is a much different force than the one depicted in The Soldier and the State. To be sure, it is professional and expects to follow the orders of its civilian leaders. By the same token, if that professional core is isolated and driven in upon itself, then the dangers Huntington seeks to avoid may surface. At the very least, such a military will be less inclined to suffer silently.

What is required, then, to maintain a proper civil-military relationship is to keep the military "engaged", and give them a mission that fully employs the diversified talents they have developed over the past 50 years. Military officers are internationalists by temperament and used to the difficulties inherent in any operation that seeks to project the elements of US power abroad. Democratization is just such an operation, and the military posseses the expertise, innovative spirit and energy to get the job done now, just as it did in Japan at the end of World War II. This is especially important in an era of history which presents such a small window of opportunity. While some might argue that nontraditional military roles may also undermine military professionalism by causing a loss of combat expertise, exclusive reliance on that proficiency is a certain prescription for isolation from domestic political support and increasing irrelevance as an international instrument of power.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Looking out at the horizon, one is impressed by the rapidly changing international landscape and the need for a more prompt and coherent response from all levels of national security leadership (21:1; 70:2859; 69:2893). In the meantime, there are many serious proposals for change in the foreign policy arena that

merit consideration, including a renewed emphasis on support for emerging market democracies. Exactly what role DOD should assume in this process is very much in limbo. However, rather than minimizing the role of DOD in democratization efforts, the better approach would be to enlarge it, and make it relevant to the emerging foreign policy dynamic of the 21st century. Having won a marvelous Cold War victory at a comparatively low price, and having won it on the basis of an idea, America now stands ready to consolidate its victory with no ideological competitor in sight (72:222).

The process of consolidation must begin now, and must include all instruments of national power, including the armed forces. The President has set the strategy and must now set the order of battle, beginning with the appointment or designation of a "Democracy Czar" within the NSC to guide DOD, DOS, and other interagency efforts. Those efforts must be clearly spelled out in a Presidential Decision Directive setting forth a chain of command (61:9) which retains civilian control but permits the flexibility of military execution of democratization programs, particularly where DOD's superior organization, manpower and security capabilities are most applicable. In such cases, a regional "Democracy CINC" should direct all operations, placing primary reliance on an expanded SOF CA capability. That capability must be enhanced through CA training programs conducted by Reserve CA units for active duty personnel and members of a second echelon civilian democracy corps (28:34) promoted by DOS. In all cases, a transition plan to full civilian operational control should be implemented as soon as the situation on the ground permits. This is not to say that the military would not assume operational control over other activities, i.e., disaster relief. However, a

sliding scale that evaluates DOD involvement against the security situation, probabilities of success of all options and the cost of those options should be applied. A useful model to employ in this context is that of the Military Support Group created in Panama following Operation Just Cause (84:33).

For its part, the US military must be willing to assume the burden of nontraditional roles with the full realization that the employment of power in the post-Cold War world is changing. Innovative thinking is required to make this new paradigm a reality. Nontraditional tools such as information management (79:94), will become key ingredients in American military success on the nontraditional battlefield, just as the machine gun and the tank were the keys to more traditional military victories in the past. Naturally, combat capability must always be maintained, because without it America's overall national security strategy will not be credible. By the same token, the long term security objectives of the US will never be won by infantry. Rather, they will be secured by the power of ideas, promoted within the context of a careful balance of civil-military relations.

In the final analysis, it will be political leadership of this nation that will decide how to employ its military instrument of power. The tradition of civilian authority runs deep in this country, and is unlikely to be overturned because of a change in roles and missions. It will be up to the military, however, to inform that decision-making process and provide new solutions for new opportunities and challenges to engage the considerable skills of its new centurions.

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