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**NATIONAL INTERESTS AND GEOPOLITICS:**  
***A PRIMER ON THE BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE MILITARY DOCTRINE***  
***OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION***

by Igor Tishin

Colonel, the Russian Federation

A RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

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## Introduction

The emergence of the new multi-ethnic nation-state--the Russian Federation on the geostrategic map-- is one of the most important realities of the contemporary world. Though the Russian Federation was proclaimed as the successor of the Soviet Union as one of the great powers, in the matter of international economic and political obligations it

... is not the same country, that has simply changed its name. In the past, there was no such state as today's Russia either on a political plane (a democratic system), or on the economic (transition to the market economy) and even on the geographic plane (within the borders of the former RSFSR).<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, as a result of the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the former Soviet Union, Russia faces new realities and evolutionary changes in international and domestic arenas that inevitably shape and will continue to shape its domestic and foreign policy. Three themes influence the changes. Foremost is the reduced military threat; one that was primarily based on the ideological rivalry between socialist and capitalist systems during the Cold War. Second, it is critical for Russia to join the international market system and democratic environment. Such participation will be the main guarantee of the future of the democracy and market economy in the country and political stability in the region. Lastly, there is a deep economic, political and cultural crisis inside the country because of the rapid dissolution of the ineffective state institutions of the former Soviet Union and the necessity to formulate and pursue national goals on the basis of compromise between the interests of different social groups. In the past, these institutions were based on, founded on, and sustained by the domination of the one-party ideology that drove both economics and politics. Moreover, the necessity to give the international community a clear understanding of contemporary Russia's intentions raises the problem of setting priorities for national security and military activity based on national interests as well as common interests of the world community.

This paper considers national interests as a category of geopolitics, compares the definitions and the contents of the terms "geopolitics" and "doctrine" used by the Russian and American military and political establishment, and looks at the contemporary Russian national interests through the prism of the military component of national security. Most

importantly, it hopes to show how all of these are reflected in the current Russian military doctrine. Obviously, the ideas, and interpretation of the facts in this paper have resulted from my study of national security in the USAF Air War College, as well as from my personal civilian and military experience in both the former Soviet Union and the Russian Federation.

## **National Interests as a Category of Geopolitics**

### **Russian and American Interpretations**

Each country in the world has its own national interests. These interests can coincide, or contradict, or even compete with the interests of other countries. The modern multilateral international environment makes it very important for the political and military establishment of each country to find and pursue a compromise between the national interests of the particular country and the common interests of the international community. This is a problem of great importance for the Russian Federation and the other countries of Eastern Europe that are on their own ways of transition to a market economy and democratic political environment. This problem is important for the United States also. As the only superpower, the United States now is in the process of formulating and playing of the leading role in international events, balancing its own national interests and the interests of the international community.

Today, perhaps more than at any other point in history, there is a need to compare the Russian and American definitions of the main terms used: geopolitics and military doctrine. This is important for further discussion and clear understanding of the origins and content of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation by the American reader. This is also very important for both American and Russian political and military scholars because very often in the past discussions between the USA and the USSR (that often was identified by Americans as the geopolitical successor of the Russian Empire) on political and military issues failed to achieve real understanding or compromise because of mutual misunderstanding, preoccupation, disbelief, or ideological rivalry.

As a starting point, let us see how the application of the concept of "national interests" relates to Russian and American definitions of geopolitics.

In Russia, now free from the domination of one ideology on politics and economy, geopolitics is recognized as

... the political concept, that uses natural-geographical data (configuration and the size of the territory and aquatory, climate, material and natural recourses, racial and ethnical composition of the population for explanation of national interests of the states and coalition interests of military-political alliances.<sup>2</sup>

An especially clear American definition of geopolitics is

...the application of military geography at the strategic and global level. Geopolitics integrates political, diplomatic, sociological, economic and military considerations into an overall strategic approach. Geopolitics is concerned with relative power among nations and coalitions. It includes consideration of the foundations of national power: population, industry, commerce, financial status, internal stability, resources, and national will, as well as military forces. The essence of geopolitics is consideration of the size, shape, location, and characteristics of nations with respect to one another.<sup>3</sup>

The term "national interests" presented directly in the Russian definition is presented indirectly in the American one through the term "relative power of nations and coalitions". Obviously both American and Russian schools recognize the concept of "national interests" as one of the main categories of geopolitics. Moreover, in both schools "national interests" are related to the interests of the country or nation-state, but not to the interests of "ethnoses" or ethnical groups. Within geopolitics, it is national interests which determine relations among the nation-states in the area of international politics (unlike the only official ideology of the former Soviet Union, where a similar role was attached to the "class" interests).

Thus, both American and Russian interpretations of geopolitics establish similar frames for the term "national interests" as the basis for formulation and understanding of national security problems. Having its unique historical and political experience and stable decision-making environment, the United States has already formulated its national interests in the new international situation as a basis for its concept of national security. In Russia this process was delayed because of the deep political and economic crisis of 1991-1993 and the lack of experience within the Russian political establishment at finding compromises in the articulation of priorities for domestic and international agendas.

## Geopolitical Factors, Shaping National Security of the Nation-state.

In the frame of geopolitics, national security (including the military security of the nation-state) could be evaluated from the viewpoint of several cardinal factors: historical territory, nationalities, the structure of the state,<sup>4</sup> the possession of and ability to use natural, material and human resources effectively.

Maintaining the integrity of the *historical territory* shapes the base for safeguarding national security. Natural resources and climate also affect the demographic features of the population, and the structure and capacity of the national economy. The geographic position of the territory not only determines the orientation of the economic relations of states and the zones of their external economic relations, but also illuminates points of possible political or even military confrontations. These geographic factors include: the access of naval forces and shipping to the blue water of the World Ocean; the access of air and space power to inner-outer space; the level of natural-geographic protection of the population and strategic objects against natural disasters and weapons of mass destruction.<sup>5</sup> In addition, the geographic position of the territory determines the state's relations with neighboring countries, shapes buffer zones<sup>6</sup> to separate a state from any potential economic or military threat, and determines the direction of the development of the state's military power. Having a unique geographical position in the center of Euro-Asia affecting its historical and cultural background, Russia, in spite of deep economic and political crisis, remains one of the geopolitical "centers of power". This status shapes the national interests of Russia and poses challenges for the problems of international security.

The second factor that the security of the state depends on is *the nation*, whose identity in many regards is determined by its ethnic components. According to the Russian historian L. Gumilev, the spiritual-moral and socio-political unity of the nation, and therefore its ability to articulate and pursue its goals, depends on the inner energy (vital activity) of *ethnoses*, which shape the nation. Groups of ethnoses living at the same time and in the same geographic space, mutually associated economically and politically, determined with inter ethnic and cultural proximity, form the civilization or superethnoses. They are not a political monolith, but the inter-ethnic closeness contributes

to the stability of the blocks and coalitions of states, related to the same civilization. Conflicts of interest in such states may be long-term, but they are open to compromise. Conflicts between states of different civilizations are usually based on territorial disputes, or disputes on the spheres of influence (economic, military, political, cultural, religious). They are normally deeper in nature and, as a rule, characterized by higher intensity and even cruelty. Moreover, inter-ethnic contradictions could be the reasons for internal conflicts in multiethnic states. Ideas similar to L.Gumilev's about the reasons for world instability in the contemporary stage of the human history are presented by S.Huntington. Using the term "civilization" in the meaning of cultural identity that primarily has an ethnical basis, he puts that

... the fundamental source of the conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in the world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of the civilizations will dominate global politics.<sup>7</sup>

Thus, multiethnicity is a primary determinant of the stability of the region, and consequently, influences the security of the nation-state. Russia, remaining a so-called "heartland" power in the center of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Euro-Asia, must be ready to deal with these problems inside the country and inevitably will play a significant role in regional multi-cultural interrelations.

The third factor of state security is *the statehood structure*. It is the result of the historical experience and culture of a nation, and determined by the ethnic composition of the nation and its historical territory (geographical position). A nation and its political framework are in continuous contradictory cooperation, influenced by interrelations and mutual effects. The stability of the state in the international environment and the national security of the state depend greatly on this feature. When a political system dominates the nation, despotic regimes can appear with their political irrationality, oftentimes generating aggressive military states. If the nation dominates a state, an anarchical regime, separated into a number of hostile regions, can arise. This situation destabilizes the economic, military and political affairs not only in its own region, but sometimes also in the global context. The role of the political system in pursuing the objectives of national security is important because the

nation is able to preserve its historical territory and cultural identity only due to the power of the state. However, the ability of the political system to preserve national interests (especially by means of military power) without the voluntary support of the population is very limited. The political process in Russia for the last two years shows that in transitional periods or crisis situations the role of all the elements of a nation-state's power in shaping and supporting of statehood structure to provide political and economic stability could hardly be overestimated.

The last important geopolitical factor that the security of the nation depends on is the *level of economic development*. Nowadays that means not only the possession of material, financial, natural and human resources by the nation-state, but also the ability of the nation to use them effectively in the long run. The main role of the state is not to manage the economy (like in the former Soviet Union), but to establish and support political stability, economic diversity, and the freedom of market forces to operate. In turn, stable economic development will harmonize with efforts to guarantee human rights, the social order, and the nation's internal and external security.

Thus, the geopolitical factors of historical territory, nation, the statehood structure, and the level of economic development shape the national security issues of each nation-state and significantly impact the formulation and realization of its national interests.

### **The National Interests of the Russian Federation and the Military Aspects of National Security**

The development of national security strategy and the formulation of the national interests of the Russian Federation in the form of an authoritative or official statements after the dissolution of the Soviet Union were delayed because of the economic and political crisis of 1992-1993.<sup>8</sup> However, the analysis of discussions on the current domestic and international political and economic situation in the Russian mass-media, together with the consideration of geopolitical factors allow a clearer understanding of what kind of national interests are vital for Russia today and in the near future. The Russian Federation remains a great country and one of the geopolitical "centers of power" because of its geographical position, size of territory, large population, contributions to the world's science and culture, nuclear potential,



development possibilities, and so forth. Russia has rejected unnecessary ideological confrontation and now is at the beginning of a long road toward the development of comprehensive cooperation (including cooperation in the military area) with all states. Even though Russia aims to cooperate with all states, clear priority is given to cooperation with the United States, European countries, Japan, other neighbors in the Asian-Pacific region, as well as close neighbors--newly independent states that emerged from the former Soviet Union. Like any other democratic power, Russia is interested in affirming the civilized basis of stable international relations. At the same time, Russia as any other state, gives priority to its own interests based on the principles of observing the UN Charter and other international treaties and giving priority to using political means rather than the direct use of military force in preventing and settling conflicts.<sup>9</sup> Bearing in mind Russia's deep economic, political and social crisis, it is realistic to say that the main national security objectives are to preserve the integrity of Russia as a joint and sovereign democratic state within its existing borders, to create peaceful living conditions for its citizens, and to integrate Russia politically and economically into the world community as a democratic power in the future. From the whole set of interests, the following ones--the most important for the military realm of national security--can be isolated: to defend state sovereignty and territorial integrity; to promote and to preserve the social and political stability of the society and the vitality of the political constitutional regime; to support strategic stability and security in neighboring countries and in the world; and to provide free access to vital important economic zones and lines of communications.

Moreover, as a newly independent state, the Russian Federation faces important new military and defense issues that have direct impact on the national security. The first is the judicial basis of decision-making on security and defense issues, including establishment of civilian control over the military. This also includes open political debate on the legitimacy of the use of military force for defense against aggression and for peacekeeping inside the country as well as in nearby regions of instability in contiguous states. The second issue is the estimation of potential military dangers and threats and the construction of the Armed Forces on the basis of a national policy of defense sufficiency matched with the economic abilities of the nation to support its military policies. The last one, that indirectly influences economy as a factor of national security, is the effective allocation of national

resources in civilian and military spheres including budgeting and acquisition of weapons and military equipment, as well as conversion and preservation of the defense industry. Let us analyze what appears to be the current activity on these issues in the Russian Federation.

### **Legislative Basis of the Decision Making Process on Defense Issues in the Russian Federation.**

Rejecting the Soviet system of one-party decision making on the nation's problems, which was based on the domination of ideology in politics and the economy and included party control of military issues,<sup>10</sup> Russia has adopted the main democratic principle of national security decision making--civilian control over the military. This principle is stated in "The Constitution of the Russian Federation"<sup>11</sup>, which was approved by nationwide direct vote on December 12, 1993, and contains a number of important new ideas. First, the issues of foreign politics and international relations, decision-making on war and peace issues, defense and security, defense production and arms trade are now all under the jurisdiction of the democratic state. Secondly, the right of legislative initiative (including security, defense, and military issues) is possessed by the President of the Russian Federation, the members of the Council of Federation, the deputies of the State Duma,<sup>12</sup> the Government of the Russian Federation and the legislative (representative) bodies of the members of the Russian Federation. Thirdly, the Russian Parliament adopts the laws and controls their fulfillment by the executive authorities (the President and the government). The President, being the head of Security Council and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, is responsible for all activities to ensure the military security of the Russian Federation, including introduction of the state of military alert, promotion and dismissal of high level commanders of the Armed Forces, approval of the Military Doctrine and forming of the Security Council. In turn, the Council of Federation is responsible for approval of Presidential Decree on the introduction of any state of military alert, and making decisions on the possibility of using the Armed Forces abroad. The government develops and presents the federal budget to the State Duma, ensures its execution, and reports to the State Duma regarding its execution. The Accounting Board, formed by the Parliament, controls the execution of the federal budget, including execution by the military component. Thus, the real mechanism of the judicial and financial civilian control of the military is established generally in the new Constitution of the Russian

**Federation.** However, one needs to keep in mind that in contemporary Russia effective implementation of these principles in the actual practice of civilian-military relations depends greatly on the level of political culture of civilian and military establishment as well as on the internal economic and political situation.

### **The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation as a Basis of Defense Policy and Construction of the Armed Forces.**

As it is recognized now by the Russian political and military establishment, national interests directly influence the formulation of the national security strategy of the nation-state. This, in turn, must drive decision-making on defense issues, including the formulation and implementation of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation. From the current Russian perspective, military doctrine is

... a system of views, officially accepted by the state on the prevention of wars and armed conflicts, of the development of the armed forces, on the country's preparations to defend itself, on the organization of actions to ward off threats to the military security of the state, and on the use of the armed forces and other troops of the Russian Federation to defend the vital interests of Russia.<sup>13</sup>

The standard American definition describes doctrine as "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their action in support of national objectives".<sup>14</sup> Compared to the US definition, the Russian one is more authoritative, since it describes not only the role of pure military force in the support of national objectives (defense of vital interests) but also gives a more precise understanding of responsibilities of state institutions in ensuring military security.<sup>15</sup>

The essence of the policy carried out by the state in the sphere of the military aspect of national security is reflected in "The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," approved by the Russian Federation Security Council on November 2, 1993 and adopted by the edict No1833 of the President of the Russian Federation.<sup>16</sup> For a clearer analysis of the main points of this document the coverage of the press-conference of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation General P. Grachev<sup>17</sup>, the Russian text of "The Basic Provisions...",<sup>18</sup> two versions of English

translations,<sup>19,20</sup> as well as several Russian and American commentaries will be used further.

First, according to General Grachev, the military doctrine of the Russian Federation is based on the new understanding of national security and is part of the general concept of national security of the Russian Federation that now is under development.<sup>21</sup> Secondly, military doctrine covers the issues of the possible use for meeting the goals of national security not only the Armed Forces, but other troops (Border Guards and Interior Ministry Troops) that were separated from the Armed Forces according to "The Law on Defense", approved by the former Parliament and signed by the President in September 1992. Thirdly, military doctrine is based on acceptance of the real political, economic and military abilities of the state. Moreover, General Grachev stressed that, because of the transition to the market economy, doctrine also reflects the changes in the missions of the state, and particularly, the Ministry of Defense in the articulation and fulfillment of military-technical policy. Military doctrine has three interrelated parts: political aspects, military aspects, and the military-technical and economic foundations of the military doctrine.

The political part declares the attitude of the Russian Federation to armed conflicts and the use of military force as the tool to ensure security. Additionally, it defines the main sources of military "danger" and factors facilitating the shift of the military danger into an immediate military "threat" to Russia, contains the political principles and main guidelines of socio-political factors ensuring military security, and articulates the role of the state in ensuring military security. There are four key points in this part of the doctrine.

First, compared with the Draft of the Russian military doctrine published in 1992,<sup>22</sup> the new document clearly states the legitimate basis for the use of the military force. It says that the Russian Federation will ensure its military security using all tools (political, diplomatic, military) while giving priority to politico-diplomatic and other peaceful ones. The Armed Forces and other troops will be used in accordance with the Constitution and other laws of the Russian Federation for the defense of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and other vital interests in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as to carry out peacekeeping and peacebuilding

operations by decision of the UN Security Council or in accordance with the international obligations.<sup>23</sup> Together with the restriction against using military force to pursue the interests of social groups and political parties, this statement reflects the principle of civilian control over on the military and eliminates the possibility of the repetition of Afghanistan-like decision making. The decision to send troops into a neighboring country in that case was based on pure ideological factors and made not by the governmental authorities after discussions and consultations with the military command, but by the members of the Politburo of the CPSU.

Secondly, the Russian Federation does not identify any state in the world community as its enemy. If compared with a draft of Russian military doctrine, published in 1992, the new "Basic Provisions" does not mention as possible sources of military danger for Russia "the intentions of some states and coalitions to dominate in the international community or in regions" as well as "possession of the powerful groupings of the armed forces by some states of coalitions" near the border of Russia. Those anonymous states and coalitions were primarily recognized by the Western analysts as the USA and NATO, leading analysts to conclude that the Draft of 1992 did not reflect new political realities in Europe, but rather showed the nonflexibility and conservatism of the Russian military establishment as well as their aggressiveness, inherited from their Soviet predecessors. The new doctrine reflects the further shift of Russian political and military thinking toward a more realistic, more "westernized" variant, based on the existence not of constant friends and foes, but on the presence of constant national interests and multinational interests, that can be achieved by political, economic and military means.

The next key point is that Russia will not use military force against any state except for individual or collective self-defense against military attack on the Russian Federation, its citizens, territory, armed forces, other troops and allies. This statement is the clear sign of a more defensive character, rather than an offensive one of the new doctrine.

The last important point of the political part of "The Basic Provisions" is that nuclear weapons are recognized in the new doctrine as the means of deterrence of possible aggression, but not as the means of warfare. The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against states--participants of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, who do not possess nuclear weapons. There are

two possible exceptions where the Russian Federation could employ the nuclear weapon against such kinds of states. First, it could take place in the situation of military aggression of this state against the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces or its allies, if this state--aggressor has an alliance agreement with a state that has nuclear weapons. Second, if such a state takes part in joint actions with a state that has nuclear weapons to invade to the Russian Federation, to take military aggression against it, or to support these types of actions.<sup>24</sup> Essentially, this statement means that the Russian Federation has rejected the principle not to use nuclear weapons first, that was officially declared as the basis of the nuclear policy of the former Soviet Union in the middle of 1970's. However, it hardly represents a shift from a defensive to a more offensive position, or a position that "envision[s] the possible escalatory use of nuclear weapons", as it characterized by some analysts<sup>25</sup>. On the contrary, "repudiation of the Soviet pledge not to use nuclear weapons ... first marks not so much aggressiveness as realism."<sup>26</sup> The recognition that nuclear weapons could be used as an element of political deterrence of both nuclear and conventional aggression shows the change of Russian political and military mentality to "a Western-style concept of deterrence"<sup>27</sup> and has significant politico-military importance for national security.

The new military doctrine also distinguishes the main existing and potential sources of military danger (which later are used as the frame for the formulation of the main directions of development and reconstruction of the Russian Armed Forces), and factors facilitating the shift of the military "danger" into an immediate military "threat" to Russia (which actually is the basis for decision making about the employment of military force). Defining external and internal sources of military danger, this document differs from the Draft of 1992, and reflects the reaction of the political and military establishment to the new realities outside and inside the country.

The main sources of external military danger are recognized as territorial claims of other states on the Russian Federation and allies, and existing and potential seats of local wars and armed conflicts, especially in direct proximity of the Russian borders. Another group of sources of this kind includes the possibility of employment (including unsanctioned use) of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), proliferation of WMD technology, potential undermining of strategic stability by violations of international agreements on

arms control and qualitative and quantitative arms build-up by other countries. The last group of sources of external military danger includes attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of and destabilize the internal situation in the country, the suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states,<sup>28</sup> attacks on military facilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation abroad, expansion of military blocks and alliances to the detriment of the interests of military security of the Russian Federation,<sup>29</sup> and international terrorism.

Moreover, "The Basic Provisions" contains several factors, which could facilitate the escalation of the *potential military danger* into a *direct military threat* to the Russian Federation. The most significant among them are the build-up of troops on the borders of the country and allies above the existing balance, and attacks and armed provocations on the borders. Another factor is the actions of other countries to hinder the operation of the command and control system of the Russian strategic forces, above all their space component. The next factor is the deployment of foreign troops on the territory of the neighboring states, unless it is done to restore and maintain peace in accordance with the decision of the UN Security Council or a regional agency of collective security.

One more statement of "The Basic Provisions", that reflects the new realities--political, interethnic and economic instability in the country, and was not mentioned in the Draft of 1992 -- is the articulation of *internal sources of military threat*, against which the Armed Forces and other troops may be used. The most important are ethnic armed conflicts violating the territorial integrity of the country, attempts to overthrow the constitutional regime or settle political disputes by violence, attacks on nuclear and other potentially dangerous industrial facilities, illegal armed formations (including organized crime, smuggling and drug trafficking), and attacks on military installations with the aim to capture weapons.

Considering the political principles of ensuring military security "The Basic Provisions" articulates the following guidelines: the priority of political means above military ones for settling international disputes, the constructive participation of the Russian Federation in a system of international security, the implementation of signed agreements on the limitations and reductions of

arms and forces in Europe, as well as development of the conventional forces and arms reductions in other regions of the world.

The basic socio-political guidelines for ensuring military security include the creation of a legal basis of military security and improvement of the mechanism of development of military policy with governmental control over military-political decision making. Additionally, the necessity to provide social guarantees for servicemen and military retirees, as well as to raise the prestige of military service together with the improvement of military education and the preliminary military training system are recognized as highly important matters. Moreover, recognizing the significance of the moral factor for the military security of the nation, the new doctrine highlights the necessity of the development of moral-psychological readiness of the citizens to defend the homeland. It must be noted that some Western analysts use this part of the doctrine to suggest an alarmist thesis of remilitarization of the whole society and a return to the days of the Soviet period.<sup>30</sup> However, it is very hard to argue with another general thesis, based on common sense and supported by military theorists, that readiness of the Armed Forces depends not only on professional training and armament, but also on the level of financial security and morale of the servicemen. As for "... inculcation of defense-mindedness of the population as a whole ..." <sup>31</sup>, the thesis of moral-psychological readiness in Russian doctrine is not a heritage of "Soviet aggressiveness", but the reflection of historical experience of the nation that suffered dramatically from foreign invasions during eleven centuries, and especially during two World Wars. Moreover, I think, that there is an apt comparison in the socio-psychological experience of the regeneration of the US Armed Forces morale and readiness after the Vietnam War. Just as occurred in the USA, the reforms based on volunteer service and the resulting shift of public opinion from anti-military to respect of the military man and military service would be very beneficial to study in Russia.

"The Main Provisions" also stress the role of the state in ensuring military security. Together with the traditional functions of the state--to maintain the defense ability of the country, taking into account the economic potentialities and human resources of the country--the state is also responsible for the improvement of the quality and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces. Moreover, the state is responsible for the prioritized allocation of funds to defense scientific and technological research areas which are the most



promising for security and economic development<sup>32</sup> (but not "... the priority of defense in the allocation of funds and resources ..." <sup>33</sup>), and for conversion of industry in a rational manner.<sup>34</sup>

Thus, the political part of the doctrine generally reflects the current real political situation in the world and in the Russian Federation and offers the framework for the formulation of the military aspects of the doctrine, which are described in the military part of "The Main Provisions".

The military part of the doctrine is the basis for the conception of the reconstruction (development and deployment) of the Armed Forces. The primary focus of this part is on the prognosis of the nature of possible military conflicts, strategic aims, and the rules of the usage and principles of development of the Armed Forces and other troops.<sup>35</sup> The doctrine recognizes local wars and armed conflicts as the main dangers to stability and peace. As stated in the doctrine, the main goal of the employment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in these types of conflicts is the localization of the source of instability and elimination of the combat activity (warfare) at the earliest possible stage in order to make it possible to resolve the conflict by peaceful means on conditions favorable to the Russian Federation. As for large-scale wars, military doctrine suggests that there is less probability of a nuclear or conventional world war now and in the near future, but it stresses that "in certain conditions local war and armed conflicts can develop into an all-out war."<sup>36</sup> Factors, which may prompt the Russian Federation to employ nuclear weapons are the actions of the aggressor "designed to destroy or undermine the operation of strategic nuclear forces, early warning systems, nuclear and chemical facilities."<sup>37</sup> Moreover, the document includes the warning that "any, including limited, use of nuclear weapons even by one side, can provoke a mass use of nuclear weapons, with catastrophic consequences."<sup>38</sup> This is one more sign that nuclear weapons are recognized by the doctrine as the means of deterrence based on a retaliation and justified self-defense strategy, but not as means of warfare.

Dealing with the internal armed conflicts which threaten the stability and integrity of the country, the doctrine assigns the law enforcement agencies and Interior Ministry troops the role of being the main military force to localize the conflict zone, suppress armed clashes, and disengage the rival sides. However, reflecting current reality, the doctrine says that elements of

Armed Forces and other troops may be used, in accordance with legislation, to help law enforcement agencies and Interior Ministry troops cope with such conflicts, as well as to help Border Guards to protect the state borders. This is much the same as the federalization of the US National Guard forces to cope with civil disobedience or the use of the US Armed Forces to patrol borders or assist in operations aimed at curbing drug trafficking. Moreover, and as in the US, the Russian Armed Forces may be assigned to protect important state facilities and economic zones during crisis, to combat terrorism and illegal drug trafficking, as well as to help people during accidents, catastrophes and natural disasters. It must be noted, that internal functions of the Armed Forces, especially reinforcement of Interior Ministry troops historically have a lack of popularity among the Russian people, especially among the younger generation--the cohort from which future conscripts will be drawn. That is why the transition from the a draft system to a volunteer contract system began with Interior Ministry troops and in the several most technologically intensive services of the Armed Forces (Navy, airborne troops, marine).

Regarding the goals of the development of the Armed Forces, the main objective at the present time is to create qualitatively new Armed Forces meeting the requirements of the contemporary political and military situation in the world and in the country, the tendencies of its development, and the real degree of danger. Generally, the main goal of Armed Forces development according to the "Main Provisions" is

... to create and develop forces, capable of protecting the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, the security of citizens and other vital interests of society and state in line with military-political and strategic situation in the world and real potentialities of the Russian Federation<sup>39</sup>.

At the same time, as General Grachev puts it, "the strength and structure of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation shall correspond to missions assigned to them, demographic and other possibilities of Russia as well as to the achieved agreement on the reduction of the Armed Forces."<sup>40</sup> Two important principles form the conceptual basis of the new Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The first principle is a containment of any aggressor threatening to unleash nuclear or conventional large-scale war by maintaining strategic nuclear forces capable of effective retaliation in any situation and under any conditions. Second, containment of any aggressor threatening to

unleash regional, local wars and armed conflicts. This requirement is satisfied by creating the necessary grouping of troops (forces) of general purpose (protection troops, mobile forces and reserves) sufficient to guarantee the capability to repel any aggression and provide for a timely build-up of the Armed Forces should the scale of such military action increase.<sup>41</sup>

One of the prioritized directions of the Armed Forces development is the creation of mobile forces, that must be able to be moved to designated regions of the country in the shortest time limits. These are intended for strengthening the peacetime groupings of forces (PGF) in strategic regions, fulfilling missions (in cooperation with the PGF) during local and regional conflicts, and ensuring the required Supreme General Command reserves development. It must be stressed that the structure of forces mentioned above and the priorities of their development reflect two realities. First, the reality that it is no longer necessary for Russia to keep numerous, slow, heavy controllable Armed Forces because of the contemporary political situation. Second, that Russia is no longer able to keep such forces because of the heavy burden to the state budget.<sup>42</sup>

Thus, the main directions of the Armed Forces development for the period of time until 1996 are:

- to create the groups of troops (forces) at the territory of Russia according to their missions;

- to complete the withdrawal of troops, located abroad, to the territory of Russia;

- to cut the Armed Forces to the established level;

- to continue the transition to the mixed system of recruiting (volunteers and conscripted personnel);

- to complete the research on the structure of the Armed Forces (main task forces) for the period after 1995.

For the period between 1996 to 2000 the doctrine foresees the reorganization of the Armed Forces structure, the completion of the transition

to the mixed system of recruiting, and the completion of the creation of the groups of the troops (forces) with their associated military infrastructure within the territory of the Russian Federation.

The new item of doctrine in comparison with the Draft 1992 is that, in accordance with the security interests of the Russia Federation and other members of CIS, the troops (forces) and military equipment of the Russian Federation could be located abroad as a part of cooperative joint structures, the Russian groupings of forces, and as a separated bases or objects. It must be noted that this statement is primarily used by Western analysts as an illustration of the Russian intention to violate the sovereignty of neighboring states in favor of selfish Russian interests. For example, as *Jane's Intelligence Review* puts it, there is

... a growing insistence on the right to ignore the sovereignty of now independent former-Soviet republics and to intervene in the FSU where and when it suits Russian interests. The army, and perhaps the government and people of Russia, simply do not accept that such states are truly independent and do not treat them as such.<sup>43</sup>

However, according to "the Main Provisions", the conditions of deployment of Russian military formations, separated or as a part of a united CIS or UN force, must be determined by the corresponding international legal documents. Moreover, the Council of Federation is responsible for the approval of the deployment Russian troops abroad, thereby clearly providing for civilian control over the deployment of Russian troops abroad. Additionally, the political mechanisms of the "Partnership for Peace" together with the development of democracy, including respect for the civil rights of Russian citizens in newly independent states, as well as mutually advantageous economic relations would provide additional guarantees of real independence and security for Russia's neighbors.

Military-technical and economic aspects of the military doctrine reflect the goal and mission of the state in the military-technical sphere, the main directions of the development and reconstruction of the defense branches of industry, and the military-technical cooperation with foreign countries.

According to "The Main Provisions" the main goal of military-technical support for military security is prompt provision of the Armed Forces with

effective armaments and materiel in the quantities necessary and sufficient for guaranteed protection of the vital interests of the nation, based on cost-effectiveness and realistic danger assessment. Paying attention to the qualitative characteristics of armament for smaller armed forces, the new doctrine stresses the necessity for the development and production of highly-effective systems for troop and weapon control, communication, intelligence, early strategic warning and electronic warfare, mobile precision conventional weapons and systems for their support. The intention to shift from the massive production of many types of comparatively inexpensive armament to fewer pieces of high-tech armament can be illustrated by the plans to reorganize the aviation industry.

According to the Director of the State Institute of Avionics<sup>44</sup>, Russia does not need and can not afford to have a large fleet of combat aircraft for the contemporary political situation and in the near future. However, the concept of projection of military power to the regions of hostilities or aggression by means of flexible mobile forces increases the role of air mobility and multi-role aircraft. That is why the Russian aviation industry will not be oriented to the production of many types and many quantities of combat aircraft (as it was in the former Soviet Union, oriented on a large-scale conflict with NATO with the massive employment of air power by both sides), but will continue only the SU-27 and MiG-29 series. Moreover, in the long-term the SU-24 and TU-22 will be replaced by a multi-role bomber with enhanced combat potential. The production of strategic aircraft was stopped by the President's decision. For air mobile missions, an advanced variant of the Il-76 will be used. One model will be chosen between two available models: either the Mi-28 or the Ka-50.

An important part of the military-technical policy is the support of nuclear forces readiness on the level that ensures strategic deterrence of nuclear or conventional war. To meet this requirement "The Program of armament development for strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation" was prepared.<sup>45</sup> This program covers the period of time until 2005. The need to achieve balance between economic and security considerations shapes this program. Under the START II agreement the Russian Federation can have 1300 intercontinental ballistic missiles with monobloc warheads, but the real economic situation only will provide the ability to have 900. Scientific military and civilian institutes have studied possible scenarios for strategic forces operations and have concluded that strategic forces must be based on

modernized SS-25 missile with two variants of deployment: in silos and mobile (car track). This decision was made on the basis of analysis of the infrastructure in positioning regions, their road network, geological conditions, the availability of housing facilities for the personnel, as well as on cost-effectiveness determined by comparative analysis of sea and land deployment alternatives for strategic missiles.

The shift of the military-technical policy from massive production puts into the agenda the problem of shrinking of military-industrial complex, the reorientation of the enterprises toward civilian production, and the problem of preservation of the enterprises possessing key technologies. The Russian Federation inherited about 75 percent of the defense-industrial complex of the former Soviet Union (about 2000 enterprises, scientific and design organizations with 5 millions employees).<sup>46</sup> The diminished military threat and economic considerations were the main reasons for the decision to preserve about 300 enterprises possessing key technologies. The largest part of the military-industrial complex now has to be privatized and converted for civilian production. It must be stressed that the conversion of the Russian military-industrial complex is recognized by the Russia's leadership as "the most important precondition for successful economic reform and as a component part of the post-Communist reform in the former Soviet Union."<sup>47</sup> Moreover, the conversion of the defense industry in Russia has no analogy in the world practice.

Currently more than 1500 industrial enterprises and scientific institutes are in the process of conversion. A package of conversion programs was approved by the government--fuel, energy, agro-technology and lumber industries, renewal of civilian aviation fleet, export oriented aircraft and helicopters, modern ships, new types of medical technologies, communication and information are all affected.<sup>48</sup> Priority is given to civilian production. In the aviation industry for example, priority is given to the new generation of civilian aircraft such as Il-96-300, Tu-204, Tu-334, An-74.<sup>49</sup> However, there are several challenges for conversion in Russia: the lack of financial support of conversion by the government as well as by new financial institutions; the lack of skills and ability among high-level and middle-level managers to act in a market environment without demand guaranteed by the state; and the need for the reorganization of allocation, controlling and planning systems oriented to controlling the cost of goods under production.

One of the important aspects of military-technical policy is an economic one. Some Western estimations of the new military doctrine assume that the Russian Armed Forces "can continue to spend according to their perception of need rather than what economy can afford."<sup>50</sup> The facts argue otherwise. According to the Chief of Acquisition and Procurement Office of Russian Ministry of Defense<sup>51</sup>, the share of defense expenditures in the annual budget of Russian Federation was reduced from approximately 35 percent in 1991 to 16.5 percent in 1993. Similarly, the research, development, test, evaluation and procurement funding was reduced by almost twice as much. In 1993 it was 25.5 percent as compared to about 50 percent in the 1991 Ministry of Defense budget. Moreover, according to the Deputy to the Chairman of Russian Federation Committee on Defense Industries<sup>52</sup> the military budget up to 2000 will be no more than 5-6 percent of GNP. Moreover, the increased share of the defense budget allocated for the social needs of servicemen and housing will result in the level of allocation of funds for acquisition of arms on the level of 25-30 percent of the levels of 1989-1990. That is why one of the main principles of the development of the Armed Forces, articulated in "The Main Provisions" is

... the matching of the organizational structure, combat composition and numerical strength of troops (forces) with their assigned missions, legislation, international obligations and *economic possibilities* of the Russian Federation.<sup>53</sup>

Moreover, among the principles of satisfying the requirements of the Armed Forces and other troops in terms of weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment there are

... taking into the consideration the state's scientific, technical, and *economic possibilities* of the state; ... concentration of financial and material-technical resources in prioritized directions of the military-technical supplying of the Armed Forces and other troops.<sup>54</sup>

The last aspect of military-technical policy is cooperation with foreign countries. This new doctrine, as compared with the Draft 1992, articulates the policy of the state in military foreign sales, technical and military assistance and cooperation in armament design and production. It is stressed that the Russian Federation will give priority to the restoration of mutually advantageous cooperation with CIS member states. However, the new positive changes in relations with NATO within the framework of the "Partnership for

Peace" could possibly expand this cooperation in the future. One of the zones of mutual interests is the aviation industry. The first successful result of cooperation in this area with Western countries is the completion of the development of the advanced training jet plane, made by MiG (Russia), SNECMA (France) and Sextant Avionics (France).<sup>55</sup> Another example of a zone of possible mutual interests is cooperation in the problem of anti-missile defense in an environment of proliferation of missile technologies. There are clear signs of the growing intention of the Russian leadership to cooperate with the United States on the deployment of the joint large-scale ballistic missile defense system.

The rationale typically identified by Russian officials for expanded BMD are: (1) to provide protection against limited missile threats that can not be deterred, particularly from Third World countries; and (2) to facilitate progress in political, economic, and security relations with the United States.<sup>56</sup>

### Conclusion

"The Main Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" reflects the vision of the problems of the military component of national security by the high level Russian military and civilian establishment. This document, approved by the Security Council and adopted by the presidential Decree, is the result of the realistic estimation of current political, economic, demographic and military situation in Russia and in the world. It is free from ideological preoccupation and seems to be more "Western" than the Draft of 1992. At the same time, however, this document reflects the reality that Russia, in spite of deep crisis in last several years, remains one of the "centers of power" in the geopolitical meaning of this definition. Thus the document is directed to support three main factors of geopolitics: safeguarding of the territory, the security of statehood structure, and preserving peace inside the nation in the interethnic disputes. Generally, "The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine" determine the strictly defensive and law-abiding orientation of activity to ensure the military security of the Russian Federation.

The doctrine is free from manifestations of the ideological rivalry of the Cold War and reflects more realistic assumptions about the possible threats and dangers to the national security. It stresses that local and regional conflicts, based on interethnic rivalry and territorial claims, are currently the main



threat to Russia. It makes the first mission of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation preventing those kinds of conflicts by military means in situations when all political means are exhausted. The doctrine also says that the threat of global war is diminished but not eliminated entirely, making the second function of military forces the deterrence of possible aggressors by means of nuclear and conventional force. The important point of the doctrine is the clear declaration of situations in which Russia will employ nuclear weapons. The main steps of the Armed Forces development go logically from estimation of the possible threat today and in the near future. They are directed to the construction of grouping of troops (forces) of general purpose (protection troops, mobile forces and reserves) which guarantee stopping any aggression and provide the possibility for timely build-up of the Armed Forces when scales of military actions increase. The new point of the doctrine is that the Armed Forces could be employed for several interior missions, thus reflecting the contemporary unstable internal political situation in Russia, that threatens both the sovereignty of the state and the peaceful transition to the new political and economic system.

In conclusion, it is necessary to stress that "The Main Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation", while still being authoritative, will be under constant reconsideration according to all the new changes in Russia and the world. Doctrine, being interactive as it is with the real environment, will change to reflect the reality of these interactions. Being the great powers, the United States and Russia will be inevitably involved in economic and political interactions. Thus, better understanding of each other's concerns about national and international security will help to prevent negative interactions between two countries that could influence their military doctrines.

## Notes

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1 V. Mironov. "Russia's National Security Military Doctrine and the Outlook for Russian-US Cooperation in the Modern World." *Comparative Strategy*, Vol.13, N.1, 1994, p.49

2 A. Sinayskiy. "Geopolitika i nacionalnaya besopasnost Rossii." *Voennaya Mysl*, N.10, 1992, p.2. ("Geopolitics and national security of Russia," *Military Thought*, Russian edition, N.10, 1992 ).

3 *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia*, Virginia, Brassey's (US) Inc. 1993, p.1057.

4 A. Logunov. "Ethnos and Territory in the Eurasian Geostrategy." *Military Thought*, N5, 1993, pp.20-22.

5 The importance of the geographical factor of geopolitics for national security will not be completely eliminated in the future by information technology, internetted computer data bases for trade and finance, tourism, or transportation because of the cultural diversity and historical background of the ethnical groups and nations. Germans will remain Germans, and French people will remain French people even in the united Europe. I think that the attempt to invent a new ethnical-political identity named "Europeans" is reminiscent of the artificial term "Soviet people" offered by Breznev in the middle of 70's. The significance of this factor for the nations and ethnical groups can be illustrated by the threat to the national identity and survival imposed on the Jewish people before 1948, Palestinian Arabs after 1948, and Armenians at the end of the 19th century. Moreover, the American "melting pot" is the result of the unique geographical position of this country and very likely cannot be duplicated in Russia or any other country.

6 The term "buffer zones" for Russia in the contemporary political, economic and ethnical situation does not mean the same as it did in the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, or in the Czar's Russian Empire at the end of the last century. From the first glimpse, the pure military meaning of this term maybe not make much sense nowadays because modern high technology weapons can place an enemy's homeland and the breadth and depth of his forces under very precise and nearly simultaneous attack. But the possibility for Russia to be exposed to aggression by the countries possessing such technology is estimated now as very low. However the spread of Islamic extremism in Asia, including the new independent states near the southern borders of the Russian Federation, is recognized as one of the most aggressive cultural and hostile military dangers not only by Russian but also by the American political establishment. Russia is interested in preserving the "buffer zone" in the southern region to prevent the spread of this threat, both cultural and military, to the Russian territory. From a military point of view, it makes sense because the main way of fighting used by these forces is guerrilla war and ground attack by land armies, and in both cases "buffer zones" can impact positively on the security of Russian Federation.

7 S.P. Huntington. "The Clash of the Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*. Vol.72, N3, 1993, pp.22-49.

8 S. Stepashin. "Strane nuzna koncepciya bezopasnosti, no mi poka ne gotovi k eyo prinyatiyu." *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 1993 (S. Stepashin. "The nation needs the security concept, but we are still not ready for its adoption". Red Star. 1993)

9 P. Grachev "Actual problems of the Construction and Preparation of the Armed Forces of Russia at the Contemporary Phase." *Military Thought*, N6, 1993, pp.3,4.

10 Looking back to the history it's not hard to recognize that the decision-making of the former Soviet leadership on most security and military issues, including construction and use of the Armed Forces based on an estimation of threat for last 70 years, was based primarily on domination of ideology of the class struggle in the political, economic, sociological, and military areas. There is a list of major arguments that shaped military policy in the former Soviet Union: (1) the military threat to the only socialist state imposed by hostile capitalists regimes in the early 1920s, (2) the inevitable victory of socialism as the most progressive social system, mixed with the ideas of solidarity of the working people all over the world and the need to help them to change social systems by means of revolution in the late 1920s, (3) recognition of the threat of Nazi Germany as the most aggressive state of the capitalist camp in the late 1930s, (4) the threat imposed by NATO to the socialist camp in the 1950s-60s, (5) the nuclear threat imposed by an ideologically hostile United States, (6) ideological rivalry with China, (7) the assumption that socialism is the best future for all new independent states emerging after the end of the colonial period of world history in 1960's-80's, mixed with the old ideological idea about solidarity of proletarians and the mission of the socialist camp to help them. There are maybe only two recognizable pure military factors that influenced the decisions in this area. First, this is the military and political experience of both world wars. For Russia and later for the Soviet Union these were a chain of large-scale land campaigns with enormous casualties, suffering of the civilian population, and the devastation of economic infrastructure. These shaped the ways of construction of military force, the development of operational art, and tactics. The second is the conclusion that there will be no winners in a global nuclear war.

11 *Konstituciya Rossiyskoy Federacii*. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 28.12.1993. ("The Constitution of the Russian Federation." Red Star. 28.12.1993).

12 According to the Constitution, the Russian Parliament (named the Federal Assembly) is the representative and legislative authority. It consists of two bodies -- the Council of Federation and the State Duma.

13 "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." *Jane's Intelligence Review*. Special report. January, 1994, p.6.

14 "The Air War College lexicon: Definitions of Common Terms."

15 From my perspective, the most comprehensive and compressed historical analysis of the development of the Russian views on the definition and content of the military doctrine, as well as comparison of Russian and American definitions is given by J.W.Kipp in "Russian Military Doctrine and Military Technical Policy: An American Military Historian's Prospective", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol.13, N1, pp.25-41. He stressed "a significant progress of change

from military doctrine shaped by the institutions and ideology of the Soviet state and the Communist Party."

16 Ch. Dick. "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." *Jane's Intelligence Review*. Special report. January, 1994, p.1.

17 "Voennaya doktrina Rossii: novoe ponimaniye bezopasnosti strany." *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 4.11.1993, pp.1,3 ("Military doctrine of Russia: new understanding of the national security." *Red Star*. 4.11.1993).

18 "Osnovniye polozeniya voennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federacii". *Izvestiya*, 18.11.1993, pp.1-3. ("Basic provisions of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation" *Izvestiya*, 18.11.1993, pp.1-3).

19 "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." *Jane's Intelligence Review*. Special report. January, 1994, pp.6-12.

20 "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." *Daily Report*. Supplement. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*. 19.11.1993, pp.1-11.

21 It must be noted that the articulation of the national security strategy must be made first, and military strategy, - second. Moreover, doctrine is the official document that has to be authorized after discussion of the broad concept -- strategy. However, one has to keep in mind that discussion of the issues of national security are not finished yet in Russia and will take more time, because a new social and political mentality in all levels of Russian society, including understanding new world, regional, and local realities by individuals and different social groups, is beginning to emerge. The main reason that the military doctrine was approved before the articulation of the final concept of national strategy is the understanding by the Security Council and the President that nowadays the Armed Forces appear to be perhaps the last more-or-less stable force in the country. As such it ought to have clear direction regarding its mission to defend the country and to preserve its integrity during the controversial and difficult transitional period. The immediate reason for approval of this doctrine (based primarily on the draft, made by the Ministry of Defense) could be the decision of Security Council to strengthen the political stability in the country after events in Moscow in October 1993, providing legitimacy for the new missions of the Armed Forces inside the country in time of crisis. At the same time, it's important to note that in spite of using of the draft made by the Ministry of Defense, the final document has accumulated many ideas from three other drafts made by the civilian establishment. It has less conservative estimations of possible military dangers and threats than those made by military establishment in the Draft 1992, and perhaps reflects a more realistic understanding of modern domestic and international realities. For example, the final document does not mention the intentions of several states, or coalitions of states to dominate in the international community or in the regions as a military danger -- these were recognized by Western analysts primarily as the indirect treatment of the USA and NATO as potential adversaries. Moreover, the final document does not contain the vision of possible conventional large-scale war against Russia or CIS, based actually on Gulf War scenario of employment coalition forces against Iraq, that could be fulfilled nowadays only by NATO.

22 "Osnovi voennoy doktrini Rossii", proekt. *Voennaya Misl, specialniy vipysk*. 1992. ("The provisions of Russia's military doctrine", the draft. *Military Thought*, special issue. Russian edition. 1992).

- 23 "Osnovniye polozeniya voennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federacii."
- 24 "Voennaya doktrina Rossii: novoe ponimaniye bezopasnosti strany."
- 25 J. H. Slagle. "New Russian Military Doctrine: Sign of the Times." *Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly*, spring 1994, p.90.
- 26 "Russia's New "Military Doctrine", *Washington Post*, November 7, 1993, p.C6.
- 27 Ch. Dick. "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." p.2.
- 28 There are still many disputes in Russian domestic and foreign media about the legitimacy of the Russian Federation citizenship of Russians in former Soviet republics. At least one clear "American-style" operation to defend its the citizens was the rescue operation carried out by Russian airborne troops to evacuate the personnel of the Russian embassy from Kabul in 1993.
- 29 It must be stressed that the intentions of several new independent states as well as of the Eastern European countries to joint NATO was generally recognized by the Russian political and military establishment as a potential source of greater isolation of the Russian Federation from enlarged alliances and raised the future possibility of potential military danger for the Russian Federation because of possible shifts in the military balance in the region. That is why the significance of "Partnership for Peace" proposals made by President Clinton, and the Russian decision to join this NATO's program for eliminating mutual suspicions could hardly be overestimated.
- 30 Ch. Dick. "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.", p.3.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 One of such areas is mentioned in the presentation given by Dr. Evgeni Fedosov, Director of Russian State Institute of Avionics, in the international symposium "U.S. and Russian Military-Technical Policy" (see *Comparative Strategy*, vol.13, N.1, 1994, pp.73-76). He stressed the significance of the aviation industry for military security, as well as for economic development of the country, bearing in mind the vast territory and lack of transportation infrastructure. In order to shape the military and civilian air fleet for new political, military and economic realities and at the same time holding down costs, the Russian aviation industry intends to concentrate on building multi-role aircraft instead of the many types of single-function aircraft that it produced in the past.
- 33 Ch. Dick. "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.", p.4.
- 34 About Russian conversion policy see G. Voronin's presentation in the international symposium "U.S. and Russian Military-Technical Policy" (*Comparative Strategy*, vol.13, N.1, 1994, pp.77-86).
- 35 "Voennaya doktrina Rossii: novoe ponimaniye bezopasnosti strany."
- 36 "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." *Jane's Intelligence Review*. p.9.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Ibid.

39 Ibid, p.10.

40 P.Grachev "Actual problems of the Construction and Preparation of the Armed Forces of Russia at the Contemporary Phase." p.6.

41 Ibid.

42 As. E. Fedosov puts it,

the main compliment of the army cannot be deployed in border districts because the Russian border perimeter even exceeded that of the USSR, while the army numerical strength is more than three times smaller. ... More likely, the army will be deployed in a limited number of military districts and in crisis situations, so that it can be quickly redeployed to the zone of conflict.

See *Comparative Strategy*, vol.13, N.1, 1994, p.74.

43 Ch. Dick. "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.", p.5.

44 E. Fedosov. "Russian Military and Technical Policy in the Field of Combat Aircraft R&D." *Comparative Strategy*. Vol.13, N.1, 1994, pp.73-76.

45 V. Litovkin. "Novaya raketno-yadernaya programma." *Izvestiya*. 9.02.1994, p.1. (V. Litovkin. "New nuclear missile program." *Isvestiya*. 9.02.1994, p.1.)

46 A. Trifonov. "Russian Defense Industry Policy: Military, Technical and Economic Issues." *Comparative Strategy*. Vol.13, N.1, 1994, p.87.

47 *Comparative Strategy*. Vol.13, N.1, 1994, p.6.

48 A. Trifonov. "Russian Defense Industry Policy: Military, Technical and Economic Issues," p.89.

49 G. Voronin. "How Russia's Defense Industry Responds to Military-Technical Policy." *Comparative Strategy*, Vol.13, p.84.

50 Ch. Dick. "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,", p.5.

51 V. Mironov. "Russian Federation Defense Science and Technology Policy." *Comparative Strategy*, Vol.13, N.1, 1994, p.59.

52 A. Trifonov. "Russian Defense Industry Policy: Military, Technical and Economic Issues," p.87.

53 "Osnovniye polozeniya voennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federacii." Emphasis added.

54 Ibid. Emphasis added.

55 V. Belikov. "MiG-AT: "Letayuschaya parta" dlya vozdyshnih assov." *Izvestiya*. 9.02.1994, p.1. (V.Belikov. "MiG-AT: Flying desk for aces.")

56 K.B. Payne, L.H. Vlahos, W.A. Stanley. "Evolving Russian views on defense: An Opportunity for cooperation." *Strategic Review*. Winter 1993, p.69.