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AIR WAR COLLEGE
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THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD,
CULTURE AND QUALITY

by

Edward F. Farwell, Jr.
Lt. Col, MeANG

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN

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ABSTRACT

TITLE: The Air National Guard, Culture and Quality.

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The Air National Guard is implementing Quality Guard by adopting the principles of Total Quality Management. The purpose of this paper is to explore the significance of organizational culture to the implementation of Quality Guard. The study traces the development of the Total Quality movement, explores various aspects of the concept of organizational culture and the impediments to introducing change to the unique organization that is the Air National Guard.

Secondly, the paper sketches the history and culture of the Air National Guard and discusses their implications for the implementation of Quality Guard.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Edward F. Farwell, Jr. has been a member of the Maine Air National Guard since 1967. A graduate of Undergraduate Pilot Training at Vance AFB, Oklahoma; in 1969, he has flown the F-101 Voodoo, and the KC-135 Stratotanker and remains an active pilot. He has been a full time Active Guard and Reserve member of the 101 Air Refueling Wing since 1981. He has served as a squadron pilot, instructor pilot, Assistant Director for Training, Chief of Safety, Deputy Commander for Maintenance, and Logistics Group Commander.

Lieutenant Colonel Farwell is a graduate by correspondence of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College. He is a member of the class of 1994 at Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He attended the Air National Guard Total Quality Awareness and Total Quality Implementer courses at the I. G. Brown Professional Military Education Center, McGhee-Tyson ANGB, Knoxville Tennessee and served on the 101 Air Refueling Wing Quality Council.

CHAPTER I

In the fourth decade since World War II, two competing systems have fallen into decline. The centrally managed economy of the United Soviet Socialist Republics failed to provide an acceptable standard of living for its citizens and the American system of productivity has been outpaced by competitors in a country which lay largely in ruins in 1945. While the people in the former Soviet Union are experimenting with ideas foreign to generations inculcated with Marxism, American managers are seeking renewal in a system that is credited with the resurgence of its former enemy, Japan. That system had its beginnings in methods used at Bell Laboratories during World War II, but was neither adopted nor advanced by American managers after the war.

The United States emerged from World War II unchallenged both militarily and in manufacturing capacity. Given expanded domestic markets, no international competition and worldwide reconstruction, American managers wrought maximum advantage from the nation's economic preeminence. Abundant natural resources, ample working capital, and an educated work force were harnessed to meet the apparently unlimited demand for manufactured goods. American managers could hardly lose. They emphasized mass production and mass distribution; quality and customer service could wait in a world full of eager buyers. Whole industries succeeded in a seller's market too strong to penalize wasteful practices and poor quality. Having emerged victorious from two world wars, and having defined and achieved economic leadership through management practices developed at the turn of the century, U.S. managers behaved as though success in both war and business was an American birthright. "Success in business in North America was confused with the ability to manage." (1.vi) Success made it easy for American corporate leaders to believe that they were inherently smarter, faster, and better in all facets of business, good times were mistaken for good management. Growing revenues made the replacement of poorly made goods, alienated employees, and dissatisfied customers affordable and expedient. As T.J. Rodgers notes:

The seeds of business failure are sewn in good times, not bad... during times of prosperity danger lurks everywhere. Growth masks waste, extravagance, and inefficiency. The moment growth slows, the accumulated sins of the past are revealed all the way to the bottom line. (2.91)

The American economy and bottom lines fluctuated, but continued to grow until the severe recession of the early 1980's. Adding to the shock was the emergence of international competitors who had spurned the principles and practices of U.S. manufacturers. The most powerful challenge to America's dominance came from the Japan. Japanese companies were giving the world products that were higher in quality and lower in price than those made in America. With only 0.3 percent of the world's land and 2.7 percent of its population, Japan's Gross National Product exceeded 11 percent of the world's total output of goods and services. Japanese companies were providing higher quality products at substantially lower prices; U. S. companies were mired in complacency. While growth rates in Japan accelerated, the accumulated sins of U. S. companies became apparent as reversals in both domestic and overseas markets forced layoffs in the U.S..

Japan's economic resurgence grew out of the devastation wrought by World War Two. Saddled with the heavy costs of the war effort, weak demand, lack of natural resources and a reputation for shoddy products, the Japanese understood that they could neither retreat into economic isolationism nor play by America's rules in the international marketplace.. Dr. W. Edwards Deming, an American statistician who was invited to Japan in 1950, is generally credited with setting the Japanese on the course to recovery through becoming a world leader in quality products. He gave a series of lectures on statistical process control techniques that he had used at Bell Laboratories during the war. Deming distilled his experiences into the "Fourteen Points" and "Seven Deadly Diseases" that have become known throughout the world. Another American, Joseph M. Juran worked in Japan in the 1950's and focussed on meeting customer needs to generate profits while eliminating deficiencies to reduce costs. Many others, such as Crosby in the U.S. and Taguchi and Ishikawa in Japan, contributed to the development of the philosophies, principles, and practices known today as Total Quality Management.

KEY CONCEPTS

The Department of Defense defines Total Quality Management as:

...both a philosophy and a set of guiding principles that represent the foundation of a continuously improving organization. The application of quantitative methods and human resources to improve material and services supplied to an organization, all the processes within an organization, and the degree to which the needs of the customer are met now and in the future. (3)

Total Quality is a systematic approach for providing both an impetus for change and a means of managing change. It combines human, material and financial resources through strategic planning to increase productivity, product quality, and customer service while reducing costs. It demands that key processes be identified and held in control so that decisions can be based on facts. Total Quality holds as a basic tenet that the customer's perception of value received is the measure of merit for everything an organization does. Indeed, the reason an organization exists is to satisfy its customers; excellence flows from anticipating and exceeding those expectations. If customers are to remain well served, the core processes of the organization must be continually improved. It is a management responsibility to facilitate improvements by creating an environment where employees are encouraged and rewarded for analyzing processes and making changes. The concept of management as facilitator is not new, but the emphasis on involving production employees in operational changes is new.

Many Total Quality concepts are not revolutionary, but the placement of emphasis on customer needs and the synthesis of such management techniques as reducing levels of hierarchy, involving workers in decision making, applying sophisticated statistical techniques, and using teams to improve processes combine to form a new approach. The combination of "hard" techniques that require data driven decisions with "soft" techniques to transform management and workers into a high performance team becomes revolutionary when unified into a coherent strategy.

UNIFYING PRINCIPLES

Despite the proliferation of Total Quality "masters" each of whom has that contributed techniques, viewpoints and principles. Ronald Fortuna notes that "A surprisingly cohesive set of principles emerges:"

- Customer first orientation.
- Top management leadership of the quality improvement process.
- Focus on continuous improvement.
- Respect for employees and their knowledge; employees are actively involved in the improvement process.
- Reduction of product and process variation.
- Provision of ongoing education and training of employees.
- Familiarity with a statistical way of thinking and the use of statistical methods throughout the organization.
- Emphasis on prevention rather than detection.
- View of vendors as long-term partners.
- Performance measures that are consistent with the goals of the organization.
- Standardization-the development of and adherence to the best known ways to perform a given task.
- Emphasis of product and service quality in design.
- Cooperation and involvement of all functions within an organization.
- Awareness of the needs of internal customers.
- Substantial cultural change. (3.11)

Acceptance of these principles has been sweeping the nation's private and public institutions for a decade and the military establishment is no exception.

The United States Air Force and its reserve components have recognized that they must make profound changes in how they provide for the nation's security in a world where the pace of

change is accelerating. Futurist Alvin Toffler asserts that the world is at a "hinge of history" when "What is emerging is a radical new economic system running at far faster speeds than any in history." (4.28) The end of the Cold War and the conduct of the Gulf War are signs that the world's security systems and military systems are at hinges as well. A constancy of purpose must be sustained amidst the turmoil of change if U.S. military is to maintain its competitive edge. To provide this quantity, the U. S. Air Force has instituted Quality Air Force and the Air National Guard is implementing Quality Guard. Much of Total Quality Management is congruent with American military leadership principles and many of its tools are familiar, but its implementation requires a re-examination of the assumptions about the purposes, structures and practices that constitute the culture of our services.

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

To the degree that organizations are comprised of groups who share certain purposes, values, assumptions, and ways of doing things, they are cultures. Karr and Littman's research reveals corporate cultures to be one tenth visible and nine tenths invisible. Organization charts, regulations, and published policies are overt components of a culture, but it is the "values, habits, ways of thinking, and unofficial operating principles that, combined with (and sometimes contradicting) the official view" that constitute the unseen core of an organization's culture. (5.182) A culture's assumptions are implicit, understood without being articulated, even though they may be handed from one member to another through stories of events both significant and trivial. They arise out of shared experience and define not only the purpose of the organization, but what is valued and attainable, or forbidden. Culture meets its members' needs for meaning and helps define success by helping to answer Crowl's first question: "What is it about?" (6.212) Culture expresses the "personality" of the organization and provides the unifying force which guides its members' individual and group behavior. That force holds tremendous power to promote or thwart the adoption of behavioral changes that are essential to success. Failure to align the organization's culture with leadership's vision when beginning the Quality journey often manifests itself in "hitting the wall" of discouragement and disillusionment eighteen months to two years after

a promising start. Companies then find that they must stop, re-examine, and redefine themselves before the journey can be resumed. The values and expectations of people in the various subcultures within the company must be accounted for and harmonized to produce the unity of effort needed to break through the wall.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CULTURE

An organization's structure and its culture are inextricably intertwined. Structure influences behavior by determining formal communications channels and how groups within the organization relate to one another. It forms the framework on which the planning, budgeting, production, and reward systems are supported. Twentieth century corporate, Government, and military organizations have their roots in the Industrial Revolution. They feature specialization of functions, standardization of procedures, and a vertical chain of authority. Being hierarchical bureaucracies, they promote the development of expertise within specified boundaries with little cross functional communication. The myriad rules necessary to coordinate and control the various functions tend to evolve into a mass possessing considerable inertia. Inertia promotes a comfortable stability and the pursuit of stability may become a value within a culture. The redistribution of power, cross functional teamwork, and bias for change characteristic of the Total Quality culture conflict with the desire for stability inherent in bureaucracies.

ASSESSING RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

Leaders must address organizational culture before and throughout the change process if success is to be achieved. To help in assessing resistance to change, Rino Patti has identified four variables:

(1) the nature and type of the proposed change, (2) the style and value orientation of the decision maker, (3) the administrative distance between the decision maker and the person who proposes the change, and (4) the "sunk costs", or the investments, financial or psychological, that the organization or managers have made in the system that the change agent intends to alter. (7.73)

Nature and Type of the Proposed Change

Patti notes that in assessing the nature and type of change, both the scope and depth must be considered. Will the change affect the full spectrum of the organization or just selected units? Will the new regime bring simple changes to operating procedures, affect programs and policies or alter fundamental objectives? Implementing Total Quality involves profound changes at all three levels; it requires a transformation. The second of Deming's points, "Adopt the New Philosophy", requires: "a transformation of management. Structures have been put in place that will have to be dismantled....We will have to undergo total demolition of American style of management..."(1.59) Japanese experience is expressed by Hajime Karatsu: "Quality problems arise from the nature of the company as a whole...the entire company must strive for quality." (8.95) The CEO of a successful American corporation, Xerox, illustrates the depth of change required:

I became personally convinced that in order to enlist the support of our entire organization in quality improvement, we had to radically change our entire corporate culture-everything from the way we manage and work, the way we reward people, our communications...a complete revolution. (8.94)

Given the breadth and depth of change involved in adopting Total Quality, a high degree of resistance can be anticipated and it can be expected to persist. To counter resistance, the first requirement is leadership imbued with a clear vision that is clearly communicated to all parts of the organization. The vision must represent "an achievable, challenging and worthwhile long range target toward which people can direct their energies." (10.18) Training and education will help people to apply the vision to their organizational lives and give them the tools with which to succeed. Starting with small pilot projects and applying the new techniques can help people solve problems and pave the way for more profound change.

Style and Value Orientation of the Decision Maker

Decision makers will determine the priorities and emphasis given to deploying Total Quality. The level of commitment will ultimately determine the level of acceptance of change. Leaders in government may have less latitude than those in private enterprise, but they must be

seen to working to change the hierarchy above them to better support those carrying out changes below.

Administrative Distance

Each layer of administration within a bureaucracy presents an opportunity for a good idea to be modified, diluted or ignored. The number of levels between the originator of a proposal and the person with approval authority increases the likelihood that the idea will not arrive intact. In hierarchical organizations, conflicting ideas may arise in departments which seldom coordinate, generating resistance. Even in the absence of conflict, the very process of passing information from level to level generates friction that impedes change. The readiness to act on Deming's imperative to dismantle structures is likely to be slow in evolving. A strategy of instituting changes that do not require higher approval can be employed to make small, but significant improvements.

Sunk Costs

The threat to render valueless the time, money and personal stature that people have invested in current ways of doing business can stop change dead in its tracks. The concepts the organization holds about its purpose and identity may need to be examined. Ensuring that the vision is shared and that objectives are clear while inviting participation in the necessary changes will ameliorate resistance springing from sunk costs.

CHAPTER II

The preceding sections are intended to give the reader an understanding of the development and fundamental concepts of Total Quality Management and to engender an appreciation for the role that organizational culture plays in implementing change. The subsequent sections will address the introduction of Total Quality into the unique culture that is the Air National Guard.

QUALITY GUARD

Introducing Total Quality into military cultures, steeped as they are in traditions that relate to life and death, presents special challenges. Introducing it into a militia, which is closely associated with the professional military culture, but retains an identification with the citizenry, presents compound challenges. The Air National Guard is neither a strictly professional military force nor a classical militia, although it embodies characteristics of each. Its culture arose from traditions and experiences shared with, yet separate from, the United States Air Force and must be reckoned with if Quality Guard is to flourish.

HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS

Massachusetts militiamen sowed the seeds of a unique military culture and new nation at Lexington and Concord in April of 1775. Today's National Guard is an expression of the long-held American notion that the nation should look to the citizen soldier for its defense: that large standing armies pose a threat to the very liberties they are formed to protect. As a result, the relative balance between the active forces and the militia has varied with the national security environment and the willingness of the public to support large standing forces. The post World War II establishment of the Air Force as a separate service and the Air National Guard as a reserve component combined the doctrines of airpower with the traditions of the Minutemen. The political struggles over the independence of the Air Force and the status and control of the Air National Guard reverberate today. The Air National Guard, intended to be the primary source of

combat ready units, retained its role as a state militia responsible to the governors during peacetime. First comprised of eighty four flying and four hundred thirty support units the Guard was a force of fifty-eight thousand. Almost all combat experienced veterans were citizen soldiers. The thread of mutual suspicion which exists between the professional military and the militia colors the issues of control, funding, and readiness and is woven into the fabric that has tied the two together across the years. The professional force values its warrior status and the traditions of unlimited personal liability, obedience to command, insulation from its civilian leaders, and dedication to service and country. The Guard, while not rejecting the military ethic, tends to emphasize its willingness to "get the job done" in time of war, has the militia's distrust of power, is slightly irreverent toward the symbols of the military and prefers to engage its political leaders. It tends to reflect the citizen's concern for the individual and expects to be more of a partner, as opposed to being temporary help in any venture. What has in the past been interpreted as a reluctance to serve may more accurately be interpreted as a reflection of the citizenry's concern that the nation's course was unwise or that its objectives were unclear.

The Air National Guard, supported by its core of full-time staff, conducts daily training, participates in exercises, deployments and operational missions while maintaining readiness levels well above those expected of a traditional militia. It is proud of its people and of its ability to accomplish large tasks with small numbers. Its first-line aircraft, maintained well above standard are regularly proven both in competition and in war. The National Guard is proud of having "been there" in all of America's wars since the Revolution and more recently in Korea, the Berlin Crisis, Viet Nam and the Gulf War. To be sure there have been problems and progress has sometimes been uneven, but since the inception of the Total Force Policy in 1970, the Air Guard has become the capable force upon which the active service relied in the Persian Gulf.

Paraphrased here is a study by Charles Gross of the Air National Guard's role in the Persian Gulf crisis. In it he concludes that the Air Guard validated its approach to the total force policy in several ways:

The Air Guard was trained, equipped and ready to perform its mission when called upon.

The Air Guard did not wait to be called, it volunteered in large numbers and aggressively sought a role in the conflict.

The Air Guard participation was overwhelmingly in the area of support missions, most not involving flying, although the airlift and aerial refueling contribution was enormous.

By custom tailoring its response to provide individual volunteers, tailored groups of volunteers or mobilized Guardsmen instead of insisting on whole unit mobilization, the Guard redefined itself in terms of its accessibility in the post cold war world. (14)

The Air National Guard adds this new definition to its distinct set of assumptions about its purpose, history, identity and what it means to be a Guardsman. This culture presents unique challenges for the implementation of Total Quality. The first challenge is for the Guard to re-acquaint itself with its heritage. The veterans of World War II have taken their knowledge of the Guard into retirement while the expansion of Total Force and mobility commitments has consumed the time and energies of today's guardsmen. Little time has been available to put today's Air Guard into a historical and cultural context for its membership. That context must be restored for a vision of change to have clear meaning to guardsmen. The organization of the Air National Guard is part of that context and is changing with the times.

ORGANIZATION

The Air National Guard is organized to perform its wartime mission according to standard Air Force directives. Its wings, groups and squadrons report through their gaining Major Air Commands and are available to the warfighting Commanders in Chief. The gaining command concept differs from the area approach used by the Army. This arrangement constitutes a strength in that it provides gained units with interoperable equipment, identical training standards while promoting high levels of readiness. In their non-mobilized status, Guardsmen remain under the

control of the state governors through the adjutants general, while policy flows from the National Guard Bureau, through its Air Directorate at the Pentagon. Implementation of policy, support, and administration are provided by the Air National Guard Readiness Center located at Andrews Air Force Base. Dual status presents little conflict for Air Guard members: their missions, funding and aircraft are almost entirely federal and they see themselves as part of the national defense, closely tied to their gaining commands. Both combat readiness and implementation of Quality principles are assessed by the gaining commands and the National Guard has its own Quality Center and implementation process.

QUALITY GUARD PROCESS

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Director of the Air National Guard have announced their commitment to Quality Guard. An infrastructure has been established within the National Guard Bureau and resources have been allocated for training and implementation and a new support and training center established in the Washington D.C. area.

The process at state level typically begins with the adjutant general's organizing an executive council consisting of both Army and Air Guard senior leaders. Training of the leaders and formation of a state master plan occurs before implementation cascades to the unit. The units are analogous to individual franchises in a large corporation in that they are a part of the whole, yet possess a measure of autonomy.

It is at the unit level that subcultures begin to emerge. Each unit has its own answers to the questions of mission, vision and values; its own sense of identity and each subculture has its own version of the questions and the answers. Leaders, formal and informal, play a major role in shaping the culture. Senior leaders and supervisors tend to come from within and leave their personal stamp upon the unit. This tendency promotes an enduring corporate memory, economy of communication and shared values, but it can also result in stagnation and resistance to change.

Change must occur not only vertically along the familiar divisions of Operations, Logistics and Support; but across functional and personnel barriers. Within each division are both traditional and full-time members each with different expectations and viewpoints.

Traditional guard members are the soul of the Air Guard and are closest in spirit to the concept of the militia. Their reasons for membership are as varied as their backgrounds and occupations. Some may be primarily motivated by a love of aviation and adventure, others by the concept of service, some by the pay and retirement benefits. Because of the already high demands on their time, it is they who are most difficult to involve in the process of change, but it is they whom change must serve. The full-time leadership of the Guard must address this issue most earnestly while acknowledging its own investment in the status quo.

The full-time force adds an occupational dimension to the militia and to emerging military viewpoints. It is comprised of Federal Excepted Civil Service Technicians who must be military members and wear the uniform daily; members of the Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) program, and state employees who maintain the facilities. While AGR members may feel a closer affinity for the concerns of their active service counterparts, non-supervisory technicians and state employees may be concerned with the issues raised and negotiated by their unions. The civil service union position on Total Quality appears to be evolving.

Quality's cross-functional approach and its reliance on empowerment, accountability and consensus rather than negotiation would appear to raise concerns for those long immersed in the adversarial labor-management paradigm. Visions have power however, and the current administration is conversant with Quality principles. Executive Order 12871 dated 1 October 1993 establishes:

Labor - Management Partnerships

The involvement of Federal Government employees and their union representatives is essential to achieving the National Performance Review's Government reform objectives. Only by changing the nature of Federal labor-management relations so that managers, employees and employees elected union representatives serve as partners will it be possible to design and implement comprehensive changes necessary to reform Government. (10.52201)

The Executive Order establishes the National Partnership Council at the deputy secretary and union president level to support the creation of partnership efforts. The partnership approach

to labor-management relations had already met with success in the late 1980s at NASA's Lewis Research Center. In lieu of having disputes negotiated as part of the three year contract renewal process, management and AFGE local 2182 established a union management committee that was able to reduce the contract from 49 articles to eight. The union management committee is comprised of key leaders from each side and addresses problems as they arise. Closer to the operating levels, labor management participation teams research and recommend solutions to specific problems as needed. The door to change appears to be opening. Once opened in the federal sector, the door will beckon the state employee unions as well. (11.179)

Imbedded in any culture is the system of rewards and the hallmarks of success. The Air National Guard incorporates both the military and civil service evaluation, pay and promotion systems. Thus, it is infected with the third of Dr. Deming's "Seven Deadly Diseases" (12.36) evaluation by performance, merit rating or annual review of performance. Deming's objection to performance evaluations is that they promote rivalry and build fear. Performance appraisals tend to become one way communication and are subject to rater bias and institutional gaming because of the risk of condemning the typical worker with faint praise. While elimination of ratings may not be practical in the Federal military system, they must be re-oriented to reward teamwork if trust and a shared vision are to flourish.

REQUIREMENTS FOR CHANGE

If change is both desirable and inevitable and successful change must occur at the cultural level, how is change in a culture as complex as the Air National Guard to be effected? Herbert Jasper suggests:

The pillars of cultural change are: focus on customers...:data-driven continuous improvement; and new ways to involve employees in joint identification and solution of problems. (13.37)

To erect these pillars, the first requirement is leadership. Leadership is both a quality and a process by which the actions of a group are directed toward goals. It is founded on a vision of how things ought to be and sustained by the integrity and commitment of the leader. Leadership is

expressed in the trust bestowed by those who are led. As a quality, its attributes include vision, courage, competence, personal empowerment and a caring attitude. Leaders build teams; they awaken people's talents and encourage them in ways that produce results satisfying to both customers and team members. John F. Welch, Jr., CEO of General Electric reveals that his company divides leaders into four groups:

Type 1 leaders deliver on commitments and share the company's values. Their futures are bright. Type 2 leaders, on the other hand, do not deliver on commitments and do not share the company's values. They do not last long. Type 3 leaders are those who have difficulty delivering on commitments but who share the company's values; they are given a second chance and are relocated.

The final class, Type 4 leaders, deliver on commitments but do not share the company's values. they are autocrats...who squeeze their people... Their performance is good, but only in the short run...We cannot afford management styles that suppress and intimidate. (9.17)

Vision is the ability to see where the group must go and how it is to get there. It is not so much a dream as a recognition of possibilities. Vision makes clear a desired state, what the organization is to become. It depends not on what is realistic, but what is hoped to be. The ability to perceive connections where others see only data allows the leader to scan the whole horizon for opportunity. The leader must then set the goals and provide the direction, but the key to success lies in tapping the core values of the group. The leader's vision must incorporate those values or articulate new ones and convincingly show how those values will be served if a goal is to be pursued. Without a profound understanding of the foundations, development, and importance of those values, the vision will fall short. Without the vision there will be no purposeful change.

Courage embraces the military virtues of integrity, honesty, self-sacrifice and loyalty. Its expression lies in commitment to act in ways that affirm and promotes those virtues and the values implicit in the vision. Without commitment the vision will become but a dream. Courage is also a

willingness to take risks and accept the responsibility for outcomes while holding to a constancy of purpose. There will be failures, false starts and people who lose faith and advise returning to the old ways. In the words of Machiavelli: "There is nothing so difficult or perilous than to take the lead in the introduction of change." (3.54)

Competence, a thorough knowledge of one's profession, is owed to those who would be led. Competence must extend beyond the journeyman level to mastery; it must include the communication skills and management acumen appropriate to the level of responsibility. Leaders must attain competence in the precepts, practices and tools of Quality before implementation can successfully begin.

Personal empowerment creates ownership at all levels. It is enabling people to exercise authority and be responsible for achieving the highest quality possible. It affirms people's expertise in their work and asks them how best to improve the processes that they own.

The attitude of caring must extend beyond good intentions and warm feelings. The dictum that people don't care how much you know until they know how much you care may be trite, but it expresses an essential quality of anyone who would presume to change the culture by which people largely define their purpose.

The process of leadership involves translating the vision into goals and making their attainment possible. Leadership is a vector having both direction and magnitude. The direction must be in concert with the vision and the magnitude of sufficient force to be sustainable. It must teach by example over and over again how the new culture should function to serve its members and their shared vision.

As culture change becomes a reality, structural and systems changes can bear the fruit they are intended to produce. Structural change is underway. The Objective Wing structure is being introduced into the Air National Guard. The new structure is designed to flatten the organizational hierarchy and group functions to serve their customers. Adopting this structure better aligns the Air Guard with the gaining command structure in the event of mobilization.

Systems changes such as the stock funding of depot level reparables are occurring at The Department of Defense level, but also affect Guard operations profoundly. Stock funding of reparables has provided an incentive to constantly improve operations and logistics practices by returning a portion of funds saved through efficiency to commanders for re-allocation. Allocating those funds fill the authorized Quality Advisor position would signal the depth of commitment needed to be highly successful in becoming Quality Guard.

In their widely read book In Search of Excellence, (12.119) Thomas Peters and Robert Waterman describe nine characteristics of highly successful companies:

1. Managing ambiguity and paradox. Chaos is the rule of business, not the exception. The business climate is always uncertain and always ambiguous. The rational, numerical approach does not always work because we live in irrational times.

2. A bias for action. Do it, try it, fix it. The point is to try something, without the fear of failure. Sochiro, founder of Honda said that only 1 out of 100 of his ideas worked. Fortunately for him, he kept trying after his 99th failure.

3. Close to the customer. Excellent companies have an almost uncanny feel for what their customer wants. This is because they are a customer of their own product, or they listen closely to their customer.

4. Autonomy and entrepreneurship. Ownership of a department, tasking or problem is essential in motivating employees. It is the most cited reason for entering into self-employment. Excellent companies allow and encourage autonomy within company entrepreneurship.

5. Productivity through people. Not surprisingly, people act in accordance with their treatment. Treat them as being untrustworthy, and they will be. Treat them as business partners, and they will be. Excellent companies have taken the leap of faith required to trust your employees to do the right thing right.

6. Hands-on, value driven. Practice management by walking around. Constantly ask what the value added is of every process and procedure.

7. **Stick to the knitting.** Stay close to the basic industry of your organization. The skills or culture involved in a different industry may be a shock that is fatal to the organization.

8. **Simple form, lean staff.** Flat organizations unencumbered by a heavy headquarters characterize the excellent companies.

9. **Loose-tight properties.** Tight control is maintained while at the same time allowing staff far more flexibility than is the norm.

These attributes are the result of progressing from an "as is" state to a "to be" condition that involves the basic beliefs and motivations of everybody in the organization. It grows from shared purpose and well defined goals. The leaders of the companies described by Peters and Waterman invest time and energy assessing and understanding their culture and promoting implicit acceptance of goals based on shared values.

CONCLUSION

As change sweeps over American institutions, a system of managing that change is being adopted. Total Quality Management embodies principles, practices and tools that fit together into a systematic method of channeling change toward desired ends. Organizations seeking to apply these tools must first assess their members' most basic assumptions about their purpose, vision and values. Those assumptions, where they came from and how they are communicated form the crucial component of organizational life, corporate culture. An appreciation of the development and role of culture gives military commanders a powerful tool with which to effect change while improving mission accomplishment. The current generation of guardsmen must become better versed in the development of that culture and how it relates to the active component culture. Because behavior is embedded in culture, no profound change will be possible or sustainable unless the culture is well understood. Only then will Air Guard units be prepared to encourage new behavior and permit its success.

The Air National Guard is a repository of complex values, experiences and beliefs. Similar to but separate from the active component, the Air Guard is embracing Quality as a way of meeting the challenges of a world that is changing faster than we can perceive. The cultural

reordering that must occur is a function of leadership; it must be understood by leaders, explained by leaders, and enacted by leaders.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Air National Guard must know itself before it attempts to become something new. The National Guard Bureau should revitalize its internal education program to ensure that each member has a deep appreciation of the roots, the traditions, and the role of the Guard in American society.
2. Each unit must find a way to draw upon the expertise of the many traditional guardsmen whose civilian employers may have implemented Quality principles some time ago.
3. As the force structure of the United States military shrinks, The Air National Guard must avoid the pitfalls of attempting to maximize the short term while it restructures its own force. The Guard must exploit its unique capabilities to define and seek long term missions that are essential to the defense of the nation and in keeping with the role of a militia.

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