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# JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY DECEPTION

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
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
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JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY DECEPTION

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JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY DECEPTION

PREFACE

1. Purpose. This publication sets forth doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations as well as the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

2. Application

a. The doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. In applying the doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures set forth in this publication, care must be taken to distinguish between distinct but related responsibilities in the two channels of authority to forces assigned to combatant commands. The Military Departments and Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces. This authority is, by law, subject to the provisions of title 10, United States Code, chapter 6, which is the section that details the authority of combatant commanders. These commanders exercise combatant command (command authority) over their assigned forces. Service component commanders are subject to the orders of combatant commanders, and subject to the combatant commander's direction, are also responsible to the Military Departments and

Services in the exercise of their administrative and support responsibilities.

c. This publication is authoritative but not directive. Commanders will exercise judgment in applying the procedures herein to accomplish their missions. This doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures should be followed, except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

3. Scope. Military deception operations are conducted by the commanders of combatant commands and subordinate joint forces in support of overall campaign objectives. This publication provides fundamental guidance and principles for the planning and execution of military deception at the combatant command/subordinate joint force level.

4. Basis. This publication is published in accordance with CJCS Instruction 3211.01A, "Joint Military Deception," and CJCS Memorandum of Policy 30 (MOP 30), "Command and Control Warfare."

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I GENERAL .....	I-1
Policy .....	I-1
Definition .....	I-1
Applicability .....	I-1
Deception and the Principles of War .....	I-2
Principles of Military Deception .....	I-2
Coordination with Civil and Public Affairs .....	I-3
II MILITARY DECEPTION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE .....	II-1
Command and Control Warfare (C2W) .....	II-1
Deception's Relationship to Intelligence and the Other C2W Tools .....	II-1
C2W Planning and Deception .....	II-5
III ROLES, COORDINATION, AND TRAINING .....	III-1
Roles .....	III-1
Coordination .....	III-1
Training .....	III-2
IV MILITARY DECEPTION PLANNING PROCESS .....	IV-1
Deception Planning .....	IV-1
The Deception Planning Process .....	IV-2
Step 1: Deception Mission Analysis .....	IV-2
Step 2: Deception Planning Guidance .....	IV-2
Step 3: Staff Deception Estimate .....	IV-2
Step 4: Commander's Deception Estimate .....	IV-4
Step 5: Deception Plan Development .....	IV-4
Step 6: Deception Plan Review and Approval ..	IV-12
V MILITARY DECEPTION PLANNING AND THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESSES .....	V-1
Integration .....	V-1
Planning Considerations .....	V-1
Deception Planning and the Joint Planning Processes .....	V-1
The Deliberate Planning Process .....	V-1
The Crisis Action Planning Process .....	V-2
The Campaign Planning Process .....	V-2

**APPENDIX**

A References ..... A-1  
B Explanation of Military Deception Terminology . B-1  
C Suggested Background Readings ..... C-1  
D Users Evaluation Report on Joint Pub 3-58 ..... D-1

**Glossary**

Part I--Abbreviations and Acronyms ..... GL-1  
Part II--Terms and Definitions ..... GL-1

**FIGURE**

IV-1 Deception Event Schedule ..... IV-10

CHAPTER I

GENERAL

1. Policy. CJCS Instruction 3211.01A provides joint policy guidance for military deception. Reference should be made to that document for information concerning responsibilities relating to military deception and for specific procedures and restrictions relating to military deceptions planned and conducted in support of joint operations.

2. Definition. Military deception is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decisionmakers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

3. Applicability

a. Military deception is applicable at each level of war and across the range of military operations.

b. Military deception can employed during all phases of military operations.

(1) Preparatory Phase: Deceptions conducted during the preparatory period of military operations are intended to increase the potential for successful defense against anticipated adversary actions or to increase the potential for the successful initiation of offensive action. The preparatory phase starts with the notification to commanders to ready forces for military operations (e.g., recall of personnel; fueling units; loading of weapons; improving materiel readiness; mission-related exercises and rehearsals; and deployments, build-ups, and disposition of forces and sustainment resources). Deceptions during this phase may be used to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces.

(2) Execution Phase: The execution phase of military operations starts when forces move to execute assigned missions and ends when the objectives of the operation are achieved. Deceptions in this phase may be used to mislead the adversary as to the time and location of the

introduction of forces into the theater of operations, the location of the main effort, and the command's operational objectives.

(3) Postexecution Phase: The postexecution phase starts when forces redeploy or withdraw or consolidate control over an area. It may merge with the preparatory period of the next military operation. Deceptions may be conducted to support redeployment or withdrawal operations, to protect sensitive operational capabilities from being revealed, and to establish favorable conditions for subsequent military operations.

4. Deception and the Principles of War. Military deception is a tool to be used by joint force commanders (JFCs) to assist them in accomplishing their missions. Military deception assists a commander in attaining surprise, security, mass, and economy of force. Military deception supports military operations by causing adversaries to misallocate resources in time, place, quantity, or effectiveness.

5. Principles of Military Deception. Just as the principles of war provide general guidance for the conduct of military operations, six principles of military deception provide guidance for the planning and execution of deception operations.

a. Focus. The deception must target the adversary decisionmaker capable of taking the desired action(s). The adversary's intelligence system is normally not the target. It is only the primary conduit used by deceivers to get selected information to the decisionmaker.

b. Objective. The objective of the deception must be to cause an adversary to take (or not to take) specific actions, not just to believe certain things.

c. Centralized Control. A deception operation must be directed and controlled by a single element. This is required in order to avoid confusion and to ensure that the various elements involved in the deception are portraying the same story and are not in conflict with other operational objectives. Execution of the deception may, however, be decentralized so long as all participating organizations are adhering to a single plan.

d. Security. Knowledge of a force's intent to deceive and the execution of that intent must be denied to adversaries. Successful deception operations require strict security. Need-to-know criteria must be applied to each deception operation and to each aspect of that operation. Along with an active operations security (OPSEC) effort to deny critical information about both actual and deception activities, knowledge of deception plans and orders must be carefully protected.

e. Timeliness. A deception operation requires careful timing. Sufficient time must be provided for its portrayal; for the adversary's intelligence system to collect, analyze, and report; for the adversary decisionmaker to react; and for the friendly intelligence system to detect the action resulting from the adversary decisionmaker's decision.

f. Integration. Each deception must be fully integrated with the basic operation that it is supporting. The development of the deception concept must occur as part of the development of the commander's concept of operations. Deception planning should occur simultaneously with operational planning.

6. Coordination with Civil and Public Affairs

a. Civil Affairs

(1) Civil Affairs (CA) operations are conducted as part of the overall US political, military, economic, and informational effort and may occur before, during, or subsequent to other military operations. CA operations are conducted to gain maximum support for US forces from the civilian population. CA contributes to the success of military operations and projects a favorable US image throughout the area of operations.

(2) Military deception efforts should be coordinated with CA, and with those psychological operations (PSYOP) activities that support CA, to ensure that deception does not inadvertently undermine the relationships with civilian population or with host nation military authorities. Additionally, failure to consider CA could result in the compromise of deception plans.

b. Public Affairs.

(1) Deception operations will not intentionally target or mislead the US public, the US Congress, or the US news media. Misinforming the media about military capabilities and intentions in ways that influence US decisionmakers and public opinion is contrary to DOD policy.

(2) Deception operations that have activities potentially visible to the media or the public should be coordinated with the appropriate public affairs officers to identify any potential problems. Coordination will reduce the chance that public affairs officers will inadvertently reveal information that could undermine ongoing or planned deception operations.



## CHAPTER II

## MILITARY DECEPTION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE

1. Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

a. C2W is the integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control (C2) capabilities, while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions. The synergistic application of the five C2W tools magnifies their combat power. This synergism is the essence of C2W.

b. While the objective of C2W in many situations may be to "decapitate the enemy's command structure from its body of combat forces" (CJCS MOP 30), this is not always the case. There will be situations where it is more advantageous to leave adversary commanders, who are known to be vulnerable to being influenced by deception operations, in complete control of their forces. In these situations, deception may be the main thrust of the C2W operation while the other C2W tools would be used to control the adversary commander's ability to see the battlefield.

2. Deception's Relationship to Intelligence and the Other C2W Tools. As part of the C2W warfighting strategy, military deception conducted in support of joint operations seeks to influence adversary military commanders and to degrade their C2 capabilities. When supporting joint operations, military deception is done in conjunction with the overall C2W effort. It reinforces and is reinforced by the execution of other C2W tools.

a. Deception and Intelligence

(1) Intelligence and counterintelligence are critical to deception during the planning, execution, and termination phases of every deception operation. Intelligence and counterintelligence perform the following essential functions for deception planners:

(a) Identify adversary decisionmakers and assesses the vulnerability of the decisionmakers to deception.

(b) Determine the adversary's perceptions of friendly capabilities and possible courses of action.

(c) Provide estimates of adversary actions under differing scenarios and war games possible outcomes with the deception planner.

(d) Establish and monitor feedback channels to evaluate success of the deception operation through observation of the adversary's reaction.

(e) Identify adversary information gathering capabilities and communication systems to determine the best deception conduits.

(f) Penetrate adversary OPSEC measures and deceptions in support of C2 protection.

(2) Deception planners must keep intelligence analysts aware of ongoing deception operations. The analysts must look for feedback about the operation and consider the impact, both intended and unintended, of those operations as they seek to identify possible future adversary courses of action.

b. Deception and PSYOP

(1) Similar to military deception, military PSYOP is a systematic process of conveying tailored messages to a selected audience. It promotes particular themes that result in desired foreign attitudes and behaviors that can augment US efforts to achieve specific objectives. PSYOP normally targets groups while deception targets specific individuals. An individual targeted by deception may also be part of a PSYOP target group.

(2) Groups that might be suitable for targeting by PSYOP in support of deception operations include adversary command groups, planning staffs, specific factions within staffs, nonmilitary interest groups who can influence military policies and decisions, and intelligence systems analysts.

(3) Through the skillful use of associated truths, PSYOP can magnify the effects of and reinforce the deception plan. Dedicated PSYOP dissemination assets can discretely convey intended information to selected

target audiences through appropriate "key communicator" backchannel networks.

(4) PSYOP actions convey information not only to the intended target audiences but also to foreign intelligence systems. Therefore, PSYOP objectives and actions must be consistent with the other C2W objectives and actions.

(5) Additionally, some deception actions will not only convey information to the deception target but also to the PSYOP audience. This provides the opportunity for mutual support if deception and PSYOP are carefully coordinated.

c. Deception and Operations Security

(1) OPSEC is the process for denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting the generally unclassified evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive activities. This unclassified evidence (called OPSEC indicators) is created by friendly detectable actions or is available in open-source information.

(2) OPSEC measures are those actions that organizations take to control their OPSEC indicators. This is done to deny critical information to an adversary. Critical information is that information an adversary requires to counter friendly operations.

(3) OPSEC and deception have much in common. Both require the management of indicators. OPSEC seeks to limit an adversary's ability to detect or derive useful information from observing friendly activities. Deception seeks to create or increase the likelihood of detection of certain indicators in order to cause an adversary to derive an incorrect conclusion.

(4) Deception can be used to directly support OPSEC. Cover stories provide plausible explanations for activities that cannot be hidden. False vehicle or aircraft markings disguise the deployment of specific forces. Major deception operations create numerous false indicators making it more difficult for adversary intelligence analysts to identify the real indicators that OPSEC is seeking to control.

(5) The OPSEC process supports deception. The OPSEC process identifies the key questions about friendly capabilities and intentions to which adversary commanders need answers to effectively prepare to counteract friendly operations. The process also identifies the critical information that answers many of those questions. Deception planners set out to provide another set of answers to those questions-- answers that provide the adversary with plausible information that induces certain desired actions.

(6) An OPSEC analysis of a planned activity or operation will identify potential OPSEC vulnerabilities. Those vulnerabilities may be useful to deception planners as possible conduits for passing deceptive information to an adversary.

(7) Deception actions often need their own OPSEC protection. The existence of a deception operation, in and of itself, may convey OPSEC indicators that reveal to the opposing commander the actual friendly intentions. An OPSEC analysis of the planned deception is needed to protect against just such an inadvertent or unintentional outcome.

d. Deception and EW

(1) EW is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack an adversary.

(2) Deception, in conjunction with OPSEC, supports EW operations by being used to protect the development, acquisition, and deployment of sensitive EW capabilities. Deception can also be used to support the employment of EW units and systems.

(3) In turn, EW can be used to support deception. Electromagnetic deception is a form of electronic attack (EA) and a technical means of deception. EW can be used in support of feints, demonstrations, and displays. The positioning of a majority of a command's EW systems in a particular area can be used to create an indicator of the command's intended main effort. The disruption of an adversary's intelligence and command communications capabilities can facilitate the insertion of deceptive information. EW attacks on intelligence collection and radar systems can be used to shape and control the adversary's ability to see certain activities.

(4) EW planning should be closely coordinated with deception and intelligence planners to ensure that EW does not disrupt any adversary C2 systems that are being used as deception conduits or that are providing intelligence feedback.

e. Deception and Physical Destruction

(1) The relationship of deception and physical destruction is very similar to that of deception and EW. Deception, used in conjunction with OPSEC, can be used to protect the development, acquisition, and deployment of physical destruction systems. It can mislead an adversary as to true capabilities and purpose of a weapon system.

(2) Physical destruction can support deception by shaping an adversary's intelligence collection capability by destroying or nullifying selected intelligence systems or sites. Attacks can be used to mask the main effort from the adversary.

3. C2W Planning and Deception

a. C2W planning is an integrated process conducted by a working group composed of the planners who represent each of the five C2W tools. There is no separate C2W planning staff.

b. C2W planning begins with the commander stating the C2W objective and providing C2W planning guidance to the staff. The C2W working group seeks to identify the correct mix of actions that will accomplish the commander's objective. The mix will be different for each situation. It will depend upon the mission, the friendly force capabilities, the friendly C2 system, the adversary, the adversary's C2 system and capabilities, the area of operations, and the rules of engagement. In every situation, the C2W working group must consider each of the C2W tools.

c. Joint Pub 3-13 describes the C2W planning process in detail.

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CHAPTER III

ROLES, COORDINATION, AND TRAINING

1. Roles

a. Commanders. JFCs make military deception an integral part of their planning. They assign C2W and military deception objectives; direct coordination among subordinate, supporting, and component commanders; and redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of the overall mission.

b. Operational Planners. Operational planners oversee C2W and deception planning. They incorporate counter-C2 and C2-protection concepts (including deception) into operations estimates. They recommend C2W courses of action to commanders for their consideration. They supervise the planning and execution of deceptions.

c. Military Deception Planners. Deception planners take the JFC's guidance and develop it into a detailed deception plan. They integrate the deception plan with the basic operation plan and with the other C2W tools. Deception planners ensure that their command's deception capabilities are used to the fullest extent possible.

d. Other Planners. All joint staff planners, not just the deception planners, consider using military deception when they develop their courses of action. Additionally, they support deception planning by providing subject matter expertise on their areas of responsibility.

2. Coordination

a. Military deception and its supporting actions must be coordinated with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting staffs.

b. Within a joint staff, coordination is required between the deception and C2W planners on the operations staff and the planners and analysts in the intelligence staff. Also, within the constraints of the need-to-know criteria, deception planners may need to coordinate with other staff elements such as logistics and communications.

c. Despite coordination requirements, knowledge of information relating to planned and ongoing deception operations must be restricted to only those personnel who meet the strictly defined need-to-know criteria.

(1) The JFC is responsible for providing guidance concerning the dissemination of deception-related information. During multinational operations, the JFC must be particularly sensitive to information requirements and concerns of the non-US members.

(2) During planning, deception planners develop need-to-know criteria that permit necessary coordination while limiting the number of individuals with knowledge of the deception. Only a few individuals require access to the entire deception plan. Others require only knowledge of limited portions of the plan. The need-to-know criteria should address these different levels of required access.

d. Deception operations can benefit from normally occurring activity provided that the activity fits the deception story. Conversely, actual operations have the potential to create OPSEC indicators that pose a threat to the effectiveness of deception operations. These real indicators may conflict with the deception story. Deception and OPSEC planners will have to coordinate with organizations that create these indicators to limit potential adverse effect or to maximize their deception potential.

e. In some situations, a joint command may lack the capability to convey certain types of deceptive information to the adversary. Other organizations, however, may have the required capability. PSYOP organizations can discretely convey tailored messages to selected target audiences through appropriate "key communicators" backchannel networks. Deception planners should conduct the coordination required to obtain the necessary support from those organizations and to integrate, coordinate, and deconflict deception and actual operations.

f. Deception planners should be supported by assigned liaison officers from intelligence and counterintelligence organizations. The liaison officers will provide all-source estimates upon which to base plans and real-time all-source feedback about the effectiveness of deception actions.

3. Training. Joint commands should ensure that their staffs and units receive training in deception. Additionally, joint operational and deception planners should receive appropriate deception training. Staff training can be accomplished during



command post exercises, war games, and conceptual exercises during the preparatory and execution periods of field exercises or routine forward deployments. Seminars, briefings, and other such activities can also be used for training both individuals and staffs. Unit training can be conducted during exercises.

a. Joint Commanders and Staffs. To effectively plan and execute military deceptions, commanders and their staffs should understand:

- (1) The role of military deception in C2W.
- (2) Deception's value as a force multiplier and as a cost effective tool for achieving operational objectives.
- (3) What is required to plan and execute effective deception.
- (4) The policies that govern the use of deception.

b. Joint Operational Planners. Those assigned as operational planners should understand:

- (1) The process for addressing military deception during preparation of staff and commanders estimates and the origination of courses of action (COAs).
- (2) The broad range of what can and cannot reasonably be executed as deception.
- (3) How the other C2W tools support deception.
- (4) Deception's role in military history.

c. Deception Planners. The selection and training of deception planners are critical. It is essential that military deception planners possess fertile imaginations, since the ability to create and execute an effective deception often depends upon the creativity used to develop and maintain a story. Deception planners must:

- (1) Understand each component's deception and other C2W capabilities.
- (2) Be intimately familiar with their command's assigned missions and area of responsibility.
- (3) Understand the concepts of centers of gravity, calculated risk, initiative, security, and surprise.

(4) Understand friendly and adversary intelligence systems and how they function.

(5) Possess technical understandings of intelligence sensors, the platforms on which they deploy, their reporting capabilities, and associated processing methodologies.

(6) Understand the psychological and cultural factors that might influence the adversary's planning and decisionmaking.

(7) Understand potential adversaries' planning and decisionmaking processes (both formal and informal).

(8) Understand the specialized C2W devices and weapon systems that are available to support the deception.

## CHAPTER IV

## MILITARY DECEPTION PLANNING PROCESS

1. Deception Planning

a. As with all joint planning, deception planning is an iterative process that requires continual reexamination of its objectives, target, stories, and means throughout the planning and execution phases. Although diagrams of planning processes are useful in aiding the understanding of the relationship of the individual elements of the process, it must be remembered that processes are seldom as linear as diagrams or flow charts may imply. Deception planners must be prepared to respond to the dynamics of the situation and of their own headquarters.

b. Chapter V discusses how the military deception planning process relates to the major joint planning processes. Appendix B discusses the unique deception terminology used in this chapter.

c. A key factor that must be considered during deception planning is risk. At each stage of deception planning, the deception planners must carefully consider the risks involved with using deception. The overriding consideration in risk analysis is the comparison between the risk taken and the possible benefits of the deception. Major determining factors include:

(1) Deception Failure. Deceptions may fail for many reasons. It is possible that the target will not receive the story, not believe the story, be unable to act, be indecisive even if the story is believed, act in unforeseen ways, or may discover the deception. The failure or exposure of the deception can significantly affect the friendly commander's operational activities. For this reason, a commander must understand the risks associated with basing the success of any operation on the anticipated success of a deception.

(2) Exposure of Means or Feedback Channels. Even if a deception is successful, the deception means or feedback channels that were used may be compromised. The risk of compromise of sensitive means and feedback channels must be carefully weighed against the perceived benefits of a deception operation.

(3) Unintended Effects. Third parties (e.g., neutral or friendly forces not read into the deception) may receive and act on deception information intended for the deception target. Deception planners must ensure that they are knowledgeable about friendly operational planning at the joint and multinational force level and at the component level to minimize the risk to third parties.

## 2. The Deception Planning Process

a. Step 1: Deception Mission Analysis. Deception mission analysis is conducted as part of the overall mission analysis that is done by a JFC following receipt of a new mission. The JFC, assisted by the staff, studies all available information about the mission, the proposed area of operations, and the potential adversaries. During the analysis, the JFC considers how deception can support the accomplishment of the mission. Deception may not be applicable to every situation, but it must be considered, especially at the operational level. Even in situations where operational or tactical deceptions are inappropriate, there will normally be a role for military deception in support of OPSEC.

b. Step 2: Deception Planning Guidance. After completion of the mission analysis, the commander issues planning guidance to the staff. In addition to other guidance, the commander states the **deception objective** for the operation. The commander may go on to provide additional guidance concerning specific deception COAs that the staff should address when preparing estimates.

### c. Step 3: Staff Deception Estimate

(1) The deception estimate is conducted as part of the operations estimate. Working with the operational planners, the other C2W planners, and intelligence analysts, the deception planners gather and analyze information relating to the adversary. They identify the key decisionmakers and study all available information relating to their backgrounds and psychological profiles. They consider the adversary's C2 system and decisionmaking process. They study its intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. They identify any preconceptions that the adversary leadership may have about friendly intentions and capabilities. With the intelligence analysts, the

analysts, the deception planners seek to identify any COAs that the adversary may have adopted or has under consideration.

(2) Intelligence analysts from J-2 play a critical role in developing the deception estimate.

(a) They identify the current possible (and, when justified by the evidence, probable) adversary courses of action and the adversary's rationale for taking those actions.

(b) Analysts help the deception planners understand how the adversary decisionmakers, their staffs, and trusted advisors perceive friendly capabilities and intentions and how the adversary is likely to react to the deception.

(c) They explain how the adversary processes, filters, ascribes meaning to, and uses information.

(3) On the basis of the information developed during the initial estimate process, the deception planners, working directly with the operations planners and the other C2W planners, develop several **deception COAs**. The proposed deception COAs must each be capable of accomplishing the commander's deception objective. They must be integrated with the operational COAs that are being developed.

(4) A deception COA will restate the **deception objective** and identify the proposed **deception target** and the **desired perception**. It will outline the **deception story** that would be used to create the desired perception and identify, in general terms, possible **deception means**.

(5) In many cases, actual COAs developed by the operational planners will provide the basis for deception COAs. Using COAs developed by operational planners helps to ensure that the deception COAs will be feasible and practical military options. Additionally, the proposed deception COAs should seek to promote actions that the adversary is already conducting or is believed to be considering.

(6) The strengths and weaknesses of each of the proposed deception COAs are analyzed. Some of the major considerations are feasibility, impact on actual operations, and security. How the deception COAs support the overall C2W concept of operations is also considered. Planners preparing logistics, personnel, and intelligence estimates must also determine if the concepts they are examining can support the proposed deception COAs and to determine the potential impact of the deceptions on their ability to support the operational mission.

(7) In the final phase of the estimate process, the operational planners consider deception during their comparison of the proposed friendly operational COAs. The ability of deception, along with the other C2W tools, to support a particular friendly COA should be one of the factors considered when determining which proposed COA should be recommended for adoption by the JFC.

d. Step 4: Commander's Deception Estimate

(1) Using the staff estimates as a basis, the JFC conducts an estimate. The JFC selects an operational COA for development into an operation plan or order and issues any necessary additional guidance. At the same time, the JFC selects the supporting deception COA.

(2) The JFC's decision becomes the basis for the development of the selected deception COA into a complete plan or order. As in the other steps in the process, the deception planners work very closely with other planners to ensure that the deception plan and the operational plan are mutually supporting.

(3) The component deception planners, if not already participating, should be brought into the planning process at this point to ensure that their units can support the plan.

e. Step 5: Deception Plan Development. Developing a complete deception plan is the most time consuming part of the planning process. There are five major actions in this step: complete the story, identify the means, develop the event schedule, identify feedback channels, and develop the termination concept.

(1) Complete the Deception Story

(a) During the estimate an outline deception story was developed. That outline now needs to be transformed into a fully developed story. The deception planners must identify all the actions the adversary's intelligence system would expect to see if friendly forces were actually executing the deception story. The deception planners will require the assistance of operational, logistics, and communications planners to ensure that all normal activities are identified.

(b) A key element to be considered in developing the deception story is time. The deception planners must determine how much time is available to present the deception story and estimate how long will be required for the deception target to make the decision to take the desired action. The available time may determine the scope and depth of the story. The following time related issues should be analyzed during the development of the deception story:

1. Time of Maximum Disadvantage. When is the adversary's action (or inaction) required: tomorrow, next week, or next month? The scope of the deception operation may be limited by the amount of time available for its planning and execution.

2. The Deception Target. Is the target cautious or bold? Will the target react to initial indicators, or will the target demand extensive confirmation through other intelligence sources before reaching a decision? How long does it normally take the target to make a decision?

3. Opposing Force Execution. Once the decision is made, how long will the target need to formulate and issue an order? How long will it take the adversary to perform the desired action? For example, if the deception objective is the movement of an enemy squadron to

some distant point, time must be allowed for the deception target to issue the movement order and for squadron to receive and execute the order.

4. Intelligence Processing. How much time should be allowed for the adversary's detection and collection systems to collect, analyze, and provide the deception target the false intelligence created by the deception? This will vary depending of the target's level of command.

5. Execution of the Deception Tasks. When must displays, demonstrations, feints and other actions begin to be observable by the adversary's intelligence system? How long should each last?

(2) Identify the Deception Means. Once the story is fully developed, the deception planners identify the means that will be used to portray the story. This action requires a detailed understanding of the adversary's intelligence system and of friendly force operations.

(a) Determine Adversary's Detection and Collection Capabilities. The first action in means selection is determining the adversary's detection and collection capabilities.

1. Adversary detection and collection systems vary greatly in their capabilities. The intelligence staff can provide multidiscipline counter-intelligence products that will identify a particular adversary's capabilities.

2. Most intelligence collection systems include, at a minimum, human intelligence (HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and some signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities. More sophisticated systems will include aerial and satellite reconnaissance, and extensive SIGINT capabilities.



3. Each adversary must be studied to determine its particular collection capabilities. If possible, a determination should also be made as to which intelligence capability the deception target most relies upon for information during decisionmaking.

(b) Identify Indicators. The second action in means selection is to determine the specific indicators that are associated with the activities needed to portray the deception story. The collection of indicators associated with a particular unit or activity is commonly referred to as a unit profile. The profile is more than just a listing of equipment. The operational patterns (where, when, and how normal activities occur) associated with a unit or activities are also part of a profile.

1. This action requires detailed knowledge of friendly operations. If, for example, the plan calls for the electronic portrayal of a carrier task force, the deception planners must know what emitters are normally associated with that element.

2. If the main command post of an Army heavy maneuver brigade is to be portrayed electronically and visually, then the planner will need to know not only what communications systems are found in the command post but also how many vehicles and of what types, how many tents, and where and in what pattern the vehicles and tents are normally located.

3. Units of similar sizes can have very different profiles. Marine Air-Ground Task Forces and Army mechanized brigades have different profiles because of different equipment and communications systems. A logistics brigade's profile differs from both not only because of equipment differences but also because of where and how it normally operates on the battlefield.

4. Indicator and profile information should be available from the component deception planners. An additional source is OPSEC program officers. They are also concerned about indicator and unit profiles.

5. To facilitate planning, joint deception planners, working with component planners and OPSEC program officers, should develop friendly unit indicator and profile data bases.

(c) Compare Capabilities to Indicators. The next action is to compare the adversary's intelligence collection capabilities to the appropriate indicators. Those indicators that cannot be collected by the adversary will not require portrayal. If it is known that the adversary places a higher value on information received from certain intelligence sources than from others, then those indicators that can be collected by the valued sources should be emphasized.

(d) Select Means. Using the results of the previous actions in this step, deception planners now select the specific means that will be used to portray the deception story.

1. In essence, the selection of deception means is the opposite of selecting OPSEC measures. While the goal of OPSEC is normally to reduce the adversary's ability to see certain indicators, deception normally seeks to increase the visibility of selected indicators. Both seek to manage what indicators are being seen by the adversary. OPSEC and deception planners must work closely to ensure coordinated indicator management.

2. During means selection, coordination is also required with the EW, PSYOP, and targeting planners to ensure unity of effort. If the deception story depends on the use of certain means, then the EW and targeting planners need to know not

to target for destruction or disruption the particular adversary intelligence system that will collect against those means. For example, if the portrayal of the deception story is dependent upon false communications, then attacks on the adversary's SIGINT system must be carefully coordinated with the deception planners. Similarly, PSYOP themes must be coordinated with the deception story to ensure that they are sending the same message to the deception target.

(3) Develop the Deception Event Schedule

(a) In this action, the deception means are developed into **deception events**. This requires identifying when specific means will be employed. The objective is to ensure that the deception target's perceptions are influenced in time for the desired action (the deception objective) to be completed at the most operationally advantageous time.

(b) The deception planners, in coordination with the operational planners and the other C2W planners, develop detailed execution schedules for the means that were identified in the previous action. The schedule identifies what is to occur, when it is to take place, where it is to occur, and who is to execute it.

(c) Factors to be considered during scheduling include:

1. The timing of actual friendly activities.
2. The time required for friendly forces to conduct the deception activity.
3. Where a particular activity fits in the normal sequence of events for the type operation being portrayed.
4. The time required for the adversary intelligence system to collect, analyze, and report on the activity.

5. The time required for the deception target to make the desired decision and order the desired action.

6. The time required for desired action to be executed.

(d) Events may grouped to portray **deception actions** such as feints and demonstrations.

(e) The deception event schedule is published as part of the deception plan. Figure IV-1 is an example.

ID#	Objective	DTG to Initiate	Action	Unit	Remarks
29	Simulate preparation for movement south.	131500	1. Establish traffic control points.  2. Install usual radio nets.  3. Pass scripted message traffic per scenario.	HQ 4th MAB	Initiate counter surveillance measures to prevent enemy visual photorecon of notional route.

Figure IV-1. Deception Event Schedule

(4) Identify the Deception Feedback Channels

(a) Deception planners require two major types of feedback about their operations. Operational feedback identifies what deception information is reaching the

deception target. Analytical feedback identifies what actions the target is taking because of that information.

(b) All-source intelligence and counterintelligence about the adversary's intelligence interests and activities provide indications of the receipt of deception information.

(c) Observations by friendly intelligence provide information about changes in the adversary's dispositions and actions. Those dispositions are normally the key determinant of the success of the deception. Once operations commence, the adversary's reactions to friendly initiatives are indicators of whether the deception story is still being believed by the deception target.

(d) Deception planners must coordinate with the intelligence planners to ensure that the intelligence needs of deception are reflected in the command's priority intelligence requirements. Additionally, deception planners should work with the appropriate intelligence analysts to make them aware of the type of information that is being sought. Reporting channels should be established between the analysts and deception planners to facilitate the rapid passage of feedback information.

(e) EW and targeting planners must also be coordinated with to ensure that critical sources of deception feedback information are not targeted.

(5) Develop the Termination Concept

(a) Each deception plan must address how the deception operation will be terminated. Termination planning ensures the controlled, orderly release of information relating to the deception. Planning the termination of a deception operation requires the same care and attention to detail that went into planning the deception's execution. Termination planning should include contingencies for unforeseen events such as

the deception's premature compromise forcing its early termination.

(b) Controlling the exposure of the existence of a deception operation or of elements of a deception may be difficult because of the nature of the operation. The deception target will know that it has been fooled. In some cases, it may be useful to announce the contribution of deception to operational successes, if a PSYOP goal is to denigrate the effectiveness of the deception target or the adversary leadership.

(c) In most cases, however, the fact that deception was used during an operation should be protected, both to allow use of the same deception tactics and techniques during later operations and to protect sensitive deception means.

(d) The termination concept should identify what information about the deception may be released and when. It may provide a cover story should questions be raised about the role of deception in a particular operation. Classification and dissemination instructions for deception related information should be provided.

f. Step 6: Deception Plan Review and Approval

(1) The commander reviews and approves the completed deception plan as part of the normal operations plan review and approval process. The need-to-know criteria remain in effect, however, and only a limited number of personnel will participate in the deception plan review and approval process.

(2) CJCS Instruction 3211.01A provides the procedures for obtaining higher level approval of deception plans. All joint deception planners must be familiar with the procedures in CJCSI 3211.01A to ensure that their plans are properly reviewed.

CHAPTER V

MILITARY DECEPTION PLANNING  
AND THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESSES

1. Integration. Deception planning, as part of the C2W planning process, is an integral part of the joint planning processes. It is part of effective operational planning and should not be attempted as an "add on" to the existing planning processes.

2. Planning Considerations

a. Joint Pub 5-03.1 (JOPES, Volume I) contains the detailed requirements for preparing joint operations plans and orders. Joint Pub 5-0 (Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations) and Joint Pub 5-00.1 (JTTP for Campaign Planning) describe the campaign planning process. In each planning process, deception is addressed as part of C2W in the commander's overall concept of operations. The specific deception plan will be part of Annex C, Operations, of any operations plan or order.

b. The need to conduct adequate coordination during deception planning must be balanced against the need to maintain the secrecy required for effective deception operations. Strict need-to-know criteria should be established and used to determine which individuals should be allowed to participate in deception planning. The criteria may specify separate levels of access to facilitate coordination, allowing more individuals access to the less sensitive aspects of the deception plan.

3. Deception Planning and the Joint Planning Processes

a. The Deliberate Planning Process. Deliberate planning is the JOPES process used, normally during peacetime, to develop operation plans (OPLAN) and operation plans in concept form (CONPLAN). Deception planning relates to the JOPES deliberate planning process in the following manner:

Phase I--Initiation

Phase II--Concept Development

Step 1--Mission Analysis

**Deception Mission Analysis**

Step 2--Planning Guidance

**Deception Planning Guidance**

Step 3--Staff Estimates

**Staff Deception Estimate**

Step 4--Commander's Estimate  
    **Commander's Deception Estimate**  
Step 5--Commander's Concept  
Step 6--CJCS Concept Review  
Phase III--Plan Development  
    **Deception Plan Development**  
Phase IV--Plan Review  
    **Deception Plan Review and Approval**  
Phase V--Supporting Plans

b. The Crisis Action Planning Process. Crisis action planning is used during time-sensitive situations to rapidly develop plans and orders. Deception planning relates to the JOPES crisis action planning process in the following manner:

Phase I--Situation Development  
Phase II--Crisis Assessment  
Phase III--Course of Action Development  
    **Deception Mission Analysis**  
    **Deception Planning Guidance**  
    **Staff Deception Estimate**  
    **Commander's Deception Estimate**  
Phase IV--Course of Action Selection  
Phase V--Execution Planning  
    **Deception Plan Development**  
    **Deception Plan Review and Approval**  
Phase VI--Execution

c. The Campaign Planning Process

(1) A campaign is a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives. A campaign plan describes how these operations are connected in time, space, and purpose. Within a campaign, major operations consist of coordinated actions in a single phase of a campaign and usually decide the course of the campaign.

(2) Campaign plans are normally not created until the Execution Planning Phase (Phase V) of crisis action planning. The campaign planning process, however, begins during crisis action planning when the supported commander develops the course of action recommendation for NCA (Phase III). After the COA is approved by the NCA (Phase IV), the supported commander provides specific guidance to the staff. That COA becomes the basis for the



development of a operations order (Phase V).  
Deception planning is done the same as in crisis  
action planning:

Phase I--Situation Development

Phase II--Crisis Assessment

Phase III--Course of Action Development

**Deception Mission Analysis**

**Deception Planning Guidance**

**Staff Deception Estimate**

**Commander's Deception Estimate**

Phase IV--Course of Action Selection

Phase V--Execution Planning

**Deception Plan Development**

**Deception Plan Review and Approval**

Phase VI--Execution

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## APPENDIX A

## REFERENCES

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3. CJCS MOP 6, 3 March 1993, "Electronic Warfare"
4. CJCS MOP 30, 8 March 1993, "Command and Control Warfare"
5. Joint Pub 1, 11 November 1991, "Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces"
6. Joint Pub 1-02, 23 March 1994, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms"
7. Joint Pub 3-0, 9 September 1993, "Doctrine for Joint Operations"
8. Joint Pub 3-13, (Draft), "Joint Command and Control Warfare Operations"
9. Joint Pub 3-51, 30 June 1991, "Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations"
10. Joint Pub 3-53, 30 July 1993, "Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine"
11. Joint Pub 3-54, 22 August 1991 (Change 1, 14 April 1994), "Joint Doctrine for Operations Security"
12. Joint Pub 5-0, (Draft), "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations"
13. Joint Test Pub 5-00.2, 3 September 1991, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures"
14. Joint Pub 5-03.1, 4 August 1993, "Joint Operations Planning and Execution System, Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures)"
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APPENDIX B.

EXPLANATION OF MILITARY DECEPTION TERMINOLOGY

1. Deception Terms. Knowledge of military deception terminology is necessary for understanding the deception planning process. The following paragraphs explain the key terms used in the Chapter IV discussion of the planning process.

a. Deception Objective

(1) The deception objective is the desired result of a deception operation expressed in terms of what the adversary is to do or not to do at the critical time and/or location.

(2) Military deception planners must distinguish between the JFC's operational objective and the deception objective. The JFC's operational objective is what the JFC wants achieve as the result of friendly force operations. The deception objective is the action(s) (or inaction) that the JFC wants the adversary to take.

(3) A deception objective is always stated in terms of specific actions such as "have the adversary move its reserve force from Point A to Point B prior to H-Hour."

(4) A statement such as "have the adversary think that we will make our main attack on its left flank" is not a deception objective. It is a desired perception (see below). Having the adversary decisionmaker think a certain way is important only as a step toward getting that decisionmaker to make the decision that will result in the desired action that is the deception objective. Thoughts without action are of little military value.

b. Deception Target

(1) The deception target is the adversary decisionmaker with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective.

(2) Each situation must be analyzed to identify the adversary commander who has the authority to take the desired action. For example, if the deception

objective is to have an enemy reserve division be moved from its current position to a position more favorable to intended friendly operations, then the deception target would be the enemy corps or army commander. Subordinate commanders do not normally have the authority to direct their own positioning. They must be directed to do so by their commanders.

(3) The adversary's intelligence system is normally not the deception target. It is a conduit that is used to get deceptive information to the target.

c. Desired Perception

(1) The desired perception is what the deception target must believe in order for it to make the decision required to achieve the deception objective.

(2) Deception operations seek to identify and then create or reinforce those perceptions that will lead the deception target to make certain decisions.

(3) Determining the desired perception is difficult. It requires understanding the target's historical, cultural, and personal background. Generally:

(a) It is much easier, and historically more effective, to reinforce an existing belief than to establish a new one.

(b) The target must believe that it is in its best interest to take the action required by the deception objective.

d. Deception Story

(1) The deception story is a scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception.

(2) A deception story identifies those friendly actions, both real and simulated, that when observed by the deception target will lead it to develop the desired perception.

(3) The story normally takes the form of a concept of operation statement: "We will portray that we are

preparing to attack the enemy's left flank in three days with two armored divisions reinforced by a MAGTF." The story does not address the means that will be used to portray the outlined actions.

(4) The story must be believable, verifiable, consistent, and executable.

(a) Believable. The story must correspond to the deception target's perceptions of the friendly force's mission, intentions, and capabilities. Notional plans or forces that grossly distort actual friendly capabilities will likely be discounted. Stories that closely copy past, already exposed, deception operations may not be believed.

(b) Verifiable. The adversary must be able to verify the veracity of the story through multiple channels. The story must, therefore, take into account all of the adversary's intelligence sources. The story must be made available through all or many of those sources. "Windfall" or single-source inputs that would provide the entire story, should be avoided. Multiple conduits should be used with each providing the target a small piece of the deception story. The deception target should perceive that verification of the story has required full use of its intelligence collection and analysis resources.

(c) Consistent. Deception stories should be consistent with the deception target's understanding of actual friendly doctrine, historical force employment, campaign strategy, battlefield tactics and the current operational situation. This calls for the deception element to have as complete a picture as possible of the deception target's level of knowledge and belief in these areas. The deception story must be consistent with related activities that condition the target to patterns of friendly activity.

(d) Executable. As with any course of action, the course of action that forms the deception story must be within the capabilities of the friendly force as the deception target perceives them. The target must believe that the friendly

force has the capability to execute the operations that are being portrayed by the deception story.

e. Deception Means

(1) Deception means are the methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target. There are three categories of deception means: physical, technical, and administrative. (See Glossary)

(2) Deception means are used to portray the deception story. They are used to create a complete adversary intelligence picture that supports all aspects of the deception story. Means are tailored to the adversary's intelligence collection capabilities.

(3) Whether or not the deception target relies upon any particular intelligence source should be considered when selecting means. If the target is known to trust one intelligence source over all others, then means should be selected to exploit that trust.

(4) Physical means include displays of troop movements and concentration, feints and demonstrations by maneuver units, false logistic activity, and false headquarters. Technical means include false communications nets, false radar emissions, and the use of smoke and other obscurants. Administrative means include the staged compromise or loss of classified documents.

(5) Successful deceptions use the various means in combination to present the adversary's intelligence system with what appears to be a complete picture of friendly activities and intentions. For example, a friendly intent to conduct an attack at a particular time and location could be portrayed by demonstrations conducted by combat units (physical), false radio traffic (technical), and the deliberate loss of portions of the operations order (administrative).

f. Deception Courses of Action

(1) Deception COAs are the schemes developed during the estimate process in sufficient detail to permit decisionmaking. At a minimum, a deception COA will identify the deception objective, target, desired



perception, story, and, in general terms, means. It answers the questions: who, what, where, when, how, and why.

(2) Deception COAs are developed by the deception planners, working closely with the intelligence, operations, and other C2W planners, simultaneous with the development of the actual operational COAs.

(3) In many cases, the deception COAs will be based on operational COAs that were developed by the operations planners to ensure that the deception stories meet the criteria listed in the preceding paragraph.

g. Deception Events

(1) The deception event is a deception means executed at a specific time and location in support of a deception operation.

(2) For example, a deception means is the passing of false messages over radio nets. A deception event identifies what unit would pass the desired message, when the unit would broadcast the message, and from where. Deception events are developed during the deception planning process.

h. Deception Action

(1) A deception action is a collection of related deception events that form a major component of a deception operation.

(2) A deception action is a combination of related deception events that are used to portray a main element of a deception story. The four major types of deception actions are feints, demonstrations, displays, and ruses (see Glossary).

2. Relationship of the Deception Terms. The deception operation conducted in support of Operation DESERT STORM provides an example of how the deception terms relate to each other:

a. USCINCENT's **deception objective** was to "use operational deception to fix or divert Republican Guard and other heavy units away from the main effort." The **deception target** was the Iraqi senior military

leadership. The **desired perception** was that "the Coalition would attack frontally through Kuwait."

b. Various **deception courses of action** were considered. The **deception story** for the course of action approved by USCINCCENT portrayed the main ground attack as occurring in the Wadi al-Batin area. That attack would be supported by a Marine amphibious assault on the Kuwaiti coast.

c. As the deception COA was developed into a deception plan, it was determined that all three categories of **deception means** would be used to portray the story. Specific means such as using electronic and physical decoys to portray notional unit locations and publicizing the preparations and training for amphibious operations were selected.

d. The execution of the selected means was coordinated to ensure a consistent and logical portrayal. Assigned specific times and locations for execution, the means were included in the deception plan as **deception events**. Some events were used in combination to create **deception actions** such as the 1st Cavalry Division's feints and demonstrations in the Wadi al-Batin area during the 30 days before the start of the ground operation.

APPENDIX C

SUGGESTED BACKGROUND READINGS

1. Deception planning is a creative process that requires imagination and creativity on the part of its practitioners. Additionally, deception plans must be carefully tailored for each situation. For these reasons, this publication has not provided a list of possible deception schemes or otherwise attempted to suggest potential deception courses of actions for particular situations.

2. Deception planners and others can benefit, however, from the experiences of earlier deception operations and from the theoretical work being done by academicians on the topics of deception and surprise.

3. The following is a selected bibliography of books and periodicals that deal with the subject of deception:

a. The Art of Deception in War by Michael Dewar (David and Charles, 1989)

b. War, Strategy and Intelligence edited by Michael I. Handel (Frank Cass, 1989)

c. Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War edited by Michael I. Handel (Frank Cass, 1989)

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- r. Codeword BARBAROSSA by Barton Whaley (MIT Press, 1973)

## APPENDIX D

USERS EVALUATION REPORT  
ON JOINT PUB 3-58

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2. Content

a. Does the pub provide a conceptual framework for the topic? \_\_\_\_\_

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b. Is the information provided accurate? What needs to be updated? \_\_\_\_\_

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c. Is the information provided useful? If not, how can it be improved? \_\_\_\_\_

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d. Is this pub consistent with other joint pubs? \_\_\_\_\_

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e. Can this pub be better organized for the best understanding of the doctrine and/cr JTTP? How? \_\_\_\_\_

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3. Writing and Appearance

a. Where does the pub need some revision to make the writing clear and concise? What words would you use? \_\_\_\_\_

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b. Are the charts and figures clear and understandable? How would you revise them? \_\_\_\_\_

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4. Recommended urgent change(s) (if any). \_\_\_\_\_

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5. Other \_\_\_\_\_

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6. Please fold and mail comments to the Joint Doctrine Center (additional pages may be attached if desired) or FAX to DSN 564-3990 or COMM (804) 444-3990.

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## GLOSSARY

## PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CA	civil affairs
CINCCENT	Commander in Chief, US Central Command
COA	course of action
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept form
C2	command and control
C2W	command and control warfare
EA	electronic attack
EW	electronic warfare
HUMINT	human intelligence
JOPEX	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JTTP	joint tactic, techniques, and procedures
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
NCA	National Command Authorities
OPLAN	operation plan
OPSEC	operations security
OSINT	open-source intelligence
PSYOP	psychological operations
SIGINT	signals intelligence

## PART II--TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

command and control warfare. The integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare applies across the operational continuum and all levels of conflict. Also called C2W. C2W is both offensive and defensive: a. counter-C2--To prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or

destroying the adversary C2 system. b. C2-protection--To maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception action. A collection of related deception events that form a major component of a deception operation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

deception concept. The deception course of action forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review as part of the CINC's Strategic Concept. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

deception course of action. A deception scheme developed during the estimate process in sufficient detail to permit decisionmaking. At a minimum, a deception course of action will identify the deception objective, the deception target, the desired perception, the deception story, and tentative deception means. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

deception event. A deception means executed at a specific time and location in support of a deception operation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

deception means. Methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target. There are three categories of deception means:

a. physical means. Activities and resources used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power. (Examples: military operations, including exercises, reconnaissance, training activities, and movement of forces; the use of dummy equipment and devices; tactics; bases, logistic actions, stockpiles, and repair activity; and test and evaluation activities).

b. technical means. Military material resources and their associated operating techniques used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power through the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorption, or reflection of energy; the emission or suppression of chemical or biological odors; and the

emission or suppression of nuclear particles.

c. administrative means. Resources, methods, and techniques to convey or deny oral, pictorial, documentary, or other physical evidence to a foreign power. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

deception objective. The desired result of a deception operation expressed in terms of what the adversary is to do or not to do at the critical time and/or location. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

deception story. A scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

deception target. The adversary decisionmaker with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

demonstration. In military deception, a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought made to deceive an adversary. It is similar to a feint but no actual contact with the adversary is intended. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

desired perception. In military deception, what the deception target must believe for it to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

display. In military deception, a static portrayal of an activity, force, or equipment intended to deceive the adversary's visual observation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

feint. In military deception, an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and/or time of the actual main offensive action. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decisionmakers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby

causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are:

a. strategic military deception. Military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator's strategic military objectives, policies, and operations.

b. operational military deception. Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and major operations.

c. tactical military deception. Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements.

d. Service military deception. Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems.

e. military deception in support of OPSEC. Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

ruse. In military deception, a trick of war designed to deceive the adversary, usually involving the deliberate exposure of false information to the adversary's intelligence collection system. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)