

AD-A280 471



# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



## THESIS

CHANGING ROLES OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN  
IN THE SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

By

Robin Ladd Russell

March 1994

Thesis Advisor:

Claude A. Buss

DTIC  
ELECTE  
JUN 22 1994

G

D

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

14805 94-19104



94 6 22 028

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE March 1994		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE CHANGING ROLES OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN THE SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Robin Ladd Russell					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government.					
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) The hypothesis of this study is that the United States and Japan have important and complementary roles to play in contributing to the peace and stability in Southeast Asia in spite of the end of the Cold War. Historical perspectives with regard to Southeast Asia since the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam until the end of the Cold War are provided as the foundations for change. The national development of the nations of Southeast Asia, the implications of the rapid economic growth of China, and the military buildup in the region since the end of the Cold War are examined. Similarly, the rising transnational problems of Southeast Asia including piracy, drug abuse, a burgeoning population and environmental issues are addressed. The basic changes in American policies toward the region, including the implications of the withdrawal from the military facilities in the Philippines, and the impact of the reductions in the military budget are examined. Likewise, basic Japanese policies toward Southeast Asia, particularly in light of recent dramatic changes in Japanese internal politics, the effects of the Persian Gulf War, and the Cambodian experience, are discussed.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS Southeast Asia, ASEAN, APEC, ARF, Asia, China, Transnational Problems, Piracy, Illicit Drugs, Demographics, Subic, Japan, Cambodia.				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 148	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL		

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

**CHANGING ROLES OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN THE  
SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA**

by

Robin L. Russell  
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy  
B.S., United States Naval Academy 1982

Submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**


from the


**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
March 1994**


Author:

  
Robin L. Russell

Approved by:

  
Claude A. Buss, Thesis Advisor

  
Edward A. Olsen, Second Reader

  
Thomas Bruneau, Chairman  
Department of National Security Affairs

## ABSTRACT

The Hypothesis of this study is that the United States and Japan have important and complementary roles to play in contributing to the peace and stability in Southeast Asia in spite of the end of the Cold War. Historical perspectives with regard to Southeast Asia since the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam until the end of the Cold War are provided as the foundations for change. The national development of the nations of Southeast Asia, the implications of the rapid economic growth of China, and the military buildup in the region since the end of the Cold War are examined. Similarly, the rising transnational problems of Southeast Asia including piracy, drug abuse, a burgeoning population and environmental issues are addressed. The basic changes in American policies toward the region, including the implications of the withdrawal from the military facilities in the Philippines, and the impact of the reductions in the military budget are examined. Likewise, basic Japanese policies toward Southeast Asia, particularly in light of recent dramatic changes in Japanese internal politics, the effects of the Persian Gulf War, and the Cambodian experience, are discussed.

Accession For	
NTIS	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
CRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC	<input type="checkbox"/>
TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By .....	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE . . . . .	4
A. THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE . . . . .	4
B. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA	20
C. THE JAPANESE ROLE . . . . .	33
III. CHANGES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR . . . . .	48
A. REMOVAL OF THE THREAT OF WORLD COMMUNISM . . .	50
B. NEW AWARENESS OF THE GROWING POWER OF CHINA . .	58
C. THE GROWING NEEDS OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA . . . . .	64
D. THE NEW MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE REGION .	70
1. Rationale Behind the Military Buildup in Southeast Asia . . . . .	75
2. Prospects For the Continuation of the Arms Race . . . . .	78
E. THE ARISING TRANSNATIONAL PROBLEMS . . . . .	80
1. Piracy . . . . .	80
2. Illicit Drugs . . . . .	83
3. Demographics . . . . .	84

4. The Environment . . . . .	85
IV. CHANGES IN U.S. POLICIES TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA . .	87
A. MEETING GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES . . . . .	87
B. IMPLICATIONS OF OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM SUBIC . . .	90
C. RESPONDING TO ON-GOING CHANGES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA . . . . .	94
V. CHANGES IN JAPAN'S POLICIES TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA	104
A. GROWING JAPANESE AWARENESS OF THEIR GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES . . . . .	104
B. CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES	107
1. The Post Cold War Significance of the Alliance . . . . .	107
2. Strengthening the Relationship . . . . .	109
C. CHANGES IN JAPANESE INTERNAL POLITICS . . . .	112
D. THE EFFECTS OF THE CAMBODIAN EXPERIENCE . . .	115
VI. CONCLUSIONS . . . . .	126
LIST OF REFERENCES . . . . .	128
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . .	139

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Despite the end of the Cold War, four of the world's five remaining communist run nations are in Asia. There remain a number of dormant issues and disputes which could escalate into hostilities. Potential crises include a new Korean war or North Korean launch of nuclear missiles; armed conflict between China and Taiwan; battles over claims to the oil-rich Spratly Islands, particularly between China and Vietnam; Civil War in an Asian nation, such as the Philippines; or a conflict between Japan and Russia over the Kurile Islands. From boardrooms to warrooms, the region is probing for a new stability after the Cold War's demise and Communism's decline.

The United States was the major provider for security in Southeast Asia during the final years of the Cold War. Members of ASEAN viewed the U.S. military presence as the best hope for preventing war. After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam through the last years of the Carter administration, there was a fear of U.S. abandonment of the region. The implications of "No More Vietnams" and the Nixon Doctrine, stipulating nations in the region assume a greater share of their security burden, were rather intimidating. Human rights became a front line issue, as it had never before. Later, President Reagan restored regional confidence in America through a stronger U.S. defense posture and a hard-line foreign policy in the face of continued Soviet expansion in

the region, but at a high premium. Reagan used deficit spending to finance the defense build up, which attributed to the growing Asian perception of a United States in decline. During the Reagan years ASEAN was one of the "six pillars" in the U.S. policy in Asia symbolizing the U.S. commitment to remain a Pacific power. Under U.S. pressure, Japan extended its maritime defense zone from 200 nautical miles to 1,000 nautical miles and within 200 nautical miles of the Philippines. Despite the controversies between the United States and Japan, including the Toshiba debacle and the FSX controversy, Japan was the chief supporter of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. The end of the Cold War brought about many changes to Southeast Asia. One of the growing concerns is China's economic success, which has allowed increased military expenditures. Specifically, mainland China is placing a greater emphasis on preparation for regional conflict.

Southeast Asia is one of the world's most economically energetic and successful regions. Both the United States and Japan have played key roles in the region's successes. With the growing needs of national development in the region, the technology and markets of Japan and the United States and possibly greater China more important than ever.

The end of the Cold War produced dramatic cuts in military spending in Europe and the United States, but it prompted new uncertainty and anxiety in Southeast Asia, and set off an accelerating arms races with significant implications for



regional and international security. The economic means are increasingly available to support the regional arms race; regional trends in arms procurement from foreign sources and domestic production are increasing; and the stimulus of inter and extra regional pressures favoring arms build up are intact. Modernization and naval strength characterize the build up.

With the dramatic reductions in American armed forces both at home and overseas, combined with an alarming number of potential regional hot spots and increasing economic ties to Southeast Asia, the responsibilities of the United States are more difficult to meet. American policy makers must make a continuous reappraisal of Southeast Asia. Finally, the United States and Japan are vital to the welfare of Southeast Asia and the peace of the Pacific. The Japanese will not presume to displace America or fill any vacuum that might occur following decreased American participation; but will insure a proportional role of its own in fulfilling our mutual objectives.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Southeast Asia is one of six major regions of the Asian continent. Other regions include South, Southwest, East Asia, Central Asia and Siberian Russia. Southeast Asia includes ten independent states: Brunei, Burma, Cambodia (Kampuchea), Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Burma, Thailand, and Indochina - Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia - make up continental Southeast Asia; Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, and the Philippines comprise maritime Southeast Asia. Malaysia stretches from its continental core, extending into the South China Sea in Sarawak, over to Sabah in Borneo (Kalimantan).[Ref. 1]

In the Western Pacific the sea-lanes through Southeast Asia are crucial for maritime traffic passing from the Middle East to East Asia. It is also important, though not as much so, for shipping back and forth between the United States and the Middle East. The Japanese import virtually all of their crude oil, iron ore, and food grains[Ref. 2]. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China on Taiwan import approximately 80 percent of their crude oil from the Persian Gulf. All three nations are export oriented and are resource dependent. The majority of their imports, particularly oil, come through the straits in Southeast Asia.

There are four major straits allowing maritime passage between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. They include the Strait of Malacca, between peninsular Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra; the Sunda Strait, solely in Indonesian territorial waters between Sumatra and Java; the Lombok Strait, adjacent to Lombok Island and also controlled by Indonesia; and the Ombai Strait between Java and Timor[Ref. 3]. Due to the constrictive nature of all of these waterways, each can be categorized as a "choke point" - relatively easily interdicted or controlled.

For peacetime shipping, any obstruction to passage in these Southeast Asian straits would mean diverting to other longer routes. This in turn would do little more than marginally increase the market costs of commodities. In a hostile situation, however, any interdiction of traffic would involve not only increased, and possibly disabling response time to crises, but would impair the survival capacity of the economies of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan - neither of which could long endure without imported resources.[Ref. 1: p. 9] Sitting at the crossroads of two oceans, the region's geography is its destiny.

It is difficult in Southeast Asia to envisage the new balance of power if the U.S. were to withdraw from the region. Many now recognize that if the U.S. leaves the region, there would be a growing threat from both Japan and China. Currently, Japan is perceived as a theoretical threat. Its

military is constrained by a war renouncing constitution and a dependence upon U.S. forces under a security treaty. The Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) numbers only 180,000 soldiers, and that number is getting smaller. Moreover, Japan's prime minister, Morihiro Hosokawa, wants his country to lead the world in disarmament. What worries Japan's Southeast Asian neighbors, however, is that Japan possesses the technology to develop powerful weapons, including nuclear bombs, quickly. Compounding their fears is the thought of Japan leaving the American security umbrella.[Ref. 4]

## **II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

### **A. THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE**

Southeast Asians appreciate the importance of their strategic location. In the past they were conquered by aliens from over the sea, and now all their connections with the outside world depend upon the freedom of the seas. Their security depends upon not only upon their own ability to defend themselves but also upon an absence of any hostile threat from the navies of the great powers.

One of the most significant obstacles to the security of Southeast Asia is the diversity of the region. The disparity between ethnicities, religions, cultures and languages makes it unusually difficult to build the consensus necessary for a successful security policy. Nowhere was this divisiveness better exemplified than in 1976 when the United States withdrew from Vietnam. The perceptions of the Southeast Asian nations toward the three great powers vying for dominance in the region - the United States (with Japan in the background), the Soviet Union, and China - were at a critical juncture, as the tremendous influence of the United States in the region appeared to be ebbing.

Neither the United States, the Peoples Republic of China, nor the Soviet Union could be indifferent to the fate of

Southeast Asia. Each had major investments there. But the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam represented a new opportunity for the Soviet Union.

For years the Soviet Union had been trying to close the gap between the capabilities of its armed forces and those of the United States. By 1976 it appeared that they had gained the advantage. For the first time the Soviets deployed more intercontinental ballistic missiles than the United States - 1,118 for the U.S.S.R. versus 1,054 for the United States. In a comparison of naval surface combatants, the Soviets likewise had the numerical edge with 225 vessels to 175 for the U.S. With aircraft inventories, the Soviet Air Command registered more than 6,000 in service, while the United States Air Force listed 5,000.[Ref. 5] The Soviet military build up became increasingly more disconcerting to the United States and its security partners. The pattern revealed in the comparison of defense spending between the Soviets and the U.S. was of particular concern. According to some American sources,[Ref. 5] by 1977 the defense budget of the Soviet Union was more than forty percent greater than that of the United States - the Soviets were building up, while the U.S. was in a draw down following the Vietnam conflict.

This Soviet build up was indicative of a dramatic change compared to their previous one-dimensional strategy prevalent one decade before. During the 1960s the Soviet strategy had been based on nuclear strategic rocket forces, primarily

designed to deal with European conflicts where ground forces would follow nuclear strikes.[Ref. 6] The inflexibility of this one-dimensional strategy left few alternatives to nuclear conflict. With the policy changes after the 1960s, however, the Soviets seemed willing to use their growing conventional armed forces without warning to further their political and security interests. Examples included Soviet assistance to the "people's revolutionary forces" in South Yemen against the Royal Yemeni Military Command; again in support of Moammar Khadafy in his coup against Libya's King Idris in 1969; the conflict with the Chinese on the Amur River in the same year; and further in assistance of the Egyptians against the Israelis in 1973. The most blatant example of the Soviet propensity to exercise its raw military power, however, came in 1979 with the invasion of Afghanistan.[Ref. 1: pp. 34-35]. No one worried about the costs the Soviets paid for these policies.

After the fall of Saigon the apparent gains of the Soviet Union in the region were substantial. In 1978 the Socialist Republic of Vietnam became a member of the Soviet-sponsored Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). This in turn was followed by a series of bilateral agreements that culminated in a treaty of friendship and cooperation signed on 3 November 1978. The treaty committed Vietnam to "support the struggle waged by the nonaligned countries and the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America against

imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism." [Ref. 7]

Later, the association of Laos and Cambodia with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam gave the treaty the image of a regional organization [Ref. 7]. More importantly, the Soviets gained access to the naval and air facilities at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay.

Southeast Asians witnessed first hand Soviet hegemonism in the region with the newly accessible facilities in Vietnam. Through the Cold War the Soviets spent well over the equivalent of two billion U.S. dollars per year on the facilities at Cam Rahn Bay and Da Nang [Ref. 8]. The bases became the largest, most sophisticated and best equipped Soviet facilities outside the U.S.S.R. Their strategic locations were adjacent to some of the most important and most susceptible sea-lanes in the world. With access to Vietnam, the Soviets sought to guarantee maritime passage for their merchant ships between Vladivostok in the Pacific and Black Sea; the containment of China, and to counteract the United States position in the region. The tremendous costs of these initiatives might well have served as warnings of troubles ahead.

The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina had significant security implications to the region. When South Vietnam collapsed, it set in motion a chain of events which soon dramatically altered the security policies of the third major power in Southeast Asia - the Peoples Republic of China.



In 1976, the Asian members of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) - established under the leadership of the United States in order to "contain" the Chinese communists - considered the termination of that organization. In place of the formal collective defense approach, most Asian states, including the PRC and Japan, explored the concept of an ASEAN and ultimately a Southeast Asian Zone for Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) devoid of Great Power presence but backed by their collective guarantees.

Then, in 1978 the Vietnamese, backed by the Soviet Union, invaded Chinese-supported Cambodia. The invasion posed a significant security risk to the Chinese because Vietnam maintained an enormous standing army, third largest in the world behind the Soviet Union and China. For one month in 1979 the confrontation blossomed into a shooting war, which ended inconclusively, but was indicative of the Chinese sentiment toward the Soviet oriented states of the region. Also significant was the dramatic change in the Chinese relationship with their noncommunist neighbors. Prior to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Chinese focus was on supporting subversive activities designed to undermine the noncommunist governments. Thereafter, for the remainder of the Cold War, the Chinese for their own reasons significantly limited their people to people activities in support of insurgency.[Ref. 9]

In 1976 the complexities of the strategic environment of the region began to emerge. Basically, the nations of Southeast Asia divided themselves into two groups. The Indochinese states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were backed by the Soviet Union, while the ASEAN states of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines identified with the United States. Southeast Asia was completely enmeshed in the Cold War.

At the time of the inception of ASEAN, when the comparative weakness of the United States became apparent, many of the leaders recognized the inherent danger of strong military alignment with the United States. Military ties could expose them to hostile judgments and military initiatives of both Moscow and Beijing. In an effort to disarm objections from either source, the ASEAN founders stipulated that their organization would not be a military alliance against anyone but would concentrate primarily on economic, social, and cultural cooperation. Furthermore, the associated states committed themselves to the notion that the region would become a "Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers." [Ref. 10] By 1976, the United States had withdrawn from Vietnam, which resulted from Communist victories in Indochina. From a regional perspective the U.S. military might was waning. On the other hand, there seemed to be no stopping the expansion of the Soviet military influence.

Yet, there was a sharp distinction between the security policies both of Indochina and ASEAN, with further distinction in the policies of the individual nation-states.

For better or for worse, the Vietnamese became bedfellows with the Soviet Union. Their reasons for doing so were not complicated. Vietnamese nationals were starving from extreme food shortages. The government in Hanoi recognized that without Soviet assistance an uprising was inevitable. The U.S.S.R. not only supplemented food supplies, but provided Vietnam with all of its defense needs, including not only weapons, but petroleum.[Ref. 11]

Despite the threat of invasion by the Chinese, the unexpected difficulties in Cambodia, and the challenges presented by ASEAN, the greatest threat to Vietnam after the U.S. withdrawal may have been internal. After the war with the United States, the country began a socioeconomic decline that continued for years. At the heart of the problem was the Vietnamese government. The fifteen man Vietnamese Politburo came of age through years of warfighting with external powers. They were determined and of a single mind set in long wars against well equipped, formidable enemies - and they were victorious. With military victory the members of the Politburo gained confidence in their leadership abilities, and secured their positions politically. As so often in history, however, the war time leadership was ill prepared to manage the transition from the austerity of war to a healthy,

competitive economy. Consequently, the Vietnamese economy worsened to the point of stagnation. Economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union became an indispensable crutch, upon which the Politburo became more and more dependent. Counterrevolution was not the solution to the subsequent economic privation for the ordinary Vietnamese, as it might have been for the citizens of any other nation. Instead, the Vietnamese evaded or manipulated the constraining socialist system. Consequently, the incompetent Politburo remained in power, and as a result, the Vietnamese were compelled to witness the explosive economic success of their ASEAN neighbors from the sidelines. Since their neighbors, Cambodia and Laos, were deep in their internal problems, Vietnam was the only Indochinese state with the energy and the means to think about its security problems.

To the leadership in Hanoi the struggle with ASEAN was symbolic of the great global struggle between the forces of progress (socialism) and reaction (capitalism). The Vietnamese government maintained its belief that the societies of ASEAN were neither legitimate or durable. Sooner or later they would be consumed by the omnipotent force of the people's republic. [Ref. 11: p. 187] Hanoi wanted to help in the demise of ASEAN, but was constrained by its own socioeconomic dilemma. Nevertheless, the systems of ASEAN remained the ideological enemies of Indochina throughout the Cold War.

The problems in Cambodia transcended the Cold War. But from 1976 until the demise of the Soviet Union, Cambodia represented a focal point for instability. At the end of 1978 the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in order to subdue the threat represented by Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge. The Vietnamese expected an easy victory. Hanoi anticipated military victory in less than six months. The Vietnamese leadership was in for a surprise.

The Soviet trained and equipped People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) seemingly forgot the hard lessons they had learned from combat with the French and Americans. In an ironic twist, the PAVN adopted a warfighting technique similar to that employed by the unsuccessful U.S. forces in Vietnam three years earlier. Pol Pot, on the other hand, adopted the guerilla type warfare used so successfully by the Viet Cong against the Americans. The long war which ensued was a testament to the incompetence of the Vietnamese Politburo and military leadership.[Ref. 11: p. 181] During the Cold War the continuing Vietnamese concern was whether to install and support a federation in Indochina, or hammer out a negotiated settlement over Cambodia and Laos. The Khmers were never completely subdued, and hostilities continued for over fourteen years[Ref. 12]. Without their patron, however, the Vietnamese could never have lasted in Cambodia as long as they did.

Thailand, the largest state in mainland Southeast Asia, was the ASEAN state closest to the Vietnamese threat. There was no love lost between the two nations. During the Vietnam War, protracted American bombing raids against the Viet Cong were launched from airfields at Udon Thani and U Thapao. Moreover, Thailand owed its rapid economic growth in the 1960s to enormous U.S. military expenditures. In the "domino theory," Thailand was perceived to be the next to fall to the Soviet supported Vietnamese after Cambodia. But Thailand, more than any other nation in Southeast Asia, had a history of omnidirectionalism. Any study of the national history corroborates the age old theory that Thais are flexible people. Through the colonial era in continental Asia, for example, Thailand managed to play the great colonial powers on every border against each other, thereby maintaining Thai sovereignty. Sukhumband Paribatra of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Bangkok aptly stated that "when the chips are down, the Thais want to be standing next to the one with the biggest pile of chips" [Ref 11: p. 217]. Accordingly, the Thais preferred an arrangement with the Vietnamese that would keep Cambodia a buffer state. True to form, during the Cold War, the Thais concentrated on their own development and well being, regardless of the consequences to their alliance with ASEAN or their support for the ZOPFAN. They sought to balance their interests with everyone in the region, including the Vietnamese, Soviets and Chinese. In the eyes of the Thais,

however, the United States maintained the upper hand in the Cold War, and therefore was best able to help them maintain their desired goal of sustained economic growth.

Indonesian foreign and security policies during the Cold War were the children of nationalism and colonialism, fostered during their war of Independence (1945-1949). Despite tremendous pressure from outside influences, the Indonesians remained committed to a free and active foreign policy for the duration of the Cold War. They could not commit themselves either to the United States or the Soviet Union.

During the Cold War the Indonesians remained non-aligned, but not neutral. Their non-aligned position was not solely a consequence of noble ideological pursuits, but was a pragmatic judgment of the most effective way to deal with the great powers.

The Indonesian drift away from the West after their independence was accelerated by two disputes with the United States. First, Indonesia recognized only one China, with Beijing as the sole legitimate government. The U.S. refused to recognize the PRC, and supported the government of Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan. In an attempt to contain the PRC, the United States attempted to mobilize the PRC's Southeast Asian neighbors in a containment policy, which resulted in the genesis of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). Indonesia consistently refused to join SEATO, which eventually dissolved after President Nixon normalized relations with the

PRC. The wide ranging attitudes of the U.S. toward the PRC served to bolster the Indonesian nonaligned position. Second, relations with the U.S. deteriorated over the issue of the Indonesian annexation of West Irian, which was eventually unified with the republic in 1963. The United States was reluctant to support Indonesia's claim to West Irian, which was a "national objective" of the Indonesian government.

Indonesians had the least in common with the communist powers. With a population of over ninety percent Moslem, they thought of godless Marxism as an alien ideology.[Ref. 11: p. 192] Gradually they began to tilt toward the United States. They believed that "communist" insurgency was one of their greatest threats. On 30 September 1965 Chinese communist supporters in the Indonesian army attempted a coup. Six of the Indonesian army's top generals were assassinated. Political order was restored by the current president, General Soeharto, who promptly reestablished Indonesia's standing in the eyes of the West. By the late 1960s Indonesia had cut diplomatic relations with Beijing (restored only in 1990), had rejoined the UN, and had participated as a founding member of ASEAN. The New Order of President Soeharto brought about the concept of a dual function of the army, whereby military leaders assumed political appointments in addition to traditional military roles: army officers took charge of government ministries and became directors of government agencies. Soeharto also installed a powerful group of



American-educated economists - the Berkeley Mafia - to replace revolutionary political ideology with modern western economic practices. Unlike their communist neighbors, Indonesians experienced a era of unprecedented political stability and a firm foundation for economic growth[Ref. 2: pp. 48-49].

Through their observations and experiences with the great powers during the Cold War, Indonesians came to the conclusion that they need not count heavily on any outside power for support. This attitude was in turn reflected in their belief in the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.

Malaysia is very close to Indonesia in language and religion and throughout the Cold War followed many of the same international security policies. One of the significant differences was that Malaysia, with Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, participated in a five-power defense arrangement and in an integrated air defense system. Like Indonesia, Malaysia accepted the ZOPFAN ideal, but forged closer military ties with the United States (Malaysia sponsored a U.S. air and naval presence) - the result of the Soviet backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. However, the vast commercial potential in the abundance of Malaysian natural resources including rubber, tin and palm oil far outweighed the desire for closer military ties with the United States as a factor in shaping foreign policy.[Ref 11: p. 177] Like Indonesia, however, one of the greatest dangers to Malaysian national security was communist insurgency. In

one method of dealing with the problem, Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mahatir Mohamad invoked the Internal Security Act (ISA) in 1981, which enabled him to detain his opponents without trial. He applied the ISA liberally and emasculated his opposition. Internally, the threat came from a political system which institutionalized racism. The main political organization featured three traditional political parties: the dominant United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) formed by the minority ethnic Tamils.[Ref. 2: pp. 228-229] On more than one occasion the tension exploded in violent riots. Like Indonesia, Malaysian national security priorities during the Cold War were the promotion of economic development and the prevention of insurgencies. Ultimately, the Malaysians committed themselves for their security to the Indonesians who shared their language, religion and most of their cultural background.

At the tip of the Malay Peninsula, the city-state of Singapore maintained a strong anti-communist posture throughout the duration of the Cold War. Due to its size, the Singaporean government, headed by Lee Kuan Yew, maintained that a multilateral front afforded the best security. As with Thailand and Malaysia, Singapore recognized the Vietnamese threat as preeminent, but contrary to Thailand sought to galvanize world opinion against it. Singapore, as the most pragmatic state in existence, and completely dependent for its

prosperity on its capitalist system, identified itself without reservation as being on the side of the United States.

Of all the nations in Southeast Asia, the Philippines was closest to the United States with regard to regional security during the period between the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the end of the Cold War. The treaty of mutual defense and the U.S. use of Philippine bases became the linchpin for American commitment to the region.

The differences between the Filipinos and the Americans, however, were most evident in negotiations over the military bases. The basic agreement of 1947 underwent a number of revisions. These most often resulted in the relinquishment of certain facilities or property by the U.S. to the Philippines. Eventually, the original term of the leases was shortened from 2040 to 1991. In one significant revision, the use of the bases for U.S. military combat operations became subject to prior consultation of the Philippine government. Filipino opposition to American terms made it impossible to use Clark Air Force Base for bombing missions against Vietnam during the War.

Between 1979 and 1988, later amendments to the agreement caused the greatest controversy. During those years the Philippines accused the United States of reneging on financial pledges. Consequently, the Philippine government demanded much larger amounts of financial compensation than the U.S. was willing to provide.[Ref. 13] To the Filipino

opponents of the bases agreement, the bases infringed on Philippine sovereignty. Moreover, in the event of a nuclear war it was much more likely that the Philippine bases would be lightning rods rather than providing protection.

In June 1991, Mt. Pinatubo, a volcano dormant for over six centuries, erupted. Several feet of ash fell on both Clark and Subic. The damage was significant, and the Pentagon ordered a total evacuation of Americans from Clark, and an evacuation of dependents and nonessential U.S. civilian workers from Subic. Negotiations between Washington and Manila over the bases were put on hold, as the Pentagon and the Bush administration assessed the cost of the physical damage, the future stability of Mt. Pinatubo, and whether there needed to be a change in the American negotiating position. The cost to repair the damage, the end of the Cold War, and the potential for further eruptions weighted against the reestablishment of Clark, and the Bush administration concluded that the Air Base was no longer feasible.[Ref. 13: p. 127]

When the controversial points over Subic later turned out to be unsolvable, the Americans withdrew from the Naval Base in November, 1992.[Ref. 11: pp. 178, 228] In many ways, this was a serious blow to all the states that depended on the United States for regional security.

The bases played important roles in supporting the U.S. military presence not only in Southeast Asia, but the entire

Pacific basin, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. They were vital to several U.S. force buildups in those regions. From a Filipino perspective, after 1986 they sometimes played a direct role in the U.S. support for democratic political development in the Philippines - most notably in support of the Aquino government during the attempted coup in 1989.

#### **B. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

The interests of the United States in post World War II Southeast Asia have been best served through peace and stability in the region. For American policy makers after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, peace and stability required that the noncommunist economic systems of Northeast Asia, notably Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan remained healthy and dynamic. Any threat to the flow of trade to those nations would have been disastrous. Strategically, the U.S. allies in Northeast Asia were as important to America as Great Britain was to the Allies in World War II. In a time of crisis defense of the entire region would have been difficult, if not impossible, without them. Economic resupply was a priority, and therefore the security of the sea lanes through Southeast Asia was vital.

As long as the Cold War continued, the United States and its security partners would have been seriously disadvantaged if the nations of Southeast Asia had either begun to assume anti-U.S. or anti-Western attitudes or would have succumbed to

the influence of an enemy of the United States. The best defense against such a threat was to develop more mutually beneficial relations with those Southeast Asian nations with whom the United States shared political, economic and security interests. U.S. policy makers were convinced that nations with "democratic" ideals and progressive market based economies featured more civil and political rights for their peoples which in turn made instability unlikely. Such nations also tended to be favorably disposed to the United States and the West.[Ref. 1: p. 29]

America's foremost policy toward Southeast Asia was issued at the height of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and survived the conflict largely intact. Entitled the Nixon Doctrine, it outlined three axioms directed primarily toward Southeast Asia: first, The United States would keep all of its treaty commitments; second, the U.S. would provide a shield against any nuclear power which threatened the freedom of a nation allied with America, threatened a nation whose survival was considered vital to American security, or threatened the security of the region as a whole; and finally, in cases involving other types of aggression, the United States would furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate - but the nation directly threatened was to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its own defense.[Ref. 14]

As the years passed, however, the American government, the executive branch in particular, experienced grave difficulties in maintaining a reasonably consistent policy. U.S. policy after the American departure from Vietnam was in considerable turmoil. Richard Nixon had recently resigned as a result of the Watergate scandal, and former vice-president Ford was in office. President Ford was under pressure from several quarters.

In Vietnam, things were going badly and in the Spring of 1975 President Ford was obliged to watch with frustration as North Vietnam at last overran South Vietnam, leaving American credibility badly damaged - in all of Southeast Asia[Ref. 15]. The credibility of the office of the president was now in question. Limitations were imposed on the president's freedom to use military force by the War Powers Act. Laws were passed requiring countries that received U.S. economic or military assistance to meet certain minimum human rights standards domestically, which evolved into an annual report of human rights violations in all countries. Additionally, Congress enacted numerous "legislative vetoes" which required the president to provide it with notice of proposed arms deliveries and allowing it to veto such actions[Ref. 13: p. 20]. The first major shift in policy after the Vietnam War with regards to Southeast Asia came with the Carter administration.

During his time in office President Carter seemed determined to shift the U.S. policy even further toward human rights and morality and away from military and strategic advantages over the Soviet Union[Ref. 16]. President Carter's tendency to be soft on the Soviets did little to deter a continued Soviet build of strategic military power[Ref. 17]. Furthermore, Carter was beset by a combination of other international crises: the Iranian revolution and the ensuing hostage crisis, the second oil shock, and in 1979 the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

During the Carter years Southeast Asia shifted to the periphery of U.S. foreign policy. The region was indirectly affected, however, by America's Cold War strategy elsewhere in Asia. In 1975 President Carter issued a statement that the United States should withdraw its ground troops from South Korea over the next several years. Carter had been critical of the Republic of Korea for its suppression of human rights, and the "Koreagate" scandal involving alleged Korean gifts of money to U.S. members of Congress in an attempt to secure continued U.S. support of South Korea's military security had generated widespread criticism of Seoul.[Ref. 18] Most leaders of the ASEAN states and Japan expressed concern over what they perceived as further American retreat from Asia. Furthermore, they believed that President Carter was acting unilaterally on an issue of vital concern throughout Asia[Ref 13: p. 22].



In another significant Asian policy decision, the U.S. and PRC announced on 15 December 1978 their agreement to establish full diplomatic relations on the first day of January, 1979[Ref. 16: p. 197]. The agreement only added fuel to President Carter's growing opposition within America.

President Reagan was elected to office in 1980 and dramatically changed the United States' relationship with the nations of Southeast Asia. President Reagan attacked President Carter's position on human rights during his campaign, and true to his word altered the U.S. position on the issue. Reagan believed that the issue of human rights was applied too strongly against U.S. allies. The new president outlined his commitment to Asia early in his administration. In March 1982 Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger described U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific as a "six-pillar edifice"[Ref. 19] - the nations of ASEAN being one of the "pillars." The policy firmly established the determination of the United States to remain a Pacific power, thereby answering questions over a U.S. withdrawal raised during the Carter administration. President Reagan furthermore pressed for a stronger foreign policy and U.S. defense in response to Soviet presence in the world. A surprising sense of bipartisanship emerged between the predominantly Democratic House of Representatives, and the Republican controlled Senate.

During President Reagan's administration Japan became the chief supporter of U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia, and a rapidly growing participant in Southeast Asian development. As Japan flourished economically, President Reagan expressed a different attitude toward the Japanese than did his predecessor. Instead of publicly criticizing Japan for not spending enough on defense in relation to its Gross National Product, President Reagan focused on more appropriate roles for the Japanese Self Defense Forces in conjunction with their U.S. counterparts. In 1981 the Japanese government, with the dynamic leadership of Prime Minister Nakasone, accepted the primary responsibility for its own air defense and sea lanes out to 1,000 nautical miles to the east and south of Japan. The Japanese increased defense spending little by little with the consent of the United States. The security relationship between the two nations became stronger, which in turn affected U.S. relations with another great power with vital interests in Southeast Asia.

As the Japanese assumed a greater role in their own defense and that of the region, policy makers neglected the role of the PRC. With the growing American military strength and changing views of the "evil empire," the fear of China diminished[Ref. 13: p. 24]. The same could not be said for the Soviet opinion of the PRC.

As Soviet troubles mounted, Party Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev of the U.S.S.R. sought better relations with

the PRC during the 1980s, and the implications for Southeast Asia were considerable. Soon after assuming the reins of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev realized the dire straits of the Soviet economy. If the enormous Soviet military expenditures (on a scale previously unknown in history for a country not in a major war) could be curtailed, it would allow some breathing space for the reforms of Perestroika (restructuring of the economy)[Ref. 20]. In contrast to traditional Soviet ideology, Gorbachev commented that "The Soviet Union does not pretend to have the final truth. We do not impose our way of life on other peoples." [Ref. 21] He recognized a necessity in reducing tensions around the periphery of the Soviet Union in order to focus on the Soviet economy, and concurrently sought to increase Soviet influence abroad through political and economic initiatives. In light of Soviet policies in Afghanistan and Indochina, Asians tended to view Gorbachev's initiatives with more skepticism than did Europeans. Gorbachev appeared to see China as the key link in Soviet efforts to penetrate Asian reluctance in the region. Beijing, however, would not concede any ground to the Soviets until the "three obstacles" to improved Sino-Soviet relations were addressed: Afghanistan, Soviet support for Vietnam, and the Soviet military presence along China's northern border. Moscow complied, and the result was a much more stable security environment in Southeast Asia.

Under the more stable conditions in the region, the economies of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore flourished. They doubled their economic output during the 1980s, and their combined export trade expanded. During the 1980s American trade with Asian countries surpassed that with the Europeans, and the trend continued. America and Asia became more and more economically interdependent.

At the same time, however, the United States began to be perceived as a Superpower on the edge of decline. Through the Cold War, America's ability to successfully oppose the Soviets by promoting economic growth and political stability in Asia depended heavily upon U.S. economic strength. Americans seemed willing to accept deficit spending to achieve military and political goals. The spending included the costs of a growing military budget, substantial foreign aid programs, and the free flow of exports from Asian countries to America.[Ref. 13: p. 25] The seemingly once invincible America began to show cracks in the foundation. The United States seemed to be reeling under the weight of mounting domestic ills, including the unmanageable budget deficits, overconsumption, underinvestment, declining educational standards, drugs, crime, the erosion of traditional values, and a dangerous decline in the public's confidence in its political leaders and institutions. To the hierarchically-minded Japanese that had found so much to admire in postwar America, and to the friendly Southeast Asian nations which prospered from the

benevolent bedrock that was the U.S., the spectacle of the apparent U.S. decline was deeply unsettling[Ref. 22].

Major economic and strategic developments during the closing years of the Reagan Administration were further evidence of a growing tension between Washington and its chief supporter in Southeast Asian security - Tokyo. In 1987 the Japanese government enjoyed a trade surplus of \$80 billion, while the American trade deficit climbed to \$174 billion. Nearly \$60 billion of that deficit was with the Japanese. In April of 1987 President Reagan ordered the first trade sanctions against Japan since World War II. In retaliation for an alleged Japanese violation of a 1986 semiconductor agreement, a 100% tariff was levied on \$300 million worth of imports containing computer chips from Japan. Later that year tensions increased further with the disclosure that the Toshiba Corporation sold eight computer-guided multiaxis milling machines to the Soviet Union. With this new technology the Soviets were theoretically able to mass produce more silent submarines, thereby significantly endangering U.S. national security. As a result, Japan was perceived by Americans as enjoying protection by American forces while aiding America's primary adversary for profit. [Ref. 19: p. 268] But Toshiba was not the only significant strain in the relationship which was so important to the security of Southeast Asia.

George Bush succeeded President Reagan in January, 1989. He brought a wide foundation of experience with him to the White House, including having been an ambassador to the United Nations, U.S. representative in China, head of the CIA, and Vice President. Known as pragmatic, his foreign policy had often been highly conservative. In 1965 for example, he declared, "I will back the President no matter what weapons we use in Southeast Asia." [Ref. 23]

U.S. concerns over defense, technological, and economic issues with Japan came to a head in the first year of the Bush administration over the issue of the FSX fighter support program. The debate carried over from President Reagan's last years in office through the administration of President Bush. The problem embodied most of the elements at the heart of the difficulties in the relationship between the United States and Japan. The FSX selection became one of the most important issues in Japan's defense policy because the new aircraft was to replace the aging F-1s - the backbone of the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF). Beginning in 1985 to through January 1986 American involvement with the FSX was on a very small scale. Development was unilaterally Japanese. In 1988, after more than a year of negotiations, the U.S. and Japanese governments reached an agreement on the proposal that Japan would co-develop with the United States a modified F-16 for its next generation of jet fighter aircraft. The FSX was to have a much greater range than the F-1 and therefore be able

help fulfill the defense requirements in the new 1,000 mile defense perimeter.[Ref. 24] Later, in early 1989, opponents of the deal in Congress and the administration urged reconsideration, pending a six month review of the pact's long-term implications. They argued that it involved the sale of advanced U.S. technology at a low price to a potential major economic competitor in the aircraft/arms sales market. Supporters of the deal pointed out that such a delay would complicate Japanese defense planning and ran the risk of undermining U.S. security interests in the region[Ref. 24: p. 472]. A heated debate raged in Congress over the issue, which only narrowly passed[Ref. 13: p. 40]. However, U.S pressure resulted once again in acquiescence by the Japanese in a major defense policy. In the initial stage of the FSX selection process, the U.S. government respected the autonomy of the Japanese decision-making process and refrained from explicit intervention. Eventually, when the American administration coordinated its desires with those of Congress and U.S. military industries, American pressure reached the point where policy makers in Tokyo could no longer ignore it. Japan on the other hand, had yet to transform its economic might into diplomatic power capable of asserting more influence in dealing with the United States. During the period of negotiations and development of the FSX, however, the Japanese purchased the U.S. F-15 and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and

under license from McDonnell Douglass, began production of a modified version of the fighter[Ref. 24: p. 468].

In conjunction with strained relations with the Japanese, it was clear to the President that the world was changing at a breakneck pace. Secretary of State James Baker professed in 1989, "The world has clearly outgrown the clash between the superpowers that dominated world politics after World War II." [Ref. 25] Nevertheless, there were no new policies to deal with the changes. President Bush was determined to keep military spending high, and maintain a cautious approach to reformation. Moreover, the Democrats outnumbered the Republicans in the House of Representatives, which meant difficulty getting changes sponsored by the Republican President through the legislature.

In sharp contrast to the pragmatism of President Bush, Secretary-General Gorbachev accelerated his changes in the Soviet Union, the most significant of which manifest themselves in three world-shaking policies. The first was the "Sinatra Doctrine" - stipulating that East Europeans could do things "their way," which resulted in the opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989.[Ref. 23: pp. 328-329] The second occurred on 20 December 1989 when Gorbachev renounced both the use of force and Soviet imperialism. Third was the decision by Gorbachev to use force to subdue the Azerbaijanis who threatened to pull their region out of the U.S.S.R. His



fear was that the Soviet Union itself may have fallen apart.[Ref. 23: p. 330]

In summary, the United States was the major provider for security in Southeast Asia during the final years of the Cold War. Members of ASEAN viewed the U.S. military presence as the best hope for preventing war. After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam through the last years of the Carter administration, there was a fear of U.S. abandonment of the region. The implications of "No More Vietnams" and the Nixon Doctrine, stipulating nations in the region assume a greater share of their security burden, were rather intimidating. Human rights became a front line issue, as it had never before. Later, President Reagan restored regional confidence in America through a stronger U.S. defense posture and a hard-line foreign policy in the face of continued Soviet expansion in the region, but at a high premium. Reagan used deficit spending to finance the defense build up, which attributed to the growing Asian perception of a United States in decline. During the Reagan years ASEAN was one of the "six pillars" in the U.S. policy in Asia symbolizing the U.S. commitment to remain a Pacific power. Under U.S. pressure, Japan extended its maritime defense zone from 200 nautical miles to 1,000 nautical miles and within 200 nautical miles of the Philippines. Despite the controversies between the United States and Japan, including the Toshiba debacle and the FSX

controversy, Japan was the chief supporter of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.

### C. THE JAPANESE ROLE

Southeast Asia is vitally important to Japan; in Japan's need for Southeast Asian raw materials and markets; in the need to ensure safe passage through the sea lanes north and south from the Arab Middle East, and in the need for a Southeast Asian partnership for the new role Japan seeks to play in international affairs. Japan sees in Southeast Asia a situation relating to Japan in the same way the Caribbean is dominated by the United States. Moreover, Southeast Asia is much more heterogenous than the Caribbean. There are significant ethnic and religious disparity among the different nations; and weighty economic disparity between various nations such as for example between Singapore and Burma. Therefore, ASEAN presents a means for the Japanese to take advantage of the complexity of the region, and maintain the benefits that Southeast Asia offers.[Ref. 26] Historically, these considerations have always been at the heart of Japanese policies toward Southeast Asia.

Conceivably the most important factor in the Japanese attitude toward Southeast Asia was defeat at the hands of the Allied powers in World War II. Until 1945 the Japanese had never lost a war. They defeated the Chinese in 1895, the Russians in 1905, and were on the side of the victorious

Allies in World War I. Combined with spectacular success in the initial months of World War II, defeat was traumatic. The Japanese suffered the world's first nuclear attacks. The trauma left a legacy of skepticism about the value of war and an aversion to military buildups.

The most substantive evidence of Japanese opposition to war came as a result of the American Occupation following the War - article IX of the U.S. imposed Japanese Constitution which states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international dispute. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Additionally, the Constitution places limits on Japanese defense policy, including restrictions on the deployment of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas, offensive weapons, collective security arrangements, and conscription. Despite the fact that the Japanese Constitution imposed military restrictions on the Japanese, it does allow Japan the right of self defense.

In 1951 the Japanese signed the first of two security treaties with the United States. The American contribution represented the cornerstone of Japanese defense policy. It placed Japan under a protective "nuclear umbrella" for

security against the Soviet Union (and later China), and allowed the Japanese to focus their resources elsewhere.

The Japanese Prime Minister during the signing of the treaty was a flamboyant leader who firmly believed that the single most important goal of post-war Japan was economic recovery. Yoshida Shigeru began his second term as Prime Minister on October 15, 1948, and his emphasis on the economy over everything else in the nation's priority became known as the "Yoshida Doctrine".[Ref. 27] The result was a minimum of defense spending, and the avoidance of involvement in international politics[Ref. 27]. It was with the Yoshida Doctrine that the Prime Minister re-established inroads to Southeast Asia.

The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia during World War II had left deep scars that were slow to heal. The bitter memories represented a formidable obstacle to a return by the Japanese to the region, albeit in the form of economic aid. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Yoshida recognized the necessity of Southeast Asian raw materials, energy, and a nearby location for external investment - all critical to the economic recovery of Japan.[Ref. 28] The solution was a union of U.S. and Japanese policymakers. Prime Minister Yoshida's doctrine of economics above all was united with the American fear of the expansion of communism in the region.

Throughout Prime Minister Yoshida's administration, tension between the United States and the Soviet Union

escalated. As a direct result of the Cold War the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) and the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) were officially established 1 July 1954.[Ref. 27: p. 6] The JDA was designed as a unit directly under the Prime Minister, intentionally devoid of the influence or prestige of the Ministries.

For Prime Minister Yoshida, the danger was clear. In November 1954, after the Geneva Conference, he stated:

The most immediate challenge to the free countries today is the problem of combating Communism....In order to defend against Communism, it is urgent to promote the economic development of Southeast Asia and to reinforce their standard of living.[Ref. 27: p. 18]

It was only a matter of time before the Japanese would formally promulgate their first defense policy since World War II. Despite the limitations of the Japanese Constitution, the anti-war attitude of the Japanese populace and the concerns over revival of Japanese militarism by Southeast Asians, the Japanese published the Basic Policy of National Defense in May 1957. In addition to establishing minimum manpower and equipment goals for the newly established SDF, it stipulated support for the United Nations, development of an efficient defense force pertinent to the nation's power and situation, and joint security with the United States in order to "prevent aggression" and, "once invaded, to repel it." [Ref. 29] In 1957 the first official Japanese policy toward Southeast Asia was promulgated in the first White Paper on Japanese Diplomacy which stated:

For our country which adopted pacifism as its basic policy the only way to raise the living standards of the 90 million people living on the four small islands, and to develop our economy is peaceful expansion of our economic power.[Ref. 27: p. 17]

The next milestone came in 1960, which marked the end of an era. From that year on the United States could no longer presume to have its way in Japan without adequate respect for Japanese sensitivities. As a result of Japan's economic recovery, increased self-confidence and the growing anti-American sentiment, both the Japanese and American governments felt it would be wise to revise the security treaty. The original treaty allowed the U.S. broad prerogatives in using its bases in Japan for "the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East" and "the security of Japan." United States forces could be employed, if requested by the Japanese government, "to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan." These characteristics, concurrent with the lack of any terminal date for the agreement, seemed to some Japanese to be colonial in nature. The new Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation, signed 19 January 1960, made it clear that the U.S. would consult with the Japanese government before using its bases in Japan directly for combat elsewhere in Asia.[Ref. 30] The treaty revision proved to be the demise of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (25 Feb. 1957 - 19 July 1960), however, and successive prime ministers Ikeda and Sato had to divert the attention of the Japanese public to non-defense issues.[Ref. 29: pp. 69,90] Consequently, the

economic policies of income-doubling and high-growth came into being [Ref. 27: p. 11].

During the 1960s and early 1970s the Japanese Government pursued two dynamic political initiatives in Southeast Asia. The first came in 1964 when Prime Minister Ikeda offered to mediate in the conflict between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines over the territorial claim to Sabah. The summit convened in Tokyo, but failed to produce any concrete results. The second was in May, 1970 when the Sato Cabinet became involved in a bid to end the Vietnam War. The Japanese played a leading role in securing the "neutrality" of an Asian conference held in Jakarta, but obviously failed to resolve the conflict.

Japanese policy makers did not attempt any further high profile diplomatic negotiations until 1974, and for the next several years focused on a low key policy of economic expansion in Southeast Asia. It was in their pursuit of this objective that the Japanese formulated their first official policy toward the region - they saw the reparations issue as the catalyst for Japanese economic re-entry into the region.

The first significant change to the Japanese Security policy during the Cold War came with the introduction of the Nixon Doctrine in July 1969. The Doctrine placed a new emphasis on U.S. partners to further support the U.S. position by doing more on their own behalf.[Ref. 31] The policy began as retrenchment or "lower profile" in Asia by the

U.S., as a symbol of a new era in the region. The visit by President Nixon to China in 1972 was the first significant "Nixon Shoku" for Japanese policy makers. To the Japanese, the Nixon Doctrine represented the threat of China supplanting Japan in U.S. policy. The oil crisis of 1973 further heightened the sense of Japanese insecurity. Meanwhile, the Vietnam conflict was escalating. During the Vietnam War, the Japanese were able to successfully pursue their "peaceful" economic expansion into Southeast Asia. While the nations of the region were immersed in the Cold War the Japanese attained a position as the leading trader and investor in the region.[Ref. 31, 116: p. 19] As early as 1964 Japan's trade with Southeast Asia surpassed that of the United States.[Ref. 31, 116: p. 19] But to some, both in Southeast Asia and the United States the Japanese were perceived as economic predators, exchanging military occupation for economic domination. The result was the tumultuous reception of Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, who toured Southeast Asia in 1974. The anti-Japanese sentiment exploded into violent riots in Bangkok and Jakarta. In Singapore, students submitted a memorandum condemning Japanese business practices, and in Malaysia, Prime Minister Tanaka's effigy was burnt along with Japanese flags.[Ref. 32] Tokyo chose to revamp its Southeast Asian policy just two decades after initiating its low profile policy of "economic diplomacy."



With the end of the Vietnam War, gone was the Cold War environment which had nurtured Japan's policy of pursuing economic gain without regard for meaningful political discourse. The end of the Vietnam War also gave use to a Japanese perception of a decline in American commitments in Asia. American military power was judged to be on the decline as compared to that of the Soviet Union which seemed to be on the rise. At the end of the war in Vietnam in April, 1975, the Japanese recognized a necessity to make changes which would radically change their relationship with Southeast Asia.

In 1976 the Japanese defense officials designed a defense policy which not only represented an autonomous defense posture, but defined for the first time since World War II the minimum level of force necessary for Japan in peacetime.[Ref 27: p. 12] The National Defence Program Outline (NDPO) stipulated that Japan should possess a force large enough to meet and repel a "limited and small scale aggression" and that the assistance from the U.S. should be sought if an assault should exceed the Defense capabilities.(Defense Agency 1977, pp. 143-150) It was designed to delineate the minimum level of defense forces necessary for Japan in peacetime.

The Outline provided only general force level targets and did not stipulate the specific types of equipment. Instead it recognized the need for defense against sea and air borne assaults, and enhanced the Japanese ability to engage in sustained combat operations. It was further designed to

improve Japanese command, control, communications and information processes (C3I), thereby qualitatively enhancing Japanese defense capabilities.[Ref. 33] But the NDPO proved controversial both in Japan and Southeast Asia. With the NDPO the Japanese Government shifted away from fixed programs of defense spending. The NDPO had no target date for completion and thereby raised concerns of uncontrolled growth in defense spending. As a result, in November 1976, the Japanese government announced a ceiling on defense spending of one percent of gross national product (GNP).[Ref. 31: pp. 91-93]

One of the most significant results of the American withdrawal from the Vietnam, however, was the Japanese declaration to "forge a closer relationship with ASEAN". With that announcement, Prime Minister Fukuda unveiled his "Fukuda Doctrine" in Kuala Lumpur at a meeting of the ASEAN heads of government on 18 August 1977. With the doctrine, the Japanese took up the challenge of greater international responsibilities with a significant advancement in the relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia.[Ref. 34] In its third Principle, the doctrine states:

Japan will be an equal partner of ASEAN and its member countries and co-operate positively with them in their efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, together with other nations of like mind outside the region, while aiming at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina and

will thus contribute to the building peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia.[Ref. 27: p. 22]

The Fukuda Doctrine represented the formalizing of Japan's official political relations with Southeast Asian countries. Since its inception Japanese prime ministers have made it a priority to pay official visits to the region. The benefits included sharpened diplomatic skills of the prime ministers, and a stronger Japanese position in talks with Western countries.

In his doctrine Prime Minister Fukuda also made his position on the Japanese defense posture clear. As a result of the constraints placed on Japan - the U.S. imposed constitution, the prohibition of weapons exports, the forbiddance of the deployment of Japanese forces abroad, and Japan's obligations in collective security arrangements - Prime Minister Fukuda made this addition to his doctrine:

Japan, a nation committed to peace, rejects the role of a military power, and on that basis is resolved to contribute to the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia, and of the world community.[Ref. 27: p. 26]

Japan's direct military involvement in the region appeared to be out of the question indefinitely. On the other hand, a low profile, indirect approach to Southeast Asian security was deemed necessary to compensate for the reduction of American forces and commitments in the region after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. The Japanese proceeded on three fronts. First, as initiated in the Fukuda Doctrine, Japanese policymakers maintained a visible political agenda with ASEAN. Second, the

Japanese proceeded in a remarkable buildup of their own defenses, beginning with the NDPO. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Japanese proceeded in all their initiatives on a basis that was increasingly independent of the United States.

Politically, Fukuda made two significant moves. One year after the proclamation of the Fukuda Doctrine, he orchestrated the first Japan-ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Conference, and later established the Japan-ASEAN forum.

All the while the perceived Soviet military threat in the region began to loom larger than ever before. In 1977 the Soviets initiated a massive buildup of their armed forces in Asia. Their objectives appeared to be first to encircle China, and second to prepare for the possible formation of a coalition of U.S., Chinese, and Japanese forces against the Soviet Union. In 1978 Moscow created an independent theater command for its "Far East" forces and accelerated the expansion of its Pacific fleet (at this time the largest of the four Soviet fleets). In 1978 the Soviets began to employ their most modern aircraft and armor to the Far East. Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft carrier *Minsk*, arguably the most powerful ship of its class in the world, and the amphibious ship *Ivan Rogov* were added to the Pacific Fleet. The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and a rapid deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations enabled the Soviets to acquire the use of the former U.S. naval and air bases at

Cam Ranh Bay.[Ref. 20: p. 5] Then, in 1978 the Soviets took over the sole sponsorship of Vietnam and later the same year invaded Afghanistan and dramatically changed Japanese regional security perspective.

Until the Soviet invasion, Japanese leaders maintained a low-profile tone in introducing defense policy, while pursuing a robust economic policy. The invasion acted as the stimulus for a series of issues pressing the Japanese for change. The increased Soviet threat combined with the declining U.S. presence in Asia, and the accompanying American pressure for burden sharing resulted in several modifications of Japanese defense strategy. In May 1981 Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko (17 July 1980 - 27 Nov. 1982) met with President Reagan and pledged that the Japanese would assume a greater role in the defense of Japan. As a result, the decision was made by the Japanese to extend Japan's defense perimeter to 1,000 miles east and south - a momentous departure from Japan's previous Cold War defense posture [Ref. 31: p. 96]. The next significant modifications of Japanese defense strategy were embodied in the dynamic policies of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (27 Nov. 1982 - 6 Nov. 1987).

Under Prime Minister Nakasone, the Japanese significantly reinforced their security cooperation with the United States, thereby strengthening the security link between Japan, the United States and ASEAN.[Ref. 35]. This was accomplished first by relaxing defense technology exports to

the U.S. in November 1983. Next, the Japanese Premier established regular, large scale, combined Japan-U.S. military exercises. Soon thereafter, he promised the participation of the private sector of Japan with the United States Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Other decisions, however, did more to increase Southeast Asian anxiety over renewed militarism by Japan.

In September 1985 Prime Minister Nakasone made a pivotal decision when he approved the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) for the period 1986-1990. In comparison with the intent of the NDPO, the MTDP placed greater emphasis on sea control capability and the establishment of an air defense screen. The MTDP further stipulated an attainable end date for the fulfillment of the NDPO force levels.[Ref. 36] To accomplish this goal, however, the Japanese Premier revoked the decade old one percent ceiling placed on defense spending. These represent impressive accomplishments for a Japanese prime minister in a political system that traditionally demands consensus decision making. Any individual who shows initiative must attain consensus support before action can be taken.

To allay Southeast Asian fears of renewed militarism in Japan, Prime Minister Nakasone adhered to the Fukuda Doctrine and visited each of the nations of ASEAN. During his visit he defended Japanese security policies as being purely defensive in nature, and increased the Japanese financial aid package

over that offered by each of his predecessors[Ref. 37].

Paul Maidment of the Economist had this to say about Japanese security in 1989:

That Japan's security depends on its economic strength is the main premise of Japanese foreign policy. So its broad aim in East and Southeast Asia is to sustain a stable and capitalist region that can provide raw materials, factories and, increasingly, markets for its industries. Part of what Japanese companies and their patron ministries, particularly, MITI, are doing is to expand the Japanese economy beyond the country's geographical borders. Over the next decade, how Japan continues to do this will determine in large part the way the region develops. The goal would be to integrate the economies of the [old] NICs and the new NICs into something that would look a lot like a greater Japan, Inc. Its core would be Japan. Industrial policy would be coordinated from Tokyo. [It] would be done by something called the "Asian Brain," [which] would control the disposition of industrial investment throughout Japan and the region and coordinate the necessary policy support by the governments of those countries. The [cortex of the] "Asian Brain" is clearly intended to be the Japanese civil service, just as MITI was the brain behind Japan, Inc., in the 1960s[Ref. 38].

In retrospect, Japanese officials in 1994 contend that 1989 was a turning point in their search for a greater political and security roles in Southeast Asia to match Japan's economic prowess. That year the Japanese economy peaked with investment in the region that gave it an unquestioned commercial presence. Emperor Hirohito died in 1989 and with him perished a strong historical linkage with Japan's wartime occupation of Southeast Asia. In 1989, on the occasion of Tiananmen, the Japanese demonstrated that they could break with the United States in regard to human rights

by responding calmly, as opposed to with infuriation. And Tokyo played an influential but reserved role in the 1989 start of the new Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation regional forum.[Ref. 39]



### III. CHANGES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The end of the Cold War brought about many changes to Southeast Asia. The global Cold War imposed its division: ASEAN aligned with the West and Indochina with the U.S.S.R. The major security threat was from Vietnam, which led to ASEAN's cohesion behind its most threatened front line member, Thailand, in the first place. Moscow's decision to stop subsidizing Vietnam's aggression in Cambodia and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Vietnam led to a retraction in Hanoi's position as well. The new Vietnamese reorientation toward domestic affairs seemed to remove a significant cohesive element in ASEAN.[Ref. 40]

One major question for policy makers in ASEAN was whether it was necessary for the United States to maintain a military presence in the region with the atrophy of the Soviet threat, and for that matter an apparent absence of any specific threat. The answer was a qualified yes. If the U.S. departed, the result would be a danger represented by nations with questionable intentions toward American interests in the region. In that light, Japan became a focal point. Throughout the Cold War Japan substantially increased its defense capabilities and stepped up security cooperation with the United States. It also expanded its financial contributions to the United Nations' peacekeeping and

humanitarian activities. Japan's military responsibility expanded to 1,000 nautical miles from Japanese shores and was restricted to the protection of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs). But Tokyo was no longer content with passively following Washington's leadership in global affairs, as outlined so carefully in the Yoshida Doctrine. The Japanese demonstrated a desire to participate in power sharing in the post Cold War.

Changes came about with the end of the Cold War which prompt the U.S. and Japan to reassess continuously their traditional roles. The once-menacing ships of the Soviet Pacific Fleet are in 1994 rusting in port. The 1992 withdrawal of the United States from its substantial facilities in the Philippines including Subic Bay Naval Base, Cubi Point Naval Air Station, and Clark Air Force Base, has left a security vacuum. China's economic dynamism has allowed it to expand its military muscle, and Japan's economic dominance has led it to search for a new role in the guardianship of regional peace.[Ref. 41] Southeast Asians are no longer convinced that they can rely solely on their western partners for security. Moreover, each nation in Southeast Asia is being forced to identify its own potential threats. Old suspicions are reviving, and all the nations of ASEAN are stockpiling arms.

#### **A. REMOVAL OF THE THREAT OF WORLD COMMUNISM**

Despite the end of the Cold War, some ideological differences remain. Four of the world's five remaining Communist run nations are in Asia. According to Winston Lord, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, "Asia is caught in a time warp." [Ref. 42]

There remain a number of dormant issues and disputes which could escalate into hostilities in the absence of a security framework according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Power is being redistributed between the United States, China, Japan, and the nations of ASEAN. [Ref. 41: p. 12] To manage the anxieties of the post Cold War, Southeast Asian nations are using preventive diplomacy in order to maintain the dialogue between nations of historic and potential conflict in the region. [Ref. 41: p. 12]

One such group is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, or APEC, founded by twelve Asia-Pacific nations in Canberra in 1989, and in 1994 includes fifteen member economies [Ref. 43]. APEC has shown little cohesion since its inception. Its listless performance has been indicative of the diversity of its constituents, the emphasis on a consensus for decisions, and an abundance of political jockeying between the participants. APEC - incorporating the ASEAN nations and Australia, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States - incorporates the most dynamic and energetic economies in the

world [Ref. 44]. Despite its diversity, Asia has a "much greater sense of community," than it did during the Cold War according to Mr. Lord [Ref. 42: p. 4].

In keeping with his principle campaign promise - to concentrate on the American economy - President Clinton has successfully blended foreign policy with American economic interests in two important instances: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the APEC. With the successful passage of NAFTA through the Congress, President Clinton fulfilled initiatives of his predecessors, but in hosting the APEC summit in Seattle in November 1993 and meeting individually with Asian heads of state, he executed a brilliant political masterstroke, bound to further improve economic ties with the region. At the summit President Clinton made these comments:

The fastest-growing region is the Asian Pacific, a region that has to be vital for our future. In the span of a few years, these Asian economies have gone from being thought of as "Dominos" in the struggle between Communism and democracy to "dynamos" driving the world economy. We cannot let our national worries blind us to our national interests. More than ever our security is tied to economics. Military threats remain, and they require our vigilance and resolve, but increasingly our place in the world will be determined as much by the skills of our workers as by the strength of our weapons, as much by our ability to pull down foreign trade barriers as our ability to breach distant ramparts.[Ref. 45]

One of the greatest concerns in the "community" is the PRC, whose intentions are still not clear. There seems to be a disparity between what the Chinese are doing and what they are saying. Plans to build a "blue water navy" for example,

do not jibe with Chinese foreign policy of peace and its abiding by the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" whereby mainland China will abide by its principle of non-intervention in other's internal affairs, particularly in the South China Sea[Ref. 46]. For that matter, recent Chinese nuclear tests and Chinese diffidence over ruling out a violent takeover of Taiwan have not added to a sense of security by the nations of Southeast Asia.

In spite of the remarkable growth of the Chinese economy, however, few policy makers in Southeast Asia fear a Chinese military threat now[Ref. 47]. According to Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, "They want stability and certainty for the next few decades so that they can carry on with their economic reforms." [Ref. 48] "After the Cold War, the main issue in Asia is the absence of an overriding threat," relates security specialist Zakaria Haji Ahmad from the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur[Ref. 41: p. 12]. It is ironic that many Southeast Asians remember the PRC support of Communist insurgents during the Cold War, yet tend to sympathize with mainland China after the Tiananmen Square massacre.[Ref. 41]

Increasingly, the nations of ASEAN are finding that the idea of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality during the Cold War was unrealistic. Sitting at the crossroads of two oceans, possessing vast natural resources, and now experiencing booming economies, the commodities of Southeast

Asia are too tempting to resist for the major powers. "We tried to deny that there would be a power vacuum if the US withdrew," said the director of the Institute for Security and International Studies in Bangkok, Kusuma Snitwongse. "While it's old thinking to suggest that we should hang on to a U.S. military presence, in this uncertain period there's an ambivalence. If the U.S. leaves, will Japan and China be more aggressive in the region?"[Ref. 41: p.12]

Currently, the military threat of Japan is minimal to the region. The Japanese seem to be constrained by their "peace" constitution, and a dependence on the U.S. military forces under the 1960 Security Treaty. The Japanese Armed Forces have 245,000 personnel, only 155,000 of which belong to the Ground Self Defense Force[Ref. 49], and the numbers are shrinking with Prime Minister Hosokawa's intention to lead the world in disarmament.[Ref. 41: p. 12]

Of principle concern to Southeast Asia, however, is the fact that Japan could transform its technological superiority and economic might into the development of powerful weapons of mass destruction quickly. The threat of a North Korean nuclear arsenal adds impetus to the argument.[Ref. 50] Moreover, in September 1993 the United States unveiled a policy that it will "not oppose programs by Japan to keep producing plutonium." Consequently, the Japanese will soon have a large stockpile of plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons.[Ref. 51]

Other concerns include a widespread feeling that Japan has failed to learn from its occupation of Southeast Asia before and during World War II.[Ref. 41: p. 12] The Japanese Ministry of Education, for instance, has yet to accept textbooks containing balanced accounts of the war[Ref. 52]. "For Japan not to tell its children what happened in the war-it causes a lot of worry," according to Tommy Koh, a former Singaporean ambassador to the United States[Ref. 41: p. 13]. And yet the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, in power from 1955 until voters turned it out of office in June 1993, showed a guarded limited willingness for greater Japanese engagement of Southeast Asian interests, other than to fall in line with the policy of the United States. The younger generation of politicians forming the backbone of Japan's new ruling coalition seem willing to assert a more assertive foreign policy in the region. To accomplish this, the new Japanese politicians must assure wary Southeast Asian neighbors that the country has fully exorcised any latent nationalist tendencies.[Ref. ?] In that regard Prime Minister Hosokawa has publicly expressed responsibility for his country's actions during World War II[Ref. 53].

A stronger, more assertive Japanese foreign policy is also disconcerting to Southeast Asia. It could mean a permanent seat for Japan on the United Nations Security Council, Japanese participation in more United Nations missions in trouble spots, and in the Japanese leadership taking more

decisive, independent viewpoints on international affairs issues.[Ref. 52] What bothers Southeast Asians the most, however, is that with a growing independence the Japanese may decide to leave the U.S. security umbrella[Ref. 41: p. 12].

It is not only the Japanese that have added to regional anxiety. Though inactive, the Russian Pacific Fleet is not impotent. The fact that Moscow seeks to maintain some of its access to the warm-water port in Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay is likewise cause for concern.[Ref. 41: p. 13]

Adding fuel to the fire, the Clinton administration outlined a new defense strategy 16 May 1993. The plan, which became known as the "win-hold-win" doctrine, was in sharp contrast to the previous U.S. defense strategy. Instead of being able to fight and win two major conflicts simultaneously, win-hold-win stipulated that U.S. forces would hold the enemy in a second conflict until the first was won.[Ref. 54] If a new Korean war broke out, for example, U.S. forces may not be able to come to the aid of their friends in Southeast Asia if battles also erupted over the oil rich Spratly Islands, or civil war in the Philippines broke out, or if armed conflict between mainland China and Taiwan occurred.

After criticism, the administration switched back to a "win-win" policy on 24 June to alleviate the fears of U.S. allies, but the policy reversal could not conceal the heart of the issue - the dwindling amount of money available for the



U.S. defense budget. "The budget is driving the strategy, not the other way round," according to William Taylor, Vice President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.[Ref. 54]

To calm some of their misgivings, the member states of ASEAN decided in 1992 to build on the 25-year success of their organization by starting a new group dedicated to security issues. Invited to join the group were Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Canada, the European Community, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.[Ref. 55] The group is enigmatically known as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)[Ref. 41], and their first regional security dialogue was held in Singapore when the foreign ministers met between 26 and 28 July 1993. Admiral David Jeremiah, Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, made this comment about the Southeast Asian security dialogue:

In Europe, there are a number of institutions in which security questions can be addressed. In Asia, there [have been] no such institutions. This is one of the great differences between the two continents. In Asia, you [haven't had] the sorts of political dialogues to reduce the tensions that have emerged following the end of the Cold War. It's time for Asia to begin a dialogue. The best approach to security is not to have your first line of defence in military forces but rather to reduce tensions and to engage in conflict resolution. This new forum emerging through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will give the U.S. and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region the opportunity to start talking about issues that divide us, create tensions and pose security threats.[Ref. 56]

But the ARF began with more than its share of snags. Japan did not want Russia and China to be invited, and the United States expressed its desire to exclude Vietnam from the group. As might be expected, these apprehensions were addressed in the gradualist ASEAN way of doing business - "As a minimum you keep all the countries talking," said Mr. Koh[Ref. 41]. At the first dinner between the foreign ministers, for example, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher was seated next to Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Kam[Ref. 55]. The meeting offered the opportunity for the U.S. to hold the highest level talks with Vietnam under the Clinton administration. "The problem is not how to exclude anybody, but how to keep this happy state of affairs," says Bilahari Kausikan, head of the East Asia and Pacific Bureau in Singapore's Foreign Ministry, "It's a matter of a balance of big powers, not the vacuum of power[Ref. 41]." More substantive talks are slated for the summer of 1994 in Thailand.

During the Cold War, ASEAN shied away from forming a security forum. It is ironic that now, in a period seen by many as one of reduced tensions ASEAN should decide that it is time to initiate a security forum. For the first time, defense officials from each of the ASEAN nations will meet in the coming months to lay the groundwork for the ARF meeting[Ref. 41].

## **B. NEW AWARENESS OF THE GROWING POWER OF CHINA**

With the economy booming at a 12% annual clip and exceeding that figure in 1994, the PRC's emergence is of critical importance to the region. The potential for China to become a 21st century economic powerhouse, dismissed as naive after the Tianamen Square incident in 1989, is highly credible. Most economists predict China will sustain an average growth rate of at least 7% over the next 10 years. That means that its gross domestic product, unofficially estimated at \$1.2 trillion, would double by early next century, firmly establishing China as one of the world's top economic powers.[Ref. 57] China's economic success has allowed the Chinese to pursue an expansive military build up. Defense spending in 1990-91 was increased by 15.5 per cent over the previous year. In 1991-1992 military spending was further raised by 13.8 %.[Ref. 58]

Undoubtedly, one of the most significant developments in the PRC is the transformation of the Army. Ever since the Communist Party congress of 1992, which sanctified the PRC's move toward a market economy, the military has been in ascendancy[Ref. 59]. Military professionals have assumed a higher political profile as the ruling Communists prepare for an uncertain transition after the death of Deng Xiaoping[Ref. ?].

Additionally, a significant military reorganization has sidetracked hard line Communist ideologues in the People's

Liberation Army (PLA) and strengthened professionally oriented officers determined to turn their once peasant Army into a technologically sophisticated economic and fighting force.[Ref. 59] The PLA is shifting from a large manpower-intensive force with relatively obsolete equipment to a smaller, more capable force. The total strength of the PLA has dropped from approximately four million personnel in the mid-1980s to roughly three million today. As a result, more money has been funneled into the development and production of modern missiles, aircraft and ships[Ref. 60].

Beijing is taking advantage of hard economic times in Russia by acquiring a wide range of sophisticated weapons at dramatically reduced prices. Items the PRC desires include MiG-31 interceptors, Tu-22 bombers, T-72M main battle tanks, A-50 airborne early warning and control planes and S-300 ground-based antiballistic missiles[Ref. 60: p. 143]. This equipment would beef up an already impressive arsenal consisting of Soviet made long-range Su-27 fighter aircraft, IL-76 transport planes, and know how that give its bombers a range of more than 1000 nautical miles[Ref. 61].

Despite its recent emphasis on the development of conventional weapons, Beijing's wild card from the Cold War remains its nuclear weapons capability. The PRC now possesses a fully developed nuclear stockpile. Its nuclear weaponry includes eight intercontinental ballistic missiles, 60 intermediate-range ballistic missiles and one nuclear-powered

ballistic missile carrying submarine. Though small by U.S. and Russian ballistic missile submarine standards, the Chinese Xia is equipped with 12 sea-launched ballistic missiles.[Ref. 62] Moreover, recent reports indicate that the PRC is enhancing its nuclear delivery capabilities by developing a new missile-launching submarine, though construction is reported to be delayed[Ref. 60: p. 148]. Other nuclear capabilities include PRC possession of approximately 200 nuclear-capable bombers[Ref. 62: p. 99].

According to some analysts, with its increased military expenditures, mainland China is placing a greater emphasis on preparation for regional conflict - a point not missed by Southeast Asian neighbors. In 1985 China's Central Military Commission directed the PLA to shift its primary strategic concentration from preparation for a general war with the former Soviet Union, to preparation for more small scale, limited war on the Chinese periphery[Ref. 63]. The "peripheral defense" concept has translated to a particularly disconcerting emphasis on the South China Sea.

Since the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of the U.S. Navy from the Philippines, control over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea has become a heated issue. The Spratlys chain, comprising about 60 islands, are claimed in part or whole by six countries: the PRC, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. The island chain is coveted not only because it offers the ability to oversee much

of the maritime traffic between the Pacific and Indian oceans, but it is estimated that as much as one trillion dollars in oil and gas may lie in the geological structures beneath the Spratly seabed.[Ref. 64] Despite the fact that the United States does not officially support any of the claimants (Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines, the PRC and Vietnam), the presence of United States warships and aircraft in the region has a stabilizing effect. [Ref. 25: p. 666]

The March 1988 clash between the PRC and Vietnam is fresh in the memories of regional leaders. The PRC displayed a disconcerting capability of maritime power projection during the operation. During the campaign the PLAN masterfully employed destroyers, frigates, supply ships, marines, and a surprisingly proficient amphibious force[Ref. 65]. The islands occupied by the PRC were just outside the Malaysian, and within the Philippine, claim areas. The PRC claims include all of the islands in the Pratas Island, Macclesfield Bank, Paracel, and Spratly island groups - virtually every island in the South China Sea [Ref. 40: pp. 664, 666].

To help defuse rising pressure concerning the Spratlys, Indonesia, which does not claim any of the islands, has sponsored several informal "workshops" since 1991 among the six nations to discuss possible joint development of the island chain[Ref. 64]. Regardless of the workshops, however, the PLA has continued its expansion in the region.

Beijing's military buildup on Hainan and Woody Islands in the South China Sea sends a clear signal of an inclination to dominate the South China Sea by force while professing a willingness to negotiate shared control with other claimants to both the Spratly and Paracel chains. Recently, a military airstrip capable of accommodating the Su-27 fighters, and new naval facilities were completed on Woody Island[Ref. 60: p. 140]. Reports indicate that the Su-27s can provide air cover for the PLAN over virtually all of the South China Sea. The Su-27s decisively alter the military balance in Southeast Asia as the PRC will have an air capability encompassing all of the region and beyond - including as far as Japan.[Ref. 58: p. 34] Concerned, Tokyo is said to have quietly warned Russia that upsetting the military balance in East Asia by strengthening China with high-technology conventional weaponry will hurt Moscow's chances for massive aid from Japan and the West for reconstruction.[Ref. 58: p. 34]

Beijing's willingness to flex its new military muscle in the region was typified when an agreement for oil-exploration was signed with Denver-based Crestone Energy Corporation in an area in the Spratlys. Though the territory is also claimed by Vietnam, Beijing has threatened to use "full force" if necessary in support of the project[Ref. 61].

Yet the recent assertive policies of the PRC in the South China Sea have raised several related issues. According to

the assistant director-general of Malaysia's Institute of Strategic and International Studies:

Its continuing preoccupation with domestic politics, the complexity of international relations, the need to deal with the sovereign states of Southeast Asia as equals and the need to delicately balance the interests of the U.S. and Russia do not seem to inhibit China's new hegemonic interest in the region.[Ref. 66]

Some experts claim that Beijing's assertiveness has provided a motive for the Japanese to further build up their military. Still others think the PRC is providing a pretext for friendly nations to adopt a two-China policy by recognizing Taiwan.[Ref. 66] Yet if Chinese attitudes are any indication of future relations, the road ahead will be a rocky one.

Historically, the Chinese have not dealt with the nations of Southeast Asia as equal partners. For centuries the Middle Kingdom of China exacted tribute from the region. During the Cold War the PRC under Mao Zedong was seen by many Southeast Asian governments to be violent, unfriendly and unpredictable. On numerous occasions the PRC interfered in the internal affairs of countries in the region through repeated appeal for assistance from Chinese living abroad. Currently Southeast Asian countries are naturally leery of Beijing's intentions.

Although Southeast Asia enjoys relative stability compared to the rest of the world, many of the nations still worry about East-West tensions and decreasing U.S. military power in the region. The PRC's recent decision to end an informal world moratorium nuclear testing highlights the problem.



Despite strong U.S. pressure and President Clinton's personal appeal for restraint, China resumed testing in early October, 1993 after more than a year of tests, when it exploded a nuclear device in its western desert.

Some regional analysts were concerned that the test would bring about new fears throughout Asia and hurt efforts to pressure North Korea into halting its nuclear weapons program. Others said the blast simply underscored what Southeast Asians already knew: the PRC is an impressive military power, unafraid of flexing its muscle.[Ref. 59]

As an alternative measure, the members of ASEAN are weighing the decision to accept an economically strengthening, and militarily powerful Vietnam as an equal partner in the Association. Although tensions have cooled with the PRC, with its large standing army, Vietnam could add its weight to the deterrents of Chinese power.

#### **C. THE GROWING NEEDS OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

Southeast Asia is one of the world's most economically energetic regions, whose countries are voraciously hunting for foreign investment. Big players like Japan, some Europeans and the United States are competing to provide it. But any overview of regional national development cannot escape the predominant economic presence of Japan in Southeast Asia. Equally as evident is the growing sense of reluctance by

regional leaders toward the membership in the "Yen Bloc." Instead they favor Western investment which usually means fewer strings attached. "ASEAN sees Japan only as a money bag, which they think they should use for their own purposes." according to Mochtar Kususa-amadja, Indonesia's former Foreign minister.[Ref. 2: p. 111]

Intra-Asian trade now exceeds Asia's trade with the rest of the world. One of the primary reasons is Japan's trade and investment through the Cold War. In the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s Southeast Asia was largely dependent on Japan. Now, in the early 90s however, Japan relies on Asia for over 30 percent of its total exports, a three-fold increase since 1985.[Ref. 67] Japan now imports more color TVs, for example, than it exports from its own shores. Moreover, with another rapid yen appreciation in the near future, a second Japanese import wave in finished products from Southeast Asia may be just around the corner. But the fact that Japan is importing more from the region, may not necessarily be good for Southeast Asians. Regional exports in many cases represent the fruit from seeds planted by the Japanese. As described by Japanese author Hasegawa Keitaro, Japan's role in Asia is that of a fisherman who holds a line tied around the neck of a cormorant catching fish in its beak. The bird does all the work, but the man reaps the reward since the line prevents the bird from swallowing. Japanese firms provide the means for Southeast Asian nations to export, but mainly for

Japan's benefit.[Ref. 67: p. 13] During the Cold War the U.S. neglected the nonaligned nations, focusing its attention and spending its dollars on "friends and allies." As a result, Japan outdistanced the United States as a benefactor in Malaysia and Indonesia. For many of the nations of ASEAN, Japan provides the "core" economy. Malaysia for example has become the world's biggest exporter of air conditioners, all made in Japanese factories.[Ref. 67: p. 11]

Japan is Malaysia's number one trading partner, accounting for about a fifth of its total trade (23 percent of all its imports and over 20 percent of exports). More specifically, Japan buys a third of Malaysia's oil, 30 percent of its tin, two-thirds of its raw logs and cut timber, and virtually all of its natural gas. In return Japanese capital goods, technology, and manufactured components make up over 80 percent of Malaysia's imports. But the Japanese have given Malaysia other claims to fame. They are the world's third-largest producer of semiconductors, and the world's leading exporter of chips.[Ref. 2: pp. 231-232] Only recently have electronics and electrical products surpassed Malaysia's traditional exports of rubber and tin.

Since the end of the Cold War Indonesia has been Japan's single most important overseas market for direct investment in Asia.[Ref. 68] Japanese firms have invested nearly 10 billion dollars there and ranked number one in foreign investment in Indonesia. The United States is third behind

Hong Kong with just under 2 billion dollars, mostly in oil and gas. Japan is also Indonesia's number-one foreign lender. Fast growth in the money supply prompted Jakarta to implement a tight monetary policy, forcing the private sector in Indonesia to go to foreign banks (primarily Japanese) for investment financing.[Ref. 68] Indonesian policy makers are concerned with the degree and depth of Japanese involvement in their economy. According to Foreign Minister Ali Alatas,

Japan is without question our largest market and the dominant commercial and financial power in the region, as well as the source of most of our technology. A country with such overwhelming economic power may one day want to play an equivalent role politically and militarily. How does that affect us? Can we be ambivalent? And how can we possibly offset Japan's strength? Well, one way is by the process of multilateralization, by encouraging the U.S. to invest more here.[Ref. 2: p. 119]

Though Indonesia's Gross Domestic Product is the largest in Southeast Asia, its revenues come primarily from its natural resources, namely petroleum and liquefied natural gas.[Ref. 69] The Japanese account for 40 percent of Indonesia's exports, while the United States accounts for 14 percent. Nevertheless, economic growth is strong, averaging over 7 percent in the last three years. Each year, however, President Soeharto is closer to his plan to diversify Indonesia's economy, with less dependence on oil exports and more emphasis on a strong manufacturing base[Ref. 70].

Thailand's future, like that of Malaysia and Indonesia, seems to lie squarely in the path of economic advance and the production of higher value-added, high productivity industries

that appear destined to control the emerging information age. Also like her ASEAN neighbors, Thailand is advancing in the long shadow of the Japanese economy. For years Thailand's most important bilateral economic relationship has been with Japan, its largest foreign investor, aid donor, and trading partner[Ref. 2: p. 209]. Thailand's Chulalongkorn University, for example, is tripling its engineering faculty to produce thousands more engineers, primarily for jobs in Japanese factories around Bangkok[Ref. 67: p. 11].

But in 1991 the United States market surpassed the Japanese and accounted for about 23 percent of Thailand's exports, while Japan took in just over 17 percent of Thai exports. Traditional Thai characteristics will make the United States more valuable in the future. They include: an unparalleled cultural tolerance, which has helped Thailand assimilate so smoothly both the ethnic Chinese minority and the high levels of Japanese investment; personal friendliness and gentility, which make the Thais such pleasant people to work with; an innate love of learning, so prevalent throughout Asia; a highly educated and discipline elite, who as technocrats and business leaders have guided its political economy so capably; a political system of "flexible equilibrium"; and a history of siding with winners. The Thai model should inspire the United States to expand its activities in Malaysia and Indonesia. The United States is the biggest investor in more than one Southeast Asian Nation.

In Singapore, for example, US firms represent 18 billion dollars in investments, much of it in high technology industries (Singapore is the world's leading exporter of computer hard-disk drives).[Ref. 67: p. 14]

Communism's decline has opened up large new markets in China, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. True to form, the Japanese are following a similar strategic economic blueprint to that which so firmly established them in ASEAN. In Vietnam, for example, a nation which expects sales of 80,000 cars annually by 2005, Mitsubishi Motor Company submitted a "master plan" to government officials on how to set up vehicle-assembly factories and auto parts companies for the next 20 years. The 104 page report recommended a standard of manufacturing that would give a dominating advantage to Japanese companies.[Ref. 71] "It's like the prey of the black widow spider," according to J. Malcom Dowling, an economist with the Asian Development Bank in Manila, "by the time you realize you're in the web, it's too late." [Ref. 67] Cambodia and Laos with more recent economic reforms, however, offer improved economic foundations and clean slates for international investments. Last year alone, total exports rose by 37 percent in Laos over the previous year. Foreign investment in the local textile industry helped make garments the country's top export.[Ref. 72]

America has a streak of isolationism in its history which is a concern to Southeast Asians. It is combined with a

tendency toward anti-intellectualism. Should this trend surface, America's turning inward could hurt Southeast Asia at precisely the time they expect the United States to keep its enormous market open and remain receptive to exports from its strategic allies. During the past thirty years Japan and the newly industrialized countries have benefitted tremendously from a strong and open American market.[Ref. 2: p. 36] The United States will remain an economic player everywhere in the world especially in the Asian region. Both Presidents Bush in 1991 and Clinton in 1993 made promotional swings through Asia[Ref. 67: p. 14]. Moreover, during the 1993 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting in Seattle, President Clinton commented that "We do not intend to bear the cost of our military presence in Asia and the burdens of regional leadership only to be shut out of the benefits of growth that stability brings." [Ref. 73]

There are growing needs of national development which will make the technology and markets of Japan and the United States and possibly greater China more important than ever.

#### **D. THE NEW MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE REGION**

The end of the Cold War produced something closer to geostrategic peace and a rush to cut military spending in Europe, but it prompted new uncertainty and anxiety in Southeast Asia - and set off a massive shopping spree for arms. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the draw-

down in the power of the United States, the nations of Southeast Asia were less secure about who might attack them. Who would protect them after the United States withdrew from the Philippines in 1991 and further reduced military presence in the region by greater than twenty five percent[Ref. 74]? The booming economies in the region allowed the nations of Southeast Asia capital enough to buy a lot of firepower. In 1991 Southeast Asia accounted for thirty five percent of all imports of major weapons, more than any other region, including Europe and the Middle East. In 1990 the developing countries in the region accounted for forty four percent of imports of major arms by all developing states[Ref. 75].

The nations of Southeast Asia are engaged in accelerating arms races with significant implications for regional and international security. The nations of ASEAN, Taiwan, and the PRC are all involved, but it is the emphasis on modern weaponry, and the growing economic capabilities of those nations to acquire advanced military hardware that sets this arms buildup apart.[Ref. 76] An emphasis on naval strength, rapidly improving domestic arms industries, and high technology weaponry all characterize the Southeast Asian arms race.

Of the nations in the region, only Vietnam appears to have made any substantial cuts in defense expenditures. When Hanoi announced its decision to finish its troop withdrawal from



Cambodia by September 1989, it also announced plans to make cuts to military personnel by 50 percent and reduce defense expenditures to one percent of the nation's GNP.[Ref. 77] For ASEAN, the trend is profoundly opposite. In Thailand, the increase in defense spending in 1992 was 13.5 percent above 1991, 30.8 per cent over 1990 and 55 percent over 1989. Singapore's 1992 defence budget was 11.6 percent over expenditures in 1991, 20.3 per cent over 1990 and 40.9 percent over 1989. Malaysia spent 21.8 per cent more on defense in 1992 than 1991 while the Indonesian budget increased 14.1 percent over the same period. In the Philippines, the defense budget rose 42.9 percent from 1989 until 1992.[Ref. 77]

The trend toward higher defense spending by ASEAN nations is in large part an ambitious goal of modernization, particularly with regard to air capabilities. Brunei, for example is planning to purchase its first fixed wing aircraft. The Royal Brunei Air Force will accept 16 Hawk fighter aircraft from British Aerospace,[Ref. 78] while Malaysia has ordered 28 of the British made Hawks[Ref. 79]. The Philippine Air Force has begun its modernization by purchasing 18 SIAI Marchetti S.211 trainer and light attack aircraft from Italy, 18 Kfir fighter aircraft from Israel and 18 Albatross strike trainer aircraft from the Czech and Slovak Republic[Ref. 77: p. 67]. Thailand intends to purchase an additional squadron of F-16s[Ref. 79:

p. 842] as well as three E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft from the United States[Ref. 79: p. 67]. The Singapore Air Force is the regions most advanced, and will add to its strength with the purchase of another squadron of American made F-16s and by upgrading the avionics of its older A-4s[Ref. 79: p. 842].

In addition to the modernization of their air forces, the nations of ASEAN are transforming their coastal or "brown water" maritime forces into competent "green water" and "blue water" navies with capabilities beyond their traditional coastal defense. Indonesia, already in possession of the largest navy in ASEAN, has started to take delivery of 37 ex-East German Navy ships. The 37 ships represent over one third of the former East German Navy, and are being received under a deal signed with Germany in December, 1992. They include 16 "Parchim" class corvettes, 12 "Frosch I" and two "Frosch II" class tank landing ships and nine "Kondor" class mine countermeasures vessels.[Ref. 80] The purchase is a means of expansion of Indonesia's naval forces at a relatively modest cost, and is motivated by a desire to sharpen its image and to strengthen its power projection capability.[Ref. 81]

The only ASEAN nation with submarines, Indonesia is attempting to acquire two more from Germany. Brunei will acquire three 1,000 ton offshore patrol craft from Britain, and three CN-235 maritime patrol aircraft from Indonesia. The

Sultan may also decide to buy Indonesian made PB57 patrol boats as well[Ref. 77: p. 67]. In an effort to protect Filipino interests in its South China Sea Exclusive Economic Zone, the Philippine government has increased the naval budget by four-fold. New acquisitions will include three Australian-built 30 knot, 57 meter patrol boats, 28 fast patrol boats built in the United States; three 38 foot "Cormoran" type fast patrol boats equipped with Exocet missiles from Spain; six medium landing ships and four mine countermeasure vessels.[Ref. 82] Malaysia is acquiring two 106 meter 2,200-ton guided missile frigates with the highly touted "Seawolf" point defence missile system from Great Britain. Moreover, the Malaysian Navy plans to acquire four Beech King Air 200 maritime patrol aircraft[Ref. 83]. Singapore's Navy has completed the acquisition of six "Victory" class corvettes built by Lurssen Werft of Germany and Singapore Technologies.[Ref. 77: p. 68] Additionally, Japan is building four more Aegis-class destroyers, plus a fleet of modern frigates and submarines; Taiwan has ordered six Lafayette class frigates from France and is building eight smaller type of frigates from the United States.[Ref. 76: p. 139]

As evidence by these purchases, the arms buildup in the region is characterized by a fundamental shift from traditional warfare doctrines concentrating on self defense during the Cold War, to an emphasis on power projection. The

more modern capabilities and the ability to strike at targets farther and farther away from home raise serious questions about the rationale behind the arms race and the prospects for continuation of current relationships.

#### **1. Rationale Behind the Military Buildup in Southeast Asia**

Motivation for the arms race can be found in both internal and external tensions in Southeast Asia. Some age-old dormant tension between the member states of ASEAN have reemerged with the end of the Cold War. Examples of such latent anxiety may involve longstanding territorial disputes including the Philippine claim to the Malaysian state of Sabah, or the Horsburg Lighthouse between Singapore and Malaysia, or the Sipadan and Ligitan islands between Indonesia and Malaysia[Ref. 77: p. 68]. Some bilateral relationships in ASEAN are flimsy at best, particularly between Singapore and Malaysia. Likewise, Thailand cites a large Vietnamese standing army as justification for its continuing arms buildup[Ref. 76: p. 142].

The arms build up is also inextricably linked to the rapid growth in economic power of the region. Fueled in most cases by export-driven industrial strategy, these countries have achieved impressive gains in GNP over the past two decades, while the economies of most other nations have declined[Ref. 76: p. 138]. The temptations to resort to

military build ups for its economic advantages have not been revisited.

To finance continued economic growth the nations of Southeast Asia, with the exception of Singapore, extended their territorial waters and their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) following their adoption of the provisions of the Law of the Sea convention[Ref. 77: p. 68]. In many cases the EEZs are overlapping and are contested. As a result there is a high probability of more conflicts similar to that between China and Vietnam.

The dangers of territorial disputes are greatest in the South China Sea, particularly in the case of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos. As the threat from "communist" insurgencies receded, particularly in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, the resources allocated to countering them could be shifted elsewhere - hence the emphasis on air and naval assets[Ref. 77: p. 68].

More rudimentary causes for the arms proliferation can also be cited. The prominence of owning a modern weapon system often motivates arms purchases. Competition between the Thai armed forces, for example, explains a large part of Thailand's defense acquisition program. In Thailand, decisions regarding weapons procurement often reflect a service chief's aspiration to be remembered for having introduced an advanced weapon system.[Ref. 77: p. 68] Competition between ASEAN states is also common. A good

example is Malaysia's recent search for an advanced jet fighter. In 1988 the Malaysian Air Force Chief of Staff expressed concern that the Royal Malaysian Air Force lost the advantage it had enjoyed for almost two decades in fighter superiority over other ASEAN states.[Ref. 77] Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia eclipsed the Malaysians with their purchases of F-16 fighters from the United States.

Extra regional pressures, however, have played an even greater role in the regional arms buildup. The widely publicized Persian Gulf War demonstrated the superior capabilities of modern weaponry, particularly from the United States, even under extremely adverse conditions[Ref. 84]. Hi-tech weapons became more desirable, and so did the US presence in the region.

Despite the general agreement among the ASEAN states over the need for a continued American presence, there are still some doubts about the will of America to sustain a large military presence in the long term, given the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the U.S. military withdrawal from the Philippines and domestic economic pressures in the United States. These doubts fuelled the determination of the ASEAN members to rely permanently upon their own resources.

One pessimistic scenario would see the U.S. military presence substantially reduced by the late 1990s in both South Korea and Japan. The center of gravity of the U.S. military forces in the Pacific would shift to Hawaii, Alaska, and the

West Coast of the United States.[Ref. 85] Under this scenario, China, Japan and even India seem likely to increase their influence in the region[Ref. 85]. In this view it may be argued that the military modernization efforts of the ASEAN states are complementary, rather than competitive. Together they could provide a strong unified defense.[Ref. 77: p. 68]

## **2. Prospects For the Continuation of the Arms Race**

Between 1979 and 1989 the economies of the ASEAN nations, the PRC, South Korea, and Taiwan grew at almost twice the rate of their western counterparts. The economic engines of the nations of Southeast Asia will continue to flourish and thereby provide their governments with the assets to further invest in their military infrastructures. To sustain their economic growth into the 21st century many have invested in the development of modern electronics, in conjunction with communications and aerospace industries. While these industries are intended primarily for civilian markets, they do provide a high technology foundation for military uses.[Ref. 76: p. 140]

All of the nations of Southeast Asia are now producers of at least some military equipment, and most have invested considerable resources in the establishment of new and modern naval and aerospace production facilities. As a result these countries are becoming increasingly self sufficient in the production of advanced weapons systems. Indonesia, for

example, has made a major investment in its shipbuilding industry under the auspices of Dr. B.J. Habibie, Minister for Research and Technology. Dr. Habibie, who was educated in the United States, also plays a major role on the Ministry Council for Strategic Industries which controls one of the most modern shipyards in the world - PT PAL, in Surabaya.[Ref. 86] Under the direction of Dr. Habibie, the Indonesian domestic shipbuilding industry is being developed to fulfill Indonesia's maritime requirements in the production of defense equipment. Indonesian naval force modernization plans include the production of twenty-two 2,800 ton patrol frigates, all built by PT PAL.[Ref. 82: p. 56] The Indonesian shipyard is also under contract to build vessels for Brunei, Malaysia, and Thailand[Ref. 87].

To equip their new forces and to enhance the combat capabilities of existing units, the nations of Southeast Asia are buying significant quantities of modern weapons and support systems. In Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei total spending on imported arms rose from an average of \$2.5 billion per year in 1979-81 to \$4.6 billion in 1987-1989[Ref. 88]. More recent arms import statistics are not yet available as of late 1993, but media releases from the region suggest that the trend toward ever-increasing levels of weapons spending has continued into the 1990s[Ref. 76: p. 145].



In summary, the economic means are increasingly available to support the regional arms race; regional trends in arms procurement from foreign sources and domestic production are increasing; and the stimulus of inter and extra regional pressures favoring arms build up are firmly in place.

#### **E. THE ARISING TRANSNATIONAL PROBLEMS**

Since the end of the Cold War, transnational dilemmas have become the vanguard of Southeast Asian policy concerns. Piracy, a growing drug cluture, population growth, and environmental issues are more important than ever.

##### **1. Piracy**

Since at least the sixteenth century, piracy in Southeast Asia has been endemic. Initially impoverished local imhabitants took to piracy in reaction to foreign control over their economies. Today whole communities are involved, often times claiming they have to rob to live.

Piracy in Southeast Asia has never been particularly sophisticated. Most attacks are associated with petty theft. In general, piracy has not taken the form of coordinated attacks by large gangs on container vessels, prevalent in many other parts of the world.

In an average scenario for an act of piracy in the region, the pirates tend to operate in small groups of two to five and typically approach their targets at night in fast boats. They favor laden tankers and similar vessels with low

freeboards which make them easy to board with grappling irons. Ship speed does not seem to be a deterrent-many boardings are on vessels moving at greater than 12 knots. In most cases the pirates are totally unseen when boarding. Normally, they quietly enter the cabins of crewmen-most often the master-tie their victim up and rob him, then leave before anyone else on board realises what is happening. The period of the attack is generally about 20 minutes, as opposed to the average of several days in pirate attacks off the west coast of Africa.

Pirates in Southeast Asia are usually armed, as in days of old, with knives, cutlasses or sickles. On a few occasions (10 percent of attacks, compared with a worldwide average of 17 percent) they carry firearms.

In addition to the "traditional" form of piracy there is another "piratic" threat to the maritime nations of the region: maritime terrorism, or politically motivated piracy. In contrast to pirating for private economic gain, maritime terrorists strive to disrupt international shipping as an effective tactic to further their political objectives. An example are the Moslem rebels-known as *ambuk pare* ("Jump, buddy") from an order involved with the separatist Moro National Liberation Front.[Ref. 89: p. 17]

Relatively new concepts, including the introduction of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), expanded territorial seas, open registry of shipping, and post-colonial

sensitivities regarding national sovereignty have had a profound impact on the ability to prosecute pirates.

The areas around the Straits of Malacca have the heaviest concentration of merchant shipping in the world, which generally has to slow down in order to pass through narrow channels. The Straits have been traditionally plagued by pirates.[Ref. 89]

The consequences of uncontrolled piracy in the Straits region go beyond the potential for injury or loss of life to ships' crews, and the economic losses associated with robbery. A pirate attack frequently diverts the crew's attention from the safe navigation of the vessel, thereby increasing the likelihood of a grounding or collision. Therefore, the potential for a major oil or hazardous chemical spill, or blockage of the traffic lane, is a disturbing possibility. The potential international ecological and economic consequences from such a scenario are immense.[Ref. 90]

At issue is the international concern over the safety of navigation in the Straits. Under the existing law, however, only Indonesia is allowed to direct law enforcement action against pirates in that most heavily traveled oceanic passage, the Straits of Malacca.

Recent proposals garner a cautious optimism in the fight against piracy in Southeast Asia. A regional conference held in Malaysia in July in 1992 has resulted in the establishment of a regional anti-piracy center. Financed by

the international maritime community, the headquarters will be located in Kuala Lumpur. The center was set up by the London based International Maritime Bureau, and will function as a 24 hour coordination center to answer distress calls from ships. It will collate information that could be used by Indonesian law enforcement personnel to locate and prosecute pirates.[Ref. 91]

## 2. Illicit Drugs

With growing economic affluence of the region, the problems associated with illicit drugs also rise. Since the closing years of the Cold War, drug traffickers have been attempting to raise demand for cocaine, for example, in Japan, the southern provinces of mainland China, and Southeast Asia. Japanese prosperity and the growing prosperity of southern China and Southeast Asian countries, particularly ASEAN, attracted traffickers looking to expand their markets.[Ref. 92]

Moreover, since the late 1980s, Southeast Asia expanded as an exporter of illegal drugs to the world. Most of the world's illicit opium cultivation took place in Burma, Laos and Thailand[Ref. 92: p. 28]. Thailand bolstered its position as the principal exit to the world market with the export of large amounts of opiates destined for traditional western locals, and increasingly toward Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong.[Ref. 92: p. 30]

### 3. Demographics

Southeast Asia must also come to grips with the explosion of population in the region. The demographic challenge of how to handle an Asia forecast to surge in population from 3.0 to 4.9 billion people over the next few decades (to 2025) must move closer to the forefront of regional concerns[Ref. 93]. The dangers of overpopulation - increasing starvation and deprivation, mass deaths through famine and disease, and a rending of the social fabric[Ref. 94] - have historically been resolved peacefully through migration, agricultural revolution, and industrialization.

For example, the "green revolution" in Asia during the 1960s resulted in a new hybrid rice strain which is more durable and produces much higher output - yielding two to three times more than traditional varieties of rice. Moreover, because the new strains were made more readily available to developing countries, the "Miracle Rice" was said to have averted famines, weaned poor countries off dependence on imported food, and provided political stability.[Ref. 95]

Nevertheless, new scientific breakthroughs often create structural problems of transferring their benefits from the "haves" to the "have nots" within that region. Today's Southeast Asia is presented with a larger challenge, as advanced technologies threaten to undermine the economies of

the developing societies. Population pressure is causing a depletion of local agricultural resources (the deforestation of Indonesia and Malayaia for the conversion to plantations to produce teak, rubber, rice, coffee, and other agricultural crops, for example). Therefore, Southeast Asians must keep in mind the other possible consequences to rapid population growth: internal unrest followed by external aggression.[Ref. 93: p. 13] The French Revolution and subsequent Napoleonic France serves record that among the possible consequences of rapid population growth, social turbulence and territorial expansion are as plausible as any.[Ref. 93: p. 11]

Since the end of the Cold War, there now exist vast nonmilitary threats to the safety and well-being of the peoples of the region which deserve attention.

#### **4. The Environment**

Asia is home to more than half of the world's population but just thirteen percent of the world's total land mass. The governments of Southeast Asia recognize the significance of the balance between economic growth and the environmental preservation as one of the critical long term challenges facing the region.[Ref. 96] According to Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew,

This is one world and if we destroy the environment, whether political or physical, we are all destroyed. It may take [the younger generation] 20 years to come to that conclusion. I didn't come to that conclusion when I started [my career]. I came to this realization as a result of learning, stage by stage, as I peeled layer by

layer off and came to the heart of the problem. This is one world because, for the first time in the history of men, technologically we are one interacting world.[Ref. 97]

"Economic growth and environmental protection are no longer viewed as contradictory goals," according to Tommy Koh, Singapore's ambassador-at-large[Ref. 96].

Priorities, however, are different from country to country. Japan and Singapore, which both have long-standing environmental programmes, are trying to develop and make use of environmentally friendly technology. Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam have bolstered rules on tree felling and adopted a firmer stance on the riddance of toxic wastes. At the same time Thailand is trying to protect land from industrial intrusion. The Philippines, on the other hand, became the first country in Asia to establish a national Commission on Sustainable Development, founded on the Earth Summit's Agenda 21 - an 800 page blueprint for incorporating environmental protection initiatives into national development programmes.[Ref. 96: p. 50] What defense has been to the world's leaders for the past 40 years, the environment will be for the next 40[Ref. 98].

#### **IV. CHANGES IN U.S. POLICIES TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA**

##### **A. MEETING GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES**

In one of the most visible displays of global concerns by the leading industrial nations in the world, the Group of Seven at the annual meeting in Tokyo, expanded their traditional focus on economics to include more security issues. The annual summit, which included the leaders of the seven leading industrialized nations (The United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, Canada, Italy, and Germany), was held from 7 to 9 July 1993[Ref. 99]. As much as they tried to concentrate on economic issues, the world leaders were pressed to deal with the new security dangers of the post Cold War world - terrorism, ethnic wars, and nuclear threats[Ref. 100].

The G-7 summit served notice that despite the end of the Cold War - and in some cases because of it - potential crises endure. Ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia, U.S./U.N. intervention and clan warfare in Somalia, stability in the Middle East, the restoration of the democratically elected president in Haiti, the establishment of a constitution and an elected Parliament in Russia, and the successful conclusion to the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were all issues crowding President Clinton's



agenda in his first year in office. To further complicate matters, in Asia and the Pacific, several possible flashpoints exist: a new Korean war or a North Korean launch of nuclear missiles; armed conflict between China and Taiwan; battles over claims to the oil-rich Spratly Islands, particularly between China and Vietnam; civil war in an Asian nation, such as the Philippines; war between India and Pakistan, both able to build nuclear weapons; and conflict between Japan and Russia over the Kurile Islands[Ref. 41: p. 11].

However, it was a domestic recession and assurances by candidate Clinton of domestic economic reform, more than an emphasis on foreign affairs, that brought him to office in early 1993. With President Clinton's inauguration, America seemed destined to scale back its traditional role of international leadership as it reasserted its traditional dedication to self-interest. Most Americans were weary of the commitments their nation had carried for more than forty years and were ready to share their burdens with others. Burden-sharing gained momentum in Congress, as members from both parties lobbied for U.S. men and women in uniform to begin coming home. They pushed for Europeans and Japanese to pay for more of the expenses for those service members who remained. Feeling hard-pressed financially, Americans were less inclined to support more than their share of the remaining Cold War military infrastructure, particularly in Europe.[Ref. 101]

During the Cold War, forward deployed U.S. forces in Europe outnumbered those in Asia by 4 to 1. According to present planning (1994), the ratio will soon be roughly equal, with about 100,000 American military personnel in each part of the world, despite the fact that Europe may be less stable now than during the Cold War.[Ref. 102]

Regardless of the proportional distribution of troops in Europe and the Pacific, the fact remains that Pacific based troops have been reduced by over 30 percent. Moreover, the U.S. military budget covering all services has been cut dramatically, and by every indication will continue to be reduced. Unfortunately, those reductions are occurring simultaneously with an increase of U.S. national interests in Southeast Asia. Direct U.S. investment in ASEAN in 1992, for example, increased over 14 percent since 1991.[Ref. 103]

As the economies of Southeast Asia grow, and trade with the United States flourishes, it follows that more and more Americans will do business in the region. With the dramatic reduction in the forward deployed American armed forces, the United States will be less able to safeguard increasing numbers of Americans living and working abroad.

With the dramatic reductions in our armed forces, both at home and overseas, combined with a substantial number of potential regional hot spots and increasing economic ties to Southeast Asia, the responsibilities of the United States are more difficult to meet. Therefore, American policy makers

must constantly reappraise their responsibilities in Southeast Asia in terms of global capabilities and commitments.

#### **B. IMPLICATIONS OF OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM SUBIC**

The withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines left wide ranging implications for both the United States and the nations of Southeast Asia, including questions over continued U.S. forward deployment; continued accessibility arrangements in the region; and continued international military exercises.

What concerned Southeast Asians the most in the withdrawal of the American military from the Philippines was the strength of the U.S. commitment to the region. After the U.S. Navy and Air Force withdrew from Luzon, forward-deployed American forces in the Pacific declined by over 30 percent from their peak during the Reagan administration. "We are not sure ourselves where we are headed, so how can those Asian countries be sure?" said Chong-Pin Lin, an American expert on Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute.[Ref. 102]

President Clinton recognizes regional concerns and in his trip through Asia in the summer of 1993 addressed some of the Asian apprehensions. On several occasions he stated that America's strategy will be "to compete, not retreat," - a corollary derived from the fact that the United States will do all it can to prevent East or Southeast Asia from falling prey to turmoil and upheaval. Conflict and war, particularly a protracted hot war, would retard, and perhaps even reverse,

the tremendous progress the region has made since the end of World War II.

We think showing the flag of the United States contributes to the stability of the region. The United States Navy performs that function with the approval and support of many Southeast Asians. "All of the other ASEAN nations have intensified their bilateral relations with the United States." according to Admiral Charles Larson, Commander-in-Chief of all U.S. forces in the Pacific[Ref. 104]. The strengthened bilateral relations of most of the Southeast Asian nations attest to the fact that most want the U.S. Navy to continue plying the sealanes. It also provides evidence that the United States is considered a positive force in the maintenance of regional progress and stability.[Ref. 105]

Further attesting to the value of American forward presence, Admiral Larson states that a greater reduction will threaten vital economic and security interests in Asia:

An active and credible U.S. forward presence is the cornerstone of future American Asian-Pacific security strategy. Forward presence underscores the vitality of existing U.S. alliances; it promotes new friendships as host nations observe the benefits of training with U.S. personnel in an atmosphere of trust and confidence; it encourages and helps underwrite the stable geopolitical climate necessary to promote economic growth; it assists not only nation building efforts, but the promotion of democracy, by providing a working example of the American military's apolitical role; and it increases America's as well as friendly states' military preparedness. Most importantly, forward presence demonstrates on a daily basis the continued U.S. commitment to remaining an Asian-Pacific power.[Ref. 106]

Moreover, the forward deployed American military presence is heartily endorsed by both Seoul and Tokyo. Both have pledged to increase their financial support for maintaining American forces in their countries. Japan will pay 73 percent of the cost, up from 60 percent today, and the Republic of Korea will assume 30 percent of all won-based stationing costs by 1995.[Ref. 106]

In response to queries about the long term commitment of forward deployed American forces, Admiral David Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had this to say:

Of course, there are no guarantees one can give that there won't be further draw-downs. We are in the process of trying to rebuild the American economy. A strong economy means we can maintain a strong defense effort. Conversely, a weak economy will affect our defense effort. Furthermore, there is no commitment the administration can give about attitudes in Congress. But it is my impression that there is a broad political consensus in our Congress and the body politic that in this uncertain world as we emerge from the Cold War, it is not prudent to dismantle our forces or withdraw them in a precipitous manner from Asia as we did in the wake of the Vietnam War, the Korean War and World War II. There is now a much stronger consensus in favor of sustaining an adequate, strong military capability[Ref. 56].

If anything, the U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines has led to more visible support for a continued U.S. presence by the other ASEAN nations. Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have offered ship repair facilities, while training ranges have been offered by Thailand, Malaysia, Australia and Singapore. None of these are permanent bases like those at Subic Bay or Cubi Point, "...but the facilities are welcome." says Admiral Larson.[Ref. 104]

One of the most valuable assets the U.S. forfeited in the Philippines, and one of the most difficult capabilities to replace, was the instrumented bombing range in Crow Valley. Crow Valley was indispensable, for example, in naval battle group preparation for the air campaign against Iraq during the Persian Gulf War. Now, to attain the same level of preparedness, battle groups must travel either to Alaska or to Western Australia - hundreds of miles from the normal operating areas of Pacific battle groups.

According to the 1992 Pentagon report to Congress, "The Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim," the U.S. is taking a new approach to regional access that will consist of a network of bilateral arrangements that facilitate training, exercises and interoperability which, in lieu of permanent bases, will permit the U.S. to remain forward deployed in Southeast Asia. The U.S. military posture will consist of regional access, mutual training arrangements, periodic ship visits, intelligence exchanges and professional military education programs rather than permanently stationed forces. "The lesson of *Desert Storm* is that the U.S. can project power without bases, and that is the basis of bilateral access," according to Thomas McNaughen, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a military specialist on Asia.[Ref. 107] The U.S. Navy's objective has been redefined as "places not bases."

The United States is also pursuing bilateral relationships for combined exercises. For example, Indonesia and the U.S. conduct minor exercises at the component command level (ship or squadron level rather than battle group or fleet level). Most regional exercises are bilateral. The most extensive exercise is the annual U.S.-Thailand "Cobra Gold" exercise, involving all the U.S. services.

#### C. RESPONDING TO ON-GOING CHANGES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia is a dynamic region - always changing. Yesterday's division into friendly and allied states, and unfriendly states (China, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) is no longer tenable. Our policies must be sufficiently flexible to take account of on-going changes, without reference to which states are "friendly" or "unfriendly" at any given moment.

Until recently, the Clinton Administration has declined to lift the long standing ban on trade with Vietnam. It had eased some of the sanctions, agreed to back international loans for Hanoi and allowed U.S. companies to bid for contracts financed by such loans[Ref. 108], but normalization has been withheld because of animosity of war veterans over the President's aversion to military service. Though the President does not need the approval of Congress to widen diplomatic or trade relations with Vietnam, he has tried not to offend opponents of liberalized relations in the legislature.

As a candidate, President Clinton pledged there would be no easing of the embargo until Hanoi makes a "full accounting" of missing American servicemen. But that position was at odds with the President's emphasis on expanding overseas trade to improve the American economy.[Ref. 109] Once elected, he stipulated that normalization would require tangible progress by Vietnam in four areas - repatriating the remains of American known to have died in Southeast Asia, supplying documents that could help in the search, assisting on cases where downed American airmen were suspected of being alive but were not returned in the large-scale prisoner release in 1973, and working with the Government of Laos to determine what happened to American airmen who were downed in that country.[Ref. 109: p. 5]

However, U.S. policymakers met in late December 1993 to discuss a range of options, from partial abandonment of the embargo, to a total lifting of the ban. They met after Assistant Secretary of State for Asia, Winston Lord, returned from a trip to Southeast Asia in mid-December with positive reviews.[Ref. 109]

Assistant Secretary Lord made two trips to Vietnam in five months and had nothing but praise for Vietnamese cooperation on the issue of missing Americans. For their part, he reported, Hanoi wanted to "proceed toward normalization as soon as possible." [Ref. 109: p. 5] Finally, with the strong support of Congress, President Clinton lifted the embargo with



Vietnam in February 1994. The prospect for full normalization lies immediately ahead. After Vietnam, the on - going changes in Cambodia offered the next challenge to American policy makers.

Cambodia offered the United Nations its largest peacekeeping roll ever. An agreement endorsed by the United States in Paris on 23 October 1991 was to create a "neutral security and political environment in Cambodia,"[Ref. 110] pending election of a new government. The world could then redirect its attention to other world trouble-spots. The Paris Agreement, however, overlooked the nature of Cambodian politics and the apparently irreconcilable aspirations of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, Son Sann and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), Norodom Sihanouk and the Front Uni National Pour un Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif (FUNCINPEC) and Hun Sen - despite their assurances to work together as Cambodians. Cambodia was to be given something it has never had and probably does not desire - democracy.[Ref. 111]

The plan had two phases. The first was a Khmer Rouge and the ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign military forces, and their weapons and equipment. There was to be ongoing verification that the antagonists did not return. The second phase involved regrouping the majority of the opposing forces into U.N.-supervised cantonments. Once in the cantonments,

the forces would hand over their weapons to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

UNTAC was headed by a Japanese named Yasushi Akashi, and reached full strength of 16,000 in September 1992.[Ref. 111: p. 115] Despite continued unanimous support for UNTAC by the Security Council, several factors combined to make the Paris Agreement difficult to enforce. Non compliance of the Paris Agreement by the Khmer Rouge and the porous Cambodian border (allowing the almost unabated flow of gems, timber, weapons, money and people) were particularly disruptive.

Ironically, prior to United Nations involvement, the nearest the Cambodian Civil War came to a solution was when the Vietnamese drove the Khmer Rouge out and left Hun Sen in charge. The U.N. intervention solved the international complications caused by Hun Sen's ascendancy, but recreated Cambodia's domestic political crisis by reintroducing Prince Sihanouk, his sons, and the Khmer Rouge back into the equation. The dilemma for the United States since the new Constitution is whether or not to accede to the agreement to let the Khmer Rouge participate in the government.

Aid and technical assistance from Japan and the West to rebuild the economy will go a long way toward improving Cambodian stability and the ideals delineated in the Paris Agreement of 1991.

Some of the most dramatic changes to challenge the U.S. in the region since the end of the Cold War have occurred in

Laos. The political, economic, social and cultural changes of the recent past have been unusual in a Confucian society with its propensity for compromise and consensus.

Politically, the death of Kaysone Phomvihane, Secretary General of the Lao Communist Party since its foundation in 1955 and head of the Lao Government since 1975, on 21 November 1992 represented an important transition of the old-guard communist leadership. Yet before his death, even the old communist leader recognized the rising democratic aspirations of more liberal elements within the government and in Lao society.[Ref. 112]

Conceding to the liberals, Kaysone was quoted as saying:

Enhancing democracy is both the pushing force and the objective of our Party's all-round renovation. Enhancing democracy is a long term process associated with the growth rate of all sectors in the country, the level of people's knowledge and the nations's historic features and traditions. In the immediate future, the Party gives importance to enhancing democracy in economic activities and at the grass-roots level. Together with socio-economic expansion, democracy in society must be widened and enhanced step by step.[Ref. 113]

Devastating though Kaysone's death was to the very small and close-knit circle of top communist leadership, it was not unexpected. Government functions were not disrupted, and the leadership transition was smooth. Nouhak Phoumsvan and Khamtay Siphandon, the second and third highest ranking members in the Politburo were quickly sworn in as President of the State and Secretary General of the Party - two positions concurrently held by Kaysone.[Ref. 112: p. 187] Kaysone's

plan remained in effect - while the Party is prepared to make concessions on the economic front there will be a much slower transition to a freer political system.

The seven member Politburo (only three of which are original members elected by the Second Party Congress in 1972) recognized in the collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc a lesson to be learned. Moreover, the huge brand new and nearly vacant Russian Embassy in Laos serves as evidence to Moscow's drastic reassessment of key allies. Built for tens of millions of U.S. dollars, the embassy and numerous other buildings in other parts of Vientiane were intended to house and serve a Soviet community of more than 1,000. Russians in Laos in late 1993 number fewer than 200.[Ref. 114]

Lao reforms since the end of the Cold War involve fundamentals of nation and economy-building. The country's first constitution was published in 1991. Since then the government has put in place a legal infrastructure, including commercial, property and tax laws and allowed the establishment of a central bank - all elements essential to any modern society.[Ref. 115]

Privatization became a major cog in the new economic engine of Laos. With the advice of the World Bank, in May 1991 a regulatory framework for public enterprise operations was adopted. The vast majority of Laos' 600 state-owned enterprises, all of which were badly managed and unprofitable, were to be privatized. Only Lao Electricity, National Water

Company, Postal Service, National Printing House and three others belonging to the Ministry of Defence were exempted.[Ref. 112: p. 192] More recent reforms have involved greater access to information. In 1992 international direct dialling was allowed for telephone owners and private facsimile machines permitted. Satellite television dishes and foreign newspapers have put in an appearance. As a result the 1989 inflation rate of 85% went down to a healthy 6%, and GDP growth in 1993 hit 7%.[Ref. 116]

Socially, recent domestic and foreign investment in health care and education are expected to greatly improve mortality and literacy rates over the next decade[Ref. 112: p. 194].

One of the key ingredients to the continued progress in Laos is a strong relationship with Thailand. To land locked Laos, Thailand represents not only a source of foreign investment, but access to the west with all its benefits and problems. Laos and Thailand share very close ethnic and cultural links - their language is virtually the same. Centuries of distrust between the two countries, however, persisted through the Cold War, and were exacerbated by such events as Thailand's closure in 1983 of the two countries' border. The closure severed Laos' main trade route, and resulted in bloody border clashes in 1988. Since the end of the Cold War, however, Thai investment and most importantly, the hand of friendship offered by Thai King Bhumibol Adulyadej and his family are helping to ease old

animosities.[Ref. 117] In 1993, the Australian built, recently opened Mitraphap bridge over the Mekong River near the Laos capital Vientiane is the first modern road link between Laos and Thailand. But the fundamental distrust between Laos and Thais remains - the Laos want as little as possible of Thailand's spiritual corruption.

In November 1991 the United States announced its decision to upgrade its mission in Vientiane to ambassadorial level in 1992 and in August 1992 the first U.S. Ambassador officially presented his credentials to the Lao President.

Perhaps the most significant on-going change in Southeast Asia with which the U.S. must cope is occurring in Myanmar, the former Union of Burma. Unlike Laos and Cambodia, Myanmar remains a relatively closed society, though changes since the end of the Cold War have been substantial. The changes have been in a direction demanded by a strong handed government, but also in line with government opponents. Of the four recognized political forces in Myanmar, the Tatmadaw (military), whose priority is the preservation of a unified national state, remain dominant. The main issue is how centralized the state should be. Democracy is not the first priority, and is acceptable only if it facilitates or at least does not hinder the attainment of government objectives.[Ref. 118]

Economically, the Myanmar government has moved to give more impetus to the economy through an increased roll for the

private sector. Unfortunately, high inflation and limits to the energy supply have remained major unresolved problems. in 1993 the GDP was down to a rate of 1.3 percent and declining since a post Cold War high of 3.7% in 1989/90.[Ref. 118: p. 254]

The United States does not have much direct leverage against the Myanmar military regime. Favoring a civilian government, the U.S. attempted to prevail upon the ASEAN nations to exert pressure. The request was met with insistence by the ASEAN members on their common preference for "constructive engagement," which gives preference to a more quiet, reconciliatory diplomatic approach. Myanmar, however, was not invited to attend the ASEAN foreign ministers' conference that summer. Its attendance had the support of at least two member countries, but was blocked by Malaysia.[Ref. 118: p. 263]

By way of summary, it is very evident that through the period between the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region in 1976 until the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asia gave every indication of being unstable. Due in large part to the active interests of the three nations with the largest armed forces in the world (the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and China), combined with complex indigenous difficulties made Southeast Asia one of the most volatile regions anywhere. Since the end of the Cold War a large part of the volatility has disappeared but the region remains as one of the world's great pressure

points, and a region where continuing conflicts must be now subordinated to cooperative efforts for progress and national development.



## **V. CHANGES IN JAPAN'S POLICIES TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA**

### **A. GROWING JAPANESE AWARENESS OF THEIR GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES**

The Japanese are becoming more aware of their global responsibilities so they must reassess the importance Southeast Asia. Geographically, Southeast Asia is close to Japan. Even from Co-Prosperity days, Japan looks at the importance of Southeast Asia in much the same way we regard the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America.

In the 1990s, Japan is emerging from the constraints of the Cold War as the nation with the world's strongest and most advanced manufacturing capability; the highest levels of accumulated savings and capital formation; the best educated work force, including the largest proportion of engineers; an unusual reputation for close cooperation between government and business; and a political economy well qualified to expand beyond its shores.

The Cold War allowed the Japanese to galvanize their national consciousness and forge a unity of purpose that enabled them to win by economic means what they could not win militarily in World War II. They were a major contributor to the United States position in the bi-polar world, and helped

create the multipolar world of geoeconomic reality that exists today.

The story of Southeast Asia is a significant chapter in modern Japanese history. With their own stellar example of post war economic success, the Japanese established a role model for the dynamic and immensely successful economies of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan.

These two nations formed the core of a group called the Little Dragons - South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong - which mirrored Japan in many ways. Each is governed by an authoritarian political structure. Each successfully unites public with private sectors in pursuit of common economic goals. Each possesses an outward orientation toward their economy, producing quality manufactured exports. Each focuses on the application of research and development of others (usually the United States). Each adopted an industrial policy that targeted strategic industries and shielded them in their infancy from foreign competition. And above all, each boasts a system of public education that has produced the best educated human resources in the world[Ref. 119].

In response to a changing economic environment, Japan expanded the sphere of its influence first into Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia and then into the rest of Southeast Asia. To the Japanese, these nations have become integral cogs in Japan's industrial machine. They supply the lower value components for Japan's own manufactured goods exports,

and also serve as launch pads for exports of indigenous products manufactured with Japanese technology, and are becoming dynamic, prosperous, rapidly growing markets of their own.

Japanese policy makers are quick to point out that changes since the end of the Cold War in the Asia-Pacific region have been less prominent and slower to take hold than in Europe. Moreover, defense officials recognize that despite the formulation of the ASEAN Security Forum, there are no real equivalents to the multinational security frameworks existing in Europe, namely the Conference on Security and Cooperation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "The continuation of a security framework based on bilateral arrangements with the United States seems to be appropriate for the foreseeable future," according to the 1993 White Paper on Japanese Defense.

In order to provide the appropriate response to the continuous changes to international conditions, and taking into account the downsizing of the JSDF, the Japanese Defense Agency is reexamining the national defense capabilities. Many anticipate that there is a modification to the National Defense Program Outline which prescribes the JSDF organization and material provision among other things.

Regardless of the reexamination of the national defense, however, "Japan's fundamental national defense platform involves an on-going commitment to upgrading material to the

level needed for the defense of the nation and also to uphold the joint Japan-U.S. security arrangement and improving its reliability."[Ref. 120]

## **B. CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES**

The Japanese must continue to cooperate with the U.S. in constructing the best military machine possible for guaranteeing the security of Southeast Asia. They will keep in mind the necessities for cooperation with the U.S., but also to take care of themselves in event rifts occur in the U.S. - Japanese policies.

### **1. The Post Cold War Significance of the Alliance**

Though some would argue that the security relationship between the United States and Japan appears to be shaky in the absence of a Soviet threat to justify the U.S. commitment[Ref. 121], Japanese policy statements continue to stress the necessity of a close security alliance. For the Japanese the alliance is critical to the security of Japan and the stability of the Far East. Rooted in the 1960 Security Treaty, it provides not only a foundation for the political and economic cooperation between Japan and the United States, but the basis of Japanese diplomacy.[Ref. 122] In a speech delivered to the 127th session of the National Diet in Tokyo, Prime Minister Hosokawa stated,

Close cooperation between Japan and the United States centered on the Security Treaty is indispensable to world peace and prosperity. I welcome the fact that the United States has indicated its determination to maintain its presence and to remain engaged in the Asia-Pacific region, and I intend to make every effort to continue to forge good , constructive relations with the United States as the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy.[Ref. 123]

Recognizing the economic and political hurdles in a continued military build-up, the Japanese "find it realistic to ensure (their) security by forming an alliance with the militarily powerful U.S. which shares the basic common value and ideals called freedom and democracy." [Ref. 122: pp. 68-69]

In January 1992, the "Tokyo Declaration on the Japan-U.S. Global Partnership," issued at a summit meeting between the two heads of state, reaffirms the criticality of the Japan-U.S. relationship to the security and stability of Southeast Asia in the post Cold War. The Declaration states that "...as countries with vital interests in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan and the United States recognize the continuing importance of the defense relationship to the peace and stability of this vast and diverse region." Article VI of the 1960 treaty is specific in granting the use of facilities and areas in Japan for the purpose of contributing to the security and international peace in the region[Ref. 29: p. 178].

Though the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty focuses on security, it simultaneously provides a foundation for the promotion of political and economic cooperation for the

Japanese in Southeast Asia. "The maintenance of close, amicable relations with the U.S. is vital to the development and continued prosperity of Japan." according to the Japanese Defense Agency[Ref. 122: p. 70].

Moreover, many Japanese maintain the conviction that the Japan-U.S. security arrangements constitute the basis of Japanese diplomacy:

To further promote a desirable political climate developing in this part of the world in recent years, it is needed for Japan to push dialogue with neighboring countries, thereby positively cooperating with them in fostering such a favorable development. It is believed that the firm Japan-U.S. alliance endorsed by the Japan-U.S. security arrangements will play a key role in the direction of such efforts.[Ref. ?]

## 2. Strengthening the Relationship

According to the JDA, "...at this time when the international situation is going through dramatic changes there is a need for Japan and the U.S. to avail themselves of every opportunity to conduct closer dialogue to strengthen mutual trust and cooperative relations."[Ref. 122: p. 71] To that end, the Defense Agency outlines several means to enhance the security relationship with the United States: encourage the close exchange of views on security issues at the highest levels; upgrade peacetime studies on the integration of the JSDF and U.S. forces in the event of an "emergency"; increase the number of combined military training exercises between the two countries; further develop joint Research and Development

projects; and assume a greater percentage of the financial burden of U.S. forces in Japan. In addition to standard diplomatic channels, the close personal exchange of views on security issues between heads of state and senior officials go a long way toward strengthening Japan-U.S. relations. In November 1991 Secretary of Defense Cheney and his Japanese counterpart met in Tokyo to reaffirm security relationship. Their conversation centered on the rapidly changing events in Europe and nuclear missile development in North Korea[Ref. 122: p. 72]. The meeting was followed by the summit between President Bush and Prime Minister Miyazawa which likewise emphasized the necessity of the union to the security of the region in January 1992. Later, in July 1993, newly elected President Clinton met with Prime Minister Miyazawa after the G-7 summit in Tokyo where security issues crowded what was to have been an economic conference[Ref. 124]. Availing the opportunity of the APEC summit in Seattle, the President also met individually with new Prime Minister Hosokawa. Hosokawa visited Washington in February, 1994 and again let it be known that trade issues must not interfere with the security relationship.

In order to ensure the effective fulfillment of the Security Treaty obligations, the Japanese acknowledge the necessity of close cooperation, particularly through studies and consultations on the coordinated action of the SDF and U.S. forces. Based on the "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense

Cooperation," compiled in November 1978, future studies are to address combined command, coordination, intelligence and support activities. They will be designed to prevent aggression in the region, and recommend action in the event of an armed attack against Japan.[Ref. 122: p. 72]

Should the need arise, execution of the combined defense planning will be enhanced through upgraded training between the SDF and U.S. military forces. "Combined training is indispensable from the standpoint of ensuring the smooth conduct of Japan-U.S. coordinated actions." says the Japanese Defense Agency. Furthermore, additional training exercises add to the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and add a degree of deterrence against potential assailants.

The 1960 treaty stipulates that the two countries cooperate with each other in maintaining and developing their respective defense capabilities. The "Mutual Defense Assistance agreement Between Japan and the United States" provides the framework for cooperation in defense research and development.[Ref. 122: p. 74]

The Japanese never felt as vulnerable to missile attacks during the Cold War as they do in March, 1994. In response to the threat from North Korea and the recent successful firing of a medium range missile capable of reaching the Japanese main islands, the Japanese have begun discussing the joint development of a missile defense system. The Theater Missile Defence (TMD) system would defeat the



North Korean missiles with an anti-missile missile, similar to the U.S. Patriot missile system which distinguished itself during the Gulf War. However, there is concern in both Washington and Tokyo that the project would aggravate bilateral tensions in the same manner as the FSX in the closing years of the Cold War[Ref. 125]. Nevertheless, the two countries continue to conduct a Systems and Technology Forum to exchange views on equipment and technology cooperation[Ref. 122: p. 75].

Finally, the Japanese have agreed to shoulder a larger portion of the cost to support U.S. forces stationed in Japan. The Japanese will assume payment for the construction of new family housing and labor costs for Japanese employees working on USFJ bases. Additionally, the Japanese government is constructing replacement airfields on Iwojima and Miyakejima islands for the Naval Air Station in Atsugi. The fact that the Japanese economy has been in a recession for well over two years highlights the strength of the Japanese commitment to a continued U.S. presence.

#### **C. CHANGES IN JAPANESE INTERNAL POLITICS**

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was a catalyst to a momentous departure of the Japanese decision makers from their post war inhibitions. Unlike the West, Japanese decision making traditionally proceeds at an exceedingly slow and deliberate pace. This apparent lethargy is due to two traits of Japanese

society: the ingrained desire for broad consensus reached through comprehensive participation, and the traditional absence of commanding public leadership from the top down.[Ref. 99] The perceived hesitancy, both on the domestic and international fronts, of the Japanese government to respond to the Gulf Crisis reflects the ambivalence of the Japanese populace. But, the only legal means, by way of the Constitution, for the Japanese to respond to the growing sentiment for internationalization - that Japan must do more internationally - was checkwriting diplomacy, that is spent the money as means of meeting their presumed responsibilities.

The \$13 billion raised by the Japanese for the Gulf War was no small accomplishment. It was the fourth largest contribution to the war effort behind the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. The amount was shouldered largely by Japanese taxpayers through a tax hike adopted by the government. Regardless of their efforts, the Japanese received little international credit or recognition for their efforts in return. In March 1991 two events served notice of Japan's unpopularity in the United States and Kuwait. A *Washington Post* - *ABC News* poll showed that 30 percent of Americans said they had lost respect for Japan because of the Gulf crisis. Only 19 percent indicated that their respect for Japan had increased. Shortly thereafter the Kuwaiti government published a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* to thank members of the U.N. coalition for restoring

Kuwaiti sovereignty. Japan was conspicuously absent from the list of countries named in the advertisement.[Ref. 125: pp. 8-9] On 26 April 1991, over two months after the conclusion of hostilities against Iraq, and in possible violation of the Japanese Constitution, the Japanese minesweeper flotilla consisting of four minesweepers, a "mothership" and a supply ship set sail for the Persian Gulf. The Japanese legislature chose to interpret a previously obscure article of the SDF Law as legal provision for the deployment of the JSDF minesweeps. In response to Constitutional arguments, Dietman Kanji Kawasaki, speaking for the government, said "We have no choice but to go by the argument that (the decision to deploy the minesweepers is) unconstitutional, but legal"[Ref. 126].

Surprisingly, in this first deployment of Japanese forces overseas since World War II, the reaction of Southeast Asian leaders was positive. Prime Minister Mahatir of Malaysia had "no problems whatsoever" with the deployment. Similar responses were received from the Sultan of Brunei and the Thai Prime Minister. Only the Chinese Premier LI Peng showed concern.[Ref. 127] The rapid mobilization of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) represented an attempt by the Japanese to prevent international isolation and rejection and demonstrated the ease with which Japanese policy makers can challenge constitutional constraints.

After the deployment of the MSDF, it was only a matter of time before the legislative process caught up with the dispatch of the Japanese military forces overseas. The Japanese were rethinking their 45 year long absence from a military role in world affairs.

#### **D. THE EFFECTS OF THE CAMBODIAN EXPERIENCE**

In September 1990 the first tangible evidence of that rethinking came in the form of the U.N Peace Cooperation Bill (UNPCB). The UNPCB was submitted to the Diet by Liberal Democratic Party Prime Minister Kaifu for deliberation. The Bill met strong resistance by opposition parties and on 8 November was defeated. Under intense international and domestic pressure, newly installed Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa made the second attempt with the submission of the Peacekeeping Operations bill (PKO) to the Diet on 9 September 1991. The endorsement by the opposition Komeito and Democratic Socialist parties ensured the eventual successes of the measure, which passed by the House of Representatives on 3 December 1991.[Ref. 128] Success in the House of Councilors, however, required a concentrated effort by all the forces Prime Minister Miyazawa could bring to bear. Finally, on the fifteenth of June 1992, the PKO bill was passed.[Ref. 129] Prime Minister Miyazawa wasted no time and began immediate preparations to send more Self Defense Forces (SDF) overseas. On the second day of July, 1992, in fluent

English, he delivered a 3,300 word speech in Washington with an underlying message of greater military presence in the region by stating, "not only do we intend to continue economic cooperation, but we also hope to play a positive role in promoting political stability." [Ref. 130] Later

that month warships of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force were dispatched on a "goodwill call" to several Southeast Asian nations. [Ref. 131] Next, in August 1992, a twenty member mission comprised of SDF experts were dispatched to Cambodia to prepare for the larger dispatch of SDF forces in support of the United Nations. [Ref. 132]

The Japanese recognized the value to be perceived in East and Southeast Asia as committed to regional stability.

Two events in 1989 brought about a greater focus by the Japanese on Cambodia; the end of the Cold War, and the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. Spurred by the prospects for greater economic opportunities with peace and stability in Cambodia, Japanese foreign minister Taro Nakayama visited Thailand and Malaysia in January 1990 for talks on efforts to end the war. [Ref. 133] Continuing with those objectives, Tokyo sponsored a two day meeting in June. During the meeting in Tokyo plans were formulated for the establishment of the Supreme National Council (SNC) in Cambodia.

The SNC was to be comprised of an equal number of representatives from both the Hun Sen and Sihanouk factions. But the third element required to negotiate a successful ceasefire agreement was missing. At the last moment the Khmer Rouge boycotted the conference. Without the compliance by the Khmer Rouge, and without a military force in place to backup the agreement, the settlement lacked the muscle to enforce the peace.[Ref. 134]

Nevertheless, the agreement made in Tokyo was considered a success by virtue of the establishment of the SNC. Later, a compromise was reached whereby all warring factions met in Jakarta and approved the United Nations Security Council's peace plan, under which the SNC delegated to the United Nations the power necessary to ensure the implementation of the agreement. It was a breakthrough in the sense that all of the warring factions seemed satisfied with the new direction of the negotiations.[Ref. 31, 114: p. 339] With what appeared to be a satisfactory solution, it is ironic that the greatest pressure for the Japanese to take up arms in support of the Peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia came from the institution (the UN) empowered with keeping the peace.

Prime Minister Miyazawa had this to say about the deployment of SDF troops to Cambodia: "I want our nation's contributions to maintaining peace to be widely understood both at home and overseas." [Ref. 135] On the eleventh of September 1992 Japan formally told the United

Nations it would send a contingent of 683 personnel to join UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. The peacekeeping team was comprised of eight ceasefire monitors, 600 SDF engineers, and 75 police.[Ref. 136]

Some Westerners and Asians are still concerned about the political, diplomatic and military significance of Japan's new PKO law. Most Asian governments regard the passage of the new law and Japan's United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) deployment with various degrees of trepidation and concern. Citizens groups in Asia tended to react more stridently and negatively than their leaders. Only Cambodia and Thailand welcomed the law and the SDF's new mission. Cambodian leaders were grateful for the Japanese financial aid which accompanied SDF personnel, and Thailand, fearing that renewed fighting would send more Cambodian refugees across the border, believed the SDF mission facilitated UNTAC's success.[Ref. 137] But historical factors also explained both Thai and Cambodian dispositions. As previously noted, neither country suffered greatly under Japan during World War II. They consequently do not fear Japanese aggression to the same degree that other Asians do. Fears of theirs were alleged when the Japanese peace keepers returned to their homes immediately after the UN mission was completed.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the strongest criticism of Japan's PKO law came from the two countries which suffered the

most at the Japanese hands during World War II - Korea and China. North Koreans viewed the law and subsequent SDF Deployment as the fruition of its claims that Japanese desires are to become a military superpower while the ruling Democratic Liberal Party of South Korea said they felt "dread" over the law. At the Japanese embassy in Seoul, Korean students, housewives and war veterans burned Japanese flags. Chen Luzhi, Chinese Secretary General for the National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation stated that China "will not tolerate militarism by the Japanese, which will only lead Japan to disaster." [Ref. 118: p. 127]

No government within Southeast Asia overtly rejected the PKO law. Most generally expressed reservations or offered only lukewarm support. Only under the auspices of the United Nations did the law receive favorable reviews. Indonesian response to Japanese legislation allowing the dispatch of Japanese troops overseas came from Indonesian Foreign minister Ali Alatas, who stated, "As long as they are sent under the U.N. umbrella we have no objection whatsoever and we think it's a good thing." [Ref. 138]

The news was likewise well received by former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew who voiced support for Japan's participation in United Nations peace keeping operations, but stressed that Tokyo should maintain its security alliance with the United States. Lee warned Prime Minister Miyazawa that altering the arrangement of Japan-U.S. security would be



unwise. He emphasized the necessity for the United States to preserve its role in the alliance as a necessity for regional stability. Lee also suggested that Japan develop enduring relations with China and strengthen its ties with Southeast Asian countries. Lee further commented that after forty-seven years since Tokyo's defeat in World War II, Japan remains reluctant to acknowledge the extent of its past aggression and should clearly accept responsibility.[Ref. 139]

Another view from Singapore was voiced by Singaporean Cabinet Minister Brigadier General Yeo who announced:

Asian countries fear the bill may lead Japanese society in the wrong direction and could lead down the slippery slope toward militarism. In order to gain Asian trust, Japan must practice a softer form of nationalism by re-asianizing and forging closer cultural interaction with East Asian nations. There was a time when Japanese leaders thought it was better to de-Asianize and join the West. While East Asia may find it very hard to accept a militarily powerful Japan, East Asia can more readily accept a politically influential Japan within the framework of the United Nations.[Ref. 140]

In perhaps the strongest endorsement of Japan's overseas peacekeeping role, Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said it was about time that Japan, being an economic super-power, played a role in the peacekeeping process.[Ref. 141]

A spokesman for the Aquino government in the Philippines asserted that "there is very little to fear about Japan returning as a military power," but added that many Filipinos would continue to mistrust Japan's intentions anyway. Several citizens groups in the region, however, protested the peacekeeping law. The May First

Movement, the largest leftist labor union in the Philippines, for example, organized mass protests against it. In Malaysia, a number of citizens groups also cited the danger of aggression and demanded that Tokyo repeal the law.[Ref. 118: p. 127]

The United States response to the Japanese PKO Law showed little concern for Japanese militarism. While Prime Ministers Kaifu and Miyazawa were working for passage of their respective peacekeeping bills, Washington seemed more concerned with applying constant pressure on the Japanese over financial contributions to the war effort. However, when the final version of the bill became law in June 1992, the US Information service in Tokyo came forth with a written statement:

We (the US) have refrained from any comment regarding the internal debate within Japan...(the bill) was a matter for the Japanese people to decide. The United States Government welcomes this landmark legislation...this will allow Japan to make further contributions to promoting peace and stability...in cooperation with the UN. This contributes to our global partnership.[Ref. 118: p. 128]

Far from apprehension over the law, the United Nations encouraged an even stronger military role for the Japanese. On the 15th of February 1993, four months after the deployment of SDF personnel to Cambodia, UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali arrived in Japan to hold talks with Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe. The primary focal issue of the Secretary General was the persuasion of the Japanese leaders in favor of the concept of

heavily armed "peace enforcement Forces". The efforts by the Secretary General Butrus-Ghali were in response to repeated cease-fire violations that could not be handled by the original PKO efforts. His proposal was to enforce the ceasefire through the use of heavily armed forces, including the Japanese SDF.

This in sharp contrast to the existing law which places severe restrictions on the SDF. For example, when a member of the SDF comes under attack, under current legislation, he must first fire warning shots, then shoot only at the feet of the attacking soldiers, and then fire only at their non-vital areas. Prime Minister Miyazawa responded:

The United Nations has never adopted the idea of organizing PEF units with heavy weapons as its own responsibility. This issue must first be discussed...the Japanese Constitution makes it impossible for the SDF to participate.[Ref. 142]

This statement is ironic considering the disregard for the Constitution by the LDP in passing the PKO law. Nonetheless, the proposal by the Secretary General placed significant pressure on the Japanese for a greater military presence in the region.

The debate for the PEF concept was heightened on 8 April 1993 when a Japanese election supervisor with the United Nations and his interpreter were killed while driving to the provincial capital of Konpong in Cambodia. The supervisor, Atshito Nakata, was killed a week after he first asked for United Nations military protection which could not be provided

by the Japanese forces.[Ref. 143] The killing stiffened the resolve by the Japanese Government toward maintaining a peacekeeping role in Cambodia, but did not endorse armed intervention.

In January 1993, Prime Minister Miyazawa visited four ASEAN countries in order to "think anew about how we should shape the cooperation between Japan and the ASEAN countries with the future of the Asia-Pacific region in mind, and about the role Japan should play in this regard." In his speech the Prime Minister stressed that regional flashpoints - such as the Korean peninsula, Cambodia and the South China Sea - could dramatically affect the security landscape of the region as a whole. He identified the current "period of transition" for the region, and the necessity to develop a long-term vision regarding the future order of peace and security. "For this, he stated, "various ideas should be thrashed out through a security dialogue among the countries of the region." He continued to emphasize that "Japan will actively take part in such discussions".[Ref. 144]

The Japanese, however, had reached an age of uncertainty. On 18 June 1993 two renowned members of the LDP joined non-LDP politicians in a routine no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Miyazawa. Four days later 44 LDP members resigned, forming two new parties. On 28 July 1993, opposition leaders from seven disparate parties announced that they had assembled the votes to oust the governing LDP, which had been in power

for 38 years.[Ref. 145] In August Prime Minister Hosokawa assumed office of Prime Minister.

Hosokawa entered national politics early in 1992 when the Japan New Party was formed and became prime minister in little over one year. His ascendancy makes him different than traditional Japanese leaders. The conventional modus-operandi involved building a power base in a single constituency and then accumulating seniority by holding various party and government posts. Very few people supported Hosokawa when he first announced his eligibility. Shortly, however, hundreds of policy makers joined him and finally a large part of the nation followed suit. In that respect Prime Minister Hosokawa is the closest thing the Japanese have had to a U.S. style of elected president [Ref. 146].

The new Prime Minister immediately began to address the remaining barriers to a more constructive international role by the Japanese. First, Prime Minister Hosokawa acknowledged, after decades of denials by the LDP, that the Japanese military forced Asian and European Women to work in army brothels during World War II.[Ref. 147] Next, on the 15th of August Prime Minister Hosokawa identified Japan as the aggressor in World War II and offered condolences to other nations' war victims. It was the 48th anniversary of Japan's surrender. This statement combined with the admission by lower house speaker Takako Doi that Japan caused "horrible

sacrifices" for Asians contrasted dramatically with previous LDP leaders about Japan's war role.[Ref. 148]

As with many of his predecessors, Prime Minister Hosokawa recognizes the necessity of maintaining a strong bond with the United States. Along with Prime Minister Miyazawa, he recognizes the United States as the "cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy."

Prime Minister Hosokawa, in his first news conference 10 August 1993, emphasized his eagerness to improve strained relations with the United States. He expressed Japan's concern over reducing the huge trade surplus with the U.S., but as with his predecessor rejected most of the "tools" President Clinton has insisted on using to do the job - tax cuts, targets for Japanese imports for example.[Ref. 149] The Prime Minister indicated that he was committed to change, but on a relatively narrow range of issues, focused primarily on eliminating corruption in Japan's electoral system. Overall his foreign policy and economic ideas do not appear to be any more in harmony than those of his predecessor.

With regards to Southeast Asia, he makes a point of emphasizing a "modest demeanor and always working to foster mutual trust, to make every possible contribution to the peace and prosperity of this region (Southeast Asia).[Ref. 123: p. 708]

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

The United States was the major provider for security in Southeast Asia during the final years of the Cold War. During that time members of ASEAN viewed the U.S. military presence as the best hope for preventing war. After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam through the last years of the Carter administration, there rose a fear of U.S. abandonment of the region. The implications of "No More Vietnams" and the Nixon Doctrine (stipulating nations in the region assume a greater share of their security burden) were rather frightening. Human rights became a front line issue, as it had never before. Later, President Reagan restored regional confidence in American military support through a stronger U.S. defense posture and pronouncement of a hard-line foreign policy in the face of continued Soviet expansion in the region, even if at a high premium. Reagan was obliged to use deficit spending to finance the defense build up, which contributed to the growing Asian perception of a United States in decline. During the Reagan years ASEAN was one of the "six pillars" in the U.S. policy in Asia symbolizing the U.S. commitment to remain an Asian-Pacific power.

Under U.S. pressure, Japan extended its maritime defense zone from 200 nautical miles to 1,000 nautical miles thus reaching to within 200 nautical miles of the Philippines.

Despite the controversies between the United States and Japan, including the Toshiba flare-up and the FSX controversy, Japan was the chief supporter of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.

As of the present, the economic means are increasingly available to support the regional arms race; regional trends in arms procurement from foreign sources and domestic production are increasing; and the stimulus of inter and extra regional pressures favoring arms build up are firmly in place. With the dramatic reductions in American armed forces, both at home and over seas, combined with an alarming number of potential regional hot spots and increasing economic ties to Southeast Asia, the responsibilities of the United States are if anything more difficult to meet. Therefore, American policy makers must make a continuous reappraisal of Southeast Asia in terms of global capabilities and commitments.

My conclusion is that it is clear that the roles of the United States and Japan are vital to the welfare of Southeast Asia and the peace of the Pacific. The U.S. - by virtue of its military and economic strength will continue to play an important role. It follows almost automatically that Japan will not presume to displace America or fill any vacuum that might occur following decreased American participation; but will insure a proportional role of its own in carrying out our mutual objectives.



## LIST OF REFERENCES

1. Gregor, James A. *In The Shadow of Giants: The Major Powers and the Security of Southeast Asia*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989.
2. Schlossstein, Steven. *Asia's New Little Dragons: The Dynamic Emergence of Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia*. p. 11. Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1991.
3. MccGwire, Michael. "The Geopolitical Importance of Strategic Waterways in the Asian-Pacific Region." *Orbis* 29, No. 3. pp. 1058-1076. Fall, 1975.
4. Jones, Clayton. "A Southeast Asian Arms Race Builds in the Wake of Departing Superpowers." *The Christian Science Monitor*. pp. 12-13. 17 November 1993.
5. Korb, Lawrence K. *The FY 1981-1985 Defense Program: Issues and Trends*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980.
6. Vernon, Graham D., ed. *Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace*. Washington, D. C.: National Defense University, 1981.
7. Pike, Douglas. "The USSR and Vietnam: Into the Swamp." *Asian Survey* 19, No. 12. pp. 1161-1163. December, 1979.
8. Snitwongse, Kusuma. *The Soviet-Vietnamese Alliance and the Security of Southeast Asia*. pp. 47-55. New York: International Security Council, 1986.
9. Row, William T., and Willian R. Freeny, eds. *U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific Security: A Transregional Approach*. p. 10. Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.
10. "The ASEAN Declaration." *The Indonesian Quarterly* 4, No. 2-4. p. 109. (1967).
11. Buss, Claude A., ed. *National Security in the Pacific Basin*. p. 183. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986.
12. Mouat, Lucia. "Khmer Rouge Intimidation Fails To Halt UN Plan for Cambodia." *Christian Science Monitor*. p. 2. 14 April 1993.
13. Sutter, Robert G. *East Asia And The Pacific: Challenges for U.S. Policy*. pp. 126-7. Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1992.

14. Bailey, Thomas A. *A Diplomatic History of the American People*. pp. 921-923. Prentice-Hall, 1980.
15. Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. p. 316. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
16. Carter, Jimmy. *Keeping Faith*. p. 145. New York: Bantam Books, 1982.
17. Wildavsky, Aaron, ed. *Beyond Containment: Alternative American Policies Toward the Soviet Union*. pp. 231-232. San Francisco: Institute For Contemporary Studies, 1983.
18. Hardgrove, Erwin, C. *Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good*. p. 147. Baton Rouge, La: Louisiana State University Press, 1988.
19. Corning, Gregory, P. "U.S. Japan Security Cooperation in the 1990s: The Promise of High-Tech Defense." p. 270. *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIX, No. 3, March 1989.
20. Solomon, Richard H., and Masataka Kosaka. *The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security*. p. 231. Dover, Massachusetts: Auburn House Publishing Company, 1986.
21. Schultz, George P. *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years As Secretary of State*. p. 1098. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993.
22. Brown, Eugene. *Japan's Search For Strategic Vision: The Contemporary Debate*. p. 2. Carlisle, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.
23. LaFeber, Walter. *America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1990*. p. 327. New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1991.
24. Kohno, Masaru. "Japanese Defense Policy Making: The FSX Selection, 1985-1987." p. 458 n 3. *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIX, No. 5, May 1989.
25. Baker, James. "Power for Good." *Current Policy*. P. 1. No. 1162.
26. Nathan, K.S., and M. Pathmanathan, eds. *Trilateralism in Asia: Problems and Prospects in U.S.-Japan-ASEAN Relations*. pp. 35-37. Kuala Lumpur: Antara Book Company, 1986.
27. Sudo, Sueo. *Southeast Asia in Japanese Security Policy*. p. 9. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991.

28. Sheldon, Simon W., "U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia." p. 665, *Asian Survey* 7 (July 1991).
29. Buckley, Roger, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990*. p. 194 n33. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
30. Reischauer, Edwin O. *Japan, The Story of a Nation*. New York: McGraw Hill Publishing Company, 1990.
31. Olsen, Edward A. *US-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist View*. p. 7. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985.
32. Kambhu, Jidbhand, and others. "Tanaka Blows Up a Storm." *Far Eastern Economic Review*. pp. 13-16. 21 January 1974.
33. Katahara, Eiichi. *Japan's Changing Political and Security Role*. pp. 35-41. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991.
34. Tasker, Rodney. "Enter the Japanese." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, pp. 20-29, 19 August 1977.
35. Alves, Dora, ed. *Pacific Security Toward the Year 2000*. p. 111. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987.
36. Japan Defence Agency. *Defence of Japan 1990*, pp 281-85.
37. Sudo, Sueo. "From Fukuda to Takeshita: A Decade of Japan-ASEAN Relations". *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 10, no. 2. pp. 119-143. September, 1988.
38. Maidment, Paul. "The Yen Block: A New Balance In Asia?" *The Economist*. p. 6 15-21 July 1989.
39. Jones, Clayton. "Asians Follow Japan Cautiously As It Tries to Exert Leadership." *The Christian Science Monitor*. pp. 12-13. 15 December 1993.
40. Simon, Sheldon W. "U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia." pp. 672-673. *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXI, No. 7, July 1991.
41. Jones, Clayton. "Contest over Asia: Search for Security In the Pacific." p. 11. *The Christian Science Monitor*, 17 November 1993.
42. Lord, Winston. "Asia-Pacific Policy Statement." Text of the Opening Statement By Ambassador Winston Lord at His Senate Confirmation Hearings for Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, 31 March 1993. p. 2.

43. Lord, Winston. "Prosperity in the Pacific." *FEER*. p. 23. 11 November 1993.
44. Trumbull, Mark. "APEC Ministers to Push Private Investment Drive." p. 11. *The Christian Science Monitor*, 19 November 1993.
45. Friedman, Thomas L. "Clinton Sees Asia Exports as Key to Jobs." *The New York Times*, p. 5. 20 November 1993.
46. Fernandez, Jose. "Asia-Pacific Security-Need To Avoid Regional Arms Race." *Asian Defence Journal*. p. 91. October 1992.
47. Jones, Clayton. "Lee Kuan Yew on Asian Power and Security." *The Christian Science Monitor*. p. 15. 17 November 1993.
48. Crovitz, Gordon L. "Give Face, Make Deals." *FEER*. p. 18. 18 November 1993.
49. "Asia's Arms Race." *The Economist*. p. 19. 20 February 1993.
50. Grier, Peter. "Asian Nations Pose Greatest Nuclear Risk." *The Christian Science Monitor*. p. 1. 3 August 1993.
51. Goldemberg, Jose. "Nonproliferation Nonsense." *The New York Times*. p. A23. 18 November 1993.
52. Graybow, Charles. "Japan Gets Closer to Removing War Stigma." *The Christian Science Monitor*. p. 19. 19 August 1993.
53. Landers, Peter. "Japan Honors All War Dead." *Monterey Herald*. p. 2A. 16 August 1993.
54. Awanohara, Susumu and Shim Jae Hoon. "Win, Hold, Confuse." *FEER*. p. 12. 15 July 1993.
55. Vatikiotis, Michael. "Uncharted Waters." *FEER*. p. 10. 5 August 1993.
56. Richardson, Michael. "Pacific Force Levels to be Maintained." *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*. p. 27. October-November 1993.
57. Barnathan, Joyce, Pete Engardio, Lynne Curry and Bruce Einhorn. "China: The Emerging Economic Powerhouse of the 21st Century." *Business Week*. p. 56. 17 May 1993.

58. Winterford, David. "Chinese Naval Planning and Maritime Interests in the South China Sea: Implications for U.S. and Regional Security Policies." *Journal of American-East Asian Relations*. p. 8. Fall 1993.
59. Tefft, Sheila. "When China Speaks, Asia Listens." *The Christian Science Monitor*. p. 14. 17 November 1993.
60. Klare, Michael T. "The Next Great Arms Race." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3. p. 141. Summer 1993.
61. Reed, Stanley. "Beijing Is On An Arms Binge, And The Neighbors Are Nervous." *Business Week*. p. 49. 6 July 1992.
62. Sachi, R., Ellisha Nasruddin and Benjamin Machmud. "Military Balance: Asia-Pacific." *Asian Defence Journal*. p. 97. January 1993.
63. Foxwell, David. "Far East Navies Building Well-Balanced Fleets." *International Defense Review*. p. 123. February 1992.
64. Jones, Clayton. "Paradise Islands of an Asian Powder Keg?" *The Christian Science Monitor*. p. 14. 1 December 1993.
65. Jacobs, G. "China's Amphibious Capabilities." *Asian Defence Journal*. pp. 60-68. January 1990.
66. Hamzah, B.A. "China's Strategy." *FEER*. p. 22. 13 August 1993.
67. Jones, Clayton. "Japan Dominates Region's Economy, But China is Awake." *The Christian Science Monitor*. p. 11. 1 December 1993.
68. *The World Factbook 1992*. p. 158. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992.
69. United States National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation. *Pacific Economic Outlook 1992-93*. p. 26. San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 1992.
70. Neher, Clark D. *Southeast Asia in the New International Era*. p. 95. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.
71. Jones, Clayton. "Vietnam Weighs Japanese Influence." *The Christian Science Monitor*. p. 8. 19 May 1993.
72. Handley, Paul. "Laos: The Old and the Bold." *FEER*. p. 30. 4 November 1993.

73. Ching, Frank. "At Apec Summit, Everyone Won." *FEER*. p. 48. 9 December 1993.
74. Larson, Charles R., Admiral, U.S. Navy. "American Military Presence Remains Crucial for Asia." *Asian Wall Street Journal*. p. 1. 3 May 1993.
75. Segal, Gerald. "Managing New Arms Races in the Asia/Pacific." *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 3. p. 83. Summer 1992.
76. Klare, Michael T. "The Next Great Arms Race." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3. pp. 136-137. Summer 1993.
77. Acharya, Amitav. "Explaining the Arms Build-Up In Southeast Asia." *Asian Defence Journal*. p. 66. January 1993.
78. Menon, K.U. "Brunei darussalam: The Ceaseless Quest for Security." *Leader Perceptions and National Security*. pp. 181-204. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989.
79. Buszynski, Leszek. "Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era." *Asian Survey*. p. 842. September 1992.
80. Bickers, Charles. "Indonesia Continues Its Naval Build-Up." *Jane's Defence Weekly*. p. 4. 30 January 1993.
81. Richardson, Michael. "Indonesia's Big Naval Buy No Threat." *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*. p. 9. April-May 1993.
82. Dantes, Edmond. "Naval Build-Up to Continue Unabated - Part II." *Asian Defence Journal*. p. 54. May 1992.
83. "RMAF Buys Four Beech Surveillance Aircraft." *Asian Defence Journal*. p. 155. January 1993.
84. Schwarzkopf, General H. Norman. *It Doesn't Take a Hero*. p. 501. New York: Linda Grey Bantam Books, 1992.
85. Fernandez, Jose. "Asia-Pacific Security-Need To Avoid Regional Arms Race." *Asian Defence Journal*. p. 91. October 1992.
86. Foxwell, David. "Far East Navies Building Well-balanced Fleets." *International Defense Review*. p. 124. February 1992.

87. Preston, Antony. "The Indonesian Navy In The 1990s." *Asian Defence Journal*. p. 42. July 1991.
88. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1990*. Table II. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991.
89. Ellen, Eric, ed. *Piracy At Sea*. p. 12. Paris: International Maritime Bureau, 1989.
90. Scott, David L. "Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: Towards an Effective International Legal Response." p. 6. A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Marine Affairs, University of Rhode Island, Kingston RI. 1992.
91. "Maritime Bureau Opens Center to Fight Piracy in Southeast Asia." *Journal of Commerce*. p. B:1B. 2 October 1992.
92. The Drug Enforcement Administration. *National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee Report of 1991: The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States*. p. 22. Washington, D.C., July 1992.
93. Kennedy, Paul. *Preparing For The Twenty-First Century*. p. 158. New York: Random House, 1993.
94. Malthus, T.R. *An Essay on the Principle of Population As It Affects the Future Improvement of Society*. London, 1798; reprinted in New York: 1965.
95. Johnstone, B. "Snow for the Future." *FEER*. pp. 72-75. 1 December 1988.
96. Schwarz, Adam. "Looking Back at Rio." *FEER*. p. 48. 28 October 1993.
97. Crovitz, L. Gordon. "Give Face, Make Deals: Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew on Apec, US-China Talks." *FEER*. p. 18. 18 November 1993.
98. "The First Green Summit." *The Economist*. p. 13. 15-21 July 1989.
99. Jones, Clayton. "Group of Seven Meets Under Economic Cloud." *The Christian Science Monitor*. p. 1. 6 July 1993.
100. Jones, Clayton. "Security Issues Crowd Agenda at Tokyo Summit." *The Christian Science Monitor*. p. 1. 9 July 1993.

101. Gergen, David. "America's Missed Opportunities." *Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1991-1992*. pp. 1-2. Vol. 71, No. 1.
102. Grier, Peter. "U.S. Defense Goals Reflect Rising Importance of Asia." *The Christian Science Monitor*. p. 13. 17 November 1993.
103. Blass, Anthony. "Go East Young Man." *FEER*. p. 42. 4 November 1993.
104. Pexton, Patrick, and Don Ward. "Back to the Philippines? Only for a visit." *Navy Times*. p. 4. 8 November 1993.
105. Fic, Victor. "US Presence in the Asia-Pacific: New Role?-Part II." *Asian Defence Journal*. p. 12. September 1993.
106. Larson, Admiral Charles R. "American Military Presence Remains Crucial for Asia." *Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly*. 3 May 1993.
107. Morton, John F. "U.S. to Maintain Access in ASEAN/Asia-Pacific Region." *Asian Defence Journal*. p. 31. February 1993.
108. Moot, Max. "One Deal Too Many for Brown?" *The Christian Science Monitor*. p. 3. 16 December 1993.
109. Holmes, Steven A. "The White House is Moving To Ease Embargo on Hanoi." *The New York Times*. p. 1. 1 January 1994.
110. United Nations. *Agreements On A Comprehensive Political Settlement Of The Cambodia Conflict*, Section III, Article 6. p. 3. Paris: 23 October 1991.
111. Klintworth, Gary. *Southeast Asian Affairs 1993*. p. 113. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993.
112. Meng, Ng Shui. "LAOS At the Crossroads." *Southeast Asian Affairs 1993*. pp. 185-86. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993.
113. Phomvihane, Kaysone. Quoted from the English translation of *The Political Report of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Presented at the Fifth Party Congress*. p. 33. 1991.



114. Handley, Paul. "Russia House." *FEER*. p. 34. 4 November 1993.
115. Handley, Paul. "Making Connections." *FEER*. p. 28. 4 November 1993.
116. Handley, Paul. "The Old and the Bold." *FEER*. p. 30. 4 November 1993.
117. Handley, Paul. "Reluctant Embrace: Laos takes a cautious view of warming Thai relations." *FEER*. p. 32. 4 November 1993.
118. Siemers, Gunter. "Myanmar 1992: Heading for "Guided Democracy?"" *Southeast Asian Affairs* 1993. pp. 265-66. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993.
119. Thurow, Lester. *Head To Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America*. pp. 158-159. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1992.
120. Information Bulletin No. 33. Excerpt from the 1993 *White Paper of the Defense of Japan*. p. 4. Translated by the International Press Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 29 September 1993.
121. Jones, Clayton. "Asians Follow Japan Cautiously As It Tries to Exert Leadership." *The Christian Science Monitor*. pp. 12-13. 15 December 1993.
122. *The White Paper on the Defense of Japan* 1992. p. 70. Trans. by The Japan Times, Ltd. Tokyo: Japanese Defense Agency, 1993.
123. Hosokawa, Morihiro. "Ushering in a New Era." *Vital Speeches of the Day*. p. 708. 15 September 1993.
124. Jones, Clayton. "Group of Seven Meets Under Economic Cloud." *The Christian Science Monitor*. p. 1. 6 July 1993.
125. Awanohara, Susumu. "My Shield or Yours?: U.S. and Japan Consider Joint Missile Defence System." *FEER*. p. 22. 14 October 1993.
126. Quoted from the American Embassy of Tokyo translation of *Asahi Shimbun*, p. 2, 10 July 1991.
127. Quoted from the American Embassy of Tokyo translation of Toshiaki Nakajima, Yukinori Yoshitake, Masaru Honda, and Kiyotatsu Nemoto, "Post-Gulf and Japan; Dispatch of Minesweepers (Part 1)," p. 2, *Asahi Shimbun*, 3 May 1991.

128. "Lower House Votes For SDF Dispatch Bill," *Japan Times Weekly*, 9-15 December 1991.
129. Sanger, David E., "Japan's Parliament Votes to End Ban on Sending Troops Abroad," *New York Times*, p A1, 16 June 1992.
130. Address by Prime Minister Miyazawa at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., 2 July 1992. Transcript provided by the Embassy of Japan, Press and Information Section, Washington, D.C.
131. "The Miyazawa Doctrine," *Asiaweek*, p. 21, 24 July 1992.
132. "Peacekeeping Cooperation Law To Take Effect," quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), EAS-92-150, 4 August 1992.
133. Sudo, Sueo, "Japan and the Security of Southeast Asia," *The Pacific Review*, p. 336, Vol. 4, No. 4, Oxford University Press, 1991.
134. Sutter, Robert G., *East Asia and the Pacific*, pp. 105-114, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.
135. "Cabinet Finalizes Plan for PKO Troop Deployment," quoted in FBIS-EAS-92-117, 11 September 1992.
136. "Un Informed of Dispatch of Personnel to Cambodia," quoted in FBIS-EAS-92-117, 11 September 1992.
137. Fic, Victor, "Geopolitical Implications of Japan's PKO Law," *Asian Defence Journal*, p. 126, January 1993.
138. "Indonesia's Alatas Views Permanent UNSC Seat," quoted in FBIS-EAS-92-124, p.9, 26 June 1992.
139. "Lee Kuan Yew Supports Tokyo on PKO Bill," quoted in FBIS-EAS-92-124, p. 33, 26 June 1992.
140. "Minister Says Japan Must Gain Asia's Trust," quoted in FBIS-EAS-92-120, 22 June 1992.
141. "Japan's UN Overseas Peacekeeping Role Viewed," quoted in FBIS-EAS-92-118, p. 19, 18 June 1992.
142. "Miyazawa Wary of Proposed Un Force," quoted in FBIS-EAS-93-032, 19 February 1993.
143. "U.N. Monitor From Japan Killed With Aide in Cambodian Attack," *New York Times*, p. A4, 9 April 1993.

144. "Miyazawa Gives Asia Policy Speech," quoted in FBIS-EAS-93-001, 19 January 1993.
145. Sanger, David E., "Coalition in Japan Has Votes to Oust Long Ruling Party," *New York Times*, p. A1, 29 July 1993.
146. Smith, Charles. "Power Behind the Throne: Shusei Tanaka is the 'brain' behind the prime minister." *FEER*. p. 33. 25 November 1993.
147. Sterngold, James, "Japan Admits Army Forced Women Into War Brothels," *New York Times*, p. A2, 5 August 1993.
148. Landers, Peter, "Japan Honors All War Dead," *Monterey Herald*, p. 2A, 16 August 1993.
149. Sterngold, James. "Japanese Premier Wants Improved U.S. Ties, but No Trade Targets." *The New York Times*. p. A4. 11 August 1993.

# INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. Copies
1. Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria VA 22304-6145	2
2. Library, Code 052 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA 93943-5002	2
3. N51, The Pentagon, Room 4E566 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Washington, DC 20350	1
4. N31, The Pentagon, Room 4E572 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Washington, DC 20350	1
5. Director, Naval Intelligence (N2) The Pentagon, Room 5C600 Washington, DC 20350	1
6. N-511, The Pentagon, Room 4D563 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Washington, DC 20350	1
7. Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau Chairman, National Security Affairs (NS/Bn) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
8. Dr. Claude A. Buss 1033 Cowper Ave. Palo Alto, CA 94305	2
9. Dr. Edward A. Olsen, code NS/Os Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
10. LCDR Robin L. Russell 12620 Towner Ave. NE Albuquerque, NM 87112	2