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UNDERGROUND MANAGEMENT:
AN EXAMINATION OF
WORLD WAR II RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

by

Christian E. Christenson

March, 1994

Thesis Advisor

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Underground Management:
An Examination of
World War II Resistance Movements

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of


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
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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the methodologies employed by the underground resistance movements of World War II to manage the inherent difficulties associated with operating in a clandestine environment. Specifically, it examines the role of the underground, the advantages and disadvantages of operating underground and discusses the management procedures implemented by the clandestine organizations to address the topics of recruitment, internal security, leadership and command and control. The underground organizations are examined generically, recognizing that there are fundamental operating principles, management requirements and security dictates are universally applicable -- whether discussing World War II resistance movements or contemporary guerrilla groups.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The underground resistance movements of World War II represented a unique and multifaceted form of warfare -- one which eventually played a prominent role in the Allied victory. The underground fought its war without the benefit of well established operating procedures, a pre-organized chain-of command and many of the assets taken for granted by overt organizations. They operated against an enemy who was vastly superior in martial terms, in an environment fraught with unrelenting, deadly threats. To survive, the underground was compelled to develop unique and adaptive operating methods. This paper explores the methods employed by the underground to manage the critical operational requirements associated with recruitment, internal security, leadership and command and control.

Operating in a underground environment offered the clandestine organization both advantages and disadvantages. The underground's ability to strike unexpectedly, from the very midst of its enemy's camp, to dissipate back into the indigenous population between actions and the relative ease with which it could infiltrate the German infrastructures were precious tools to the grossly mismatched forces of the underground. Conversely, the inordinate amount of time and effort expended by the underground merely to insure its

survival, the ceaseless demands for secrecy and the inherent communication hazards served to significantly obstruct clandestine activity. The successful organization was the one which was capable of rapidly identifying these advantages and disadvantages -- adapting his activities to exploit his clandestine advantage while minimizing the effects of the disadvantages.

To understand the utility and impact of the underground organizations of occupied Europe it is instructive to review the activities and missions which they conducted. The underground provided the Allies with invaluable real-time intelligence, assisted in the escape of downed airmen, conducted subversive actions against German material and personnel targets, diverted immense numbers of Axis troops from their point of main effort and conducted a wide range of special tasking at the request of Allied forces. Collectively, these underground activities had a profound effect upon the war-fighting capabilities of both the Allies and Axis forces.

The diverse and constant threats to the security of the clandestine organizations dictated the organizational and operational management of the underground. Threats to the survival of the underground organization had to be addressed before any operation could be planned and conducted. The

internal security of the underground was the essential minimum to underground existence -- providing resistance organizations the thin cloak of secrecy -- all

that stood between itself and certain destruction at the hands of a vastly more powerful opponent.

Whether developing a command and control structure, delineating the role of its leadership or devising recruitment methods, the underground was forced to adapt to a tremendously repressive and hostile environment. Survival and operational efficiency were contingent upon the development of adaptive, flexible and often imaginative underground procedures. To varying degrees, utilizing a diverse assortment of methodologies, the resistance movements of occupied Europe adapted to the perilous world of the underground, providing invaluable service to the Allied war effort and their own struggles for liberation.

I. BACKGROUND

We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing ground, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender. - Winston Churchill, 1940.

A. INTRODUCTION

The underground resistance movements of World War II represented a unique and multifaceted form of warfare - one which eventually played a prominent role in the Allied victory. Their roles ranged from highly publicized and dramatic sabotage operations to more judicious but equally damaging collection and transmission of information concerning the German order of battle. The underground resistance fought its war not in pre-formed units, with well established procedures, experience and tactics to govern their actions, but in covert organizations which were forced to organize, recruit, communicate, plan and operate in an extraordinarily oppressive and restrictive environment. How the underground movements of World War II accomplished this is the subject of this paper.

Before exploring the methods employed by the underground to manage these inherent obstacles, it is instructive to examine some background information that will assist in understanding "the big picture" and place underground,

clandestine warfare in a clearer context. This chapter provides some useful, general information concerning underground resistance forces, defines who "the underground" refers to, examines their roles, the environment in which they operated, and the advantages and disadvantages of operating underground.

The term "underground" has been applied to such a diverse and frequently confusing mixture of people, whom are linked together only by their common need or desire to disappear, that the word has lost much of its explicative capacity. Jorgen Haestrup explained the situation in Europe during the Second World War in the following ways:

an enormous number of people - perhaps millions - went underground. The maximum result of this could mean that they joined the partisan camps or gathered in refugee camps in partisan conditions, in suitable forests or mountain districts, while the minimum simply meant that they changed their place of residence, took a new name, a new identity and perhaps a new appearance, and by every imaginable means procured the necessary money, papers and materials to remain hidden.¹

For the purposes of this paper, the "underground" refers only to those persons actively engaged in the struggle against the occupying forces and because of these actions were forced to operate in a clandestine manner. This definition, however, fails to capture the many different variants of underground

¹Jorgen Haestrup, European Resistance Movements, 1939-1945: A Complete History, (Westport, CT., Meckler Publishing, 1981) p. 358.

resistance. Bor-Komorowski, the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Home Army, addressed the many different forms and roles potential resisters assumed by dividing the members of the Polish Underground - the Polish Home Army - into three categories:

The first and largest group comprised people who led a double life. In ordinary, everyday existence, they differed in no way whatsoever from any other man in the street. They worked in offices and factories, on railways, in agriculture, etc.: everyone of them was, nevertheless, in touch with his direct superior in the organization, from whom he got orders... The second category of our members comprised what might be termed professional conspirators, i.e. people who worked full time in the underground or at least had to be available any time of the day and night for work in our staff or its numerous branches, intelligences, liaison, etc. They therefore had no time for any occupation outside the conspiracy, nor any mode of life which would limit their availability; they had to live under false identity, with forged documents and labor permits... The third group consisted of those who had broken with their former existence completely and set out a life of free men as soldiers of partisan units. They lived mainly in the forests, wore uniforms and fought the German openly.²

Komorowski's third group, that of partisan units, is outside of the purview of this paper. While certainly worthy of further study, the dynamics, operational requirements and daily management of partisan units are distinctly different from those of the "underground" - Komorowski's first two groups. In addition to Komorowski's three categories, there existed a tremendous number of supporters on the fringes of

²Stanislaw (Bor) Komorowski, The Secret Army, (New York, The MacMillan Company, 1951) pp. 143-144.

the organizations which provided invaluable moral, material and intelligence assistance. Although these elements frequently risked their lives and were essential to the successes of the resistance movements they do not qualify as actual members of the "underground." As defined by this paper, the "underground" consisted of those persons that actively participated in resistance units, which because of an overwhelmingly repressive, hostile security apparatus were forced to conduct all activities in a completely clandestine manner.

B. THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE UNDERGROUND

Before a complete understanding of the activities of the underground movements can be obtained, it is necessary to look at the environment in which they were forced by the occupying powers to operate. The formation and management of any organization, even in the most permissive environment, invariably faces difficulties and obstacles to success. These organizations have the benefit of unobstructed advertisement of its aims and opinions, open and unrestricted channels of communication for disseminating and acquiring information, the use of a pre-established network of transportation and communication, and an environment in which education, training and supplies are readily accessible. The underground movements of Europe possessed none of these assets while

simultaneously operating in direct opposition to an efficient, well trained German security force that did possess all these resources. Under such conditions, it seems remarkable that underground movements were ever established, and much more remarkable still that they were able to operate on a continuing basis for many years. Tore Gjelsvik described the specific conditions as they applied to occupied Norway:

It needs to be borne in mind that the resistance campaign took place under quite exceptional circumstances, in a country where the normal means of communications with other lands were shut down and all the regular sources of information were censored or controlled by the occupation authorities or their Norwegian henchmen. Decision could only be founded upon a slender basis of firm knowledge, and they often had to rest upon subjective interpretation of enemy intentions.³

In addition to the denial of the of the normal instruments of organization, the German security apparatuses imposed varying degrees of offensive counter-measures designed to make resistance activities as difficult as possible. Even in Denmark, a country which escaped the drastic measures imposed by the Germans in other less fortunate realms, underground operations were hampered by restrictive security counter-measures. In Denmark, as explained by Irving Werstein, "for the first time the Nazis had used velvet gloves in taking over a foreign country. There had been a minimum of brutality, an

³Tore Gjelsvik, Norwegian Resistance, (Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977) p.vii.

almost complete lack of violence; everything had been done with tact and diplomacy according to German standards,"⁴ a country which was intended to represent a model case of an occupied country, repressive measures were eventually implemented. On 28 August 1943, continuing, widespread unrest and the blowing up of the Forum, Copenhagen's largest public hall by the Holger Dansk - a Danish resistance group, compelled the Germans to proclaim a State of Emergency. The provisions of the State of Emergency were:

(1) Public meetings of more than five persons are prohibited.

(2) Any form of strike or any form of support of strikers is prohibited.

(3) Any form of gathering or meeting in a closed room or open air is prohibited.

There will be a curfew between the hours of 8:30 p.m. and 5:30 a.m. All restaurants will close at 7:30 p.m.

(4) All weapons will be surrendered before 1 September 1943.

Any encroachment on the rights of Danish citizens as a result of their own relatives' cooperation with the German authorities, or relationships with Germans, is prohibited.

(5) There will be censorship of the Press under German control.

(6) Summary courts will be set up to deal with cases where the above-mentioned decrees are violated to the prejudice of security and order

⁴Irving Werstein, That Denmark Might Live, (Philadelphia, Macrae Smith Company, 1967) p. 18.

Violation of the above-mentioned decrees shall be severely punished under the laws which empower the government to maintain order and security. Any sabotage and all assistance in sabotage, any defiance of the German Wehrmacht and of its members, as well as continued retention of weapons and explosives after the first of September, will be subject to the death penalty immediately.⁵

The Germans instituted other, frequently more severe and brutal provisions, designed to curtail resistance activities throughout Europe. Kenneth Macksey describes the measures taken by the German in June of 1941 in the Balkans to curb resistance activity; in an effort by the Germans to quell partisan activity in the Balkans "the Germans laid down an arbitrary rate for the execution of hostages at three hundred for each German killed."⁶ Similarly, in October 1942, Hitler issued what became known as the "Commando Order."

In this he declared that all sabotage parties, whether or not they were in uniform, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, were to be 'slaughtered to the last man.' It accorded the right of judgement and execution to any soldier...⁷

In July of 1942, the German occupying powers in France published the penalties for involvement in anti-German activities in the newspaper *Pariser-Zeitung*. The notice proclaimed:

⁵John Oram Thomas, The Giant Killers, (New York, Taplinger Publishing Company, 1975) p. 21-22.

⁶Kenneth Macksey, The Partisans of Europe in the Second World War, (New York, Stein and Day Publishers, 1975) p. 62.

⁷Macksey, p. 87.

Near male relatives, brothers-in-law and cousins of the agitators above the age of eighteen years will be shot. All female family members of the same degree of relationship shall be condemned to forced labor. Children, less than eighteen years of age, of all above mentioned persons shall be sent to a house of corrections.³

In Norway, the Germans implemented a system designed specifically to discourage the resistance's continued sabotage of railway lines. Helen Astrup describes the purpose and results of this tactic:

The Germans had a system whereby young men, civilians, were forced to patrol the railways, a group to each sector throughout the entire length of the line, and if the Resistance men blew up the line, the group in whose damage occurred were shot. The Norwegians called this *borgevakt*, and it cost hundreds of fine young Norwegians their lives - shot up against a wall.⁴

The fear of brutal reprisals effected not just the underground movements but the general population on whose support the resistance relied. Fear of the potential consequences prevented many from hiding resistance fighters on the run, caching equipment, supplying material aid, or providing essential intelligence. An excellent example of the effects of German promises of dire consequences to anyone that assisted, or failed to report, resistance activity is provided

³Macksey, p. 89.

⁴Helen Astrup, Oslo Intrigue, (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954) p. 219.

in David Howarth's book, We Die Alone.¹⁰ A group of Linge Commandos¹¹ inserted into Northern Norway from the Shetland Islands via the fishing trawler, *Brattholm*. Upon their arrival they sought out a merchant who operated a small general store - a man whose name was on a list in London of those who could be trusted - to conceal some of the equipment they had brought from England. The shopkeeper - a man of little courage - became very frightened at the prospect of assisting any underground activity and declined to help. The commandos informed him that he was regarded as a reliable patriot and could not understand his refusal. "The man told them he had only been running the shop for a few months. Its previous owner had died. His name was the same, so there had been no need to change the name of the business."¹² The Norwegian commandos, now having revealed their identity, returned to their fishing trawler after repeated, dire warnings never to speak of the incident. The apprehensive shopkeeper, realizing the Germans had imposed a death penalty for any contact with the 'enemy,' was terrified. He was soon

¹⁰David Howarth, We Die Alone, (New York, The MacMillian Company, New York, 1955)

¹¹The Linge Commandos were Norwegian nationals who received extensive training in England by the British SOE and were then returned to their occupied country to conduct a variety of resistance operations.

¹²Howarth, We Die Alone, p. 20.

struck with a new fear. "Was it possible that the three men were German agents sent to test him? He had heard people say that Germans sent people about in the islands, dressed in civilian clothes, to do that very thing: to say that they came from England, and then to report anyone who offered to help them."¹³ After hours of agonizing, the shopkeeper contacted an acquaintance in an official post in the Department of Justice, who passed the information on to the German authorities. The result was that the fishing trawler was ambushed, with the capture or death of all of its crew and all but one of the Linge commandos. The environment of distrust and fear which the German had carefully nurtured was recompensed in full.

From an objective point of view, the measures implemented by the German security forces seemed extremely well designed to make the environment in which the underground had to function as demanding as possible. In the face of these incredibly brutal deterrents -- ones which frequently meant imprisonment, torture and death, not only to the participants but to their immediate and extended families, the execution of as many as hundreds of his fellow countrymen and other horrifying consequences -- it is extraordinary that resistance movements continued to operate. The potentially horrific

¹³Howarth, We Die Alone, p. 22.

repercussions forced the underground to carefully consider all actions, balancing the potential benefit of any operation against the agonizing price which the Germans would extract.

As Kenneth Macksey explains:

there was a point at which overt attacks had to be withheld for fear of provoking such harsh retaliation that morale and organization might be utterly destroyed. To juggle the point of balance between discretion and indiscretion would always be crucial to the success or failure...¹⁴

The German attempts to discourage resistance activity through massive reprisals, certainly made the cost of operating extremely high and must have deterred many from supporting the underground organizations, but the effects were not always what the German intended. At times, the Germans indiscriminant use of reprisals served not to frighten the occupied people into submission but to leave them feeling as if they were damned if they resisted and damned if they didn't. Faced with such a choice, many choose to take their chances in the underground. Bor Komorowski explains the results of the massive and indiscriminate deterrent techniques employed by the Germans in Poland. Terror he notes, is a "dangerous weapon."

Mass reprisals amounted to the indiscriminate use of terror which affected everybody and produced a feeling of universal danger independent of whether the individual was playing an active part in the fight or not. It was all a matter of luck, since the choice of

¹⁴Macksey, p. 51.

subjects for the arrests, deportations to concentration camps and executions was made without the slightest discrimination.... It developed a strong tendency to strengthen the bond of uniting the whole nation, increased the general feelings of solidarity and opened the eyes to the necessity of universal cooperation.¹⁵

It is impossible to judge exactly to what degree the German counter-offensive techniques effected underground operations. There are ample examples of German threats and reprisals both encouraging and discouraging participation in underground resistance activity. Potential German retaliatory measures were invariably a major consideration in the decision to conduct or forego operations. The denial of the assets normally available to "above-ground" organizations also had a profound effect on underground activity. The German ability to eliminate the most fundamental implements of communication, transportation, education, training, etc... required a complete restructuring of normal methods of operating. Finally, what is most important to realize is that the hostile and extremely dangerous environment, intentionally fostered by the German security forces throughout Europe, deeply effected the underground movements and necessitated the development of unique and distinctive methods of operation.

¹⁵Komorowski, p. 39.

C. ROLES OF THE UNDERGROUND

The underground resistance movements of Europe participated in an extensive variety of activities, ranging from the dramatic destruction of the German heavy water plant in Vemork, Norway, to the less visible, daily efforts to gather and transmit information on the disposition of German troops and assets to the Allies. The British recognized very early in the war the highly significant role an indigenous resistance force could play. In the summer of 1940, an official British War Cabinet directive was created to stimulate,

'subversive activities and propaganda with well organized sabotage, to strike at the whole machinery of production and distribution, particularly in the occupied areas.' and to prepare for the landing of 'mobile armoured forces, aided in Allied countries by operations of local resistance forces, secretly armed and equipped to rise in revolt at the right moment.'¹⁶

In July 1940, the British established the Special Operations Executive (SOE), designed specifically to encourage and augment incipient resistance organizations in their struggle against the Axis' occupying forces. Churchill's directive to Lord Dalton, the first head of SOE, was succinct

¹⁶Dr. L. De Jong, "Anti-Nazi Resistance in the Netherlands," in European Resistance Movements 1939-1945, ed. First International Conference on the History of the Resistance Movements held at Liege-Bruxelles-Breendonk 14-17 September 1958, (New York, Pergamon Press, 1960) p. 143.

and to the point, "And now set Europe ablaze."¹⁷ Churchill later elaborated his vision of what SOE should be, saying;

SOE, was to be an unavowably secret organization to carry out two tasks. Firstly, it was to create and foster the spirit of resistance in nazi-occupied countries... Secondly, once a suitable climate of opinion had been set up, SOE was to establish a nucleus of trained men who would be able to assist 'as a fifth column' in the liberation of the country concerned whenever the British were able to invade it.¹⁸

The SOE and underground resistance movements eventually performed not only the roles envisioned by Churchill but many others as well. M.R.D. Foot divided resistance activities into three broad functional categories of intelligence, escape and subversion with subversion subdivided into sabotage, attack on troops and individuals, politic and insurrection.¹⁹ Borrowing from Prof. Foot's classifications, the division of the roles of the underground resistance movements are depicted as:

1. Intelligence Gathering and Dissemination
2. Assistance in Escape
3. Direct Subversion
 - a. Actions against material targets
 - b. Actions against individuals or troops
4. Diversion of the Enemy's Main Effort
5. Special Tasks as Required

¹⁷M.R.D. Foot, SOE in France, (London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1966) p. 10.

¹⁸Foot, SOE in France, pp. 11-12.

¹⁹M.R.D. Foot, Resistance, (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977) p. 10.

Individually, each of these activities contributed to the eventual Allied victory. Collectively, these actions had profound implications upon the war-fighting capabilities of both the Allies and Axis forces.

1. Intelligence Gathering and Dissemination

The existence of friendly forces - in this case an indigenous population, in continual, intimate exposure to the activities of enemy forces represents an extremely valuable intelligence potential. They are in a position to report the enemy's, disposition, size, types of units, morale, equipment, location of enemy ships, anti-aircraft emplacements, etc. Their close, daily interaction with soldiers, inevitably yields clues about future operations. The underground resistance organizations in Europe provided all this and more. The local railway workers supplied detailed reports on the exact movements of troops and sensitive equipment, providing invaluable indicators about the intentions of German forces. On a more mundane but equally important level, they provided "up to the minute" meteorological reports on the weather condition in Europe, greatly facilitating the Allied air campaign. The acquisition and timely dissemination of intelligence by underground forces could have dramatic consequences. An excellent example of this is provided by the case of the German battleship, *Tirpitz*. The *Tirpitz*, the German's last and most formidable battleship, had been sent to

Norway, as Olav Riste and Berit Nokleby explain, "partly in connection with Hitler's preparation against invasion and partly to cut off the convoy route by which Allied material was being sent to North Russia."²⁰ The anchorage of the Tirpitz, as described by David Howarth, made attack by conventional means impractical.

The high mountains around it made her an impossible target for aircraft, and it was out of the question to reach her, seventy miles up the winding fjord, with any kind of warship, for the Germans had naturally been lavish with shore batteries, escort vessels and anti-submarine defenses.²¹

The Allies best opportunity at sinking the ship was when it was at sea and for details of her movements they relied on the underground. As Riste and Nokleby explain, "About 16 SIS radio stations, situated along the coast from Oslo to Tromso, sent invaluable naval intelligence, giving the allied navies a day-to-day picture of the German naval positions."²² The final result was the destruction of the Tirpitz, which in turn freed numerous British ships for duties in other vital sectors and eliminated a major threat to Allied shipping to Russia.

²⁰Olav Riste and Berit Nokleby, Norway 1940-45: The Resistance Movement, (Oslo, Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, 1973) p. 48.

²¹David Howarth, Across to Norway, (New York, William Sloane Associates, 1952) p. 173.

²²Riste and Nokleby, p. 48.

In Poland, Stanislaw "Bor" Komorowski, the commander-in-chief of the Polish Home Army recognized the value of the intelligence gathering, stating, "In general, the aims of our Army were to prepare for an armed rising and, more immediately, to support the Allied effort by sabotage and diversionary activity and above all by maintaining an intelligence service."²³ General Komorowski's and his fellow countrymen's realization of the crucial role which intelligence played in the overall war effort resulted in innumerable valuable contributions and two major coups. The first of these coups was the acquisition of the top secret German encoding machine "Enigma." Stefan Korbonski describes the circumstances surrounding the "Enigma" machine:

Recently revealed secrets of the intelligence services of France and Great Britain brought to light the most crucial Polish contribution: In July 1939, the Poles gave to the Allies a duplicate of the German coding machine 'Enigma' constructed by the Polish intelligence service; this made it possible for the Allies to read the dispatches of Hitler and his commander throughout the war.²⁴

A second major intelligence coup of the Polish underground was its discovery of a new, secret German weapon,

²³Komorowski, p. 30.

²⁴Stefan Korbonski, The Polish Underground State, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1978) p. 62.

the V1 Rocket, and the delivery to the Allies of several of its key components. Korbonski describes the Polish Underground's role in the V1 affair:

Among its most important accomplishments, the Polish intelligence discovered that a new, secret weapon (as it turned out later: rockets) were being tested at Peenemunde in Germany, and forwarded the plans of the site to London. As a result, several hundreds of British bombers were sent over the testing grounds on the night of August, 17, 1943, demolishing the station completely." Polish underground force also later recovered an unexploded rocket, eluded German patrols and sent vital portions of the rocket and drawings to London to be examined by Allied intelligence.²⁵

The preceding paragraphs mention only a few of the many extraordinary successes achieved by the intelligence services of the underground organizations of Europe. While they focus, perhaps unfairly, on dramatic and memorable single events, it is not intended in any way to minimize the significance of the daily and not so sensational intelligence activities. Indeed, it was the underground's unrelenting, dependable flow of daily intelligence, identifying German troop strengths, movements, locations, gun emplacements, current activity and meteorological reports that made them a continuing valuable asset.

2. Assistance in Escape

The European resistance movements provided assistance in escape, primarily to two groups; Allied service men -

²⁵Korbonski, p. 61.

usually downed pilots and Jews. These escape networks provided Allied airmen a chance to avoid what otherwise would have been almost certain capture if they were shot down over occupied Europe. In addition to raising Allied morale, escape meant the return of a valuable, wartime asset - trained pilots and crewmen. It also reduced the chance of vital operational information falling into enemy hands through interrogation of captured crew members. While assisting in the escape of Jews may not have served any immediate strategic goals, it contributed greatly to national pride, served as an example of defiance to the German occupation and of course saved thousands of innocent fellow countrymen.

Denmark provides an excellent example of the accomplishments a country of only four and a half million people can make towards an escape service. Altogether about 18,000 persons were transported out of Denmark to Sweden. Only 450 of the approximately 7,500 Danish Jews were arrested and taken to Germany²⁶ - the remainder being successfully evacuated out of the country under the eyes of the German occupying forces. Denmark was not alone in its assistance to downed airmen. Throughout Europe, members of the underground resistance, risked brutal repercussions to aid Allied airmen

²⁶Jorgen Haestrup, From Occupied to Ally: Danish Resistance Movement 1940-45, (Copenhagen, Press and Information Department of the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1963) p. 37.

shot down over their country. Elaborate escape networks, covering multiple countries, and requiring intricate planning and coordination were responsible for the safe return of thousands of Allied servicemen.

3. Direct Subversion

Direct subversion is divided into two broad categories. The first, actions against material targets, refers to those acts which are intended to destroy or damage materials vital to the German war effort, such as factories, railways, vehicles, locomotives, barracks, etc. The second, attacks against individuals and troops, refers to those actions undertaken by the underground to eliminate collaborators, particularly offensive members of the German security forces, and direct attacks on the German forces. The two types of subversion were distinctly different - the potential repercussions for the killing of Germans, necessitated a much greater degree of forethought and deliberation prior to embarking upon an attack against German personnel. The balance between what was to be gained by the operation versus the price to be paid in terms of both lives and increased scrutiny and additional repressive measures required the utmost consideration. Besides provoking a greater German response, attacks on personnel were generally more risky, required better intelligence and planning and

generally required approval much higher up the resistance group's chain-of-command.

a. Actions Against Material Targets

Attacks against material targets - more specifically, those materials deemed to be vital to the German war effort, took many different forms and resulted in immeasurable delays, distractions and reduction in German efficiency. Not all were as spectacular as the demolition of railways. Actions against material targets could be as simple as the slashing of tires on German vehicles or as insidious as the use SOE provided "dirty tricks" to damage factory equipment. M.R.D. Foot describes the use of "Abrasive grease, which wears out the parts it appears to lubricate - a specialty of SOE's - provides an obvious example: mild discretion on the operator's part was all that was needed to protect him while he wreaked plentiful damage."²⁷ Foot describes an even more subtle method employed against German materials:

Whenever goods trains were made up or shunted, railway men sorted the truck out according to what the label said: [regarding destination and contents of the cargo] and fresh sets of labels were issued at main interchange stations. All the saboteur needed was to mix the labels up a trifle; putting the top one at the bottom of the pile would do. One or two, trivial, untraceable, apparently clerical errors of this kind

²⁷Foot, Resistance, p. 43.

caused disproportionate delay, dislocation, and annoyance...²⁸

Less subtle actions also proved successful in diluting the German war-making potential. In Denmark, the day before the Forum, Denmark's largest exhibition hall, was to become a German Army barracks, the Holger Dansk struck. Underneath a crate of Tuborg beer bottles, more than a hundred pounds of P-3 explosives was placed in the building, causing enough damage to prevent it from becoming a barracks.²⁹ In 1944, the Norwegian puppet government, after years of threats, agreed to mobilize young Norwegians for a "labor draft" but with insinuations that they may also have been used as troops on the Eastern Front. The Norwegian resistance reacted by first blowing up the registering machines used in preparing the draft cards and then, the day before registration was to occur, placed a bomb in the Labor Office which destroyed both the draft papers and the Labor office. The result was an indefinite postponement of the labor draft.³⁰ Throughout Europe, innumerable charges were detonated, destroying thousands of miles of railway lines and causing inestimable delays in the movement of German troops and material. The

²⁸Foot, Resistance, pp. 43-44.

²⁹David Lampe, The Savage Canary, (London, Cassell & Company Ltd., 1957) pp. 34-35.

³⁰Gunnar Sonsteby, Report from No. 24, (New York, Lyle Staurt, Inc., 1965) pp. 107-111.

results of these actions on the war fighting capabilities of the German is impossible to calculate but costs both in terms of resources and efficiency must have been enormous.

b. Attacks Against Individuals or Troops

Attacks against individual or troops can be further divided into attacks on German personnel and attacks on non-German collaborators. Attacks on Germans were subject to much harsher penalties, frequently resulting in the execution of large numbers of randomly selected hostages in retaliation for each German death. The execution of non-German collaborators by the resistance organizations usually elicited very little response from German forces. Thus, the killing of German nationals required much greater consideration and was embarked upon only when no other options were considered practical.

Direct attacks upon Germans were, given their intimate and continuing contact with the occupied country's population, relatively rare. In this sense, the brutal deterrents applied by the German forces appear fairly effective. The incidents when Germans were the targets of selected execution invariably involved extenuating circumstances. An example of such circumstances is provided by the assassination of SS Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich. As Callum McDonald explains, Heydrich was selected for execution because he was;

the most feared figure in occupied Europe and the symbol of the hated Nazi SS elite, as a Reichsprotektor of Czechoslovakia. Heydrich, who had organized the infamous Wannsee Conference to plan the final solution, terrorized the Czechs in an orgy of torture and murder in order to establish his model SS State on their soil.³¹

Whether the assination of Heydrich by the joint British-Czech endeavor was worth the horrific penalties the Germans extracted from the Czech populace - the murder of thousands of Czechs³², is impossible to answer. Perhaps, in final analysis, the removal of Heydrich from a position in which he willingly and liberally exercised the authority to order the deaths and tortures of so many, saved lives. Perhaps the assumption of Reichsprotektor of Czechoslovakia by a man less able than Heydrich resulted in a less proficient German security force in Czechoslovakia. Whatever the answer to these questions may be, they graphically illustrate the agonizing options which those deciding to conduct attacks on German personnel must resolve.

While the killing of Heydrich was perhaps the most dramatic example of attacks on Germans, there were many others throughout Europe. In Poland, the underground killed German soldiers merely to acquire their arms. Although no other attacks elicited such massive German reprisals as the killing

³¹Callum MacDonald, The Killing of SS Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich, (New York, The Free Press, 1989) back cover.

³²MacDonald, pp. 174-190.

of Heydrich, they all have an element in common. Any underground organization, anywhere, considering an attack on German personnel, from the shooting of a German sentry to the execution of a SS Obergruppenfuhrer, had to address the same basic question: did the potential benefits outweigh the frequently horrific costs of reprisals.

In addition to attacks on German personnel, underground organizations carried out numerous executions of indigenous collaborators. What may sound like a fratricidal, divisive activity, in fact provided invaluable service to the fight against the occupier. Collaborators, unlike the German, were intimately familiar with the local customs, activities, dress, speech, habits, etc... and could provide indispensable service to German security forces. Collaborators in the industrial sector could ensure the efficient and timely production of indigenously-produced materials to be used in the German war effort. Unlike Germans, collaborators could be used to infiltrate the underground resistance groups, causing inestimable damage. Collaborators in a puppet government could provide valuable assistance to ensure a smoother governing of their occupied country.

Despite the obvious danger collaborators represented to the underground resistance and the Allied war effort, execution of purported collaborators was not

undertaken lightly. Jan Karski explains the system established in Poland to deal with collaborators:

The Fourth Branch was called the Directorate of Civilian Resistance and its main function was to bolster up the policy of 'the stiff attitude towards the occupant.' Its members were outstanding scientist, jurists, priests, and social workers. They were to keep Poland Clear of traitors and collaborators, to try those accused of collaboration, sentence them, and see that the sentence was carried out.... It was authorized to pass sentences of either 'infamy' or death. A Pole was sentenced to 'infamy' who did not follow the prescribed 'stiff attitude towards the occupant'... Sentences of death were passed on anyone who attempted active aid to the enemy and could be proved to have harmed the activities or personnel of the Underground.³³

The elimination of collaborators could become a major function of the resistance. Jorgen Keeler, an underground participant and author of several publications on the Danish Resistance, explained that in the later stages of the war as much as fifty percent of the Holger Dansk's activities were dedicated to the elimination of collaborators.³⁴ The amount of effort exerted to exterminate collaborators is not surprising considering the threat they represented to underground organizations. In interviews with multiple underground participants - several of whom have since become experts on the topic of underground resistance groups, they unanimously stated the threats posed by collaborators was

³³Jan Karski, The Story of a Secret State, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1944) p. 235.

³⁴Jorgen Keeler, Interview with the author, 19 JAN 1994.

the greatest risk to their organizations. This coupled with the relative impunity with which such actions could be undertaken, resulted in a large number of operations against collaborators.

4. Diversion of Main Effort

By their existence alone, underground resistance movements served as a diversion of German troops from the main battlefield. The greater the potential for unrest among the occupied countries, the greater the number of German troops which were forced to be deployed away from the front lines. The more violent and debilitating the activities of the underground, the more troops the Germans were forced to allocate to a distracting side shows. The total number of German troops committed to keeping order in the occupied countries was tremendous. It is difficult to imagine that freeing these troops to contribute to the main war-fighting effort would not have made a significant difference.

But beyond this largely coincidental diversion of German forces, were intentional, planned campaigns, the primary objectives of which were to divert or delay German forces from reaching a critical point at a certain time. Irving Werstein provides an excellent example of a concerted effort to divert German forces from a crucial point:

During the Battle of the Bulge, the Field Marshall (Montgomery) said, the Danes effectively prevented German reinforcements from reaching the front at a

crucial point for the Allies. 'The Danes turned the tide for us on Jutland's railroads,' Montgomery asserted. 'I cannot stress the importance of the contributions by that fearless and bold brotherhood who formed the Danish Resistance.'³⁵

Similar praise could be bestowed upon both the Polish and Norwegian undergrounds. Tore Gjelsvik describes the Norwegian effort to suspend the German effort to reach a critical front:

Under the impact of the German offensive in the Ardennes in December 1944, the scope for actions by the Home Forces was widened to comprise sabotage of the north-south railway network in Norway, so as to prevent the transfer of German troops to the continent... It was launched in the middle of March, when the lines were broken in nearly 1,000 places and the State Railways office, used as headquarters for the German railway administration in Oslo, was simultaneously reduced to rubble.³⁶

As with the other functions of the underground, it is extremely difficult to estimate the significance they had on the total war effort. While there have been skeptics³⁷ regarding the actual impact the resistance has had on diverting German forces from critical areas at critical times, it is difficult to imagine that a railroad being severed in multiple places and the destruction of numerous locomotives

³⁵Werstein, That Denmark Might Live, p. 100.

³⁶Gjelsvik, pp. 200-201.

³⁷see Aage Trommer's Jernbanesabotagen i Danmark under den anden verdenskrig, Odense University Press, 1971, with a 20 page English summary. Explores the possibility that the Danish Resistance's destruction of railway lines may not have had the impact normally attributed to them.

would not appreciably hinder German efforts to arrive at a given point in a timely fashion.

5. Special Tasks as Required

Upon occasion the Allied forces would require specific tasks to be conducted for which they lacked the "in country assets." Because of the unique position and capabilities of the underground, these, often critical missions, were frequently delegated to the indigenous resistance movements. These actions need not serve the particular interests of the indigenous resistance organizations, but were accepted because of their potential to support the overall war effort. The actions requested by the Allies might include the destruction of specified targets, the elimination of key individuals or the acquisition of precisely defined intelligence. Kenneth Macksey provides an example of a highly specific RAF request to the SOE to "ambush the pilots of Kampfgeschwader 100 at Vannes as they travelled by bus to the airfield."³⁸ Jorgen Haestrup provides an example of the utilization of the Danish underground in a special tasking role when he notes that, "In Jutland fixed Eureka-stations were established according to Allied wishes. Their function was to give radio beams to Allied aircraft over Western Europe. That worked as occasion

³⁸Macksey, p. 53.

required."³⁹ Oluf Reed Olsen tells of the specific task assigned to him while providing his services to the British SIS in Norway.

A Heinkel 111 had the same day turned a somersault down the slope of the north-south landing runway. It was the interior of the aircraft that was of interest - the direction-finding apparatus and its fittings, a new type of wireless compass with which the Heinkel was believed to be equipped, and the layout of the pilot's cockpit in general.⁴⁰

Olsen and his companion were to remove the direction-finding apparatus and take photographs and sketches of the cockpit for eventual conveyance to England.

Perhaps the most famous utilization of underground resistance organizations to conduct special tasks was that of the SOE's use of Norwegian Linge commandos to destroy the German heavy water plant in Vemork, Norway. As explained in Norway's Resistance Museum guidebook: "During the war heavy water was considered indispensable as an aid to the production of atomic arms. The only plant in the world where heavy water was produced continuously was situated at Vemork. High priority was therefore given to the destruction of the plant."⁴¹ After a mission composed of British

³⁹Jorgen Hastrup, "Expose" in European Resistance Movements 1939-1945, pp. 159-160.

⁴⁰Oluf Reed Olsen, Two Eggs on my Plate, (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952) p. 29.

⁴¹Norway's Resistance Museum (guidebook) Publisher: Norges Hjemmefrontmuseum, 1982, item # 30.

Engineers/commandos failed to destroy - or even reach - their objective at Vemork, a decision was made to utilize Norwegian commandos. Their knowledge of local conditions and intimate contacts with the indigenous underground movements greatly enhanced their prospects for success. In February 1943, a daring raid conducted by nine Norwegian commandos, blew up vital portions of the heavy water plant. A year later, on 20 February, 1944, "the Hydro ferry, carrying practically all the remaining supplies of heavy water concentrate was sunk on Lake Tinnsjo,"⁴² by Linge commandos, by then fully integrated into the Norwegian underground resistance.

As illustrated, the underground resistance organizations of World War II participated in a vast assortment of activities. Their achievements ranged from the spectacular destruction of the German heavy water plant in Norway to the more mundane but extremely critical provision of accurate and "up to the minute" reports on local weather conditions. The contribution this vast array of services had on the eventual defeat of the Nazi regime is inestimable. At a minimum, underground organizations serve to draw badly needed combat troops from the battle front. Maximally, they contributed directly and significantly to the defeat of the German Army in battle. Whatever the case may be, the

⁴²Norway's Resistance Museum, item #30.

underground resistance provided invaluable support both to the Allied war effort and their own struggles for freedom.

While the underground provided invaluable assistance to the war effort, they did so at considerable risk. Operating within a hostile environment which imposed unique operational constraints and benefits, the underground was forced to constantly analyze these inherent advantages and the eventual defeat of the Nazi regime is inestimable. At a minimum, underground organizations served to draw badly neisadvantages, seeking to minimize the detriments and maximize the benefits. The following section discusses the advantages and disadvantages inherent to the underground operating environment.

D. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE UNDERGROUND

The "underground" is an unique and frequently misunderstood world - one which presents the clandestine operator with a wide range of life-threatening impediments while simultaneously offering him invaluable advantages. The degree to which these advantages and disadvantages could be capitalized upon was directly related to the capabilities of their adversaries and the nature of the environment in which they operated. The paramount determinant of successful underground operations lies in the ability to identify these advantages and disadvantages which are inherent to the underground world and tailor their actions accordingly. This

section discusses some of the advantages and disadvantages which face underground organizations, and applies them specifically to the resistance movements of Europe.

1. Advantages to Operating Underground

Traditionally, the underground has been viewed as possessing more advantages than disadvantages in its fight against the above-ground, "legitimate" forces. J. Bowyer Bell described this conventional perception of the underground as a world in which its inhabitants can strike,

unexpectedly out of the dark in unanticipated ways, appearing as a murderous wraith, using cunning without restraint, the underground killer seemingly has a whole spectrum of opportunities, capacities, and targets which are denied to the legitimate professional.⁴³

The ability to strike unexpectedly, in unanticipated ways is, in fact, one of the biggest advantages available to underground organizations. A relatively small number of operatives undertaking a relatively moderate level of activity can force the defending force, in this case the occupying German Army, to exert an inordinate effort in defending its acquired assets. This is what Leites and Wolf call imposing an "Air Defense" requirement⁴⁴ on the forces in command. The

⁴³J. Bowyer Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underground" in Terrorism and Political Violence, p. 193.

⁴⁴Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts, (Chicago, The Rand Corp., Markham Publishing Company, 1970) p. 68.

Germans were forced to attempt to defend all their assets, at all times over the entire breadth of the occupied country, against an underground attack that could come at anytime, anywhere -- in a manner that optimized their advantages and exploited German weaknesses. Thus, even a small underground force, which conducts only sporadic actions can divert a large number of German troops from more productive areas of operation.

Once the underground organization concludes an operation they have the ability, to cache or discard any incriminating weapons and equipment, and to disperse into the indigenous population rather than remaining to combat a vastly superior force. The occupying power is not faced with an opposing army easily identified by its uniforms or even by their visible possession of arms but by a routinely silent and hostile population which wittingly or unwittingly harbors an indistinguishable army in its midst. The biggest challenge to the occupying power is not to defeat the underground army in battle but merely to identify its members. As long as the population remains, at a minimum, uncommitted but silent the underground possesses sanctuary within the very confines of its enemy's camp.

Ironically, membership in underground organization could, at times, offer its members security advantages not

available to the general public. Bor Komorowski illustrates this point, stating:

In fact, a member of a secret organization could actually feel safer than others in the circumstances. He had the protection of his organization's intelligence service, which was often in the position to warn him of approaching danger, and, with his false documents, he was much safer.⁴⁵

Josef Karski provides an actual depiction of the added security advantages membership in the underground offered.

In June, 1940, the Germans staged a manhunt in the street of Warsaw and seized about twenty thousand people who were taken to three large police stations where they were searched, questioned and had their documents verified. All males under forty were sent as forced labor to Germany. All girls between seventeen and twenty-five were shipped to East Prussia for farm labor. All those whose documents were not in perfect order, who could not give a satisfactory account of their ancestry, employment and political sympathies, or could not clear themselves of charges made against them were sent to concentration camps. We later learned that about one hundred members of the Underground were caught in this raid. They were, without a single exception, promptly released. Every one of those had their documents in perfect order, could prove his occupation and supply a satisfactory account of his personal history. Every one had ready answers to every question that was asked him and impressed the police by his clear, straightforward, and unhesitating manner.⁴⁶

Although the underground offered security benefits which protected its members from certain random actions of the enemy's security forces, the benefits accrued did not offset

⁴⁵Komorowski, p. 39.

⁴⁶Karski, p. 72.

the tremendous risks one incurred by participation in resistance groups.

The underground organizations also possessed the advantage of operating in an environment that provided ample opportunities for its members to infiltrate vital sectors of the German security, transportation, government and political establishments. As Jorgen Haestrup explains:

The Occupation authorities had to rely on the existing system of administration, if for no other reason because of their lack of manpower, but at the same time they had to face the fact that collaboration could bring treachery with it. How much or how little this occurred was conditional upon local conditions, individual actions and stages, but the fact that it did occur was often the condition determining the extent of the illegal possibilities.⁴⁷

Due not only to the realities of the lack of German manpower, but in an effort to encourage indigenous cooperation and exploit the knowledge and intelligence that could only be provided by the local population, the German employed numerous native citizens in potentially sensitive positions. The underground did not hesitate to take advantage of this German dilemma, and rapidly filled positions within the puppet regimes' police forces, government offices, local Nazi parties, etc... Among other services, these underground agents were able to provide valuable, inside information on the activities of the German security forces.

⁴⁷Haestrup, European Resistance Movements, 1939-1945: A Complete History, p. 363.

There are other, miscellaneous and difficult to categorize, advantages to operating underground. The fact that underground movements are frequently "nonprofessional," can result in certain advantages. J Bowyer Bell describes this coincidental benefit:

Often rewards come to the unconventional, simply because they are inefficient: make-do operations and blunders of fieldcraft catch the conventional unprepared. Counter-insurgency specialists tend to tailor their responses to professional standards and orthodox assumptions about the unconventional and, hence, are never quite prepared for irregular guerrilla maneuvers.⁴⁸

In addition to security considerations, Karski defines other, less tangible, advantages underground possessed by operatives in Poland:

He had the protection of the organization and its efficient machinery at his disposal. He could secure good personal documents and obtain certificates of fictitious in German enterprises. He usually received a little money, had a number of addresses to retreat to, homes where he could always find a little food, and a place to hide from Gestapo raids on streets, even whole districts. " Furthermore, he had the peace of mind resulting from the knowledge that he was serving a good cause. He had the dignity of remaining independent and true to his beliefs, while the turncoat was faced with a universal contempt from those he attempted to join, from those he betrayed, and even from his own mind.⁴⁹

⁴⁸J. Bowyer Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underground," p. 198.

⁴⁹Karski, p. 71.

2. Disadvantages to Operating Underground

While the advantages available to underground organization are numerous, they are more than offset for by the formidable disadvantages they must face. J. Bowyer Bell, who has provided excellent insights into the innate disadvantages of operating underground, describes it as:

Not only is the real underground not very romantic, certainly not, as the conventional would imagine, a wondrous and effective base for guerrilla warfare with gunmen coolly reviewing the options of the covert armed struggle, but also it is always inherently inefficient, a flawed, usually fatally flawed, world created in desperation by those who have made it a last refuge before despair.⁵⁰

M.R.D. Foot reemphasizes Bell's description of the underground, reiterating the hardships:

Fiction has to stress the excitement of the clandestine life. Those who have experienced it know that though it is, rarely, exciting, and now and again terrifying, a lot of it is exceedingly dull. Monotony, loneliness, boredom, even more than fright, were the resisters bugbears. A Tommies proverb says war is 99 percent boredom and 1 percent fright. A resister might encounter as much as 2 percent of fright; 98 percent is still an awful lot of boredom.⁵¹

What Foot fails to depict is that even during that 98 percent period of boredom, the underground operative is constantly in danger, always being hunted by the enemy's security apparatuses - never able to relax. Unlike the conventional

⁵⁰J. Bowyer Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underground," p. 195.

⁵¹Foot, Resistance, p. 150.

soldier, that experiences frequent lulls in the fighting, an underground soldier's war is perpetual.

Perhaps the gravest disadvantage which faced underground organizations was the inordinate amount of energy and effort that its operatives expended merely to survive. Rather than focusing its energies solely on the conduct of operations directly against the German occupation, the underground was compelled to dilute its efforts searching for covert safehouses, forging an infinite number of official documents, establishing unquestionable aliases for its operatives and conducting all the individual security precautions that were necessary for survival. Stefan Korbonski captures the degree with which security concerns interfered with the efficiency of underground operations, saying the individual operators:

faced a double danger: in addition to random mass arrests, they were also threatened by planned actions, directed against particular individuals, since the Gestapo pursued the underground men with rabid doggedness. Death was the constant companion of every member of the underground. At night in the room where he hid under a false identity or without registering, he risked a Gestapo night raid, if they were looking for him; during the day, when he went out on the streets, he had to make his way past the Gestapo agents, provided with his description or photograph... any activity connected with the underground - required courage, alertness, utmost caution, great presence of mind, cunning - and most importantly - luck. Without these there was an ever present threat of arrest, torture and frequently, death.⁵²

⁵²Korbonski, p. 11.

Unlike conventional (above-ground) forces, the underground was in a position of danger not only when conducting actual missions, but at all times before, during and after. Not only did the specifics of their operational planning, communications, organization, intelligence gathering and training need be conducted with the utmost secrecy, but the secret of their very existence was a matter of life and death. Thus, not only did an underground operator have to refrain from revealing the secrets he possessed but he was compelled to keep secret his possession of secrets.

The underground relied not on force of arms to protect itself from the overwhelming martial superiority of its enemy, but upon its ability to remain anonymous. The point at which the German security forces discovered the identity or location of a member of the underground usually signalled the moment of German victory - all that then remained was the relatively anticlimactic seizure of the underground member. In addition to explaining the underground's extensive security exertions, this also illustrates the utter necessity of maintaining a covert identity and address. The tremendous disadvantage this represented to the underground was that the arrest of one member, who despite security precautions (of varying degrees of stringency) invariably knew the identity and/or location of other fellow underground constituents. The German security

agencies knew that the captured underground member possessed information that could lead to the arrest of other underground participants, which in turn, could lead to additional arrests in an ever expanding circle. Thus, the arrest of a single member of the underground could range on a spectrum from, at worst, the dismantlement of a significant portion of the underground and at best, force all underground associates known to the captured members to abandon their current identities, addresses, jobs, and either flee the country or cease all activity and go into hiding. Wherever the arrest fell on the spectrum, they represented an enormous disruption to continuing operations and were a profound disadvantage to operating underground.

Other disadvantages to underground operations are symptomatic of the nature of the environment and were discussed in detail in the section on the operational environment of the underground. To reiterate, the operational environment imposed by the German security services denied the underground preestablished networks of transportation, the benefit of unobstructed advertisement of its aims and opinions, open and free channels of communication and an environment which was conducive to the education, training and supply of its forces. In the case of the European resistance organizations, these environmental disadvantages were

intensified by the competency and capabilities of the German security forces.

Operating underground offers the astute participant incalculable advantages, which if properly utilized, serve to alleviate the tremendous martial superiority of his enemy. Simultaneously, the underground operator is faced with profound, inherent disadvantages, which even to the most discriminating and cautious, can result in sudden and dire consequences. How the underground operator addresses these inherent advantages and disadvantages determines not only success or failure but usually life or death.

E. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has provided a glimpse at the environments in which the underground organizations functioned, described their roles and examined the inherent advantages and disadvantages. The underground resistance movements of World War II, despite operating in a tremendously repressive environment, faced with all the disadvantages inherent to underground organizations, continuously provided invaluable services to both the Allied war effort and their own struggle for freedom. Recognizing that the operational environments changed appreciably over time and could be significantly different between countries and even within different regions of the same country, there are still "universal" or "generic"

conclusions that may be drawn from the experiences of Europe's underground organizations. Any underground movement, anytime, anywhere, must identify the opportunities and limitations inherent to operating in their particular underground environment. The more successful organizations were not only able to correctly identify these opportunities and limitations, they were able to tailor their activities accordingly. How they managed to adapt to these conditions in the vital areas of leadership, command and control, recruitment and internal security will be addressed in the following chapters.

II. RECRUITMENT

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the role of recruitment in underground organizations, using the European resistance movements as a prototype. Specifically, it addresses why recruitment was important to the underground, who were the underground participants, why they joined and, how the recruitment process functioned, including the security considerations associated with underground recruitment.

Recruitment in an underground environment requires a dramatically different set of guidelines and procedures than those utilized by above-ground organizations. Since membership in underground organizations is almost invariably a crime punishable by death, recruitment poses an extreme hazard to both the established members of the organization and the potential recruit. The acceptance of unqualified or indiscrete individuals, or worse still, agents of the enemy's security forces, could result in devastating consequences for the underground group. Those seeking membership in the underground frequently face the disheartening predicament of wanting to join but not knowing who to contact. If, in their frustration, they approach the wrong person or pronounce their

views too loudly, they too, could become the target of the adversary's security forces.

The operational demands of the underground require the recruitment of a very select type of candidate, one which offers desirable personal attributes, professional knowledge, special accesses, and/or specialized experience. The mechanisms of underground recruitment are of utmost significance to the survival of illicit organizations - failure to recruit means a slow death by attrition, a lack of judicious recruitment procedures may result in ineffectiveness, a lack of discretion, or enemy infiltration. Even utilizing the most ingenious methods available to the underground, recruitment posed both a troublesome organizational and security dilemma.

Recruitment was critical to the underground for the same reasons it is important to any organization - without recruitment there are no members and with no members there can be no organization. But recruitment in the underground becomes a more essential task than in above-ground groups because of the constant attrition of its members due to arrests, deaths, and blown covers necessitating the constant replenishment of its constituency. While the absolute size of an underground organization is an imperfect indicator of its vitality and capabilities, an organization that loses members faster than they recruit is invariably on the decline.

Indeed, the underground's opponent frequently measures his success not only by the total number of subversives eliminated but by the overall reduction in his force size. Thus, while the underground will not succeed merely by recruiting faster than it loses members, it will consistently fail if it is unable to replace its losses.

Recruitment has pivotal implications beyond the rudiments of survival. The clandestine nature of an underground organization furnishes any recruit a destructive potential well beyond that intrinsic to membership in non-covert groups. All actions, including the continuing existence of the underground, are by their very nature, highly secretive. Thus, all members of the organization are privy to highly sensitive information, ranging from, at a minimum, the knowledge of how to contact his underground associates to, at most, an intimate knowledge of the identities and whereabouts of a significant section of his chain of command. Whether through indiscretion and "loose lips" or active enemy infiltration, the wrong recruit can cause irreparable damage to the underground organization. Recruitment, properly executed, serves to identify and ensure only those capable, and qualified assume places in the precarious world of the underground.

B. WHO WERE THE UNDERGROUND PARTICIPANTS

Who the underground participants were and the criteria upon which they were recruited varies widely from case to case and differed contingent upon the role the potential recruit was to assume in the underground. There was not a consistent profile of an underground member, based upon profession, class, sex, age or political leanings. Jorgen Keeler describes membership in the underground saying it did not draw a particular type of person - but attracted all types of people, all they had in common was "indignation."⁵³ Tore Gjelsvik reinforces this point, saying, people from all walks of life joined - it was a personal question, not one of professional or social background.⁵⁴ There were, however, certain characteristics - individualistic and professional, that were highly suitable for participation in the underground. This section will discuss those individualistic and professional attributes which were prized by the underground.

Although both the individualistic and professional attributes for recruitment will be discussed equally, they did not play equivalent roles. As repeated interviews with underground participants revealed, the individualistic

⁵³Keeler, Interview with the author.

⁵⁴Tore Gjelsvik, Interview with the author, 14 JAN 1994.

characteristics played an overwhelming part in determining who was recruited. The vast majority of the recruits were chosen not because of their professional capacities or access but because of their personal traits of reliability, discretion, bravery and intelligence. If the underground sought to recruit a member in a particular profession primarily because of the invaluable service they could render as a result of their position, they would still be required to meet a minimum standard of personal qualifications.

1. Individual Attributes

A long list of desirable characteristics have been used to describe an exemplary recruit. These characteristics include; courage, resourcefulness, discretion, patience, common sense, reliability, loyalty, intelligence, availability and a high level of physical conditioning. M.R.D. Foot compiled his own catalog of desirable underground attributes, which include:

Not only was an ordinarily brave man little more use than a coward: to succeed in resistance, you needed extra strong, steely, flexible nerves, no inhibitions at all, and uncanny quickness of wit.⁵⁵

Close behind courage and swiftness came discretion. More groups of resisters have been undone by careless talk than anything else; particularly in those countries that had few or no secular memories of foreign tyranny...⁵⁶

⁵⁵Foot, Resistance, p. 14.

⁵⁶Foot, Resistance, p. 15.

Originality, unorthodoxy, dash, explain themselves: a similar quality, often much needed, was resourcefulness.⁵⁷

Patience was another quality, closely allied, that resisters needed; familiar enough as a virtue, but needed in unfamiliar strength. Simply to wait, for hours on end, in a hedge, for the sound of an approaching aircraft with a load of stores; to wait so several nights running without result; and to be there again, waiting, at the next change of moon...⁵⁸

M.R.D. Foot was not the only individual to formulate a paragon of the virtues of an underground agent. Jan Karski, a member of the Polish underground, describes what the Polish underground looked for in its potential recruits;

The underground organization demanded that its members fulfill certain physical qualifications and that they be relatively unencumbered and free to perform the tasks assigned to them... Many who had families could neither participate in this wholly unsettled mode of existence nor endure the prospect of German punishment and reprisals on themselves or on those who were associated with and dependant on them.⁵⁹

Jozef Garlinski, an officer in the Polish Home Army, depicted what he considered important attributes in a recruit;

What we wanted were young male or female volunteers who must be in perfect physical condition, intelligent, with plenty of initiative and self-reliance but at the same time disciplined and capable of standing up to arduous training. They must be willing to take risks consciously but without bravado, good at keeping secrets, courageous, tough and at times brutal. These were formidable requirements, and few were able to satisfy them. Volunteers were

⁵⁷Foot, Resistance, p. 16.

⁵⁸Foot, Resistance, p. 16.

⁵⁹Karski, p. 73.

forthcoming, but at least half of them had to be rejected as unsuitable.⁶⁰

The descriptions presented in the preceding paragraphs illustrate the individualistic attributes which the underground sought in its recruits. These requisite characteristics superseded class distinctions, professions, age, sex and in some cases - though certainly not all - politics. As a result, the underground consisted of elements from virtually all segments of society, who were selected largely on the basis of their personal merit.

A prerequisite to recruitment was the expression by the potential member of a desire to volunteer his services to the underground. The underground recruit was, thus, defined not only by the numerous characteristics mentioned previously, but also by a willingness to volunteer. What emerges as a result of these two criteria, is a very approximate profile of the underground recruit. The recruit was much more likely to be male than female, although females performed vital underground services throughout Europe, usually as couriers. The average age was between 18 - 25 years, but with innumerable examples of both older and younger participants. They were typically single - probably due to both their age and security considerations. While the underground recruit

⁶⁰Jozef Garlinski, The Survival of Love: Memoirs of a Resistance Officer, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991.) p. 43.

loosely fit these basic generalities, exceptions were very common. The clandestine organizations was epitomized by its diversity -- employing individuals of all ages, professions, male and female alike.

2. Professional Attributes

In addition to the conventional recruit, the underground sought the services of those occupying sensitive or highly useful positions. Among other professions, this included those employed in the postal services, on the railroads, in the police forces and in vital sectors of industry. The fundamental difference between these "professional" recruits and the conventional recruit was the underlying motivation for his recruitment. Not only did the "professional" not necessarily have to volunteer before being approached but his services were solicited for very specific purposes. John Oram Thomas, the author of The Giant Killers, describes an example of an underground agent of Holger Dansk, Duus Hansen, recruiting members based upon professional skills;

It was not difficult for Duus Hansen to make contact with willing and qualified radio-telegraphists from the merchant service and navy. They were already skilled in Morse and it was necessary only to give them a short course in the procedure, the use of codes and schedules and technical control of the 'telephone book' transmitter receiver.⁶¹

⁶¹Thomas, The Giant Killers: The Danish Resistance Movement 1940-1945, (New York, Taplinger Publishing Company, 1975.) p. 59.

M.R.D. Foot lists numerous examples of the types of professions which could serve the underground well and which were consequently the target of underground recruitment. Doctors, scholars and bookshop vendors were particularly sought after recruits.

Scholars being good at assimilating, recording, condensing information, and doctors having more facilities than most for travel at odd hours. Streams of strangers, besides, could call at a town's doctor's house without rousing suspicion: this made surgeries convenient rendezvous. Bookshops had similar advantages...⁶²

Unobtrusive and apparently unimportant clerks, in such places as railway termini could be invaluable; if they had the nerve and the skill to abstract an extra copy of a list of impending train loads, or specimens of a new type of ration card.⁶³

Some of the most daring and successful were prostitutes, who used their special opportunities to rifle their German customer's pockets and lower their morale.⁶⁴

Czeslaw Stankeiwicz, a veteran of the Polish underground, emphasized the importance and worth of the recruitment of railroad workers.⁶⁵ The induction of a railway worker could significantly increase the underground's access to uncontrolled, uncensored transportation of communications and materials. The recruitment of members of the police force

⁶²Foot, Resistance, p. 12.

⁶³Ibid., p. 13

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 14.

⁶⁵Czeslaw Stankiewicz, Interview with the author, 4-5 DEC 1993.

could, and often did, provide the underground with crucial warnings of impending enemy actions and furnish intelligence which facilitated the resistance's operations.

Members of many different professions, from doctors to prostitutes, offered invaluable potential service to the underground movements. Because of their professional attributes, they became the object of underground recruitment. Although those recruited on the basis of their professional positions constituted only a small portion of the total underground forces, they proved their worth by providing inestimable contributions that would not have been available without their services.

C. WHY THEY JOINED

The explanation of why individuals join underground organizations is extremely complex, varying from individual to individual. A single individual may and frequently is motivated by multiple factors. To understand what influenced individuals to join the European underground resistance movements of World War II it is necessary to examine multiple motivators. Those most frequently mentioned are: (1.) Patriotism, (2.) Backlash, (3.) Group Participation, (4.) Role Modeling and (5.) Personal motivators. But before these individual motivators could have significant impact, certain recruitment prerequisites were required.

1. Recruitment Prerequisites

Before an underground organization can expect to attract any semblance of a popular following, certain prerequisites must exist. These prerequisites are broad, non-specific conditions that on their own probably will not serve to motivate an individual to actively support an underground movement, but will provide the conditions under which individual motivators may be appealed to. These non-discriminatory recruitment prerequisites serve as a minimal pre-condition which must be satisfied before significant support for the underground is engendered. The three prerequisites are:

1. A dissatisfied society.
2. Sympathy and agreement with their goals and methods of the underground organization.
3. Some expectation of success.

The first of these prerequisites is what Chalmers Johnson calls the "disequibrated social system." Johnson states,

Society is a form of human interaction that sublimates violence, of which one form is revolution. Revolutions are in this sense antisocial, testifying to extraordinary dissatisfactions with a particular form of society. They do not occur randomly, and they need not occur at all. Revolutions can be rationally contemplated only in a society that is undergoing

radical structural change and that is in need of still further change.⁶⁶

Revolution, as used by Johnson, can be substituted for the resistance struggle against an occupying power. The conditions of a "disequibrated society" - the first prerequisite for underground support, were easily met in the German occupied countries of Europe. The German dismantlement of the legitimate forms of indigenous government and their establishment of weakly disguised puppet regimes, resulted in virtually universal discontent with the established authority.

The second prerequisite is that potential recruits must be in agreement with the goals and methods advanced by the underground groups and the organization must possess a basis of legitimacy. As long as the goal remained an apolitical liberation of the occupied country, it was unlikely to engender anything but widespread popular support. The methods employed by the underground were more likely to be a subject of contention. The perception of an inappropriate level of violence - either too much or not enough - could and did discourage potential members from seeking membership.

The third prerequisite is that there must be some realistic expectation of success. The anticipated success need not be immediate nor complete but the movement must offer

⁶⁶Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1982.) p. 61.

something other than certain failure to attract potential members. Kenneth Macksey discusses this prerequisite for recruitment, saying,

Success at arms was a superb recruiting sergeant. Each local victory garnered its influx of new adherents to the cause, regardless of political standpoint. Failure and defeat simply put the process into reverse.⁶⁷

The expectation of success was significantly enhanced by the simultaneous war the German occupying powers were fighting both with the Allies and the resistance. In an inadvertent fashion, an Allied victory was also seen as a victory for the underground. As World War II progressed, and an Allied victory appeared more certain, there were more and more volunteers willing to join the underground.

2. Recruitment Motivators

In virtually all of occupied Europe, the three recruitment prerequisites existed for a significant portion of the population. Yet, some people elected to join revolutionary organizations while a great majority of others choose not to. Martha Crenshaw discusses this issue, which she labels the "free rider problem," asking,

Why should a rational person become a terrorist [underground agent], given the high cost associated with violent resistance and the expectation that

⁶⁷Macksey, p. 21.

everyone who supports the cause will benefit whether he or she participates or not?"

Since the environment is generally equal for all potential members of the underground, the differences in behavior between the participant and non-participant are explained by the five individual motivators to be discussed below.

a. Patriotism

Patriotism was an integral component of resistance. Since the underground was created in response to a foreign invasion, resistance was generally defined within a nationalistic framework. Resistance was synonymous with patriotism. It was unthinkable that a "good patriot" would not be willing to assist the underground's struggle and, consequently, those with reputations for patriotism were marked for recruitment from the beginning of the war. In multiple interviews conducted with underground participants, invariably "patriotism" was attributed as the single, most prominent impetus which compelled people to volunteer for underground organizations. Simply put, those people possessing a greater predisposition towards patriotism, were much more likely to volunteer to serve in underground organizations.

⁵⁸Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist behavior as a product of strategic choice," in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich, (Boston, Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.8.

b. Backlash

Ill considered, repressive actions conducted in an environment already hostile to the Germans presence frequently served to further polarize the indigenous population, often to such a degree that the numbers volunteering for membership in the underground would increase drastically. In many cases, it was the complete randomness of the German actions that served to encourage volunteers. If the general population felt it was at as much risk of German reprisals as those conducting the underground activities they had nothing to lose and everything to gain by membership in the underground. Kenneth Macksey describes the situation in France in 1941;

It was left to the Germans to act as the best recruiting sergeants of the masses into the ranks of embryo secret armies. On top of the incitement to rebellion, implicit in every execution of hostages, there came the impact of the forced labor program.⁶⁹

The forced labor program, an instruction from Hitler to assemble a force of 6 million foreign workers to augment Germany's industrial sector, perhaps more than any other single German action, resulted in a tremendous anti-German backlash. Macksey describes the results;

Suddenly, in all parts of Europe, people began to abruptly disappear as they were herded into Germany and set to work. No other measure did more to set Europe ablaze against the Germans; no longer was it possible to be indifferent and escape the issues involved... Anybody might be kidnapped without

⁶⁹Macksey, p. 116.

warning. Everybody now had a reason to fight for survival like the Slavs.

Magne Skodven, a participant in the Norwegian resistance and authority on the history of Norway's underground, tells a story of the consequences of an ill-conceived, unproductive and repressive measure over a seemingly inconsequential matter. In the first week of December 1940 it became fashionable to wear a paperclip on one's lapel - signifying that the Norwegians stuck together. The *Nasjonal Samling* (NS), the Norwegian Nazi Party, decided to stop this practice and ordered their lackeys to tear the paperclips off of all lapels - the result was that everyone wore them. This progressed into the wearing of monetary bills - as symbols of Norway. Again, the N.S. ordered the bills forcibly removed. This deteriorated into street fighting between members of the NS and the patriotic Norwegians on the 13th of December⁷¹ - illustrating how over-reactions and lack of judicious policies by the occupying power, in this case their puppets, even over such an inconsequential matter as the wearing of paperclips in lapels, may polarize a population and create an environment favorable for recruitment.

⁷⁰Macksey, p. 85.

⁷¹Magne Skodven, Interview with the author, 13 JAN 1993.

c. Group Participation

Very frequently entire organizations were alienated by the repressive and manipulative actions of the occupation government which infringed upon their traditional freedoms. Over the course of the first two years of German occupation of Norway, the leaders of the Norwegian Church, the National Association for Sport, the Farmer's Union, Norwegian Medical Association, the Trade Union Organization, the Communist Party, the educators and students all denounced German occupation and in essence supported the cause of the resistance. The stance taken by the leaders of these organizations towards underground activity had a major impact on the course its followers would pursue. Thus, instead of alienating individuals, entire organizations, with their constituents largely intact, were induced to participate in underground activity. Magnus Jensen describes the results of the alienation of entire organizations;

Inside the separate organizations they created at a quite early stage the feeling of solidarity which was a necessity for the civil struggle. They broke down the isolation of the individual, the dread of standing all alone which was the most important weapon of Nazi terror.⁷²

Tore Gjelsvik describes how N.S. meddling in the affairs of the Norwegian Medical Association - including N.S.

⁷²Gjelsvik, Norwegian Resistance, quote from Magne Jensen, pp. 31-32.

attempts to proscribe hiring/firing procedures, require a declaration of loyalty to the N.S. Guild for Health and Hygiene and politicize the Association, resulted in the mobilization of a large portion of the Norwegian medical profession.

The case helped to arouse the medical profession, so that a strikingly large number of doctors were later to be found in prominent positions in both the civil and military resistance movement. It also led to the formation of a self-constituted secret committee of action in the Medical Association.⁷³

The Norwegian Medical Association is only one of the many examples of how group allegiances proved to be a powerful recruitment catalyst. Stefan Korbonski describes similar developments in Poland;

They began to band together of small groups of a few or several people who knew and trusted one another. Each of such groups adopted a name for their organization, drafted its rules and wording of its oath, and began recruiting new members. In many cases these clandestine organizations were based upon prewar associations, such as veteran's organizations, sports clubs or Boy Scouts.⁷⁴

Associations from as small as football teams to as large as nationwide scouting organizations provided fertile grounds for underground manpower. Whether due to the ease with which pre-existing organizations, with their established infrastructure and leadership, could make the transition to illicit activity

⁷³Gjelsvik, Norwegian Resistance 1940-1945, p. 37.

⁷⁴Korbonski, p. 14.

or because of the feelings of solidarity they inspired within their members, they often provided the backbone of underground organizations.

d. Role Modeling

The knowledge that well respected and admired friends, family members or other fellow countrymen were active in the struggle against the German occupation, furnished the potential recruit a precedent which illustrated that resistance was both possible and a legitimate course of action. People frequently volunteered their services to the underground based largely upon what they knew of the organization's membership. Tore Gjelsvik addresses the impact that respected figures could have on recruitment if they promoted objectives compatible with the underground. He explains that when the Norwegian Supreme Court resigned on 21 December 1940 due to actions of the occupation government,

It was an eye-opener for the nation as a whole and gave incalculable encouragement to the incipient resistance movement; now the Supreme Court had actually ranged itself on its side, the movement knew it had a basis in law. The 'illicit' organization had been legalized.⁷⁵

The advancement of the ideals and objectives fostered by the underground by widely admired and esteemed members of society -- either in word or by deed -- could

⁷⁵Gjelsvik, Norwegian Resistance 1940-1945, p. 27

easily lend an air of legitimacy to an organization, which by law, was illegal.

e. Personal Motivators

Personal motivators refer to the highly individualistic characteristics that compel a potential member to join the underground. These are usually the result of a person's particular history and psychological-material needs. If one's particular history included incidents in which the German occupying force killed or tortured friends or family members, destroyed property or otherwise abused the person in question, the thirst for vengeance and justice could act as a powerful motivator to volunteer for an organization that was actively confronting the source of their grievance. The psychological attractions of prestige and excitement which the underground offered, also encouraged some to volunteer their services. The prestige motivation probably played a lesser role since one's participation in the clandestine organization could not be advertised. Excitement, the drive to participate in exhilarating, dangerous activities - while under the auspices of the struggle for freedom, induced many, stimulus-hungry individuals to offer their services to the underground.

Material considerations, such as the proper documentation, safe houses and even the basics of food and shelter, which the underground could provide for a person "on the run" induced some to seek membership in the underground.

Jan Karski, prior to his enlistment in the Polish underground, was in just such a situation. He was a lieutenant in the Polish Army before the German-Russian invasion. After the rout of the Polish Army, he escaped both Russian and German captivity and made his way to Warsaw. Once there, he lacked the correct papers, had no lodging, means of survival or purpose. He contacted a friend, who unbeknownst to him, was a member of the Polish underground. His friend, fully discerning his situation, arranged his recruitment into the underground. As Karski described it,

There was nothing extraordinary about it; nothing at all romantic. It required no decision on my part; no spurt of courage or adventure. It came about as the result of a simple visit to a good friend, dictated largely by my despair, gloom and the feeling of being utterly at loose ends.⁷⁶

The five recruitment motivators listed above are not, nor are they intended to be, a comprehensive catalog of the reasons why people joined the underground. They do, however, represent five of the major motivators which compelled members to volunteer for service. Additionally, an individual need not be compelled to volunteer on the basis of a single motivator and may volunteer as the result of multiple considerations. Whether because of patriotism, backlash, group participation, role models, personal motivators or some

⁷⁶Karski, p. 63.

combination of these motivators, the underground, despite the inherent hazards, did not lack for volunteers.

D. HOW THE UNDERGROUND RECRUITED

The process by which the underground recruited its members was, by necessity, dramatically different from above-ground organizations. The restrictions imposed upon the underground as the result of operating clandestinely demanded drastic modifications in normal recruitment procedures. The underground did not have access to an open forum in which to advertise its objectives and function - indeed, the mere possession of materials relating to the underground was frequently punishable by death. It did not possess recruitment offices, in permanently established locations to which those interested in joining the underground resistance could present themselves - instead those interesting in joining the organization frequently faced the frustrating prospect of being willing to join but not knowing who to contact. They lacked the facilities to conduct thorough background checks on their prospective members, checks that could mean the difference between life and death. How the underground managed the issue of recruitment, specifically; the recruitment methodology employed by the underground, who conducted underground recruitment and security considerations associated with underground recruitment will be examined below.

1. Recruitment Methodology

The methods by which underground organizations recruited its members were largely left to the local units. While the SOE provided instruction to underground operators on everything from the use of the latest explosive devices to proper security procedures, no centrally directed method for recruitment was ever disseminated. As an interview with Robert Barron, a SOE trainer and agent, confirms, very little guidance, methodology or instruction was provided either operationally or in the training environment as to how the resistance groups should address the topic of recruitment."

The underground recruitment process included two pivotal procedures - identification and confirmation. Since membership in the underground was voluntary, the first task was simply to identify those willing to participate in the organization. In an environment in which members of the underground zealously guarded their clandestine role, the potential recruit might have a very difficult time making his intentions known the right persons. Secondly, once the volunteer's intentions were conveyed to the underground, confirmation was required that the volunteer was who he said he was and that he was suitable for the demands of underground life. The methodologies employed by the underground movements

⁷⁷Robert Barron, Interview with the author, 9 JAN 1994.

of World War II to address these two crucial procedures were virtually universal.

a. Identification

The dilemma of how to contact those willing to volunteer for the underground was generally left to the individual rather than the organization - the exception being those recruited for specific skills or professions. The potential recruit, not knowing who to contact, made his opinions known to as many as discreetly as possible. Jorgen Keeler, a participant in the Danish underground and author of several publications on Danish resistance, experienced first-hand the difficulties associated with seeking membership in the underground. He was eager to join the underground from the beginning of the German occupation and spent a couple of years trying to make the right contacts. He began to talk loudly about his opinions and was eventually contacted by members of the underground and offered a position in the underground press.⁷⁸

If a volunteer was fortunate enough to have knowledge of the identity of an underground participant, his aspirations for enlistment could be greatly facilitated. As Czeslaw Stankiewicz, a participant in the Polish underground relates, rumors about who was active in the underground

⁷⁸Keeler, Interview with the author, 19 JAN. 1994.

abounded. If you wanted to contact a member of the underground to volunteer your services "you had to have a nose for these things."⁷⁹ Magne Skodven, a participant in the Norwegian resistance, who left the organization and sought reentry into the underground, accomplished his return by dropping hints about his willingness enlist his services to a friend he suspected "knew about such things."⁸⁰

b. Confirmation

Once a volunteer was identified, the organization had to decide if the volunteer met the individual attributes (page 5.) desired in an underground operative. Since the extensive vetting capabilities normally available to secret, above-ground organizations were not available to the underground, they had to rely solely on the underground members' judge of character and on recommendations from acquaintances of the volunteer trusted by the underground.

The underground's reliance on individual judge of character to determine the acceptability of a potential recruit was a perilous but often relied upon practice. John Oram Thomas, provides an excellent example of the reliance on character judgement in his description of the recruitment methods used by Johannes Johannesen, the Danish harbor master

⁷⁹Stankiewicz, Interview with the author.

⁸⁰Skodven, Interview with the author.

at the Tuborg Brewery in Hellerup, Copenhagen. Johannesen, sought to establish a circle of reliable boat crews to assist in underground escape operations. The process he employed has been described by John Oram Thomas:

Carefully, over many beers, Johannesen sounded out their skippers, listening to their views on the new German 'masters', estimating their courage and their ability to keep a mouth shut. Gradually he built a team of good, loyal seamen who would be prepared to cooperate in running an escape operation.⁵¹

In addition to its reliance on judgement of character, the underground sought to confirm the suitability of its potential members by seeking affirmation of their qualifications from trusted persons who had ties with the volunteer. The acceptance of new members was overwhelmingly based not upon who you knew, but who knew you. If the volunteer was known by members of the underground or other respectable members of the community to have a reputation for being a good patriot possessing discretion, courage and intelligence the likelihood of his recruitment was virtually assured. Oluf Reed Olsen provides a description of his employment of underground recruitment techniques when approached by a volunteer, Rolf Gabrielsen, in the Norwegian town of Mandel;

He [Gabrielsen] gave us a number of references in Mandel, without our asking for any; among them was a leader of one of the former Mandel Scout troops, whom

⁵¹Thomas, The Giant Killers, p. 118.

I had met a few years before... Among the many people whom Gabrielsen had given us as references were two we knew were good Norwegians - and safe. The same evening I went to see one of them and cleared up the question of Gabrielsen's identity.⁸²

A good word from an individual highly regarded by the underground, was, without question, the surest method of entry into underground organizations.

2. Who Conducted Underground Recruitment

The underground authorized and encouraged a complete decentralization of the recruitment process, authorizing the recruitment of new members down to the lowest rungs in the chain-of-command. Dick Rubenstein, a long time SOE operative in France and Burma, states, recruitment was initiated "on your own" down to the cell/circuit level⁸³ - the cell leader could make the decision about who was brought into the organization.⁸⁴ Tore Gjelsvik describes the process in Norway as, recommendations were made to the leaders that this was a good man who would serve the resistance well - it was based upon personal initiative - anyone could recruit but all

⁸²Olsen, Two Eggs on My Plate, pp. 64-65.

⁸³The cell or circuit in a hierarchial organization was the most junior unit within the organization's chain-of-command, usually consisting of 5 to 7 members.

⁸⁴Richard Rubenstein, Interview with the author, 7 JAN. 1994.

members of the cell had to agree to the new members inclusion.⁸⁵

Whether due to the underground leadership's inability to assume the additional responsibilities required to supervise local recruitment or because they determined that recruitment was best left to those with an intimate knowledge of the local conditions, virtually every unit/cell recruited its members with no centralized direction. The leadership was apparently, little concerned with the underground becoming too large and unmanageable, and encouraged the recruitment of whatever numbers were required to conduct regional operations. While this greatly enhanced the efficiency and speed of the recruitment process, it entrusted an awesome responsibility to an incredible number of people with a wide range of competency.

3. Security Considerations

Underground recruitment must strike a balance between the underground organization's basic need to replace its members lost through attrition and acquire additional members versus the security threat posed by the introduction of new recruits. As discussed previously, recruitment of members is an absolute necessity to the survival of the underground movement. Yet, to recruit in a non-judicious manner could

⁸⁵Gjelsvik, Norwegian Resistance 1940-1945.

also threaten the survival of the organization. Each new recruit represents an unknown, unproven element, that poses new potential dangers to the group. It is at the recruitment stage that the potential infiltrators, those lacking discretion and operational common sense must be identified and discarded if the group's security - and thus its survival - is to be maintained. J. Bowyer Bell discusses the uncertainties, and potential threats inherent in underground recruitment;

The greatest sin is betrayal, worse than heresy... Thus, every underground revolutionary organization tends to query its own, suspect all, seek for the informer and assume conspiracy and betrayal, usually not without cause. For the government an informer out of the underground is a golden prize. Every organization is prey to the informer who cast a cold shadow on the fires of the faith that are kept burning at such enormous cost. Every rebel organization is apt to aggregate this fearful internal danger, become obsessed with the police, the special forces, and orthodox operatives. They, at least, are real, unlike the nightmares of internal betrayal.⁸⁶

The primary method the underground employed to reduce the likelihood of infiltration - the most significant threat to the organization's security - was to rely on references from reliable sources about the identity and past of the potential recruit. A second precaution was to recruit "by invitation only." Dick Rubenstein sums up the underground procedure, saying, "Generally speaking - one was dubious of those requesting membership. This approach was viewed with

⁸⁶Bell, Revolutionary Dynamic: The Inherent Inefficiencies of the Underground, pp. 205-206.

suspicion and possibly as an attempt at infiltration - it was usually by invitation only."

This policy appears contradictory in an all volunteer organization, like the underground, in which the potential recruit usually expressed a willingness to join before being recruited. In practice, there appears to have been a balance between the verified identity and character of the volunteer versus the acceptable degree to which he pursued membership in the underground. A person widely known for his patriotism, both before and during the war, would arouse little suspicion if he ardently sought participation in the underground. Conversely, a person, of whom little was known, or one who did not previously possess a reputation for support of the underground cause, could not pursue membership in the underground with the same zeal without raising fears of infiltration and betrayal.

The repressive and hostile environment in which the underground operated, required the formulation of recruitment methods that addressed the unique associated conditions. The reliance on the recruiter's judgement of character of the potential recruit and, especially, the recommendations provided by persons trustworthy to the underground, were the basis for acceptance into the organization. Recruitment was

"Rubenstein, Interview with the author.

greatly constrained and largely directed by the constant demand to zealously guard the security of the group. New recruits meant new risks and the ever present danger of infiltration. The recruitment methods developed by the underground were largely successful, not only in supplying the requisite manpower, but in safeguarding their security.

E. CONCLUSIONS

Recruitment within underground organizations, while supplying the manpower critical to the group's continuance, simultaneously, possesses the potential for its destruction. Because of the profound implications associated with underground recruitment, extreme caution and discretion are required in the selection of new members. With virtually no centralized direction, the underground had to formulate their own unique recruitment procedures to address the hostile and repressive environment in which they operated. Even the act of volunteering was a laborious, circuitous process. The underground had to identify volunteers in an environment which its members scrupulously guarded their clandestine role - leaving the potential recruit with no one to whom he could volunteer. Once a volunteer was identified, verification had to be obtained that he was who he said he was and that he met the attributes required of an underground operative. Given the unremitting hazards and inherent difficulties associated

with underground recruitment, the underground was remarkably successful in devising techniques which adapted to its perilous conditions.

III. INTERNAL SECURITY

A. BACKGROUND

Internal security is the single most important consideration to any underground organization. Underground organizations, by definition, possesses an ability to impose their will inferior to that of the forces which they oppose. If this was not the case there would be no need to operate underground. Because underground movements do operate in conditions in which they are less "powerful," whether due to disparities in numbers, armament, equipment, organization, training or other factors, they adapt by employing clandestine and elusive methods. The underground compensates for their enemies' martial strength by striking at unanticipated times and places, employing unconventional techniques and upon completion of their operation, assimilating back into their own indigenous population, protected not by fire superiority but by the fragile shield provided by their hidden identities. The ability of the underground to maintain the clandestine nature of its activities, to prevent the exposure of its members, its methods, and its intended targets is of overwhelming importance in determining not only the underground's capability to continue operating but to exist.

Underground security is responsible for ensuring that these operational prerequisites are met.

This chapter will discuss the specific threats encountered by the underground, the security management procedures they employed to address the threats and the security dilemmas associated with underground operations. Although the topic of underground internal security is treated generically, it is recognized that underground security requirements are contingent upon the efficiency of the opposition. If the authoritative security agency lacks competency, commitment or organization, the issue of underground security becomes less demanding. The underground movements of occupied Europe all faced German security forces, the capabilities of which varied from country to country and changed significantly over time. While these variances impacted upon the undergrounds' security considerations, the differences were largely a matter of degree not principle. The same threats, security dilemmas and security management demands remained in all countries at all times.

B. SECURITY THREATS

The underground resistance organizations of occupied Europe, whose very existence was contingent upon maintaining stringent internal security measures, suffered no shortages of security threats. As M.R.D. Foot explains, "Resisters, whether local or infiltrated from abroad, needed to keep

themselves safe from several overlapping police jurisdictions; some German, some indigenous."⁹⁸ In addition to the threat posed by the hostile police agencies, the underground faced threats from numerous other fronts. The Germans recognized the tremendous advantages of recruiting members of the indigenous population, persons with an innate knowledge of local customs, dialects, activity and geography to serve as intelligence gathers. These collaborators, whether serving voluntarily or involuntarily, openly or clandestinely, represented an incalculable threat to the security of the underground. Other less tangible factors also threatened the security of underground organizations. Security awareness and the adherence to proper security procedures by individual underground agents impacted significantly on the performance and functioning of the underground. Lack of discretion, boasting of ones exploits and over-confidence due to routinization could imperil an organizations as certainly as German street patrols, check points and raids.

This section will discuss the four primary threat sources to the underground resistance organizations in occupied Europe. The first threat was that posed directly by the largely random and undirected actions of German security forces. The second threat was that of collaborators, members

⁹⁸Foot, Resistance, p. 64.

of the indigenous population that serve the objectives of the occupying force. The third threat was that of the capture and torture of underground agents. The fourth threat sources was that of inadequate or improper individual security measures.

1. Undirected Actions of Hostile Security Forces

Threats posed to the security of the underground by the largely undirected actions of hostile security forces included routine street patrols, check points at critical transportation nodes, such as train stations and street intersections, the random arrests of large numbers of people and the continual monitoring of all communication networks. These were the actions taken by the German security forces without specific knowledge or forewarning of individual underground activity. While these actions were generally undirected, they were frequently designed to target areas of known underground activity. Neighborhoods, districts or regions renown for housing, supporting or serving as a base for underground members were a natural locations for the establishment of check points, street patrols and random, large scale arrests. Theses actions were initiated not in response to a particular underground venture but designed to address underground activity as a whole and make the conduct of even the most basic clandestine activities as difficult as possible.

The random actions of German security forces achieved varying degrees of success but all served to force the underground to alter its operational methods, increasing the complexity and effort required to conduct their activity. While these measures were an encumbrance they were generally feared less than the more insidious threats posed by collaboration and infiltration. As Robert Barron, a SOE operative explains;

Random actions by the security forces were always a danger, a daily impediment and hazard. But these were easier to take precautions against. If a road block or security station was established the word would be disseminated and thus avoided. But it did force the agents to take precautions all the time.⁸⁹

Czeslaw Stankiewicz states a similar impression of the threat presented by undirected actions conducted in Poland by German security forces, stating,

Random security measures did not pose much of a threat because of the overwhelming support of the populace which warned everyone else of the check points and security forces' movements.⁹⁰

While these undirected action were less feared than other measures employed by German security forces, they did have a profound effect on the ability of the underground to conduct even the most basic tasks. The transportation of equipment, personnel and communications through the maze of

⁸⁹Barron, Interview with the author.

⁹⁰Stankiewicz, Interview with the author.

check points and street patrols expended an inordinate amount of the underground's time and energy on logistical rather than operational issues. Tore Gjelsvik attributes the innumerable security checks conducted by German forces in the last part of the war as making the carrying of any illegal material virtually impossible.⁹¹ Birger Rasmussen, a member of the Norwegian underground operating in Oslo, contends, based upon personal experience, that while undirected actions by the German forces were easier to spot -- "we knew them" -- and avoid, they still posed a danger. Despite the relative ease with which such activity could be spotted, they could not always be avoided. Birger Rasmussen relates his encounter with random German patrols which nearly cost him his life, twice. In the beginning of March 1945, the home forces were actively seeking to blow up the rail lines and disrupt the German retreat from Norway. Birger Rasmussen and a SOE compatriot whom had arrived from England four days previously, were parked in a car with loaded with explosives when they encountered a random "street patrol" of 8 men (the average being between 8 and 12). Three members of the patrol were dispatched to check out the car with Birger Rasmussen and his fellow saboteur. Realizing that discovery of their intent and identity was imminent, when the patrol got within 3 yards of

⁹¹Gjelsvik, Interview with the author.

their position, Rasmussen "opened up with his pistol." After shooting the first two members of the security patrol his pistol jammed and he was severely wounded. He managed a harrowing escape, staggering a lengthy distance from the shooting site, maintaining consciousness long enough to crawl over barbed wired fences and reach a point from which he was taken to a safehouse. Three weeks later an attempt was made to send the wounded Rasmussen to Sweden. While attempting his escape he and his escort again encountered a random German patrol on an island off the west coast of the Oslo Fjord, and he was re-arrested. Strangely enough they were allowed unescorted into a house through which they again escaped. "It started with a random patrol and ended in a random patrol on the island."⁹²

Threats precipitated by the undirected actions of the German security services incorporated more than just the highly visible operations of street patrols, random arrests and check points. Especially damaging was the continual monitoring of all communication networks, including the telephone and telegraph services, the postal systems, and the detection and interception of radio transmissions. This was such a comprehensive threat to underground communications that traditional methods and channels of communication were forced

⁹²Birger Rasmussen, Interview with the author, 12 JAN. 1994.

to be abandoned and new modes and techniques devised. The denial of these established and efficient channels of communications had a profound effect on the ability of the underground to function proficiently and coherently.

2. Collaborators

Members of the indigenous population who served as collaborators for the occupying German forces came in many different guises and were motivated by many different reasons. Some severed their German masters openly in public positions, such as, the local security forces, the indigenous Nazi Parties, and crucial positions in industry. Others served more treacherously, functioning as covert infiltrators into the underground. Most collaborators conducted their activities willingly, motivated by an assortment of explanations, ranging from a genuine belief in the ideology of the tenets of the Third Reich to the financial and power rewards associated with collaboration. Some were forced, through blackmail and torture, to collaborate. Whatever their motivations or methods of serving, collaborators represented the most serious threat to underground organizations. Kenneth Macksey reiterates the hazards and results of collaboration, saying;

The most prolific source of information about partisans [the underground] naturally came through informers [collaborators], whose news waxed and waned in sympathy with German successes and failures, not

only at the front but in relation with the local populace.⁹³

To facilitate the examination of the threat posed by collaboration, collaborators are divided into two categories; open and clandestine.

a. Open Collaboration

The threat posed to the underground by open collaboration was largely confined to the actions of the members of the indigenous population that served in German sponsored security forces. These collaborators possessed an intimate knowledge of local customs, activities, dialects, accents and dress that was of invaluable assistance in identifying suspicious activity and persons. Helen Astrup describes the dangers that collaborators in the German sponsored Norwegian security services represented to the underground, stating;

The Quisling police were as bad as the Germans - at times more dangerous, because where you could fool a German, especially in regard to local knowledge, you could not always convince a Quisling policeman.⁹⁴

Dick Rubenstein, a British officer who operated behind German lines in France, was extremely conscious of the threat posed by local collaborators serving in German security services. Not only was he, as a foreigner, at extreme risk if forced to

⁹³Macksey, p. 90.

⁹⁴Astrup, p. 218.

encounter French collaborators, so too were the indigenous members of the resistance. He states;

The indigenous security forces which acted as the German lackeys were more feared than the Germans because they were more familiar with the local customs, dress, accents, activities and were thus more likely to identify subversive activity.⁹⁵

b. Clandestine Collaboration

Clandestine collaboration primarily involves some form of infiltration of underground organizations by hostile, indigenous agents. But it may encompass anything from the actual induction of a collaborator into an underground group to relating conversations and rumors of underground activity overheard as the result of improper security awareness. Because of the enormous damage and horrific consequences associated with the infiltration and penetration of an underground organization, clandestine collaborators were considered by most to be the most significant security threat to the survival of the organization. As Paul Wergeland, a long time participant in the Norwegian underground relates;

The biggest security threat was infiltrators - not by the Gestapo because they were easy to spot but the Norwegians that collaborated were the real danger because they were so impossible to detect.⁹⁶

Jorgen Keeler concurs with Wergeland's assessment stating that in Denmark, "the biggest threat to the security of his

⁹⁵Rubenstein, Interview with the author.

⁹⁶Paul Wergeland, Interview with the author, 12 JAN. 1994.

organization was informers."⁹⁷ The Holger Dansk, recognizing the danger posed by these clandestine collaborators liquidated 350 informers and infiltrators during the course of the war.⁹⁸

The potential damage which could be wrought by the infiltration of a collaborator was tremendous. A single informer within the ranks of an underground circuit could provide, at a minimum, a description of all underground members with whom he came in contact, their codenames, times and addresses of meeting places, procedures for contacting other members, locations of safehouses and description of the group's operating procedures. This information could easily result in the arrest and torture of all members of the individual group which in turn, could lead to additional arrests and tortures of other underground members which could continue in an ever expanding and destructive circle. The damage which could be inflicted by an infiltrator was directly proportional to the security consciousness of the individual underground units. The potential damage to the underground could be minimized if meticulous security measures were adhered to, such as not revealing real names and addresses, constantly changing meeting places, compartmentalization and disclosing information solely on a "need to know" basis. Even

⁹⁷Keeler, Interview with the author.

⁹⁸Ibid.

within units that established exceptional security standards, the threat of infiltration, with its horrifically destructive potential, forced the underground to expend an inordinate amount of time and effort to ensure that possible recruits were not infiltrators and engendered a constant fear of betrayal and an atmosphere of distrust.

The motivations for collaborating with the occupying powers were diverse, ranging from simple avarice to coercion. M.R.D. Foot provides an example of the financial motivations for collaborating, saying;

The Gestapo offered substantial head-money - 5,000 pounds or more - for information that led directly to the arrest of an agent of the Allied secret services; in some countries, resistance security was weak enough for a desperate man to entertain, as a business proposition, the idea of getting into an established circuit in order to betray its leader and claim the reward.⁹⁹

A less reprehensible motivation for collaboration was that of compliance due to coercive measures. Captured members of the underground that faced continued torture, certain death and frequently the death and torture of family members were, upon occasion, offered an alternative to their otherwise inevitably lamentable fate. An agreement to continue their affiliation with the underground in order to supply German security forces with information could be exchanged for the personal well

⁹⁹Foot, Resistance, p. 20.

being and the safety of one's family. Jorgen Keeler addresses this issue, stating;

The most dangerous of all and the most tragic were those of the underground who were captured then for the sake of their survival or that of their family agreed to actively seek information for the Germans.¹⁰⁰

Whether operating clandestinely or openly, voluntarily or due to coercive measures, collaboration with the enemy forces by members of the indigenous population proved to be the single greatest threat to the security of underground organizations. The collaborator's intimate knowledge of local affairs and ability to infiltrate into resistance organizations -- capabilities rarely possessed by Germans, served as invaluable assets in the German endeavor to combat underground activity.

torture

While the largely undirected actions of street patrols, check points and random patrols conducted by German police forces were not considered an extreme threat to the underground's security, the danger posed by their use of torture to extract damaging information during interrogation of captured underground agents was regarded as a tremendous threat. Different underground units had different procedures to address the hazards arising from the arrest of its members, but all operated on the assumption that, under torture,

¹⁰⁰Keeler, Interview with the author.

everyone would reveal incriminating information. Bor Komorowski describes the Polish underground's perception of the threat posed by torture as;

It was a fundamental principle of our security plan to assume that everybody arrested would, under torture, reveal what he or she knew. Naturally, they did not all do so, but we had to work on the assumption that they would.¹⁰¹

The revelation of critical information concerning identities, locations and operations of the underground, necessitated the rapid and thorough reorganization of all elements at risk. Like the threats presented by undirected actions of the hostile security services and collaborators, the prospect of underground agents capture, torture and divulgence of incriminating information required the underground to dissipate its operational focus and expend time and effort on basic survival requirements.

4. Individual Factors

In addition to the threats posed by the concerted efforts of the hostile security forces, underground agents could suffer from largely self-induced threats. The inability to keep quiet about one's participation and knowledge of underground activity proved to be a recurrent and destructive shortcoming. The requirement to ceaselessly maintain the highest levels of security consciousness, even when conducting

¹⁰¹Komorowski, p. 54.

repetitive and seemingly benign activities, was extremely difficult to sustain. Underground operatives frequently lapsed into a semi-relaxed security posture, lulled into a false sense of safety as the result of past successes and routinization. Even when underground agents maintained the highest levels of security awareness they could be plagued by simple bad luck.

Operating in an environment of intrigue, betrayal and fear, a non-judicious slip of the tongue, an overheard conversation or a boast in the wrong company could prove to be a fatal error. Despite the potential death penalty for indiscretion, "loose lips" plagued many underground organizations. M.R.D. Foot describes this sometimes fatal propensity, stating;

The main fault of resisters was that, being human, they would talk; and so drew towards themselves or their friend the attention of the large, and sometimes efficient, nazi police forces. To be inconspicuous, not to stand out in a crowd, never attract a second glance, was the safest and most precious of a resister's gifts...¹⁰²

Paul Wergeland confirms that lack of discretion was a major problem, especially in the initial stages of the Norwegian resistance, attributing this weakness not just to the actual underground participants, but to the people outside of the organization, who eagerly passed on their knowledge and rumors

¹⁰²Foot, Resistance, p. 15.

of suspected underground activity.¹⁰³ While this information was usually passed along as source of pride of the heroic actions of the indigenous forces, the results, nonetheless, could prove catastrophic. Czeslaw Stankiewicz, a member of the Polish Home Army, provides an succinct but excellent summation of the problem, saying that the biggest threat to his unit's security was "people talk too much."¹⁰⁴

The danger of an underground participant becoming complacent about security affairs, despite the potentially catastrophic consequences, was not an uncommon occurrence. The repetition of underground activity, conducted without encountering discernible opposition from the hostile security forces, lead to a routinization of operation procedures, often resulting in the underestimation or lack of proper regard for the unremitting threats constantly menacing underground operations. Birger Rassmussen relates how routinization effected his group security consciousness, telling how as the organization progressed and became successful in conducting underground operations the members self-confidence rose. He personally participated in 20 - 25 sabotage operations and with success they had a tendency to increase their willingness to take chances and minimize their regard for adherence to

¹⁰³Wergeland, Interview with the author.

¹⁰⁴Stankiewicz, Interview with the author.

strict security measures.¹⁰⁵ Per Hansson describes how three underground agents operating out of farm at Helle, Norway were afflicted with similar threats.

The three at Helle were haunted by another fear: that they might come to take it all as routine. So far everything had gone very well indeed. Time and again they had survived really critical situations, but there was danger in that fact itself, because it tended to weaken their resolve to preserve the utmost circumspection and caution. At times the two men found themselves tending to underestimate the Germans, especially the Gestapo, and they had to force themselves to remain as alert and watchful as they had been in the beginning...¹⁰⁶

In addition to the threats resulting from individual errors in judgement, the underground was often imperilled by factors beyond its control. Individual security could be jeopardized simply by returning to one's own country. As Oluf Reed Olsen explains, when a man left his occupied country to escape to England, the fact was soon known to his extended family, friends and even acquaintances. Upon return, if he was recognized by any of these, he was at the mercy of the silence and loyalty of the individual.¹⁰⁷ Even when observing meticulous security standards an underground agent could be compromised by simple bad luck. M.R.D. Foot tells a story of an underground agent forced to transport a B-2 wireless set

¹⁰⁵Rasmussen, Interview with the author.

¹⁰⁶Per Hansson, The Greatest Gamble, (New York, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1965) pp. 107-188.

¹⁰⁷Oluf Reed Olsen, Two Eggs on my Plate.

(radio) through a railway station in which German forces were conducting random checks of luggage and personnel. The radio which the agent was carrying was a distinct size and shape and thus easily recognizable to alert police forces. The underground operative, realizing the precariousness of his situation, initiated a cunning security measure he presumed would reduce his risks.

He, reached a big terminus by train; carrying only his B2 in its little case; saw a boy of about twelve struggling with a big one; and said genially (in the local language) "Let's change loads, shall we?" He took care to go through in front of the boy; there was no trouble. Round the first corner, they changed cases back. The boy said "It's as well they didn't stop you; mine's full of revolvers."¹⁰⁸

While these types of threats were generally beyond the control of the underground, and could occur despite the implementation of the most stringent security measures, it illustrates the less tangible but equally hazardous threats associated with operating in an underground environment.

C. SECURITY MANAGEMENT

The pervasive and unremitting threats to the security of the underground from so many diverse and incalculable quarters forced the underground organizations to develop unique and cunning counter-measures. Each and every action conducted by the underground imperiled the security of the organization. Absolute security and secrecy could only be assured by

¹⁰⁸Foot, Resistance, p. 106.

absolute inactivity. While a minimal level of security awareness -- determined largely by the efficiency of the hostile security forces -- is a fundamental survival prerequisite for any underground organization, complete inactivity precludes the rationale for its existence. To a greater or lesser degree, the underground organizations rapidly identified the threats to their security, made the decision to proceed with their operations despite the inherent risks and tailored their activities in response to the perilous and repressive environment in which they were forced to operate.

This section will discuss how underground organizations managed the numerous and diverse threats to its security. Specifically, it will examine how the underground adapted its operations and applied its own security measures to the crucial activities of; communications, formulation of its command structure, what to do in the event of the capture of an agent, recruitment, individual agent security, and offensive security measures.

1. Communications

The underground's use of conventional channels of communications, such as the telephone, telegraph and postal systems, as previously discussed, was greatly inhibited due to the threats posed by enemy monitoring and interception. As M.R.D. Foot explains, "... for the bulk of resisters, post,

telegraph, and telephone were alike taboo; as government organs, they were far too liable to nazi interception."¹⁰⁹ Attempts to establish alternative communication systems, involving the employment of couriers, were jeopardized by random arrests, check points and patrols which scrutinized all possessions of anyone inspected, with the express purpose of locating any material relating to underground activity. Radio use, usually restricted to communication between underground units and Allied support commands (S.O.E.), could be rapidly detected and the location of the source pinpointed. The remainder of this section will discuss the security procedures employed by the underground to address the difficulties of clandestine communication utilizing conventional channels of communications, couriers and radios.

a. The Use of Conventional Channels

Despite the constant monitoring of the conventional channels of communications, the underground, employing enough cunning and imagination, could still make invaluable use of these compromised networks. Prearranged, hidden messages could be concealed in seemingly innocent telephone conversation or correspondence. M.R.D. Foot provides an excellent example of the use of the telephone by the underground escape networks to convey crucial information;

¹⁰⁹Foot, Resistance, p. 101.

Members were warned never to call on any safe house, without first checking the security of the house by telephone; a simple inversion covered this inquiry, if the coast was clear, the safe-house-keeper said "it would not be convenient to be called on," and the phrase "By all means do come," meant the Germans are here.¹¹⁰

M.R.D. Foot provides another example of the use of apparently innocuous statements, this time in written correspondence, to evade detection, sayings that one could communicate illicit messages using;

... an apparently innocent letter, with the message concealed in it. This called for care and prearrangement, but could work; prearrange, for example, that the third sentence of a letter, the second letter of every third word is to be extracted, and quite a lot can be conveyed; if the writer has the time, the ingenuity, and the imagination needed for the task of completion.¹¹¹

The underground also discovered techniques to use the postal services for their own purposes. Postal workers were considered prime candidates for recruitment into the underground because of the assistance they could render in facilitating clandestine communications. An agent operating inside the postal system could arrange the transportation of correspondence without subjecting it to the scrutiny of official monitoring. If the agent personally conveyed the underground correspondence, he could do so with little likelihood of being searched. The postman, after all, is

¹¹⁰Foot, Resistance, p. 101.

¹¹¹Foot, Resistance, p. 100.

expected to deliver mail -- in this case, mail which purportedly has already been subjected to official examination. Even if the mail deliverer was apprehended in the act of distributing clandestine communications, he could plausibly deny any wrongdoing and claim he was simply performing his official duties. The same principle applied to telephone operators. A underground agent operating at a telephone exchange could, at times, ensure telephone calls that should be monitored by hostile forces, were somehow misrouted and escaped the requisite censorship.

b. Couriers

The predominant method of underground internal communication was the employment of couriers. The use of couriers circumvented the underground's reliance on official channels of communications and their accompanying scrutiny, but added new security concerns. Couriers were forced to navigate the hazards of countless check points, random personnel searches and other less random actions conducted by German security forces. The discovery of a courier could result not only in the revelation of the highly sensitive and potentially destructive information conveyed by the courier, but the capture and interrogation of the courier could provide additional information deleterious to the security of the underground organization. Recognizing the threats associated with the courier system of communication, the underground

devised unique and often ingenious methods to manage the inherent dangers.

The same techniques used by the underground to hide clandestine messages in seemingly innocent letters sent in the official mail, were employed in courier transport. While this was perhaps the safest method of conveying a message it was severely limited in its usefulness. Hidden message were often ambiguous, could only convey an extremely limited amount of information and were dependant upon prior coordination. Vocal messages, while not possessing any incriminating material, were also severely limited in the amount and accuracy of information capable of being conveyed. The underground compensated for these defects by utilizing encoding, invisible inks and cipher techniques. Codes and ciphers allowed the communication of much larger quantities of information in an unambiguous manner but if the courier was searched, no plausible explanation could be concocted for their possession of such incriminating material. M.R.D. addresses the pros and cons of the use of ciphers, stating;

Ciphers - more elaborate codes - were another matter still: again, something if discovered could not be explained away; but at least a ciphered message was likely, even if intercepted, to impose some delay on the enemy's understanding of what was happening.¹¹²

¹¹²Foot, Resistance, p. 100.

Despite the dangers posed to couriers, the use of codes, ciphers and invisible inks, were widely used. As Kenneth Macksey explains;

Nearly everything was sent in cipher or code; some the Germans could read, others they could not - it depended on whether they had captured the keys or infiltrated the system.¹¹³

In addition to the measures taken to prevent the revelation of the content of underground messages in case of search and examination by hostile forces, elaborate efforts were made to preclude the discovery of underground correspondence. Hidden compartments, microfilm, anal suppositories containing microfilm, concealment of messages in women's bras and panties were some of the methods used to combat the threat of the discovery of underground communiques. Tore Gjelsvik describes the techniques used in Norway as diverse, using a variety of methods from sophisticated microscopic messages that required a microscope to read and was only the size of a matchhead to less intricate techniques, including hidden compartments in cases and the utilization of women as couriers, hiding the messages in their bras and panties. He tells an amusing story of conditions at the end of the war -- bras and panties were items difficult to acquire in war-time Norway, and by the end of the war the ones that remained were quite worn, making the concealment of messages

¹¹³Macksey, p. 90-91.

much more difficult. Thus, in the interests of security, the underground imported female underclothing from Sweden, displaying admirable operational flexibility, while simultaneously serving the interests and needs of their patriotic countrywomen in the process.¹¹⁴

The procedures taken to disguise and hide messages was limited only by the underground operators' imagination. John Oram Thomas provides examples of the Danish resistance's use of microfilm sent by courier inside shaving brushes, combs, soap tablets, anal containers and even concealed in small holes drilled into keys and under dentures.¹¹⁵ M.R.D. Foot describes a method used to carry messages that seems to have been widely employed in occupied Europe;

The nearest to safe way of carrying a message was to have it written (or write it) on cigarette paper; wrap the paper around a needle; and insert it into a cigarette. A perfectibilitarian smoked a few puffs of the cigarette, stubbed it out, and carried the stub in his hand, ready to drop it in the gutter in case of alarm.¹¹⁶

The use of couriers was the single most widely used method of internal communications employed by the underground. While the couriers system represented a communication network free from the inherent scrutiny of

¹¹⁴Gjelsvik, Interview with the author.

¹¹⁵Thomas, pp. 29, 33 and 34.

¹¹⁶Foot, Resistance, p. 99.

hostile intelligence services associated with public communication channels, they were fraught with dangers of their own. Not only did the underground have to keep the content of their communiques secret -- employing codes and ciphers -- but they had to keep the very existence of their messages concealed.

The couriers, who routinely braved hostile check points, street patrols, random searches, among other hazards, transporting material that inevitably carried a death sentence if discovered, were absolutely essential to underground operations. Their actions, while lacking the dramatics of more visible underground operations, provided an invaluable service to the resistance, facilitating a fundamental necessity to any organization -- communications.

c. Underground Radio Communications

The use of the radio was a crucial component of underground communications, used primarily for maintaining contact with Allied associates outside of their country. Allied associates usually meant the S.O.E., who required some form of two-way communications to coordinate the supply of equipment, the insertion of additional agents, the timely provision of intelligence and to request specific needs and taskings. As with the other means of communications, the radio possessed its own merits and detriments. The radio could transmit messages rapidly, over great distances, but was

vulnerable to the threat of both detection and interception. The use of the radio to transmit and receive clandestine messages, as with other methods of underground communications, required the development of unique and adaptive security measures.

The underground and their Allied associates addressed the security threats to their radio communication using many of the same techniques employed in courier system. Messages, with hidden meanings, were transmitted, usually by the Allies, to provide prompt but undetectable instructions or information. Codes, ciphers, and identity checks were used to protect the contents and ensure the authentication of transmitted messages which would, by the nature of radio communications, be prone to interception by anyone -- including German security forces -- who monitored that frequency. Underground radio communications faced the additional danger of enemy detection resulting in the pinpointing of the transmission site and the capture of the radio operator.

The B.B.C.¹¹⁷ provided the main conduit for the transmission of seemingly normal radio broadcasts, but in fact, contained a concealed message decipherable only to members of the underground. Josef Garlinski provides an

¹¹⁷British Broadcasting Corporation

excellent description of the Polish undergrounds use of the B.B.C.'s Polish Radio to receive transmit messages to the reception committees of Allied airdrops.

Almost every programme of Polish Radio contained musical interludes, and attention was now devoted to these. Certain tunes were selected and earmarked "reserved," and the Polish underground was given the details in strictest secrecy. The tunes were then divided into groups and communicated to the various dropping zones. In due course a cipher message would be sent from London to Warsaw by radio to the effect that it was intended, during a specified period of time (generally a few days), to send men or supplies by plane to a particular dropping zone. The size of the party would be indicated, and as far as was possible the number of packages or containers. The reception committee would stand by, but no-one yet knew for certain whether the drop would take place. Only if the appropriate tune was played at the end of the Polish Radio at lunch time would those on the ground know that the planes were to be expected that very evening, about midnight.¹¹⁸

The insertion of concealed messages into open broadcasts allowed clandestine messages to be sent with little opportunity for their true meaning to be garnered by hostile forces, and was available on a known and constant frequency to anyone -- even if listening to the BBC was often a crime punishable by death -- possessing a radio receiver.

The use of codes and ciphers to protect the content of radio communications and security checks to authenticate the identity of the sender were employed by virtually all underground organizations. Much like the use of

¹¹⁸Jozef Garlinski, Poland SOE and the Allies, (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969) pp. 79-80.

public channels of communications, the underground generally operated under the assumption that any message transmitted over the radio would be intercepted by enemy forces. Communication security was therefore contingent not on concealing the existence of the message but making it indiscipherable. Codes, ciphers and security checks, while allowing the underground the use of the radio waves, suffered their own security restrictions. All required prior coordination and continual updating to preserve their secrecy. If a radio operator was captured before he could destroy his codebooks or divulged his security checks under torture, the enemy could infiltrate the underground's communication link, causing tremendous damage.

Security, or identity, checks were intended to prevent hostile forces from infiltrating the underground's radio communication network in the event of the compromise of codes or ciphers. Hostile agents, even in possession of the undergrounds codes, theoretically, could not pose as members of the underground without authenticating their identity through use of an individual check system. Kenneth Macksey illustrates the purpose of these identity checks, saying;

SOE, as the Germans eventually discovered, protected its radio networks with a security check based upon a system of deliberate mistakes in specific places (for example, the displacement of letters at agreed intervals in a message). Later SOE supplied a bluff security check in addition to the real one so the operator might deceive the Germans with the bluff and

still introduce the real one if he was invited to transmit bogus messages. The system was far from foolproof; it was easily compromised and sometimes, even after a captured agent had sent the warning check, he was not believed at home, particularly if the message arrived, as so many did, in jumbled order.¹¹⁹

Despite its fallibility, security checks did provide an additional security obstacle to the compromise of underground communication networks.

Even if the strictest communication security procedures were adhered to, the underground radio operator, as soon as he initiated a transmission, was in constant danger of detection and compromise. The length of time an underground radio operator was secure in transmitting was contingent upon a host of factors -- the proximity of hostile direction finding (DF) machinery, the regularity from which the site was used for radio transmissions and the proficiency of the DF operator. In the absence of mitigating circumstances, Stanislaw Komorowski states the guidelines used by the Polish Home Army;

At the beginning, a radio set could function for ten hours in one place before being located. In the final phase, improved detection cut this period to a bare thirty minutes.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹Macksey, p. 91.

¹²⁰Komorowski, p. 62.

M.R.D. Foot provides a more circumspect view of the German DF capabilities, accurately stating that underground radio communications;

called for exceptionally strict discipline on the clandestine operator's part; he had to live by the clock, and so regulate his life that he could be at his set for a few essential minutes several times each day and night.¹²¹

Whether undetectable for ten hours or ten minutes, radio transmitting required an uncompromising adherence to security standards. Each minute spent transmitting brought the operator closer to capture, resulting not only in the loss of an invaluable operator and a precious radio but in the possible compromise of codes and all knowledge possessed by the clandestine operator. The savvy operator altered his transmission locations as frequently as possible, minimized his air time and deployed lookouts to warn of the approach of the easily ascertained enemy DF elements. Despite the implementation of the best security precautions, radio communications were inherently dangerous, and like other methods of underground communications, security measures could only reduce the associated hazards not eliminate them.

2. Command Structure

While of the utmost importance to the survival of an underground organization, command structure security will only

¹²¹Foot, Resistance, p. 104.

be discussed in very general terms in this section. Chapter five provides an in-depth examination of command and control issues, emphasizing the security demands. Command structure security encompassed those measures taken by the underground to minimize the damage incurred by either the capture of a friendly agent or the infiltration of a hostile agent. These measures are oriented primarily to limiting the number of underground personnel whose identity could be divulged through information provided by infiltration or torture.

The essence of command security is to restrict the knowledge of agent's true identities, addresses and other incriminating information from anyone not absolutely required to know. This should be a non-discrimantory, universal policy, applying both up and down the chain of command, from the most trusted to the most suspect, within the smallest units and biggest alike. Irving Werstein explains the utility of this "need to know" policy, using the Danish resistance group, the Holger Dansk, as an example;

Holger Danske, under the leadership of Jens Lillelund, a Copenhagen businessman, was broken down into small groups or cells, rarely numbering more than four or five. The members knew only the few operatives in their own groups-and these by cover names. This reduced the security risks if a man were captured by the Germans; even under torture he could not give away information which endangered the entire organization.¹²²

¹²²Werstein, p. 57.

The same principles which applied to the limitation of individual knowledge of incriminating information concerning other group members also pertained to one group's knowledge of the identities and activities of other groups. If separate units maintained intimate ties with one another, including cross knowledge of the identities or locations of their underground counterparts, the penetration of either unit could result in the destruction of both. Tore Gjelsvik describes the actions of Knut Moyen, a leader within the Norwegian resistance, who implemented command security procedures to address this threat;

Moyen emphasized principles of security, denying the areas any direct connection with each other, and requiring that everybody that was to be in a fighting group should consistently keep out of any other resistance activity.¹²³

Command structure security stressed the need to compartmentalize sensitive information, especially that concerning any information which could lead to the divulgence of another underground member's identity. Its chief purpose was to minimize the damage which could be inflicted upon the underground organization in the event of infiltration or the capture of an agent. Without proper command structure security, entire underground organizations and their affiliates could be identified and either destroyed or used

¹²³Gjelsvik, Norwegian Resistance, p. 84.

hostile forces to attempt to infiltrate any remaining resistance organizations.

3. Capture and Torture

Operating in an underground environment, facing innumerable threats from a powerful and in this case, efficient, hostile security force, made the prospect of capture and corresponding torture a very real consideration. The divulgence of information under the coercion of torture could have serious consequences for the survival of the captured agent's clandestine associates and if proper command structure security measures were not heeded, could imperil the entire underground unit and their associates. The underground managed the threats presented by capture in several ways. As previously discussed, compartmentalization and limiting the knowledge of underground agents to a "need to know" basis, especially regarding identifying information, greatly reduced the damage a captured operative could unwillingly inflict upon his compatriots. Many members of the underground made the decision to die rather than be captured, even if it meant taking their own lives, rather than submit to the agonies of torture and risk the betrayal of underground secrets. All underground organizations operated with the understanding that if any of their members were capture by hostile security forces they would attempt to remain silent long enough to allow their underground colleagues time to escape.

For many underground members, especially those possessing a great deal of incriminating information, instantaneous death was a much more attractive option than capture, the ensuing torture, the risk of divulging destructive information, inevitably followed by their execution for participating in subversive activities. Thus, agents vowed never to be taken alive -- whether this entailed dying in a shootout with hostile forces or taking their own lives. The most widely relied upon device to ensure that an agent would not be captured was the "poison pill." The pills, which were either "home made" or provided by the SOE, could be concealed in rings, the lapels of jackets or any convenient, accessible locations, depending upon the user's preference. Komorowski provides a description of his experiences with the pill, saying;

As a further security measure, I asked a medical friend to provide me with a dose of efficient poison. Next day he gave me a small glass capsule. It was very fragile. The mere act of swallowing fractured the glass, which then pierced the skin of the throat, thus bringing cyanide and blood into direct contact. The immediate effect was apparently rather like that of splitting the skull with a battle-axe.¹²⁴

Because of massive German retaliations for the death of German security officers the utility of the pill as a defensive measure was, at times, the only viable options. Komorowski illustrates this point, stating;

¹²⁴Komorowski, p. 25.

"The rule that poison and not revolvers should be used in self-defense, came as a consequence. In such circumstances, a man is not protecting his own life so much as those of the others whom he might betray."¹²⁵

Despite the security efforts taken to minimize the amount of incriminating information possessed by members of the underground and to avoid capture, underground agents, possessing potentially damaging knowledge were captured regularly. Recognizing this inevitability, the underground planned accordingly. As suggested earlier, the underground operated under the assumption that anyone subjected to the brutalities of torture would eventually reveal all they knew. Anyone known to the captured agent went into hiding, changed identities, addresses, places of work, etc... Agents were instructed, that in the case of capture and torture, to attempt to refrain from imparting critical information for either a specified amount of time or simply as long as was possible.

John Oram Thomas illustrates the procedures agreed upon within a Danish resistance group, saying;

The group had an agreement that if a man were taken by the Gestapo, he would try to hold out for at least twenty-four hours or, better still, thirty-six hours. If he could not stand the torture any longer, he was free to talk - but the other had up to thirty-six hours in which to get clear.¹²⁶

¹²⁵Komorowski, p. 39.

¹²⁶Thomas, p. 98.

Dick Rubenstein explains the value of placing a specified length of time, during which an underground agent tried to maintain his silence;

The standard procedure for captured agents was to hold out for 24 hours, allowing the other members of his circuit to disappear. The 24 hour period gave the captured agent a goal to strive for, after which he was not expected to hold out any longer.¹²⁷

Most underground organizations placed no specified time duration during which the agent was requested to remain silent. If arrested, the underground member was asked to try and hold out as long as possible, recognizing that the longer he held out, the greater the likelihood of his associates escaping.

4. Recruitment

Security procedures implemented by the underground to ensure only the recruitment of reliable candidates, while of the utmost importance to any underground organization, will be discussed only briefly in this section, but is examined in detail in the chapter on underground recruitment. Recruitment security measures focused primarily upon two considerations; preventing the infiltration of collaborators and ensuring the recruit possessed the attributes necessary to be an effective and prudent underground operative. This was largely accomplished by the reliance on the personal recommendations

¹²⁷Rubenstein, interview with the author.

of sources known to be trustworthy and supportive of the underground's cause, who were familiar with the potential recruit's background and qualities. Recruitment, because of its enormous security implications, required extraordinary caution and stringent security management if the underground organization was to remain secure.

5. Individual Agent Security

Individual agent security encompassed those measures taken by underground participants to ensure their own safety. The majority of these actions were contingent upon the individual operator's understanding and regard for the diverse and constant threats that were an inherent component of his underground world. These precautions generally required little encouragement, being motivated by the basic instinct of self preservation. Individual agent security measures included such actions as; the memorization, in complete detail of all elements of their false papers, revealing their true identity and address to no one within the underground, remaining as inconspicuous as possible, carefully selecting one's companions and remaining constantly alert to the dangers ceaselessly surrounding the underground.

Underground agent were frequently provided with a false identity, complete with underground addresses, fictional familial members, birthdates and professions. It was crucial that the agent possessing these "doctored" documents be able

to unhesitatingly recite all the facts contained within his papers and be capable of answering any related questions. The inability to accomplish this basic task could prove disastrous if questioned at a check point or worse still, if the agent was arrested. Jan Karski explains the contents and importance of false identification papers, saying;

A "legend" is the collection of data which comprises an underground member's identity. It was furnished to all new members and to all those who find it necessary to change their identity. It consists of a fictional biography and a number of equally fictitious dates and places necessary to constitute a new personality. It must be carefully memorized until it becomes part of one's normal consciousness.¹²⁸

The more security-minded members of the underground recognized the critical difference rapid and confident answers could make between discovery and escape. M.R.D. Foot illustrates this point, saying;

Conscientious and well trained resisters used to practice, constantly running over the answers in their minds, what they would say if asked at a snap control the usual routine questions: who are you? where are you (a nasty one, sometime, for a parachutist just off the dropping zone)? where have you come from? how? where are you going? why? where do you live?¹²⁹

An obvious individual security measure was simply to remain as anonymous as possible -- not revealing your true name, address, place of work, or any other clues that could

¹²⁸Karski, p. 196.

¹²⁹Foot, Resistance, p. 66.

lead to the discovery of your identification to anyone not absolutely required to know. As Foot reveals;

A perfectionist kept even his private address and his usual cover identity to himself, so that if a colleague was caught no harm to himself and little to the circuit was likely to follow; not many resisters were so careful.¹³⁰

Underground participants frequently devised their own personal security precautions. Some, like Jan Karski, sought safety in constantly changing their place of residence.

I registered myself at two new addresses and dropped around once in awhile, according to a scheme I worked out with the landladies. The advantages of living in triplicate outweighed the annoyances. In case one of my identities was compromised, there were two fresh ones into which I could jump at a moment's notice. The paltry rations of bread, jam and vegetables were tripled for me, too.¹³¹

Birger Rassmussen trusted in the wisdom of the security maxims, warning;

"Don't contact your family"
"Don't be conspicuous"
"Don't trust women"¹³²

Other underground agents devised their own individual security practices, tailored to meet their particular security requirements and threats.

¹³⁰Foot, Resistance, p. 67.

¹³¹Karski, p. 250.

¹³²Rassmussen, interview with the author.

6. Offensive Security Measures

The underground's offensive security measures consisted primarily of two preemptive activities; infiltration of the German controlled infrastructures and the elimination of collaborators. The underground's infiltration of the indigenous, German sponsored security forces and other official organizations could provide the resistance with invaluable intelligence concerning hostile, counter-underground activity. The elimination of collaborators accomplished the dual purpose of eradicating an extremely menacing threat to the underground's security and discouraging other would-be collaborators.

The infiltration of the German sponsored infrastructure could be of inestimable service to the underground. Underground agents, posing as loyal servants of the puppet regimes, frequently had access not only to German military intelligence but to the local efforts to combat the indigenous resistance forces. The security of the resistance organization could be greatly enhanced by an underground agent who could provide advance warning of Gestapo actions, alert the underground to whom was on the Germans "wanted list" and identify clandestine German collaborators. Irving Werstein illustrates the valuable role underground agents within official organizations could play, saying;

Many resistance men escaped Gestapo arrest because policemen forewarned them of impending raids. Not only the police, but the fire brigades, harbor patrols, telephonists, radio technicians and other civil servants supplied the Resistance with help and assistance of all sorts.¹³³

The underground's opportunity to infiltrate German agencies and the degree to which they exploited this advantage was largely contingent upon the insight and cunning of the various underground operatives. Those that recognized the potential benefits offered by the penetration of the occupying force's organizations often achieved remarkable results. Jozef Garlinski illustrates the scope and utility the underground's infiltration of the German sponsored signal organization had on underground operations in Poland;

Another opportunity for infiltration was offered by the signals organization. The Germans set up posts to defend the army's telephone system and provided those who worked in them with quarters, arms, uniforms, food and pay. A Polish engineer named Wroblewski, who worked at one of these, succeeded in bringing into the service 120 soldiers of the underground army and three officer-parachutists... The patrol guarding the telephone lines, which consisted almost entirely of Home Army soldiers, were able to station themselves openly at key points; they moved about the country on German transport, listened in to conversations and could send warning messages at any time - a perfect background for sabotage... Small patrols would slip away for short periods, blow up a bridge or railway line and return to their quarters under the very noses of the infuriated Germans. Sabotage of the telephone lines was even easier, since they were almost entirely 'guarded' by members of the underground.¹³⁴

¹³³Werstein, p. 60.

¹³⁴Garlinski, Poland, SOE and the Allies, p. 107.

The second primary offensive security measures were those directed against collaborators. Collaborators, whether performing their seditious acts openly or infiltrating clandestinely into underground organizations, were considered, by most, to be the single greatest threat to the security and survival of the underground. Recognizing the tremendous hazards posed by collaborators, the underground, in addition to initiating measures designed to limit the damage which could be caused by collaborators, took a more direct approach to address this security menace -- the execution of traitors. The elimination of collaborators served two primary purposes; it robbed the German security forces of invaluable counter-insurgency weapons and discouraged other from providing assistance to the occupation forces -- both operating to sever the Germans ties with the indigenous population.

Every country in occupied Europe developed their own procedures and clandestine units to manage the threat posed by collaborators. The Norwegian resistance formed a "Security Group," whose task it was to serve as an underground security unit and to protect the underground against security threats. Consisting largely of patriotic policemen and former policemen expelled from the police force because of their nationalistic sentiments, they maintained contacts in the jails, prisons and concentration camps using these contacts to identify suspected

collaborators.¹³⁵ The Danish underground organization, Holger Dansk, focused much of its efforts on identifying and liquidating Danish collaborators. Jorgen Keeler estimates that by the end of the war, more than half of Holger Dansk's operations were directed against collaborators, resulting in the elimination of 200 suspects.¹³⁶ The Poles developed an entire branch of the underground devoted almost exclusively to addressing the collaborationist threat. Jan Karski provides a detailed description of the composition and function of the Polish Home Army's Fourth Branch, explaining;

The Fourth branch was called the Directorate of Civilian Resistance and its main function was to bolster up the policy of 'the stiff attitude towards the occupant.' Its members were outstanding scientists, jurists, priests and social workers. They were to keep Poland clear of traitors and collaborationist, to try those accused of collaboration, sentence them, and see that the sentence was carried out. It was authorized to pass sentences of either 'infamy' or death. A Pole was sentenced to 'infamy' who did not follow the prescribed 'stiff attitude towards the occupant'... Sentence of death were passed on anyone who attempted active aid to the enemy and could be proved to have harmed the activities or personnel of the Underground.¹³⁷

Underground security management is the most basic determinant in both the survival and success of any clandestine movement. Without adequate security management,

¹³⁵Gjelsvik, interview with the author.

¹³⁶Keeler, interview with the author.

¹³⁷Karski, p. 235.

the underground forfeits its fundamental means of protection and its most essential advantage -- secrecy. Every underground endeavor, from communications to the formulation of its command structure required, above all else, that the dictates of security be adhered to absolutely. The penalties for deficient security management could be devastating, ranging from the agonizing torture and execution of a careless underground operative to the infiltration, compromise and destruction of entire underground units. Simply stated, security management is what allows the underground to exist, to continue operating -- providing the only practical guardian against the overwhelmingly superior forces inevitably opposing underground organizations.

D. SECURITY DILEMMAS

Underground organizations were faced with several security dilemmas and were forced to achieve a balance between two conflicting operational considerations. The first and most basic security dilemma all underground organizations faced was what the balance should be between action and exposure versus inaction and absolute security. Other dilemmas faced by the underground included that of knowledge versus vulnerability and reality versus security. The ability of the different underground groups to find the correct compromise between the contending factors was a crucial determinant in their success and failure.

1. Action and Exposure versus Inaction and Security

Having spent the majority of this chapter describing the unrelenting threats to the survival of the underground and stressing the absolute necessity for the employment of stringent security management, it is also true that exaggerated security precautions may result in the paralysis of the organization. If a clandestine organization was concerned exclusively about maintaining absolute security within their movement they would not dare to risk the dangers of infiltration by recruiting new members, they would not communicate for fear of hostile interception of their secret communiques and they would not embark upon an operation because action entails exposure and the corresponding degradation of security. Adherence to absolute security renders the organization inoperable and precluding the very grounds for its existence. Conversely, the risks posed as the result of a lack of regard for security usually are, as discussed in the preceding pages, equally detrimental to the underground's cause. The underground must constantly seek to find and maintain the delicate balance between security and action, meticulously weighing the threats against the value of each operation. The underground movements that mastered these deadly balancing acts were able to operate effectively with inevitable but minimal losses. In the words of one SOE agent who recognized the inherent underground dilemma of action and

exposure versus inactivity and absolute security, "caution axiomatic, but over-caution results in nothing done."¹³

2. Knowledge versus Vulnerability

Another security dilemma which directly impacted upon the ability of the underground to operate successfully was the conflict between knowledge and vulnerability. The agents with the most knowledge and experience are the one best capable of serving the underground. They knew whom to trust, whom not to trust, understood the proper operational procedures and intra-workings of their organizations and knew who and how to contact vital elements within the underground movement. Yet, precisely because of these valuable attributes, they simultaneously posed the biggest threat to the organization if captured. Each day an agent spent in the underground, every operation he was a part of increased his utility to the clandestine movement. Concurrently, it brought him one day and one operation closer to discovery and capture and the associated threat of the divulgence of all the incriminating information the seasoned operative had garnered over his career in the underground. John Oram Thomas illustrates the hazards associated with the continued operation of veteran, knowledgeable agents, using the case of an experienced female Danish agent to make his point;

¹³from Foot, Resistance, p. 63.

If she were arrested again and subjected to torture in the Shellhus cellars she might disclose too much and endanger key circles in the resistance. She knew the identities and function of too many leaders and the contents of too many vital telegrams.¹³⁹

The underground was forced to balance the utility and benefits seasoned, knowledgeable operative brought to the organization against the significant security threats they represented if captured. As with so many other contentious issues facing the underground, the solution lay in achieving just the right balance between two equally consequential but contending factors.

4. Economic Reality versus Security

Very often fiscal restraints precluded the implementation of security procedures known to be necessary for the safety of individuals and the underground organization. Operating underground, observing even a fraction of the innumerable security precautions, was an enormous expense. Ideally, members of the underground would never meet at the residence of one of its operatives, but would, instead, arrange rendezvouses in locations that would not reveal their addresses or risk the capture of multiple underground members in a residence conceivably under hostile observation. This often required the procurement of a neutral "safehouse." Maintaining a secure hidden identity frequently

¹³⁹Thomas, p. 79.

involved supporting more than one residence, or at least, regularly changing addresses. Agents whose clandestine identity was suspected of being compromised were forced to retreat into hiding, forfeiting their jobs and the associated wages. All these security considerations, while recognized as being vital to the safety of the underground, involved significant personal expense. For the poorer members of the underground, especially those with families to support, going into hiding could be a economic disaster. Jorgen Keeler describes how the economic realities of underground life could interfere with the implementation of even the most basic security precautions, saying;

When poor people went underground some of their strongholds were cheap restaurants - the traitors knew this and went there to identify them - but they [the underground agents] had no where else to go to.¹⁴⁰

The underground was confronted with the inescapable compromise of its security standards owing to simple economic realities. Merely recognizing what security measures should be taken was of no practical utility without the financial means to implement them.

E. CONCLUSIONS

The underground resistance movements of occupied Europe, confronted with an unrelenting and diverse array of threats, were required to develop adaptive and imaginative security

¹⁴⁰Keeler, interview with the author.

management procedures. The underground was protected not by its martial superiority but by the precarious shield provided by its hidden identity. All security measures, therefore, had the same ultimate intent -- to safeguard the clandestine character of the organization. The successful underground organization recognized the interminable threats to its security and incorporated stringent security policies into every endeavor.

Security threats came from many different sources, some readily apparent and others more insidious. The underground was faced with the daunting task of operating in an environment dominated by hostile forces. Its enemies, enjoying virtually complete military control, could employ expansive counter-insurgency technique. The establishment of widespread check points, street patrols and random arrests impacted significantly upon the ability of the underground to conduct operations. The threats posed to the security of the underground by collaborators, represented the single greatest hazard. Collaborators, because of their intimate knowledge of local activities, accents, dress, and customs provided an invaluable service to the German security forces. Only a member of the indigenous population offered the possibility of infiltrating into the ranks of the underground. Security threats could also emanate from within the underground. A lack of discretion, poor individual judgement and the

routinization of clandestine activity could imperil underground security as surely as the Gestapo or a collaborator.

The underground, because of the perpetual threats to its survival, was forced to develop and apply security procedures governing every activity. Communications, the structure of the organization, the threat of capture, recruitment, and individual agent security all were conducted with a regard to dangers inherent in the world of the underground. In an effort to improve its awareness of specific threats and enhance its internal security, the underground initiated offensive security measures, infiltrating the vital enemy agencies. The organizations that rapidly identified the scope of the threat, were able to exploit the enemy's weaknesses while maintaining a balance between caution and action were not only the most successful but the most likely to survive.

IV. LEADERSHIP & COMMAND AND CONTROL

A. INTRODUCTION

The expansive and brutal environmental constraints imposed upon the resistance movements of occupied Europe by the German security forces required the underground to address the topics of both leadership and command and control issues in unique and adaptive manners. This chapter will examine how the underground managed the difficulties of operating underground. The first section will explore the environment in which the underground leadership functioned, the importance of leadership, the role of the leader, who were the underground leaders, their basis for legitimacy, and their provisions for succession. The second section will examine underground command and control concerns, specifically, the security dictated cellularization of underground forces, initiative versus centralized control, the command implications of governments-in-exile and underground communications.

B. UNDERGROUND LEADERSHIP

Underground leadership methods varied considerably from organization to organizations and, on occasion, within the same organization over time. It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a universally applicable description of underground leadership structures and adaptations. It is

intended to illustrate the impact the inherent difficulties of operating underground had on leadership management, and to discuss how the underground - as a whole - adjusted to their environment.

1. Background

Prior to examining how the underground managed the difficulties associated with leadership in a clandestine and hostile environment, it is instructive to explore some of the background conditions specifically relating to leadership. Of particular interest are the special conditions imposed upon the traditional leadership of Europe by the occupying forces and the resulting leadership structure of the underground forces.

a. Special Conditions

In Europe, the occupying powers recognized the importance and potential impact the indigenous, pre-war leadership could have in organizing, managing and leading the resistance to their occupation. Pre-war military, political, educational, social and industrial leaders possessed a proven capability to lead, commanded some degree of respect, were better educated and were generally regarded as symbols of legitimate authority. Because of these attributes, they were considered to be the primary threat to the consolidation of authority by the occupying powers. They were the ones best qualified to transform the widespread and general discontent

of foreign occupation into organized, effective resistance. Based largely upon the potential menace these elites represented to the occupiers, they became the target of extreme scrutiny and, at times, brutal subjugation and wholesale slaughter.

No country's leadership suffered greater devastation merely because of the resistance threat they represented than did the Poles. Stefan Korbonski describes the actions taken by the occupying armies - both Soviet and German - in an attempt to forestall the rise of Polish resistance to their occupation by decapitating the leadership of the entire country.

Already in the very first days of the occupation, leaders in each community - particularly, political leaders, major landowners, local officials, priests, teachers, lawyers and doctors - were seized and shot, executed publicly and ostentatiously in the market squares of their respective towns and villages [by the Germans].¹⁴¹

The same policy was implemented in Poland's eastern territories upon the Soviet occupation, during which;

hundreds of priests and monks, judges, prosecutors, police officers, political and social leaders, deputies and senators, government functionaries and officials of local governments were murdered outright. The slaughter reached its peak after the outbreak of the Nazi-Soviet war on June 21, 1941, when all political prisoners were murdered. Total Polish

¹⁴¹Korbonski, p. 3

losses due to this policy of murder are estimated at close to 100,000¹⁴² people.¹⁴³

In Norway, similar fears of the potential dangers the indigenous leadership represented to foreign occupation prompted the Germans to identify the leaders of Norway's society and develop contingency plans for their removal. As Magne Skodven describes:

The Gestapo compiled a list of leading Norwegians to be arrested in case of an invasion or major disruptions. These were classified into three different groups [A. the sun, B. the moon and C. the stars]: A. People whom they assumed would assume command B. The second in commands C. Those that were suspicious characters.¹⁴⁴

The identification and, in Poland's case, elimination, of the leading elements of the indigenous society by the occupying powers' security forces had a profound effect on the ability of the pre-war leadership to assume positions in the underground. Those suspected of any patriotic sentiments not eliminated, were often identified by the German security forces, and thus easily recognizable and generally kept under close scrutiny - all qualities which impinge upon effective participation in clandestine, underground organizations. Despite the German preemptive actions, the

¹⁴²Included in this number are the 15,000 army officers, buried in the Katyn Forest, that formed the backbone of the educated and elite classes in Poland.

¹⁴³Korbonski, Stefan, pp. 5-6.

¹⁴⁴Skodven, Interview with the author.

pre-war leadership still assumed many vital underground leadership roles. But German actions did serve as a significant deterrent and frequently forced the resistance to turn to other, less visible, persons to assume the leadership of the underground organizations.

b. Centralized v.s. Non-Centralized

The underground may assume greater or fewer characteristics of centralization but tend to assume less hierarchial structures which place fewer operational demands upon the organization. Centralized organizations are characterized by a strong reliance on a strictly established chain-of-command, with few allowances for discussion and common consent. Orders are received from superiors in the chain-of-command and executed without question. Leadership in a hierarchial system is restricted to implementing orders in the manner directed from above. Less hierarchial organizations, whether through design or externally imposed constraints, allow much greater individual latitude and regional autonomy. Leadership in the non-hierarchial system is a democratic process, requiring the consent and of its participants before any action may be assumed.

The external constraints imposed by the German security forces greatly inhibited the potential formulation of a hierarchial system by the underground organizations in occupied Europe. The primary requirement of a centralized

structure is the unimpeded flow of communication through which the organization may be constantly monitored and controlled. This simply was not available to resistance groups operating clandestinely against the efficient and vigilant German security forces. The unavoidable result was the establishment of underground units with significant regional independence, bestowing a liberal degree of operational freedom upon the local leadership.

The underground movements of occupied Europe implemented varying degrees of centralization into their command structure which impacted significantly upon the responsibilities and roles of clandestine leadership. But, the traditional military dictates of centralization were forced to be abandoned in the repressive and enemy controlled underground environment. The distribution of authority and decision-making to the peripheral units imposed increased responsibilities and duties upon the local leaders.

2. Role of the Leader

The inherently precarious world of the underground, with its potentially horrific repercussions, its deficient communication systems, its indistinct command and control structure and constant necessity to combat the interminable threats to its security, required a leader who could manage these adversities and still conduct offensive operations. This section will discuss the importance of leadership under

these conditions and the role that the leader played in the conduct of underground operations.

a. Importance of the Leader

The underground leadership operated in circumstances significantly different from above-ground organizations. The leaders, especially at the extremities of the underground organization, lacked the prerequisite communications with his chain-of-command, if he even possessed a chain-of-command, to receive detailed orders, clarify instructions and provide operational guidance. The leadership of each element, however small, was forced to make policy, tactical and operational decisions, shouldering responsibilities normally reserved for senior leadership elements of an organization. David Howarth describes the importance and scope of underground leadership;

The leader always had a degree of responsibility which few people are called upon to carry in war. The orders he was given were in very general terms, and in carrying them out he had nobody whatever to advise him. His success and his own life and the lives of his party, were in his own hands alone.¹⁴⁵

The underground leadership, because of the extraordinary responsibilities and the expansive scope of the duties associated with illicit organizations, was the crucial component in determining the success of his unit. The individual unit leader was normally supplied only with broad

¹⁴⁵Howarth, We Die Alone, p. 10.

strategic objectives by his nominal superior in the chain-of-command and then left to plan and conduct specific actions according to his own judgement. He had to make the determination whether regional operations, conducted in support of the overall strategic plan, merited the local repercussions sure to follow. His decisions had life and death implications not only for the members of his unit but for members of his community that would inevitably suffer the wrath of German retaliations.

b. Duties of the Underground Leader

The duties of an underground leader were significantly different, procedurally, from the functions of leadership in conventional circumstances. The underground leader, while ultimately responsible for specific mission selection, planning, intelligence gathering and conduct of the action, relied on a distinct and unique leadership style to accomplish his tasks. The leader rarely dictated commands to his subordinates, but instead acted as the primary organizer and chief mediator. He provided the inspiration, rationale and motivation to his followers which facilitated and encouraged underground activity. He was the leading democrat in a system whose basis of authority was leadership by popular approval.

Tore Gjelsvik, a participant in the Norwegian underground for the duration of the war, who eventually rose

to a position of senior leadership, describes the underground leadership as based upon common consent rather than a strict hierarchial system. "Everything was requested, discussed and everyone volunteered for every individual mission."¹⁴⁶ Jorgen Keeler, a member of the Danish underground and resistance leader, reiterates Gjelsvik's statement, saying, "The leader could not issue orders - the idea of an order did not exist! He organized operations and asked for volunteers."¹⁴⁷ Dick Rubenstein, a member of the Jedburgh Teams¹⁴⁸ in occupied France which operated closely with the local undergrounds, says; "Leadership was rarely dictated in strict, non-conversational terms but was generally a democratic process - discussion was allowed."¹⁴⁹ The obligations and duties associated with command in the underground required its

¹⁴⁶Gjelsvik, Interview with the author.

¹⁴⁷Keeler, Interview with the author.

¹⁴⁸The Jedburgh Teams as described in Covert War, Vol. 3. "OSS Jedburgh Teams I," ed. John Mendelsohn, (New York, Garland Publishing, Inc. 1989, p. ii) "are specially trained three man teams. They will be dropped by parachute at prearranged spots behind enemy lines in France, Belgium and Holland on and after D-Day. Each Jedburgh Team consists of two officers and a radio operator with his W/T set. One officer is a native of the country to which the teams is going, and the other British or American. The members of the team are soldiers and will normally arrive in the field in uniform. There they will make contact with the resistance groups, bringing them instructions from Supreme Allied Commander, W/T communication, supplies and, if necessary, leadership."

¹⁴⁹Rubenstein, Interview with the author.

leaders not only to face responsibilities and consequences far exceeding leadership positions in standard organizations but to do so with an ambiguous, poorly defined sense of authority. His leadership was contingent upon his ability to inspire his cohorts to action, organize underground operations within the severe confines imposed by the German security forces and to mediate differences between his subordinates. Under such circumstances, it is easy to understand both the importance of selecting a suitable leader and the challenges and demands inevitably associated with underground leadership.

3. Who Were the Underground Leaders?

To adequately address the question of who were the underground leaders, a distinction must be made between the local unit commanders and the senior, national leadership. Leadership at the more senior levels of the underground chain-of-command were much more likely to consist of the pre-war elites than was the case at the local levels. The local, unit commanders were much more diverse, consisting of elements from all walks of life, seemingly unbiased by profession or class.

a. Senior Leadership

As previously discussed, the pre-war leadership was frequently constrained by the preemptive efforts of the German security forces from assuming leading positions within the underground. Despite German efforts, many senior leadership positions were filled by leading members of the

indigenous society. Poland provides an example of the perseverance of the pre-war leadership. Despite the elimination of a large number of the Polish societal elite, enough remained to provide the leadership for the Polish underground. The first Chief Delegate of the underground, Ratajski, was the former mayor of Pozan, his successor, Jan Jankowski, previously occupied a senior position in the National Workers' Party.¹⁵⁰ The nucleus of the Polish Home Army's General Staff was composed of 15 Polish Army officers.¹⁵¹ The senior leadership of the underground in Norway also consisted largely of pre-war leaders, as Olav Riste and Berit Nokleby confirm;

The central civilian Resistance leadership as it existed in Oslo by the end of 1942 consisted mainly of two groups, which were cooperating; in fact, several of the leaders were members of both groups. The first one, called the Circle (Kretsen) counted, among others, former members of the Supreme Court and the Administrative Council, as well as prominent labor leaders. In close cooperation with the other group, it gradually was to take over leadership of the civilian Resistance.¹⁵²

The pre-war leadership, just as was feared by the occupying German forces, was the exclusive element possessing the reputation, proven competence and credibility to assume the senior leadership positions of the underground. This was

¹⁵⁰Korbonski, p. 39.

¹⁵¹Korbonski, p. 16.

¹⁵²Olav and Nokleby, p. 38.

particularly evident in the formative stages of the underground, before new leaders - those establishing their credentials as the result of underground performance - could arise. The risks posed by the assumption of leadership roles by the pre-war elite was simply an unavoidable hazard.

b. Local Leadership

Local leadership incorporated a much more diverse cross-section of the indigenous population. Leadership at the local level did not require the credentials or reputation normally necessary for the central leadership positions. Perhaps, because of the personal observations and familiarity between local followers and leaders, suitability was much more contingent upon proven competence than pre-war qualifications. As Jorgen Keeler describes, before the war underground leaders were not necessarily those in positions of authority in the underground but gained their positions based upon respect, confidence, performance, strength of personality, knowledge of operating procedures and experience.¹⁵³ John Oram Thomas relates the overriding importance of the confidence a leader could inspire and the insignificance of his social credentials, demonstrating that the normal foundations of leadership such as seniority, education and social class gave way to less tangible factors.

¹⁵³Keeler, Interview with the author.

It is difficult to make anybody understand the confidence John inspired in us. When he took command of the group we were all between the age of eighteen and twenty-one years of age. We had never seen him before. We knew his cover-name but we knew nothing else about him. Yet we obeyed his orders blindly - even when it meant killing someone. We believed in him without knowing him. That was an important thing in the Danish Resistance, that incredible confidence between people.¹⁵⁴

As discussed in the recruitment chapter, entire pre-war organizations, such as trade unions, sports clubs, scouting organizations and political parties, were frequently alienated by the repressive and manipulative actions of the occupation government, which impinged upon their traditional freedoms. In these cases, the pre-establish leadership structures often remained unchanged, with the groups' leadership transitioning from legal to illegal, underground leadership roles. Rather than selecting a new and unproven leader, these alienated groups could frequently rely on established leaders, avoiding a disruptive and laborious restructuring of the organizations hierarchy.

4. Basis for Legitimacy

Max Weber presents three bases for the legitimation of authority:

1. Rational grounds - resting on a belief in the 'legality' of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority).

¹⁵⁴Thomas, The Giant Killers, p.198.

2. Traditional grounds - resting on a established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority); or finally,

3. Charismatic grounds - resting on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority).¹⁵⁵

The underground movements' legitimacy was derived largely from Weber's first and third bases for the legitimation of authority. Again, a distinction exists between local leadership and the senior, national leadership. The legitimacy of the senior leadership was generally based, particularly in the incipient stages of the underground's formation, upon Weber's "rational grounds," while the local leadership was much more reliant on "charismatic grounds."

Weber's rational grounds of legitimacy rests "on a belief in the 'legality' of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands." Neither the direct German administration of the occupied countries nor their forcibly installed puppet governments were viewed as the legal and therefore, legitimate, authorities by the vast majority of the indigenous populations. The ousted pre-war leadership, including not only the governments-in-exile and exiled royalty, but other

¹⁵⁵Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press; 1947.), p. 328.

members of the indigenous elite retained the legitimacy earned according to the nationally representative, legal standards of the pre-war, occupied country. Many of these leaders, as previously discussed, became the senior leadership of the underground.

Despite the indigenous leader's inclusion in the underground, which was, by definition of those in positions of authority, an illegal organization, they retained and usually enhanced the legitimacy which they had earned before the invasion of their country.

Leadership at the local level was much more contingent upon Weber's "charismatic grounds," resting to a great degree on the "exemplary character of an individual person" rather than on pre-war leadership qualities. Leadership at the local level was a process of "natural selection," those demonstrating the most proficiency and aptitude assumed the leading positions. Tore Gjelsvik conveys the motivation of members of the underground to follow their leader as based upon a personal attraction. "One had to have confidence in their leader before they would follow him."¹⁵⁶ Dick Rubenstein reiterates the importance of the "exemplary character" of the local leader, saying members of the underground followed their

¹⁵⁶Gjelsvik, Interview with the author.

leaders "because of his force of personality, ability to win loyalty and gain confidence."¹⁵⁷

Neither the local nor senior leadership were absolutely confined to the categorization listed above. Even at the local level, the pre-war leading elements of society appeared somewhat more likely to assume positions of leadership. Perhaps their pre-war qualifications added to their charisma and increased their follower's faith in their leadership ability. At the senior levels of leadership, in addition to possessing pre-war leadership credentials, those exhibiting "exemplary character" were far more likely to assume leadership positions. Among different organizations, the degree of importance attached to "charismatic" and "rational" legitimacy varied between the senior and local leadership.

5. Provisions for Succession

Provisions for the succession of leadership in the event of the leaders death or capture, could mean the difference between the survival and collapse of an underground organization. Kenneth Macksey describes the results of the lack of established provisions for succession in local Soviet resistance units, stating, "When bosses were killed whole

¹⁵⁷Rubenstein, Interview with author.

bands disintegrated..."¹⁵⁸ The question of leadership succession seems to have been addressed, to some degree, by most underground units. The more hierarchial the organization the more likely it was to have made preparations for leadership succession. In organizations which leadership was based less on hierarchial strictures and more on the "charisma" of the individual leader, preparations to manage leadership succession were generally less refined.

In underground movements such as the Polish Home Army, which was a more hierarchial organization, provisions for succession were confronted in an organized and disciplined manner. As Czeslaw Stankiewicz, a Polish underground leader, states;

There was a definite chain-of-command within the organization, with a second in command identified. If a Platoon, group or section leader was eliminated a new commander would be appointed from the next higher link in the chain-of-command. Leadership was based much more on a chain-of-command appointment than personal charisma.¹⁵⁹

While the provisions for leadership succession inherent in the more centralized organizations assured a less destabilizing transfer of command, it was counter-balanced by the negative qualities associated with such systems. The more centralized organizations often lacked the operational freedom available

¹⁵⁸Macksey, p. 77.

¹⁵⁹Stankiewicz, Interview with the author.

to less structured groups and as a result failed to fully employ local expertise and personal initiative. A crisis could result in operational paralysis if the organization was compelled to await direction, via the capricious and burdensome underground communication network, from their superiors in the chain-of-command.

The less centralized organizations generally lacked the explicit provisions for successions inherent in the more hierarchial organizations. The succession of leadership was based upon more abstract principles. Dick Rubenstein describes some of the methods employed by underground organizations to address the topic of succession; "The leader usually let it be known who his choice of successor was in the case of his death. Discussion was held beforehand. The choice was frequently apparent based upon prior performance."¹⁶⁰ Despite the apparent lack of pre-ordained succession procedures in the less centralized organizations, there appears to have been few incidents where groups collapsed as the result of the removal of their leader. The leader's stated choice for succession, the assumption by an individual of a second-in-command role, prior discussion and general aptitude for leadership appears to have served much of

¹⁶⁰Rubenstein, Interview with the author.

the underground well in assuring effective leadership succession.

C. UNDERGROUND COMMAND AND CONTROL

The design of clandestine organizations' command and control structures is largely responsible for delineating the foundations of the underground's internal security potential and operational efficiency. While underground security is not exclusively contingent upon its command and control composition, the structure of the organization is the single most significant and encompassing determinant of the movements general security. Command and control policies effect not just the security of its individual agents but the safety of entire units and the movement as a whole. In addition to its profound security implications, the method in which the movement is structured is decisive in defining the ability of the organization to operate in the inherently hostile and perilous underground world. The capacity of clandestine units to address the difficulties associated with underground communications, the unremitting need for secrecy and nebulous chain-of-commands -- all innate characteristic of the underground environment -- are the primary determinant of operational efficiency.

Underground command and control furnishes the operational blueprint for the structure of the organization. It provides for the cellularization of its separate components, balances

the needs of local initiative versus centralized control, constructs a chain-of-command and strives to achieve some degree of consolidation of effort of the different underground elements. This section will examine how the underground addressed these considerations, constantly adapting and reconfiguring the development of its command and control structures to confront the changing threats of the underground world. It will also examine the fundamental prerequisite, upon which the command and control of all organizations -- above-ground and underground alike -- are dependant -- communications.

1. Cellularization

Faced with the innumerable threats from both indigenous collaborators and the overwhelmingly powerful occupation forces, the underground was compelled to develop a unique and adaptive command and control structure. One command and control security measure employed by the underground to provide for the security of the organization was to compartmentalize its various components, preventing the compromise of one element to endanger others. The principle of cellularization applied not only within individual circuits¹⁶¹ and from one circuit to the next but also both up

¹⁶¹Circuit refers to the smallest operational units within the underground organization, usually consisting of 3 - 7 members. Referred to also as: "cell," "unit," "section," and "squad," depending upon the source.

and down the chain-of-command. Yet, to maintain any semblance of command coherence and control, the underground leadership had to preserve some form of connection or link within and between its different elements. The cellularized organization was designed to link its operatives and elements at a single point, minimizing the hazards posed by the arrest, torture and coerced divulgence of incriminating information by any single agent. What an agent doesn't know he can't tell.

While compartmentalization greatly reduced the potentiality of the exposure of large numbers of underground members, it often served as an operational impediment. The secrecy surrounding the identity of underground participants hindered the timely dissemination of information and warnings, resulting in missed opportunities and potentially avoidable arrests. If the single link between different levels of the chain-of-command was severed, attempting to re-establishing the link could be both dangerous and troublesome.

In the ideal cellularized system individuals, even within the same circuit, would know as little identifying information about their compatriots as was possible. The wary operative would use only his clandestine codename, never divulge the address of his residence, the name of friends, place of employment or any other clues to his true identity. John Oram Thomas describes the implementation of these

standards by the Danish resistance organization, "Bopa," saying;

In accordance with classic 'underground' principles Bopa comprised a number of sections, normally of three to six people, each of whom had only one connecting link with the remainder of the group. That, at least, was the theory; in practice it was necessary to bend this rule because, among other considerations, many actions required the participation of more than one section.¹⁶²

The tenets of cellularization became more crucial when applied to links beyond the individual circuit. Within the circuit, failure to adhere to the precepts of compartmentalization, would, at worst, result in the identification and capture of all members of the section. While tragic, the elimination of a single circuit need not have debilitating repercussions to the underground movement. Conversely, failure to observe the principles of cellularization in regard to links up the chain-of-command could have devastating consequences. The arrest of a single individual, even at the lowest levels of the organization's hierarchy, could provide a trail that could dismantle the entire organization. Jan Karski calls this the principle of "no contact upwards" and explains it as;

... a precautionary measure, adopted in the formation of the Underground. It was originally designed against the infiltration of spies and provocateurs into our cells. The presence of any suspicious individual, anyone who might, by the remotest

¹⁶²Thomas, p. 174.

possibility, have been a spy or provocateur presented us with a complicated problem. We could not eliminate all those touched with suspicion without causing a complete stoppage of all activity. However, to let them carry on their work without taking any precautions exposed the Underground to the possibility of falling en masse into the hand of the Gestapo. "No upward contact" was a kind of compromise. The extent of damage any suspected individual could inflict was limited, since he was denied any contact with his superior officers. However, he could still carry on some of his duties by issuing order to those inferior in rank. Naturally, if the suspicion proved well-founded, the suspect would be eliminated.¹⁶³

a. Coordination versus Security

The undiluted tenets of cellularization, with the security of the movement as its primary motivator, argue against any form of contact between different underground organizations. The establishment of links between separate organizations make both susceptible to the compromise of either. Yet, coordination and communication between different underground organizations, combating a common enemy, could enhance the overall efficiency of all participants. Intelligence concerning the identity of collaborators and counter-insurgency techniques could be shared, the optimization of sabotage activities could be arranged and the unintentional endangerment as the result of independent actions avoided.

Most analysts of underground movements recognize the critical security benefits derived from the absolute

¹⁶³Karski, p. 193.

segregation of the different clandestine organizations yet many lament the general lack of underground cohesion and coordination. Jorgen Haestrup ponders the advantages of greater underground coordination and integration, saying;

Of paramount importance was mutual understanding between the organisations and their collected coordination with the outside world. The more coordination, and, indeed, integration there was, the better the effect.... I have often wondered what would have been the achievements of the Resistance movements if it had been possible to coordinate them thoroughly and to coordinate their efforts with the war efforts, both in the West and the East. This was only partially done and a great chance of establishing mutual confidence was lost.¹⁶⁴

Lack of coordination between different underground units invariably resulted in duplication of effort, imperfect utilization of assets and the endangerment of valuable and well rehearsed operations and their personnel by well-meaning but largely insignificant actions on the part of other elements. Jozef Garlinski provides an illustration of the hazards of the lack of lateral communications on underground operations in Poland. In an attempt to infiltrate a resistance member into Pawiak prison to reestablish the communication link to the outside, Garlinski, arranged to have his agent, an engineer, arrested and taken to Pawiak. His well conceived scheme, however, was ruined by the simultaneous

¹⁶⁴Haestrup, "Expose," pp. 160-161.

and obviously uncoordinated actions of a separate underground unit. He describes the event, saying;

... a diversionary unit of scouts captured a Black Maria taking prisoners from Gestapo headquarters to Pawiak and amongst those set free was my engineer!¹⁶⁵
I must surely have been the only Pole in Warsaw at that time who bore a grudge against those brave boys.¹⁶⁶

While increased integration and coordination between overt organizations seeking to accomplish identical objectives is unquestionably advantageous in the above-ground world, the security threats inherent to the underground negate the benefits associated with increased clandestine cooperation. M.R.D. Foot, recognizing the destructive potential of inter-underground coordination, says,

Lateral communications between resistance networks was severely frowned on by all the professionals; the communists even maintained that 'There should be no horizontal communications of any kind.' But not all resisters were professionals.¹⁶⁷

Internal security was the unequivocal prerequisite for underground survival. Conversely, underground coordination, while facilitating the efficiency of clandestine operations,

¹⁶⁵ This clandestine action was one of the resistance coups of occupied Poland, occurring in Warsaw, on 26 March 1943. Twenty-five political prisoners were set free.

¹⁶⁶ Garlinski, The Survival of Love: Memoirs of a Resistance Officer, p. 52.

¹⁶⁷ Foot, Resistance, p. 99.

threaten this rudimentary component of survival, its potentials costs far outweighing its potential value.

b. Secrecy versus Efficiency

Secrecy and efficiency, both attributes highly desirable in any organization, had an adversarial relationship in the underground. J. Bowyer Bell captures the essence of this relationship, stating, "...as a general rule, the greater the secrecy, the greater the inefficiency of the organization or operation; absolute secrecy assures absolute chaos."¹⁶⁸ The obvious benefits to the efficiency of the underground accrued by keeping its constituency informed about the goals, methods and identities of fellow clandestine participants had to be scrupulously weighed against the increased exposure and detrimental impact on internal security.

The benefits of compartmentalization, discretion and the adherence to stringent security considerations has been discussed in detail in previous chapters and will not be reiterated here. However, the maintenance of these high levels of secrecy necessary to the survival of the organizations extracted a significant cost. Secrecy infinitely compounded the effort necessary to complete even the simplest tasks. Meetings had to be held in neutral, secure locations, using the same site as infrequently as possible.

¹⁶⁸Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiencies of the Underground," in Terrorism and Political Violence, p. 203.

Garlinski describes the efforts taken to arrange underground meetings;

If two people wanted to discuss something they often had to the other end of town or arrange laboriously prepared meetings, complicated by the fact that sometimes co-workers would not know each other.¹⁶⁹

Since true identities and addresses were closely guarded secrets, it was difficult to contact anyone when the need arose. Underground objectives and plans were disseminated grudgingly, revealing as little as possible to as few as possible. Naturally, this resulted in a great deal of ambiguity, misunderstandings and local tactical actions conflicting with national strategic objectives.

Jozef Garlinski describes the limitations secrecy imposed upon the efficiency of Polish underground operations, saying;

You see, in underground work various things happen - you can't know everything and everybody. The secrecy which envelopes every aspect of the cause and the persons working for it produces many surprises and misunderstandings. It often happens that someone works in all in good faith and then turns out that his work is harmful.¹⁷⁰

Garlinski illustrates this point by relating a case where a Gestapo agent, code name Colonel Baczewski or "Uncle", posed as a colonel sent by the Allied government in London. The

¹⁶⁹Garlinski, The Survival of Love: Memoirs of a Resistance Officer, p. 24.

¹⁷⁰Garlinski, The Survival of Love: The Memoirs of a Resistance Officer, p. 32.

"provocateur" set up his own resistance unit which he used to infiltrate other underground units and provide intelligence to the Gestapo.¹⁷¹ This case demonstrates both the potential benefits and demerits of secrecy. While secrecy prevented the "colonel" from undergoing a thorough vetting and authentication process which would have revealed his false credentials, it limited the amount of damage and extent of penetration he could achieve.

2. Initiative versus Centralized Control

The underground organization is forced choose find a functional balance between the command and control extremes of rigid centralized control versus the absolute autonomy of local sub-units. Bell sums up this contradiction, saying;

Control must either be too centralized, imposing rigidity on strategy and tactics, or too loose, allowing a dangerous flexibility to those on the periphery.¹⁷²

Opting to grant considerable authority to individual units to pursue the objectives of the organizations allows the sub-units on the periphery to exercise considerable initiative, take advantage of their regional expertise and exploit targets of opportunity in a timely manner. This course of action leaves much of the decision making in the

¹⁷¹Garlinski, The Survival of Love: Memoirs of a Resistance Officer, p. 32.

¹⁷²Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiencies of the Underground," p. 202.

hands of the periphery, relinquishing authority to the local sub-units to choose a course of action which may contradict or imperil the overall strategic objectives of the central underground authority.

The alternative course of action is to dictate absolutely the actions to be pursued by the peripheral units. The center is then assured of adherence to its dictated strategies but loses the advantages of initiative, regional expertise and exploitation of targets of opportunity. Furthermore, clandestine organizations invariably lack the communication mechanisms necessary to support a rigidly centralized chain-of-command. The more centralized a command and control structure, the greater its need for a secure, uninterrupted flow of communication, carefully prescribing and continually revising its commands to peripheral units. As previously illustrated, the underground's system of communication is inherently incompatible with such demands.

3. Governments-in Exile

Governments-in-exile, a recurrent theme in the occupied countries of World War II, had varying degrees of impact upon the underground movements. The governments-in-exile, generally, retained their legitimacy as the ultimate authority of the occupied country. Thus, all underground organizations deriving their legitimacy from claims of serving the interests of their country and the real national leaders

were intrinsically obligated to heed, to a greater or lesser degree, the instructions from their government-in-exile. This extended and often confused chain-of-command offered both benefits and drawbacks to underground operations.

The single greatest value of operating under the auspices of a government-in-exile was the relatively greater security provided to the top leadership elements of the resistance. This security benefit extended not only to the leadership itself but to their documents, communication networks and other administrative components, allowing the leadership to concentrate its efforts more fully on operational issues. Jan Karski lists the advantages derived from operating under a governments-in-exile, saying,

"...the Underground required a method for maintaining the technical continuity of the organization. This could be obtained by having emanate from a source beyond the danger zone the appointment of personnel. This system insured orderly continuance of underground activity against any losses suffered as a result of Gestapo encroachments."¹⁷³

Attempting to direct underground activities from another country, separated by thousands of miles, operating under severe communication restrictions and a lack of "real time" intelligence posed considerable difficulties. These factors contributed to the sentiment that the government-in-exile was "out of touch" with current events and lacked an

¹⁷³Karski, p. 133.

appreciation for the reality of their situation. Stefan Korbonski relates his criticisms of the Polish underground chain-of-command, which extended thousands of miles, to London, stating;

Discussing the difficulties associated with the government-in-exile attempting to command its resistance forces. "This arrangement did not take into account the fact that a commander cut off from the enemy-occupied country and communicating only through infrequent courier service, could not possibly be effective; neither could radio communication replace his direct contact with his subordinates;" K goes on to say "the commander should be where the battle is, even if not in the front line."¹⁷⁴

Governments-in-exile could provide invaluable service to their indigenous underground movements if they recognized their limitations and exploited their benefits. Most exiled government, recognized their intelligence and communication limitations and did not attempt to interfere at an operational level. They, instead, provided broad policy direction, material and moral support and lent their legitimacy to their constituents battling for the freedom of their country.

4. Underground Communication

The command and control of any organization is thoroughly dependant upon its ability to communicate. Instructions, commands and intelligence must be relayed up and down the chain-of-command to ensure the efficient operation and enhance the decision-making process of the organization.

¹⁷⁴Korbonski, p. 23.

The greater the organization's ability to communicate, the more effectively the center can command and direct the actions of the periphery. The underground, with its tenuous and always treacherous channels of communication, suffers innate limitations to its command and control capabilities. The threats to the security of the underground organizations emanating from the demands to communicate, which are discussed in detail in chapter three, pose a tremendous obstacle to clandestine operations. The burden of hostile censorship and the monitoring of all communications, whether postal, telephonic or radio required underground organizations to implement drastic adaptive measures. J. Bowyer Bell aptly describes the difficulties of underground communications, saying;

Communication, covert and often clumsy but always essential, has often been a major obstacle to rebel [underground] success. Even in optimum circumstances communication problems tend to have the most severe effects on the pursuit of the armed struggle and on the internal nature of the rebel organization. To communicate in an illicit world is far more difficult than experts in special operations normally assume.¹⁷⁵

The underground, recognizing the both the requirements and associated threats, addressed the necessity of communication in a variety of different manners. The most essential adaptation implemented by the underground to combat

¹⁷⁵J. Bowyer Bell, "Aspects of the Dragon World: Covert Communications and the Rebel Ecosystem," in International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 3. p. 23.

the threats to its communication networks was the decentralization of its command and control system. Stanislaw Komorowski provides an excellent description of the difficulties and requirements associated with underground communications and provides the solution implemented by the Polish underground, stating;

Headquarters should be able to reach out immediately to any point for further information and to call at once on any particular branch for its particular specialized work. But we could not make use of telephones, nor could we summon meetings of more than two or three people at once. Even detailed correspondence was denied to us.... Everything at headquarters was decentralized as far as possible. This entailed the daily distribution of many batches of correspondence to widely scattered points in Warsaw alone.¹⁷⁶

While decentralization served to minimize the needs for underground communications, it could not eliminate the requirement altogether. Communications, even at a reduced level, were an indispensable part of underground operations. Jorgen Haestrup explains;

Illegal contact at home from person to person, from group to group, from function to function, from locality to locality, and from the Resistance world to the legal world, was so fundamental in its importance that it must come first in any account of the problems of illegality...¹⁷⁷

The underground met this requirement in a variety of ingenious and practical ways. Haestrup illustrates the diversity and

¹⁷⁶Komorowski, p. 59.

¹⁷⁷Haestrup, European Resistance Movements, p. 355.

complexity of the methods of underground communications employed by the underground, stating;

This shadow world with its short or long lines of communication eludes any schematic or statistical treatment, characterized as it was by agreements on all levels within families, circles of friends, places of work, localities, organizations or simply between one person and another, and characterized as it was by constant changes, uncertainty, continual improvisations and long series of purely accidental circumstances.¹⁷⁸

The exact balance between the value accrued from illicit communications and the innumerable hazards posed to the internal security of the underground was a difficult to define and constantly changing point. From a security standpoint, the complete absence of communications was the safest option available to the underground. Based purely upon command and control requirements, regular and plentiful communication was the most desirable option. Bell emphasizes the conflict between the ideal security standards and the operational requirements of the underground, saying;

Within the underground, the ideal communication is no communication; this obviously protects the message, but the scarcity of communication invariably engenders certain organizational problems. Revolutionary messages are difficult to send, rare, short, and seldom require response.¹⁷⁹

A minimum level of communication both up and down the underground chain-of-command and on occasion horizontally, is

¹⁷⁸Haestrup, European Resistance Movements, pp. 357-358.

¹⁷⁹Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics," p. 203.

an absolute necessity to the functioning of any organizations. Consequentially, the underground was left to devise its own methods to manage the numerous security threats intrinsic to underground communications. The methods which they employed to address these security threats are discussed in detail in chapter three and will not be reiterated. The underground organizations that were able to master the inherent conflicts between security and communications, balancing command and control requirements against security threats, significantly enhanced not only their operational efficiency but their likelihood of survival.

D. CONCLUSIONS

While the identification and elimination of the leading elements of the indigenous societies of the occupied countries by German security forces had a profound effect on the ability of the pre-war leadership to assume leadership positions in the underground, they were the only ones possessing the credentials and universal respect necessary to assume the senior leadership roles. Despite German scrutiny and preemptive actions, the pre-war leadership defied these additional deterrents and filled many of the vital underground leadership roles.

The leadership of the underground differed significantly in its constituency from the senior level to the local level. The senior leadership was far more likely to consist of

prominent pre-war leaders, drawn from the military, political and social elite of the country. The local leaders were of a much more diverse composition, consisting of individual from all walks of life - contingent upon their personal leadership qualities, rather than pre-war leadership roles. The bases of legitimacy of the underground leaders also differed significantly between the senior and local leadership. The senior leadership derived much of its legitimacy from legal precepts established before the occupation of their country. The local leaders' legitimacy was founded upon his "exemplary character," what Weber classifies as "charismatic grounds" of legitimacy.

The need for establishing provisions for leadership succession was generally recognized by the underground, the arrangements for implementation, however, differed dependant upon the organizations degree of "non-hierarchialness." The more hierarchial organizations relied upon an established chain-of-command and orders from above to direct leadership succession. The less hierarchial organizations relied on less definite methods, such as the leader's stated choice for succession, the assumption by an individual of a second-in-command role, prior discussion and general aptitude for leadership. The different undergrounds appear to have addressed the question of succession satisfactorily - the

elimination of leaders was not uncommon yet the dissolution of groups because of succession conflicts was unusual.

The underground leadership was imbued with extraordinary responsibilities and an expansive scope of duties. His decisions had life and death consequences not only for the members of his unit but for members of his community that suffered the wrath of German retaliations. He was responsible for organizing and coordinating operations, inspiring and motivating his followers, with the benefit of only minimal guidance and direction from above. The underground successfully adapted its operational methods to address these seemingly overwhelming deterrents, developing a innovative and unique alternative to traditional methods of leadership.

The underground command and control structure was largely defined by the balance achieved between the innately conflictual demands of communications and security. Underground organizations cannot exists without both meticulous considerations for internal security and some level of communications between its different elements. Any organizations with aspirations for even limited coherence and congruity must maintain periodic communications from its center to the periphery of the movement. Strategies, targets, information and directions must be disseminated down the chain-of-command, and inquires, requests, intelligence and responses must be passed up the chain-of-command. Without a

minimum of communication, the organization ceases to be a coherent force and regresses into its component parts.

While communication is an essential part of maintaining an underground organization's congruity it imposes severe security risks. Public communication networks are constantly monitored by hostile security forces. Couriers must brave the maze of enemy checkpoints, street patrols and random arrests. Radio transmissions are susceptible to both interception and location of the transmission point. The very likely prospect of the interception and revelation of the contents of clandestine messages could have tremendously destructive consequences. Plans could be revealed, agents and leaders identified, codes could be broken and agents turned, allowing the hostile infiltration of the organization. The only recourse available to the underground was to limit its communications to the bare minimum, devising unique and adaptive methods to sustain the remaining communication requirement.

The underground command and control structure, because of the unremitting threats to their security, implemented several organizational safeguards. Most underground were "cellularized," minimizing the contacts within individual units and up and down the chain-of-command. To reduce the communication requirements, the underground granted a generous amount of autonomy to the peripheral units, allowing for

increased local initiative and reduced operational constraints. As was true for so many other aspects of clandestine operations, the underground's management of command and control requirements was forced to adapt to an arduous and constantly changing environment. The omnipotent security demand invariably conflicted with the other underground considerations. The secret to the underground's success lay in the ability to address the unremitting security threats without becoming operationally paralysed -- devising creative and flexible solutions to the clandestine command and control organization.

V. CONCLUSIONS

For the purposes of this paper, underground organizations have generally been addressed as generic entities. The disparities between the undergrounds of different countries and within the same organizations over time have been intentionally minimized. While the different underground movements should be viewed as distinct structures, each possessing its own unique threats, operational environment and opposition, there are universal concerns and dictates that apply, to a greater or lesser degree, to all underground organizations. The competency level of all underground opponents, the vitality and capabilities of the underground organization and, especially, the balance of strength between the underground and its enemy, effects underground management, but only peripherally. The underground, by definition, always remains less "powerful" than its adversary. Despite this tremendous differential, the underground must continue to conduct the operational and administrative functions intrinsic to any organization. This paper has addressed how the underground movements of World War II managed the onerous task of recruitment, internal security, leadership and command and control in the perilous world of the underground. While the underground resistance movements of World War II were used to

provide substance for this paper, the same principles, requirements and dictates apply equally to contemporary "guerrilla" and revolutionary underground organizations.

The underground resistance movements of World War II, despite operating in a highly repressive environment, faced with all the disadvantages inherent to underground organizations, continuously provided invaluable services to both the Allied war effort and their own struggle for freedom. They provided the Allies with invaluable, real-time intelligence, assisted in the escape of downed Allied airmen, conducted subversive actions against German material and personnel targets, diverted immense number of Axis troops from their point of main effort and conducted indispensable special tasks at the behest of the Allies. Collectively, these underground activities had a profound effect upon the war-fighting capabilities of both the Allies and the Axis.

Operating in an underground environment offered the clandestine organization both advantages and disadvantages. The underground's ability to strike unexpectedly, from the very midst of its enemy's camp, to dissipate back into the indigenous population between actions and the relative ease with which it could infiltrate the German infrastructures were precious tools to the grossly mismatched forces of the underground. The inordinate amount of time and effort expended by the underground merely to insure its survival and

the ceaseless demand for secrecy, placed severe restrictions on clandestine operations. The successful organization was the one that was able to rapidly identify these advantages and disadvantages and adapt its management accordingly.

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