

AD-A280 300

1

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California

DTIC
ELECTE
JUN 15 1994
S F D



DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

THESIS


GERMAN-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONS WITHIN
NATO AND THE UN

by
Jobst Schönfeld

March, 1994

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Donald Abenheim

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

14985 94-18500


REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEForm Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank)		2. REPORT DATE March, 1994	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE GERMAN-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONS WITHIN NATO AND THE UN			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Schönfeld, Jobst				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES (S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the US Government or the German Ministry of Defense or Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) The war in the Balkans suggests that despite the end of the East-West conflict, general instability casts a pall of doubt over hopes of enduring peace in Europe and beyond. As one sees in South East Europe, post-communism creates nationalism which can lead to war. The former Yugoslavia is the test case. In East Central Europe, where former Soviet satellites are facing a similar power vacuum and Russian imperialism celebrates its possible rebirth, war could be the consequence if NATO is not able and willing to provide security and stability in this region. This thesis investigates the factors which define the current crisis in NATO and transatlantic security relations. This in turn brings up the question of structural realities in German-American strategic interaction. This thesis examines how lasting internal conflicts gain new explosive force today and presents conclusions regarding the survival of NATO. In the end, the thesis suggests that NATO and the tantamount security partnership with the United States is vitally significant for Germany and for stability in Europe. This maxim applies to the past and it holds equally true for the future.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS NATO-STRATEGIES, NATO EXPANSION, US-GERMAN SECURITY RELATIONS, GERMAN SECURITY POLICY, GERMAN REARMAMENT			16. PRICE CODE	
			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 149	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED		20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18, Z39-182

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

GERMAN-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONS WITHIN NATO AND THE UN

by

Jobst Schönfeld
Major (GS), German Army
MA, University of the German Federal Armed Forces, Hamburg, 1979


Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 24, 1994

Author: 
Jobst Schönfeld

Approved By: 
Dr. Donald Abenheim, Thesis Advisor


Dr. Bertrand Patenaude, Second Reader


Dr. Thomas Bruneau, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

The war in the Balkans suggests that despite the end of the East-West conflict, general instability casts a pall of doubt over hopes of enduring peace in Europe and beyond. As one sees in South East Europe, post-communism creates nationalism which can lead to war. The former Yugoslavia is the test case. In East Central Europe, where former Soviet satellites are facing a similar power vacuum and Russian imperialism celebrates its possible rebirth, war could be the consequence if NATO is not able and willing to provide security and stability in this region. This thesis investigates the factors which define the current crisis in NATO and transatlantic security relations. This in turn brings up the question of structural realities in German-American strategic interaction. This thesis examines how lasting internal conflicts gain new explosive force today and presents conclusions regarding the survival of NATO. In the end, the thesis suggests that NATO and the tantamount security partnership with the United States is vitally significant for Germany and for stability in Europe. This maxim applies to the past and it holds equally true for the future.

Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM	1
B. SUBJECT DEFINITION	2
II. FROM POTSDAM TO MAINZ (1945-1989): THE STRUCTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONS	8
A. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR TO THE KOREAN WAR (1944/46-1950)	10
1. The United States Remains a European Power	10
2. West German Defense Perspectives Between 1948 and 1950	17
B. NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE STRATEGY AND WEST GERMAN DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION (1950-1958)	21
1. The Defense is Going Nuclear	21
2. Aspects of German Rearmament Between the Korean War and Entrance into NATO (1952-1955)	24

C. PROBLEM AREAS OF NATO'S NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND	
ASPECTS OF BUILDING UP THE BUNDESWEHR (1952-1955)	28
1. The Rearmament Crisis and the Radford Shock	28
2. The German Conventional Option and the Alliance's Nuclear	
Strategy	32
D. GERMAN-FRENCH RELATIONS AND THE QUESTION OF THE	
CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1958-1964)	33
E. BURDEN-SHARING AND THE FEAR OF AMERICAN	
WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE	37
F. DÉTENTE AND DETERRENCE	41
G. AFTER THE WALL CAME DOWN: THE UNITED STATES AND	
GERMANY'S UNIFICATION	47
H. CONCLUSIONS	49
III. THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: GERMAN-AMERICAN SECURITY	
RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF CURRENT CHALLENGES	53
A. THE PERSIAN GULF WAR	55
1. Operation Desert Storm: A Case of Maritime-Air Strategy	55
2. The Germans to the Front	58

B. WHY SOMALIA AND NOT BOSNIA?	63
1. Operation Restore Hope	63
2. The Germans on their Way to the Front	66
C. THE WAR IN THE BALKANS	75
1. War Returns to Europe	75
2. NATO's Role in the Former Yugoslavia	77
3. The American "Lift and Strike" Concept	82
D. CONCLUSIONS	87
 IV. THE FUTURE OF GERMAN-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONS AND NATO	 92
A. EAST CENTRAL EUROPE'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY	94
1. The Rebirth of Imperial Temptations	94
2. The Struggle for NATO Membership	98
B. NATO AT A TURNING POINT	103
1. Germany and the Process of European Integration	104
2. Recreating the Bipolar System	106
3. Partnership or Membership?	109
C. CONCLUSION	110

V. CONCLUSION	114
A. THE NUCLEAR ISSUE	115
B. THE GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE	117
C. THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS	118
D. THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE IDENTITY	120
E. THE FACTOR OF BURDEN-SHARING	121
BIBLIOGRAPHY	123
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	134

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank Lt Colonel Larsen, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado, for the generous assistance in the completion of this thesis. The research funds of the INSS played a major role in the authors research. The author would further like to thank those individuals who helped make this period of study in California possible: Brigadier General Lanz, Colonel (GS) Kuse, and Colonel (GS) Treche. Despite all of the help cited above, this work could not have been completed without the understanding and assistance of my wife, Barbara.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The future challenges for transatlantic partnership will take place outside old NATO boundaries. Former clearly defined limits of regional and global perspectives, as well as the limits of the Alliance, thus become ambiguous. For the United States this means that in the future it is likely to become involved in a regional crisis. For united Germany it means that the Germans can no longer think only in terms of security guarantees for its NATO allies. Thus the most difficult future structural problem in German-American security relations will revolve around the share of responsibility for collective security outside its own regional interests that Germany will be willing to accept. The share of responsibility that Germany will be able to cope with will determine whether German-American security relations have a positive future.

The latest challenges for the United States and united Germany within the framework of NATO and UN have also demonstrated that the structural realities in their security relations have gained more explosive force, because there is no longer a common threat. Deterrence in the nuclear age was in American hands. The new deterrence will not be controlled by the United States alone. Clear goals and a solid political will stood behind the old deterrence. There will not be a new deterrence as long as there is an absence of such clear goals and a solid political will.

The war in former Yugoslavia and the Persian Gulf War indicate in their own respective ways that the United States must continue to provide world leadership. The Gulf War showed an example of a strong American leadership role from which the Europeans could benefit for their own security purposes. The present crisis in the Balkans demonstrates that Europe will continue to rely on security and political ties with the United States, despite efforts to create common foreign and security policies within the European Union.

The case studies also suggest that since the end of the Cold War, European crises do not appear to involve United States' interests. However, a world power cannot long neglect crises in the international community. The absence of American leadership in former Yugoslavia may cause problems in the years to come because the example Vladimir V. Zhirinovskiy or others like him take from Bosnia is that the Americans will act more with rhetoric than with force unless their direct security interests are concerned.

The Europe of the future will need the leadership of the sole remaining world power: the United States of America. Without the leadership of an overseas and non-partisan power, NATO would lose its ability to act, because the West European partners' national interests would get in the way. Europe would then lose the only functioning security system capable of filling the existing power vacuum in East Central Europe. Given recent events in Russia, the absence of the United States and NATO would again make Europe vulnerable to political developments that might result in a "Second Cold War."

The future of NATO will especially depend on the future of German-American relations. The United States needs a dependable European "partner in leadership" who will play an active role in European unity and at the same time serve as a bridge to Eastern Europe. Germany is the only country that can do this. Germany, on the other hand, needs America not only because Germany as a non-nuclear power is dependent on US nuclear security guarantees, but because only through this German-American partnership can the fears of the political and economic power of a unified Germany, particularly in East Central Europe, be alleviated.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

The war in the Balkans suggests that despite the end of the East-West conflict, general instability casts a pall of doubt over hopes of enduring peace in Europe and beyond. NATO may have won the Cold War against the Warsaw Pact, but the possibility of a wider war in South East Europe challenges the alliance daily. If wars of aggression return to Europe while the leaders of NATO look the other way, then such chaos will not only undermine a new security structure for Europe, but also global insecurity and instability will be the consequences.

The war in the Balkans is the result of a power vacuum in Europe which emerged after the end of the Cold War. As one see in South East Europe, post-communism creates nationalism, which can lead to war. The former Yugoslavia is the test case. In East Central Europe, where former Soviet satellites face a similar power vacuum and the possible rebirth of Russian imperialism, war could be the consequence if NATO is not able or willing to provide security and stability in this region.

For united Germany, the key to security has always been the NATO alliance and partnership with the United States. Nonetheless, the successful history of NATO and German-American security relations is also marked by repeated phases of internal crises

and conflicts. Such conflicts create the strategic reality. As the example in the Balkans dramatically shows, the final test of a security alliance is war.

This thesis investigates the factors that define the current crisis in transatlantic security relations. This analysis in turn brings up the question of structural realities in German-American strategic interaction. This thesis examines how lasting internal conflicts gain new immediacy today and it presents conclusions regarding the survival of NATO. Finally, the thesis suggests that NATO and the paramount security partnership with the United States is vitally significant for Germany and for stability in Europe. This is the maxim illustrated by the past, and it holds equally true for the future.

NATO must restore deterrence to thwart the use of force. The aggressors of tomorrow must realize that they have no chance of reaching their goals with violence. This reality requires might and decisiveness in NATO actions. This is made more difficult by the fact that, after expending tremendous energy during previous periods of confrontation, Europe and the Western World have directed their energies to internal affairs. People forget that *esprit de corps*, solidarity, and the readiness to shed blood when necessary have been the historical foundations of peace in Europe.

B. SUBJECT DEFINITION

Political scientists and historians have intensively researched the creation of security alliances, as well as issues involved in dealing with external foes and cohesion among allies.¹ They have proven that the state of an alliance can be analyzed less by

¹ See for example, Beer, F.A. (ed.) *Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary*

commonness and much more by inherent problem areas and resulting correlations that most clearly characterize crisis situations.

In examining German-American security relations in the framework of NATO, five problem areas emerge as pivotal in defining transatlantic relations since World War II ended. They are:

- ♦ Nuclear issues
- ♦ Different geostrategic perspectives
- ♦ The issues of domestic politics
- ♦ The dilemma between European integration and transatlantic partnership
- ♦ The factor of burden-sharing

Figure 1 illustrates these problem areas, along with their political and military derivations. These problem areas make up the structural realities in German-American security relations. Their effects on these relations up until the end of the Cold War will be examined in Chapter II of this thesis.

The illustration in Figure 1 clearly suggests that the structural realities involved in the transatlantic relationship mandate an unequal partnership. America has benefited from a unique geostrategic island-like position that has afforded the superpower 200 years of military impregnability. Thus, two mutually influential fundamental orientations have proven true: the isolationism which lies dormant in the American psyche and globalism, which is the result of the global orientation of a Western superpower. The

World (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).

domestic political battle of these two deeply-rooted trends determines the kind and extent of foreign political engagements, which in turn affects Europe's security.




Figure 1. Structural Realities in German-American Security Relations

Unlike the US which is protected by oceans, the continent of Europe lies as an appendix on the western periphery of the greater Eurasian land mass. During the Cold War, the superior conventional potential of the Warsaw Pact posed a direct threat to Europe. Europe was also confronted with the Eurostrategic nuclear threat of the former Soviet Union.

Invulnerable to direct conventional attacks against their own country, America considered its greatest risk to be that conventional disparities in Europe would push the US into nuclear confrontation with the former Soviet Union. In the case of conflict, this would have meant risking America's existence for the sake of protecting Europe. Because of this perception, the Americans were on the one hand interested in minimizing their own risk through nuclear deterrence and arms control measures, something of which the West Europeans were always suspicious. On the other hand, America, in exercising its leadership, insisted that the alliance partners in Europe who were responsible for conventional defense take on a greater defense role.

The goal of being relieved of world power status became an inherent source of conflict resulting from latent American isolationism after the US had entered the "entangling alliance" with Western Europe at the beginning of the Cold War. The source of conflict was further intensified by (what the Americans considered) the Europeans' unwillingness to do more for their own defense. American disappointment over this European attitude toward burden-sharing has characterized transatlantic security relations since the 1950's.

The burden-sharing conflict and concern about American willingness to genuinely share the risks when talking about nuclear guarantees for Europe caused the Europeans to further unite. This is especially true in the case of two former arch enemies, Germany and France. Besides seeking a solid partnership with the US, Germany was also seeking reconciliation with France. This relationship with its neighbor on the other side of the

Rhine developed into a constant dilemma for Germany. The cause of this dilemma was the French demand since 1958 that it preserve its unrestricted national independence. The French figured that this demand would rule out military integration of their troops into the alliance, thus giving rise to a conflict with the United States. From then on the United States followed the German-French dialog with great interest. The United States was concerned that the Federal Republic might also turn its back on NATO.

The Federal Republic was especially at risk because of its boundary position between two different political systems and its geopolitically key position in Central Europe. The most important principle of German security became multinationality, with eight partners already enjoying peace in the NATO alliance. A *singularization* of the Federal Republic was to be avoided at all costs. Because West Germany could not change its geostrategic position in Europe on its own, it wanted to at least mitigate negative consequences of its exposed position. Germany wanted the most tension-free relationship between East and West because any tension between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would put pressure on the sensitive relations between the two Germanies. Dismantling sources of conflict and creating a trust-building environment thus became the driving force for West German *Ostpolitik*.

Another structural problem came in the form of the correlation of security policy developments *in* and *out* of NATO territory. This is how the question of the alliance's limits came up. One can see that today's *out of area* discussion is not a new problem, particularly in Germany. Since the Korean War, this topic has led to tensions because the

United States, following a maritime strategy, incorporated the political and strategic developments of the entire world in its foreign and security policies. Meanwhile, the Europeans concentrated on more of a regional approach, which essentially led to conflicts.

With the end of the Cold War and collapse of former totalitarian regimes, the political situation and threats to peace in Europe have changed considerably. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the world learned that violently suppressed ethnic tensions are still highly dangerous; the outbreak of several regional armed conflicts in Southeastern Europe demonstrate this. Chapter III will examine three case studies that demonstrate how German-American security relations have further developed under the conditions of the post-Cold War era. These case studies will demonstrate that the structural realities in this relationship still remain valid, although they have another valence. This also applies to German-American strategic interactions under UN auspices.

Chapter IV deals with the future of NATO and the future of Europe. The chapter will suggest that a successful future for the transatlantic partnership (which must include the newly independent states in East Central Europe) will be guaranteed only if the structural realities in all important areas, especially in the area of burden-sharing, comply with the framework of new security policy. Reunited Germany has a key role to play in the formation and execution of such policy. The thesis will end with Chapter V, which offers suggestions on what such compliance should entail.

II. FROM POTSDAM TO MAINZ (1945-1989): THE STRUCTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONS

With the End of the East-West confrontation, the United States and Germany find themselves at a crossroads. There has been a general impression in Europe that the United States has lost interest in West European security affairs. By the same token, there is a sense on the other side of the Atlantic that the Europeans have lost interest in their own security. This problem is as old as NATO and the German-American security partnership. Today, many Americans are concerned about a developing rift which they see between once close allies, Germany and the United States. They also fear the possibility that this rift could lead to a change in global politics, especially in a world of uncertainty and chance after the end of the Communist threat.²

In order to understand the current crisis in transatlantic security relations, one has to examine the history of NATO and German-American strategic interaction. This chapter will therefore investigate the structural realities of this relationship from the Potsdam Conference in 1945 through the unification of Germany in 1990.

Post-World War II development of German-American security relations may be divided into two stages which, one could argue, accurately represent the psychological development of Germany's international role. These stages are associated with two places in Germany: Potsdam (1945) and Mainz (1989). Physically and materially

² See for example, Smyser, W.R., *Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press: 1993).

decimated, Germany unconditionally surrenders in August 1945 and is divided into occupied zones. In July 1945, in the Potsdam castle of Cecilienhof, representatives of the victorious nations meet: Harry S. Truman, Josef W. Stalin, Clement Attlee, and, later, Winston Churchill. A declaration sums up their talks; a declaration that is to do away with German militarism and Nazism once and for all. The allies came up with agreements to insure that Germany would never again be able to threaten its neighbors or world peace.³

Germany had no military for the following ten years. Many people, including true conservatives, swore that Germans would never to touch weapons again. But it did not take long for Germany to begin rearming itself. The United States was especially active in *demanding* that Germany rearm itself because of the East-West confrontation, which was beginning to manifest itself as early as 1946/47. The fall of both communism and the Berlin Wall completed a cycle of German-American security relations which had been decidedly dictated by the Cold War. A new chapter in security relations was reached when in Mainz, Germany, George Bush declared on May 31, 1989:

The United States and the Federal Republic have always been firm friends and allies; but today we share an added role: partners in leadership. Of course leadership has a constant companion: responsibility. And our responsibility is to look ahead and grasp the promise of the future.⁴

³ See Noguee, J.L., and Donaldson, R.H., *Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II*, 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992), p. 81.

⁴ *Europa-Archiv*, 12/1989, pp. D536 ff.

It is a fact that Germany owes tremendous thanks to the United States for its unmistakable, guiding support in attaining reunification. However, the long road from Potsdam to Mainz was also a road pockmarked with German-American crises. These crises illuminate the character of German-American security relations, a subject which is poorly understood in the United States.

A. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR TO THE KOREAN WAR (1944/46-1950)

1. The United States Remains a European Power

The founding of NATO in April 1949 resulted from the Soviet Union posing a threat to Western Europe. Though deterring a Soviet attack was NATO's principal interest, it was not its only concern. As Lord Ismay, NATO's first general secretary put it, the alliance had three goals: "To keep the Soviets out, the Americans in and the Germans down."⁵

Just as everyone agreed on plans in Yalta in 1945 to keep Germany down after the war, it was also clear that in talks between Roosevelt and Stalin, the last thing on America's mind was a future military presence and military alliance in Europe. Rather, the United States wanted to have all American troops out of Europe within two years of the war's end.⁶ In the United States at that time, public pressure was mounting for rapid

⁵ Quoted in Feldmeyer, K., "Die NATO und Deutschland nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Gegensatzes," in Zitelmann, R., Weissmann, K., and Grossheim, M. (eds.), *Westbindung* (Frankfurt/M.: Propyläen, 1993), p. 460.

⁶ See Joffe, J., "Nach der Revolution: Die amerikanischen Interessen in Europa in den

demobilization. Everything indicated that for the second time in this century, an American withdrawal from Europe would leave behind a power vacuum that would, in turn, result in instability and insecurity in the face of looming Soviet expansion.⁷

At the time, United States' military doctrine specified that extensive conventional forces would not be necessary to protect American interests; rather, the US could depend on military bases in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. Herein lies the initial crisis of the Atlantic partnership with the United States: ever-important sea and air dominance in the leading western power's strategic thinking and the strong belief at that time in the power of deterrence by America's nuclear monopoly.⁸

With solid trust in the atom bomb's power of deterrence, Washington was set to redeploy American troops from overseas to America after Japan was defeated. The United States military, which during the war had grown to 12 million soldiers, was reduced to 1.6 million. The US forces in Germany were reduced just as drastically: from 2.6 million to 103,749 soldiers.⁹

The outbreak of the East-West conflict in 1947, especially the events in Greece and Turkey,¹⁰ changed the United States' foreign affairs plans. The Western powers had

neunziger Jahren," in Mahnke, K. (ed.), *Amerikaner in Deutschland-Grundlagen und Bedingungen der transatlantischen Sicherheit* (Bonn: Bouvier 1991), p. 182.

⁷ See Nelson, K.L., *Victors Divided-America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 243-253.

⁸ See Sherry, M.S., *Preparing for the Next War-American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 218.

⁹ See Haftendorn, H., "Historische Entwicklung, politische Motive und rechtliche Grundlagen," in Mahnke, 1991, p. 140.

agreed on a policy based on limiting Soviet power and influence and involving the United States on the international military scene. The Soviets' incredible superiority in the area of conventional warfare was a particular threat to Europe, where the Western powers did not have a functioning alliance at the time able to successfully resist attack.

For the first time in United States history, the US wanted to continue its military presence in Europe in order to contain Soviet expansion, rather than follow through with the planned withdrawal from Europe at the end of World War II. This meant a change of direction in American policy, even if only half-heartedly implemented.

National leaders had always hoped that America's skeletal navy, coastal fortifications, and latent strength would discourage an attack on the homeland. But the nation's feeling of security before World War II arose primarily from its sense of geographical remoteness from the cockpits of conflict, not from confidence in its modest professional military forces. The nation usually built a large war machine only after hostilities began, and then in order to punish aggression or pursue other national goals rather than to deter an attack.¹¹

The United States had already fought Germany on the European continent once in this century, but following World War I, American troops only remained five years as part of the Allied occupation forces in the German Rhineland. The decision to be a part of this occupation force was justified (the presence of American troops served as a stabilizing device, appeasing the Germans and restraining the French), but the withdrawal of the last American troops in January 1923 was difficult to accept. The French invasion of the Ruhr and increasingly tense Franco-German relations in that year are directly

¹⁰ See Noguee, J.L., and Donaldson, R.H., 1992, pp. 92-93.

¹¹ Sherry, M.S., 1977, p. 201.

correlated to American withdrawal policy in the early 1920's.¹² The Americans had already rejected the Treaty of Versailles, which they felt had too great an influence on Germany.

After the American Senate had rejected the Versailles Treaty, the United States government maintained a position of decided aloofness from European disputes. In the separate peace treaty that was concluded between Germany and America in August 1921, Washington disclaimed all responsibility for the political and military provisions of the Versailles peace settlement and their execution. It was understandable that the US government remained in the background when, in 1923, tensions in Germany reached a new high and led to the French occupation of the Ruhr. America's only reaction was to withdraw the last American troops of occupation that had remained in the Rhineland. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes thought that a 'bit of chaos' would not hurt the Europeans but might bring them to their senses.¹³

Once again Europe was on its own. The United States left the Europeans to take care of their own business until 1941. But a "bit of chaos" eventually was enough to convert Europe into a region of insecurity and instability, which finally led to war. The Americans had wanted to withdraw from Europe because most European countries did not seem to be morally-suitable allies. There was no way even the Americans could know that this Europe, left to its own devices, would turn out to be an uncontrollable disaster for the next three decades.

Churchill's speech in Fulton in March of 1946 and American Secretary of State James Byrnes' speech in Stuttgart in September 1946 were cornerstones of a development

¹² See Nelson, K.L., *Victors Divided-America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 243-253.

¹³ Schwabe, K., "The United States and the Weimar Republic: A 'Special Relationship' that Failed," in Trommler F., and McVeigh, J. (eds.), *America and the Germans-An Assessment of a Three-Hundred-Year History* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1985), p. 21.

toward a continental US presence in Europe, influenced by the anti-Hitler coalition's downfall and the developing Cold War.¹⁴ The final turn toward permanence in Europe occurred in the summer of 1948, when the three Western allies decided on a divided Federal Republic of Germany and then reacted to a Soviet blockade of West Berlin with an airlift.

Even if the United States strongly considered it its duty to contain an increasingly aggressive, expansive-minded and powerful Soviet Union,¹⁵ the US still wanted to eventually withdraw from Europe for the long term. In order to avoid leaving a power vacuum, and to keep Germany from losing ties to the West, the British initiative toward the Brussels Treaty¹⁶ was finally supported by the US in 1948. A year later, in April 1949, the United States and its European allies signed the North Atlantic Treaty.

With its military contribution for a common defense plan of NATO in Europe, the US followed the principles of an unchanged dominating maritime (air) strategy: the US was determined to supply its strategic air force and navy, Great Britain and France were to be responsible for a tactical air force and, finally, continental Europe would be

¹⁴ See Borgert, H.-L., "Zur Entstehung, Entwicklung und Struktur der Dienstgruppen in der britischen und amerikanischen Besatzungszone Westdeutschlands 1945-1950," in *Militärgeschichte seit 1945: Dienstgruppen und westdeutscher Verteidigungsbeitrag, Vorüberlegungen zur Bewaffnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, ed. by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Boppard am Rhein, 1982, pp. 106-109.

¹⁵ See Wiggershaus, N., "Nordatlantische Bedrohungsperzeptionen im Kalten Krieg 1948-1956," in Maier, K.A. and Wiggershaus, N. (eds.), *Das Nordatlantische Bündnis 1948-1956*, Munich, 1993, pp. 18-21.

¹⁶ See Kaplan, L.S., "Die Westunion und die militärische Integration Europas 1948-1950. Eine Darstellung aus amerikanischer Sicht," in Wiggerhaus, N. and Foerster, R.G. (eds.), *Die westliche Sicherheitsgemeinschaft 1948-1950, Gemeinsame Probleme und gegesätzliche Nationalinteressen in der Gründungsphase der Nordatlantische Allianz*, Boppard am Rhein, 1988, pp. 37-56.

responsible for conventional land forces. Deploying US land forces within the framework of a continental strategy was not intended; the approximately 82,500 American soldiers still in Europe in 1949 were in Germany and Austria exclusively for administrative military purposes.¹⁷

Defense planning followed the strategic wishes of the United States and -- to a lesser extent -- those of the United Kingdom in this early stage of NATO. In light of the increasing severity of world circumstances and the beginning Berlin crisis, the US came up with its war plan *Halfmoon* in the spring of 1948. This plan corresponded with American strategic thinking in that in the event of Soviet attack, Western Europe would respond with a massive atomic, strategic air war against the Soviet Union. After short-term resistance on the Rhine, American occupation forces in Europe were to be delivered into safety by way of French and Italian seaports. In the spring of 1949, with the US now a member of NATO, the strategy was changed so as to be able to defend the river Rhine as early as possible. The goal was now to be ready to deploy American occupation forces to offset a Soviet attack and not, as was originally planned, to withdraw them without fighting. However, because of the scarcely available air power within the framework of the *Offtackle* planning, one saw in the United States a realistic means of defense for Southern Europe and Great Britain. Winning back continental Europe was thought to be feasible within two years of the start of hostilities.¹⁸

¹⁷ See Haftendorn, 1991, p.144.

¹⁸ See Greiner, C., "Militärstrategische Konzeptionen für die Verteidigung Westeuropas 1948 bis 1950," in Wiggershaus, N. and Foerster, R.G.(eds.), *Die westliche Sicherheitsgemeinschaft 1948-1950. Gemeinsame Probleme und gegensätzliche Nationalinteressen in der Gründungsphase*

Global demands and budget constraints continued to influence United States' military strategy for NATO. From the worldwide possibility of war with the Soviet Union and the only effective means of defense a Strategic Air Command (SAC) armed with atom bombs emerged the concept of total war to contrast with limited war. This was a concept that was to ensure the Soviet Union's defeat. According to this plan, Europe and the continental mainland were of mere regional importance. Only the European strategic bomber bases and bases on Azores, Greenland and Iceland were of military importance. All these bases represented a peripheral or indirect defense for the continental mainland. The Americans felt that directly and conventionally defending Europe with a continental strategy was not a main priority; or, it was simply something the Europeans had to worry about themselves.

After the Soviets tested their first atom bombs in August of 1949, the American strategy of nuclear deterrence and its defense plans for Europe were questioned. The success of Soviet nuclear technology represented a nuclear threat alongside the conventional; furthermore, the Soviets were in the process of significantly expanding their long-range bomber fleets. Instead of concentrating more on its conventional strategies, Washington reacted by intensifying its own nuclear program and building hydrogen bombs.¹⁹ This decision represented a continuation of previous strategic ideology. The continental European allies deeply mistrusted this development. They

der Nordatlantischen Allianz, Boppard am Rhein 1988, pp. 262-264.

¹⁹ See Wiggershaus, N., "Nordatlantische Bedrohungsperzeptionen im Kalten Krieg 1948-1956," pp. 25-30.

were more interested in America's land forces defending their land and less interested in atom bombs which could destroy Western Europe.

The United States did not entirely forget about NATO's weakness in conventional strategy, however. In the face of an increasing global threat in the form of the Soviet Union and the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, the containment policy (outlined in NSC-20) underwent major revising.²⁰

The ensuing document, NSC68, recommended a major expansion of both general-war and limited-war capabilities and the strengthening of America's allies; a special point was made of allied weakness in Europe. The report estimated that the danger of a major Soviet attack could become acute by 1954, when it was expected that the Soviets would have built up a sizable strategic nuclear force.²¹

The NSC-68 analysis dictated that the West depart from pure atomic deterrence in favor of a conventional strategy.²² The mandatory inclusion of Western Europe in the more narrow security plans of the United States had to include the Federal Republic of Germany. The rearmament of West Germany was now only a matter of time.

2. West German Defense Perspectives Between 1948 and 1950

Germany occupied the front line position throughout the Cold War. Had the Soviet Union chosen to risk armed conflict in Europe, Germany would have been the first country to be overrun, and this is perhaps the first geopolitical reality that the Germans

²⁰ Graebner, N.A. (ed.), *The National Security. Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 23.

²¹ Richardson, J.L., *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance-The Interaction of Strategy and Politics* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 18-19.

²² See Freedman, L., *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 69-71.

confronted. The founding of NATO indirectly increased the Federal Republic's security because the West showed that it was prepared to unite in common defense; furthermore, the United States was tying itself more and more to Europe's destiny. Although the alliance's commitment for support did not include West Germany's territory, it did include the Western occupation troops. In Bonn, the fact that Germany was being disarmed caused grave concern about future security for several reasons: the occupying powers' refusal to commit to support, uncertainty concerning how long the allies would be in Germany, the Berlin blockade that developed in June 1948, armament in the Soviet zone and the knowledge of allied defense plans.²³

According to NATO's defense plans, West Germany east of the river Rhine was considered to be no man's land. This fact made Konrad Adenauer realize that the mere existence of NATO would not be enough ensure the protection for which Germany hoped.²⁴ Germany would have to first become a member of the alliance. Konrad Adenauer's observation 45 years ago is as true today as it ever was for European security. Today, one may consider the area east of the rivers Oder and Neisse to be no man's land. Later, this point will be further explored.

From 1949 on, Adenauer wanted West Germany to become a full member in NATO and be responsible for its share of alliance duties. In return, he wanted the Federal

²³ See Wiggerhaus, N., "Zur Frage der Planung für die verdeckte Aufstellung westdeutscher Verteidigungskräfte in Konrad Adenauers sicherheitspolitischer Konzeption 1950," in *Militärgeschichte seit 1945: Dienstgruppen und westdeutscher Verteidigungsbeitrag*, pp. 15-16.

²⁴ Adenauer, K., *Konrad Adenauer - Erinnerungen 1955-1959* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967), p. 15 ff.

Republic to receive equal status as the other members. West Germany wanted to be defended as far to the east as possible, a view that clearly conflicted with America's *offset* plan still in effect at that time. The river Elbe was to be considered the front line. The first goal was to stop a Russian land attack. The West Germans wanted any battle between the Elbe and the river Rhine to be fought with 55 divisions; 12 would be West German divisions.²⁵ Thus, while the United States was interested in the operative components of the air force and atom bomb in an indirect approach, the Federal Republic tended to value direct defense by conventional means.²⁶

The outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950 caused the United States to drastically alter its policy toward Europe. The surprise attack on South Korea served as a indicator to the world, especially Western Europe, of future Soviet policy. Meanwhile, Western Europe was starting to have more and more doubts about the effectiveness of American nuclear deterrence. The Western Europeans seriously questioned America's strategy of balancing out the Red Army's superiority through nuclear deterrence. On the other side of the Atlantic, America was ready to take energetic measures with allies to improve the West's defense capabilities.²⁷ However, sharp increase in the Europeans' defense contributions did not occur because of the Europeans' weak economic power;

²⁵ See Rautenberg, H.J., and Wiggershaus, N., *Die Himmeroder Denkschrift vom Oktober 1950* (Karlsruhe: G. Braun, 2nd ed., 1985).

²⁶ See Greiner, C., "Militärstrategische Konzeptionen für die Verteidigung West Europas 1948 bis 1950," pp. 278-282.

²⁷ See Haftendorn, 1991, pp. 144-148.

critical German contributions to the alliance did not happen because of French disapproval.

Thus Washington decided to send four additional divisions to Europe and appointed General Dwight D. Eisenhower to be commander-in-chief of NATO troops in Europe (SACEUR). But deploying these troops was perceived to be support for the short term, gradually allowing the Europeans to become responsible for their own defense. Deploying these six divisions represented the clearest, strongest commitment the United States ever had toward Europe. As far as the Americans were concerned, however, this link would not be permanent. In contrast, the European partners' main objective was making the commitment a permanent one, even at that early point in time. The principal function of such a commitment in the early 1950's was "dual containment" of both the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany.²⁸ This became all the more significant when West German defense contributions became America's prerequisite for sending more troops to Europe. So the Federal Republic had benefited from the Korean War in that it was allowed to rearm itself, although rearmament did not occur until 1955.

For the young Federal Republic of Germany, the presence of American troops and resulting guarantee against the Soviet threat meant political stability and a gradual introduction into the international community. The American military presence became an important political factor in Europe and the most important structural reality in German-American security relations.

²⁸ See Hanrieder, W., *Deutschland, Europa, Amerika. Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1989* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1991), p. 7 ff.

B. NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE STRATEGY AND WEST GERMAN DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION (1950-1958)

1. The Defense is Going Nuclear

US foreign and security policy revision peaked when the Korean War broke out. The new military and political program involved a military strategy that put more emphasis on conventional defense but was still based on US nuclear superiority. The Korean War is important because it represents an international challenge to the United States in the form of the Soviet Union. Everyone thought that Western power would be tied down in Asia, that the *domino theory* would dictate involvement in Indochina as it had done in Korea.²⁹ Thus another structural basis for transatlantic security was founded: the Pacific challenge had become a constant rival to the Atlantic. This brought up the question of the alliance's limits. The question of NATO's operational boundaries also came up because the Soviet challenge was a global one that did not accommodate NATO's boundaries. As far as the Americans were concerned, this new challenge underscored the importance of a dominating Anglo-Saxon maritime/air strategy to be able to uphold global deterrence.

Germany remained the most important domino piece. A *forward strategy* was to be implemented as of 1950 to protect Western Europe from a looming *Iron Curtain* and to meet West German security interests. The number of the forces (deployed until 1954)

²⁹ See Mai, G., *Westliche Sicherheitspolitik im Kalten Krieg: Der Korea-Krieg und die deutsche Wiederbewaffnung 1950*, Boppard am Rhein, 1977, pp. 23-24.

necessary to implement this concept was established in February 1952 by the so-called "Lisbon goals," named after the place where NATO held this council meeting. According to the Lisbon goals, the number of existing divisions was to be increased to 96 -- a goal that was never achieved.³⁰

Meanwhile, the partners on both sides of the Atlantic once again deviated from each other's strategic ideas. Besides expanding conventional forces, the United States also introduced an intensive nuclear development program which led to a broad spectrum of nuclear weapons technology in 1953. From strategic hydrogen bombs to tactical nuclear artillery projectiles, the arsenal was quite formidable. It was an arsenal that became the basis of a new concept known as the *New Look*.³¹ This new concept had two simple objectives: deterring war by a threat of nuclear retaliation or winning a war with nuclear weapons. It was hoped that this would preserve conventional forces and thus conserve financial resources. The *New Look* doctrine was a break with the conventional force goals of NSC-68. With this doctrine, American strategic thinking had returned to the nuclear-driven idea of peripheral or maritime/air strategy. After the events of the Korean War "the United States would no longer constrain itself to meet communist military probes with local conventional counterforce, as it had done before."³² Once again, the Americans considered Europe's conventional defense to be mainly a European

³⁰ See Haftendorn, 1991, p. 146.

³¹ See Greiner, C., "Zur Rolle Kontinentaleuropas in den militärstrategischen und operativen Planungen der NATO von 1949 bis 1958," in Maier, K.A. and Wiggershaus, N. (eds.), *Das Nordatlantische Bündnis 1949-1956*, Munich, 1993, p. 154.

³² George, A.L., and Smoke, R., *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 26 ff.

responsibility and its nuclear defense was America's. And once again, NATO's defense plans were adapted to the military strategic and technical developments of the United States. Nuclear and thermonuclear weapons became a part of NATO's operations plans between 1953 and 1957. The *nuclear sword* of the air force represented an instant attack on Soviet air and nuclear potential. The conventional *shield* forces were of drastically reduced importance. In the operative considerations of SACEUR, General Alfred M. Gruenther (appointed in 1953), conventional forces were a low priority. In 1950 talks focused on defense along the *Iron Curtain* with *forward strategy*, but in 1954 the focus was defending a line along the Weser, Fulda, and Main rivers, and the Ludwig Canal. With a range of about 30 kilometers, the American nuclear 280mm cannons had turned about half of West Germany into an atomic battlefield.³³ A NATO maneuver in June 1955 known as *Carte Blanche* provided insight as to how many German casualties could be expected in a nuclear confrontation: through simulated nuclear air maneuvers, it was estimated that casualties would have been in the millions.³⁴ The Americans did not want their own forces in Europe to have to deal with a conventional defense; rather, American forces were to represent a stimulus for nuclear retaliation by means of the SAC, a *trip wire*.³⁵

³³ See Greiner, C., 1993, pp. 154-159.

³⁴ See Fischer, P., "Zwischen Abschreckung und Verteidigung. Die Anfänge bundesdeutscher Nuklearpolitik (1952-1957)," in Maier, K.A. and Wiggershaus, N. (eds.), *Das Nordatlantische Bündnis 1949-1956*, Munich, 1993, p. 279.

³⁵ See Prasuhn, B., *Strategisches Denken in Frankreich und den USA* (Herford: Mittler und Sohn, 1985), p. 77.

The strategic military and technological developments in the United States had significant influence on the shift from "Forward Defense" (MC 14/1) to "Massive Retaliation" (MC 14/2) in the 1950's, which added a nuclear component to deterrence and defense. With the exception of the British, Western Europeans remained nuclear *have nots*, without much likelihood for influential power. European dependence on the American nuclear deterrent dominated transatlantic security relations and made power-sharing impossible. Never did the US cede to any foreign power the authority to launch nuclear weapons, nor would they. Such a decision rested in fact not with NATO but with the US President, SAC, or both -- depending on the circumstances. As a consequence, US leadership in NATO became a structural reality and -- as one sees today -- a benefit for European security.

2. Aspects of German Rearmament Between the Korean War and Entrance into NATO (1952-1955)

The alliance's existence was dependent on the twelve German divisions to fulfill minimum duties of NATO's nuclear-based defense in 1954. Thus, it basically did not matter if a conventional/nuclear or purely nuclear defense was planned; the German divisions were needed in any case.

There was no way that the new *trip wire conception* could possibly have been in the interests of the West Germans, however. Because the state of conventional defense necessitated nuclear weapons deterrence, a nuclear confrontation would have meant a catastrophe on German soil. The Germans, therefore, fought even more for the

conventional defense option and the *forward defense* associated with it. This took place in the hope that every small-scale clash would not eventually develop into a nuclear confrontation. The United States' conventional reduction plans and technical weapons strategies were not the only reasons that *forward defense* failed in the 1950's. The concept was never fully implemented. The British reduced their forces on the continent in order to pay for nuclear armament. The French deployed four divisions to Algeria in 1954.³⁶ The number of divisions in Central Europe sank to 18 in 1956, compared with the 54 that had been planned for this time period in 1950. German contribution remained the heart of *forward strategy*, as far as the United States was concerned. America had taken special note of West Germany's defense efforts even before official entry into NATO. This American consideration of the German defense contribution also counts as one of the structural foundations of American interests in Europe and continues to be significant to this day.

West German defense contributions were not concretely defined until 1955, despite the fact that America had openly demanded that West Germany be rearmed and allowed to enter NATO. Before the treaty concerning Germany's admittance into NATO could be signed in the fall of 1954, and rendered effective in May of 1955, enormous domestic and foreign political opposition had to be overcome. The interior opposition revolved around the question of whether associating with the West or embracing neutrality would be more effective in attaining reunification with Soviet-occupied East

³⁶ See Greiner, C., "Die militärische Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die WEU und die NATO 1954-1957,;" in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956, Band 3*, Munich, 1993, pp. 627-629.

Germany.³⁷ Strong political opposition in France represented the external opposition that had to be overcome.

In the first ten years after the war, France was afraid of a new German threat. Therefore, the European Defense Community (EDC), which was strongly influenced by the French, initially tried to make a German military reemergence possible only if under French control.³⁸ France took seriously the threat of an American withdrawal out of Europe in the event that the Europeans were unsuccessful in agreeing to common defense efforts.³⁹ The failure of a common European defense plan in 1954 strengthened the 1950 American argument for rearming Germany under American auspices, but it especially weakened the European idea. Solving the German question was no longer to be a European problem, rather an Atlantic one.

The Paris Treaties (1954) between France and Germany allowed both countries to reconcile with each other, but also set the structural foundations for disagreement between the two over the *European Europe* that the French wanted and the *Atlantic*

³⁷ For an domestic political discussion on the question of association with the West see Ehlert, H., "Innenpolitische Auseinandersetzungen um die Pariser Verträge und die Wehrverfassung 1954 bis 1956," in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956, Band 3* (see footnote 36), pp. 235-560. The "German question" as an important part of easing East/West tensions found its first high point when the foreign ministers' conference took place in Geneva in October 1955.

Association with the West for a united Germany was not acceptable to the Soviet Union in 1955; see Rupieper, H.J., *Der besetzte Verbündete. Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1949-1955* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991), pp. 446-465 ("Das Scheitern der Genfer Gipfeldiplomatie").

³⁸ See Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), *Militärgeschichte seit 1945: Die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft-Stand und Probleme der Forschung* (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1985), p. 2.

³⁹ See Kaiser, K., and Lellouche, P. (eds.), *Deutsch-Französische Sicherheitspolitik. Auf dem Wege zur Gemeinsamkeit?* (Bonn: Europa Verlag, 1986), pp. 6-9.

Europe that the Federal Republic wanted. However, the Paris Treaties confirmed the Federal Republic's association with the West, the end of occupied rule, and West Germany's entry into the Western European Union (WEU), and later into NATO. The development of permanent institutions also included the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which became the model for future cooperation between Germany and France, and the first steps toward the development of a European Union.⁴⁰

The Germans, as well as the Americans, wanted Germany to be treated as an equal among equals but French/European demands dictated that Germany receive a discriminatory special status. Thus the EDC treaty was adhered to, which had a provision stipulating that West Germany not manufacture or possess atomic, chemical, or biological weapons.

To conclude, the United States, by its presence in West Germany, inherited the duty of ensuring that the Federal Republic could not engage in any suspicious military/political adventures. When the Federal Republic of Germany was founded, the United States became the protector power for Germany; after Germany's entry into NATO, this was backed by a treaty. The American troops served as a trip wire for triggering a nuclear retaliation in case of a Soviet attack. The US took special care to link West European defense with that of North America. This is how a nuclear unequipped West Germany finally came under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. All in all, Germany's admittance into NATO meant that the geopolitical heart of Western Europe

⁴⁰ See Campbell, E.S., *Germany's Past and Europe's Future* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), pp. 76-77.

became an integral part of NATO. Furthermore, when the Geneva talks had failed, Germany's admittance into NATO also established the European political power structure after World War II, which lasted until the events of 1989.

C. PROBLEM AREAS OF NATO'S NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND ASPECTS OF BUILDING UP THE BUNDESWEHR (1952-1955)

German-American relations were strained in many ways toward the end of 1956; the rearmament crisis of the German armed forces (the *Bundeswehr*), the *Radford Plan*, and the *Suez Crisis* are a few examples of issues and events which posed obstacles to the maintenance of a positive relationship. America's forced nuclearization of alliance strategy continued to be a sore point, especially for continental Europeans. The emphasis on nuclear weapons for Western defense continued to challenge the feasibility of maintaining the alliance's conventional forces.

1. The Rearmament Crisis and the Radford Shock

When, beyond the alliance's limits and borders, France became more caught up in Algeria and the British became involved in Cyprus, the German *Bundeswehr* inherited a key role in Central European defense. In the eyes of the allies, however, it seemed as though the Germans wanted to postpone the rearmament program. In 1955, for example, 605,000 troops were promised by 1958, but the Germans wanted only 323,000 redeployed by 1961. The Germans, however, assured the United States that 323,000 troops would not be the maximum number of troops.⁴¹ The rearmament of German forces

⁴¹ See Greiner, "Die militärische Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die WEU

was delayed in all areas. The causes for this included not only a tight budget,⁴² but continuous domestic political disputes involving a large sector of society which was and had always been against German rearmament. This was important for the Adenauer administration during the uncertain 1957 parliamentary elections. During NATO's *Annual Review Conference*, the German government, and especially the German Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Strauss, had to take sharp criticism from the Americans concerning insufficient financial efforts to rebuild the German military.⁴³

Further American, and also British, criticism came as a result of Germany's sluggishness in paying the costs for stationing Allied troops on German soil. The Americans increasingly criticized the Germans for not carrying their fair share of the financial and military burden to defend the Atlantic community.⁴⁴ This kind of accusation, associated with the factor of burden-sharing, would become the most important structural reality throughout NATO's history and German-American security relations.

The question of German force contribution to NATO remains a major concern in US-German security relations. The United States fears that today Germany could carry

und die NATO 1954-1957," pp. 750-751.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 758-759.

⁴³ See Greiner, C., "Nordatlantische Bündnisstrategie und deutscher Verteidigungsbeitrag, 1954 bis 1957," in *Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), Vorträge zur Militärgeschichte*, Volume 4, Herford 1983, p. 133.

⁴⁴ See Thoß, B., "Der Beitritt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur WEU und NATO im Spannungsfeld von Blockbildung und Entspannung (1954-1956)," in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956, Band 3*, Munich, 1993, pp. 204-205.

out further reductions of their agreed peace time ceiling of 370,000 soldiers for all German Forces and simultaneously try to fill the gap with NATO, and especially US, troops.⁴⁵ US military experts also fear that Germany, under the conditions of the agreed new force structure, could transform the *Bundeswehr* into a "hollow army"⁴⁶ that depends significantly on mobilization, a development the US military had to experience in the post-Vietnam War period.

In the mid-1950's, increasing stagnation of the alliance's policies were not only evident in Germany's clumsiness in rearming or in France's and Great Britain's activities in the Mediterranean fringes of alliance territory. The situation became more serious when the United States, in light of President Eisenhower's doctrine of a *New Look*, began to openly discuss curtailing its conventional activities in Europe. According to a *New York Times* article on July 13, 1956, the Pentagon seemed quite adamant about curtailing conventional forces by 800,000 troops.⁴⁷ The timing and the degree of curtailment, which was largely tied to the name of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Arthur W. Radford, caught the West German government off guard.⁴⁸ West Germany became involved in a fierce domestic political debate concerning the proportion of German contribution to the alliance; the open debate in the United States reinforced the German opposition's criticism of German rearmament. How could Chancellor Adenauer justify

⁴⁵ See for example, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, "Kein Verständnis," February 19, 1993.

⁴⁶ Kuiper, M. A., "Return of the Hollow Army," *Military Review*, August, 1993, pp. 2-9.

⁴⁷ See Thoß, 1993, p. 216.

⁴⁸ See Richardson, 1966, pp. 41-42.

the need for a German military geared toward conventional deterrence and defense if President Eisenhower wanted to drastically curtail American conventional efforts for the *New Look*? The *Radford Plan* caused Bonn to become extremely distrustful, which in turn led to a radical change in German defense policy. Among new considerations were a reduction of compulsory military service from eighteen to twelve months, and the possibility of a nuclear reorganization of the *Bundeswehr*.⁴⁹

Germany's mistrust grew when the October 1956 Suez Crisis demonstrated that the alliance partners could not count on political consultation with the United States.⁵⁰ The *Suez Crisis* also demonstrated that the alliance was continuously being influenced by the national interests of individual member states outside of alliance territory, as was the case with French military operations in Algeria. This leads back to the consideration of the *limits of the alliance* as a structural reality in NATO and transatlantic security relations. In this case Great Britain and France wanted to respond to the nationalization of the Suez Canal with military force, if needed. The British call for NATO solidarity in this crisis threatened to intensify the north/south conflict within NATO. The United States sought to play the role of neutral mediator and had condemned the hasty use of violence.

The *Suez Crisis* brought about the realization of a central prerequisite for the alliance's negotiating power, and has made NATO's reform difficult to this day. NATO emerged as a regional security alliance necessitated by a common security threat analysis.

⁴⁹ See Fischer, 1993, pp. 280-281.

⁵⁰ See Thoß, B., 1993, pp. 224-226.

NATO did not originate from the necessity to create a political and economic union. Efforts going beyond NATO's spatial and scope limits had to solve all internal conflicts of interest and gave the alliance a permanent alternative: coming to a consensus by finding a lowest common denominator, or risk a break-up of the alliance.

2. The German Conventional Option and the Alliance's Nuclear Strategy

After the *New Look* was implemented in NATO through NATO Strategy MC 14/2 ("Massive Retaliation"), the focus on nuclear defense increased at the expense of conventional defense. This was widely criticized in Bonn. There was only one way out of the cycle of nuclear deterrence (which meant nuclear defense and implied a German nuclear wasteland): building up conventional defenses. The Radford Plan provided the impetus for Bonn to participate in efforts aimed at the reduction and control of nuclear weapons, rather than focusing exclusively on a nuclear defense. The Germans felt that increased dependence on nuclear weapons would run the risk that these weapons would be used as soon as any conflict developed.⁵¹ In light of the Soviet satellite *Sputnik* liftoff on October 4, 1957, there was another danger: decreasing trust in the reliability of American nuclear protection for Western Europe. If it was expected that United States soil was no longer invulnerable to nuclear attack, the US would have decided to respond to the threat of nuclear weapon deployment only if its own vital interests were at stake.⁵² It was feared that a regional conflict, one involving Berlin for example, would not justify using nuclear weapons. As a result of these fears, the French started thinking about

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

⁵² See George, A.L., and Smoke, R., 1974, p. 30.

obtaining their own nuclear forces and emphasizing closer relations with the continental European NATO states. Adenauer thought about this goal too, considering a review of the international ban on Germany producing NBC weapons.⁵³ Tactical nuclear weapons were more important to him than German nuclear-equipped long-range bombers and rockets. Temporary nuclear euphoria even allowed him to go so far as to talk about nuclear hand-held weapons to make up for reduced conventional forces.⁵⁴

The already mentioned open harmony between German and French defense expectations strengthened the American justification of its policy for European interests, but did not stop France from pursuing its own nuclear program. Germany, which ended up not possessing nuclear weapons, had gained more of a voice in nuclear affairs as a result of the creation of a Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1966.

D. GERMAN-FRENCH RELATIONS AND THE QUESTION OF THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1958-1964)

The United States was becoming increasingly concerned with the fact that Franco-German relations were improving over the transatlantic problem areas mentioned previously, which seemed to promise the creation of a "Paris-Bonn Axis."⁵⁵

⁵³ Ibid., p. 220.

⁵⁴ See Greiner, "Die militärische Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die WEU und die NATO 1954-1957," pp. 732-733.

⁵⁵ See McGhee, G., *At the Creation of a New Germany. From Adenauer to Brandt-an Ambassador's Account* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 20-36.

Like many Europeans, Americans were surprised and concerned by the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation signed by de Gaulle and Adenauer on January 22, 1963, during Adenauer's official visit to Paris. Adenauer's great respect for de Gaulle and his desire to use their friendship to bring Germany and France together were well known. The treaty came so soon after de Gaulle vetoed British entry into the Common Market that his move had the aura of German approval, or at least acquiescence. The US government had been particularly disturbed by the anti-American implications of the press conference in January 1963 at which de Gaulle pronounced his veto. Germany was concerned about the effect of the treaty on German relations with the United States and on NATO, from which France was in the process of disengaging.⁵⁶

George McGhee, US ambassador to Bonn, expressed concern over a common Franco-German, anti-NATO, and anti-American policy. This represented another cornerstone in German-American relations that had from the beginning been a headache. American uneasiness concerning the establishment of the Franco-German *Eurocorps* (1991-1992) is the best recent example. The fact that Germany's Atlantic partnership with the United States was never doubted meant that its concurrent reconciliation and cooperation with its European neighbor France, which had withdrawn from NATO in 1966, was a constant political juggle.

President John F. Kennedy wanted to hinder such a special relationship between Germany and France by creating an "Atlantic Partnership" and promising a united Europe equal rights of co-determination, especially in nuclear affairs. Moreover, the widely discussed Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) in the beginning of the 1960s (1959-1964) was supposed to hinder West German nuclear ambitions as well as make it unnecessary for Germany to depend on France too much. The undiminished and, since the second

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p. 23.

Berlin crisis (1958-1961), increased presence of American troops was supposed to convince West Germany that the US was still acting in Germany's best interests.

The increase of American troops in Germany had another purpose. The Soviet Union's development of intercontinental missiles meant that US territory was now vulnerable; thus the strategy of *Massive Retaliation* was no longer feasible. This strategy had been subject to widespread criticism for allowing little or no options even before Sputnik (1957).⁵⁷ From a German point of view, there was still doubt, based on America's vulnerability, that the US would employ its strategic systems should a conflict arise. From the American point of view, the existence of their nuclear weapons was based on a military strategy to safeguard alliance interests and to avoid conflict with the Soviet Union after reaching a nuclear stalemate. Since the end of the 1950's, the US considered itself to be confronted with its own nuclear dilemma: wanting to have the weapons to contain Soviet influence and at the same time wanting to reduce the risk of nuclear involvement. The Federal Republic and its European alliance partners have since considered themselves vulnerable to removal from the US nuclear umbrella. US policy toward the other nuclear superpower, now geared more toward global stability, did not necessarily correspond to the Federal Republic's perception of its regional interests.

Flexible Response Strategy (MC 14/3, 1961/1967-1991) was a deviation from the quality of nuclear guaranty envisaged in the *Massive Retaliation Strategy*, and afforded conventional forces a more significant role.⁵⁸ Conventional forces were to no longer be a

⁵⁷ See Prasuhn, 1985, pp. 79-81.

⁵⁸ George, A.L., and Smoke, R., 1974, p. 31.

trip wire, but gain the ability to halt aggression and, if possible, end a conflict without using nuclear weapons. This American change of course, adapting to the political and military orientation of the Soviet Union, brought forth new doubts in Germany. On the one hand the now necessary conventional forces were supposed to be sufficient to stop a quick strike of Soviet troops. On the other, as far as the Germans were concerned, these troops were in no way a replacement for nuclear retaliation. Had this been the case, a war would have been regionally limited, and the United States would have been spared the effects of a nuclear war, but Germany, as the potential battlefield, would have been razed to the ground.

This is why West Germany pushed for nuclear participation. The MLF was an opportunity to do just that. With the formation of the MLF, Bonn hoped to become involved in nuclear deployment and planning operations.⁵⁹

However limited its military functions, the MLF would be an effective symbol of American-European interdependence. It is very likely that, at least in 1963, this was the most important German motive for supporting the MLF, not merely the most frequently voiced. An interest in entering the nuclear business would necessarily be much less publicly voiced, but there is little reason to suppose that this was the 'real' motive; the indications are that in the circumstances of 1963, with the 'first-things-first' mood of German officials, the interest in strengthening Atlantic interdependence was in fact the overriding objective of German policy on the MLF.⁶⁰

When the MLF failed in 1964/65, the Federal Republic retained carrier weapons, but their warheads remained under American control. Membership in the Nuclear

⁵⁹ See Kelleher, C.M., *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 228-269.

⁶⁰ Richardson, 1966, p. 70.

Planning group remained important for Germany in order to have its nuclear interests represented. The MLF proved that the Atlantic partnership had the highest priority for the Federal Republic, despite the threat of French intrusion.

E. BURDEN-SHARING AND THE FEAR OF AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE

Not only in present times have Europeans, especially the Germans, worried that the Americans' changing national interests would cause them to turn away and withdraw from Europe. It was, after all, Thomas Jefferson who coined the phrase *entangling alliances*. Giving up the Atlantic alliance in favor of returning to an isolationist policy has since WWII been tied with to the European fear of once again being abandoned to an unsure fate.

In the mid-1960's, the first substantial reduction of American troops in Europe took place. Significantly reduced tensions between East and West in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis and improved strategic air transport capabilities made this move possible. The Vietnam War made it necessary. On the one hand, personnel in Germany were withdrawn because they were needed in Vietnam. On the other, they were withdrawn because of budget constraints. These budget constraints led to American troops in Germany being reduced from 280,000 to 265,000.⁶¹ The US balance of payments deficit was growing at the same rate Western Europe was recovering economically from the consequences of World War II. Because of the subsiding East-West conflict and

⁶¹ See Haftendorn, 1991, p. 138.

improved crisis management capability, the circles in Washington that wanted further reduction of American troops in Europe gained more influence. Influential Senator Mansfield, for example, insisted that American troops in Europe be substantially reduced, pointing to an unequal burden-sharing in the alliance. He introduced an amendment in 1968 based on this argument which called for American troops to be reduced to 50,000 that same year.

If such actions were political warning signs for Western Europe, then the offset payments in the 1960's had a much more concrete meaning for Germany, as evidenced by the following quote from George McGhee:

The United States, in light of its balance of payments problems, could not continue the present rate of military expenditures abroad. We had already taken concrete steps to improve our position, as recently reported by the President to the Congress. We appreciated greatly the assistance that Germany had rendered in the past through the offset purchases of military equipment. It was, however, absolutely essential that we receive as an offset the full amount of our dollar expenditures in Germany -- \$1.3 billion in the next two years, not the \$1 billion that had been suggested by the Germans.⁶²

For the first time, a correlation between currency offset and troop deployment had been established. Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's administration, fighting budget difficulties of its own, had such problems with this in 1966 that the administration fell apart and had to form a grand coalition with the SPD.

The *offset payments* created an exceptional example of the burden-sharing problem, because the payments were made only by Germany. Besides being financially burdensome, these arrangements were also difficult because the principle of equal rights

⁶² McGhee, 1989, pp. 90-91.

and fair treatment had from the beginning been seen as a prerequisite for a German military contribution. Not until later was German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt able to eliminate such special treatment of this financial matter.⁶³

This did not solve the fundamental problem of burden-sharing. The problem was and is difficult to solve because NATO members' individual interests will not allow for simply balancing out costs with alliance membership. The United States, however, pressed for a more fair distribution of duties and responsibilities within the Atlantic alliance well into the 1980's. The burden-sharing debate thus became a burden to the alliance. American demands for more European solidarity remained closely tied with the American presence in Europe. A good example for the burden-sharing debate is the "Stoessel Demarche" of November 1980, named after the US ambassador to the Federal Republic, in which West Germans were asked to contribute more. Subsequently, a treaty on "Wartime Host Nation Support" (WHNS) came about. According to this treaty, the Federal Republic declared itself ready to supply personnel and facilities to support American reinforcement units in case of a crisis. The NATO infrastructure program of 1984, the establishment of *Patriot* air defense systems, and last, but not least, European willingness to deploy intermediate-range missiles in August 1983 led to a temporary quieting of the debate during the last phases of the Cold War.⁶⁴

⁶³ See Schmidt, H., *Menschen und Mächte* (Berlin: Siedler 1987), pp. 215-216.

⁶⁴ See Inacker, M.J., "Die europäische Leistung: Lastenteilung als Einflußfaktor auf die amerikanische Präsenz," in Mahnke, 1991, pp. 524-527.

Other events, such as the 1973 Yom-Kippur War, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, and Panama, had already shown how significant burden-sharing would be in the future. The United States constantly confronted the Federal Republic with the expectation of supporting the United States in conflicts even outside alliance territory. This was a constant thorn in the side of Bonn. On one hand, West German forces could be deployed outside alliance territory. On the other, characteristic of German-American security relations, the German public has always deeply mistrusted American military intervention in crisis areas outside of NATO territory. As former Defense Minister Georg Leber put it, this led to the Germans renouncing such US actions three times "even before the cock crows the first time"⁶⁵ rather than automatically going along with them to make maintenance of the alliance easier. An equally mistrustful Washington sometimes also neglected to promptly let NATO members know of its own national military operations.

The burden-sharing debate went on until 1988, and the demise of the Warsaw Pact as a military threat. The end of the threat meant that NATO lost the outside pressure that motivated solidarity in the alliance. Since then, burden-sharing, such a fundamental factor in German-American security relations, has taken on a whole new meaning, with new consequences to be considered. This became clear with regard to the Gulf War, as the following pages suggest.

⁶⁵ Quoted by Schweigler, G., "Die Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland als Faktor amerikanischer Politik," Mahnke, 1991, pp. 487-488.

F. DÉTENTE AND DETERRENCE

No subject in German-American security relations better demonstrates the structural contrast between US global interests and West Germany's mainly regional interests than the attitude toward the Soviet Union concerning détente and deterrence. West Germany's fear of sacrificing German security interests on the superpowers' altar of strategic balance is seen throughout German-American post-WWII relations.⁶⁶

Interestingly enough, these German-American conflicts of interest had characteristics that varied with the political climate. Wanting to turn more to the West, Adenauer pressed for a tougher policy toward the Soviet Union, especially during the *Berlin Crisis* and the building of the Berlin Wall that followed soon after. A cautious and reserved American policy toward the Soviet Union, especially when tensions were easing after Stalin's death, made Bonn fear Germany's becoming neutral as a result of American policy.⁶⁷

The Willy Brandt chancellorship during the early 1970's had exactly the opposite view.⁶⁸ Motivated by Kennedy's foreign policy, Willy Brandt, together with Egon Bahr (Brandt's close assistant in Berlin in the 1950s and later in the Chancellor's Office) developed a policy of "change by approaching" the East, or *Ostpolitik*.⁶⁹ Now it was the

⁶⁶ See Hacke, C., "Die Entscheidung für die politische Westbindung nach 1945," in Zitelmann, R., Weissmann, K., and Grossheim, M., *Westbindung* (Frankfurt/M.: Propyläen, 1993), pp. 139-144.

⁶⁷ See Richardson, 1966, p. 60.

⁶⁸ See Craig, G.A., and George, A.L., *Force and Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 137.

⁶⁹ See Herf, J., *War by Other Means, Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles* (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 32-43.

West Germans who were establishing a policy to ease relations with the East as well as Washington, where there was a mistrustful reaction. "Brandt and Bahr accumulated a host of critics who believed that the intentions and certainly the consequences of their policies would in fact lead to a revival of German nationalism, neutralism, and a loosening of West Germany's Atlantic ties."⁷⁰

The conflict that had the most consequences for German-American security relations in early NATO history originated out of differing interests and concerns of both countries involving the Soviet Union. This conflict took place when President Carter and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt were in office. Both seemed to agree that German-American relations were never worse than they were in the late 1970's.⁷¹ The *Neutron Bomb Affair* also played a role in this, although this incident will not be explored any further here.⁷²

Easing tensions between West Germany and the Soviet Union have continued to play a role in German politics since 1970. The climax of this development was the CSCE Final Act in Helsinki in the summer of 1975. As far as the Americans were concerned, their relations with the Soviet Union were completely dependent on the outcome of the SALT II negotiations. SALT II was also in German interests. Schmidt wanted the SALT II negotiations to include the Soviet Backfire bomber. He was even more concerned with

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, p. 39.

⁷¹ See Schweigler, 1991, p. 503.

⁷² See Herf, 1991, pp. 60-62.

discussing the recent deployment of Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles as a key issue for the treaty.⁷³

In contrast to President Gerald Ford, President Jimmy Carter did not want to include the Soviet SS-20 missiles, which were a threat only to Europe, in the negotiations. Schmidt suspected that these weapons were being used for the political blackmail of Europe, and that Carter was interested only in the security of his own country. Schmidt had the following to say about this: "I was fed up with Brzezinski and Carter, who had told me that the Russian SS-20 did not matter at all...they didn't understand that the SS-20 was a political threat, political blackmail against Germany most of all and later on against others in Europe..."⁷⁴

In strengthening his demands that the SS-20 missiles be included in SALT II negotiations, Schmidt addressed the issue in his famous October 1977 London speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Chancellor Schmidt said:

Changed strategic conditions confront us with new problems. SALT codifies the nuclear strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. To put it another way: SALT neutralized their strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe this magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional systems.⁷⁵

Schmidt's London speech, calling attention to the political implications of an imbalance in intermediate-range nuclear weapons, was surely a turning point in the

⁷³ See Schmidt, 1987, p. 64.

⁷⁴ Quoted from Herf, 1991, p. 54.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 55.

history of the Cold War in Europe, and in the rhythms of global politics in general. This speech led directly to the "two-track" NATO decision of December 1979 and the deployments of 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 cruise missiles on West European soil in 1983.⁷⁶

The *Euromissile dispute* was significant for two reasons. First, West Germany, previously suspected of indifference, had confirmed that it was aligned with the West and NATO. Second, the Soviet Union's strategy of threatening with their SS-20 missiles had failed; the Soviets had thus reached the limits of their strategic and geopolitical competitiveness.

The missile deployments of fall 1983 completed a reversal in the global balance of forces that began with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's speech in London in October 1977. These deployments dealt Soviet foreign policy one of its most decisive defeats of the postwar era, and were the indispensable precondition for the INF Treaty of December 1987. The Western victory of fall 1983 may have contributed to the emergence of 'new thinking' in the Soviet Union and to the subsequent collapse of communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe.⁷⁷

In October 1986 in Reykjavik, Reagan and Gorbachev discussed the disarmament of all intermediate-range missiles in Europe. In the winter of 1987 they came to an agreement, the "zero-zero option"⁷⁸. This is further proof that the United States had given higher priority to its own security interests on a global strategic level, in contrast to the regional interests of its Western European alliance partners. The "zero-zero option,"

⁷⁶ See Schweigler, 1991, p. 509.

⁷⁷ Herf 1991, p. 226.

⁷⁸ See Noguee and Donaldson, 1992, pp. 368-369.

which involved the disarmament of all nuclear systems not only between 1,000 and 5,000 km but also over 500 km, underlines the US effort since the 1960's to limit as much as possible its own risk of being involved in a nuclear confrontation in Europe. One might even conclude that the INF Treaty represented the beginning of the end of American nuclear guarantees for Europe.

According to West European strategic thought, the American intermediate-range missiles stationed in Europe served to deter a Soviet attack, particularly by being coupled with American strategic nuclear potential. Withdrawing these systems would thus have to lead to a reduction in the alliance's deterrence capabilities.⁷⁹ The Germans were worried about the inclusion of "their" Pershing IA, just as they had been concerned about tactical weapons in the mid-1950's. The old principle was once again in effect: the shorter the range, the greater the impact on German security.⁸⁰

The breakup of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union spared NATO and German-American security relations a further test, which would inevitably have dealt with the question of modernizing the remaining nuclear systems. NATO put off the 1983 Montebello modernization decision in the summer of 1989.⁸¹ Both sides of the Atlantic have avoided the topic of extended deterrence for protecting Europe ever since.

⁷⁹ See Pond, E., "Sind wir verraten und verkauft?" in *DIE ZEIT*, 26 June 1987.

⁸⁰ See Schweigler, 1991, p. 518.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 519.

Reykjavik was not only the beginning of denuclearization, as far as the INF was concerned; it was also a contributing reason for forming a "European defense identity."⁸² Reykjavik was the latest point at which the West European allies perceived that the US would remain ready to safeguard Europe's strategic protection, but that this readiness would be linked to a policy of decreased responsibility with regard to the alliance in Europe. What strengthened this belief even further was the SDI program, which many Germans felt would form an umbrella over the USA while leaving the Europeans in the (nuclear) rain.⁸³ It was clear that the Europeans would have to intensify their own efforts. Evidence of these European efforts have, since 1987, come in the form of the revival of the Western European Union (WEU), the development of a common European foreign and security policy within the framework of the European Community (EC), today's European Union (EU), and, finally, the establishment of the *Eurocorps*.⁸⁴ All of these developments increased European self-reliance and caused new transatlantic difficulties, as evidenced by the dispute over the Franco-German *Eurocorps* initiative.⁸⁵

⁸² See Rühl, L., "Die geopolitische Frage Europas und die Grundlage einer europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur," in Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (ed.), *Sonderforschungsvorhaben "Analysen Sicherheits-/Verteidigungspolitik IV" (SASVP IV)*, Ebenhausen, 1993, Band 5, pp. 82-83.

⁸³ See Hacke, C., "Der Einfluß von SDI auf die Beziehungen zwischen den USA und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Funke, M., Jacobsen, H.-A., and Knütter, H.-H. (eds.), *Demokratie und Diktatur-Geist und Gestalt politischer Herrschaft in Deutschland und Europa*, a publication series of the Federal Center for Political Education, Volume 250, 1987, pp. 460-475.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ See Denison, A., "Die Haltung der USA gegenüber dem 'Euro-Korps': Akzeptanz oder Ablehnung?" in Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, ed., *Kurzpapier der Abteilung Außenpolitik*, Nr. 50, Bonn, 1992.

As mentioned earlier, the *Eurocorps* was a new occasion for old worries. In 1963, the Americans were concerned about a reconciliation between Germany and France. Now the Americans were afraid that the Franco-German *Eurocorps* project would again weaken NATO and loosen German integration into the alliance.

G. AFTER THE WALL CAME DOWN: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY'S UNIFICATION

That the United States was a power representing protection and support became clearer than ever during German reunification in 1989 and 1990. A hastily concluded Two-Plus-Four Treaty, which gave Germany its full sovereignty, would have been impossible without American support.⁸⁶ One of the deciding factors for the Americans was that a reunified Germany would remain a member of NATO.⁸⁷

The Bush administration considered it a high priority to keep reunified Germany from turning away from the West. It was important to maintain good relations with reunified Germany, which suddenly became the greatest power east of Washington and west of Moscow. It was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that America had challenged Bonn to be a "partner in leadership." This was not only important for the Bush administration's above-mentioned interests; it is also an expression of an American

⁸⁶ See Merkl, P., *German Unification in the European Context* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), pp. 355-359.

⁸⁷ See Ackermann, A., and Kelleher, C., "The United States and the German Question: Building a New European Order," in Verheyen, D., and Soe, C. (eds.), *The Germans and Their Neighbors* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 416.

expectation that the US would not be the one to carry the burden of responsibility for Germany and Europe in the future, as was the case during the Cold War. This expectation was doomed to go unfulfilled. This is one of the most important lessons the Transatlantic alliance must learn in the post-Cold War era.

Being named a "partner in leadership" was as big a surprise to Germany as reunification. Since the end of World War II, a special relationship between Germany's citizens and force and statecraft has been created. As long as a potential front line ran through the middle of Germany, Germans in former West Germany had been prepared to accept the costs resulting from the East-West confrontation and the need to maintain a defense contribution. These German forces existed only as a part of the greater NATO military organization, and there was no independent General Staff from which to coordinate exclusively German military operations.. Hence, not only would the then 500,000 man strong *Bundeswehr* not have been capable of carrying out a self-reliant military operation, but there was also the suggestion that Germany was not responsible for itself, relying on the actions of NATO to provide protection. The Germans saw NATO as a kind of insurance policy, where one contributes a certain amount to the insurance company, who will cover the costs of a future emergency. NATO, as the insurer of West Germany, was responsible for handling all of activities involving a claim, as it were. The Federal Republic therefore considered NATO, and mainly the United States, responsible for its security.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ See Feldmeyer, 1993, pp. 470-471.

This attitude originated from past experience: after experiencing war twice this century, many Germans desire not to have military power, which they see as a guarantee that the state will not abuse it.⁸⁹ The forty-year period of West German foreign and security policy involving limited sovereignty was attractive for many Germans because they could leave existential matters to others, especially the United States.

Thus reunification has meant the end of a special role for Germany. For the Germans this means that they must find their way around in a political reality which, since 1945, they thought they had escaped. The 1991 Gulf War, for instance, caught the Germans completely off guard. They learned a bitter lesson: that war is still a political instrument and is, under certain conditions, justified.

H. CONCLUSIONS

After World War II ended, the United States was not especially willing to take over the role of world leader. The American role as a European power in an *entangling alliance* contradicted an apparently sacred isolationist tradition. But this role was unavoidable in the face of looming Soviet expansionism. After all, nobody wanted to repeat the mistakes of 1923 and leave Europe to an unsure future again.

The "grand strategy" of the United States not only included democracy but free market economies and establishing an open world economic system for military and political containment of the Soviet Union. The combination of military alliances and

⁸⁹ See Baumgartner, H.M., and Wellershoff, D. (eds.), *Frieden ohne Macht?* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991).

footholds around the Eurasian power block, military strategies, and forces as well as arms control treaties held a global opponent (the Soviet Union) in check. These factors threatened to severely limit the Soviet Union's offensive option to unilaterally change the post-war order of Yalta while at the same time providing security to the allies in Europe, especially the Germans in the Federal Republic.

The principle of this "grand strategy" remained in effect for nearly a half century. Only the means and methods changed; the all-important role of nuclear weapons, a centerpiece of almost every strategy debate, was key in all phases of American post-war policy. Conflicts over the question of means and methods repeatedly arose, especially in the Atlantic community. The strategic interests of the European allies, whose main goal was to prevent a regional war in Central Europe, was destined to clash with the global interests of the United States. This was especially true for the nation whose territory would have become the primary battlefield: the Federal Republic of Germany. This explains why the Federal Republic constantly worried about becoming victim to the strategic goals of the United States, whose security interests included both regional and global crises. The differing strategic and operative views were also of critical importance. The maritime/air strategy of the US had always been an expression of a limited commitment; it allowed for a prompt response to a crisis as well as a prompt disengagement. The same could be said of the peripheral/indirect defense method, in which one seeks to avoid a direct and bloody confrontation with the opponent on the battlefield. There was no way that these methods could have been pursued by

conventional means. For the United States, the key piece in its foreign policy strategy has been and continues to be the atom bomb, both as a threat to be used and a consequence to be avoided

Germany's membership in the Atlantic alliance was not only in Adenauer's interests. The rearming of occupied and demilitarized West Germany was not a goal of the United States in the period after World War II, but the Korean War created a new structural reality. German membership in NATO and close security ties with the United States were a necessity for the US, and became a blessing for the Federal Republic. German security would bear a price for Germany, however, and debate over burden-sharing began, at the latest, in the 1960's. Although threatened many times in order to achieve a more "fair" sharing of the security burden, a significant American withdrawal never took place before the events of 1989.

There was also a correlation between burden-sharing and the regional and political limits of the alliance. Solidarity among NATO members was required when operating outside alliance territory (*out-of-area*), and was proven necessary when participant nations began to act based upon their own national interests. The worldwide containment of the Soviet Union necessarily led to the withdrawal of troops from Europe during the Vietnam War, when US troops were needed elsewhere. Western Europe is now looking, with a certain degree of uneasiness, at the scale of the American military presence in the Atlantic and Pacific regions in order to determine where the predominant American interests lie.

NATO owes most of its success during the Cold War to the fact that the members not only defined their interests, but found the common will to pull together to pursue those interests. Furthermore, it was crucial that there was agreement on the United States taking on the leadership role in the alliance. The future of NATO, as well as the future of close German-American security relations, will in particular depend on whether the necessary harmony of interests among NATO members can be achieved in the future.

III. THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: GERMAN-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF CURRENT CHALLENGES

The end of the East-West confrontation seemed to leave the US with no focus for its deterrent efforts. Initially, the sudden disappearance of the former global opponent seemed to have moved a crucial step closer to ever-lasting peace. Euphoria soon turned to concern, however. This was not the end of history dealt with by Francis Fukuyama, nor is it likely to come in the foreseeable future.⁹⁰ On the contrary, the collapse of the USSR has opened a Pandora's box of nationalist, fundamentalist, secular, and ethnic animosities long overshadowed by the Cold War. These animosities present the most immediate threat to international stability. Additionally, power struggles have emerged to fill vacuums created by the collapse of the former USSR. Against all wishful thinking, there is a *New World Disorder* that confronts not only NATO but also the UN with new challenges.⁹¹

To the UN, the end of the East-West conflict also means the end of a period marked by the inability to act. In Europe, the Cold War and the Iron Curtain resulted in rigid positions and a razor-sharp division. Conflicts were pursued in other corners of the globe and, in simplified terms, called "proxy wars." Wherever the antagonists encountered each

⁹⁰ See Fukuyama, F., "The End of History?" in *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18.

⁹¹ See Jowitt, K., *New World Disorder-The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 306- 331.

other, the UN Security Council was paralyzed by the veto power of members in opposition.⁹²

As a result of Russia's new willingness to cooperate, the Security Council became a place where positive action can be taken, and the UN can now be seen as a vehicle through which to attempt the management of global crises.. With respect to American-German security relations, the UN became a frame of reference in addition to NATO.

Through unification, the Federal Republic of Germany not only became a larger and sovereign nation, but it also had to assume a larger portion of international responsibility. The crisis in the Gulf, at the Horn of Africa, and in the Balkans were moments of truth for Germany. It was no longer a matter of the allies coming to Germany's defense at its inner border; rather, Germany was now expected to contribute its share to international crisis management, even outside NATO's area of responsibility. The roles that were played by the US and Germany in these crises, and the conclusions to be drawn with respect to American-German security relations are the subject of this chapter.

⁹² See Schmidt, R., "Das Instrumentarium der Vereinten Nationen zum Krisenmanagement und seine Entwicklung in den letzten Jahren," in Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (ed.), *Sonderforschungsvorhaben "Analysen Sicherheits-/Verteidigungspolitik IV"* (SASVP), Ebenhausen, 1993, Band 6, pp. 31-33.

A. THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

1. Operation Desert Storm: A Case of Maritime-Air Strategy

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi military forces poured across the frontier and quickly occupied the tiny oil-rich state of Kuwait. President Bush quickly declared the annexation of what Iraqi President Saddam Hussein called the 'nineteenth province of Iraq' an unacceptable act of aggression. Reviving the moribund collective security provisions of the United Nations, Bush called on the nations of the world to join the Americans in reinstating Kuwait sovereignty. Secretary of State James Baker was dispatched to enlist volunteers; in the end, a coalition of thirty states stood opposite the Iraqi lines. Standing rhetorically with the coalition was the former Soviet Union.⁹³

Only a few days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, President George Bush, in a speech before Congress noted the requirement of creating "a new world order in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony."⁹⁴ The role of force and the role of the United States in this "new world order" were reflected in an exemplary way in the Gulf War.

The reason for the United States' intervention in the Gulf was its strategic interest in securing the oil wells that provide the western industrial nations with an essential portion of their energy. Saddam Hussein's disregard of that interest earned him punishment by military means. Unlike America's Vietnam experience, the Gulf War exploited the full conventional potential of the US arsenal. Since it was a coalition army that had to be commanded and controlled, it was inevitable to reduce objectives to

⁹³ Snow, D.M., *Distant Thunder. Third World Conflict and the New International Order* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 181.

⁹⁴ See Schwarz, K.-D., "Die USA im Übergang zur postkonfrontativen Weltordnung," in Heydrich, W., and others (eds.), *Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands: Neue: Neue Konstellationen, Risiken, Instrumente* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), p. 100.

essentials. Many different interests, including regional interests, had to be reconciled.⁹⁵ Hence, the basic focus of the coalition effort was on restoring Kuwait's sovereignty, bringing hostilities to an early end, and, in the American view, rapidly pulling the US forces out of the theater. Before long, the failure to reach agreement on eradicating the fundamental cause of the problem, Saddam Hussein, proved to be a serious mistake.

Having overcome the former bipolar division in the world community, the United States was in a position, in this first war of the post-Cold War era, to pursue the classical approach to maintaining a balance of power that has been pursued for the past two centuries. The United States, as England in the past, has two global monopolitical advantages that perfectly lend themselves to a maritime strategy. On one hand, the United States is the only nation to still retain the military resources required for global power projection -- similar to England with her fleet in the past.⁹⁶ On the other, given the demise of the Soviet ballistic missile threat, the US has regained the relative invulnerability of a maritime power protected by surrounding seas. Invulnerability and the potential for power projection provide the United States with options no other power in the world has. Invulnerability engenders independence and self-assurance. One can afford to maintain alliances, to join ad hoc coalitions like the one in the Gulf, or to act on one's own. As with Great Britain in the past, the potential for power projection has always permitted intervening in any corner of the world without having to maintain a

⁹⁵ See Snow, 1993, p. 186.

⁹⁶ See Howard, M., *The Continental Commitment. The Dilemma of British Defense Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars* (London: Ashfield Press, 1972).

presence in a variety of theaters. The best and, arguably, the last example, considering the magnitude of the operation, is the Persian Gulf War, which involved the deployment of 500,000 US military personnel. Notwithstanding the United States' intention to use its potential for intervention to fight no more than two regional wars at any one time in the future,⁹⁷ it does retain recourse to implementing the "British Strategy." This strategy is global but discriminating, as will be highlighted in discussing the war in the Balkans.

The Persian Gulf War has shown that the United States wants, and is able, to play the part of a world policeman only in the case of crises that are deemed to involve US interests. Also, the US will assume this task only if other nations, too, provide their financial or military contributions. This requirement also casts a new light upon the issue of burden-sharing.

As far as the liberation of Kuwait was concerned, ideal preconditions existed for the application of military means in the *New World Order*. What was at stake was a strategically important raw material in a strategically important region where three continents meet. There also lingered a supraregional threat stemming from Iraq's impending nuclear arms buildup. The UN Security Council condemned the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, and approved a liberation operation through an ad hoc coalition, the nerve center of which, however, was not in New York, but in Washington.

The Persian Gulf War clearly showed that the American "Grand Strategy" of the Cold War had to undergo a thorough review. In the future, the United States would have

⁹⁷ See Aspin, L., "The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era." September 1, 1993, and Gordon, M.R., "Pentagon Seeking to Cut Military but Equip it for 2 Regional Wars," in *The New York Times*, September 2, 1993, p. A1.

to place increased emphasis on its ability to prevent regional crisis or to solve such crisis by using military force, if required.⁹⁸ The criteria governing such a mission have been highlighted previously, but one must also consider the domestic pressure on the leadership in Washington to reduce America's foreign commitments

2. The Germans to the Front

During the Persian Gulf War, the Germans once again drew heavy criticism to themselves. The media of the western allies denounced the Germans as being ungrateful, maintaining that the allies had done everything they could to help bring about German unification.⁹⁹ There was mention of the "shirking of responsibility" and "checkbook diplomacy," but the main accusation was that Germany did not exhibit common command responsibility within the alliance framework. The way Germany acted, they were quick to state, "has also demonstrated that many Germans, like the Japanese, remain transfixed by years of postwar conditioning to view their country as an economic giant but a political dwarf."¹⁰⁰

When the United States counted its allies at the beginning of the Gulf conflict, Germany initially kept a very low profile. There soon emerged the old alliance of the United States, England, and France, while Germany, along with Japan, was sharply

⁹⁸ See Pocalyko, M.N., "Riding on the Storm: The Influence of War on Strategy," in Tritten, J.J., and Stockton, P.N., *Reconstituting America's Defense. The New US National Security Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1992), pp. 53-56.

⁹⁹ See Schierwater, H.-V., "Deutschland, der Golf und die Allianz-Fragen an die deutsche Außenpolitik," in *Rissener Rundbrief*, April (4), 1991, p. 85.

¹⁰⁰ Hamilton, D., and Clad, J., "Germany, Japan, and the False Glare of War," in *Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1991, p. 41.

criticized in America. It was pointed out that Germany, considering American support since the end of World War II, and recent German economic prosperity, had every reason to shoulder Gulf War burdens with the United States. The Germans could find little solace in the fact that the Japanese, whose interests in the Gulf region were affected much more directly and whose constitutional considerations were drastically different than those of Germany, at times came under even sharper attacks.¹⁰¹

For Germany, the Persian Gulf War was totally unexpected. The Germans would realize once again that "playing an active part in world affairs was not confined to a politically friendly environment."¹⁰² It should also be mentioned, however, that Germany was confronted with the Persian Gulf crisis during a period of difficulties arising from the process of German Unification.

At that time, Bonn's options were limited in several respects. On one hand, it had to follow the escalation of the situation in the Baltic states, where the moribund Soviet Union was making a violent last-ditch attempt to keep the empire from falling apart.¹⁰³ At the same time, the German unification process, the importance of which was totally underestimated by the outside world,¹⁰⁴ had to be implemented at the domestic level and secured at the international level. From the German point of view, it was

¹⁰¹ See Merkl, 1993, pp. 16-22.

¹⁰² Hondrich, O., "Der Golfkrieg hat die Friedfertigkeit der Deutschen erschüttert," in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, January 14, 1992, p. 9.

¹⁰³ See Lieven, A., *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 244-254.

¹⁰⁴ See Zehrer, H. (ed.), *Der Golfkonflikt: Dokumentation, Analyse und Bewertung aus militärischer Sicht* (Herford: Mittler, 1992), p. 307.

particularly important to proceed cautiously and to allay the global uneasiness about a both economically and politically strong Germany.

As a matter of fact, Germany did provide significant assistance to the coalition forces operating in the Persian Gulf region. The initial deployment of the US troops from Germany and, indeed, Operation Desert Storm itself, would probably not have been possible without German assistance. Prior to providing that assistance, though, the Germans had temporarily been tongue-tied and paralyzed. The lesson to be learned in view of the future of American-German cooperation can only be: "Better not to hesitate to do what needs to be done anyway and walk away with a bonus, than act belatedly and get no credit at all."¹⁰⁵

The major part of Germany's contribution was financial aid, which led to the already mentioned accusation of Germany pursuing a checkbook diplomacy. According to a cost breakdown by Michael J. Inacker, the financial contribution totaled 17 billion German marks as of April 1991. Of this amount, about 3.5 billion German marks were paid to the allies as direct military assistance.¹⁰⁶ Considering the fact that the amount of 17 billion German marks, which is more than one third of the total annual defense budget, suffices to maintain a full-strength armored division of 18,000 personnel for 20 years or to maintain the entire Federal Armed Forces, or *Bundeswehr*, for more than six months,¹⁰⁷ one becomes aware of the actual magnitude of Germany's contribution. Yet something

¹⁰⁵ Joffe, J., 1991, p. 218.

¹⁰⁶ See Inacker, M.J., "Der deutsche Golfkrieg," in *Rheinischer Merkur*, September 20, 1991.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

else was expected of Germany, something money cannot buy, namely, sending troops to fight and risk their lives. "The Germans to the front!" This is what was expected of a united Germany. Sending just one tank battalion to the Persian Gulf would probably have sufficed to live up to expectations. Both the government and the domestic opposition maintained, however, that the legal situation ruled out any participation of German armed forces in the liberation of Kuwait. Committing German soldiers abroad was considered in line with the constitution only as long as such commitment served to defend, if only indirectly, the Federal Republic of Germany. This would have been the case had Iraq, during the Persian Gulf crisis, attacked, for instance, NATO member Turkey.¹⁰⁸ What held true for this Turkish scenario did not in the case of Kuwait. The legal aspects of committing German troops, particularly in out-of area missions, will be discussed in more detail in the context of the case study on Somalia.

In the early 1990s, the Persian Gulf War rekindled the debate over burden-sharing and solidarity within the alliance. As the Korean War had shown: war creates reality. In the final analysis, the latest confrontation in the Persian Gulf has created the need for a basic redetermination of a fair and just sharing of financial burdens and responsibilities between the United States and the European allies. From the American angle, this was urgently needed in view of the US economic situation increasingly demanding cuts in the defense budget. All of this was possible because the Soviet Union, and later Russia, had switched from confrontation to cooperation. Also,

¹⁰⁸ See Zehrer, 1992, p. 310.

the Americans considered it appropriate, because the Europeans seemed to become stronger economically and to be determined to engage in wider political cooperation.¹⁰⁹

The Federal Republic of Germany will ultimately have to deal with the issue of "out-of-area" *Bundeswehr* missions. Germany can no longer afford to be an exception to the rule of international participation. "The Persian Gulf War was," as Hondrich put it, "the first war after World War II where the insistence of one's own peaceableness and nonparticipation ran counter to the German economic and security interests -- and especially to Israel's security interests -- and, given these interests, was even bound to be considered untruthful."¹¹⁰

It is a fact that the Federal Republic of Germany, in becoming a member of the United Nations in 1973, accepted, without reservation, all the rights and obligations associated with UN membership. This provides the general basis for *Bundeswehr* participation in UN peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations.¹¹¹ The example of the Persian Gulf War also demonstrates that in the face of today's intertwining of international politics at an all-encompassing global level, it is no longer possible for Germany to limit its security efforts to the regional level. When President Bush talked of "partners in leadership," he also implied that Germany should contribute to protecting international law and implementing democracy and the rule of law as part of the effort to

¹⁰⁹ See Moodie, M., "Burden-Sharing in NATO: A New Debate with an Old Label," in *Washington Quarterly*, 12/1989, pp. 61-71.

¹¹⁰ Hondrich, 1992, p. 9.

¹¹¹ See Bartke, "Internationale Verwendung der Bundeswehr im Rahmen der Charta der Vereinten Nationen," in *Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages*, Info-Brief 132/93, February 1993.

establish the principles of western democracy on a global scale. Germany did not live up to these expectations during the Persian Gulf War, because it simply was not ready at the time. Yet, new tests were not long in coming.

B. WHY SOMALIA AND NOT BOSNIA?

1. Operation Restore Hope

In December 1992, when the US troops went ashore near Mogadishu, they brought along not only firepower but also the world's undivided support. Stirred by pictures of starving children, and appalled by reports of looted warehouses and attacks on relief organization personnel, the world hailed the decision by President Bush to start operation "Restore Hope".¹¹²

At first, the plan seemed to work, because hunger was successfully battled. Over time, however, the operation became more and more questionable. Since 4 May 1993, when the UN assumed command under the name UNOSOM II,¹¹³ the pictures of emaciated children have been replaced by pictures of the terrible events of 3 October 1993 and that naked corpse of a dead US soldier being dragged through Mogadishu's dust by a raucous mob of Somali people. "What in the world are we doing?" *Time* magazine asked an appalled American public and a helpless President Clinton in October 1993.¹¹⁴

¹¹² A detailed description of the background and a noteworthy analysis of the sequence of subsequent events during the UN and US involvement in Somalia until the decision to withdraw the US troops can be found in Bolton, J.R., "Wrong Turn in Somalia," in *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1994, pp. 56-66.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹¹⁴ See *Time*, October 18, 1993.

The escalation of violence in Somalia indicates two things: first, from the outset, the military operation in Somalia lacked a clear and concrete political concept accepted by the participating nations and the UN; second, the operation started without the personnel really knowing the country and its population. President Clinton's decision to double the number of US troops following the disaster of 3 October 1993, while at the same time planning to withdraw all troops by late March 1994, shows the inconsistency of the current American approach to foreign involvement.¹¹⁵ The most serious failure of the whole operation was certainly UN resolution No. 814, through which, on 26 March 1993, the operation in Somalia took on an entirely different quality.¹¹⁶ The once humanitarian relief operation was expanded to be a "nation-building" mission, without anyone knowing just how to go about the task of "nation building." At the same time, the hunt for the powerful clan leader Aidid commenced, and the peace-keeping mission thus rapidly turned into a peace enforcement mission that lacked both the appropriate equipment and UN authorization.¹¹⁷

The withdrawal of the US troops can in large part be attributed to the *CNN factor*. More than any other argument in favor of a sharp reduction of the worldwide US commitment, pictures of captured US soldiers broadcast from Somalia broadcasted into every American living room served to demonstrate the costs associated with being the

¹¹⁵ See *The New York Times*, "Somali Leader Gets Mixed Signals From the US About Its Next Steps," October 9, 1993, p. 7.

¹¹⁶ See Bolton, 1994, p. 62.

¹¹⁷ See Holmes, S.A., "Clinton Defends Aspin on Action Regarding Request for US Tanks," in *The New York Times*, October 9, 1993, p. 7.

world policeman, and set public opinion against expanding such a role in the future.¹¹⁸ Another direct outcome of this development is the new US policy of a more restricted participation in future UN peace-keeping operations.¹¹⁹

With regard to Somalia, the withdrawal of US troops will be a signal to all other nations to withdraw their troops as well.¹²⁰ As a result, Somalia will probably very soon lapse back into its old anarchic structures, and everything that helped calm the situation throughout almost the entire country will be gone within a few weeks.

When the operation started, many Europeans and even more people in the Balkans were wondering about the commitment in Somalia. In Bosnia, where Serb genocide quickly spread in April 1992, US intervention using ground forces would have had a major impact. -- also for humanitarian reasons. If it is true that the United States in the future will confine its commitment as a world policeman in the "new world order" to strategically important regions, the question inevitably arises as to whether Somalia has any strategic importance. What are the legitimate national interests that would warrant such an operation? Are there any oil fields in that region? Does the United States need Somalia as a "flattop" for global power projection?

As mentioned before, the United States is in a position in the post-Cold War era to choose whether, where, and with whom to engage. The question raised at the

¹¹⁸ See Sommer, T., "Dem Sheriff wird der Stern zur Last," in *DIE ZEIT*, October 29, 1993, p. 1.

¹¹⁹ See Williams, D., and Devroy, A., "US Limits Peace-Keeping Role," in *Washington Post*, November 25, 1993, p. A60.

¹²⁰ See *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, "Deutscher Abzug im Sog der USA," October 18, 1993.

beginning is therefore quite simple to answer: the United States went to Somalia because it did not go to Bosnia. The reason is obvious. In contrast to assistance given to Bosnia, assistance given to war-torn Somalia seemed to be an easy gain in prestige without taking too great a risk.

Since 3 October 1993, Bosnia's future -- and the future of Europe as a whole for that matter -- has been even more insecure than before. The US Congress and the general public have never shown much interest in becoming involved in the war in the Balkans, and, since the events in Somalia, the chances of a US engagement with ground forces in Bosnia have plummeted to an absolute low.

The ambitious goals of the no less ambitious UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to help troubled Somalia to get not only rice, but also a new political structure, were directly related to the Balkans.¹²¹ Annoyed that the Europeans had, in Boutros-Ghali's view, passed on to the UN one of their very own problems, the Secretary General pushed through an intervention in Somalia.

Yet a third party is also in Somalia, because it is not in Bosnia: the Federal Republic of Germany. This illustrates that the united Germany is taking great pains to find its role in the world and that it is still quite unsure of how to go about it.

2. The Germans on their Way to the Front

It was a long way to the first armed mission of the *Bundeswehr* outside the NATO area. During the almost forty years of forward defense on domestic territory, hardly anybody in the *Bundeswehr* had seriously believed until 1989 that *Bundeswehr*

¹²¹ See Lerch, G., "Wie weiter in Somalia?" in *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, October 12, 1993.

forces would ever be employed for purposes other than national defense. The utmost that was conceivable was to defend another member of the alliance in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty.

Given its high degree of professionalism and its outstanding equipment, the *Bundeswehr* was considered one of the most effective armies, if not *the* most effective, among the European NATO members. Other nations envied Germany for its conscript army that was every bit as combat capable as a professional army. They also showed admiration for the *Bundeswehr* concept of *Innere Führung*, or leadership and civic education, a concept that became the backbone of the internal structure of the new West German Armed Forces and distinguished them very clearly from the former *Wehrmacht* of the Third Reich. With this new internal structure "never again could blind obedience to orders become the alibi for crimes."¹²²

Both proud and respected, the *Bundeswehr* had demonstrated defense preparedness side by side with the allies, thus successfully contributing to deterrence. Here again, the Persian Gulf War brought about a change. The other NATO members suddenly left Germany to deploy first to the Gulf region and later to the Adriatic, while the German soldiers, made uncertain by the politicians and considered cowards, and deserted by their allied comrades in arms -- both friend and foe -- stayed at home.¹²³

¹²² Abenheim, D., *Reforging the Iron Cross* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 293.

¹²³ See Martenson, S., "Von Feind und Freund verlassen," in *Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt*, February 19, 1993.

In the view of many observers within and without the Federal Republic, it was high time that something was done about the credibility of Germany's foreign policy and its ability to act. In order to prevent a singularization of Germany in NATO, which was for more than four decades a major German concern, the UN mission in Somalia, which carried the label "humanitarian operation," was a welcome opportunity to find a way for Germany to act. As early as 17 December 1992, the German government offered to provide the United Nations, in support of UNOSOM, a reinforced supply and transport battalion of up to 1,500 (later 1,700) personnel to perform "humanitarian tasks."¹²⁴ In particular, German soldiers were offered as personnel to set up a distribution organization for relief goods. However, this offer was made with the understanding that the mission would be carried out in regions "where peace had been established." The reason that this was so important to Bonn was that it provided the only way to win wide support for the mission among the German public and also in the Federal Parliament.

For the *Bundeswehr*, Bonn's decision did not come as a surprise. As early as February 1992, the Federal Government had decided to redefine the mission of the *Bundeswehr*. New risks and threats on one hand, as well as a new strategy and structure of the NATO alliance on the other, led to new tasks for the German Armed Forces.¹²⁵ A new mission package has been established in detail in the "Defense Policy Guidelines,"

¹²⁴ See Hoffmann, O., *Deutsche Blauhelme bei UN-Missionen* (Bonn: Aktuell 1993), pp. 86-87.

¹²⁵ See General K. Naumann, Chief of Staff of the *Bundeswehr*, "Wir betreten alle gemeinsam Neuland - die Dimensionen des neuen Auftrages der Bundeswehr," in *TRUPPENPRAXIS*, 5/1993, p. 444.

which reflect Germany's new role and new responsibilities in the world.¹²⁶ According to this document, the German Armed Forces will protect Germany and its citizens against external danger and political blackmail; it will promote military stability and the integration of Europe and defend Germany as well as its NATO allies; *and* it will contribute to world peace and international security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, providing support in disaster situations and humanitarian operations.

In 1992, the force structure planning of the *Bundeswehr*, was carried out with the so-called "expanded mission spectrum" in mind. The military leaders had done their homework based on the experience gained by observing coalition operations during the Persian Gulf campaign.¹²⁷ This was especially true of rapid deployment and logistical support issues, in which the German military had actually been involved during the deployment phase of Gulf operations. While the old structure of the *Bundeswehr* was primarily tailored to the needs of a Forward Defense of West Germany, the future structure of the German Armed Forces will be not limited to the exclusive defense of the Central Region. It will also incorporate components for crisis management and humanitarian aid operations under NATO or UN auspices.

So, while the *Bundeswehr* was prepared for the Federal Government's decision of 17 December 1992,¹²⁸ the opinion-forming process with respect to *Bundeswehr*

¹²⁶ See Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien*, November 1992.

¹²⁷ See *TAP-Dienst Sicherheitspolitik*, "Die Neuplanung der Bundeswehr," 1-2/93, January 1993.

¹²⁸ See *Neue Ruhr Zeitung*, "Die Truppe ist bereit zum UNO-Einsatz," April 17, 1993.

out-of-area missions in general (meaning missions beyond the NATO limits), and the mission in Somalia in particular, is still going on within the political establishment. Of particular significance is the question of whether the Basic Law permits such missions, or whether there is a need for amending or clarifying the constitution. The debate about this issue is reminiscent of that on German rearmament in the fifties. As in those days, a decision must be made on the future course of German foreign and security policies. Germany's relations with the United States are at stake, as was the case in the years before 1955. As it was then, it is Konrad Adenauer's party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) which is the driving force behind an acceptance of the military, in full consonance with Clausewitzian notions,¹²⁹ as an indispensable instrument of responsible politics -- and this applies also to out-of-area missions.

On 4 October 1990, the Federal Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, said in Berlin that "the unified Germany will meet its increased responsibilities within the United Nations, the European Community, and the Atlantic alliance." Continuing, he noted that it was the intent of the Federal Government to "establish unambiguous constitutional prerequisites soon and to clarify the constitutional bases."¹³⁰ Since there are no clarifying comments in the Basic Law concerning the employment of German Armed Forces outside the national German territory or in combined/joint operations with the armed

¹²⁹ See Clausewitz, C.v., *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

¹³⁰ See Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 12/5, Bonn, January 30, 1991, p. 69

forces of other countries, there is room for broad interpretation by the political parties -- as was the intent of the authors of the constitution.¹³¹

On 20 August 1990, there was a meeting of the party leaders of the CDU, Christian Social Union (CSU), Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) at the Federal Chancellery. At the meeting it was agreed in principle to amend the Basic Law. The proposals and demands of the CDU concerning international missions of the *Bundeswehr* are the most far-reaching ones. The CDU wants the German Armed Forces to become integrated into European multinational formations and to participate in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations on a global scale on behalf of the United Nations.¹³² This means that a clarification of the Basic Law must allow an employment of the *Bundeswehr* for NATO and/or UN missions and for the defense of joint European interests. A solution allowing only "blue helmet" (peace-keeping) missions is seen as unacceptable on the grounds that a clarifying amendment to the Basic Law should effect a change in Germany's international situation, rather than putting *additional* restrictions in place that do not recognize current developments.¹³³

While the CSU is pursuing similar objectives, the FDP, as a member of the government coalition, is calling for an amendment of the Basic Law to allow participation in peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions, the latter being only

¹³¹ See Bartke, 1993.

¹³² See CDU-Infobox, Aktueller Dienst der CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Nr. 7, 1990.

¹³³ See *WELT am Sonntag*, "Beschränkung auf Blauhelme widerspricht dem Völkerrecht," March 17, 1991.

permissible with a two-thirds majority vote of approval in the *Bundestag* (Federal Parliament).¹³⁴

Finally, the SPD, the most important opposition party at the federal level, wants to allow exclusively "blue helmet missions" by an amendment of the Basic Law, but to exclude other military missions beyond NATO territory once and for all.¹³⁵ Although, in terms of the Basic Law, there is a consensus that the deployment of military units for UN missions gives no cause for concern in the areas of humanitarian aid, disarmament measures, transportation tasks, and medical care, the UN deployment of the *Bundeswehr* in Somalia prompted the SPD to file a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. According to the SPD, the Somalia operation clearly constituted a violation of the Basic Law.¹³⁶

However, the SPD's motion was dismissed. The *Bundeswehr* advance units, which had already deployed to Somalia, were not ordered to return to Germany. After 23 June 1993, the *Bundeswehr* could start deploying its main forces. The area of operations assigned to the *Bundeswehr* contingent was Belet Huen in the northern part of Somalia, a safe region "most likely pacified like no other Somalian region."¹³⁷ In contrast to the American allies, who right from the start of Operation "Restore Hope" suffered losses by

¹³⁴ See Bartke, 1993, p. 25.

¹³⁵ See *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, "SPD will deutsche UN-Einsätze nur bei friedenserhaltenden Aktionen," November 19, 1993.

¹³⁶ See *Bundesverfassungsgericht* - 2 BvQ 17/93 - June 23, 1993.

¹³⁷ See Sommer, D., "Das Eis ist gebrochen," in *TRUPPENPRAXIS* 5/1993, p. 458.

the dozen in Mogadishu, there were no German casualties in Belet Huen. The German press, which followed every move of the *Bundeswehr* on this first out-of-area mission with German combat and combat support troops, had nothing to report apart from spiders, desert sand, and the scorching weather the German "boys" had to endure until their withdrawal in early March of 1994.¹³⁸

The Federal Government had picked Belet Huen quite deliberately. Any mission other than a purely humanitarian one, such as providing protection or surveillance which might involve heavy losses, would have had disastrous consequences for domestic politics in Germany just as it was starting to take a larger role in the international community. The structural realities of German involvement were not rewritten as a result of Somalia, however. The Germans were spared the *CNN factor* of Mogadishu with its pictures of death and violence. In the long run, Germany will have to confront the fact that burden-sharing will inevitably involve risk-sharing as well.

Notwithstanding the desire to participate on the international level, the Federal Government followed the American example and called the German soldiers home. The reason given for the German withdrawal, according to Defense Minister Volker R  he, was that the Germans would not be able to continue their mission without the US supply lines.¹³⁹ Of course, one must also consider the fact that the absence of US supply lines also meant the absence of US integration in the security arrangements for German troops.

¹³⁸ See *Frankfurter Neue Presse*, "Nur der Sand und die Post machen Ärger," July 28, 1993.

¹³⁹ See *S  ddeutsche Zeitung*, "R  he: Bundeswehr in Somalia von USA abh  ngig," November 16, 1993.

In conclusion, it can be stated that German participation in UNOSOM II was a success, even though the original mission of providing logistical support to an Indian brigade could not be carried out because that force never arrived in the German area of operations. Without the assistance of the German soldiers, it would not have been possible to provide drinking water and to set up hospitals and schools in the devastated region in such a short period of time. The military results of the Somalia operation are asserted by some to be a failure, by others to be a success. While this issue may continue to be a source of debate, one thing is certain: as a vehicle for Germany to explore the realities of participation in out-of-area disputes, the Somalia deployment of German forces was a success.

Politically speaking, the mission was a success because a strong commitment to "humanitarian objectives" may help open the door to "normal" UN missions while maintaining the positive direction of German public opinion regarding military involvement. In view of the obvious connection between political will and public consensus, one must doubt, at least for the time being, that constitutional clarification will follow. As long as both politicians and the military want to completely erase the perception that Germans will inherently seek to become involved in "military adventures,"¹⁴⁰ the majority of parliamentary votes required for an amendment to the Basic Law will be forestalled. The course which the Germans are following, namely promoting public acceptance of a new international role, assuming political responsibility in the world, and, finally, creating a new image the *Bundeswehr* within the scope of

¹⁴⁰ See *DER SPIEGEL*, "...morgen die ganze Welt," 16/1993, pp. 18-22.

humanitarian aid missions can in the long run, however, lead to public consensus and a reinterpretation of the Basic Law.

C. THE WAR IN THE BALKANS

1. War Returns to Europe

The road from the shots in Sarajevo in June 1991 to the siege of Sarajevo in 1992 was long. This road has seen the disasters of the 20th century and passes through nuclear-era peace of 1945-1989. Looking down this road, one knows only that the dream of a new world order and/or a European peace order remain unfulfilled. For forty years the West was able to hold in check the most powerful war machine the world has ever known. Now, the West has problems to bring even small armies and irregular units to account.

Conventional deterrence made a comeback during the Gulf War. But what was won in the desert was lost during the first two years of the war in the Balkans: the will and competence to use conventional deterrence. Although deep-seeded tensions between Serbs and Croats have long been documented,¹⁴¹ the war came as a complete shock to the European public. If anything, one expected the beginning of a new era of peace, rather than the outbreak of such a bloody war, particularly at the end of the Cold War.

Daily pictures of the dead and wounded, flattened villages and desperate refugees stir up feelings of terror and rage. The mortar shell attack of 5 February 1994,

¹⁴¹ See Glenny, M., *The Fall of Yugoslavia* (New York: Penguin Books, 1992).

which killed 69 people in the main Sarajevo market,¹⁴² is the latest peak in such violence. Negotiation attempts, peace talks and cease fires-continually raised hopes that the nightmare would soon end. But the more diplomatic efforts failed, and the longer Serb-nationalist conquest continued, the more resignation and dejection took their toll.

The people who had become victims of Serb aggression could not believe how the continent of Europe was abandoning them and idly standing by while the murder in the Balkans continued. They could not figure out why the civilized world, in light of such murder, banishment and devastation, had forgotten its moral principles.

The massive firepower of an international air-land-sea armada came to the aid of an overrun Kuwait, but the dying victims in Bosnia had to be satisfied for almost two years with aid in the form of food convoys. The invasion of one country by another, especially in a region containing such a large portion of the world's oil supply, brought forth a provocation that the world could not accept. Furthermore, if one takes into consideration that the aggressor was trying to build atomic weapons, a fierce response was only a matter of time.

Bosnia, on the other hand, situated in Europe's own backyard, has initially been met by an Atlantic world of indecisiveness, ignorance, and resurgence of individual national interests. Bosnia was hoping for help from the sole remaining world power, but the United States was reluctant to continue playing the role of world policeman.

¹⁴² See *The New York Times*, "NATO to Hold Emergency Talks on Fighting Around Sarajevo," February 7, 1994, p. A7.

2. NATO's Role in the Former Yugoslavia

"The need for NATO to assert its continued relevance in the absence of a 'clear and present danger' to the East, provided part of the background for the decision to expand its activities into the unchartered territory of peacekeeping."¹⁴³

Nevertheless, up until the summer of 1992, NATO had more or less stayed out of the Balkan War (except for a few warships and planes to enforce the embargo). NATO's reluctance to become involved was attributable in part to the United States' attitude toward the Balkans. "On May 18, [1993], Mr. Christopher told the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 'At heart, this is a European problem.'"¹⁴⁴ The war in the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Warren Christopher has also explained, involves only the "humanitarian concerns" of the United States, not its strategic interests.¹⁴⁵

Further, NATO was somewhat hesitant to get involved because the European NATO partners could not come up with a common goal in their policy toward the Balkans. Gillessen, one of the leading security policy editors in Germany, appropriately points out how far removed from reality NATO members' now routine differentiation of effectiveness of "in" and "out" of area was.¹⁴⁶ According to him, this perception of

¹⁴³ See Berdal, M., "Peacekeeping in Europe," in International Institute for Strategic Studies (ed.), *European Security After The Cold War, The IISS 35th Annual Conference*, Brussels, September 9-12, 1993, p. 15.

¹⁴⁴ *The New York Times*, "Backing Away Again, Christopher Says Bosnia Is Not a Vital Interest," June 4, 1993.

¹⁴⁵ See Tucker, R.W., and Hendrickson, D.C., "America and Bosnia," in *The National Interest*, Fall 1993, p.23.

¹⁴⁶ See Gillessen, G., "Versäumte Abschreckung," in *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 28, 1993.

differentiation has become so widespread in the Alliance because different European countries, especially Germany and France, wanted to set limits to the Alliance's solidarity and deterrence principles. In the case of Alliance solidarity, France did not want to become a normal NATO member. This explains why France in the beginning of the war absolutely rejected military action in Bosnia under the auspices of NATO; only under the supreme command of the United Nations was military action acceptable to France. In the case of the principle of deterrence, there was a general German desire for protection, but Germany did not want to be a protector. That is why, according to Gillessen, Germany "came up with so many constitutional restrictions."¹⁴⁷ Great Britain feels, as does Howard, that British interests lie beyond Europe.¹⁴⁸ This is why the British feel that it is important that the realization of European interests do not hamper their ability to pursue a more wide-ranging foreign policy. Nineteenth and twentieth century European history has clearly shown that British interests have rivaled whatever the strongest European nation happened to be (balance of power). As far as the British are concerned, would not a Greater Serbia play a welcome role in the European power structure?

The makers of strategy in Serbia and the Serbian dominated parts of Bosnia were aware of this fundamental problem of NATO from the start. Because they did not fear NATO, they continued with their crusade for domination and basically ignored everything the security institutions had to say.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ See Howard, M., 1972, pp. 31-52.

¹⁴⁹ See *Europäische Sicherheit* "Die NATO und der Balkan," 7/1993, p. 326.

Finally, in February 1994, after the events on the market place in Sarajevo and the starting effect of the *CNN-factor* on public opinion both within and without the United States, NATO made a decisive step in order to regain the power of deterrence in Europe. Under the threat of NATO air strikes, Serbian artillery around Sarajevo was being moved elsewhere. Thanks to NATO's belated determination to intervene, the war in the Balkans has hopefully come to the beginning of its end.

The application of collective power found its clearest demonstration on February 28, 1994, when US fighter jets shot down four ground-attack jets flown by Bosnian Serbs. This was a milestone for the 45-year-old Alliance, because NATO has never before engaged in combat.¹⁵⁰

As was the case during the Gulf War, in the Balkans the Germans were the cause of unrest in NATO: once again Bonn refused to participate in NATO or UN sponsored military actions because of constitutional restrictions and the risk of singularization. "The Americans are running out of patience with the Germans"¹⁵¹ dominated German headlines in February 1993. The reason for increasing American impatience with Alliance partner Germany was the alarming news that Geilenkirchen-based German soldiers in AWACS (airborne warning and control system aircraft) were under orders to abandon their airplanes, should the no-flight zone over Bosnia-Herzegovia have to be

¹⁵⁰ See *Washington Post*, "US Jets Down 4 Serb Bombers Over Bosnia," March 1, 1994, p. A1.

¹⁵¹ *DIE WELT*, "Ende der Geduld," February 19, 1993.

enforced.¹⁵² Had the German members of the crew abandoned their machines, the entire mission would have probably resulted in failure.¹⁵³

The situation became serious for Bonn on April 2, 1993, when the NATO Council voted to enforce UN Resolution 816 (flight ban, enforceable by military means) with NATO air power if necessary.¹⁵⁴ As a result of this decision, AWACS surveillance aircraft, along with German crew members, indirectly took part in military maneuvers to insure that airspace was not violated. This took place outside of NATO territory.

Because of concern that German-American relations would further deteriorate, Bonn ruled (with CDU/CSU ministers' votes) to allow German personnel on board the aircraft. Bonn did this despite unclarified constitutional restrictions. The SPD considered this action, as was the case later with intervention in Somalia, to be a violation of German Basic Law. This is why the SPD, together with the FDP, strove for constitutional consistency and clarification in the form of a reversal of the ruling.¹⁵⁵

On April 8, 1993, the Federal Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*) rejected the grievances of the SPD and FDP.¹⁵⁶ The Court's reasoning was not that their grievances were necessarily inadmissible, but rather because a German withdrawal from

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ See *Bonner Rundschau*, "US-Politker sehen Bonner Koalition über Awacs stolpern," February 19, 1993.

¹⁵⁴ See *Bundesverfassungsgericht* - 2 BvE 5/93 - April 8, 1993.

¹⁵⁵ See *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, "Der Zweite Senat des Verfassungsgerichts bemüht sich um den Awacs-Konflikt in der Koalition," April 6, 1993.

¹⁵⁶ See *Bundesverfassungsgericht*, April 8, 1993.

AWACS forces might have had repercussions on Germany's foreign policy.¹⁵⁷ The Federal Constitutional Court was seeking to reduce mistrust toward Germany brought on by (what the Americans and others considered to be) Bonn's unbearable constitutional debate. But the world is not rid of this problem yet. Final constitutional clarification concerning *Bundeswehr* out-of-area deployment, including amendment of the Basic Law if necessary, requires a 2/3 majority vote in the Bundestag (Lower House); nobody expects this to happen in the near future.

As became evident in the case of Somalia (Operation Restore Hope), Germany will finally start to fulfill its global responsibilities, but first on the basis of case by case rulings. Burden-sharing and sharing the responsibility thus remain an important faultline in the structure of the transatlantic partnership. In light of America's partially ambiguous interest in Europe, the significance of these realities in German-American security relations is likely to grow.

The world officially conceded understanding for the fact that Germany could not become actively involved in the Balkans for historic reasons. But the Americans, as well as others, cannot understand why the Germans are "once again shirking responsibility." There is a perception in the American public that Germany has much more to lose in the former Yugoslavia than any other European country, especially because of the streams of refugees from this region that want to live in Europe's richest country. How can a US President explain to American citizens that US ground troops have to risk their lives for

¹⁵⁷ See Hefty, G.P., "Bonner Glaubwürdigkeit - aus Karlsruhe," in *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 10, 1993.

people in Bosnia while Alliance partner Germany stays home, despite the fact that Germany has so much more at stake?

3. The American "Lift and Strike" Concept

One can no longer count on diplomacy alone in Bosnia. Since the Balkan War began in 1991, diplomacy has failed time and again. UN and EU negotiator Cyrus Vance (today Torwald Stoltenberg), and Lord Owen have lowered their goals by about as much as the Serbs have raised theirs.¹⁵⁸ Diplomacy without a sword is worth nothing; this is the sobering lesson of this war.

The Gulf War was a classic example of what conditions must be fulfilled in order for the United States to intervene militarily in the "New World Order." Yugoslavia is an example of an obvious lack of conditions for intervention, especially with ground troops. As far as the Americans are concerned, certainly moral interests, not strategic or economic, are at stake in the Balkans.¹⁵⁹ The conflict appeared to remain within the boundaries of the actual battlefield. Nobody -- in Europe, in the UN or the American public -- has ever really expressed real support for full scale military intervention. According to American Secretary of State Warren Christopher, ". . . that is why the President, I think, has taken a prudent policy of not over-extending United States' commitment."¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ Sommer, T., "Bomben gegen Gewissensbisse?" in *DIE ZEIT*, August 20, 1993, p.1.

¹⁵⁹ See Tucker and Hendrickson, 1993, p. 23.

¹⁶⁰ *The New York Times*, "Backing Away Again, Christopher says Bosnia Is Not a Vital Interest," June 4, 1993.

Thus, troop deployment and a ground offensive, as were needed to liberate Kuwait, were unlikely. But the United States turned to an already well-known means; it offered air strikes, the "American way of war."¹⁶¹ However, consistent with American strategic thought, "air strikes" had already been carried out to bring forth the complete opposite effect: "American C-130 planes dropping supplies."¹⁶² How could real air strikes open Serb containment around Sarajevo and at the same time prevent endangering the mostly British and French UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia? Until the events of 5 February 1994 Paris and London did not go for such plans.¹⁶³ Whether they were just worried about the safety of their own troops remains unclear; the fact remains that the US could not convince them of the need for action, especially the British government, until 69 people were killed at one time.

The American concept for ending the Balkan War involved another component: lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia. Once again the British and French thought that their "Blue Helmets" would be endangered as a result of anticipated increased fighting. As far as the Germans were concerned, Bonn from the beginning of the conflict had made it clear that the *Bundeswehr* could not participate in air strikes or ground attacks because of constitutional restrictions.¹⁶⁴ But Bonn, in solidarity with the US, supported lifting the

¹⁶¹ Sommer, T., August 20, 1993.

¹⁶² *The New York Times*, "Europeans Welcoming US Help in the Balkans," February 25, 1993.

¹⁶³ See *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, "Die NATO erwägt Luftangriffe," May 7, 1993.

¹⁶⁴ See *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, "Keine deutschen Soldaten nach Bosnien," May 6, 1993.

arms embargo on Bosnia.¹⁶⁵ By doing this the Germans hoped to make amends after the damage the AWACS debate had caused.

After an American President, who was undecided and unsure toward the former Yugoslavia, had unsuccessfully sent his secretary of state to Europe to win the support of European allies for his "lift and strike" concept,¹⁶⁶ Bill Clinton asked the German Chancellor in writing to promote his plans.¹⁶⁷ Kohl did as he was asked. At an EC heads of state conference in Copenhagen in Spring 1994 he promoted Clinton's embargo policy. This promptly upset his colleagues. As Kohl stood out in the rain, Washington did something to make him become even more wet. Washington played down the whole affair and said that it was not meant to be as such.

Clinton's letter to Kohl appears to not only be further evidence of America's present attitude of part wait-and-see, part resignation...It was an ambiguous letter that is much more a sign of questionable diplomatic expertise and lack of political orientation. Further, it serves to cloud fundamentally stable American-German relations which had been strained the preceding week by Christopher's implied accusation that Bonn's early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia had led to escalation of the war.¹⁶⁸

Bombarding Serb artillery positions (as a result of the ultimatum in February 1994), destroying Serb reinforcements, and even attacking strategic targets in Serbia itself

¹⁶⁵ See *Bonner Rundschau*, "Kohl und R  he: Waffen nach Bosnien liefern," February 1, 1993.

¹⁶⁶ See *The New York Times*, "How European Unity Over Bosnia Eluded Clinton," May 12, 1993.

¹⁶⁷ See *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, "Clintons Brief an Kohl zum Balkankrieg stiftet neue Verwirrung," June 24, 1993.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

would eventually end the war in the Balkans. However, one must remember that even the Gulf War, after 100,000 air attacks, ended only after ground troops were deployed.¹⁶⁹ But undoing Serb war success "Desert Storm style" will not be possible. To do that a massive number of ground troops, as in Desert Storm, would be needed. These troops would then have to spend years in the ravines of the Balkans, fighting a murderous war against the Serbs. The examples of WWI and WWII clearly demonstrate how difficult military action in this region can be.¹⁷⁰ Nevertheless, no matter what American-led NATO air strikes on Serb targets could regain, deterrence could be probably reestablished. The next task will be to make it clear to the US that the situation in what was Yugoslavia *is* among the factors to be considered in determining its national interests.

The great interest at stake in Bosnia is neither more or less than order and stability in post-Cold War Europe. If a persuasive case cannot be made on these grounds, it probably cannot be made at all.¹⁷¹

As one sees in southeastern Europe, post-communism creates nationalism, which often leads to war. The former Yugoslavia is the best example for this. Slobodan Milosevic's road to a Greater Serbia could serve as a prime model for Russia's ultranationalist Vladimir V. Zhirinovskiy or his successor on how to create a Greater Russia.¹⁷² The threat of rising Russian nationalism could start war in East Central

¹⁶⁹ See Joffe, J., "Der Frieden läßt sich nicht herbeibomben," in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, April 30, 1993.

¹⁷⁰ See Cancian, M.F., "The Wehrmacht in Yugoslavia: Lessons of the Past?" in *Parameters*, Autumn 1993, pp.76-81.

¹⁷¹ Tucker and Hendrickson, 1993, p. 15.

Europe, where the former Soviet satellites and republics are facing a similar power vacuum if NATO is not able to provide security and stability in the region.

There is another analogy: a power vacuum in Europe which is not filled by NATO will be filled by Russia.

But nature and politics abhor a vacuum and the NATO allies may have allowed the vacuum to last too long. In Russia's December election, foreign policy hard-liners were a big winners. Russia is beginning to assert itself once more. It is finding that it no longer must plead with NATO to respect its weakness. Given the division and lack of direction in NATO, Russia finds it can wheel and deal once more, taking advantage of its operational freedom.¹⁷³

The deployment of about 800 Russian troops in Bosnia in mid-February 1994 was in deed a "brilliant decision," as Vitaly Churkin, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, pointed out.¹⁷⁴ Russia has not only started to fill the power vacuum in the Balkans, it has also guaranteed by doing so the territorial gains of the Bosnian Serbs.

The fact is that NATO's ability to function continues to lie with the United States' presence in Europe. The war in the former Yugoslavia proves this in a dramatic way. Despite the steps taken in February 1994, American hesitance in the former Yugoslavia indicates a lessened interest in crisis-laden Europe. One forgets that it was the US presence in Europe that brought that continent a half century of peace.

¹⁷² See *The New York Times*, "Nationalist Vote Toughens Russian Foreign Policy," January 25, 1994.

¹⁷³ See *Wall Street Journal*, "Score One for Russia at Sarajevo," February 22, 1994.

¹⁷⁴ See *The New York Times*, "Russia's Balkan Card," February 18, 1994.

But why is it America's business? If the Europeans have failed to meet the challenge, why look to us? The answer is that this country is the only superpower. And the world will not move unless and until our President does.¹⁷⁵

Unfortunately, Anthony Lewis is right about this. The war in the former Yugoslavia is the best example.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The war in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf War clearly indicate, in their own respective ways, that the United States must continue to lead world efforts aimed at peace. The Gulf War is an example of a clear American leadership role from which the Europeans can benefit for their own security purposes. The war in Yugoslavia is an example of what can happen in the absence of such leadership. Both cases underline Joseph S. Nye's "bound to lead"¹⁷⁶ as a response to Paul Kennedy's *Decline Thesis*. Further, the present crisis in the Balkans demonstrates that Europe will continue to rely on security and political ties with the US, despite efforts to create common foreign and security policies within the European Union.

These case studies also show that, since the end of the Cold War, each international crisis does not -- or does not appear -- to involve the United States' interests. America's relative dependence on established military alliances has also dwindled since the East-West confrontation was nullified.

¹⁷⁵ Lewis, A., "Waiting for Clinton," *The New York Times*, April 19, 1993.

¹⁷⁶ See Nye, J.S., *Bound to Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

The international community is not an involvement that can be neglected for very long. The absence of American leadership in the former Yugoslavia may very well cause problems in the years to come. This is the case because the example Vladimir V. Zhirinovskiy takes from Bosnia is that the Americans will act more with rhetoric than with force unless their direct security interests are concerned. The Zhirinovskys will misjudge NATO and the Western World, and when they misjudge them, this may provoke a war. If that happens it is much more the fault of NATO than those who would misjudge its reactions. In Bosnia the United States and its allies left their standards behind them, but the world will judge NATO by those standards. They will judge NATO by those standards in Ukraine, they will judge the Alliance by those standards in the Baltics and in Kazakhstan. There is a power vacuum in Europe. No power vacuum is ever absolute, but the very fact that it exists may in some sense provoke aggressive attitudes.

Nevertheless, the structural foundations of German-American security relations have remained unchanged in the *New World Order*. In some areas, these foundations have become even more significant. History suggests that democracies -- especially American democracy -- shift in their collective attitudes and beliefs. The person in Germany who believes that America's relationship to Europe is in German interests has to be concerned about America losing its trust in Germany. This is dependent on the Germans fully accepting foreign policy responsibilities of burden-sharing when issues go beyond mere German interests. The old borders of the Alliance were justified for

maintaining stability in the bipolar world order of the Cold War: in the *New World Disorder*, these borders are simply relics from a time long past.

The most serious future controversies between Germany and America will deal with how much responsibility Germany will be willing to accept in the world -- be it in free world trade or in collective security outside traditional NATO boundaries. This renders unacceptable the German attitude of not being able to deploy German soldiers to help out in humanitarian missions outside of Germany or well-defined NATO borders because of constitutional restrictions. This assertion becomes all the more true in light of the negative turn of events in Somalia and its effects on American domestic policy.

As one sees in Somalia and Bosnia, guerrilla forces, terrorists, and bandits involved in violent confrontations embrace a new type of military action. This is characterized by tribal, ethnic, and religious factions engaged in partisan warfare without using high-tech weapons and respecting the traditional conventions of war.¹⁷⁷

Counter-guerrilla warfare remains *politics by other means*. Armed action -- even in *low-intensity conflict* -- must therefore correspond to political objectives.¹⁷⁸ As demonstrated in the case of Somalia, unclear political goals lead to questionable and unclear military goals, which inevitably lead to a higher casualty rates. The unsuccessful hunt for Somali clan leader Aidid is an excellent example of this.

The traditional Americans military concepts and strategies that were successful in the Gulf War cannot solve *low-intensity conflicts* as seen in Somalia and Bosnia. "The

¹⁷⁷ See Snow, 1993, pp. 64-84.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

Mystique of US Air Power," as described by Cohen in light of the Gulf War, means little in guerrilla warfare.¹⁷⁹

Firepower and military technology can never be a substitute for careful and flexible political thinking and military planning. This was true in the past and will especially hold true in future regional and/or *low intensity conflicts*. "The American Way of War" has proven to be a cornerstone of deterrence and played a tremendous role in winning the Cold War, when deterrence has failed, however, and it is necessary to use military force to deal with conflict, especially *low intensity conflict*, the need for a reexamination of US operational thinking becomes apparent.

Deterrence in order to avoid fighting was a principal of NATO security policy in the Cold War-era. The cases of Kuwait and Bosnia clearly demonstrate the appropriateness of such an approach, even in the *New World Order*. In the past, the followers of the German and American freedom movement (*Friedensbewegung*) had always wanted to overcome deterrence. Today, even a token peace would undoubtedly be a priceless commodity in the Balkans. How wonderful it would be if a country like Bosnia had been spared such misery and despair because Serb leader Milosevic been confronted with the principal of deterrence from the beginning. The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) is a clear example of how to end a crisis with a strong deterrent will and capability. Other examples demonstrate what happens when deterrence is not used. The Falklands War (1982) would not have been necessary had British troops shown the flag.

¹⁷⁹ See Cohen, E.A., "The Mystique of US Air Power," in *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1994, pp. 109-124.

A British infantry battalion and a Royal Navy frigate would have been enough to do the job. The same is true for Kuwait. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (1990-1991) would have been unnecessary had limits of the tolerable been clearly demonstrated to the dictator in time.

The eve of World War II presents the worst case of neglected deterrence. A lack of deterrent will and capability, as well as the lack of security guarantees from powerful nations, made the attack on Poland possible. This is an historic lesson, which becomes all the more significant in light of the current debate on NATO's potential expansion to the East and rising ultranationalism in Russia.

IV. THE FUTURE OF GERMAN-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONS AND NATO

The external security position of Germany has improved after the end of the Cold War in fully unexpected ways. The immediate threat by a hostile Eastern world power no longer exists. A united Germany remains allied to its Western neighbors. It is today "encircled by friends," but those who would therefore conclude that Germany no longer needs collective security and defense, should reflect on the imponderables in East Central Europe as well as on the southern flank of Europe.

Germany continues to depend on ties to the nuclear and naval forces of the North Atlantic Alliance as stated in the German Defense Policy Guidelines (*Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien*) of November 1992, because Germany remains a "non-nuclear power and continental middle-power with world-wide interests."¹⁸⁰ The reliability of the allies and the reliability of the Germans as partners are the guarantors of Germany's security. Any attempt to change this state-of-affairs, to base national assertion more on national means, would not only be futile, it would lead directly to isolation and coalitions against Germany.

It is also evident that NATO, as an organization founded in the era of the Cold War, must be adapted to the new security environment and probably redefine its general mission as well as its roles and functions in order to overcome its present crisis. The

¹⁸⁰ Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien*, November 1992, p. 4.

disaster in the Balkans makes it crystal clear that no international organization can function without the political will and the consensus of its member states. This is also true for NATO. The war in the Balkans has proven traumatic for the Atlantic Alliance, as it points out how quickly the security consensus its members once shared dissipated after the Cold War had ended. The current situation of the Alliance is rather fittingly described in NATO circles with an analogy. A huge dragon has been slain, but now one lives in a jungle with an alarming number of poisonous snakes. In many ways it was easier to keep an eye on the dragon. With respect to NATO, this implies it is very unlikely that all sixteen member states would be prepared to participate in joint defensive measures against each poisonous snake in like manner and at the same time.

Thus the central question arises: Is the Alliance still necessary without the former threat and what is it still capable of doing? With so many poisonous snakes lurking around in the adjacent regions, the European members at least have kept their doubts about the Alliance within limits. Is it not surprising that under these circumstances the East Central European countries of the former Warsaw Pact want to become new members of NATO?

However, nations on both sides of the Atlantic are part of NATO. Traditional isolationists in the United States are not the only ones to register their doubts about NATO still being needed by their country. This last chapter seeks to analyze the future necessity for the Atlantic Alliance and the ongoing partnership with the US not only for Germany but for the security of Europe as a whole.

A. EAST CENTRAL EUROPE'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY

1. The Rebirth of Imperial Temptations

Europe is moving backward in history, as if in H.G. Wells' time machine. The atrocities of a past which were believed overcome long ago overshadow Europe's present and darkens the future of this continent. According to the 3 January 1994 issue of the news magazine *DER SPIEGEL*, fascism is threatening to reemerge from the ashes of history, with 1993 being its "most successful year."¹⁸¹

The power vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the Western orientation crisis with respect to East Central Europe and elsewhere is compensated by ideologies of hatred. The development of post-communist nationalism and, in part, a relapse into tribalism, is the revenge of peoples whose identities have long been suppressed in the bipolar world of power blocs.¹⁸² Fueled by unsolved ethnic-political conflicts,¹⁸³ poverty and national humiliation, desperation and anger, aggressiveness is bottling up and unleashed in the form of xenophobia, suppression of minorities, threats against weaker neighboring countries and even open warfare. The Balkans offer the best example.

¹⁸¹ *DER SPIEGEL*, "Die Alten Dämonen tanzen," January 3, 1994, p. 99.

¹⁸² See Brzezinski, Z., "Post-Communist Nationalism," in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1989/90, pp. 1-2.

¹⁸³ See for example, Medvedev, S. A., "Ethnisch-politische Konflikte auf dem Territorium der ehemaligen UdSSR: Ursachen, Typologie und Folgen für die GUS und die übrige Welt," in *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* (ed.), *Sonderforschungsvorhaben "Analysen Sicherheits-/Verteidigungspolitik IV"* (SASVP IV), Ebenhausen, 1993, Band 3A, pp. 45-52.

While such potentials for conflict were initially regarded as regional problems, they are now viewed in a different light as a result of Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky's shocking success in the Russian parliamentary elections held in December 1993.¹⁸⁴ National degradation, fear of unemployment and crime, disappointment with Boris Yeltsin's reform policy, inflation and impoverishment have driven approximately one quarter of the Russian voters into the arms of the only candidate who overtly vows to lead Russia into an era of new grandeur.¹⁸⁵ "As the elections showed, nostalgia for the old empire is a potent issue in Russia these days, with many Russians disillusioned by what they see as a string of unfulfilled promises from the West."¹⁸⁶

Zhirinovsky is a real expert when it comes to exploiting public fear of poverty and the fear of the entire Russian people of bankruptcy and humiliation of the nation for his politics. The essence of his political approach is: "Bayonets for bank notes; expansion against inflation, geostrategy rather than economics; racism rather than reformism."¹⁸⁷ Zhirinovsky's followers can be found especially in the Russian military community. On December 12th, the soldiers, certainly hardest-hit by the collapse of the Soviet Empire, voted for him at a rate far above the national average.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁴ See for example, *The New York Times*, "Traacherous Transition," December 20, 1993, p. A15.

¹⁸⁵ See Schmidt-Häuer, C., "Sein Kampf," in *DIE ZEIT*, January 21, 1994, pp. 7 - 8.

¹⁸⁶ See *The New York Times*, January 25, 1994.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

No demographic study has yet been published that maps out his followers. But interviews and samplings showed strong support among soldiers and sailors, disaffected youth, pensioners, workers in military industry -- those, who, like the young Zhirinovsky, felt rejected, abused, humiliated and impotent as their country tumbled from great power to economic cripple.¹⁸⁹

The Russian neo-fascist Zhirinovsky has not yet seized a foreign country as announced in his book "The Last Jump Towards the South"¹⁹⁰; however, he is already playing an important part in Russian foreign policy. The "Zhirinovsky Factor" has, in the meantime, become Boris Yeltsin's most efficient instrument for urging Western support for his reform policy. In addition, he provides Yeltsin and his foreign minister Andrei V. Kozyrev with arguments for a warning to Western Europe and the United States not to take any action that conflicts with Russian interests; this applies particularly to an eastward expansion of NATO. Any such step, Moscow argues, would only support the cause of Zhirinovsky and the ultra-nationalists and further add to their strength. In the meantime, however, the "Zhirinovsky Factor" is also used for countering Western criticism aimed at Russia's increasingly aggressive attitude toward its neighbors in the "near abroad".¹⁹¹

While the Western world is keeping a close watch on the course of Russia's reform policy, ready to provide trillions of dollars in economic aid, Moscow is

¹⁸⁹ *The New York Times*, "Muscovite with Bravado," December 14, 1993, p A1.

¹⁹⁰ See Schmidt-Häuer, p. 7

¹⁹¹ See Crow, S., "Drang nach draußen," in *DIE ZEIT*, Jan 21, 1994, p. 4.

developing a new foreign policy strategy which continues to feature hegemony over the former Soviet Union and, to a lesser degree, over East Central Europe.¹⁹² Russia is regaining the former Soviet sphere of domination as its sphere of influence. However, rather than using military force, as has been done in the past, geopolitical tactics involving far less political and economic efforts are now being applied.

In the current international political climate, the former Soviet republics and East Central Europe are being drawn into Moscow's orbit because of Russia's political weight in the region and the unwillingness or inability of states and groups of states outside the region to counter the Russian Federation. Such a situation grants Moscow all of the benefits and none of the responsibilities typically associated with a hegemonic status. Indeed, a case could be made that Russia enjoys, in some significant ways, a more advantageous geopolitical position now than the Soviet Union did at the height of its domination of Eastern Europe.¹⁹³

The power vacuum in East Central Europe, which results from the collapse of the Soviet Union, is being compensated for by a Greater Russian foreign policy which vigorously opposes any eastward expansion of NATO and, in this respect, even enjoys international support as a stabilizing factor in this region. Russia's opposition to a NATO membership of East Central European states can be traced to Moscow's belief that this area is vital to Russia's interests and properly belongs in its sphere of influence.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹² See Crow, S., "Russia Asserts its Strategic Agenda," in *RFE/RL RESEARCH REPORT*, Vol. 2, 17 December 1993, pp. 1 - 8.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 1

According to Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Russia plays a "special role" in what was the former Soviet Union. "To ignore that role", he said in a recent speech, "is to ignore historic ties, what has been achieved over centuries and special relations in this space sealed by the common history and culture of the multimillion Russian-speaking population."¹⁹⁵

Russia's new military doctrine, by stating "that the security interests of the Russian Federation and other members of the CIS may make it necessary to station Russian troops outside Russia's borders"¹⁹⁶, provides another serious indication as to Moscow's view on the sovereignty of Russia's neighbors. Moscow continues to regard the former Soviet republics as subordinates and not as equals.

2. The Struggle for NATO Membership

In East Central Europe, as in the former Soviet Union, history has taught Russia's neighboring countries to be cautious. Recent events, like Vladimir V. Zhirinovskiy's success in the parliamentary elections and the resignation of top economic reformers in the Russian Cabinet, have alarmed the whole region.

Among the former Soviet republics, it is, besides Ukraine, the Baltic states which are most concerned about their freshly gained independence. Thus, it is no surprise that Lithuania was the first of the former Soviet republics to officially apply for

¹⁹⁴ See Crow, S., "Russian Views on an Eastward Expansion of NATO," in *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 41, October 15, 1993, pp. 21 - 24.

¹⁹⁵ *The New York Times*, January 25, 1994.

¹⁹⁶ *Jane's Intelligence Review*, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," Pointer, No. 2, December 1993, p. 1.

NATO membership. There is no immediate threat to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but the presence of about 12,000 to 17,000 Russian troops in Latvia alone,¹⁹⁷ a population of more than 1.7 million ethnic Russians, and declining economies in the Baltics are identifiable as potential trouble spots, and will influence European security in the years to come.¹⁹⁸

Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania understandably view the presence of Russian troops in their countries as an affront to their sovereignty. While the last Russian troops left Lithuania on 31 August 1993, protracted talks over troop withdrawal in Latvia have met with limited success.¹⁹⁹

As far as these troops are concerned, the United States is trying to broker an agreement between both nations under which Russia will withdraw its remaining troops by the end of August, 1994, in exchange for a four-year extension of Russian civilian control of its early-warning installation near Skundra.²⁰⁰

Russia's Foreign Minister Kozyrev "reportedly told a meeting of Russian ambassadors to the former Soviet states that it would be dangerous for Russian troops to withdraw completely from the area of the former Soviet Union, because 'unfriendly

¹⁹⁷ See *The New York Times*, "US Tells A Visiting Latvian Official That Russia Is Moving to Withdraw its Troops," February 1, 1994, p. A4.

¹⁹⁸ See Trapans, J. A. (ed), *Baltic Security: Conference in Salzburg*, in *RFE/RL REPORT*, Vol. 1, No. 49, December 11, 1992.

¹⁹⁹ See Jackson, W. D., "Russia after the Crisis. Imperial Temptations: Ethnics Abroad," in *Orbis*, Winter 1994, pp. 9 - 12.

²⁰⁰ *The New York Times*, February 1, 1994.

forces' might move in to fill the vacuum."²⁰¹ With "unfriendly forces" Kozyrev refers to nobody else but NATO. From the Russian viewpoint, East Central Europe is out of bounds to the Alliance. Hence, it is no wonder that Vitaly Churkin accuses the Baltic states of seeking confrontation with Russia while warning them "that they could defend their interests only by cooperating with Moscow."²⁰²

Russian military and political hard-liners are also reluctant to evacuate key bases and exchange the strategically valuable Baltic Sea border for the much less easily defended land frontiers it shares with the other neighboring states. "In our case, the danger coming from Russia is so serious, so strong that we should look for security guarantees today", said Mr. Kahn, an economist who has been Estonia's ambassador here [in Moscow] since Moscow recognized the independence of the Baltic countries in 1991."²⁰³ This refers to nothing less than the protection of this region by the United States and NATO.

To a considerable degree, the future of the Baltic republics will depend on Ukraine's survival as a sovereign state. Unlike any other country, Russia's destiny is linked to that of Ukraine. The inseparability of both countries is an essential element of Russian foreign policy.

For this purpose, both the levers of economic pressure and the attempt to involve Ukraine in the process of formation of interstate structures within CIS, as well as in joint

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

²⁰² *Ibid.*

²⁰³ *The New York Times*, January 25, 1994.

foreign-policy actions in the world arena, are being used now and will continue to be used in the future. At the same time, Russia will try to hinder the independent ties of Ukraine with other countries, wherever it is possible.²⁰⁴

However, it is not least by signing the "Partnership for Peace" agreement with NATO that Ukraine decided in favor of Europe and a European security architecture.²⁰⁵ Whether this opening toward Europe can be achieved, will depend to a very large degree on the United States and Western Europe. If Ukraine is left defenseless in Russia's sphere of influence, the essential "domino" in post-Cold War East Central Europe is in danger of tumbling. This would have dramatic consequences for the independence of the Baltic republics and Poland.

Among all non-Soviet republics of the former Warsaw Pact, Poland, from its own bitter experience, knows best about existence in a power vacuum. The country is already fearing a new Western appeasement policy which might sacrifice Poland to the national interests of major powers. Consequently, Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski leaves no doubt about the fact that "Poland's participation in NATO is synonymous with national security."²⁰⁶ Currently, Poland considers itself to be in a security vacuum "between two giants", namely Germany and Russia. "The consolidation

²⁰⁴ See Levchenko, A., "The Ukraine-Russia Relations in the Field of Foreign and Security Policies: Spheres of Cooperation and Conflicts," in Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (ed.), *Sonderforschungsvorhaben "Analysen Sicherheits-/Verteidigungspolitik IV"* (SASVP IV), Ebenhausen, 1993, Band 3 B, pp. 59 - 65.

²⁰⁵ See *The New York Times*, "Ukraine Joining Plan for NATO Partnership," February 7, 1994, p. A7.

²⁰⁶ Olechowski, A., "Polen und die Nordatlantische Allianz," in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, January 3, 1994.

of this vacuum would provoke these two countries to either regard Poland as a classic, 19th-century-style buffer state or as the interface of the two spheres of influence."²⁰⁷

In general, the present situation, like that of the entire region, reminds one very much of West Germany's situation at the beginning of the Cold War. Initially, with respect to security policy, West Germany was also a conceptual "no-man's land" the defense of which was originally not intended. West Germany's only advantage as compared to Poland was the fact that allied forces had already been stationed on its territory. Poland's current advantage, as compared to West Germany back in 1947/48, is the fact that it is exposed to a diplomatic rather than a military threat. Yet, the ultimate consequence might be the same: instability and decline instead of stability, security, and economic development.

Haunted by the specters of the past, Prague, too, is seeking the protection of NATO. "A rejection by the West would evoke the shadow of Munich"²⁰⁸ said Pavel Bratinka, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic. The statement alludes to the concessions made to Nazi Germany by Britain, Italy, and France in 1938, as a consequence of which Czechoslovakia had to cede the "Sudetenland" to the Third Reich. This event marked the beginning of the subsequent dismantling of Czechoslovakia.

The West is, indeed, running the risk of repeating the errors of the past, this time in favor of Russia. Efforts to avoid any provocation of Russian ultra-nationalists must not lead the United States and its European allies to conceding Russia special rights on

²⁰⁷ *ibid.*

²⁰⁸ *DER SPIEGEL*, "Die Knute zeigen", January 10, 1994, p. 108.

the territory of the former Soviet Union, thus tolerating a curtailment of the sovereignty of these states. The same applies to the former Warsaw Pact countries. If Moscow uses the tremendous power it has maintained in an attempt to prevent certain developments favored by the East Central European countries, this is tantamount to the assumption of a veto right. One cannot and must not allow Russia to practice such a policy, if a new Yalta, that is to say a repartition of the world into spheres of interest, is to be avoided.

Hence, the attitude toward Russia poses a particular problem to the West. There will be no Russia tailored to the preferences of the West. On the one hand, everything must be done to support Russia's projected reform policy; on the other hand, we must point out to Russia the limits of its imperialist aspirations. This amounts to a policy featuring a balance between cooperation and confrontation. In pursuit of its interests, the West must seek to protect Russia from its own temptations.

B. NATO AT A TURNING POINT

NATO: "A dead knight in armor?" This was the provocatively posed question in the German newspaper *DIE WELT* ("The World").²⁰⁹ One can also ask which new tasks for NATO can forge a new bond between both sides of the Atlantic, after the old main mission has been fulfilled?

The communiqués of NATO in recent years have rather been reading like "want ads" in a local paper. There is praise for the surely useful but limited activities in the

²⁰⁹ See Rühl, L., "Ein toter Ritter in der Rüstung?" in *DIE WELT*, August 28, 1993.

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) with the Eastern European countries and those of the former Soviet Union. There is the Alliance as a possible military subcontractor of the CSCE and the UN. And the American warnings are not the only ones to point out that the Western military organization should actively participate in international crisis management (out-of-area), if it is to have a function at all. To quote the influential American Senator Richard Lugar: "out of area or out of business"; either NATO engages in international crisis management or it will have to shut down. NATO Security General Manfred Wörner, however, adamantly refuted Lugar's logic in his speech from September 10, 1993: "The slogan 'out-of-area' or 'out-of-business' is out of date. We are acting out-of-area and we very much are in business."²¹⁰

However, above all NATO activities hovers the specter of the Balkan situation. If the member states of the Alliance were not able to agree on joint actions in a conflict so regionally close, what could possibly be the chances with conflicts further away?

1. Germany and the Process of European Integration

Germany sees NATO's most important future mission as promoting stable political conditions in East Central Europe.²¹¹ This ultimately means the acceptance of the East Central European countries into membership of the Atlantic Alliance.

The journey of the East Central European countries toward democracy and market economies must be supported and be made irreversible. For the sake of its

²¹⁰ See NATO Press Service, September 10, 1993, p. 1.

²¹¹ Rühle, V., Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era," in *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2 Summer 1993, pp. 135 - 136.

security, Europe must extend the Western zone of stability as far eastward as possible. Hence, it is Germany in particular which commits itself to advancing cooperation with the Eastern partners.

This concept of policy entails several ideas. The less crisis-prone the East Central European states are, the safer Western Europe will be, the more effective unforeseen events from the great, yet unfinished Russian empire can be absorbed. Germany and Europe need a stable political environment, this means first of all stable neighboring countries.

In order to achieve long-term stability in East Central Europe, the following conditions must be realized: Democratic structures and democratic institutions; sound economic development based on a market economy; balanced ethnic interests, respect for minorities, and guarantees of fundamental and internationally recognized human rights.²¹²

However, the basic requirement for a stable East Central Europe is the elimination of the existing power vacuum. Security policy and economic policy are intimately linked to each other. A successful security policy will create the prerequisites for political, economic, and social advancement. Strong liberal economies are essential to security, and good trade relations are an important characteristic of international stability. The containment policy that was applied by the Atlantic allies to the Warsaw Pact countries in the Cold War era has to be replaced by a policy of political and economic cooperation and development. All this -- from a German perspective -- is only

²¹² See Kinkel, K., Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, "Die Rolle Deutschlands in der Weltpolitik," in Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (ed.), *Bulletin*, March 3, 1993.

possible within the framework of NATO and the European Union. A NATO expansion toward East Central Europe is therefore a cornerstone for European security and prosperity.²¹³

The concept of stability transfer is not directed at anyone in particular but designed to benefit everyone. Stability in and for Europe is a task for the future to be tackled by the so-called *Euro-Atlantic community*. This requires a lasting US commitment to Europe and due consideration of the interests of all European countries (including Russia).

2. Recreating the Bipolar System

The NATO leadership is in the process of realizing that the transfer of stability to the East is currently the most important challenge of the *Euro-Atlantic community* besides the war in the former Yugoslavia. NATO is trying to develop a viable concept for meeting this strategic challenge. Parallel to this process, the key players -- the United States and Russia -- are still trying to redefine their national positions in order to adapt to the drastic changes in the international environment.

During his campaign, Bill Clinton, the first US president after the Cold War, committed himself to resolving the domestic problems of his country. The shift of priority from foreign to domestic policy was the essential element of his program.²¹⁴ In doing so, President Clinton is tackling a difficult task. He maintains the US claim to leadership while seeking to keep the lowest profile possible.

²¹³ See Rhe, 1993, p. 134.

²¹⁴ See Sommer, T., *DIE ZEIT*, October 29, 1993.

According to Anthony Lake, President Clinton's national security adviser, the concept of "enlargement" is to substitute the previous concept of "containment"; instead of countering the former expansionist Soviet foreign policy, market economy and democracy are supposed to be extended.²¹⁵ However, it has not been specified yet how these challenging objectives are to be achieved in practice. In fact, Washington's policy toward the East is in sharp contrast to an enlargement policy; it leaves the countries of East Central Europe in a state of insecurity and instability while seeking, in a "Russia first" approach, "global partnership" with the old strategic counterpart in Moscow.²¹⁶ As in the days of the Cold War, it is once again the nuclear arms and arms control considerations which serve as the current guidelines for the US foreign policy with respect to Europe. From the American point of view, this policy requires that all nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union be concentrated in the hands of Russia. This arises from the fear that, in view of the uncertain future of this region, the nuclear arsenals might fall into the wrong hands and thus turn into an immediate threat to the United States again. Washington is ready to support Boris Yeltsin at almost any price. Already today Moscow is conceded special rights in the "sphere of interest" claimed by Russia, for instance, by tolerating Russian armed intervention in the other former Soviet republics.²¹⁷

²¹⁵ See *The New York Times*, "Clinton's Security Aide Gives A Vision for Foreign Policy," September 22, 1993

²¹⁶ See for example, *The New York Times*, "Bill Clinton, The New Kid On the Block," January 9, 1994, p. 6.

²¹⁷ See *The New York Times*, February 1, 1994

The United States is sponsoring Russia in order to make it a "junior nuclear super-power partner," but, in the eyes of Adrei Kozyrev, "Russia remains a superpower -- and not only as measured by nuclear and missile strength, but by its natural resources, technological skills and strategic geography."²¹⁸ Washington's policy ignores the security interests of Ukraine, which has been forced to turn its nuclear weapons over to Russia²¹⁹ and the sovereignty of which the United States is ready to sacrifice on the altar of the new Russian-American friendship. Moreover, this policy ignores the security interests of the other East Central European states and considers their newly gained independence a burden rather than a blessing. This became very obvious, for instance, in the stance the United States took during Lithuania's struggle for recognition as an independent state.²²⁰

Thus, the American policy with respect to East Central Europe conflicts, at least in part, with Germany's security interests and the projected advancement of European integration. Consequently, the German Chancellor intends to seek a redefinition of the US policy, which is currently centering around Russia, so as to increasingly take the East Central European region into consideration.²²¹ From the German point of view, it is

²¹⁸ Kozyrev, A., "Don't Threaten Us," *The New York Times*, March 18, 1994, p. A11.

²¹⁹ See *The New York Times*, "Accords Signed on Ukraine's Atom Arms," January 15, 1994.

²²⁰ Lieven, A., *The Baltic Revolution. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

²²¹ *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, "Bonn liegt nichts an einer neuen 'Bipolarität'," January 29, 1994, p. 1.

particularly important to avoid a new American-Russian bipolarity at the expense of the other East Central European states.²²²

3. Partnership or Membership?

When President Clinton, after one year in office, took off to Europe for the first time to participate in the NATO summit in Brussels on January 10 and 11, 1994, he could be assured that the majority of the American people and of Congress would not approve any additional commitment to Europe, not after the pictures of an American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu had been shown on television.²²³ However, since any expansion of NATO -- and thus the commitment to mutual assistance -- might ultimately imply the employment of American soldiers for instance for the defense of Poland or even Latvia, it would be difficult to make this plausible to a country which is shifting priority to domestic issues.

The "Russia-firsters in charge"²²⁴ are not unhappy about this stance, since it provides the US president another domestic political argument for offering -- in line with Moscow's opposition to an eastward expansion of NATO -- "partnership" rather than "membership". For the European allies this is one more reason for concern. "Many Europeans worry that the Administration is so determined to avoid offending the

²²² Ibid.

²²³ See *The New York Times*, "Clinton Looks Homeward - Abroad, President Is Careful Not to Promise What the Folks Back Home Won't Support," January 13, 1994, p. A1.

²²⁴ *The New York Times*, January 9, 1994.

Russians, who oppose NATO membership for Poland, the Czech Republic and other Eastern European nations, that it has given Moscow a virtual veto over NATO policy."²²⁵

For Poland and the other East Central European countries, the adopted "Partnership for Peace" agreement implies the continued existence of the power vacuum in their region and their remaining in Russia's sphere of influence. This fact cannot even be consoled by President Clinton's statement, according to which "it is now a question not of whether but when and how" NATO will take them as new members.²²⁶

The question is whether this is really the appropriate way of pointing out to Russia the limits of its imperialist ambitions. It remains to be seen whether the new military doctrine spells much blessing in this context. As a matter of fact, no lessons have been learned from Bosnia yet. The North Atlantic Alliance still owes an answer as to what it is willing to contribute to the security of the new democracies in East Central Europe. Hence, Eastern Europe's search for security has not yet come to an end and consequently the question as to whether NATO is actually willing and able to tackle the future-oriented task of a stability transfer to the East remains open as well.

C. CONCLUSION

The future of post-Cold War Europe has been a source of great speculation. One tends to draw analogies to Europe's past. In Gregory F. Treverton's "Europe's Past,

²²⁵ Ibid

²²⁶ quoted from *The New York Times*, "NATO Warns Bosnian Serbs Of Air Strikes," January 12, 1994, p. A6.

Europe's Future: Finding an Analogy for Tomorrow,"²²⁷ for example, he compares Europe's current situation with Versailles 1919 and the Interwar Period. Treverton feels that such comparisons are merited because after the Cold War ended, just as when World War II ended, a new political order replaced a shattered old order. He feels that 1919 also warrants comparison because "a weakened Russia, a retreating America, and an Eastern Europe that was both turbulent and weak, providing an opportunity for great power involvement"²²⁸ were noted.

Treverton's essay is so important because it reflects America's fears toward Europe's future development. German-Russian relations in the European power structure especially warrant attention. The old ghosts of Rapallo are still around.²²⁹ It is feared that Germany will once again (as in 1922) try to establish itself as the sole major power between East and West, and possibly trying to pit them against each other. Further, it is feared that Germany could improve its relations with Russia and at the same time loosen its ties with the United States.²³⁰

Treverton is right in his analogy that the vast Russian empire today, as was the case after tsardom, finds itself in a deep domestic crisis with an uncertain way out. He is also right in saying that the United States has reduced its presence in Europe. America's

²²⁷ See Treverton, G.F., "Europe's Past, Europe's Future: Finding an Analogy for Tomorrow," in *Orbis*, Winter 1993, pp. 1-20.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

²²⁹ See Kennan, G.F., *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (New York: Penguin, 1961).

²³⁰ See Greiner, B., "Angst vor Rapallo - Amerikanische Reaktionen auf den Fall der Mauer," in *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 2/1990, pp. 159-167.

attitudes toward the war in the former Yugoslavia, toward an expansion of NATO to the East and reduction of US troops in Europe to "about 100,000 troops there"²³¹ all point to this fact.

However, a new occurrence of Rapallo, as Treverton fears, is not in sight. There is a lot more reason to fear a new Yalta, as already pointed out. German foreign policy toward the United States and East Central Europe refutes Treverton's argument. Germany is aware that a strong partnership with the United States and a solid US commitment in NATO and the European security structure are decisive requisites for security and stability in Europe. It is on this solid basis that it must also be in US interests to bring security and stability to the East. This is the only way lasting peace can be guaranteed in Europe. When Germany therefore supports NATO membership for East Central Europe, it is trying to prevent the conditions Treverton described that characterized the interwar period.

Germany does not want a security partnership with Russia to replace its partnership with the United States. A "Berlin-Moscow Axis" can and must not exist; but it is possible to come to terms with a European security structure that neither excludes Russia nor is directed against Russia. One must agree with Vaclav Havel when he said that NATO's advancing toward Russia's borders is "not the advance of an enemy, but that of a sphere of democracy and stability."²³² The enormous reconstruction process of this huge

²³¹ Aspin, L., *The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era*, September 1, 1993.

²³² Quoted from Rühl, L., "Etappe zur NATO," in *DIE WELT* December 28, 1993.

country without democratic experience or hope for quick economic recovery will be a common challenge for Russia and all Western industrialized nations. This fact will cause the subject of burden-- sharing to receive more attention in the future. The other elements of structural realities will continue to be important as well, just as one observed when the Cold War ended. Partially differing political proposals and geostrategic perspectives remain decisive in German-American relations.

V. CONCLUSION

Security relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have always been relations between two unequal partners, and this will be the case in the future. Nevertheless, relations continue to be successful to this day.

The active support of the US allowed Germany to realize its most important foreign political goals during the postwar period. At the height of the Cold War, the relationship with the United States within the framework of NATO enabled Germany's gaining partial sovereignty, reintroduction into the community of European nations, and the creation of external security, which is a requisite for domestic stability. On the basis of these solid security relations, cooperative relations with the East were realized, not to mention the end goal of German policy: full sovereignty and German reunification.

The United States also reached its most important goal of the postwar period: the collapse of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the geostrategic and political factors involved in the relationship between Germany and the US have drastically changed. Both countries appear to need each other less in the future than they did in the past.

The latest challenges for both countries within the framework of NATO and the UN have demonstrated that the known structural realities in their security relations have gained more explosive force as a result of the fact that there is no longer a common threat. The asymmetries in these structural realities act as faultlines that run through

transatlantic relations; they are the cause of constant tremors when the senior partner changes the direction of policy, and the junior partner has to adjust his policy to those changes.

A. THE NUCLEAR ISSUE

The role of nuclear weapons and American nuclear guarantees for Europe's security (especially Germany's) have been the biggest area of conflict in German-American security relations for over four decades. The latent, long-term crisis in this area began with the buildup to the nuclear stalemate of the superpowers, and ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Federal Republic, which had been thinking in terms of conventional defense from the beginning, had worried since the beginning the American policy of nuclear deterrence that America could not back its nuclear guarantees, which risked involvement in a nuclear confrontation. Germany therefore closely followed all negotiations in the area of nuclear arms control and all developments in the area of nuclear weapons technology, particularly because Germany would have been in the center of the nuclear battlefield. The biggest crises in German-American security relations necessarily centered around nuclear issues.

The United States will probably remain ready to provide protection to Europe in the framework of extended deterrence. This readiness, however, will be combined with a policy revolving around greater independence from alliance responsibilities in Europe.

The Europeans will not be allowed to relent in their own conventional (and nuclear) efforts. Russia as a giant Eurasian empire remains a major nuclear power and will continue to act as such in Europe, even in a European order based on cooperation instead of confrontation. The appropriate response for alliance policy is to improve the firepower and mobility (including deployment mobility) of European forces. NATO efforts to create reaction forces that are deployable on short notice for crisis management and crisis response is a step in the right direction. Non-nuclear Germany will have continue to lay claim to inclusion under the American nuclear umbrella to avoid the possibility of nuclear threat and blackmail; the other West European states (and the evolving East Central European states) will have to do the same.

American experts predict that the nuclearization of German forces will come to pass.²³³ This must not and will not happen. Not only would this endanger America's link to Europe's security, and therefore German-American security relations, but it would also serve to justify the already resurgent idea that a powerful Germany means risking German aggression. Regardless of the accuracy of such perceptions of German intentions, the inevitable result would be Germany's isolation in Europe.

Meanwhile, American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era continues to be defined by the presence of nuclear weapons. New conflicts and crises occur because Washington, in following its "Russia first" approach, accepts the fact that the newly independent states in Eastern Europe remain in the Russian sphere of influence. The US is doing this to assure that strategic partner Russia is the only nuclear counterpart which

²³³ See for example, Treverton, 1993, p. 11.

must be dealt with in this region of the world. A firm and decisive American foreign policy is still necessary, however; a policy that would respect and support the will and national interests of East Central European states and clearly demonstrate to the Russian side that there are clear boundaries to realizing the Russian imperialist vision.

Deterrence in the nuclear age was in American hands. The new deterrence will not be controlled by the Americans alone because they are now putting more emphasis on their own domestic policy. Europe is being tested, mainly outside old NATO borders, as a result of the failure of current policies to provide a deterrent to aggression. Clear goals and a solid political will stood behind deterrence as practiced in the Cold War. Deterrence in the present era will not be possible as long as there is an absence of such clear goals and a solid political will.

B. THE GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

America today enjoys a significantly greater freedom of action in the world than it did when confronting the Soviet Union in the context of every international issue. The almost complete elimination of a ballistic missile-based nuclear threat for the "island of America" and the end of the East-West confrontation have made this possible. During the Cold War, America was obliged to maintain a military presence to the east and west of the American continent. This continually led to conflicts with the allies within regional NATO, who considered every American military deployment in the Pacific

sphere as a compromise to their own security. The same was true when the Americans would demand support from the West Europeans when deploying outside of Europe.

Today's need for global power projection is not what it was in the past. The current examples of the Gulf War, Somalia, and Bosnia demonstrate under what post-Cold War era circumstances American troops will be sent overseas. These examples also demonstrate that future challenges for transatlantic partnership will take place outside old NATO boundaries. Formerly clearly defined limits of regional and global perspectives, as well as the limits of the alliance, thus become ambiguous. For the United States this means that in the future it is likely to become involved in a regional crisis. For Germany it means that the Germans can no longer think only in terms of security guarantees for its NATO allies. Thus the most difficult future structural problem in German-American security relations will revolve around the *share of responsibility for collective security outside its own regional interests that Germany will be willing to accept.* The share of responsibility that Germany will be able to cope with will determine whether German-American security relations have a positive future.

C. THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS

One cannot assume that a power on the other side of the Atlantic from Europe, 5000 kilometers away, would feel obligated to take on defense duties which have as their objective the preservation of Western Europe. The mother in Chicago must constantly be told why it is necessary that her son is defending the "Fulda Gap." The person in

Germany that believes that Germany has an irrefutable right to US protection must be reminded of the domestic political problems the US has experienced in relation to overseas involvement, even at the height of the Cold War, that make it so difficult to fulfill the security guarantees which have constituted American foreign policy. Senator Mike Mansfield's efforts to reduce the American military presence overseas serve as an example of this.

Every new military challenge on the part of Moscow has always done the Americans and West Europeans the favor of providing a justification for keeping US soldiers in Europe. As has been seen, the elimination of the global military threat has led to more emphasis on domestic politics in the US. This takes place at the same time that economic and other domestic concerns force Washington to downplay foreign issues in order to focus on what American voters feel are issues "closer to home," making it even more difficult to raise the issue of foreign commitments, much less justify the deployment of American soldiers overseas. This is another important reason for America's hesitation toward involvement in the situation in the former Yugoslavia and a NATO expansion to the East. Nothing could be more fatal for the credibility of American policy than for the American government to take on new security guarantees that nobody at home agrees with, because it has never been able to successfully maintain any foreign policy without popular support, and its allies around the world know this.

The pressure on American domestic policy to reduce American commitments overseas necessarily increases the already-mentioned expectations and pressures on the

Federal Republic of Germany to take on foreign policy responsibility beyond Germany's traditional regional interests. The United States is changing its policy. The junior partner must once again follow.

It is therefore critical for Germany to successfully conclude its domestic debate on the deployment of German troops outside of Germany or well-defined NATO borders; it is critical that Germany fully participate in all of the kinds of military missions which fall under the leadership of NATO and/or the UN.

D. THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE IDENTITY

Europe's defense identity, again and again challenged by the other side of the Atlantic and at the same time eyed with ongoing suspicion, lends new force to the alliance and the US presence in Europe. The glow of the European security architecture has dimmed. The mistakes made by the Western governments in the Balkans have not only shaken the confidence of the European nations, they have also shaken the confidence of the United States in the reliability of the West European governments. NATO's *European pillar*, the WEU, which had been emphasized by the Europeans as the security component of an integrated and more politically independent Europe, encountered structural realities of its own.. The establishment of the WEU, which was supposed to demonstrate consensus, actually presented additional problem issues to be resolved.. The question is whether security is really served by a proliferation of security institutions that are all created for the same purpose? Does it make sense to postulate the WEU as the

security forum of the EU -- excluding the North American partners -- while still relying on NATO to execute any military operation? In the long run, the interests of the United States and Canada cannot be maintained if the Europeans formulate positions without North American participation and move to act on those positions in the NATO Council. These nations will doubtless perceive such attempts as a fundamental rejection of the community spirit of NATO.

NATO remains the most important forum for consultation as far as the security of its members is concerned. For this reason, the WEU must be seen to enhance NATO's strength, rather than being a duplication of structures. Finally, there should be no competition between NATO and WEU; the development of WEU's operational role has to be continued in an open and complementary manner.

E. THE FACTOR OF BURDEN-SHARING

Discussion of burden-sharing issues took place in the shadow of the military superiority of the Soviet Union until 1989. The new dimension of burden-sharing, which is closely related with the key phrase "out of area," has already been expanded on in the area of geopolitical perspectives.

In the future, the phrase "burden-sharing" will no longer be seen only in the narrow sense of military and financial burden-sharing, but must involve the sharing of leadership and responsibility as well, in order to alleviate pressure on the US. The example of

Yugoslavia, however, demonstrates that it will be a long time before such levels of sharing are realized.

The European defense identity and the desired European security structure appeared as paper tigers in the former Yugoslavia. Despite the European Union, Western Europe is not yet mature enough for political leadership. This is also an important reason why the WEU -- for the present, at least -- cannot take the place of NATO.

The Europe of the future will rely on the leadership of the sole remaining world power: the United States of America. Without the leadership of an overseas and non-partisan power, NATO would lose its ability to act, because the West European partners' national interests would get in the way. Europe would then lose the only functioning security system capable of filling the existing power vacuum in East Central Europe. Given recent events Russia, the absence of the United States and NATO would again make Europe vulnerable to political developments that might result in a "Second Cold War."²³⁴

The future of NATO will especially dependent on the future of German-American relations. The United States needs a dependable European "partner in leadership" who will play an active role in European unity and at the same time serve as a bridge to Eastern Europe. Germany is the only country that can do this. Germany needs America not only because Germany as a non-nuclear power is dependent on US nuclear security guarantees, but because this partnership offers the best way to alleviate fear about a reunified Germany, particularly in East Central Europe.

²³⁴ *The Wall Street Journal*, "The Second Cold War," February 17, 1994.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abenheim, D., *Reforging the Iron Cross* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
- Ackermann, A., and Kelleher, C., "The United States and the German Question: Building a New European Order," in Verheyen, D., and Soe, C. (eds.), *The Germans and Their Neighbors* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
- Adenauer, K., *Konrad Adenauer - Erinnerungen 1955-1959* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967)
- Aspin, L. "The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era." September 1, 1993.
- Bartke, "Internationale Verwendung der Bundeswehr im Rahmen der Charta der Vereinten Nationen," in *Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages*, Info-Brief 132/93, February 1993.
- Baumgartner, H.M., and Wellershoff, D., (eds.), *Frieden ohne Macht?* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991).
- Beer, F.A. (ed.), *Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970).
- Berdal, M., "Peacekeeping in Europe," in International Institute for Strategic Studies (ed.), *European Security After The Cold War*, The IISS 35th Annual Conference, Brussels, September 9-12, 1993.
- Bolton, J.R., "Wrong Turn in Somalia," in *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1994.
- Bonner Rundschau*, "Kohl und R  he: Waffen nach Bosnien liefern," February 1, 1993.
- Bonner Rundschau*, "US-Politiker sehen Bonner Koalition  ber Awacs stolpern," February 19, 1993.
- Borgert, H.-L., "Zur Entstehung, Entwicklung und Struktur der Dienstgruppen in der britischen und amerikanischen Besatzungs-zone Westdeutschlands 1945-1950," in *Milit rgeschichte seit 1945: Dienstgruppen und westdeutscher Verteidigungsbeitrag, Vor berlegungen zur Bewaffnung der Bundesrepublik*

Deutschland, ed. by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Boppard am Rhein, 1982.

Brzezinski, Z., "Post-Communist Nationalism," in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1989/90.

Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien (ed.), "Kosovo, Makedonien und die albanische Frage: Aktuelle Entwicklungen eines möglichen neuen Konflikts," in *Aktuelle Analysen*, No. 39/1992.

Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *German Defense Policy Guidelines* (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien), November 1992.

Bundesverfassungsgericht - 2BvE 5/93 - April 8, 1993.

Bundesverfassungsgericht - 2 BvQ 17/93 - June 23, 1993.

Campbell, E.S., *Germany's Past and Europe's Future* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989).

Cancian, M.F., "The Wehrmacht in Yugoslavia: Lessons of the Past?" in *Parameters*, Autumn 1993.

CDU-Infobox, Aktueller Dienst der CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Nr. 7, 1990.

Clausewitz, C.v., *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

Craig, G.A., and George, A.L., *Force and Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

Crow, S., "Russian Views on an Eastward Expansion of NATO," in *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 41, October 15, 1993.

Crow, S., "Russia Asserts Its Strategic Agenda," in *RFE/RL RESEARCH REPORT*, Vol. 2, 17 December 1993.

Crow, S., "Drang nach draußen," in *DIE ZEIT*, January 21, 1994.

Denison, A., "Die Haltung der USA gegenüber dem 'Euro-Korps': Akzeptanz oder Ablehnung?" in Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (ed.), *Kurzpapier der Abteilung Außenpolitik*, Nr. 50, Bonn, 1992.

DER SPIEGEL, "...morgen die ganze Welt," 16/1993.

DER SPIEGEL, "Die Alten Dämonen tanzen," January 3, 1994.

DER SPIEGEL, "Die Knute zeigen," January 10, 1994.

Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 12/5, Bonn, January 30, 1991.

DIE WELT, "Ende der Geduld," February 19, 1993.

Ehlert, H., "Innenpolitische Auseinandersetzungen um die Pariser Verträge und die Wehrverfassung 1954 bis 1956," in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956, Band 3*, ed. by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, München, 1993.

Europäische Sicherheit, "Die NATO und der Balkan," 7/1993.

Feldmeyer, K., "Die NATO und Deutschland nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Gegensatzes," in Zitelmann, R., Weissmann, K., and Grossheim, M. (eds.), *Westbindung* (Frankfurt/M.: Propyläen, 1993).

Fischer, P., "Zwischen Abschreckung und Verteidigung. Die Anfänge bundesdeutscher Nuklearpolitik (1952-1957)," in Maier, K.A. and Wiggershaus, N. (eds.), *Das Nordatlantische Bündnis 1949-1956*, München, 1993.

Frankfurter Allgemeine, "Der Zweite Senat des Verfassungsgerichts bemüht sich um den Awacs-Konflikt in der Koalition," April 6, 1993.

Frankfurter Allgemeine, "Die NATO erwägt Luftangriffe," May 7, 1993.

Frankfurter Allgemeine, "Clintons Brief an Kohl zum Balkankrieg stiftet neue Verwirrung," June 24, 1993.

Frankfurter Allgemeine, "Bonn liegt nichts an einer neuen 'Bipolarität'," January 29, 1994.

Frankfurter Neue Presse, "Nur der Sand und die Post machen Ärger," July 28, 1993.

Frankfurter Rundschau, "Kein Verständnis," February 19, 1993.

Freedman, L., *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989).

Fröhlich, S., *Die USA und die neue Weltordnung-Zwischen Kontinuität und Wandel* (Bonn: Bouvier 1992).

- Fukuyama, F., "The End of History?," in *The National Interest*, Summer 1989.
- George, A.L., and Smoke, R., *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
- Gillingham, J., "The Nature of an Alliance," in Maier, K.A. and Wiggershaus, N. (eds.), *Das Nordatlantische Bündnis 1949-1956*, Munich, 1993.
- Gillessen, G., "Versäumte Abschreckung," in *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 28, 1993.
- Glenny, M., *The Fall of Yugoslavia* (New York: Penguin Books, 1992).
- Gordon, M.R., "Pentagon Seeking to Cut Military But Equip It for 2 Regional Wars," in *The New York Times*, September 2, 1993.
- Greiner, B., "Angst vor Rapallo - Amerikanische Reaktionen auf den Fall der Mauer," in *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 2/1990.
- Greiner, C., "Die militärische Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die WEU und die NATO 1954-1957," in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956, Band 3*, ed. by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Munich, 1993.
- Greiner, C., "Zur Rolle Kontinentaleuropas in den militär-strategischen und operativen Planungen der NATO von 1949 bis 1958," in Maier, K.A. and Wiggershaus, N. (eds.), *Das Nordatlantische Bündnis 1949-1956*, Munich, 1993.
- Greiner, C., "Militärstrategische Konzeptionen für die Verteidigung Westeuropas 1948 bis 1950," in Wiggershaus, N. and Foerster, R.G.(eds.), *Die westliche Sicherheitsgemeinschaft 1948-1950. Gemeinsame Probleme und gegensätzliche Nationalinteressen in der Gründungsphase der Nordatlantischen Allianz*, Boppard am Rhein, 1988.
- Greiner, C., "Nordatlantische Bündnisstrategie und deutscher Verteidigungsbeitrag, 1954 bis 1957," in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, *Vorträge zur Militärgeschichte*, Volume 4, Herford, 1983.
- Graebner, N.A. (ed.), *The National Security. Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986)
- Hacke, C., "Die Entscheidung für die politische Westbindung nach 1945," in Zitelmann, R., Weissmann, K., and Grossheim, M. (eds.), *Westbindung* (Frankfurt/M.: Propyläen, 1993).

- Hacke, C., "Der Einfluß von SDI auf die Beziehungen zwischen den USA und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Funke, M., Jacobsen, H.-A., and Knüttler, H.-H. (eds.), *Demokratie und Diktatur - Geist und Gestalt politischer Herrschaft in Deutschland und Europa*, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Band 250, 1987.
- Haftendorn, H., "Historische Entwicklung, politische Motive und rechtliche Grundlagen," in Mahnke, D. (ed.), *Amerikaner in Deutschland-Grundlagen und Bedingungen der transatlantischen Sicherheit* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991).
- Hamilton, D., and Clad, J., "Germany, Japan, and the False Glare of War," in *Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1991.
- Hanrieder, W., *Deutschland, Europa, Amerika. Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1989* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1991).
- Hefty, G.P., "Bonner Glaubwürdigkeit - aus Karlsruhe," in *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 10, 1993.
- Herf, J., *War by other Means. Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles* (New York: Free Press, 1991).
- Hoffmann, O., *Deutsche Blauhelme bei UN-Missionen* (Bonn: Aktuell, 1993).
- Holmes, S.A., "Clinton Defends Aspin on Action Regarding Request for US Tanks," in *The New York Times*, October 9, 1993.
- Hondrich, O., "Der Golf-Krieg hat die Friedfertigkeit der Deutschen erschüttert," in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, January 14, 1992.
- Howard, M., *The Continental Commitment. The Dilemma of British Defence Policy In the Era of the Two World Wars* (London: Ashfield Press, 1972).
- IAP-Dienst Sicherheitspolitik, "Die Neuplanung der Bundes-wehr," 1-2/93, January 1993.
- Inacker, M.J., "Die europäische Leistung: Lastenteilung als Einflußfaktor auf die amerikanische Präsenz," in Mahnke, D. (ed.), *Amerikaner in Deutschland-Grundlagen und Bedingungen der transatlantischen Sicherheit* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991).
- Inacker, M.J., "Der deutsche Golfkrieg," in *Rheinischer Merkur*, September 20, 1991.

- Jackson, W.D., "Russia after the Crisis. Imperial Temptations: Ethnics Abroad," in *Orbis*, Winter 1994, pp. 1-17.
- Jane's Intelligence Review*, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," Pointer, No. 2, December 1993.
- Joffe, J., "Nach der Revolution: Die amerikanischen Interessen in Europa in den neunziger Jahren," in Mahnke, D. (ed.), *Amerikaner in Deutschland-Grundlagen und Bedingungen der transatlantischen Sicherheit* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991), pp. 181-219.
- Joffe, J., "Der Frieden läßt sich nicht herbeibomben," in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, April 30, 1993.
- Jowitt, K., *New World Disorder - The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
- Kaiser, K., and Lellouche, P. (eds.), *Deutsch-Französische Sicherheitspolitik. Auf dem Wege zur Gemeinsamkeit?* (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1986).
- Kaplan, L.S., "Die Westunion und die militärische Integration Europas 1948-1950. Eine Darstellung aus amerikanischer Sicht," in Wiggershaus, N. and Foerster, R.G. (eds.), *Die westliche Sicherheitsgemeinschaft 1948-1950. Gemeinsame Probleme und gegensätzliche Nationalinteressen in der Gründungsphase der Nordatlantischen Allianz*, Boppard am Rhein, 1988.
- Kelleher, C.M., *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).
- Kennan, G.F., *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (New York: Penguin, 1961).
- Kinkel, K., German Foreign Minister, "Die Rolle Deutschlands in der Weltpolitik," in *Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung* (ed.), *Bulletin*, March 3, 1993.
- Kozyrev, A., "Don't Threaten Us," *The New York Times*, March 18, 1994, p. A11.
- Kuiper, M. A., "Return of the Hollow Army?," *Military Review*, August 8, 1993.
- Lerch, G., "Wie weiter in Somalia?" in *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, October 12, 1993.

- Levcenko, A., "The Ukraine-Russia Relations in the Field of Foreign and Security Policies: Spheres of Cooperation and Conflicts," in Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, (ed.), *Sonderforschungsvorhaben "Analysen Sicherheits-/Verteidigungs-politik IV" (SASVP IV)*, Ebenhausen, 1993, Band 3B.
- Lewis, A., "Waiting for Clinton," *The New York Times*, April 19, 1993.
- Lieven, A., *The Baltic Revolution. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).
- Mai, G., *Westliche Sicherheitspolitik im Kalten Krieg: Der Korea-Krieg und die deutsche Wiederbewaffnung 1950*, ed. by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Boppard am Rhein, 1977.
- McGhee, G., *At the Creation of a New Germany. From Adenauer to Brandt-an Ambassador's Account* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).
- Medvedev, S.A., "Ethnisch-politische Konflikte auf dem Territorium der ehemaligen UdSSR: Ursachen, Typologie und Folgen für die GUS und die übrige Welt," in Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (ed.), *Sonderforschungsvorhaben "Analysen Sicherheits-/Verteidigungs-politik IV" (SASVP IV)*, Ebenhausen, 1993, Band 3A.
- Merkel, P., *German Unification in the European Context* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993).
- Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, *Militärgeschichte seit 1945: Die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft - Stand und Probleme der Forschung* (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1985).
- Moodie, M., "Burden-Sharing in NATO: A New Debate with an Old Label," in *Washington Quarterly*, 12/1989.
- NATO Press Service*, September 10, 1993.
- Naumann, K., General, Inspector General of the *Bundeswehr*, "Wir betreten alle gemeinsam Neuland - die Dimensionen des neuen Auftrages der Bundeswehr," in *TRUPPENPRAXIS*, 5/1993.
- Nelson, K.L., *Victors Divided-America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

- Neue Ruhr Zeitung*, "Die Truppe ist bereit zum UNO-Einsatz," April 17, 1993.
- The New York Times*, "Europeans Welcoming US Help in the Balkans," February 25, 1993.
- The New York Times*, "How European Unity Over Bosnia Eluded Clinton," May 12, 1993.
- The New York Times*, "Clinton's Security Aide Gives A Vision for Foreign Policy," September 22, 1993.
- The New York Times*, "Somali Leader Gets Mixed Signals From the US About Its Next Steps," October 9, 1993.
- The New York Times*, "Muscovite with Bravado," December 14, 1993.
- The New York Times*, "Treacherous Transition," December 20, 1993.
- The New York Times*, "Bill Clinton, The New Kid On the Block," January 9, 1994.
- The New York Times*, "NATO Warns Bosnian Serbs Of Air Strikes," January 12, 1994.
- The New York Times*, "Clinton Looks Homeward - Abroad, President Is Careful Not to Promise What the Folks Back Home Won't Support," January 13, 1994.
- The New York Times*, "Accords Signed on Ukraine's Atom Arms," January 15, 1994.
- The New York Times*, "US Tells a Visiting Latvian Official That Russia Is Moving to Withdraw Its Troops," February 1, 1994.
- The New York Times*, "Ukraine Joining Plan for NATO Partnership," February 7, 1994.
- The New York Times*, "NATO to Hold Emergency Talks on Fighting Around Sarajevo," February 7, 1994.
- The New York Times*, "Russia's Balkan Card," February 18, 1994.
- Nogee, J.L., and Donaldson, R.H., *Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II*, 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992).
- Nye, J.S., *Bound to Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

Olechowski, A., "Polen und die Nordatlantische Allianz," in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, January 3, 1994.

Pocalyko, M.N., "Riding on the Storm: The Influence of War on Strategy," in Tritten, J.J., and Stockton, P.N., *Reconstituting America's Defense. The New US National Security Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1992).

Pond, E., "Sind wir verraten und verkauft?" in *DIE ZEIT*, 26 June 1987.

President of the United States, George Bush, "Speech in Mainz, May 31, 1989," in *Europa-Archiv*, 12/1989.

Rautenberg, H.J., and Wiggershaus, N., *Die Himmeroder Denkschrift vom Oktober 1950* (Karlsruhe: G. Braun, 2nd ed., 1985).

Richardson, J.L., *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance-The Interaction of Strategy and Politics* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966).

Rühe, V., Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era," in *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2 Summer 1993.

Rühl, L., "Die geopolitische Frage Europas und die Grundlage einer europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur," in Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (ed.), *Sonderforschungsvorhaben "Analysen Sicherheits-/Verteidigungspolitik IV"* (SASVP IV), Ebenhausen, 1993, Band 5.

Rühl, L., "Ein toter Ritter in der Rüstung?" in *DIE WELT*, August 28, 1993.

Rühl, L., "Bonner Analyse sieht Serben als Sieger," in *DIE WELT*, September 24, 1993.

Rühl, L., "Etappe zur NATO," in *DIE WELT*, December 28, 1993.

Rupieper, H.J., *Der bestzte Verbündete. Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1949-1955* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991).

Schierwater, H.-V., "Deutschland, der Golf und die Allianz-Fragen an die deutsche Außenpolitik," in *Rissener Rundbrief*, April (4), 1991.

Schmidt, H., *Menschen und Mächte* (Berlin: Siedler 1987).

Schmidt, R., "Das Instrumentarium der Vereinten Nationen zum Krisenmanagement und seine Entwicklung in den letzten Jahren," in Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, ed., *Sonderforschungs-vorhaben "Analysen Sicherheits-/Verteidigungspolitik IV" (SASVP IV)*, Ebenhausen, 1993, Band 6.

Schmidt-Häuer, C., "Sein Kampf," in *DIE ZEIT*, January 21, 1994.

Schwabe, K., "The United States and the Weimar Republic: A 'Special Relationship' that Failed," in Trommler F., and McVeigh, J. (eds.), *America and the Germans-An Assessment of a Three-Hundred-Year History* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985).

Schwarz, K.-D., "Die USA im Übergang zur postkonfrontativen Weltordnung," in Heydrich, W., and others, (eds.), *Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands: Neue Konstellationen, Risiken, Instrumente* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992).

Schweigler, G., "Die Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland als Faktor amerikanischer Politik," in Mahnke, D. (ed.), *Amerikaner in Deutschland-Grundlagen und Bedingungen der transatlantischen Sicherheit* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991).

Sherry, M.S., *Preparing for the Next War-American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45* (New Haven: Yale university Press, 1977).

Smyser, W.R., *Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press: 1993).

Snow, D.M., *Distant Thunder. Third World Conflict and the New International Order* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

Sommer, D., "Das Eis ist gebrochen," in *TRUPPENPRAXIS* 5/1993.

Sommer, T., "Bomben gegen Gewissensbisse?" in *DIE ZEIT*, August 20, 1993.

Sommer, T., "Dem Sheriff wird der Stern zur Last," in *DIE ZEIT*, October 29, 1993.

Stuttgarter Zeitung, "NATO-Stabschefs warnen vor militärischem Eingreifen auf Balkan," April 28, 1993.

Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Keine deutschen Soldaten nach Bosnien," May 6, 1993.

Süddeutsche Zeitung, "Deutscher Abzug im Sog der USA," October 18, 1993.

Süddeutsche Zeitung, "Rühe: Bundeswehr in Somalia von USA abhängig," November 16, 1993.

Thoß, B., "Der Beitritt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur WEU und NATO im Spannungsfeld von Blockbildung und Entspannung (1954-1956)," in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956, Band 3*, ed. by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Munich, 1993.

Time, October 18, 1993.

Treverton, G.F., "Europe's Past, Europe's Future: Finding an Analogy for Tomorrow," in *Orbis*, Winter 1993.

Fucker, R.W., and Hendrickson, D.C., "America and Bosnia," in *The National Interest*, Fall 1993.

The Wall Street Journal, "The Second Cold War," February 17, 1994.

The Wall Street Journal, "Score One for Russia at Sarajevo," February 22, 1994.

The Washington Post, "US Jets Down 4 Serb Bombers Over Bosnia," March 1, 1994.

WELT am Sonntag, "Beschränkung auf Blauhelme widerspricht dem Völkerrecht," March 17, 1991.

Wiggershaus, N., "Zur Frage der Planung für die verdeckte Aufstellung westdeutscher Verteidigungskräfte in Konrad Adenau-ers sicherheitspolitischer Konzeption 1950," in *Militärgeschichte seit 1945: Dienstgruppen und westdeutscher Verteidigungsbeitrag, Vorüberlegungen zur Bewaffnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, ed. by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Boppard am Rhein, 1982.

Wiggershaus, N., "Nordatlantische Bedrohungsperzeptionen im Kalten Krieg 1948-1956," in Maier, K.A. and Wiggershaus, N. (eds.), *Das Nordatlantische Bündnis 1949-1956*, Munich, 1993.

Williams, D., and Devroy, A., "US Limits Peace-Keeping Role," in *Washington Post*, November 25, 1993.

Zehrer, H., ed., *Der Golfkonflikt: Dokumentation, Analyse und Bewertung aus militärischer Sicht* (Herford: Mittler, 1992).

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. **Defense Technical Information Center** 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. **Library, Code 52** 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002
3. **N51, The Pentagon, Room 4E572** 1
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, DC 20350
4. **European Division/NATO Policy Branch** 1
J-5 PNT Room 20965
Joint Staff
Washington, DC 20301
5. **Colonel Michael Burns** 1
OSD-- Resources and Plans
The Pentagon, Room 1E439
Washington, DC 20301
6. **Thomas C. Bruneau, Code NS/Bn** 1
Chairman, National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
7. **Donald Abenheim, Code NS/Ah** 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
8. **Bertrand Patenaude, Code NS/Pa** 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>9. Paul N. Stockton, Code NS/Sc
 Naval Postgraduate School
 Monterey, California 93943</p> | 1 |
| <p>10. Mikhail Tsypkin, Code NS/Tk
 Naval Postgraduate School
 Monterey, California 93943</p> | 1 |
| <p>11. Jan Breemer, Code NS/Be
 Naval Postgraduate School
 Monterey, California 93943</p> | 1 |
| <p>12. Roman Laba, Code NS/Lb
 Naval Postgraduate School
 Monterey, California 93943</p> | 1 |
| <p>13. Karl H. Lowe
 Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division
 Institute for Defense Analyses
 1801 N. Beauregard Street
 Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1772</p> | 1 |
| <p>14. Lt. Col. Jeffrey A. Larsen
 Director, Institute for National Security Studies
 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 4K25
 US Air Force Academy
 Colorado Springs, Colorado 80840</p> | 1 |
| <p>15. Oberst i.G. Kuse
 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung
 Füs II
 Postfach 13 28
 53003 Bonn
 Germany</p> | 1 |
| <p>16. Generalmajor a.D. Anton Steer
 Wilhelm-Leuschner Str. 8
 56076 Koblenz
 Germany</p> | 1 |

17. Major i.G. Jobst Schönfeld
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung
FüS III2
Postfach 13 28
53003 Bonn
Germany

3