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**THE ARMY RESERVE COMMAND
OF THE 21ST CENTURY FORCE:
AN ELEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ARMY**

BY

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THE ARMY RESERVE COMMAND OF THE 21ST CENTURY FORCE:
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ABSTRACT

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The Force that was required for the Cold War is not the Force for the 21st Century. As the Active Army transforms into the Force of the 21st Century, the United States Army Reserve (USAR) must transform to support that Force. As a major element of the USAR, the Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM) of today must likewise change. Projecting today's ARCOMs into the 21st Century Force that supports the U.S. National Security Objectives in the rapidly changing contingency environment requires a rethinking, refocusing, restructuring of the U.S. Army Reserve Force for the future. The USAR must enhance its position as an element of the **Federal Force** by working towards **total integration** with the Active Army. It must play an active role in **contingency planning** to fully support the Unified Commanders with combat support and combat service support units (CS/CSS) fully ready for rapid deployment to meet any crisis. In doing so the USAR must focus its efforts on clearly identified goals, functions and structure that add value, elimination of waste, continuous improvement, flexibility, adaptability and responsiveness. With these as a guide, an ARCOM for the 21st Century Force can be developed.

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INTRODUCTION

Change is a fact of life in our World today. Change has increased exponentially since the early 1900's and will surely continue. Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent crumbling of the Warsaw Pact, the Global defense environment has been altered drastically. The Army of the 21st Century is under great scrutiny and discussion. The Bottom Up Review was by no means definitive in its description of the Force required for the New World Order. Discussions continue as to what is really required to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies among other questions. The future Force is yet to be completely defined. Likewise, the U.S. Army Reserve of the future is evolving and is in a mode of constant and continuous modification. We are at a crossroad in the evolution of the Army Reserve the likes of which have never been seen. The changes made in the next few years will be long lasting and could be revolutionary.

The purpose of this Research Project is to examine where a piece of the current USAR structure, the Army Reserve Command (ARCOM) is going in the future. ARCOM's were formed in 1968 as a command and control structure to provide primarily administrative, logistic and training support for regionally grouped Reserve units. Additionally, they put all Reserve units

which had previously been under Active General Officer command, under Reserve General Officer command. The ARCOM is fundamentally a Cold War Force element which must be reevaluated in light of the New World Order and the 21st Century Force. Upon examination, though, it becomes apparent that projecting today's ARCOM into the 21st Century Force that supports the U.S. National Security Objectives in the rapidly changing contingency environment requires a rethinking, refocusing, and restructuring of the total U.S. Army Reserve Force for the future. The destination of this Research journey, the conclusion, is a recommendation for the organization of the ARCOM of the 21st Century, including organization, function, roles and mission. The journey, however, must take a long, circuitous route. In order to define an ARCOM it was necessary to diverge to examine the Army Reserve as a whole and then converge back to the ARCOM. As a starting point, an explanation of what an ARCOM is today and how it got there is essential. A brief description of the changing environment both domestic and international will set the stage for what can be termed building blocks for the future. They include those elements that must be factored into USAR Force Development. The final building block is a Conceptual Model for USAR Force Development. Tied to this Model are principles for building the Force taken from the Twentieth Century success story of the Japanese automobile industry. These are the principles of lean production. Together with the Conceptual Model, they will provide the framework for the recommendations of ARCOM

organization, functions, roles and missions for the 21st Century Force.

This project is not a prescription to be followed step-by-step to redefine the ARCOM or the USAR structure for the future. It is a "Vision of the Future" for the U.S. Army Reserve; a future state that may never be fully attained but one which represents a realistic goal for the future. This is a logical thought process, ignoring the realities of the political environment, that provides a challenge as the Active Army and the Army Reserve, the Federal Army, move forward to form the 21st Century Force.

HISTORY

A Department of Defense announcement of 21 December 1967 described the formation of 18 new commands to round out the U.S. Army Reserve structure across the United States. Designated Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM's), each of these headquarters is commanded by an Army Reserve general officer with a staff of approximately 100 Army Reserve officers and soldiers, and eight to eleven full-time civilian technicians. The ARCOM's provide general officer command to all Army Reserve units not assigned to one of the 45 Army Reserve General Officer Commands (GOCOM's) in the Army Reserve force structure in CONUS.¹ Five more ARCOMs have since been added making the total 23 which includes one in

Heidelberg, Germany, Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, and Fort Derussy, Hawaii.² Originally they were identified by city and later were redesignated as numbered commands using the unit numbers of inactive Army Reserve divisions authorized the Division's flag and unit insignia as a challenge and trust pending reactivation of the Division.³ The mission of the ARCOM has remained unchanged since formation: to command and supervise the training, intelligence, administration, maintenance, and support of attached USAR units and individuals to ensure mobilization readiness.⁴ Functions include: Develop training plans and policies; Supervise training and administration of units and individuals for both active and inactive duty training; Coordinate use of training centers, areas, and ranges within their geographic area; Provide guidance and supervises preparation of unit alert and mobilization plans; Recommend reorganization, activation, organization, inactivation and relocation of assigned units; Develop plans for implementing intelligence, counterintelligence and security activities; Supervise materiel readiness programs; Coordinate logistical support; and Coordinate public information and public affairs within geographic area⁵. Additional functions of each ARCOM vary since each has expanded its roles in both pre and post mobilization activities regionally. In some cases, this is a duplication of effort and highlights a potential lack of clarity of lines of demarkation.

There are two types of ARCOM headquarters, command and control only and command and control plus base operations (base operations includes limited funding control, engineering activities, and facilities maintenance over units and facilities in a geographic area). The staff of each ARCOM is fundamentally the same. Subordinate units of the ARCOM vary greatly depending on the geographic area. They include many combinations of medical, engineer, signal, transportation, military police, logistics, judge advocate general, and other combat or combat service support units. Many units are functionally aligned under a headquarters subordinate to the ARCOM HQs. No two ARCOMs are identical. It is generally accepted that there are too many ARCOMs and there are studies ongoing to review how to reduce the total number. Downsizing of the USAR would warrant the right sizing of the ARCOMs, however, I am proposing a complete relook.

The evolution of the composite subordinate elements of the various ARCOM headquarters is the evolution of the U.S. Army Reserve itself. The most significant of the early legislative reforms dealing with reserve issues were the 1903 Dick Act, the 1908 creation of the Federal Medical Reserve, and the 1916 National Defense Act.⁶ World War I saw the Officer Reserve Corps totalling 89,476, combining the Medical Reserve Corps and newly trained and appointed Reserve Officers. The Enlisted Reserve Corps, created to secure an additional reserve of enlisted men for military service with the Engineer, Signal, and Quartermaster

Corps and the Ordnance and Medical Departments of the Regular Army, totalled 55,000 by October 1917.⁷ The National Defense Act of 1920 merged all components into one Army and provided that the peace establishment be organized into tactical divisions distributed over the country and administered through nine corps area headquarters from Boston to San Francisco.⁸ A total of 23 Divisions were reconstituted in the Organized Reserves, consisting of a cadre of officers and NCOs. The number grew to 26 prior to World War II. All divisions saw combat, however, their assigned reservists were mobilized individually in the pre-mobilization period leaving them divisions on paper only, to be filled by other means during mobilization.⁹ Post World War II saw the War Department retain 25 divisions but designate most as "Class C" (consisting of 60 percent officer cadre only). Low priority afforded these units caused deficiencies of facilities, equipment, and funds.¹⁰ No divisions were activated for Korea but by the end of the War, 404 units and a total of 240,500 Army Reservists were on active duty.¹¹ Two important pieces of legislation, the Armed Forces Reserve Acts of 1952 and 1955 strengthened the Reserve Component, established officially the Army Reserve, and increased membership. Various structural and organizational changes were made to Army Reserve units during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations paralleling changes in the Active Force. In 1967, Secretary of Defense McNamara announced the approval of the plan that among other things, designated the National Guard mostly combat and the Army Reserve

only combat support and combat service support (CS / CSS).¹² By this time the 25 divisions through many iterations, were reduced to 13 Training Divisions, 2 Maneuver Area Commands and an array of CS and CSS units spread across the country under Corps Headquarters. In 1968 the Corps were phased out and the ARCOMs created.¹³ With minor modification, they have remained the same since.

This historical perspective describes what the ARCOM of today is and how it got there. The evolution is varied because the Army Reserve changed as a result of the international environment, the domestic situation, the organization of the Active Army, funds available and developing legislation. The ARCOM of the 21st Century Force could be developed in a similar evolutionary manner or it could be developed in a revolutionary manner from a perspective focussed on the future and constructed according to a proven thought process.

ENVIRONMENT

The environment of today is neither predictable, simple, certain, or calm. To define the Reserve force for the 21st Century, all aspects of the environment must be taken into consideration both international and domestic.

The changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold War

have indeed been phenomenal. For more than 40 years the world was dominated by the two great superpowers. While during this period the World appeared to be constantly on the brink of nuclear holocaust, total war was avoided. What has developed since the Cold War, is a World characterized by: a solo superpower, regional disorder, erosion of Cold War alliances, U.S. geostrategic withdrawal, and information age military capability.¹⁴ The result is a World filled with unprecedented promise for the future, but also a World filled with uncertainty and confusion.¹⁵ Where a few short years ago, the U.S. could focus on one imposing adversary, this situation now developing requires an immense amount of adaptability and flexibility to respond to the ever changing contingency environment. Also required is a clear understanding of the potential adversaries, their goals, values, interests, purpose, and national and military strategies.

Responding to the Global environment with an array of potential contingency situations requires a force quite different from the Cold War. Long Range deliberate planning is still required to consider all potentialities up to and including a global conflict. While the forces necessary to counter these extreme possibilities may never be funded, especially in the Reserve Component, the plan must be there on the shelf for future use, a blue print for the future. Contingency planning, on the other hand, requires flexibility, adaptability and agility. Army

Reserve planners must play an active role in assisting the Unified Commands to define requirements that can be met by Reserve Forces. This must then be translated to a Force responsive to the CINC's requirements, ready for rapid deployment and flexible enough to respond to the array of contingency situations.

The current and future domestic environment must also be integrated into the Reserve Force development process. Priorities such as health care, crime, economic health, gun control, environmental issues all occupy the attention of our public and private sectors. While budget reductions will have an obvious, immediate and enduring impact on the 21st Century Force, other domestic issues must be taken under consideration. The Reserve Force for the 21st Century must be developed with these domestic considerations in mind. Budget is the ultimate driver, sometimes overruling international situations. To respond positively to the reduced resources and maintain a viable Army Reserve Force, all resources must be carefully used to reduce and eliminate waste in Force structure, continuously improve readiness and ensure all organizations, activities, facilities and actions are adding value to the Force. Additionally, since the Reserve Forces consist of citizen soldiers, from communities across the country, other domestic issues must not be ignored. Public support as well as unit member support must be maintained.

As the Active Army restructures for the 21st Century, the Army Reserve must maintain a supportive complimentary role. The right sizing of the Force began before Operation Desert Storm and has continued at a rapid pace since. How the USAR responds to these reductions is critical. Numerous functions currently performed by Active soldiers and units can and should be performed by Army Reservists. COL Charles E. Heller's Strategic Studies Institute report, "Twenty-First Century Force: A Federal Army and a Militia" describes this concept very clearly and recommends a Federal Reserve totally integrated into the Federal Army performing functions for which many Reservists have civilian acquired skills. As the Army right sizes for the future the USAR must be an integral, inseparable component.

BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE FUTURE FORCE

A trap that must be avoided when modifying the Force to meet the current situation is to merely take what was there and reduce to an appropriate level. A criticism of the Base Force was that it was a scaled down Cold War Force. Army Reserve history illustrates that over the years that has to a degree been the case, take what you have, review the current and future situation and modify accordingly. In developing this research project, I walked myself through what I considered a logical, unconstrained thought process. This led to the identification of five Building Blocks for the Future Force: The Federal Army consisting of the

Active Army and the U.S. Army Reserve¹⁶; complete and aggressive integration of the Active Army and Army Reserve; Contingency planning based on the CINC's requirements; USAR force composition (combat service and combat service support); and a Conceptual Model for force development.

The Mission of the Army Reserve as directed by Congress is: "To provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the Armed Forces, in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires." The Army Reserve possesses certain core competencies that define not only what it is, but also what it can provide to the Total Army. The Army Reserve is an extension of the Active Army; a **Federal Force** that can be activated immediately upon the call of the President.¹⁷ The key is Federal Force. The Army Reserve, as a Federal Reserve Force, can be mobilized and deployed immediately. The Army Reserve is an extension of the Active Component - a **Federal Force** that activates quickly upon the call of the President.¹⁸ Access to USAR units and individuals is direct upon authorization by the President. As an extension of the Active Army the Army Reserve must endeavor to strengthen the link, providing support that is needed, timely, flexible and professional to add value to the Total Force.

Being a Federal Force means nothing without full integration of Active and Reserve forces. How the U.S. Army will proceed in

refining this policy of integration is stated in its Fiscal Year 1993 posture statement. In this document, Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan states that the Army's policy will be

to **Strengthen the Total Force** by fully integrating our active and reserve components, keeping early-deploying units "mission ready," establishing strong training relationships and by fully integrating Total Army readiness standards and operating systems.

This enabling strategy may be best defined by the U.S.

Army's Reserve Forces Policy Board. According to the board,
Total Force

means the integration of planning, programming and budgeting for the manning, equipping, maintaining and training of a mix of active and reserve forces essential for meeting initial contingency demands for forces. The Total Force Policy implies an increased interdependence of active and reserve forces. It absolutely requires that the availability and readiness of reserve forces must be as certain as the availability of active forces.¹⁹

Integration must be more than a policy, it must be a way of life. Army Reserve soldiers must look, act, think and perform like their Active Army counterparts. Units must perform their mobilization mission with the same professional thoroughness of their Active Army counterpart units. The only difference should be the shoulder patch which in many cases could be the same for Active or Reserve. Integration must be complete throughout all levels from platoon to the CINC's Staff. The Army Reserve's most vocal supporters should be the Unified Commanders who, understand where they need Army Reserve support for contingency missions, recognize their value, and see their adaptability, flexibility, and agility.


At the Unified Command level, the Army Reserve must be an active participant in the contingency planning process. The reduction in forward deployed forces and the concept of power projection requires versatile Force apportionment. Figure 1 depicts the four corps with Regional focus²⁰. At the center of the contingency package is the Reserve CS / CSS force primarily for the echelons above division and echelons above corps (EAD / EAC). The December 1993 "Off-Site Agreement," which reaffirmed Robert McNamara's 1967 Plan for Reorganization, stated that the National Guard would be primarily combat and the Army Reserve CS and CSS. The entire CS / CSS package at the center of Figure 1, therefore should be made up of Army Reserve. Federal Force, AC/RC integration and contingency planning all support this concept. Reserve Force structure should be developed to this end.

If all contingency force package CS and CSS is Army Reserve, (Fig.1) then the entire Army Reserve force structure should be built around it. Figure 2 is the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 96-01 Total RC Force. I propose two modifications. All Warfighting CS /CSS (left hand column) should be Army Reserve; and the Mobilization (MOB) / Training support and deployment support should be moved to the left ahead of the 15 ARNG Enhanced Brigades in the order of mobilization priority. Deployment support from the Army Reserve must be utilized to deploy some Active Army assets and other support functions must be

DAMO.COM

VERSATILE Force Apportionment

4 CORPS WITH
REGIONAL FOCUS



prioritized as will be explained later. Additionally, the National Guard Enhanced Brigades are an unproven asset given the performance of the 48th, 155th and 256th Brigades during Operation Desert Storm. The 48th was validated in 90 days and it was estimated that the 155th and 256th would have needed 105 days and 135 days respectively to validate.²¹ The logic is therefore: resource and man CS and CSS elements to support contingency planning, which is the U.S. Army Reserve raison d'être; rely on the combat elements of the National Guard as follow-on to Active Army Combat Forces to be used if the contingency becomes protracted or expands. The rapidity, unpredictability and volatility of the global contingency situations requires the adaptability, flexibility and agility which must be the Army Reserve. Support the Unified Commanders contingency plans by providing the CS & CSS required by the Active combat elements.

The Army Reserve is a Federal Force, integrated with the Active Army, actively participating in contingency planning, made up of the CS and CSS for all contingencies. It follows then that the entire Contingency Force Pool should be Army Reserve. This however does not define all forces necessary within the Army Reserve. Figure 3 is a Conceptual Model for the Army Reserve Force. The base requirement to be fulfilled is the Contingency Force Pool itself. It consists of those CS / CSS units at EAD / EAC that support up to two corps and 8 2/3 divisions in worldwide contingencies.²² It is an evolving concept that aims to

CONCEPTUAL MODEL: USAR FORCE DEVELOPMENT




FIGURE 3

incorporate the lessons learned during the Gulf War, the realities of downsizing, and the changed world situation in the post-Cold War era. The basic concepts for the CFP include the capability of world-wide deployment, maximum participation from Active component units based in CONUS, and tiered DA Master Priority List (DAMPL) priority. In determining the scope and nature of the Reserve component slice of the CFP, FORSCOM specified that all selections for the CFP had to support CINC requirements, that Active component units would be utilized before Reserve component units if available, that wartime and peacetime chains of command should be the same if possible, that the geographic proximity of supporting units within CONUS should be optimized, that basic force packages should be retained between/among operations plans, and that Reserve component units selected for the CFP had to have good readiness records.²³ Currently, 42% of the CFP is Active Component, 25% National Guard and, 33% USAR.²⁴ Future force development should modify this split to eliminate the National Guard from the CFP and replace them with Army Reserve units. Since the mission of the USAR is to provide CS and CSS support to the Warfighting CINCs, the CFP slice that is not AC should be Army Reserve.

The CFP cannot completely define the USAR. The next priority is for CONUS Base Support. This consists of deployment support such terminal transfer units, deployment control units, port security detachments and possibly mobilization station

individual mobilization augmentees. Many of these elements are required to deploy even the earliest Active Component CFP units. This is a logical USAR function since a high percentage of soldiers in these units have civilian occupations related to port and deployment activities, the same as required for military deployment.

Conus Backfill and Theater Backfill are of similar make-up. These categories provide backfill for any function, primarily from civilian acquired skills, to replace Active Component soldiers and units that have deployed. These would include units such as military police, medical units, logistics/installation support units, or military law detachments. The focus should be to backfill critical functions left vacant by Active soldiers or units that have deployed to another theater of operations. These should be only for those functions that are truly critical and that cannot be satisfied by other installation personnel. Also, maximum care should be taken to ensure the utilization of civilian acquired skills. Doctors, nurses, lawyers, law enforcement, and clergy are just a few of those occupations and skills that fall into this category, but many other semi-professional and non-professional skills also have application and would be valuable in backfilling for a soldier who is critical in the theater of operation.

These four categories cannot exist, maintain and sustain the

Force without additional support. The final category is the CONUS Sustainment Base. It includes elements such as the training support base important for keeping the force trained and for training to sustain the force. It includes forces for equipping and maintaining equipment and facilities. Functions are administrative, logistic or operational in nature that upon mobilization are performed by the wartime gaining command. During peacetime, however, these functions are more efficiently done by a USAR unit or command. This cannot be a catch all to slot any other USAR unit that does not have a mission fitting one of the other categories. This category must be scrutinized to cover required functions, only those that can be clearly justified as sustainment related.

This Model defines the entire Army Reserve force. All units, commands, staffs, and individuals must fit into one of the five categories. If they do not, they should not exist. Funds, manpower spaces, equipment and time cannot be wasted on a function that does not directly support the Warfighting CINCs. That is what this Model is focussed on. It is driven solely from the Warfighting CINCs' requirements. Support the CINC, deploy the force, backfill critical skills, and sustain the force. All units, commands, staffs, and individuals must be able to withstand the closest scrutiny if they are to be resourced. Resources cannot be wasted on units that do not fit the Model. If the USAR is successful at supporting the Warfighting CINCs,

its value to the Total Force will be obvious, easily recognized, and universally accepted. That would be the strongest of political support. It would be support based on need, performance, professionalism, and a direct and vital link to National Security. No additional political maneuvering should be necessary.

Once the Model has been defined, refined and accepted, the Force can be developed. This is not a start from scratch activity though. There is a lot of history that has gone into getting the USAR to where it is today. That cannot be forgotten. However, it may be useful to look outside the Army Reserve and the military in general to examine potentially parallel situations from civilian business. From them, principles for force development can be derived. It may be easy to conclude that a parallel between the military and profit driven organizations is not valid. Complete parallels probably cannot be made, but principles that make large civilian organizations successful in general can be applied to the military and specifically the Army Reserve.

More than 90 years ago Henry Ford developed what became known as mass production techniques. In the first half of this century, mass production had a phenomenal effect on virtually all aspects of life. The first automobiles were made by craft production, hand built, one at a time, no two being identical.

Only the very rich could afford them. They frequently required a full time mechanic to keep them running. Henry Ford developed the concept of interchangeable parts, and simplicity of assembly. His workforce was primarily immigrant, uneducated, speaking little or no English. He developed a highly centralized organization relying mainly on himself to make critical decisions. His product, the Model T, was simple, easy to repair, reliable, and low cost. He quickly buried most of the craft producers, but he also made vehicular transportation available to a far greater number of people and he offered a much better way of life for the people he employed. He was followed closely by Alfred P. Sloan who took General Motors to the forefront by building on what Henry Ford started. GM became a large professionally managed organization that elaborated on Ford's concept but offered the customer much more variety. Mass production was king and every business that converted to it was successful. By 1955 US auto making was at its peak; 95% of all US auto sales and 75% of worldwide auto sales were from the Big Three: Ford, GM, and Chrysler. By 1990, US auto manufacturers fell to less than 75% of the US market and slightly more than 25% of the worldwide market.²⁵

After World War II, the Japanese economy was in shambles. All economic activity in Japan, including the automobile industry had to start from scratch. In 1950, a young Japanese engineer, Eiji Toyoda (correct spelling for the family name) spent three

months touring Ford's automobile facility in Detroit. Back home, with his production genius, Taiichi Ohno, he concluded that mass production could never work in Japan. From this tentative beginning were born what Toyota Motor Company came to call the Toyota Production System and, ultimately, "lean production".²⁶

The Japanese market, workforce, and economy were very different from Henry Ford's. Indeed, the outside world was quite different in 1950. Toyoda and Ohno built a system in which the company was the community. Employment was for life. Manufacturing focussed on elimination of waste, teams of workers making their own decisions, continuous improvement and tireless pursuit of excellence. They tied in the complete supply chain including the dealers, developed and engineered buildable products and provided the customer exactly what they wanted. Flexibility, reliability and rapid response were keys to success.

The principles that are the foundation of lean production can also be the principles that are the foundation of force development. All aspects must be value added. There must be clearly identified goals and total dedication to their accomplishment. Waste in all forms must be eliminated. Focus always on continuous improvement. Systems must be flexible and responsive using minimum resources. Streamline the organization all the way to the customer eliminating unnecessary layers and bureaucracy. Striving for quality is an endless quest along with

reducing cost. Lower responsibility to those actually adding value to the organization. Develop simple systems totally integrated and driven by dynamic teamwork. Remove all unnecessary extras in every facet of the operation thus developing a creative tension throughout that results in excellence. Leadership in all aspects, teamwork, communication and unfailing loyalty to the organization are requirements.

ARCOM ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

The building blocks for the future have been defined. The Army Reserve is a Federal Force that must be totally integrated with the Active Army. The Reserve Components must play a key role in contingency planning. All of the USAR is CS / CSS and all of the required EAD and EAC, CS and CSS is USAR. All components of the Army Reserve must fit somewhere into the Conceptual Model and there must be complete adherence to the principles of lean production. This process will define the Army Reserve Force of the 21st Century. Only after all this is complete can the number, structure and function of the ARCOMs be determined.

Keeping the structure as lean as possible and designing AC/RC integration into the organization, Figure 4 illustrates a proposal for how ARCOMs could be structured for the 21st Century. Clearly there are too many ARCOMs today and there is too much

ARCOM OF THE FUTURE




FIGURE 4

structure throughout the organization. This proposal reduces two complete layers, by eliminating the USARC and combining the CONUSAs and the ARCOMs. This is not very different from the corps structure of the 1960's. The CONUSA/ARCOM would be a totally integrated structure commanded by and AC LTG and a RC MG as deputy commander. The staff sections must be totally integrated also. The subordinate elements of the CONUSA/ARCOM would be aligned into functional commands with all, including today's GOCOMs, reporting to the CONUSA/ARCOM CG. This would eliminate layers, simplify reporting chains and keep the span of control at a manageable level.

These organizations would be typical corps in their functions. Administration, logistics and readiness must be the keys. Readiness, however, encompasses all else. To be truly lean, for a Reserve unit, all activities, actions, decisions, and direction must be to enhance readiness. If they are not, they must be waste and must be eliminated. Devotion to readiness must be fervent. The CONUSA/ARCOM's role is to ensure the readiness of the Total Federal Force by constantly encouraging integration throughout the organization. While the CAPSTONE program may be a vestige of the Cold War, its concept of aligning Reserve units with their wartime gaining command is still valid and necessary. The current FORSCOM wartrace concept must be developed and made effective. CAPSTONE was not unsuccessful because the concept was invalid. The concept was valid, the execution was incomplete.

The CONUSA/ARCOM must make the wartrace program work.

Mission Essential Task List development must be based on the contingency situation and mission based on the Conceptual Model. Units must train for their mobilization missions without distraction. Annual Training, driven by the CONUSA/ARCOM, must be focussed solely on the mobilization mission, at the mobilization site if possible, supporting the wartrace unit if possible while being evaluated by the one Army standard. All must continually be guided by lean principles.

CONCLUSION

What has been developed and recommended is a thought process intended to be unconstrained but logical. It would be impracticable to think that all could be implemented just as described. Many factors, not the least, politics make complete implementation unlikely. The basic fundamental thoughts can and must be pursued though. The Army Reserve is a Federal Force. Access is direct and there is no confusion with priorities or loyalties. As an organization it must be totally dedicated to the requirements of the Unified Commanders. The Army Reserve exists only to support the warfighters. Any other priority is misguided. Complete integration of the Army Reserve and the Active Army must occur. The Active Army must continue to do what it has always done very well: fight our nation's wars. The Army

Reserve must do what it can do best. By using civilian acquired skills, take on only those missions that it can do effectively, efficiently, and professionally. That means following the proposed Conceptual Model. Lean production may very well be changing the world as we know it. The same principles that guide it can also guide the development of an Army Reserve that is flexible, agile and adaptable, prepared to support the warfighting CINC with rapidly responsive, trained, professional units. The soldiers of the USAR are capable of this. All that is required is the leadership to make it happen.

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