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DECEPTION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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DECEPTION, AT SOME LEVEL, IS A PART OF ANY CONFLICT. THE IMPORTANCE OF DECEPTION IN WARFARE HAS BEEN FORMALLY EXPRESSED AT LEASE SINCE THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C. WHEN SUN TZU WROTE ABOUT THE MERITS OF DECEPTION IN WARFARE AND SUGGESTED THAT DECEPTION CAN BE USED AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER. THIS PAPER ADDRESSES THE SUCCESSFUL USE OF DECEPTION IN TWO PAST OPERATIONS. THE FIRST OPERATION, BARCLAY/MINCEMEAT SHOWS HOW DECEPTION CAN BE USED TO EVEN THE ODDS WHEN A FORCE IS INFERIOR. THE SECOND OPERATION, DESERT STORM, SHOWS HOW DECEPTION SHOULD BE USED IF POSSIBLE, EVEN WHEN A FORCE IS SUPERIOR, IN ORDER TO SAVE LIVES AND RESOURCES. THE ANALYSIS INCLUDES A DESCRIPTION OF THE OPERATIONS AND A COMPARISON OF WHY EACH OPERATION WAS OR WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL. USING THESE CONCLUSIONS, THE PAPER DEVELOPS SEVERAL LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE DECEPTION OPERATIONS.

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Abstract of
DECEPTION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

Deception, at some level, is a part of any conflict. The importance of deception in warfare has been formally expressed at least since the fourth century B.C. when Sun Tzu wrote about the merits of deception in warfare and suggested that deception can be used as a force multiplier. This paper addresses the successful use of deception in two past operations. The first operation, Barclay/Mincemeat, shows how deception can be used to even the odds when a force is inferior. The second operation, Desert Storm, shows how deception should be used if possible, even when a force is superior, in order to save lives and resources. The analysis includes a description of the operations and a comparison of why each operation was or was not successful. Using these conclusions, the paper develops several lessons learned and recommendations for future deception operations.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Who will be the future Secretary of Defense is not certain, but what is certain is that Secretary Aspin's proposed force reductions and budgetary constraints will continue to be the trend in the U.S. military for the next several administrations. The current force reductions started as a result of the end of the Cold War. But this "new world order" is a larger challenge for the operational commander than the bi-polar cold war era. Today the operational commander is faced with a multitude of "other than peaceful" scenarios and unpredictable actors. While the U.S. military is downsizing, we still maintain the strategy of being able to win two sequential major regional contingencies (MRC), and we still maintain the doctrine of "overwhelming force".

Today's CINCs are challenged to maximize their dwindling forces. Deception will become more important, if not essential, as it is one tool that can be used as a force multiplier to either give the U.S. that offensive advantage when we may be at a disadvantage (as in the second MRC contingency), or enable us to use less force and therefore save money and lives even when we have the offensive advantage (as in Desert Storm). This paper presents two case studies to illustrate how deception can work in both of the previous mentioned situations. The first case study

- British deception efforts in the Mediterranean in 1943 before the Allied invasion of Sicily (focusing on Operation Mincemeat in particular) - demonstrates how deception can be a force multiplier for the weaker side. The second case study - U.S. deception efforts in Desert Storm illustrates how deception should be used even when an armed force is numerically and qualitatively superior. The paper compares and contrasts these two case studies to show why deception was successful in both operations, what conditions existed in 1943 that may or may not exist today, and also discusses why the U.S. has not done enough in regards to operational deception planning. While the U.S. deception effort during Desert Storm may have helped enable the much touted "Hail Mary", it is hard to measure to what extent the U.S. active deception measures actually played in the success of the offensive ground phase. The U.S. may be deceiving itself more about its deception capabilities based solely on this apparent success than merited. We can and need to improve our strategic/operational deception skills and organization.

> "All warfare is based on deception.[1] ...If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions* while at the same time I conceal my own then I can concentrate and he must divide. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his. There I will be numerically superior.[2] Sun Tzu.

For purposes of this paper, deception is defined as the purposeful attempt by the deceiver to manipulate the perceptions

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* The "dispositions" Sun Tzu refers to includes the enemy's intentions, capabilities, and perceptions.

of the target's decision makers in order to gain a competitive advantage[3] by making the enemy do or not do something that he otherwise would not have. Operational deception differs from tactical deception in that the former aims to deceive the enemy's "high command" as opposed to just his forces in the field.[4] Sun Tzu illustrates that deception must be an integral part of the commander's repertoire, and not just be considered a "bag of tricks".

Deception is often wrongly perceived as a "last resort" method. As Clausewitz wrote:

> The weaker the forces that are at the disposal of the supreme commander, the more appealing the use of cunning becomes. In a state of weakness and insignificance, when prudence, judgement, and ability no longer suffice, cunning may well appear **the only hope.**"[5] (emphasis added)

This misperception is probably based on the fact that historically, deception has been used much more extensively, even relied upon, by the disadvantaged side, (i.e. in World War II by the British, and in the Korean War by the United States.)[6] But rationally speaking, it is the **moral obligation** of the commander to attempt deception if possible since it can result in economy of force by achieving victory at a lower cost, with fewer resources and fewer casualties.

CHAPTER II

EVALUATION OF WORLD WAR II CASE STUDY

Mincemeat. The first operation to be examined is Operation Mincemeat, a unique deception operation which was part of "Barclay", the overall Mediterranean deception plan for 1943. The main Allied operation planned for 1943 was Operation Husky- the invasion of Sicily. The object of Barclay was to secure the greatest possible surprise for Husky by posing credible threats to the Germans which would pin down enemy forces in Southern France and the Balkan peninsula; to weaken the garrison of Sicily and retard its reinforcement; and to minimize air and naval attacks on shipping being assembled for the assault on Sicily from England, north Africa, and Egypt.[7] Deception, used as a force multiplier, was an integral and critical part of Operation Husky: the Allies had inferior forces; the Germans were expecting the Allied invasion; the amphibious landing at Sicily was dangerous; and finally, General Eisenhower stated that the invasion would be called off if there were four German divisions on Sicily.

The best known and perhaps most successful deception operation of World War II (in terms of both what the German's thought **and** did) was Operation Mincemeat. Ewen Montagu's popular book The Man Who Never Was gives an account of the deception from which the following description is derived: The main idea of the deception was to plant misleading plans of future operations on a

dead body which would wind up in the hands of the Germans. The seeds of the idea were lain in 1942 when a British aircraft crashed off the coast of Spain, and a body washed ashore carrying documents. These documents were made available by the Spanish authorities to the Abwehr (the Secret Intelligence Service of the German High Command). In this instance, the documents were not important. If somehow these conditions could be reasonably reproduced, then the false information could be introduced in a far more secretive, and therefore, more believable way than through other means.

In February of 1943 a body was procured that had died of pneumonia, which could give a similar diagnosis of a drown victim to a pathologist. Thus, Operation Mincemeat began. A briefcase was chained to the body, by now given the notional identity of a Major Martin, Royal Marines, serving on the staff of the Chief of Combined Operations.

Major Martin's suitcase contained several items to substantiate his veritability, but the most important document was a letter from the Vice Chief of the Imperial Staff to General Alexander. The letter was personally written by LTGEN Nye to ensure authenticity of penmanship and style. (See Appendix I). The letter suggested that the Allies were planning an assault landing in Greece, code-named Husky, at Kalamata and Cape Araxos. It also suggested that Sicily would be used as a cover target for an operation against Sardinia and the Peloponnese.

Major Martin was cast overboard a surfaced submarine in the vicinity of Huelva, Spain where the Germans had a highly competent Vice-Consul. All went according to plan. The body and the documents were recovered by the Spanish authorities. The body was returned to the British, but not before the documents were photocopied and passed on to Berlin.

The subsequent progress of the documents and the results of the deception were able to be followed through signals intelligence during the war (see Appendix II) and verified by the capture of documents following the war (see Appendix III). The effects of the deception were as follows: The German Intelligence Service in both Spain and Germany were fooled, as was the German Operational Staff and the German Supreme Command (both Keitel and Hitler) up through the first three days of the invasion. In the eastern Mediterranean, the Germans put in immense efforts into the defense of Greece, including the creation of mine-fields and shore batteries, (causing them to violate the principal of economy of force). The Germans also concentrated troops in Greece, which included sending a Panzer division across Europe, and Hitler sent Rommel to command them (causing the Germans to violate the principal of mass). In the western Mediterranean, Corsica and Sardinia were fortified at the expense of Sicily, and in fact, some resources including R-boats, were redeployed from Sicily to the Aegean.[8]

Mincemeat was successful because the deception was tailored to the German's unique character and conditions. The bait was

prepared in accordance with one of the German's methods of gathering intelligence (use of Spanish informants), their perceptual frame of mind (Germans believed that an attack through Greece or Sardinia was likely) and their cultural framework (Germans believed that if enemy information was too easy to acquire and too good to be true- then it probably was.) Mincemeat information was difficult to acquire. As Charles Cruickshank wrote in Deception in World War II: "The perfect deception is like a jigsaw puzzle. Pieces of information are allowed to reach the enemy in such a way as to convince him that he has discovered them by accident. If he puts them together himself, he is far more likely to believe that the intended picture is a true one." [9] One of the principals of deception is that it is very difficult to introduce a completely new idea into the mind of the enemy -to make him believe something that had never occurred to him. The corollary is that the best deceptions are those which reinforce existing (albeit false) beliefs or fears of the enemy. Mincemeat reinforced German fears of an attack through Greece.

Deception activities try to mislead or confuse the enemy concerning one's intentions or capabilities. Operation Barclay relied on intermingling both. This was done through passive means- using operational security (OPSEC) to hide the Allies' actual intentions, and through active means, such as planting "decoy" information on Major Martin in Operation Mincemeat. Like many deceptions, the Mediterranean deception strategy was based

on misdirecting the enemy's attention, thus causing him either to concentrate his forces in the wrong place, or to violate the principal of mass by forcing him to spread his forces thin to cover all possible lines of attack. Operation Mincemeat supported this strategy by giving the enemy a false impression of Allied intentions.

CHAPTER III

EVALUATION OF BRITISH DECEPTION TECHNIQUES

But why did Mincemeat really work? It was a spectacular plan in and of itself; however, it was only one operation in the context of a larger strategic deception plan for the Mediterranean and indeed all theaters during World War II. The British made use of a large variety of deception techniques that all worked to reinforce each other. Mostly through work done by the "A-Force", a special permanent deception organization under the Middle Eastern Command (Cairo), the Allies displayed real and dummy aircraft, tanks, guns, etc used fictitious radio traffic between notional military formations, and created entire notional divisions in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, all of which caused the Germans to grossly overestimate the size and disposition of British and Allied forces in the Mediterranean. (See Appendix IV). False rumors were transmitted via the media, the government, diplomats, and word of the public mouth in Britain and overseas. A division of British Intelligence which controlled human intelligence assets (spies) called the Twenty Committee leaked misinformation to the Germans through the "Double Cross" (XX) System. The Double Cross System referred to Twenty Committee's control and management of all known German Agents in Britain who were "turned" to the Allied cause. All of these deceptions were monitored for effectiveness through the use of both the Double-Cross System and signals intelligence. And

finally, there was a single group in London, the London Controlling Section (LCS), which coordinated all deception operations and saw to the efficient sharing of intelligence information between all necessary staffs.

Dr Michael Handel, editor of Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War has proposed a construct which can be used to evaluate and compare reasons for strategic and operational successes of deception operations. This construct divides deception characteristics into two categories- (a) Means and Methods, and (b) Attitudes and the Environment.[10] I will use this analytical framework to evaluate British deception operations, and later, U.S. deception operations in regards to Desert Storm.

MEANS and METHODS:

1. **Organization:** The British were extremely well organized and developed permanent organizations to manage and coordinate deception activities and insure the cross-pollination of intelligence among different commands, regions, and military organizations. The London Controlling Section (LCS) was primarily concerned with coordinating deception so that a plan being carried out in one theater did not conflict with a plan in another theater. The LCS ensured that Operation Barclay as part of Operation Husky did not interfere or contradict with plans for the Normandy invasion. On the other hand, the German Intelligence system was poorly organized and morally corrupt. Central control was extremely weak. Each spy group was

independent. There was no central division of targets. The German Intelligence network had the appearance of not one large organized unit, but the loose association of many smaller independent ones which often conflicted and competed with each other. [11] Most German intelligence was obtained through their spy network (though they did not know that all of their British-based spies, and a good part of their Mediterranean were double agents). While some German agents turned for altruistic reasons, many turned for self-profit. Also, the agents' controllers in Germany were paid based on how much information their spies provided; therefore, the controllers were willing to accept as valid almost any information provided in order to gain more money. They also more readily accepted the existence of notional spies as real, because this also earned the controllers more money.[12]

2. Intelligence Collection Capabilities:

A: ULTRA: Signals intelligence provided the Allies with real-time access to the enemy's plans and disposition.** The allies could create deception plans which would reinforce the actual beliefs of the Germans, then use ULTRA again to measure the effectiveness of the deception plan. If the plan wasn't working, the Allies could use other means to change or modify the deception plan such as the Double-Cross System or an adhoc, special deception plan such as operation Mincemeat.

** See footnote 1 for definition.

B: Double-Cross System: The Double-Cross System (run by XX Committee) was based on German agents who were turned around to work for the British. These agents provided the British with information about the Germans, and were conversely used to plant false information about the Allies in Germany. J.C. Masterman's book The Double-Cross System defines the goals of the XX Committee as follows: 1) to control the enemy system; 2) to gain in-depth knowledge of the personalities and methods of the German Secret Service; 3) to gain additional knowledge of the German code and cipher system; 4) to gain information on the ene plans and intentions; 5) to influence the enemy's plans and intentions; and 6) to deceive the enemy on Allied plans and intentions.[13] The information gained by ULTRA and the Double-Cross System allowed London to develop Operation Mincemeat because the British knew what would be believed by the Germans already. Also, Mincemeat was just one operation in the Mediterranean deception strategy. "A-Force" had been working its own deception plans, particularly through the use of double agents, false signals traffic and notional forces to convince the Germans that the Peloponnese, not Sicily was the next target.[14]

3. **Time and Degree:** Deception operations have to be planned in coordination with, and on a scale equal to, the real operation. Through numerous "under-efforts", the British learned that a deception could not succeed unless it was planned with the same degree of thoroughness as the genuine operation.[15] Additionally, the "real"/operational plan comes first- both in conception and

in priority- not the deception. Operation Mincemeat is the epitome of thoroughness and attention to detail, as everything about Major Martin had to be created- from his past lifestyle to his future intentions. Major Martin was made to be an actual person in the minds of the Germans, and to some extent the British! Good deception operations also require time. The main reason for this is that, as stated earlier, the best deceptions are those pieced together by the enemy. Any deception plan presented in one giant lump is likely to be perceived as too good to be true.[16] The British had four years to work on refining their deception strategy and techniques before operation Mincemeat was conceived.

4. **Enemy Intelligence-Collection Capability:** Much of "A - Force's" deception successes are attributed to the fact that the Germans had very limited air-reconnaissance resources, and therefore could not readily identify or disprove the existence of notional forces in the Mediterranean. The Germans also relied too heavily on one collection source - their agents (and the created notional agents), who were obviously supplying the Germans with false information, often to the total disregard of conflicting information.[17]

ATTITUDES and the ENVIRONMENT:

1. **Strength versus Weakness:** As stated earlier, the side that is at a disadvantage has a greater incentive to resort to deception[18] and therefore to perfect it. As Clausewitz said, "The bleaker the situation, with everything concentrating on a

single desperate attempt, more readily cunning is joined to daring".[19] The British showed much imagination in creating Mincemeat. Truly, cunning was joined to daring, for as the British saw it, extreme measures needed to be taken for the Sicily invasion because, as Churchill stated, "Everyone but a bloody fool would know that it's Shishily".[20] The German's, however, relied more on operational prowess, and therefore spent less resources on their intelligence apparatus and organization.

2. **Ideological Environment:** For England, her very survival was at stake. It was the "Free World" against Fascism. In such situations desperate measures are taken. Deception often equates by its very name to treachery, and something far less than chivalry. While the British traditionally fought wars based on chivalry and "the gentlemanly thing to do", World War II posed an extremely different situation where the ends (in most cases) did justify the means. Deception was encouraged by Churchill who often played an active part in strategic deception operations.

3. **Attitudes of the Leaders:** As previously mentioned, Churchill was a big advocate of deception, which allowed the British deception planners to be creative and productive. Hitler on the other hand ultimately thwarted any possibility of the Germans to create a successful deception strategy because he undermined the German intelligence network. Deception can not exist without good intelligence. Intelligence in Germany was politically skewed. Nobody wanted to be the bearer of bad news to Hitler. Conversely, everyone wanted to be rewarded for bringing Hitler

good news, or news which reinforced Hitler's beliefs, even if it was not accurate. Finally, even if German intelligence did provide accurate intelligence, Hitler saw himself as the "all-knowing" and would ignore intelligence if it didn't suit his purposes. As Richard Betts has stated in "Analysis, War and Decision, Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable", in the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes are often committed by the ultimate intelligence consumer-the decision maker- not by the analyst.[21] This was certainly the case for Germany.

CHAPTER IV

EVALUATION OF DESERT STORM CASE STUDY

Desert Storm: Where as the British had to rely on deception as a force multiplier in order to gain the minimal force ratios required for a victory, this case study illustrates why deception **should** be used even when an armed force is numerically and qualitatively superior. While aiding the commander to gain strategic surprise, deception can ultimately save resources (by shortening the war) and lives (by reducing the enemy's ability to counter-attack).

The military operations of Desert Storm consisted of four phases: (1) the strategic air campaign, (2) achieving air supremacy in the Kuwaiti theater of operations, (3) battlefield preparation, and (4) the offensive ground campaign.[22] The following analysis concentrates on the deceptions used to support the offensive ground campaign.

The goal of the deception plan was to "use operational deception to fix or divert Republican Guard and other heavy units away from the main effort." [23] The plan intended to convince Iraq that the main attack would be made directly into Kuwait from Saudi Arabia, and that it would be supported by an amphibious assault in order to have Saddam concentrate his forces in eastern Kuwait and along the Kuwaiti coast.[24] Even though the Coalition forces were much superior and could have gained surprise without deception, and perhaps even victory without surprise, it was

decided to use deception to save lives and resources.

To convince Iraq that an amphibious assault would take place, the Navy conducted feints and demonstrations in the Persian Gulf, while the Marines staged amphibious landings. Coalition air forces flew combat air patrols along the coast and the Kuwaiti/Saudi border. Air refueling tracks appeared to support a frontal assault against entrenched Iraqis along the southern border.[25] The First Cavalry Division also staged artillery raids into the Wadi Al-Batin area.

Deception schemes reminiscent of those organized by A-Force in World War II were used to support Schwarzkopf's Hail Mary maneuver. Radio transmissions, dummy tanks and artillery guns, and simulated sound effects were used to simulate troop reinforcement along the southern border while the Army combat corps moved west.[26]

To keep Iraqi troops focused on the southern border and coastline, the Amphibious Task Force moved into position to feign an amphibious assault attempt. Coalition ground troops made feints into Kuwait. The Navy and Marines staged raids on coastal islands.[27]

Unfortunately, unlike Operation Mincemeat which could be verified for effectiveness via ULTRA and the documents retrieved after the war, it is difficult to determine just how much of an effect Coalition deception efforts had on the Iraqi's. There is no concrete evidence to show that Saddam positioned his forces **differently than he would have otherwise** based on our deception

efforts; however, while much of the documentation for the deception effort remains classified, it would appear that deception did help the U.S. achieve the element of surprise with the western assault. Like Mincemeat, the deceptions in support of the ground offensive were tailored to the enemy's unique character and conditions. The bait was prepared in accordance with (1) the limited remaining Iraqi methods of gathering intelligence (those inherent in the ground forces along the borders and infiltrating Iraqi soldiers, and the media), (2) their perceptual frame of mind (the Iraqi's believed that an amphibious assault on Kuwait would be likely as evidenced by a room sized model of Kuwait, found in an Iraqi Command Center in Kuwait City after the war, on which all the Iraqi forces were positioned to repel an amphibious assault), and (3) their cultural framework (the Iraqi's believed that Coalition forces would not go through Iraqi territory for political reasons).[28]

Like Mincemeat, these deceptions did not introduce a completely new idea into the mind of the enemy nor try to make him believe something that had never occurred to him. The Desert Storm deceptions reinforced the existing beliefs or fears of the enemy.

Like Operation Barclay, the Desert Storm deception plan used both passive and active means to misdirected the enemy's attention, thus causing him to concentrate his forces in the wrong place. Passively, OPSEC successfully hid the Coalition's actual intentions. The Amphibious Task Force believed it would

launch its offensive until the last moment! Through military feints and media misinformation, the Coalition forces provided active deception.

CHAPTER V

EVALUATION OF COALITION DECEPTION TECHNIQUES

Using the framework presented earlier, I will compare the Desert Storm deceptions with Mincemeat. These comparisons will then be summarized in lessons learned and suggestions for future use of deception. (See Appendix V for summary in chart format).

MEANS and METHODS:

1. **Organization:** The British were extremely well organized and developed permanent organizations to manage and coordinate deception activities and insure the cross-pollination of intelligence among different commands, regions, and military organizations. Currently, each CINC can put together his own team to come up with a deception plan. While civilian member's of the CINC's staff may have area expertise, because the military has moved away from area expertise, it is fair to say that the active duty personnel put together to come up with a deception plan usually have tactical deception experience, but do not have in depth knowledge of the enemy's culture and intentions. Thus, the deception plans devised in Desert Storm, and even in Urgent Fury and Just Cause had to rely on traditional "OPDEC" plans - or using staged exercises, and troop movements combined with false electronic signals to fool the enemy. This is fine when our enemy has just enough intelligence collection capability to see our deception but not enough to realize our true force disposition; however, these types of adhoc deceptions may not

work against an enemy with greater capabilities, such as North Korea, or China, or an enemy assisted by these countries. It may also not work against a country with virtually no inherent intelligence collection capability.

2. **Intelligence Collection Capabilities:** Suffice it to say that combined US, Coalition, (and probably Israeli intelligence) capabilities far outstripped the virtually non-existent Iraqi intelligence capability. However, while the Coalition had excellent overhead reconnaissance capability, there was very limited reliable human intelligence. Our ability to predict the intentions and plans of Saddam were poor. Even when we had photographic evidence to support the prediction that Saddam would indeed invade Kuwait as he had made allusions to previous to the invasion, we were slow to react. The British had far better knowledge of their enemy's intentions because they ran and controlled the network of German spies. Our penetration of the enemy prior to Desert Storm was not extensive enough. We also didn't have the luxury of time, as the British did in WW II, to effectively use captured Iraqis or defectors to help implement a deception plan to the extent the British did.

3. **Time and Degree:** As stated previously, deception operations have to be planned in coordination with, and on a scale equal to, the real operation. The Desert Storm deception efforts were planned and supported on a level commensurate with their needs. Like Operation Barclay vis -a vis Operation Husky, the Desert Storm offensive ground attack plan came first, then the

deception. It was decided to entrap Saddam's forces with the extreme move to the west because the U.S. knew (through satellite photography) that the majority of Saddam's forces were still fixed in that area. The deception of keeping Saddam's attention focused on Kuwait City and out to the east came secondarily and was designed to support the operational flanking move - not vice-versa.

As far as the element of time is concerned, the U.S. plan was briefed to the NCA in mid-December. We did not have the luxury of working on our plans for years as the British did, although a dedicated deception staff could have been working the problem in peacetime. Fortunately we had the advantage of neutralizing the Iraqi intelligence capabilities, otherwise, our plan would be in vain. We also had a quantitative force advantage that could have persevered even in the event the deceptions did not work.

4. **Enemy Intelligence-Collection Capability:**

> "As you know, very early on, we took out the Iraqi air force...for all intents and purposes, we took out his ability to see what we were doing down here in Saudi Arabia. Once we had taken out his eyes, we did what could best be described as the Hail mary play...once the air campaign started, he would be incapable of moving out to counter this move, even if he knew we made it." [29]

The deception efforts were successful because the U.S. had effectively destroyed the Iraqi intelligence network by destroying and/or denying their air reconnaissance capability. Like the Allies in 1943, the Coalition had air superiority, thus

denying the enemy any indigenous capability to verify troop movements and disposition. The coalition also prevented Saddam from gaining any satellite photography once Desert Shield started. Whereas the Germans had to rely on single source intelligence - their spies (many of whom were controlled by Britain), Saddam was forced to rely on the media. False stories were used in support of the deception operation. A Newsweek article appeared two weeks before the ground assault which amplified the plans for the amphibious assault. The article stated "in one sense, our amphibious assault on Iraqi forces in Kuwait is already underway. It's just that the Iraqi's don't know it."[30]

Even when an article appeared in the New York Times which detailed the western maneuver, the Iraqi's could not either verify it, nor would they believe it because it went against their preconceived notions of a southern and eastern attack.[31]

ATTITUDES and the ENVIRONMENT:

1. **Strength versus Weakness:** As stated earlier, the side that is at a disadvantage has a greater incentive to resort to deception[32] and therefore to perfect it. The corollary is that the stronger side tends to make minimal use of deception or pay less attention to perfecting it. The U.S. needs to concentrate on deception more as a life saver - not as a force multiplier. The British showed much imagination in creating Mincemeat. Our deception plans are beginning to be predictable (feints and decoys) and rely too much on the enemy's lack of intelligence

collection capabilities. We need to be more creative in our deception planning, otherwise we will be predictable.

2. **Ideological Environment:** The U.S. is perceived as being the "honest broker". It goes against our national culture to be perceived as "liars". But if lying will save American lives, it is more than justified, it is morally required. If the U.S. feels that a cause is worth dying for, that same cause should be worth lying for. The very fact that the U.S. is perceived as the honest broker means that our deception plans should have a better chance of being believed. If a U.S. president came on T.V. and said "We will be ready to begin our offensive by next week", we would have an excellent chance of achieving strategic surprise by beginning our offensive earlier. Why? Because of the U.S. reputation for giving deadlines and sticking to them and the perception that the U.S. is too strong to rely on strategic deception.

3. **Attitudes of the Leaders:** The U.S. leadership must change its view on strategic deception, especially in terms of the U.S leadership providing false information to the press if it will help a just cause. We must also be careful of having the same situation exist in the U.S that existed in Germany where intelligence was politically skewed to appease Hitler. Intelligence has been skewed in the U.S. to support the administration's policy. [33] If deception is based on politically skewed intelligence, the plan will not work.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

In comparing the two case studies, some lessons learned can be drawn. I will not restate some obvious lessons such as the need for security, good intelligence, etc, but rather, enumerate areas where the U.S. needs to improve or change current operating procedures.

1. **Organization:** We need to increase our pre- planning effort for deception. Because we will not have four years to work on our deceptions as in WW II, we must have a preconceived notion of types of deception operations to run, from the Flexible Deterrent Options up through real conflict. In a dual MRC scenario, a single deception controlling section could be critical in order to ensure the effective management of scarce resources that will be needed to run the fighting and the deception. If asset sequencing and allocation is left until late in the game, those assets will already have been assigned to the operational forces and it will be difficult to reallocate them later.

We need to be more ingenious and creative in our deception thinking. This could be assisted by permanent deception planners for each region whose sole function is to study the enemy and assist in pre-planned deception concepts. While we have time now, we should be conducting dual MRC deception planning. As OPLANs are written for an area, a deception plan should be written at the same time that coincides with the OPLAN. These

permanent deception planners would most likely be civilians since they would be required to fully study the enemy, which takes years. These deception teams would be augmented by intelligence officers and warfighters.

We must spend more money on training DOD personnel on area specialties in order to better know the enemy's culture, traditions, military, and language. The role of deception must be taught at all levels, particularly at the mid-career level and higher. The military must be made aware of deception's value and potential.

2. **Intelligence Collection Capabilities:** There is a perception that because of the widespread availability of surveillance technology and mass communications that it will be more difficult to achieve strategic surprise or to effect deception operations.[34] This very perception is what the U.S. should concentrate on to implement deception. We must be creative and devote more dollars now to developing technological deception techniques. The possibilities are only limited by our imagination. Some possibilities include: (1) feeding enemy satellites false imagery/communications intelligence (COMINT) of pre-staged events so the enemy will believe it is seeing/hearing real time formations, when perhaps the imagery/comint is of military operations that were staged weeks or even years ago; (2) convincing a coalition partner to sell false imagery to the enemy (an opportunity existed in the case of France and Iraq); (3) Penetration of enemy C3 lines. Instead of sending in

Special Operations Forces (SOF) to destroy key fiber optic cables, why not hook up something whereby we can both intercept enemy communications and feed false information. Obviously it will take time and money to develop such capabilities, but the point is, technology should not be seen as the limiting factor to deception, it should be seen as a challenge to gaining new ways of perfecting deception.

In the same vain, we must increase our capability to verify the success of a deception effort. This is extremely difficult to do. The British were able to prove the merit of their deception plans through ULTRA, captured documents, and POW interviews. We still can not **prove** the value of our deception effort in Iraq. As assets become critical, deception will go by the wayside if useful measures of effectiveness (MOE's) can not be determined.

3. **Attitudes of the Leaders:** Strategic deception should be supported and **implemented** at all levels. That does not mean that top political leaders should directly control the deception strategy, though they can play a part in it. Deception must be planned and executed on a continuous basis by professional deception planners. Deception should not be seen as treachery but as a necessary tool for saving U.S. lives and resources.

4. **Plausibility and Deniability:** It is critical to add this category to the conclusions. Every deception operation must include plans to cover its methods and provide a plausible explanation to the enemy. The British could successfully enact

numerous deception plans against the same enemy in a short period of time because the British provided an acceptable explanation (usually through the Double-Cross System) to the Germans on why any invasion did not go as the German's expected. Thus the German's never felt deceived, nor realized that their intelligence network and encryption systems had been penetrated. The U.S. does not do this. While we classify parts of deception efforts, specifically those parts which may give away our intelligence capabilities and sources, we nevertheless let the world know immediately what kind of a deception plan we ran. Why did we let the world know that the Amphibious landing was a deception immediately following Desert Storm? Why not give a very plausible excuse that our plans changed at the last moment because it was decided the landing was too dangerous? There are still U.S. Marines who believe this. Without plausible deniability, the enemy begins to expect deception. The enemy can also compare past deception efforts and realize our modus operandi. An enemy would much rather believe that we changed our plans, than his intelligence failed him. We should do better at maintaining secrecy after our successful deception efforts. If we keep our deception plans secret and deniable, the U.S. should not worry about losing its reputation as the honest broker.

5. **Media:** Military members often see the media as the obstacle to running successful deceptions because they can intrude on operational security. This true fact is the very reason that using the media in deception efforts is so successful (as in

Desert Storm). Once the media is perceived as being in cahoots with the military, it will be very difficult to use it for a deception effort because any story published will immediately be suspect. The President should not feel morally wrong in stating false or misleading statements to the press with the intention of misleading the enemy. He must have a excuse ready once his story has been proven false. The same holds true at the operational level. Specific uses of the media to convey misleading and deceptive public statements should be written into the deception plan.

While it may be convenient to say that it is too difficult now to devote more resources to implementing some of the above suggestions and to perfect deception techniques, we need to spend the time and effort now. With dwindling resources and a public aversion to any U.S. casualties, the commander must find ways of increasing his efficiency and of saving lives. In other words, deception can not be seen as "just the hors d'oeuvres before the battle". [35] It must become an integral part of the operational strategy. While deception itself does not ensure success, it can definitely add to our chances.

APPENDIX I

LETTER FROM GENERAL SIR ARCHIBALD NYE, THE VICE-CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF, TO GENERAL SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER, COMMANDER OF THE 18TH ARMY GROUP.



WAR OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
LONDON, S.W.1.

23rd April, 1943

PERSONAL AND VERY SECRET.

My dear Alex -

I am taking advantage of sending you a personal letter by hand of one of Mountbatten's officers, to give you the inside history of our recent exchange of cables about Mediterranean operations and their attendant cover plans. You may have felt our decisions were somewhat arbitrary, but I can assure you in fact that the C.O.S. Committee gave the most careful consideration both to your recommendation and also to Jumbo's.

We have had recent information that the Boche have been reinforcing and strengthening their defences in Greece and Crete and C.I.G.S. felt that our forces for the assault were insufficient. It was agreed by the Chiefs of Staff that the 5th Division should be reinforced by one Brigade Group for the assault on the beach south of CAPE ANAMUR and that a similar reinforcement should be made for the 46th Division at KALAMATA. We are earmarking the necessary forces and shipping.

Jumbo Wilson had proposed to select SICILY as cover target for "HUSKY"; but we have already chosen it as cover for operations "MINCEMEAT". The

/C.O.S.

General the Hon. Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander,
G.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C.,
Headquarters,
18th Army Group

C.O.S. Committee went into the whole question exhaustively again and came to the conclusion that in view of the preparations in Algeria, the amphibious training which will be taking place on the Tunisian coast and the heavy air bombardment which will be put down to neutralise the Sicilian airfields, we should stick to our plan of making it cover for "HUSKY" - indeed we stand a very good chance of making him think we will go for Sicily - it is an obvious objective and one about which he must be nervous. On the other hand, they felt there wasn't much hope of persuading the Brasts that the extensive preparations in the Eastern Mediterranean were also directed at SICILY. For this reason they have told Alison his cover plan should be something nearer the spot, e.g. the Dodecanese. Since our relations with Turkey are now so obviously closer the Italians must be pretty apprehensive about these islands.

I imagine you will agree with these arguments. I know you will have your hands more than full at the moment and you haven't much chance of discussing future operations with Eisenhower. But if by any chance you do want to support Alison's proposal, I hope you will let us know soon, because we can't delay much longer.

I am very sorry we weren't able to meet your wishes about the new commander of the Guards Brigade. Your own nominee was down with a bad attack of 'flu and not likely to be really fit for another few weeks. He stuck, however, you know Forster personally; he has done extremely well in command of a brigade at home, and is, I think, the best fellow available.

You must be about as fed up as we are with the whole question of war medals and 'Purple Hearts'. We all agree with you that we don't want to offend our American friends, but there is a good deal more to it than that. If our troops who happen to be serving in

/one

-2-

WAR OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
LONDON, S.W.1.

one particular theatre are to get extra decorations merely because the Americans happen to be serving there too, we will be faced with a good deal of discontent among those troops fighting elsewhere perhaps just as bitterly - or more so. My own feeling is that we should thank the Americans for their kind offer but say firmly it would cause too many anomalies and we are sorry we can't accept. But it is on the agenda for the next Military Members meeting and I hope you will have a decision very soon.

Best of luck

Yours ever

Archie Nye

Source: Roger Morgan, "The Man Who Almost Is," **After the Battle**, November 1986, p. 6.

APPENDIX II

ULTRA INTERCEPT DATED 15 MAY 1943

REF: 779 MIL 1955 CO
REF: CX/MSS/2571/T4 IN TWO Parts Part One

XX

INFORMATION FROM SUPREME COMMAND ARMED FORCES, OPERATIONS STAFF, ARMY TO AIC IN C SOUTH AND C IN C & C IN C SOUTH EAST ON TWELFTH. OPERATIONS STAFF OF SUPREME COMMANDS NAVE AND GAF & GAF INFORMED. QUOTE ACCORDING TO A SOURCE WITH [*sic*] MAY BE REGARDED AS ABSOLUTELY RELIABLE, AN ENEMY LANDING UNDERTAKING ON A LARGE SCALE IS PROJECTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN BOTH THE EASTERN AND THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN. ((MIL 1955 & 1955 CO 876 & 876 IN TWO PARTS PART ONE)) THE UNDERTAKING IN THE EASTERN MED & MED HAS AS ITS OBJECTIVE THE COAST NEAR KALAMATA & KALAMATA AND THE COASTAL SECTOR SOUTH OF CAPE ARAXOS & CAPE ARAXOS (BOTH PLACES ON THE WEST COAST OF THE PELOPONNESE & PELOPONNESE). THE LANDING NEAR KALAMATA & KALAMATA IS TO BE CARRIED OUT BY FIVE SIX INFANTRY DIVISION, AND THAT NEAR CAPE ARAXOS & CAPE ARAXOS

33

EMJ/ 15//Z/15/5/43
KVB

BY THE REINFORCED FIVE INFANTRY DIVISION. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER BOTH DIVISION [*sic*] WILL OPERATE AT FULL STRENGTH OR ONLY WITH ELEMENTS. ((ML 1955 & 1955 TWO/AND FINAL)) IF THE FORMER WERE THE CASE ABOUT TWO OR THREE WEEKS WOULD BE NEEDED BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE LANDING. SHOULD ONLY ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISIONS OPERATE, THE LANDING COULD TAKE PLACE AT ANY TIME. THE COVER-NAME FOR THE LANDING IS HUSKY & HUSKY. A FEINT AGAINST THE DODECANESE & DODECANESE MUST BE RECKONED WITH UNQUOTE. COMMENT COLON KNOWS THAT FURTHER INFORMATION (PRESUMABLY DEALING WITH WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN & WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN) NATURE OF WHICH UNKNOWN THERE, WAS TOO [*sic*] BE SENT TO OTHER ADDRESSEES NAMED ABOVE, BUT NOT & NOT TO CHARLIE IN CHARLIE SOUTH EAST

15517/15/5/43

Source: Michael I. Handel, ed., **Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War** (London: Frank Cass & Co., LTD., 1987), pp. 79-80.

Note: The original ULTRA message is located at the U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks, PA. Reel 127 5 to 15 May 1943 ML dated 15 May 1944.

APPENDIX III

CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE MARTIN PAPERS AND TRANSLATION



Nur zur persönlichen Unterrichtung!
Nicht über Registratur!

Translation: Captured Enemy Documents on Mediterranean Operations.

Attached herewith are:

(a) Translation of the captured letter from the Imperial Chief to General Alexander.

(b) Appreciation thereof by the German General Staff.

The contents of further captured documents are unimportant. Exhaustive examination by 3Skl. revealed the following

1. The genuineness of the captured documents is above suspicion. The suggestion that they have intentionally fallen into our hands- of which the probability is slight- and the question whether the enemy is aware of the capture of the

documents by us or only their loss at sea is being followed up. It is possible the enemy has no knowledge of our capture of the documents. Against that, it is certain he knows they did not reach their destination.

2. Whether the enemy will now alter his intended operation or will set an earlier date for their commencement must be taken into consideration, but seems unlikely.

3. Probable Date of Operation: The latter is being treated as urgent; yet there is still time until the 23rd of April to inform General Alexander by air courier of General Wilson's proposal to use Sicily as cover target for assault in Eastern Mediterranean, wherein he is requested to reply immediately in the event of him supporting Wilson's opinion, "as we cannot postpone the matter much longer. In this case, the Imperial General Staff considers altering planning both in the Eastern and Western Mediterranean for which there is still time.

4. Sequence of Operations: It is presumed that both operations will take place simultaneously, since Sicily is unsuitable as a cover target simultaneously for both.

5. The Tobruk area comes into consideration as a starting point for the operations in the Eastern Mediterranean as Alexandria is not considered, as in this case Sicily would have been absurd as a cover target.

6. It is not clear whether the deception worked by the cover target concerns only the period up to the beggining of the operations or whether in fact a cover-operation would be used as well as the actual assault.

7. It is not clear from the attached whether only the 5th and 56th Divisions will be landed in the Eastern Mediterranean (at Araxos and Kalamata). However, only these two divisions are able to be reinforced for their assault. It is always possible that assault troops and targets are included with them.

8. It should be emphasised that it is obvious from the document that big preparations are in course in the Eastern Mediterranean as well. That is important, because considerably less intelligence about preparations has reached us from this area than from Alegeria, owing to their geographical situation.

Source: Roger Morgan, "The Man Who Almost Is," **After the Battle**, November 1986, p. 22.

APPENDIX IV

ANALYSIS OF ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER - MAY 1944

	ACTUAL	BOGUS	OKW ESTIMATE
Divisions in Italy			
British	12	12	13
Polish	2	4	4
U.S.	7	7	7
French	4	4	4
	25	27	28
Western Med outside Italy			
British	1	4	3
U.S.	1	1	3
French	3	6	9
	5	11	15
Eastern Med including Persia and Iraq			
British	4	13	13
Defensive Formations			
British	0	8	10
French	4	5	5
	4	13	15
Grand Total	38	64	71

Source: Michael I. Handel, ed., **Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War** (London: Frank Cass & Co., LTD., 1987), p. 91.

APPENDIX V

COMPARISON OF DESERT STORM AND BARCLAY DECEPTION OPERATIONS

DESERT STORM	BARCLAY
Target: Iraqi High Command	German High Command
Perceived Attack Avenue: Kuwait City	Greece
Organization: CINC control over one theater of operations	Central Control over multi-theaters of operation
Intel Collection Capability: US: Excellent Overhead, SIGINT Iraq: Poor	British: Outstanding SIGINT, Agents Germany: Poor
Time and Degree: Deception plans improvised, "ad hoc", one-time deal	Plans required extensive preparation and coordination with other on-going deception plans
Goal: Cause enemy to reinforce wrong place; violate principal of Mass; Stronger Force-save lives	Cause enemy to violate principals of Mass and Economy of Force Weaker Force- even odds
Methods: Passive and Active Reinforce misperceptions/ fears of enemy Did not provide plausible deniability	Passive and Active Reinforce misperceptions/ fears of enemy Provided plausible deniability
MOEs: No effective MOE; mostly speculative determination of deception success	Effective MOE. Deception effectiveness verified

NOTES

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 66.

2. Ibid., p. 98.

3. Michael I. Handel, "Military Deception in Peace and War," The Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, no. 38, 1985, p. 7.

4. Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Vol. V, Strategic Deception (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. x.

5. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 203.

6. Handel, Military Deception, p. 9.

7. Howard, p. 85.

8. Ewen Montagu, The Man who Never Was (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1954), pp. 149-150.

9. Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. i.

10. Michael I. Handel, ed., Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War (London: Frank Cass & Co., LTD., 1987), pp. 19-20.

11. F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Vol. IV, Security and Counter Intelligence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.298.

12. Howard, pp. 47-49.

13. J.C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939-1945 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), p. xiv.

14. David Mure, Practise to Deceive (London: William Kimber and Co., LTD., 1977), p. 93-104.

15. Cruickshank, p. 23.

16. Howard, p. 41.

17. Handel, Strategic and Operational Deception, pp 29-30.

18. Handel, Military Deception, p. 8.

19. Clausewitz, p. 203.

20. Ewen Montagu, Beyond Top Secret Ultra (New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, Inc., 1978), p. 143.

21. Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable", World Politics, 1978-79, p. 61.

22. U.S. Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington: 1992), p. 96.

23. Ibid., p. 90.

24. Ibid., p. 102.

25. Ibid., p. 141.

26. Robert C. Parker, Jr., "Deception: The Missing Tool," Marine Corps Gazette, May 1992, p. 100.

27. Ibid., p. 99.

28. Norman Friedman, Desert Victory (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 130.

29. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, "Schwarzkopf: Strategy Behind Desert Storm," The Washington Post, Feb 28 1991, p. A35.

30. Tom Post, "To the Shores of Kuwait," Newsweek, 11 February 1991, p. 28.

31. Harry G. Summers, A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York: Dell Publishing, 1992), p. 216.

32. Handel, Military Deception, p. 8.

33. For examples of intelligence skewing and resulting problems see Sam Adams, "Vietnam Cover-Up," Harper's Magazine, May 1975, pp. 41-73; T.L. Cubbage, "Westmoreland vs. CBS: Was Intelligence Corrupted by Policy Demands?", in Leaders and Intelligence, ed., by Michael I. Handel, (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1989), pp. 118-180; Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," World Politics, Vol. 31, 1978-1979, p. 61-89; U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of Robert M. Gates, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1992, Vol. II, pp.

1-11.; Richard K. Betts, "Intelligence for Policymaking, The Washington Quarterly, vol III, Summer 1990, pp. 119-129.

34. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (Washington: 1993), p. 2-5.

35. B. H. Liddell Hart, Colonel Lawrence (New York: Hayclon House, 1937), p. 239.

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