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**PLANNING OF THE FIRST GALLIPOLI AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS:
AN OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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**Abstract of
PLANNING OF THE FIRST GALLIPOLI AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS:
AN OPERATONAL ANALYSIS**

Focusing on the operational level of war, this research paper analyzes General Sir Ian Hamilton's planning of the first Gallipoli amphibious landings to derive lessons for future planners responding to a crisis with limited resources. The analysis is presented in four parts. First, the strategic background and preliminary events leading to the decision to land at Gallipoli are introduced. Second, Hamilton's plan, and rationale behind his decisions, are cited using an operational construct. Third, the plan is examined in execution to determine why the operation failed. And last, lessons are deduced. The chief finding of this study was that Hamilton had within his power the ability to accomplish his assigned mission, but it would have required near flawless application of operational art. Despite a well-conceived plan, Hamilton had shortcomings as an operational commander that kept his plan from being properly implemented. As a result, his operation failed. The paper concludes that Hamilton's shortcomings provide valuable lessons for future operational commanders and planners seeking to optimize limited resources, to include amphibious assets, in a crisis response.

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PREFACE

That the Gallipoli Campaign was a British disaster is well known. Many have written about the strategic inadequacies, the faulty campaign design, and the tactical mistakes. Instead of rehashing old arguments, I elected to focus instead on the planning for the campaign's most crucial operation, the first Gallipoli amphibious landings. It was here, despite all the prior mistakes, that excellent operational art could have made the biggest difference. And it was here, that the most meaningful lessons can be deduced for future operational commanders and planners.

This paper seeks to answer one question: What, if anything, could General Sir Ian Hamilton, the operational commander, have done better in his planning and in preparing his forces for the landings at Gallipoli? Put another way, how could Hamilton have improved his operational art?

When judging operational art, one must first evaluate what information the operational commander possessed -- or should have possessed. Therefore, the paper is intentionally slanted towards this perspective. Even still, I consciously left some aspects of the plan out to concentrate on the areas I thought more critical. For example, the reader will find no mention of the operational security problems Hamilton inherited because the lessons here were too defused to offer significant insight into the subject. There are other aspects, though important to operational design, that were not addressed as well because the lessons they offer were less consequential than those chosen.

I hope my respect for Hamilton will transcend my criticisms. He was a brilliant man, probably ahead of his time. What I found particularly astonishing in researching this operation was that Hamilton not only recognized most of his shortcomings as an operational commander but also realized what corrective action should have been taken. Hamilton lost one additional battle at Gallipoli. He lost the battle to do what he knew in his heart was right. He was unwilling to correct his shortcomings because he felt compelled not to do so by his loyalty to British

command traditions and by his loyalty to superiors and subordinates alike, loyalties that were not always deserved. Like the martyr in a Shakespearean tragedy, Hamilton, with great stress and anxiety, all too willingly accepted his fate at Gallipoli. Herein lies the crux of the entire paper: an operational commander must do more than develop a winning operational scheme; he must also do everything in his power to bring his scheme to fruition. Only by doing both can superior operational art be achieved.

In the last chapter, I have listed some lessons of relevance for today's planners. On first reading, these might seem as an adjunct to my main argument. However, the foundations for these lessons are drawn from the preceding chapters. They are included because of their importance to future operational commanders and planners.

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PLANNING OF THE FIRST GALLIPOLI AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS: AN OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND STRATEGIC BACKGROUND

Overview. It was 10:00 a.m. on the morning of March 12, 1915, when General Ian Hamilton was suddenly summoned to report to Lord Kitchener, the revered British Minister who served as the Secretary of State for War. At the time, Hamilton commanded the Central Striking Force, responsible for the land defense of England. Kitchener told Hamilton that he was now to be the commander-in-chief (CINC) of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF), a force being assembled and sent to support the Fleet presently at the Dardanelles. Surprised by this unexpected command, Hamilton knew nothing of his supposed mission. Subsequent inquiries brought little into focus. Indeed, he was only able to extract the limited strategic guidance summarized below.

- His forces, roughly 78,000 strong, consisted of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (Anzac); the British 29th Division and Royal Naval Division; and a French contingent about a division in size. Moreover, the 29th Division was to return to England as soon as they could be spared.
- His theater of operations was secondary to the Western Front. Though the Greek General Staff estimated it would take a force of 150,000 men to seize the southern part of the Gallipoli Peninsula, no more Allied forces could be spared.
- As the campaign was framed, the British Fleet was to force through the Dardanelles. Large scale land operations were only a possible contingency to enable the Fleet to accomplish its mission. Amphibious raids were authorized to assist the Fleet.
- If the Fleet was unable to force the Dardanelles, he was to land on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Otherwise, he was to control the Peninsula with minimal forces and prepare to attack Constantinople in a joint operation with the Russians.
- All military forces were to be assembled before starting any "serious" operations.
- He was to avoid risk, yet if committed he was to follow the mission through.
- Operations on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles were to be avoided to limit British liabilities.¹

Hamilton, a proven combat veteran, departed the next day for the Eastern Mediterranean, accompanied only by his undermanned and largely inexperienced General Staff. His first task was to determine what needed to be done to assist the Fleet. Remarkably, 43 days later, he would lead an amphibious assault on a scale never witnessed before. In this short time, he had organized, equipped, and trained his multinational forces for an amphibious assault against a prepared, numerically superior enemy. Hamilton attempted to orchestrate a thousand parts into one massive crescendo against a largely unknown foe. Yet, just seven months later, he would be relieved of command. Despite his numerous accomplishments, he failed to achieve his objective, forever tarnishing his reputation. What, if anything, should Hamilton have done differently during his initial planning, and what lessons can future operational planners learn from his operational art? This analysis seeks answers to these questions by examining his plan at the operational level.

The Relevance of Gallipoli. There are three reasons why Hamilton's use of operational art at Gallipoli has more relevance for us today than in the recent past. First, with the decreasing size of our military forces, there exists a greater probability that a future operational commander of the United States might have to fight a regional conflict with limited assets much like Hamilton had to do for Britain. Second, with decreasing amphibious forces as well, we no longer can overwhelm a determined enemy. Gallipoli highlights both the inherent strengths and vulnerabilities of limited amphibious forces. And third, because of the time and space factors of the era, Gallipoli represents the type of crisis response we may face in the future. The decreasing forward presence of our military forces makes this especially likely.

Strategic Background. Before we can examine Hamilton's operational art, we must review the strategic background from which it was formulated. The seeds of the Gallipoli Campaign were sown on October 31, 1914, when Turkey declared war on Great Britain. Britain's War Council, the makers of British strategy during this time, felt that the most critical theater of operations was on the Western Front primarily because defeat in this theater threatened Britain more than any other.² Nonetheless, on November 3, Britain responded to Turkey's declaration of war by having two cruisers bombard the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles, partly to determine the effective range of the Turkish guns.³ After the First Battle of Ypres, it was obvious that neither the Germans nor the French and British had sufficient strength to break through the other's

defenses on the Western Front.⁴ Consequently, other theaters of operation were in the process of being evaluated when a crisis occurred on January 2, 1915. Russia unexpectedly requested Britain to make a demonstration against Turkey as soon as possible.⁵ In addition to defending herself against the Germans, the Russians were heavily engaged with the Turks in the Caucasus. Loss of Russia was unacceptable. Without her, Britain and France had little hope of defeating Germany. For this reason, Britain quickly pledged to make a demonstration against the Turks, leaving the War Council to determine what to do and how to do it.

Crisis Assessment. The members of the War Council were in a quandary on what type of demonstration they should make. No ground forces could be spared from the Western Front, and it would be at least two months until additional ground forces could be made ready. Winston Churchill, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, used this crisis to push for a naval attack on the Dardanelles, an idea he first proposed over a month earlier. Though a long shot, he pointed out that a naval attack had the advantage of allowing Britain to honor its pledge at minimal risk. If unsuccessful, the naval forces could withdraw with minimal loss of British prestige. Maintaining prestige was critical because, without it, Britain would lose influence with the Balkan states. Churchill also pointed out that such an attack might even result in the overthrow of the Turkish government.

On January 13, with no other viable options and heightened expectations, the War Council directed a naval expedition be prepared to "...take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective."⁶ Two weeks later, the War Council began to swing towards increasing the size of the operation. They not only sought an alternative to the Western Front but desired to increase the likelihood of success. Still, Kitchener was reluctant to commit any ground forces. It was not until March 10, after the British Fleet had failed to make the progress anticipated, that Lord Kitchener finally agreed to deploy ground forces in support of the Gallipoli Campaign. Two days later he gave (what we call today) a warning order to General Hamilton. The desire of the War Council appears to have been to continue to push the naval assault of the Dardanelles while ground forces were being readied to assist.⁷


It is important to keep in mind that the Gallipoli Campaign was designed as a naval campaign. Ground forces were deployed for possible operations in support of this naval campaign.

Strategic Goals. The strategic goals Britain undertook were rather lofty when compared to the military resources allocated to achieve them. In a traditionally British fashion, the War Council was trying to win on the cheap. Britain's primary goal was to defeat Turkey, a German ally. Nevertheless, the British had many reasons to support their belief that this might be easy to achieve. First, the ruling party in Turkey, the Young Turks, had only marginal popular support. Second, many of the Turkish people revered Britain, and feared war with her. And third, Constantinople was virtually defenseless once the Dardanelles had been forced. The War Council had other strategic goals as well. Principally, they wanted to open a supply line to Russia, and because of Russia's limited railroad system, this could only be done by gaining access to Black Sea ports. Such a supply line would not only allow Russian wheat to be shipped to France and England but would allow desperately needed armaments to be shipped to Russia. Also, a Turkish defeat would help induce the Balkan states, Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania, to join the Allies. Finally, an attack at the Dardanelles would divert Turkey from attacking British controlled Egypt.

Summary of Preliminary Naval Events. The Eastern Mediterranean Fleet, consisting of British and French warships, was initially commanded by Vice Admiral Carden. RN. In response to a British Admiralty inquiry, he planned a four phase operation to force the Dardanelles that he estimated would take only a month to complete.⁸ The first phase started on 19 February 1915. Carden's intermediate objective was to destroy the guns at the entrance of the Dardanelles. As conceived, there was little room for operational maneuver, rather, Carden hoped to capitalize on the longer range of his naval gunfire, spotted by aircraft, to reduce systematically the fixed gun emplacements he expected to face. Unfortunately for Carden, the flat trajectory of naval gunfire required concealed forts to be attacked at close quarters. Poor weather and the inability of his naval gunfire to hit point targets kept Carden from successfully completing his first phase until March 1. During the next ten days, Carden unsuccessfully attempted to complete the second phase of his operation plan, clearing the coastal defenses along the Dardanelles up to the Narrows. Carden's efforts were frustrated by a number of factors; first and foremost were the mutually supporting effects of Turkish mines, mobile howitzers, and the guns of Turkish forts. His persistent attacks, however, did succeed in one thing: they alerted the Turks of a possible invasion.

Hamilton, embarked aboard the HMS *Phaeton*, arrived in theater on March 17. As Hamilton was arriving, Vice Admiral Carden was departing due to medical reasons. His replacement, Vice Admiral de Robeck, RN, was preparing for a renewed, massive effort to force the Narrows. Hamilton immediately met with the new naval commander and learned of the general situation. On the next day, Hamilton would see first hand the Fleet's determined efforts to force the Dardanelles. The British would lose three battleships to an unknown minefield (hastily emplaced by the Turks during the previous night) before de Robeck stopped his attack. He had no way of knowing that his enemy was out of mines and dangerously low of ammunition. Both Hamilton and de Robeck were convinced by the day's action that further naval attacks should wait until ground forces could be made ready to assist.

FIGURE 1
THEATER OF OPERATIONS



CHAPTER II

PREPARATIONS AND PLANS

Initial Impressions. On the morning of March 18, Hamilton examined the western side of the Gallipoli Peninsula with an eye towards a possible amphibious assault. What he learned was limited to what could be seen from the deck of the *Phaeton*. At the time, he had yet to obtain any aircraft capable of making a more thorough reconnaissance. He saw enough evidence of Turkish preparations to recognize that he faced a formidable challenge. Hearing from some naval officers that German staff officers were supervising the defenses of the Peninsula further increased his growing anxieties. After witnessing the unfortunate conclusion of de Robeck's attack, Hamilton -- impetuous in nature -- instinctively knew what needed to be done. He relayed his thoughts to Kitchener, receiving a reply on the following day. Hamilton was to land ground forces to reduce the batteries along the Narrows after carefully considering the local defenses.⁹ Under tremendous pressure to make the earliest possible landing for both political and tactical reasons, he and his general staff began planning. As with any crisis, he had to make the best of available resources. The plan, and the rationale behind the decisions made, must be examined before any operational lessons can be derived.

Desired End State. Hamilton focused primarily on his assigned mission. He let others worry about the future political actions and military operations necessary to achieve the strategic objective. He fully believed, however, that Constantinople would fall with minimal effort once the Dardanelles had been forced and therefore saw no fault with the conceived Campaign design.¹⁰

Theater of Operations. Hamilton was never formally placed in charge of his theater of operations. Instead, he became the de facto operational commander because it was in the Fleet's best interest to support him. His theater of operations can be derived from the actual operations conducted, although it was never prescribed in detail. Essentially it consisted of the Gallipoli Peninsula, the Asiatic side of Turkey and the Aegean Sea through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus (see Figure 1).

The Enemy's Critical Factors. Turkish defenses at the Narrows had stopped the Fleet from accomplishing its goal. These mutually supporting defenses consisted of mines, mobile howitzers, and the guns of Turkish forts. Hamilton believed that he needed only to neutralize the howitzer threat to enable the Fleet to push through to Constantinople. To get to the howitzers, he had to defeat the Turkish ground forces protecting them. He recognized that his enemy had two lines of communication: the primary being the Sea of Marmara, and the other being the secondary roads that ran down the length of the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Operational Intelligence. Hamilton's initial intelligence information was limited to official, outdated handbooks of Gallipoli, the outline of a Greek attack plan for the Dardanelles, and visual observations made by the Fleet.¹¹ Other than authorizing more seaborne reconnaissance missions and obtaining an organic aerial reconnaissance capability, he did little else to improve his intelligence information. At first, Turkish strength was estimated at 40,000 to 80,000 soldiers on the Gallipoli Peninsula with the ability to reinforce with as many as 60,000 more soldiers in short notice. Another 30,000 Turk soldiers were believed to be on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles.¹² Before the landing, new estimates reduced the number of Turks on the Peninsula to 34,000. The soldiers of the MEF generally had a low regard for the fighting qualities of the Turks. Hamilton also expected the Turks to retreat when faced by a determined offensive assault. Historians have often criticized Hamilton's intelligence estimates. Though he did misjudge the actual disposition (he thought more Turks were along the beach), his later estimates of enemy strength were fairly close.¹³

Operational Objective. Hamilton selected the Kilid plateau, located on the Gallipoli Peninsula at the neck of the Narrows, as his objective. He felt that if he could dominate this terrain and cause the withdrawal or destruction of the Turkish mobile howitzers, the Fleet would be able to force the Narrows. In the overall Campaign plan, the Kilid plateau was nothing more than an intermediate tactical objective that would allow the Fleet to achieve its operational objective of getting through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmara.

Net Assessment. Determined to succeed, Hamilton hoped to capitalize on the few advantages he enjoyed, the largest of which was sea control. It gave him relative mobility; it allowed him to pick the time and place of his operation; and it forced the Turks to prepare for landings along their entire coastline. Hamilton had two significant weaknesses to overcome. First, he had to organize and train his forces for amphibious landings,

and this meant he had to spend time developing, from scratch, the necessary techniques and procedures. Time to organize was limited. Each day the Turks further improved their coastal defenses, all now under the expert supervision of the German General Liman von Sanders. Second, he knew his finite force could ill afford a prolonged conflict with a continental power. His force would have to strike with such speed and mass as to overwhelm the local Turkish defenses.¹⁴ For Hamilton, there could be no half measures.

Hamilton knew he faced long odds, yet he was reluctant to ask Kitchener for additional forces. Kitchener was known to have taken away troops from subordinates who had asked for reinforcements. With this in mind, Hamilton couched his requests with subtle innuendoes. Kitchener's response netted little for the MEF. He sent a British division to Egypt, available in case of emergency. He also sent a telegram (never seen by Hamilton) to General Maxwell, CINC Forces in Egypt, directing him to supply Hamilton any troops he could spare. Maxwell, who disapproved of the Gallipoli Campaign, chose to ignore the telegram.¹⁵

Courses of Action Development. To achieve his military objective, Hamilton seriously considered four courses of action. The first was an amphibious assault in the Gulf of Saros, north of his objective. As Hamilton felt (incorrectly) that such a landing would not be seriously opposed, this course of action offered the possibility of getting all his forces ashore simultaneously because of the large number of suitable landing sites. This option was rejected for a number of reasons. First, he would be unable to use his naval gunfire effectively once his forces moved inland. Second, he would face the enemy on two fronts, defending against Turk reinforcements from the north while conducting offensive operations southward down the Peninsula against a Turkish army still able to receive supplies via the Sea of Marmara. Last, he lacked the pack transport necessary to maintain his own lines of communications.¹⁶

The second course of action considered was an amphibious assault on the Asiatic shore. As Hamilton stated, "The attractive part of his idea is that if we did this the Turks must withdraw most of their mobile artillery from the Peninsula to meet us, which would give the Fleet just the opportunity they require for mine-sweeping and so force the Narrows forthwith."¹⁷ Hamilton rejected this course of action primarily because the British could not effectively fire across the Dardanelles against the Turkish guns located on the higher elevated Kilid Bahr plateau. There were other problems as well, the difficulties that he would have in

traversing the terrain and protecting his southern flank to name two.¹⁸ Ultimately, this course of action lacked the means to ensure that the Turks would be compelled to move their howitzers, and unless this happened, the Campaign would fail.

The third course of action considered was a landing at Sulva Bay. Hamilton later rejected this option when he learned that the salt lake bed immediately inland was presently filled with water and therefore impassable.¹⁹

The fourth course of action, the one eventually adopted by Hamilton, was an amphibious assault upon the southern half of the Gallipoli Peninsula.²⁰ This option did offer a number of advantages: it provided the most direct route to the objective; he could dominate by fire the Turkish guns on the Asiatic side once the Kilid Bahr plateau was seized; and he could fully bring to bear his most vital asset, naval gunfire. The main disadvantages were the limited beaches and lack of maneuver space. The mine threat precluded any thought of using beaches inside the Dardanelles.

Operational Idea Seizing his objective and forcing the Dardanelles before the Turks could react was the essence of Hamilton's operational idea. First he needed to prepare his disorganized forces that were assembling, so he directed most to Egypt. There they would organize and train for the forthcoming amphibious assault. Planning for operational momentum was more problematic. As Hamilton stated:

I would like to land my whole force in one -- like a hammer stroke -- with fullest violence of its mass effect -- as close as I can to my objective, the Kilid Bahr plateau. But, apart from my lack of small craft, the thing cannot be done; the beach space is so cramped that men and their stores could not be put ashore. I have to separate my forces and the effect of momentum, which cannot be achieved by cohesion, must be reproduced by the simultaneous nature of the movement.²¹

Even by using all the suitable beaches along Cape Helles for his main attack, Hamilton dared not land more than a division, to do so would result in over-congesting the beachhead. With the size of his main attack thus limited, he logically looked for ways of using his remaining forces to support the main attack. The concept of operations that he finally developed took firm root from his operational idea.

Concept of Operations. Hamilton selected the 29th Division, his most experienced unit, to make the main attack. Landing on five small beaches along Cape Helles, they were to move inland to seize the dominant heights of Achi Baba, six miles inland. From there, the 29th Division would be in a good position to launch offensive operations on the main objective, the Kilid Bahr plateau. Hamilton thought this attack would succeed because the Turks had constructed few trenches between the beach and the assigned objective; the Turks had recently proven to be poor fighters in open warfare; and without trenches, the Turks should be easy prey for the MEF's 200 naval guns. Hamilton decided to have the Anzac (equivalent of two divisions) land on a small beach near Gaba Tepe, located thirteen miles north from the tip of the Peninsula, to envelop and isolate the Turk forces defending between Kilid Bahr and Cape Helles. This supporting attack was to move rapidly inland to seize the objective of Mal Tepe, a hill immediately north of the primary objective.²² Hamilton pointed out to the commander of the Anzac force, General Birdwood, that if he took Mal Tepe, the entire operation was certain to succeed because he would be in an excellent position to block any Turkish reinforcements from engaging the main attack. Hamilton hoped the supporting attack would divert attention from the main attack and disrupt Turkish lines of communication.

Besides getting the ground forces ashore, the fleet was expected to assist in three ways. First, they were to conduct preliminary bombardment on Turkish positions.²³ Second, a cruiser squadron, reinforced with four battleships, was tasked to provide naval gunfire support for the main attack. Hamilton saw naval gunfire as a force multiplier that would allow him to beat a numerically superior enemy. Third, remaining Fleet assets were expected to begin a renewed assault on the Narrows on the day after the initial landings.²⁴ Hamilton still had two units yet to commit. As will be shown, he planned to use these units to support the main attack indirectly.

Operational Fires and Isolation of the Objective. The technology of the era made operational fires impossible. The MEF had only five serviceable aircraft, mostly used for reconnaissance and gunfire spotting.²⁵ Nonetheless, Hamilton realized the importance of isolating his objective area. He attempted to accomplish this by pushing for submarines to interdict the Turkish sea lines of communication, and by directing a French brigade to conduct an amphibious raid at Kum Kale. The French landing was designed to eliminate the gunfire

eat from the Asiatic side to the 29th Division's southernmost landing beaches. This raid was also designed to keep Turkish units on the Asiatic side from being used as reinforcements against main attack.

Operational Deception. Hamilton felt his chances of making a "victorious landing" hinged on upsetting the equilibrium of Liman von Sanders. Hamilton wanted to keep him from concentrating his forces until the success of main landings was assured. Therefore, he added two more parts to his concept of operations. First, the Royal Naval Division would make an amphibious demonstration north at Bulair to fix the Turkish forces deployed in this area. Second, the remainder of the French contingent would also make an amphibious demonstration at Besika Bay to fool the Turks temporarily into thinking that the main attack might be on the Asiatic side. Hamilton's goal was to keep von Sanders so confused that he would be unable to react effectively for 48 hours.²⁶ Hamilton planned to use both the French contingent and the Royal Naval Division to reinforce the main attack upon completion of their deception missions.

Culminating Point. With his longer lines of communication, virtually no reserves, and limited ammunition, Hamilton was well aware of his culminating point. If his advance towards the Kilid Bahr plateau stalled or was protracted for any reason, the Turks would have the time to reinforce. He consciously gambled that he could seize his objective before reaching his culminating point.

Operational Coordination / Synchronization. Synchronization was necessary for Hamilton to realize his operational idea. Limited by the number of landing craft, he wanted to land as much combat force as possible at night. Obdurate to Hamilton's arguments, the Fleet insisted on daylight landings for the main attack because they feared uncharted rocks and unknown offshore currents. Compromising, Hamilton planned to land his primary waves simultaneously an hour after daybreak. Only the Anzac covering forces were to be landed before dawn; if lucky, they might draw some local defenders away from the main attack. Hamilton's staff worked out what was to be landed and in what order, and Fleet planners worked out the detailed sequencing of shipping to ensure the MEF landed at the desired beach at the desired time. Final plans were not completed until a few days before the actual landing. The movement and preparations for over 200 ships had to be coordinated. Just completing the embarkation of these ships was a monumental accomplishment, straining the limited port facilities at Alexandria. To ensure synchronization, advance assembly points were

selected. Most ships were assembled at the port of Mudros, but due to space limitations, most of the ships dedicated to the Royal Naval Division and the French contingent had to assemble off Skyros at Trebuki Bay. So numerous were the number of ships, however, that still others had to assemble at Tenedos and Imbros as well. Because the first ships had to begin movement 36 hours before the designated landing time, the MEF had to have several days of good weather for proper execution. The poor communication technology of the era and the dispersion of Hamilton's forces complicated coordination.²⁷

As stated, naval gunfire was considered critical to success. The plan required spotters to use visual signals to request fire missions until wireless stations could be established. Small detachments were established to relay signals. Aircraft, if available, were to assist in relaying fire missions. To eliminate confusion, preplanned targets were designated. Also, the operating area was divided into areas of responsibility with a naval gun ship dedicated to support each area. Hamilton hoped that all these arrangements would greatly enhance coordination.²⁸

Operational Sustainment. Though the relatively long lines of communication were worrisome, it was the shortage of landing craft that was the biggest obstacle to sustainment. Hamilton decided combat operations would be given top priority of landing craft. The plan called for all ranks to carry rations for three days. Additionally, rations for seven days and extra ammunition were also to be landed on the first day.²⁹ Special detachments were established to supervise the unloading at each beach. The plan demanded careful detail. For example, two units that were to fight side by side sometimes required different ammunition because they were armed with different weapons.³⁰ Another critical issue was how many transports to use for medical evacuations. Hamilton, wanting to avoid a possible bottleneck, arranged to have field ambulances land in the first wave. The problem was if too many wounded from the beach were transported, the combat forces would have to do without supplies; if too few were transported, the beach would become congested, restricting the movement of supplies. Water was yet another concern. Hamilton's staff worked on this potential problem as well because it was not known if water was available on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Careful precautions were made to avoid an initial shortage³¹ Hamilton also lacked ammunition for a prolonged operation. Since his theater was deemed as secondary, he could do little to improve his ammunition situation.


Command Relationships. Hamilton tried to make the best of a less than optimal command structure. He and de Robeck were coequals, accountable directly to the War Council. Hamilton, seeing cooperation as the key, worked to foster it. He saw himself working directly for his old commander, the ever-dominant Kitchener. The desire not to disappoint Kitchener so obsessed Hamilton that he frequently hid many of his private doubts and anxieties. Extremely loyal, he refused to communicate to anyone but Kitchener. There were four commanding generals that worked directly for Hamilton: Lieutenant General Birdwood (Anzac forces), Major General Hunter-Weston (29th Division), Major General Paris (Royal Naval Division), and General de Division d'Amade (French contingent). Hamilton saw himself as a consensus builder, not an authoritarian. He sought to persuade rather than direct. He considered all sides of an issue before making a final decision. He used enthusiasm to rally support – often interpreted by some of his more senior commanders as wishful thinking.³² Hamilton's command philosophy, based on his experience as a junior officer, was not to interfere once the battle was joined.³³ He believed that subordinates had staffs to complete detailed planning. As was common for the time, he saw his role as developing the scheme, assigning the missions, and providing combat assets necessary for his subordinates to succeed.

Staff Planning. During the First World War, British CINC's had two staffs to assist them: a General Staff, responsible for operational planning; and an Administrative Staff, responsible for support planning. Until April 1, Hamilton only had an undermanned General Staff to perform all the planning. With little detailed information, and required to make rapid decisions, the members of his overburdened General Staff had to make many assumptions.³⁴ When the Administrative Staff arrived, Hamilton thought they were too late to help much. Instead of incorporating them into the ongoing planning, he ostracized them, leaving them to their own devices.³⁵

Alternative Plans. Just prior to the actual landings, Hamilton had prepared his only alternative plan, entitled "Suggested Action in event of Failure." This plan was a general outline of how forces would be withdrawn if one or more of the landings failed. As Hamilton believed that if the landings were stopped at the beach any hope of victory would be lost, this plan mentioned no alternative offensive operations.³⁶

Summary. Though risky, the overall plan was daring and imaginative. It reflected Hamilton's belief that the main difficulty would be getting his forces ashore safely. It depended on confusing the enemy long enough to defeat the local defenders with overwhelming force. It depended on seizing the objectives rapidly, and this, in turn, depended on the drive and leadership of Hamilton's commanders. And finally, it depended on the full support of the Fleet.

FIGURE 2
AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA



CHAPTER III

THE PLAN IN EXECUTION

Introduction. As an operational artist, Hamilton had four major shortcomings that became evident as his plan unfolded. First, he assumed his General Staff and all his commanders were capable, knew his intent, and would therefore do everything possible to achieve it. As a result, he did a poor job supervising in spite of having many reasons to question his assumptions. Second, because he felt he had to succeed, he inadequately considered what he would do if he did not. Virtually no useful contingency plans were developed. Third, he over-estimated his capabilities in relation to the Turks'. And fourth, he tended to be more concerned with not upsetting Kitchener than accomplishing his mission. These shortcomings, together with a determined adversary, kept Hamilton from realizing his operational idea. Parts of his plan worked as envisioned, but it was things that went wrong during the execution that would clearly reveal how these shortcomings weakened his plan.

Execution. Operationally, when the weather failed to cooperate -- one mischance planned for -- Hamilton simply delayed the departure from his naval assembly points until the poor weather abated. On April 23, two days later than scheduled, his powerful armada began its calculated movement towards the Gallipoli Peninsula. By embarking aboard HMS *Queen Elizabeth*, a ship with poor signaling equipment, Hamilton knew he would have difficulty monitoring the situation ashore, but he felt this was less important than being collocated with Vice Admiral de Robeck.

The Anzac landings immediately deviated from the plan. Not only had the covering force landed at the wrong beach, but they also had the misfortune of engaging the most driven and capable division commander in the Turkish army, Mustafa Kemal.

The Anzac covering force made the first landing upon the Peninsula just before dawn on April 25, in three successive waves. According to Birdwood's orders, the covering force "... should keep in mind the advantage of landing on a broad front and the necessity for occupying as rapidly as possible the ... objective."³⁷

For reasons still debated, they landed tightly grouped about a mile north of the intended landing site, Ari Burnu. Despite being thrown into disarray from their unexpected placement, those landing on the southern portion of the landing site carried out Hamilton's desire by moving immediately inland, albeit in a disorganized fashion. Those on the northern portion found their way blocked by the steep cliffs along the beach. Their initial achievements, however, looked promising. The defending Turks, after offering some resistance, had retreated and Anzac had advanced almost a mile inland. By 10:00 a.m., the tide turned in favor of the Turks.

Kemal moved his entire division, instead of the battalion ordered by his superior, towards the dominant high ground, Chunuk Bair. From there, he halted the Anzac advance. Meanwhile, the congestion on the small beachhead increased, causing confusion and delaying follow-on waves. Kemal launched a savage counterattack that drove back the numerically superior, but thoroughly disorganized, Anzac later in the afternoon. More devastating, he gained control of the most advantageous terrain. That evening, with his beach covered with wounded and dead, Birdwood asked to withdraw. Hamilton, awoken from his slumber and without a contingency plan, lamely reacted by telling Birdwood to dig his forces in. Hamilton hoped that the Anzac would threaten the Turks enough to keep them from concentrating against his main attack, a goal the Anzac would achieve.


The entire Anzac was ashore by noon the next day. Hamilton waited two days to reinforce their position with detachments from the Royal Naval Division. Chance and friction, always elements in war, had worked decidedly against Hamilton's supporting attack.

Hamilton's deception plan worked exactly as envisioned. The simultaneous landings overwhelmed Liman von Sanders' ability to respond, even though he received accurate reports. He nevertheless saw the demonstration by the Royal Naval Division as his biggest threat. Though he sent five battalions south to reinforce shortly after learning of the landings at Cape Helles, it would take another day before he began sending the bulk of his forces.³⁸ Turkish reinforcements on the Asiatic side would not move for four days as a result of the French amphibious raid and demonstration.³⁹ Hamilton achieved his goal of obtaining 48 hours for his main attack, because his demonstrations were conducted at the two places that von Sanders expected the main attack to land. Much of this success can be attributed to Hamilton's instinctive understanding of the

inherent advantages of amphibious forces. Having mobility on the sea, amphibious forces require an adversary to defend against all possible landing points. Through deception, he gained the window of opportunity necessary for his scheme to work.

More than anything else, the failure of the main attack to gain any momentum during the first two days of the operation doomed Hamilton's plan. Much of the blame for this failure belongs to the division commander. The antithesis of Hamilton, the commander of the 29th Division, Weston-Hunter, had a one dimensional, unimaginative approach to problem solving, and he would soon prove unable of handling the complexities of five different beach heads (designated "S, V, W, X, and Y" -- See Figure 3). Instead of following Hamilton's intent of using all five beaches to overwhelm the Turks like flowing water, Weston-Hunter desired a more "set piece" scheme of maneuver. He therefore divided and assigned his covering force to land on the center three beaches. After landing, they were to link together and then push forward. The forces landing on the outside beaches were to defend the flanks until joined by the advancing covering force.⁴⁰ Hamilton had wanted these forces to attack, not to defend, thereby enveloping the Turks defending against the center beaches.⁴¹ Weston-Hunter's alter scheme would prove fatal.

FIGURE 3
THE GALLIPOLI LANDING



The British landing on "S" beach, located on the east side of Morto Bay, drove back the defending Turks. Casualties were light. Naval gunfire decisively suppressed the Turkish defensive positions, easily discernible from the sea. After seizing the local high ground, the commander prepared positions to defend against possible counterattack and to protect the covering force's flank. Weston-Hunter, duly informed, signaled his approval.⁴²

The British landing on "V" beach, at Sedd El Bahr, met with disaster. Naval guns fired an hour long preliminary bombardment and then stopped. Landing craft, along with a merchant ship, converted to land troops, then began moving slowly together towards the beach. Turkish defenders, who had withdrawn from their positions because of the naval bombardment, returned to deliver lethal fire on the landing British. Only a few soldiers got safely ashore to find protection behind a small escarpment. The British suffered hundreds of casualties and hundreds more remained trapped aboard the merchant ship. Weston-Hunter, completely unaware of the situation, sent a second wave in, only to get even more badly mauled. Naval gunfire could not assist because of the proximity of the friendly soldiers. That night, using the cover of darkness, the British finally unloaded the merchant ship and overran the Turkish defenders.⁴³ A breakout could have happened earlier if British soldiers, idle at "S" beach a mile away, had been sent to envelop the defenders at "V" beach. Neither Weston-Hunter nor Hamilton thought to do this.

The British landings at "W" and "X" beaches occurred in daylight after a preliminary naval bombardment. The forces landing at "W" beach, located near Cape Helles, found themselves in a fire sack. Naval bombardment, with its flat trajectory, proved ineffective against the Turkish positions located north on high ground. Through heroic action, the British finally gained a toehold. The Turk defenses (two companies), inaccurate maps, and death of the British commander caused great confusion. Meanwhile, the forces landing at "X" beach, a mile north of Cape Helles, met little resistance and began moving south to join with those on "W" beach. They were soon stopped by the same Turks firing on "W" beach. The British attack eventually succeeded early that evening.

The British landing at "Y" beach, located 4 miles up the coast from Cape Helles, met no resistance and climbed to the top of the adjacent cliffs. Confused over vague orders and questions concerning who was

actually in command, these forces failed to attack or even to prepare defensive positions. This area was so void of defenders, one officer walked two miles inland without seeing a single Turk. Witnessing most of the events on "Y" beach, Hamilton asked Weston-Hunter if he wanted to land additional forces there. Hamilton's conception of command kept him from doing more.⁴⁴ Preoccupied, Weston-Hunter replied that he did not want to disrupt his previous plans.⁴⁵ That night the Turks finally arrived and continuously attacked until sunrise. Not having received any word from Weston-Hunter for over 39 hours (he was too busy focusing on his covering forces to reply), the British started an unauthorized evacuation. Ironically, Hamilton had finally decided to send reinforcements. Discovering this evacuation, however, he elected to abandon "Y" beach altogether, thus forfeiting one of his best chances for success.⁴⁶

In summary of the main attack, three of the five landings met little resistance. In fact, only two Turkish battalions and one company of engineers stood between Cape Helles and Achi Baba.⁴⁷ The division probably would have achieved their assigned objective if only they had understood Hamilton's operational idea. Opportunities were squandered due to lack of direction. For example, when the British covering force eventually broke through the initial defenses that night, they paused. The Turks were, at the time, in complete disarray.⁴⁸ Weston-Hunter's commanders wanted to prepare for a counterattack instead of seizing valuable terrain while the Allies still outnumbered the Turks.⁴⁹ Hamilton failed to intervene because he assumed Weston-Hunter had a better appreciation of the situation, and assumed he understood what to do. Hamilton assumed too much. As a result, the single most critical breakdown in Hamilton's operational art occurred.

The submarine sent to raid the Turkish sea line of communications could not get through the straits. Consequently, an important part of Hamilton's plan never materialized. When von Sanders sent his remaining forces from Bulair by sea to reinforce the southern beaches, there was no submarine to isolate the battlefield from Turkish reinforcements. Hamilton could have pushed for renewed submarine attempts but did not. This lack of action suggests Hamilton failed to keep focused on his operational idea.

Another part of the plan that failed to occur was the Fleet's renewed attack on the Narrows. Hamilton thought this should occur shortly after the initial landings. Admiral de Robeck, however, decided that his ships would not attack until Hamilton achieved his objective.⁵⁰ Moreover, the Fleet reduced its support in response

to reports of German submarines.⁵¹ Though critical to his scheme, Hamilton let de Robeck have his way without even an argument — particularly surprising considering they were collocated. Hamilton had become too preoccupied with other calamities to push his operational idea.

The landing of the French brigade at Kum Kale initially went as planned. Though all the objectives were obtained, they had to withdraw 24 hours earlier than planned. This requirement diverted Hamilton's attention from the area of his primary concern, the Peninsula.

Summary of Subsequent Operations. No thanks to Hamilton's self imposed ignorance and inactivity, a foothold was gained on the Peninsula. The Allies fought bravely and with determination in later operations, slowly increasing their gains and linking the units of the 29th Division. By the third day, however, it was too late. Von Sanders had arrived with substantial reinforcements. As Hamilton knew, he had reached his culminating point. The Allies simply could not reinforce as rapidly as the Turks.

The Plan's Weaknesses. The weaknesses of the plan can be tied to Hamilton's shortcomings as an operational artist. **The first shortcoming**, Hamilton's unwillingness to supervise, both during the planning and execution phases, denied him the one mechanism for determining how well his plan was being implemented. Without supervision, he could not reassess — something an operational commander must continually do if he is to optimize his plan. Also, for operational art, a commander must consider not only the capabilities of each of his units but the leadership abilities of each unit's commander as well. Both affect combat power. For example, if Hamilton had considered the leadership of his commanders, he might have given the main attack to the more offensive minded Birdwood. Instead, Weston-Hunter was given a task beyond his ability. Hamilton needed only to listen to his own misgivings or have read Weston-Hunter's published orders (that concentrated almost exclusively on the landing operations) to realize that Weston-Hunter did not adequately understand how important moving immediately inland was to the overall scheme. His unwillingness to accomplish this by leaving enemy resistance in his rear areas gave the Turks time to reinforce. Perhaps more significantly, it gave the Turks the confidence that they might succeed.

Related to supervision, Hamilton's decision to position himself aboard the *Queen Elizabeth* denied him the ability to monitor the actions ashore. As he stated, "No order is to be issued until I get reports and

requests."⁵² While his command philosophy is to be admired, an operational commander must intercede when things go clearly wrong. Even from the *Queen Elizabeth*, Hamilton could tell that the landings along Cape Helles were being bungled. He knew the potential of the successful landing at "Y" beach yet failed to do anything to exploit this temporary success until the next day. In contrast to Hamilton, von Sanders was able to respond quickly by maintaining closer contact with his front lines.

Hamilton could have better judged the MEF's readiness by conducting a large scale rehearsal. A rehearsal would also have provided a way for all participants to learn Hamilton's operational scheme, and many of the problems experienced could have been avoided.

Another mistake related to supervision was the failure of Fleet to shape the battle area. Hamilton assumed the navy would soften Turkish positions while his forces prepared in Egypt. In fact, de Robeck had changed his mind, electing not to risk any of his valuable battleships. Worst than doing nothing, the Fleet continued making observations along the coast, thereby warning the Turks of an eminent attack. If Hamilton had monitored the Fleet's activities more closely, this mistake could have been avoided as well.

A second shortcoming, Hamilton failed to develop contingency plans. He did not consider the "what ifs?" necessary for an operational commander to be responsive. For example, if the Anzac could have been reinforced early, they might have been able to seize Chunuk Bair. Hamilton, however, had not established any provisions for landing subsequent waves on those beaches lightly opposed.⁵³ Without contingency plans, he had no way of taking advantage of any unexpected operational momentum he might achieve. Also, if he had thought about how he was going to enact contingency plans, he most certainly would have been compelled to examine his command and control plans more closely. As it was, command and control became impossible as signaling equipment began to fail upon first contact with the enemy.⁵⁴ Therefore, changing the scheme would have been difficult even if Hamilton was inclined to do so. An operational commander must do more than set his operational idea in motion. He must be able to respond effectively when things go wrong. When they did for Hamilton, he retreated into a catatonic state of disbelief. Though some modifications to the plan were made, most were minor, obvious, and inconsequential.

A third shortcoming, Hamilton overestimated his capabilities in relation to the Turks. As a result, he focused too much on executing the landings and not enough on subsequent operations ashore, diluting his operational idea. He also failed to establish any meaningful reserve force, necessary if flexible response options were to be maintained. In other words, overestimation led to problems of improper apportionment. Additionally, Hamilton's overconfidence led to the neglect of his administrative staff, a decision that would precipitate cataclysmic consequences because inadequate plans were made for sustainment and other combat service support. Gallipoli was far too complex of an operation for one individual to handle all the details. Lastly, he never felt compelled to improve his intelligence information. Many of the problems experienced could have been avoided with better intelligence collection and dissemination.

In a somewhat separate category, but nonetheless indicative of Hamilton's overconfidence, tactical objectives were assigned that were too ambitious. In retrospect, the Anzac might have been more successful if Hamilton had assigned a more realistic objective. For example, if Chunuk Bair or Sari Bair Ridge was assigned as a minimal tactical objective, Birdwood might have been able to more effectively concentrated his forces to seize this dominant terrain before the Turks could have reacted. Though control of Mal Tepe, the assigned objective, was more advantageous, the chances of seizing a minimal objective were significantly better.

A fourth shortcoming, Hamilton's concern with not upsetting Kitchener created problems, the largest being his unwillingness to keep his superior adequately advised of the risks. If he had, Kitchener would likely have either authorized additional forces or have called off the entire operation. Hamilton also inadequately addressed his reservations about the lack of unity of command. An operational commander can ill afford to be a "yes man." Unsound political decisions were made because Kitchener – and in turn, the War Council – had an incomplete appreciation for the actual situation. Hamilton would have been better served by providing Kitchener a frank, unbiased appraisal. Misleading information can prove disastrous. Sound political and military decisions require accurate information.

Because of his shortcomings as a commander, Hamilton had failed to achieve the operational art he sought. The tragic result would be many long months of fruitless stalemate.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNED

Conclusion. Hamilton responded to a crisis with limited assets by developing a well-conceived plan for amphibious operations. Despite those strategic and tactical mistakes beyond his control, Hamilton had within his power the ability to accomplish his assigned mission, but it would have required near flawless application of operational art. Unfortunately for him, he let his own shortcomings as a commander keep an excellent operational idea from being properly implemented. He had neither the time nor the forces to afford such shortcomings.

Operational commanders must do everything in their ability to achieve results. As no set formulas for operational art exist -- for each operation is unique -- an operational commander must realistically judge both the potential benefits and risks of contemplated military operations. He must then select a course of action and do everything in his power to increase the chances of success.

Lessons for Future Operational Planners. We can learn from Hamilton's performance at Gallipoli. The most important lessons come from Hamilton's shortcomings as an operational commander. First, an operational commander must take the necessary steps to ensure through supervision that all subordinates understand his operational idea (commander's intent) as early in the planning process as possible. Second, meaningful contingency plans are an important element of any plan. Third, an operational commander must never underestimate his enemy. Last, the chain of command requires realistic, frank appraisals to make sound political decisions. Understanding these four lessons will help future operational commanders and planners better achieve operational art.

Hamilton's failed plan has even more relevance for us today. Our recent reductions in military resources increases the likelihood that we may have to fight with similar limitations experienced by Hamilton. Gallipoli offers some keen insights on how we might fight in the future.

Fighting with Limited Resources. The Gallipoli Campaign demonstrated that operational art depends on optimizing the limited resources available. From Hamilton's difficulties in maximizing his combat potential, the following lessons emerge.

- A realistic appraisal of the capabilities and potential of both friendly and enemy forces must be made.
- Deception is a force multiplier, but the operational commander should be prepared to react if the desired results are not achieved.
- Available force should be massed into one synchronized and fully coordinated attack.
- Reserve forces add flexibility and robustness to any operational plan. They should not be neglected when resources are tight.
- Unity of command is far more effective than cooperating commanders. Operational commanders must insist and ensure unity of command at all levels.
- When tasking units, an operational commander must consider not only each unit's capabilities, but the leadership abilities of each unit's commander as well.
- A good operational idea is the foundation of success.
- Once made, a plan must be continually reassessed (even through its execution).
- An operational commander must intervene if events go clearly wrong.
- Minimum tactical objectives should be assigned.
- Rehearsals provide an excellent way to measure combat readiness and to familiarize subordinates of their roles in the overall operational scheme.

Optimizing Limited Amphibious Forces. Amphibious forces give the operational commander tremendous flexibility. Hamilton discovered that if they are improperly employed, they can also become a tremendous liability. Gallipoli provides the following lessons for using limited amphibious forces.

- An amphibious operation should be a means to an end, not an end unto itself.
- Amphibious operations should be high in tempo; victory goes to side that builds up combat power fastest, everything else being equal.
- Isolating the battlefield with operational fires is even more critical for amphibious operations.
- Amphibious forces should not be committed before an exit plan is developed.
- By their inherent mobility, amphibious forces lend themselves to operational deception. Amphibious demonstrations and feints work best when conducted off beaches where the enemy expects the main landing to occur.

- Amphibious forces are extremely vulnerable during the landing phase. As such, an operational commander should always seek ways to land amphibious forces against minimal enemy opposition.
- Advance staging areas help synchronize amphibious landings.

Crisis Response Planning. Hamilton used a process similar to what we prescribe today for crisis planning. The Gallipoli operation demonstrated the difficulties that can be experienced by compressed planning time. The following lessons can be drawn from Hamilton's rapid planning.

- An adequate operational plan decided early is better than a superb operational plan decided late. An operational commander must give subordinates time to develop their own plans. Intent must be known by all.
- The operation plan must be flexible enough to react to changing enemy situations. Contingency plans should be developed concurrently with the primary plan.
- Staffs must be brought into the planning process early for detailed planning to be completed. Towards this end, standing staffs are better than new ones thrown together ad hoc.
- Logistic considerations must be weighed when selecting a course of action. High operational tempo is not possible without adequate sustainment.
- Intelligence collection efforts must begin early and the results quickly disseminated.
- Good command and control are essential, especially when planning time has been limited, because they give a plan inherent flexibility.

Final Remarks. At Gallipoli, Hamilton developed a sound operational scheme, but failed to take the necessary steps to ensure that it was properly implemented. As a result, he did not achieve the operational art he sought. Gallipoli, a story of missed opportunities, plainly demonstrates that operational art is more than a conceptual plan. Operational art is also about ensuring your forces are both ready and capable to execute that plan.

NOTES

Chapter I -- INTRODUCTION AND STRATEGIC BACKGROUND

¹ General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., Gallipoli Diary, (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1920), v. 1., pp. 2-10.

² Great Britain, Dardanelles Commission, Final Report, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1917), p. 6.

³ Great Britain, Dardanelles Commission, First Report & Supplemental, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1917), p. 14.

⁴ Ibid., p. 19.

⁵ Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell, K.C.B., The Dardanelles, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924), p. 7

⁶ Dardanelles Commission, First Report & Supplemental, p. 21.

⁷ Ibid., p. 18.

⁸ Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli, (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1956), pp. 38-39.

Chapter II -- PREPARATIONS AND PLANS

⁹ Dardanelles Commission, Final Report, p. 98.

¹⁰ Hamilton, v. 1, p. 115.

¹¹ Dardanelles Commission, Final Report, p. 10.

¹² C. F. Aspinall - Oglander, Official History of the War: Military Operations Gallipoli, (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1929), v. 1, p. 111.

¹³ Von Sanders, whose account is biased towards portraying himself as a superb commander, states 60,000 Turks opposed the MEF's landings. Based on the distribution of his forces, about 30,000 Turk soldiers were defending on the Gallipoli peninsula when the MEF landed. Liman von Sanders, General of the Cavalry, Five Years in Turkey, (Annapolis: The United States Naval Institute, 1927), p. 64.

¹⁴ Hamilton, v. 1, p. 47.

¹⁵ Robert Rhodes James, Gallipoli, (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1965), p. 83.

¹⁶ Hamilton, v. 1, pp. 86-88.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁸ Aspinall - Oglander, v. 1, p. 112.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 113.

²⁰ Dardanelles Commission, Final Report, pp. 98-99.

²¹ Hamilton, v. 1, p. 96.

²² Moorehead, pp. 120-121.

²³ James, p. 84.

²⁴ Aspinall - Oglander, v. 1, p. 136.

²⁵ Hamilton, v. 1, p. 110.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 99.

²⁷ Aspinall - Oglander, v. 1, pp. 144-147.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 147.

²⁹ Dardanelles Commission, Final Report, p. 100.

³⁰ Aspinall - Oglander, v. 1, p. 121.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 144-147.

³² James, pp. 81-82.

³³ Ibid., p. 121.

³⁴ Moorehead, p. 119.

³⁵ James, p. 87.

³⁶ Aspinall - Oglander, v. 1, p. 150.

Chapter III -- THE PLAN IN EXECUTION

³⁷ General Birdwood's Instructions to G.O.C. 1st Australian Division, contained in Aspinall - Oglander, Maps and Appendixes, p. 42.

³⁸ Von Sanders, pp. 66-67.

³⁹ Aspinall - Oglander, v. 1, p. 264.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 216-237. Though Aspinall - Oglander does not specifically state that Weston-Hunter changed Hamilton's scheme (his work is short of criticism), this fact can be readily deduced from reading his account.

⁴¹ Hamilton, v. 1, pp. 96-97.

⁴² Henry W. Nevinston, The Dardanelles Campaign, (London: Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1918), pp. 91-92.

⁴³ Moorehead, Gallipoli, pp. 141-145.

⁴⁴ Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. 138.

⁴⁵ John North, Gallipoli: The Fading Vision, (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1936), p. 277.

⁴⁶ James, pp. 133-135.

⁴⁷ Aspinall - Oglander, v. 1, p. 221.

⁴⁸ Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli, p. 149.

⁴⁹ Aspinall - Oglander, v. 1, pp. 221-222.

⁵⁰ James, p. 185.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 202-203.

⁵² Hamilton, v. 1, p. 141.

⁵³ North, p. 136.

⁵⁴ Moorehead, p. 129.

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